# "From radical revolution to pragmatic moderation."

What drives anti-system moderation in former rebel parties?

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Abstract

A growing literature researches how former rebel parties (FRPs), or parties with a past as insurgency groups adjust to being part of formal political systems. Yet, little has been written about FRPs more generally, or the causal mechanisms driving FRP adjustment. This thesis tries to remedy these knowledge gaps.

The thesis constructs a new concept "anti-system moderation", to measure how and whether FRPs change the anti-system elements of ideology, behaviour, and violence to fit with the norms of the formal political system. The concept basis its logic on the study of anti-democratic moderation, used to study radical Islamic parties. The concept of anti-system moderation forms part of a broader analytical framework hypothesising causal mechanisms and causal relationships between independent variables and changes in rebels anti-system characteristic. The thesis tests the framework in a medium-N analysis of 10 cases, inspired by systemic review, in which 13 previously published studies of FRPs are used as the data for analysis. These 13 studies are coded to fit with the framework. The cross-case patterns among the 10 FRPs analysed form the basis for conclusions.

The analysis finds that anti-system moderation and its operationalization has empirical validity in the 10 cases analysed. It also finds that participation in formal political systems cause former rebel parties to adjust to system norm. The results suggest that anti-system moderation is driven by a causal cost/benefit mechanism, and that FRPs will moderate if the system provides incentives for it to do so. The thesis concludes that incentives for moderation have a stronger effect when dominant internal party actors desire moderation. The analysis identifies four main variables determining moderation outcomes; (1) whether the dominant party faction supports moderation, (2) electoral results, (3) whether FRPs' core supporters endorse or resist moderation, and (4) whether structural conditions created by wartime provide incentives for FRPs to moderate.

The thesis also contains a broad literature review of past literature on FRPs, defines its various camps and paradigm shifts in research, and comments on the conceptualisations of politics and normative values underpinning past research on FRPs. It also argues that these underpinnings should be changed, to better reflect the empirical realities of FRPs contexts as non-democratic political spaces existing at the intersection between war and peace.

Acknowledgements

To Mum. My dear Ane.

For hours long spent, and love long given.

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List of Abbreviations

FRP	Former rebel party
FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front
GAM	Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka)
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam
MPLA	Movimento Popular para Liberação de Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OHR	Office of the High Representative
Renamo	Resistência Nacional Moçambican
RUPF	Revolutionary United Front party
SDPL	Social Democratic and Labour Party
SDS	Serbian Democratic Party
SIRA	Information Centre for a Referendum on Aceh
SNSD	Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
TNA	Tamil National Alliance
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola

Chapter 1: Introduction

"The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose."

Henry Kissinger.

"You adapt, evolve, compete or die."

Paul Tudor Jones

1.1 Introducing former rebel parties and the research question

In the post-Cold War era, a growing number of insurgency groups have transitioned into political parties, moving from the battlefield to formal electoral politics in the transition from war to peace. Manning and Smith (2016) find that in civil wars ending in 1990 or later, rebel groups formed political parties in more than half of the cases. There is a developing field of research examining how these rebels-turned-parties, or former rebel parties (FRPs), adjust as a result of this transition in the arena.

Most of the studies in this field have focused on whether rebels demilitarise and come to adapt electoral-driven and vote-maximising logics (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Berti 2013; de Zeeuw 2008; Close and Prevost 2007; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; 2020; Ishiyama et al. 2019; Lyons 2005; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Matanock and Staniland 2018; Reilly 2006; 2013; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2008; Whiting 2018). Some also focus on why rebels chose to joing election systems in the first place (de Zeeuw 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008; Løvlie 2013; Berti 2013; Whiting 2018). This demilitarisation and election-mindedness are predicted to have consequences for the success of peace and democracy-building in the countries rebels are included into (Baker 2001, 760–61; Manning 2008, 2; Nilsson 2008; Rudloff and Findley 2016; Suazo 2013; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 136–37; Wallensteen 2002, 139).

Past provide a good overview on a case-by-case basis, but use a variety of conceptual and analytical frameworks and contain few cross-references. Moreover, I have not found any larger field-wide synthesis or generalised descriptive-theoretical works on FRPs adjustment to formal politics. Some studies focus on internal changes in the rebel organisation following formal political inclusion. Sindre (2016c) focuses on intra-party democracy, Sindre (2016a) focus on the influence of ex-combatants, and several other studies focus on changes in party membership

as a consequence of entering formal politics (Berti and Knobel 2015; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2008). Several studies comment on arising tensions between party factions and the emergence of more pro-election factions within individual former rebel parties (Aalen 2020; Berti 2013; 2019; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Løvlie 2013; Manning 2007; 2008; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). While commenting on the same traits, these studies do not overtly appear to build on one another, and rarely cross-reference or situate their findings relative to each other.

A number of studies also examine how specific FRPs adapt their ideology to fit the needs of election and former politics (Aalen 2020; Berti 2013; 2019; Berti and Knobel 2015; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Rufyikiri 2017). However, thes studies examine different elements of ideology, focusing on wartime cleavage issues, peace-making, political pluralism, reduction of absolutism, or democratic characteristics, using different analytical frameworks and lenses. In short, the research does not provide a generalised overview of the field.

Additionally, the beforementioned studies make few references to causal mechanisms. Some limited causal explanations connecting independent variables to a particular aspect of FRP in case-specific scopes do exist in the literature. Such causal explanations are provided for electoral and institutional design (Allison 2006; 2010; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Purdeková, Reyntjens, and Wilén 2018), government, international actor or other parties actions (Berti 2013; de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007; Manning 2008) and rebels supporters (Berti 2013; Løvlie 2013; Manning 2008; Sindre 2018; Sprenkels 2019). However, general causal mechanisms explaining *why* rebels adapt to elections politics or how to conceptualise the indicators or elements of FRPs' transition on a general basis are not identified.

In short, quite a lot is known about individual FRPs, but little is known about FRPs generally, and little is known about the causal mechanisms driving how FRPs adapt to formal politics. In an attempt of addressing these research gaps, the thesis asks the following research question: *"What are the independent variables of causal importance and the causal mechanisms driving anti-system moderation in former rebel parties?"*

1.2 The structure of the thesis

The thesis addresses the research gaps in sequential fashion, structured over eight chapters. *Chapter 1* and *Chapter 2* provide an introduction for the thesis and the concepts used in it. The first gap addressed in the lack of generalized knowledge. *Chapter 3* contains a literature survey focused on conceptualizing FRPs, conceptualizing how FRPs adjust to formal politics (the dependent variable), and identifying potential independent variables.[1] In *chapter 3*, the literature is sorted into two chronological waves, who have different conceptualisations of FRPs. The waves are explained in more detail in chapter 2.

The resulting generalized account showed an image of a field driven by a Western-European[2] conceptualisation of intra-state politics, with an underlying focus on peace and democracy. *Chapter 4* describes this argument. The chapter argues that the Western-European conceptualisation prevents the empirical realities of FRPs' context, as non-democratic, somewhat oppressive, war/peace hybrid systems, from entering analysis. This results in an incomplete starting point for analysing FRPs. When these characteristics are accounted for, FRPs emerge as anti-system actors, who resist the formal political system. How FRPs adjust to formal politics should therefore focus on this anti-system characteristic. This stands in contrast to previous literature, which has analysed FRPs as anti-democratic actors (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, Höglund 2008; Manning 2004, 54; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134; Lyons 2013; 2016b; Sprenkels 2019).

The second gap addressed is the lack of causal mechanisms. Following the example of previous works in FRP literature (Berti 2013; 2019; Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018; Wilson 2020), the thesis borrows from the literature studying how radical Islamic parties adjust to formal political systems (Bruckler and Künkler 2013; Schwedler 2011; Tezcür 2010) to fill this gap in causal mechanisms. The literature on radical Islamic parties describes how absolutist, ideologically driven, proto-political, anti-system actors[3] adjust to formal political systems (Bermeo 1997, 305; Huntington 1991; Schwedler 2011, 350; Wuhs

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[1] As Gerring (2012a) notes, conceptualisation and descriptive analysis are necessary for causal analysis (723, 733).

[2] For more on why the term is coined as "Western-European" see chapter 4, this thesis.

[3] In this literature, the anti-system characteristic is defined as radical parties demands for substantive systemic change and viewing the current regime as illegitimate (Bermeo 1997, 305; Huntington 1991; Schwedler 2011, 350, Wuhs 2013, 191). However, in the literature, the anti-system sentiment is presumed to apply to democratic systems, and radical Islamic parties are analysed as anti-democratic actors (Bermeo 1997, 305; Huntington 1991, Schwedler 2011, 350, Tezcür 2010a; Wickham 2003; Wuhs 2013, 191).

2013, 191). The moderation of radical Islamic parties is a process sharing strong commonalities with FRPs adjustment. Both analyse how ideologically driven, proto-political, anti-system actors adjust to the new arena of formal political systems. This literature provides a conceptualisation of radical party adjustment through the concept of "moderation", entailing radical parties gradual change in behaviour and ideology, towards political system norms (Schwedler 2011, 305). It also identifies independent variables and proposes causal mechanisms.

Based on these commonalities, and the use of moderation in previous FRP studies, the thesis develops a framework of "anti-system moderation" based on the causal mechanisms and variables identified by the studies on radical Islamic parties. The framework is presented in *Chapter 5*. The framework modifies the insights from the literature on radical Islamic party studies to fit with FRPs and their context. The framework operationalises anti-system moderation, or how and whether FRPs change to fit with the norms of the formal political system, along three indicators: "behaviour", "ideology" and "violence". It also hypothesises the causal direction of independent variables to anti-system moderation in the form of 29 hypotheses covering 18 variables. The framework also proposes that moderation occurs through a causal mechanism of a cost/benefit analysis.

The validity of the framework is tested in *Chapter 7*. Due to the scarceness of relevant available data on FRPs, the choice fell on conducting the analysis on relevant previously published studies from FRP literature, following the logic of a systemic review. The result is a medium-N analysis of 10 FRPs/cases[4], based on 13 previous studies, coded to test the empirical validity of the framework on a cross-case basis. The cross-case patterns found within the analysis form the basis of the thesis' findings. *Chapter 6* outlines the methodological concerns of the medium-N analysis and a justification for the research design. *Chapter 8* provides concluding remarks, addressing implications of the thesis' findings and making recommendations for future research.

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[4] In the context of the analysis, the thesis uses "cases" and FRPs interchangeably. By cases it refers to the 10 FRPs covered by the analysis.

1.3 Why is it important to address the research question?

Former rebel parties represent an enduring and growing phenomenon. Manning and Smith identify 77 FRPs which have attempted transitions into politics in 37 countries, on every continent (2019, 425). How rebel movements adapt to formal politics is a key element for understanding post-civil war politics in these countries, with implications for autocratic regime consolidation, democracy building, forms of citizenship, and the functioning of the political system (Aalen 2020; Burhiabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama 2016; Lyons 2016b; Sindre and Söderström 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2008). FRPs also have implications for how we theorize the connection between war, violence and politics. Without generalised knowledge and synthesis, the fields ability to develop and improve on these insights is limited. The descriptive discussions and conceptualisations, the synthesized knowledge, and the cross-case examination of the drivers of FRP adjustment provided by this thesis is an attempt at furthering the basis for these insights. It ought to help researchers in the field gain a better overview of the field and assess the external validity and theoretical implications of future case study analysis. A generalised account might furthermore be of use when analysing new cases.

1.4 Contribution and research design

The thesis contributes to filling two research gaps; generalised knowledge on FRPs, and causal mechanisms driving FRPs adjustment to formal politics. It employs a medium-N research design, analysing 10 cases. The design uses 13 previously published studies in FRP literature as its data, following the logics of a systemic review (Averis and Pearson 2003; Hughes, Taylor, and Green 2008; Mulrow 1994). The data are coded to fit with the framework. The design was chosen as it allows for a simultaneous testing of external and internal validity of the framework, combining qualitative small-N in-depth case studies' ability to test multiple hypotheses, and assess causal mechanisms (Beach 2020, 164,168; Kuehn 2013, 54–57; Rohlfing 2008, 1494, 1511) with the thesis goal of establishing generalized, cross-case knowledge on FRPs. The design was also influenced by the lack of available data on FRPs on the relevant indicators. The thesis also contains an analytically rich field-wide literature review, and a generalised conceptualisation of FRPs, and their moderation. It is also the first study in the field to emphasise the anti-system characteristic of FRPs in analysis. Methodologically, the thesis is the first medium-N analysis conducted on former rebel parties. The scope of the thesis is limited to oppositional FRPs.The justification for this limitation is described in chapter 2.

1.5 How did the research question and design evolve?

In chapter 3 and chapter 4 of the thesis, I have engaged deeply and critically in the literature on former rebel parties. In the two chapters, I have constructed the field on former rebel parties, defined its waves, identified the normative goals of the literature, its underlying conceptualisations, and suggested adjustments in how previous literature has conceptualised FRPs and their political environment. I am aware that this is a somewhat uncommon form of engagement for a master thesis, and it was not my original intention to conduct such an analysis. To fully understand why it was done, I will describe the process and the steps of writing the master thesis.

Originally, I started the thesis to shed light on the connection between former rebel parties and democracy/autocracy.[5] This was inspired by works stating that FRPs were likely to have a negative effect on democracy (de Zeeuw 2008; Söderberg Kovacs 2008), unless they transformed their violent, anti-democratic selves in an effort to adapt to formal electoral democratic politics (de Zeeuw 2008; Lyons 2016a; Sindre 2016a; 2016b; 2019; Sindre and Söderström 2016; Speight and Wittig 2017). The argument that rebels, with their violence and military modus operandi might be ill-suited for formalised democratic politics made perfect sense to me and was not something I set out to question.

As I was primarily interested in trying to identify causal effects and as I could not find available qualitative data on FRPs democratic traits at a party level, I landed on a qualitative case study as a research design. My next step then became to create a solid basis of knowledge in which to base case-selection and hypotheses on how FRPs affect regime type. This soon proved difficult. As mentioned before, I couldn't find any general debates on the conceptualisation or theorisation on FRPs. The research that I did find on FRPs tended to be small-N qualitative case studies, whose focus was at case-specific level of analysis. These case studies used various theoretical and analytical frameworks, made few cross-case references, and rarely included a general implications section. In short, I could not find an overview of the field or a generalised descriptive conceptualisation of FRPs. Nor did I find a coherent account of what FRPs are. I felt that without these elements in place, I lacked the foundation for a) presuming that FRPs

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[5] The motivation was in part influenced by Sindre and Söderström (2016) identification of this connection as a knowledge gap in literature, and their recommendation for further research on the issue.

were anti-democratic, b) making valid case selection and c) comparing and understanding the findings of previous literature.

I therefore set about creating a more comprehensive literature review, in an attempt to create a sound enough knowledge basis to enable me to make valid and reliable research decisions. Driven by the concern that I would misconstrue, overlook, or otherwise misinterpret the details of the cases, and thereby compromise the validity of case selection and the subsequent analysis, I ended moving the information up several "levels of abstractions"[6], removing them from their specific context. This was the only way I was able to compare and make sense of the contributions of the cases.

Through this process, I engaged in a project of constructing and conceptualising most previous research on FRP adjustment into one synthesised image. To ensure the validity of my analysis I ended up engaging with the literature in a deep and critical manner. This ended up in an analysis making the distinction of the two waves, the identification of the underlying beliefs and conceptualisations reflected in the synthesized image of the literature, and the realisation that FRPs contexts might be different than what had previously been assumed. This led me away from the regime type focus adapted in the original focus of the thesis.

The attempt to create an overview of the literature led to three realisations. First, that former rebel parties usually emerge out of autocracies and tend to fight against oppressive regimes. Works driving this realisation includes Aalen (2020), Curtis and Sindre (2019), Burihabwa and Curtis (2019), Koko (2016), Lyons (2013; 2016a; 2016b), and Wittig (2016). Second, I got the impression that rebel groups do not relate their projects to the logic of democracy or autocracy. Works driving this realisation includes Arjona (2014), Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly (2015), Berti (2019), Berti and Gutiérrez (2016), Wilson (2020), Wittig (2016) and Sanín and Wood (2014). Third, that FRPs who are opposition parties face a very different post-war context than FRPs who enter formal politics as governments. This realisations was influenced by Aalen (2020), Aalen and Muriaas (2017), Lyons (2013; 2016a; 2016c) Muriaas, Rakner, and Skage (2016), Purdeková, Reyntjens, and Wilén (2018), Burihabwa and Curtis (2019), and Toft (2010). These realisations led me to question whether the focus on peace and democracy was

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[6] In Sartori's ladder of abstraction, going from levels of case-specific detail, to less detailed, more general knowledge and concepts with wider intension (Sartori 1970)

a conducive foundation for creating a nuanced understanding of oppositional FRPs adjustment to formal post-war politics.

As a result, I decided to change the focus of the thesis, conduct the analysis seen in chapter 4, and analyse FRPs adjustment to formal political systems sans regime type specification. I had already been directed towards the literature on radical Islamic parties and moderation as a framework proposing causal mechanisms and measuring radical party adjustment. This was a framework I saw as valuable to keep. When re-considering how to analyse FRP adjustment, the question therefore became, "what type of actors are FRPs, and how are they radical in relation to the political system? "After some thinking, I realised that FRPs are anti-system actors whose political struggle, manifested in violence, ideology and non-violent behaviour, denounce the legitimacy of the formal political system. How rebels adjust or moderate along this anti-system characteristic would accordingly be a central element of analysis. So, that is the logic of this masters thesis.

1.6 Key findings

The analysis finds support for anti-system moderation as a concept. All the 10 FRPs studied in the analysis have undergone anti-system moderation. This suggests that participation in formal political systems cause former rebel parties to adjust to system norms. The analysis also indicates that moderation occurs through a cost/benefit calculation. Rebels will moderate if it benefits them to do so, and will not moderate if the benefits to do so are insufficient. Seen together with FRPs' overall tendency to moderate, the thesis finds that formal systems provide incentives for FRPs to moderate. The thesis also finds that these incentives have a stronger effect when internal party actors desire moderation. Four variables are identified as having a particularly strong impact on moderation outcomes. (1) Whether the dominant party faction supports moderation, (2) electoral results, (3) whether FRPs'æ* core supporters endorse or resist moderation, and (4) whether structural conditions created by war provide disrupt or support system incentives for FRPs to moderate.

Chapter 2: Foundational Concepts

This chapter gives an overview of the definitions and concepts used in the thesis.

Political party

Defined as "an organisation that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions.» (Janda 1980, 5). Placing is further defined to include electoral and non-electoral means, including violent forceful imposition (Janda 1993, 166).

Former rebel party

For the purposes of the thesis, *former rebel parties* are defined as political organisations that fulfil the following criteria: 1) have a history as an armed rebel militia participating in intra-state conflict, 2) are registered as a political party, and 3) participate in formal electoral politics in at least one election.[7] The criteria follow classical conceptualisation and are all considered as necessary and sufficient (Collier and Mahon 1993, 2).

The distinctions made between FRPs

The thesis separates FRPs into two mutually exclusive categories; opposition parties, referred to as *oppositional FRPs*, and parties in government, *governmental FRPs.* Oppositional FRPs are FRPs who spend a minimum of ten years as opposition parties following their inclusion into politics. Governmental FRPs are FRPs who enter government immediately after entering formal politics (be it through elections, power sharing or military victory). As noted on page 8, the distinction is based on the realisation that governmental and oppositional FRPs have a different role and face different pressures in the post-civil war system. The scope of this thesis is not sufficient to address both types of FRPs' transition to politics. The thesis therefore focuses on explaining oppositional FRPs' transition to politics, as it is the primary focus of previous literature.

The thesis separates FRPs into four types of ideological struggles. 1) *Liberation movement*s, desiring national liberation from colonial or occupational forces. 2) *Ethnic-based secessionist movement*s, desiring independence for smaller regions of a country based on ethnic identity. 3) *Islamic movement*s, desiring Islamic rule as a form of governance. And 4) *Marxist-socialist movement*s, desiring the abolishment of inequality, capitalist markets, and implementing

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[7] This definition corresponds to Hatz and Söderberg Kovacs's criteria (2016, 996).

Marxist-socialism. The categories are not mutually exclusive, and do not serve as a universal classification of FRPs. Their purpose in the thesis is to illustrate that the ideological component of anti-system moderation will vary between different types of ideology . The classification is inspired by Sindre' (2019) and Whiting (2018)'s development of ideological moderation as specific to ethnic-secessionist movements. Table A in the appendix, includes classifications of FRPs according to ideological type and opposition/governmental role.

The two waves

In the literature survey, I have sorted the studies of FRPs into two "waves", which correspond to a chronological paradigm shift in studying FRPs and FRPs' adjustment to formal politics.

The transitions wave consists of early studies in the research field, published from 2005 to 2010. These studies tend to analyse FRPs from a normative goal of peace and democracy, from a perspective of post-war reconstruction, focusing analysis on the immediate post-war period (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Close and Prevost 2007, 3, 7; de Zeeuw 2008, 8–10; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Klapdor 2009; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134–35). The wave also adopts a Western-European perspective on politics. The wave defines FRPs by their military traits and violence (Allison 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2008). FRPs are therefore portrayed as violent, anti-democratic, apolitical, non-party actors who pose a threat to peace and democracy-building, unless they manage to transition into democratic, peaceful, electorally minded political parties (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Deonandan 2007, 233; de Zeeuw 2008; Höglund 2008; Klapdor 2009,13; Manning 2004, 54; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008). Studies in the wave largely focus on identifying variables that aid rebels in successfully transforming into political parties.

The continuous movement wave consists of studies in the field of FRPs published from 2013 to 2020. The studies tend to analyse FRPs with a goal of generating insights into the dynamics of FRPs. The wave analyses FRPs as political, party-like movements, engaged in the same political struggle *continuously* through the pre-war, wartime and post-war period, which adapt and develops their means to the political context (Berti 2013; 2019; Lyons 2013; Wilson 2019; Wittig 2016). The wave continues to view FRPs as potentially anti-democratic actors, whose adjustment and change has implications for peace and democracy (Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018, 2019, Sprenkels 2019, Whiting 2018, Wilson 2019). Studies in the wave identify various

changes in FRPs, such as ideology, mobilisation tactics, electoral-mindedness, democratic traits, internal dynamics, and use of violence. Studies also identify a variety of independent variables affecting these various aspects of change.

Works published in 2011 and 2012 mark a transition period between waves, examining transition wave research questions while using the conceptualisation of rebel parties from the continuous movement wave (as political parties) and is therefore mentioned in both waves.

Moderation

The thesis uses the concept of moderation to operationalise and measure FRP adjustment. Moderation is defined as "a movement of a radical party from a system-contradicting to system-abiding behaviour and ideology after having joined formal politics". The concept of moderation is borrowed from the inclusion-moderation hypothesis, where this definition is applied to democracy (Bermeo 1997, 304–6; Huntington 1991; Schwedler 2011, 350). Radicalisation is defined as "a movement of a radical party away from system-abiding behaviour and ideology after having joined formal politics." (Schwedler 2011, 350).

Literature on radical Islamic parties

The framework in chapter 5 is partly based on insights from small N qualitative case studies on radical Islamic parties. The thesis refers to these studies as "studies on radical Islamic parties" or "the literature on radical Islamic parties". These studies use the inclusion-moderation hypothesis as a base assumption to study radical Islamic parties. Examples of studies include (Ashour 2007; Brocker and Künkler 2013; Pahwa 2017; Schwedler 2011; Tezcür 2010b; Wickham 2004).

Anti-system characteristic

The thesis uses the term *anti-system characteristic* to describe FRPs' opposition to the political system. The anti-system characteristic is defined as "FRPs lacking recognition of the legitimacy of the political system". The characteristic manifests itself into rebel ideology and political struggle, its use of violence, and non-violent behaviour, all of which represent continuities from a wartime *modus operandi*. For more on the concept see chapter 4.

Anti-system moderation

The thesis analyses FRPs adjustment to the formal political system through the concept a*nti-system moderation* (combining moderation with FRPs' anti-system characteristic). Anti-system moderation is defined as *a movement from a position of rejection of the political system's legitimacy, towards a position of system abidance and acceptance*. The concept is operationalised along three indicators: ideology, (non-violent) behaviour, and violence. For more on the concept see chapter 5.

Chapter 3: Literature Survey

The purpose of the chapter is to survey the previous literature on former rebel parties. The chapter examine how previous literature has a) conceptualized FRPs, b) conceptualized FRP adjustment to formal political systems (the dependent variable), and c) which independent variables the literature has identified. Previous studies are separated by two views on the above elements, one for *the transitions wave* and another for *the continuous movement wave.* When going through these elements, each section is therefore organized by wave.

3.1 Conceptualisation of former rebel parties

3.1.1 The transitions wave: conceptualisation of former rebel parties

The transitions wave by conceptualise former rebel parties as militant, apolitical, anti-democratic actors.

Militant

The transitions wave defined former rebel parties by their military characteristics. These characteristics include: tendencies of absolutism, maximalism and seeking unconditional victory, hierarchical commando-lines and highly centralised leadership and decision-making structures, the use of violence, and an anti-regime characteristic, where rebels refuse to recognise the legitimacy of the current regime (Allison 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2008). Due to these military and anti-regime characteristics, FRPs are seen to have potentially negative effects on peace and democracy (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Curtis and de Zeeuw 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Klapdor 2009, 13).

Apolitical

The transitions wave also sees former rebel parties as apolitical organisations. The wave sees FRPs as lacking political profile and political programs (Allison 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2007; 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008). The wave also perceives FRPs as possessing strong cultures of secrecy and obedience, and to be based on exclusionary and socially devise rhetoric (Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Lyons 2005, 123; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). Based on these characteristics, as well as the military characteristics outlined in the previous paragraph, the literature presumes that FRPs do not qualify as political parties and are apolitical organisations

(de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233). The role of violence is particularly emphasized as a disqualifier of political party status.

Anti-democratic

The transitions wave portray rebel parties as militaristic, anti-statist characteristics with lacking ties to civil society (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Höglund 2008). These attributes, in addition to rebels' absolutist mindsets, cultures of secrecy and obedience, and exclusionary rhetoric, lead authors in the wave to view rebels as inherently anti-democratic when they join formal politics (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Höglund 2008; Manning 2004, 54; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). The wave therefore predicts that rebels will have negative effects on democracy and democracy-building efforts unless they adjust to system norms of electoral and democratic abiding behaviour (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Höglund 2008; Manning 2004, 54; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). Rebel parties are thereby seen as potential *spoilers of democracy*: actors who use their power to obstruct and damage the democratic electoral process (Manning 2004, 54; De Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134).

3.1.2 The continuous movement wave: conceptualisation of former rebel parties.

The continuous movement wave sees former rebel parties as political, party-like organisations heavily driven by ideology, possessing both democratic and autocratic characteristics.

Political

The continuous movement wave sees rebels as engaged in *political* struggles with the pre-war and wartime regime. The wave traces the origins of many rebel groups in civil society organisations, labour unions, political parties and social protest organisations (Berti 2013; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Løvlie 2013b; Lyons 2016a; Nissen and Schlichte 2006; Sindre and Söderström 2016, 111; Wittig 2016, 143). FRPs' representative function, fighting on behalf of historically marginalised groups is also emphasised (Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Lyons 2016a, 1028; Purdeková, Reyntjens, and Wilén 2018; Wittig 2016, 143).

Party-like

The continuous movement wave views rebels as social proto-political organisations possessing party-like functions (Berti 2013, 12; Lyons 2016a, 1028). These functions include the pursuit of power for social change, mobilisation of civilian support, recruitment of new members,

raising financial support, and organising groups and supporters according to shared goals and identities (Berti 2013, 12; Lyons 2016a, 1028). Many rebels also govern in conquered territory during war. This governance requires bureaucratical and administrative competence, involving tasks such as material service- and security provision, mobilisation,   civilian outreach, and the incorporation and direct inclusion of civilians into governance structures (Arjona 2014; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Arjona 2016; Aalen and Muriaas 2017; Börzel and Risse 2010; Kasfir 2015; Mampilly 2011; Lyons 2016a; Pearce 2020). Such governance should have transferability to the running of a political party, marking rebels as proto-political actors (Berti 2013; Lyons 2013).

Ideologically driven

Recent studies find that rebels hold complex ideological profiles, and that ideology has a potent influence in shaping the rebel organisation's development, behaviour, and policies (Aalen 2020; Berti 2019; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Pearce 2020; Sprenkels 2019; Wilson2020).[8] These studies maintain that ideology is an essential aspect of rebel parties. It serves as an alternate vision for society and the state that rebels fight for, prescribing continually evolving ideas about political community and representation (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 399–400). Most studies in the wave analyse ideology both as an instrumental tool employed by rebel leadership for strategic purposes,[9] and as a representation of genuine beliefs and normative commitments (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 389; Sanín and Wood 2014, 214, 220).[10] Combining these two uses, rebels use ideology as a platform and communication device to craft internal and external legitimacy, mobilise support for their political struggle, and justify their opposition to the adversary regime (Berti 2019, 515; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 401; Jo 2015). In other words, ideology prescribes the political content and representative function of former rebel parties. It also serves as a source of internal legitimacy, and as a source for FRPs' legitimacy among supporters.

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[8] These studies stand in sharp contrast to previous studies, which see rebel parties as lacking ideological profiles (Aspinall and Weiss 2014; Carbone 2007; Carothers 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Nindorera 2012, 20; Randall and Svåsand 2002a; 2002b; Rufyikiri 2017; Söderström 2014; Ufen 2008).

[9] Strategic benefits in providing coordination, organisational cohesion, recruitment and mobilisation of members and supporters, and decision-making rationale (Berti 2019, 515; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 389, 392; Hira and Hira and Hira 2000; Sanín and Wood 2014, 214–19).

[10] For a walk-through of the analytical value of analysing ideology in these two dual ways and a case for why ideology has a more-than instrumental use, see Curtis and Sindre, (2019) and Sanín and Wood (2014).

In these studies ideology is seen as an essential element permeating almost all aspects of the rebel organisation (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406). During war, ideology is shown to dictate organisational structures, political rhetoric, forms of violence, civil-military interaction and service provision (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Börzel and Risse 2010; Cohen, Hoover Green, and Wood 2013; Kasfir 2015; Mampilly 2011; Sanín and Wood 2014, 221–22; Sinno 2008; Sukyens 2015; Wilson 2016; Wilson2020). In peacetime, ideology has direct transference to political policy (Berti 2013; Sindre 2016a; 2019), and is frequently used as a foundation for governing practices, power-consolidation and state-building practices (Aalen 2020; Berti 2016; 2019; Metsola and Melber 2007; Wilson 2020). Ideology also affects the types of social issues the party mobilises on (Sindre 2018; 2019). It is given a leading causal role in explaining organisational shifts in strategy and tactics (Berti 2013, 25; Løvlie 2013; Whiting 2018). Ideology also frequently bounds intra-party factionalism, and features prominently in intra-party debates (Berti 2013, 188; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 400; Løvlie 2013, 584–87; Sprenkels 2019, 537; Wilson 2020, 617; Whiting 2018, 298–301). Suffice to say, ideology forms an important dimension of rebel parties, with significant consequences and implications for party dynamics.

Both democratic and autocratic characteristics

The continuous movement wave sees former rebel parties as possessing both autocratic and democratic characteristics. On the democratic side, authors emphasise rebels representative function, how rebel ideology and goals can be compatible with democracy, and how rebel governance includes elements of citizen inclusion into decision-making (Berti 2013, 11; Caspersen 2011; Piccolino and Speight 2017; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sindre and Söderström 2016, 111; Speight and Wittig 2018; Wittig 2016; Whiting 2018, 288–89). Some authors also note the presence of democratically-minded party factions within rebel groups during both wartime and peacetime (Berti 2013; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Sprenkels 2019). Simultaneously, the wave sees rebels as autocratic based on their military characteristics and use of violence(Berti 2013, 2016; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama 2019; Lyons 2013; 2016). Several studies in the wave therefore see former rebel parties as simultaneously possessing autocratic and democratic characteristics (Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Wilson 2019). There are also researchers in the wave who question the validity of understanding FRPs from a democracy perspective, arguing that these notions make little sense to the worldview, cultural contexts and realities of FRPs (Berti 2013; Wilson 2019).

The conceptualisations of FRPs presented in this past section is important to keep in mind. They have consequences for how the transitions wave and continuous movement wave see the dependent variable and FRPs contexts..

3.2 The dependent variable: How do former rebel parties adjust to formal politics?

3.2.1. Transitions wave: FRP adjustment seen as rebel-to-party transition

From rebel militia to political party

How does the transitions wave understand the dependent variable, how former rebel parties adjust to formal politics? The transitions wave understands the moderation of FRPs as a linear party-building process, where the end goal is to transform rebels into non-violent, election-minded political parties, who abide by the rules of a pluralistic, elctoral political system. (Allison 2010, 105–6; Close and Prevost 2007 11; de Zeeuw 2008, 12–15; Ishiyama and Batta 2011, 372; Lyons 2005; Manning 2007, 253, 256; 2008, 13, 141; Reilly 2006; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008, 23).

If this transformation is successful, the likelihood of renewed violence is presumed to decrease, and peace will be more stable (Berdal and Ucko 2009; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011, 369; Klapdor 2009, 13; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). The negative effects rebels are expected to have on democracy are also expected to decrease (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233). The logic behind this peace-making function is that democracy, defined as pluralist elections, serves as a peace mechanism (De Zeeuw 2008, 6; Lyons 2005, 123). Including formally excluded rebels into elections is presumed to solve the power-distribution concern fuelling civil war, transferring conflict from a violent to a non-violent form (Baker 2001, 760–61; Manning 2008, 2; Paris 2004, 19; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 136–37; Wallensteen 2002, 139). In other words, elections and their mechanisms are expected to transform rebel militias into an organisation closer to the image of a democratic, non-violent, peaceful political party.

The elements of transformation

On a system-level, the successfulness of this transformation is measured rebels' electoral performance and electoral survial, in addition to the absence of renewed outbreaks of violence (De Zeeuw 2008: Close and Prevost 2007; Deonandan 2007; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2010). On

a party level, the transformation is more comprehensive. Rebel-to-party transformation is seen to entail the eradication of rebels' military characteristics, and comprehensive party-building (de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). The transformation process involves; a) the creation of political policy programs and a political profile which rebels need to succeed in elections, b) the building of intra-party democracy and c) the creation of a party apparatus, including tasks such as recruiting new staff and political candidates fitted to run a political party, setting up offices across the country, creating a relationship with civil society actors and garnering new sources for fundraising (Allison 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2007; 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008). As the later works of the continuous movement wave illustrate, the presumptions about the need for building these capacities should be revisited, as many FRPs already possess several of these characteristics when they enter formal politics.

Rebel-to-party transformation is furthermore seen to include a change in the rebel groups' behaviour, attitude and stated principles. It includes making and showing commitments to peace through renunciation of violence, recognising elections as the only legitimate power-allocating mechanism, and adopting a more inclusive, pluralistic rhetoric (Close and Prevost 2007, 8; de Zeeuw 2008, 12,17; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 137). The transformation process includes demilitarisation[11], abidance to electoral rules, less hostile relationships to other political actors, and adapting to the political rules of the game of formal politics (Close and Prevost 2007, 8; Deonandan 2007, 227; de Zeeuw 2008, 12, 17; Manning 2008, 22; Manning and Smith 2016, 276; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 137, 141, 144). This last element, political rules of the game, seemingly implies parliamentary participation, cross-aisle cooperation, abiding by institutional design incentives, and not obstructing horizontal or vertical accountability (de Zeeuw 2008; de Zeeuw and Kumar 2010; Manning 2008, 22; Manning and Smith 2016, 276; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 137, 141, 144).

The literature also presumes that FRP adjustment involves vote-maximisation, where rebels conduct a series of measures to mobilise a larger share of the population. These vote-maximising efforts include outreach to civil society, the creation of a mass-appealing political policy that will help rebels broaden their support base, and the changing or modification of

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[11] Demilitarisation efforts include the formal disarmament and demobilisation of arms within the rebel movement. For more on rebel parties and demilitarisation, see, for instance, Jennings (2008), Lyons (2004; 2005), Söderström (2013; 2015; 2016), Berdal and Ucko (2009) and the book edited by Dudouet, Giessman and Planta (2012).

party identity (Deonandan 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2008; Reilly, Nordlund et al. 2008).

3.2.2 Continous movement wave: FRP adjustment seen as party change

As shown previously in the chapter, the continuous movement wave sees FRPs as possessing bureaucratical and administrative competence, ideological profiles, political content and ties to civilian supporters (Berti 2013; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 300–400; Løvlie 2013; Lyons 2013; 2016b; Wittig 2016). Works in the wave therefore view FRPs as possessing many party-like qualities previous to joining formal politics (Berti 2013; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Lyons 2013; 2016c). Therefore, the process of adjustment is seen less as a project of party-building but more as a project of party development (Berti 2013; Ishiyama 2016; Sindre and Soderström 2016; Lyons 2016a).

The elements of party change

The elements of party change the continuous movement wave focuses on can be sorted into three categories; changes in behaviour, changes in internal composition of the party, and changes in ideology and political profile.

Behaviour

The continuous movement wave examines a variety of aspects of FRP behaviour. Several studies focus on how FRPs have conformed their behaviour to fit with the parliamentary and electoral channels of the political system. Aspects examined include whether rebels have engaged in cooperation or parliamentary alliances with non-FRP political parties (Allison 2016; Berti 2013; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; Whiting 2018). Studies also focus on changes FRPs have made in behaviour regarding the electoral channel (Allison 2016; Berti 2013; Sindre 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). Aspects examined include whether FRPs engage in vote-maximising behaviour (Allison 2016; Berti 2013; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018) and whether FRPs have broadened their target electorate (Allison 2016; Berti 2013; 2019; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2019; Sprenkels 2019). Other aspects examined include FRPs electoral success (Allison 2016a; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; Manning and Smith 2019) and whether and how FRPs change their mobilisation tactics (Berti 2013; 2019; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Løvlie 2013; Pearce 2020). Some

studies also examine the use of violence in FRPs (Berti 2013; 2019; Berti and Knobel 2015; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Ishiyama et al. 2019).

Internal composition of the party

The continuous movement wave examines changes in the internal dynamics of former rebel parties. One aspect examined is whether new members join the party (Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; Sindre 2016a; Sindre 2018). Another is whether new party factions emerge within the party (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Sindre 2016a; 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, Whiting 2018). These studies also note the presence of factional divides between wartime members and members joining after the FRP enters formal politics (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Sindre 2016a; 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, Whiting 2018). Another aspect examined is party structure and culture. Studies examine whether cultures of strong personalistic leadership and centralised command structures continue within the party (Sindre 2016b; Söderberg Kovacs 2019) or whether changes in internal culture towards increased intra-party debate and internal democracy occur (Sindre 2016b; Sprenkels 2019).

Ideology and political profile

When examining changes to ideology and political profile, works in the continuous movement have looked at various elements, such as FRPs rhetoric, political statements and ideological manifestos.[12] Researchers have examined whether rebels show increased tolerance and acceptance for their wartime adversary, the government (Berti 2013;2019; Pearce 2020) and whether FRPs have moved beyond wartime political cleavages (Sindre 2018; 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019). Researchers have also looked at whether rebels show increased recognition of the political system's legitimacy (Berti 2013; 2019; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019). Some studies examine whether rebels show increased political pluralism, bu showing tolerance for non-FRP political parties (Berti 2013; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Sindre 2019, Whiting 2018) or in the form of less exclusionary rhetoric (Berti 2013; 2019; Sindre 2019). Researchers have also examined whether FRPs soften absolutist or extremist elements of ideology, from describing an alternate vision of the state, to a vision that fits the current realities

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[12] Examples of studies using ideological manifestos include Berti (2013, 2019), Sindre (2018; 2019), Pearce (2020) and Söderberg Kovacs (2019).

of the political system they operate within (Berti 2019; Curtis and Sindre 2019; Sindre 2018; 2019). What such softening entails depends on the type of ideology and political struggle FRPs are engaged in. Examples include moving away from visions of governance based on Islamic sharia, Marxist economy, or ethnic-based alternative statehoods, to more moderate Islamic-inspired governance, market-based economies, or less-ethnic based form of regionalism (Berti 2013; 2019, 515-517; Løvlie 2013, 577-578; Pearce 2020, 475-479; Sprenkels 2019; Sindre 2019, 488-492).

An additional contribution of the continuous movement wave is the role of ideology as interconnected with and delineating both behaviour and internal party dynamics. Ideology is presumed to shape both collective party identity and the identity of individual party members (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 398-401; Sanín and Wood 2014, 218; Sprenkels 2019, 539-540; Söderström 2011; 2013; 2015; 2016; 2019). Ideology is shown to influence the image of the party held by different factions of the party (Berti 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019, Whiting 2018). Ideology is identified as the distinction upon which intra-party factionalism is made (Berti 2013,188; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 400; Løvlie 2013, 584–87; Sprenkels 2019, 537; Wilson2020, 617; Whiting 2018, 298–301). Ideology has also been found to influence organisational structures within the party both in wartime and peacetime (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Börzel and Risse 2010; Cohen, Hoover Green, and Wood 2013; Kasfir, Frerks, and Terpstra 2017; Sanín and Wood 2014, 221–22; Sinno 2008; Sindre 2016b; Sprenkels 2019, 539-541; Sukyens 2015; Wilson 2016; 2020). Ideology can therefore be presumed to be a contributing variable driving internal party divisions and internal party structures..

Studies in the wave have also found that ideology has direct transference to political policy (Berti 2013; Sindre2016; Sindre2019) and is frequently used as the foundation for governing practices (Aalen 2020; Berti 2016; 2019; Metsola and Melber 2007; Wilson 2020). Ideology is also identified as having a leading causal role in explaining organisational shifts in strategy and behaviour, and features prominently in intra-party debates discussing FRPs behaviour and tactical goals (Berti 2013, 25; Berti and Knobel 2015; Løvlie 2013, 579-583; Whiting 2018, 298). Ideology can therefore be presumed to have a delineating role in driving FRPs behaviour and goals (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406). Several authors also argue that change in FRP behaviour and goals is limited to its realignment with existing ideological rationales (Berti

2013, 532; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406; Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2020; Sindre 2018; 2019; Whiting 2018; Wilson 2020). In other words, changes in behaviour and goals must be accompanied by changes in ideology.

Yet, as shown earlier in the chapter, FRP ideology is relatively inflexible. Changing ideology may have detrimental effects on internal cohesion, internal legitimacy and electoral support (Berti 2019; Curtis and Sindre 2019; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2016a). Several continuous movement wave studies show that ideological adaption is limited to the reframing and reinterpretation of past ideology (Berti 2013, 532; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406; Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2020; Sindre 2018; 2019; Wilson 2020; Whiting 2018). Therefore, the abandonment of radical goals by rebels as posited by the transitions wave is argued to be impermissible by several studies in the transitions wave (Curtis and Sindre 2019; Whiting 2018; Berti 2013; Wilson 2020). The entrenchment of wartime forms of organisation and political beliefs consolidated through violence are additional arguments posited in favour of incremental change (Berti 2013; Curtis and Sindre 2019; Sanín and Wood 2014). Therefore, one would expect the changes in behaviour, identity, and internal composition within FRPs to be a *limited* form of change, limited by the constitutive force ideology represents within the movements.

3.2.3 Continuous movement wave: FRP adjustment seen as anti-democratic moderation

Some studies in the continuous movement wave have used elements of the inclusion-moderation hypothesis to study how FRPs development and change (Berti 2013; 2019; Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019, Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018; Wilson 2019). These studies examine how FRPs have changed their ideology and behaviour, where behaviour change is premised and dependent on accompanying ideological change (Berti 2013, Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Wilson 2019). Furthermore, the studies are characterised by a lack of conceptual clarity as to what change or moderation entails[13], they all tend to examine what can be seen as democratic aspects of the parties.[14] The studies do not adapt the hypothesis as a complete framework. However, the fact that the hypothesis is used supports the argument made

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[13] This is true both in the sense that the studies examine different aspects of "democraticness", and in their inclusion of various other aspects, ranging from aspects of peace (Sindre 2019), democratic values (Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019, Sprenkels 2019, Sindre 2019; Whiting 2018), to newness or breaks from the past (Wilson 2019).
[14] What these "democratic" aspects are vary between the studies, ranging from political pluralism and less exclusionary rhetoric (Sindre 2019), to electoral-mindedness and lack of violence (Sprenkels 2019, Whiting 2018), to parliamentary cooperation (Whiting 2018; Berti 2013; 2019) to recognition of the political system (Berti

in this thesis, that works and findings using the inclusion-moderation hypothesis as its baseline is applicable to and create added value to the analysis of former rebel parties.

3.3. The independent variables: Which variables determine FRPs' adjustment?

3.3.1. Independent variables identified by the transitions wave

Which variables affect rebels transition into political parties? The transitions wave identifies several variables that might contribute to or predict the successful outcome of rebel-to-party transitions. In the following section, they are sorted into internal variables, describing conditions within the party, and external variables, describing conditions of the external environment/ the political system FRPs operate in.

External variables

Structural variables

The transitions wave identifies a set of structural variables impacting rebel-to-party transformation. The variables include the presence of political openings, or the extent to which electoral politics provide legitimate opportunities for rebels to win seats (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Manning and Smith 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008), power-sharing deals (De Zeeuw and Curtis 2009; Reilly 2006; Wolpe and McDonald 2006), and frequently held competitive elections (Reilly 2006; De Zeeuw and Curtis 2008; Söderberg-Kovacs 2008, 137). The transitions wave also identifies structural variables that restrict FRP behaviour that goes against electoral or parliamentary norms. Most frequently pointed to are institutions enforcing horizontal and vertical accountability (De Zeeuw and Curtis 2009; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2007, 255, 268; Reilly 2006; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 137, 154; Wolpe and McDonald 2006; Caspersen 2004).

The transitions wave does, however, identify a set of structural obstacles that might reduce the prospects of successful rebel-to-party transition. Some of these variables are related to the post-civil society context, including the lack of security and the rule of law in post-conflict political systems, the weakness and lack of funding of state institutions, and the weakness of state institutions (Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama

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2013,2019; Sprenkels 2019, Whiting 2018) to responsiveness and involvement of citizen into governance (Wilson 2019).

and Batta 2011; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2007). Studies in the wave also point to the relative inefficiency of institutional and electoral design in restricting and shaping party behaviour (De Zeeuw 2008; 2010; Manning 2008, 2, 17, 19; Deonandan 2007; De Zeeuw and de Goor 2008; Reilly, Nordlund et al. 2008). Local structural logics created by peace-agreements or how the civil war ended, such as the relationship between political actors, structural institutional design as a result of peace-deal concessions or military fighting in war, are also identified as an influential variable ,with potentially both contributing and preventative effects on rebel-to-party transformation (Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 149, 153).

One strand of the transitions wave also argues that variables determining whether former rebel parties can retain their support among wartime supporters, as well as the wider electorate are important the outcome of rebel-to-party transition (Allison 2006; 2010, 2; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008). The extent of rebels' popular support will again depend on the degree of violence used by rebels during the conflict and whether the political message used in wartime corresponds to salient social issues in formal politics (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008). Manning further suggests that if the material links of patronage, or the political messaging used in wartime no longer remains effective for garnering voters in the electoral arena, FRPs will be forced to go through transformation (Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 149, 153).

External actors

The transitions wave has also identified four external actors impacting rebel-to-party transition: international actors, the government party, other political parties and financial donors. International actors are identified as actors forcing pressure towards rebels to transform, as part of peace-efforts (Allison 2006; 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Söderberg Kovacs 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008). Governments are also identified as playing a role, particularly the extent to which they show tolerance for FRPs, or whether they actively oppress FRPS which impacts the availability of political openings (De Zeeuw 2008; Kumar and De Zeeuw 2008; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; Manning 2007). Other political parties are identified as having an impact by showing tolerance for the rebel party and whether this tolerance is conditioned upon rebels' transformation (Manning 2004, 60; De Zeeuw 2008; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008). Political parties also affect rebel-to-party transformation through inter-party

competition (Manning 2004, 60; De Zeeuw 2008; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008). Rebels are also expected to be cut off from financial donors who supported their wartime efforts (De Zeeuw 2008). This variable is expected to serve as an incentive for rebels to adopt political party behaviour, to attract new financial donors (De Zeeuw 2010; Ishiyama and Batta 2011).

Internal variables

Internal actors

Several internal variables are also identified as affecting the outcomes of rebel-to-party transitions . Three internal party actors are emphasised: party leaders, party factions and party members. Several studies point to the role of rebel leadership and its willingness to adapt to the logic of elections (De Zeeuw 2008; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; Pearce 2010). Other internal variables identified include the degree of *factional divides* within the party, split between favouring or rejecting transition (De Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011). Internal dissent is expected to cause high internal pressures, either in favour or against transformation (Manning 2008, 153).

Organisation capacities

Emphasis is also placed on rebels' previous experience and capacities. This includes a focus on previous experience with elections by former rebel parties (Close and Prevost 2007) and political and administrative competence possessed by rebels (Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008).

3.3.2. Independent variables identified by the continuous movement wave

The continuous movement wave identifies a set of independent variables affecting the development of former rebel parties. I have sorted these independent variables into two categories: internal variables *referring to variables inside the party*, and external variables referring to environmental variables in the FRPs' external environment.

External variables

Structural variables

Like the studies of the transitions wave, the studies of the continuous movement wave have focused on the role of institutional design and whether it provides rebels with opportunities to use the electoral channel to attain power (Berti 2013; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Løvlie

2013; Sindre 2018; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). This involves a discussion on proportional and representative voting systems and the degree of competition within party systems (Allison 2016; Ishiyama 2014; Pearce 2020; Whiting 2018). Whether rebels are shown tolerance and are accepted into the political system are also identified as important variables (Ishiyama et al. 2015; Allison 2016). In addition to these institutional designs, electoral results are also presumed to serve as an independent variable (Allison 2016; Ishiyama and Marshall 2013; Berti 2013, Whiting 2018).

External actors

Studies in the continuous movement wave identify four external actors whose behaviour affect the outcome of FRP change. The four external actors identified are: government, other political parties, financial donors and international actors.

The actions of government, and whether the government shows tolerance or oppresses the FRP, is seen to impact the effectiveness of structural design incentives, affecting whether rebels perceive the political system as providing opportunities for power (Ishiyama 2016; Ishiyama and Marshall 2019; Pearce 2020; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). Other political parties in the system are also identified as having an impact. Political parties can compete with FRPs over voters, or put pressure on FRPs to change its behaviour, in order to be accepted as a legitimate political party (Berti 2013, Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Whiting 2018). Financial donors are also expected to have an impact, somewhat akin to that of a shareholder. Donations from those who endorse previous party behaviour and ideology make it easier to resist party change, while donors pushing for change incentivise and contribute to party change (Allison 2016; Berti 2013; Sprenkels 2019).

International actors, either foreign states or over-national organisations, may also have an impact on FRPs adjustment (Berti 2013; Sprenkels 2019, 548; Wittig 2016, 140). International actors, if having a strong impact in the post-war political system, may influence the effectiveness of institutional design and structural incentives (Berti 2013; Manning 2008, 60; Sprenkels 2019, 548; Wittig 2016, 140). International actors may push rebels to change their behaviour or ideology through threats of violence, promises of financial aid, or through providing political recognition and legitimacy to the rebels cause and the FRPs status as a legitimate political party (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015, 64-65; Sindre 2019; Sprenkels 2019, 548; Whiting 2018).

Core constituents

Previous studies from the continuous movement wave shows that former rebel parties have a close relationship to civilian support networks garnered during war, which usually consist of the referent group rebel parties claim representation on behalf of (Pearce 2020; Sindre 2016b; Söderberg Kovacs 2019). I refer to these groups *as core constituents*. FRPs have been shown to rely on core constituents in elections (Berti 2013; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2019; Sprenkels 2019), and to be highly responsive core supporters' opinions (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). A lasting impression from canvasing the literature is also that maintaining core constituent support is important for maintaining legitimacy as representatives of the rebels' political cause (Berti 2013; Løvlie 2013; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2019). Several case studies on former rebel parties have shown that ideological cohesion and the retaining of core supporters is prioritised above electoral benefit (Berti 2013;Løvlie 2013, 577-578; Pearce 2020, 486; Sprenkels 2019, 537; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 11; Whiting 2018, 298). Therefore, the opinions of core constituents are expected to impact FRPs adjustments to formal political systems.

Internal variables

Internal party actors

Overall, three actors within the party are identified as impacting changes in behaviour, identity and ideology: party leadership, party members, and party factions. Several case studies identify the change of party leaders as a variable likely to cause party changes (Aalen 2020, 664; Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Whiting 2018, 298). The opinions of party factions and party members also matter, particularly changes in the dominant party faction (Berti 2013; Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019). Internal division among party members often run between pragmatists and ideological hard-liners or those accommodating the rules of the regime and actively participating in electoral institutions, and those advocating for minimal participation while subverting or boycotting parliamentary and electoral proceedings (Berti 2013; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019, 577-278; Whiting 2018, 297-299). The power balance between party factions, party members and party leaders on each side of this divide prove influential for "tipping the scale" towards changes in former rebel parties behaviour and ideology (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015, 66; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019, 578; Løvlie 2013, 587-588; Sindre 2018, 31; Whiting 2018, 297).

Two additional variables are identified on either side of this divide. The diversification of party members, marked by the entry of new, change-willing members into the party, is a variable that might, over time, cause a shift in internal power balances, pushing towards change (Berti 2013; Ishiyama and Batta 2011, 673-674; Sindre 2018; Whiting 2018). On the other hand, studies from the continuous movement wave show that ex-combatants strongly impact party policy and decision-making (Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019, 577-579; Sindre 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 9-10; Sprenkels 2019). In a number of studies, these groups have been shown to be heavily ideologically driven and resist change in the party (Pearce 2020; Sindre 2016a; 2016b; Sprenkels 2019, 538; Söderberg-Kovacs 2019, 2, 9-11).[15] Therefore, the presence of ex-combatants is identified as a variable preventing change in FRPs' behaviour and ideology.

Organisational structure

The organisational structure and culture of former rebel parties are also identified as variables affecting change in FRPs' behaviour and ideology. Organisational structure determines the room and channels of influence available to internal party actors, both those who push for change and those resisting it. The extent to which change-positive members and factions grow within the party is dependent on several aspects. If advancement in ranks is dependent on obedience and loyalty to party leadership (Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2013; Løvlie 2013) moderate members are unlikely to gain influence. The same is true of strong cultures of loyalty and obedience to charismatic party leaders, which limits tolerance for dissent (Manning 2007; 2008; Pearce 2020, 485; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 8). For a new change-willing faction to emerge, it needs to have the available room and agency to impact and change the party from within.

The extent to which FRPs open for intra-party democracy and internal debates is also identified as a variable affecting internal actors' ability to change former rebel parties from within. One case study has found that FRPs have relatively low degrees of intra-party democracy (Sindre 2016a). At the same time, several FRPs have been shown to employ forms of communal self-reflection, larger general assemblies and party-wide internal debates to discuss changes in strategy, behaviour and goals (Aalen 2020; Løvlie 2013; Berti 2013; Berti 2019; Whiting 2018). These debates are likely channels of influence and challenge within FRPs, that internal party actors can use to increase their influence, be it individual members, faction leaders or

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[15] Ex-combatants are also shown to support the use of violence (Söderberg 2011; 2015; Berti and Knobel 2015; Whiting 2018; Berti 2013) and anti-democratic means (Curtis and Burihabwa 2019).

party leaders. Organisational diversification, or the inflow of internal members is also dependent on whether the FRP needs new recruitment to fit the demands of electoral politics, which in turn depends on the capacities of staff within the rebel organisation (Allison 2016; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Ishiyama and Marshall 2013; Lyons 2013; 2016a; Pearce 2020; Sprenkels 2019).

Chapter 4: Underlying Conceptualisations

Chapter 3 accounted for how previous literature has conceptualized former rebel parties and how FRPs adjust to formal politics. In this chapter I identify the conceptualisations and normative beliefs underpinning these understandings. I argue that previous literature has been driven by a (subconscious) Western-European understanding of intra-state politics as democratic and peaceful endeavours separate from war and violence. This Western understanding is disadvantageous for answering the research question posed of the thesis because it does not reflect the local empirical realities of the political contexts FRPs operate in. This local reality is *non-democratic* and characterised by a state of *war/peace hybridity*, where elements of war and peace are continually and simultaneously intertwined in pre-war, wartime and post-war politics. Adopting a conceptualisation of intra-state politics in line with these realities, I argue, allows for an improved understanding of how FRPs adjust to formal politics, in which FRPs emerge as anti-system actors, adjusting to oppressive, non-democratic systems.

4.1. Underlying normative perspectives in past literature

4.1.1 Underlying normative perspectives in the transitions wave

Militant, anti-democratic, apolitical

The transitions wave is driven by a strong proclivity with peace. The wave defines FRPs by their violence and military nature, marking them as *spoilers* of peace and democracy (De Zeeuw 2008; Close and Prevost 2007; Deonandan 2007; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2010). Rebels are thereby marked as *anti-democratic* actors based on their militancy and violence (De Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Manning 2004, 54; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). The wave sees democracy, defined as formal elections, as a peace tool, whose primary function is transferring violent disagreement into electoral disagreement (Baker 2001, 760–61; Manning 2008, 2; Paris 2004, 19; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 136–37; Wallensteen 2002, 139). Democracy is thereby subsumed to its inflexion point with peace.

FRPs' military characteristics and violence are further used to define FRPs as apolitical, non-party actors, without ties to civilian life, who struggle to adjust to formal politics (Allison 2010; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Klapdor 2009). Rebel-to-party transition entails transforming rebels from militant, violent actors, into *peaceful, non-violent* actors, so they no longer pose a threat to stable, peaceful, democratic formal politics (Close and Prevost 2007; De Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007; Höglund 2008; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2010; Lyons 2005;

Söderberg Kovacs 2008). In so doing, the wave subverts the analysis of FRPs as organisations to the overarching goal of researching FRPs as they pertain to peace.

4.1.2 Transitions wave: Western-European conceptualisation and its limitations

This conceptualisation of FRPs as violent, anti-peace, anti-democratic, non-party actors is, I argue, reflective of a Western-European conceptualisation of domestic politics as non-violent and democratic. I call this conceptualisation for Western-European as it is premised on the temporal and geographical realities of the post-Second World War Western world, which is not necessarily applicable to other historical or geographical locations.[16] This Western-European understanding of domestic politics legitimatises state-sanctioned, sovereign violence as the only acceptable form of violence within the domestic arena, and sees non-state sanctioned violence as unnecessary, and an anomaly.[17] The result is a conceptualisation of domestic politics as mutually exclusive from violence, wherein war is understood as a disruption of politics "as normal" (Phayal 2011, 2; Phillips 2009, 2; Wittig 2016, 142–43).

By the logic of this Western-European conceptualisation, former rebel parties, as non-state actors using violence in war, are seen as disruptors of politics with potentially detrimental effects on the project of peace-making, which in turn, is interpreted as a project with the ultimate goal of shifting away from a state of war and violence, to return society back to its "normal" state (Söderberg Kovacs 2007, 5; Phillips 2009, 2; Phayal 2011, 2; Wittig 2016, 142-143). The spoiler role assigned to rebels reflects this view.

This Western-European worldview also portrays war as a bad, disorderly, best-avoided state of rule, contrasted by a portrayal of peace as a good, orderly, desirable state of rule (Richards 2005, 3). This can be seen as a result of the Western-European perspectives' tendency to obscure the connection between violence and politics. The juxtaposition of war as bad and peace as good brings war out of its socially situated context, making it "a thing of itself" instead of being understood as a socially situated political project (Richards 2005, 4). If war is not

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[16] Any reader familiar with the history of politics can corroborate the role of violence in contesting, conquering and defending power and transforming society. Campbell (2014)'s analysis of violence in ancient history or Tilly's (1990) notion of violence as necessary for the transition to moderation are examples of this.
[17] Writings on this regarding civil war and international interventions emerge in international relations and war studies. Examples include Barkawi (2011), Charbonneau (2012) and Doyle (1986). The privileging of state violence over other kinds of violence can also be traced back to Weber's ideas of the state, the maintenance of state force against internal threats by "all other conceivable means" (Weber 1921, 55).

understood as a political project, the actors who participate in it, why they do so, and the structural, political and social contexts wars emerge out of are obscured from analysis (Richards 2005, 4).

The Western-European perspective thereby prevents the transitions wave from addressing the social situatedness of FRPs, or seeing former rebel parties as political and social actors (Richards 2005, 3-5). In so doing, the political, ideological and social nature of FRPs and their party-like characteristics are precluded from analysis, and understanding of FRPs is made poorer. Furthermore, the waves' tendency to see rebels as apolitical *based on their use of violence* is not universally applicable. Definitions of political parties do exist that are open for violence, such as the one used in this thesis. [18] Some political parties in post-civil war countries also use violence (Moniruzzaman 2009; Omotola 2010; Reilly, Nordlund et al. 2008; Reilly 2001; 2006; 2013; Reeder and Seeberg 2018; Reilly and Reynolds 1999; van Biezen 2003). This illustrates that violent actors can also be political actors, and that such actors operate in formal politics.

Additionally, the assumption that FRPs are apolitical negates the role of FRP violence as *political violence.* If war is a political project instigated by political actors for political purposes, the use of violence in war should also be seen as a *political act.* Rebels violence should therefore have political and ideological significance. Studies in the continuous movement wave show support for these claims by emphasising the role of ideology as a rationale for violence (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 389; Sanín and Wood 2014, 221–22; Sukyens 2015), and the use of violence as a political tool (Sanín and Wood 2014; Wittig 2016, 43). By not addressing the political significance of rebel violence, the Western-European perspective hinders an understanding of *what* rebels give up when they demilitarise, or how demilitarisation affects subsequent FRP development. Hence, the Western-European perspective's portrayal of FRPs as apolitical due to their violence, is not necessarily merited, and limits our understanding of FRPs.

The Western-European conceptualisation also sees rebels as anti-democratic spoilers, based on their military characteristics. However, presuming that FRPs violence is political, and that

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[18] As "an organisation that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions (Janda 1980, 5).

FRPs engage in war to further political and ideological struggles in opposition to non-democratic regimes, one cannot say that FRPs are undemocratic unless they exhibit anti-democratic ideological or political content. Rather, the presumption of FRPs' anti-democratic nature appears to result from assigning anti-democratic values to rebels wartime characteristics, and by extension, war itself. This, I would argue, is reflective of the the dichotomous war/politics distinction of the Western-European conceptualisation of politics.

The Western-European perspective also prevents the transitions wave from addressing the social situatedness of the political systems FRPs operate in. This applies both to democratic character of the regime and whether political violence is used within the political system. Without adressing the social situatedness and the characteristics of the political regime rebels are included into, one cannot address how the violence, military characteristics or presumed anti-democraticness of rebels fit into the wider political system. This has implications for the democratic spoiler assumption, which presumes that rebels are anti-democratic in part because of their opposition to the formal political system, which is presumed to be democratic. Without addressing the democraticness of the system, one has insufficient basis for presuming that FRPs will be democratic spoilers. The validity of the spoiler assumption is further decreased by the fact that FRPs tend to emerge from autocratic or "hybrid" regimes with relatively high degrees of state repression (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010; Wigell 2008, Wittig 2016, 143). I return to this point later in the chapter.

4.1.3 Underlying normative perspectives in the continuous movement wave
Adjustments of elements of the Western-European perspective
Violent, political, parties
The continuous movement wave conceives of FRPs as violent, political, party-like organisations (Berti 2013; Lyons 2013). The wave emphasises rebels' socio-political origins, civilian ties, political struggle, ideology, representative function, and party-like capacities before, during and after war (Aalen 2020; Berti 2013;2019; Løvlie 2013; Løvlie 2013; Nissen and Schlichte 2006; Pearce 2020; Wittig 2016, 143). The wave thereby moves beyond the Western-European perspectives' separation of violence and politics, understanding war as political struggles conducted by political actors. This echoes a Clausewitzian understanding of war as a "continuation of politics by other means" (Clausewitz 1832).

A broadening interpretation of the dependent variable

The continuous movement wave also broadens the understanding of the dependent variable, how rebels adapt to the formal politics, by moving beyond the goal of pacifying FRPs. Instead of adopting an image of European politics as the ideal image through which FRPs are supposed to arrive, the wave examines a broader set of elements of FRPs as they are, grounded in their empirical realities. These indicators include changes in internal party dynamics and ideology, electoral-mindedness, parliamentary cooperation, internal party changes, and relationship to supporters (Berti 2013; 2019; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama 2015; Sindre 2016a; 2016b; 2018: 2019; Sprenkels 2019).

Social situatedness and the continuities between war and peacetime politics

I argue that the continuous movement wave is enabled to move beyond the Western-European conceptualisation by addressing: a) rebels social situatedness, and b) the continuities between war and post-civil war politics. The wave sees rebels adjustment to formal politics as limited to a reinterpretation and continuities of their wartime foundations (Berti 2013, 532; Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2020; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406; Sindre 2018; 2019; Whiting 2018; Wilson 2020). The wave also notes the socially situated realities of formal, institutional post-civil war politics as a mix of wartime and peacetime elements. The studies also emphasise the fluidity and continuance of war and violence into formal politics (Berti, 2013; 2019; Berti and Guiterrez 2016; Staniland 2015; Wittig 2016), and or how the structures of the political system endorse the continuation of wartime practices (Berti 2013; 2019; Pearce 2020; Wittig 2016).

4.1.4 Continous movement wave: Western-European propagation and its limitations

The continuous movement wave does, however, still propagate (perhaps unwittingly) several of the elements of the Western-European conceptualisation. Some of the waves' works continue to assign rebels characteristics along a democracy-autocracy spectrum (Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama 2016; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). The wave also continues to understand military characteristics and violence as signs of rebels undemocratic character (Berti 2013; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama 2019; Lyons 2013; 2016; Sprenkels 2019), and continues to see violence as incompatible with democracy and elections (Ishiyama and Widmeier 2020; Sprenkels 2018; 2019; Whiting 2018). Additionally, the wave, despite its emphasis on the continuance of war and violence into formal politics (Berti 2013; 2019, Berti and Guitérrez

2016; Staniland 2015; Wittig 2016), does not assess the structural conditions of the political system FRPs are included into, nor does the wave conceive of FRPs' violence as political.

The wave thereby perpetuates the same assignation of war and violence as anti-democratic as the transitions wave, equating rebels' wartime characteristics with anti-democratic sentiment. Additionally, the wave continues to see FRPs as potential spoilers of democracy, despite FRPs operating in non-democratic regimes. By not seeing FRP violence as political violence, the wave does not address or understand the significance of violence to FRPs, be it in war or in the post-civil war political system. Not examining political system characteristics also prevents an assessment of whether violence is still purposeful as a political tool for FRPs in formal politics. Such an understanding should, I expect, open for new avenues of research that might help explain the continued use of violence by some FRPs after joining formal politics[19] (Berti 2013; 2019; Berti and Knobel 2015; Whiting 2018). It is also possible that FRPs' political environment contains incentives for the continued use of violence. Post-civil war regimes are often characterised by some level of violence (Björkdahl et al. 2016; Deglow 2016; Manz 2008; Staniland 2015; 2017; Suhrke and Berdal 2013; van Baalen and Höglund 2019; Wittig 2016, 147). One would presume that this occurs because the actors in it find violence to be a useful tool. FRPs might share this sentiment.

In other words, to fully address FRPs and their adjustment to formal politics, it is necessary to address the social situatedness and local empirical contexts of FRPs and the political system they adjust to, both before, during, and after war. This includes a more careful examination of the connection between war and politics, and the ways democratic notions are incorporated into understandings of war and the practices of war. Hence, adopting the Western-European conceptualisation of politics and its concern with peace and democracy as a baseline for analysis is limiting for understanding our dependent variable, how oppositional FRPs adjust to formal politics. In the next section I therefore suggest an alternative conceptualisation for politics, grounded in the empirical realities of FRPs' political systems.

4.2 A change in conceptual lens

How, then, should the conceptualisation of politics be adjusted to better answer how former rebel parties adjust to being part of formal electoral political systems? I argue that the Western-

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[19] As seen in Hamas, Sinn Féin and Hezbollah .

European conceptualisation needs to be replaced with a conceptualisation of politics that fits the contexts FRPs operate in. On a general basis, this context is one of non-democratic, political systems that exist somewhere in between the war and peace categorisation, characterised by continuities between war and peace.

4.2.1 FRPs' contexts as characterised by a state of war/peace hybridity

In this section, I draw on three perspectives, Richards' (2005) "no peace, no war", Staniland's (2015, 2017) "armed politics" and Wittig's (2016) "neither peace nor war", as well as FRP literature to construct a new conceptualisation of intra-state post-civil war politics. The three perspectives emphasise the interlinkages between peace and war as surrounding non-state armed rebel groups, emphasising how post-war contexts are a hybridity between peace and war (Richards, 2005, 3; Wittig 2016, 144; Staniland 2015, 460).

Conceptualisation of civil war

These perspectives conceptualise civil war as a political arena, with many commonalities to peacetime politics. In the perspectives, war is understood as a political project, through a Clausewitzian lens as a "long-term struggle organised for political ends, commonly but not always using violence" (Clausewitz 1832; Richards 2005, 4; Staniland 2015, 711; Wittig 2016, 142). War is instigated because political actors see violence as a logical pathway to seizing power and furthering their political struggle (Richards 2004, 4). This political struggle is further seen as originating in insufficiently resolved political and social conflict between actors in the pre-war political system (Wittig 2016, 147; Richards 2004, 4).

This conceptualisation fits with continuous movement wave studies emphasising the political struggle, socio-political origins, and representative function of FRPs (Berti 2013, 11; Caspersen 2011; Nissen and Schlichte 2006; Piccolini and Speight 2017; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sindre and Söderström 2016, 111; Speight and Wittig 2017; Wittig 2016, 143; Whiting 2018, 288-289). Wittig also emphasises that FRPs often emerge under authoritarian, oppressive regimes, where violence is the only effective means to further the rebels' political cause (Wittig 2016, 142). This is a conceptualisation shared by authors writing on insurgency groups as manifestations of larger societal struggles under oppressive states (Tse-Tung 1961b; 1961a; Guevara 1969; Kaempf 2009; Sarvananthan 2018).

In this perspective, civil war is understood to involve the breakdown, maintenance and reshaping of existing political order (Staniland 2015, 46). Rebel groups, government actors, and civilians create new political orders of governance in wartime, with new systems of service-provision, decision-making and social interaction (Staniland 2015, 459-460; Wittig 2016, 148). This fits literature on rebels' wartime governance (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Mampilly 2011; Sanín and Wood 2014, 221–22; Sukyens 2015). These orders are sustained through both violent and non-violent means, where the latter includes mobilisation, civilian-army cooperation, political actor negotiation and compromise, and government-rebel cooperation (Staniland 2015; Wittig 2016, 140-142). In FRP literature, these political orders mark the foundation for rebels' party-like characteristics. The three perspectives also emphasise that civil wars often contain sustained periods of non-violence (Richards 2005, 3; Staniland 2015; 2017, 461-462; Wittig 2016, 147-148). In other words, civil war involves both the same political skills and means used in peacetime politics, but combined with wartime violence. This is true both for FRPs and the governments they oppose in war.

Civil war dynamics integrated into post-civil war politics

The elements of civil war, its patterns of competition and cooperation, and the use of wartime means, do not disappear as society transitions into peace. Rather they integrate with elements of the pre-war political system to form a new post-civil war political system (Richards 2005, 5; Staniland 2015, 459-460; Wittig 2016, 141,148). War is also a state of mind that wartime combatants and civilians carry into peacetime (Richards 2005, 5). Wartime continuities cement relationships between governments, FRPs, and sections of the electorate (Richards 2005, 5; Staniland 2015, 460; Wittig 2016, 146-148). Additionally, post-civil war politics often involve a degree of institutionalised violence, where violence is a commonly used tool for maintaining and contesting political power, both by government and opposition parties (Wittig 2016, 144-145; Staniland 2015, 459). Wartime continuities also impact how parties compete over and mobilise support, which involves the continuance of wartime means, such as violence, patronage and absolutist rhetorics (Wittig 2016, 148). Thus, the formal political systems FRPs are included into continue to be influenced by both non-violent and violent elements of civil war.

Examining FRP literature shows support for the existence of these continuities. Several studies note the influence of the pre-war regime (Aalen 2020; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Purdeková, Reyntjens, and Wilén 2018), and competitive and structural relations from wartime

affecting FRPs' relationship to government and other political parties, or emphasise how elements of peace-deals such as power-sharing and intervention by international actors affect the structural dynamics of the post-civil war regime (Berti 2013; Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 149, 153; Whiting 2018). The general use of violence is also echoed in the literature on post-war electoral violence, post-war democratisation and post-war governance (Christensen and Utas 2008; Höglund 2008; Matanock 2016; Manz 2008; Pearce 2020; Suhrke and Berdal 2013; van Baalen and Höglund 2019).

Figure 1: Political Terror Scale

The graphs contain data from the Political Terror Scale (v.2021), for 12 countries, from 1976-2020. Societal violence is scaled from 1-5, where 1 = secure rule of law and no political prisoners, 2 = secure rule of law and a few political prisoners, 3 = extensive political imprisonment and reduced rule of law, 4 = civil and political rights violations extended to large parts of the population, and 5 = civil and political rights violations extended to the whole population. The graphs were made using R, version 4.1.0

A part of the continuities from war is the continued use of violence and prosecution by government parties. To corroborate this point, quantitative data from the Political Terror Scale are presented in Figure 1.[20] The figure present data for 16[21] countries where oppositional FRPs are active from the time period 1976-2020. The index measures societal and state-perpetrated

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[20] The countries included are identified based on the overview of oppositional FRPs provided in Table A in the appendix.
[21] Table A in the appendix identifies 19 countries as having oppositional FRPs. The United Kingdom, Djibouti and the Democratic Republic of Congo are not included in the graph due to missing data.

violence. Therefore, the index is thought to measure the system FRPs are included into, without accounting for FRPs own violence. The index scores societal and political violence from 1 to 5, where 1 indicates a strong rule of law, political protections and low levels of violence, and 5 indicates civil and political rights violations extended to the whole population. Cross-referencing the violence scores in Figure 1 with the timing of rebel inclusion[22] shows that the majority of regimes resided have a score of 4 or 5 at the time of rebel inclusion. These scores reflect civil and political right violations occurring towards the whole or most of the population. The majority of the regimes in the figure have stabilised at a score of 3 in the post-civil war era. The score reflects extensive political imprisonment and rule of law. Figure 1 thereby shows support for the argument that oppositional FRPs face relatively violent and repressive governments in the post-civil war regime.

4.2.2. FRPs' contexts as undemocratic

In addition to being characterised by war-peace continuities, the political systems FRPs operate in are non-democratic. Few studies on oppositional FRPs tend to focus on this. Non-FRP scholarship has noted the autocratic nature of post-civil war regimes (Fish and Kroenig 2006; Reilly 2001; Reynolds 2010; Reilly and Reynolds 1999; Sambanis 2000; Toft 2010, 24; Zürcher et al. 2013). There is also scholarship arguing that civil wars tend to break out from pre-war non-democratic regimes (Auvinen 1997; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre 2001, 33; Henderson and Singer 2000, 279–80; Muller and Weede 1990, 627; Reynal-Querol 2002; Jones and Lupu 2018; Bartusevičius and Skaaning 2018, 626). Additionally, the whole doctrine of post-war democracy-building and peace-making implicitly rests against an autocratic (or non-democratic) background (Billerbeck and Tansey 2019, 699). Premised on this scholarship, one would presume that FRPs exist in non-democratic regimes.

To further illustrate that FRPs' contexts are undemocratic, an overview of the regime type classifications of 19 political regimes containing oppositional FRPs is presented in Figure 2. The figure uses the Regimes of the World Index (Lührmann et al. 2021) from the Varieties of Democracies Dataset 2021. The variable codes regime type from 0-3, where 3 = a full liberal democracy, 2 = electoral democracy, 1 = electoral autocracy and 0 = a closed autocracy. As illustrated by Figure 2, 17 of these regimes have a score between 0 and 2, marking them as

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[22] As provided by Table A in the appendix.

autocratic or hybrid regimes. The index thereby confirms that oppositional FRPs operate in non-democratic contexts.

Figure 2: World Index Scores

The graphs are based on the Regimes of the World Index from the Varieties of Democracy Dataset v. 2021, covering the years 1960-2020. Regime types are classified from 0 to 3, where 0 = Closed autocracy, 1 = Electoral Autocracy, 2 = Electoral Democracy and 3 = Liberal Democracy. The graphs were made using R, version 4.1.0

Summary of new conceptualisation

Seeing war and post-war politics as a hybridity of peace and war and addressing the non-democratic character of post-civil war regimes negates the vision of war as a disruption of politics democratic, non-violent politics "as normal", and the interpretation of post-civil war politics as a return to this state of normality. For one, the political system in question do not fit with Western-European notions of democratic, peaceful politics in the pre-war era. Instead, post-civil war politics return to normality would entail the continuance of oppressive, non-democratic structures. This is not to say that civil war does not disrupt the system. But the political and social changes occurring in war, and the disruptiveness of war does not disappear, but rather become permanent fixtures of post-civil war society and politics. Pre-war regime characteristics are combined with wartime continuities that either endorse or disrupt past institutional practices. Peace-deal concessions and international interference further cause amendments to the pre-war political system. How these elements combine to a create changes in the political system, and the continued development of the said system, is not one that that

should be conceived of in Western-European terms, as a linear transition towards a peaceful, democratic society where the elements of war disappear.

4.3. Changing understandings of former rebel parties

Abandoning the "democratic spoiler" assumption

The change in conceptualisation of post-civil war politics, or FRPs' context, has implications for our understanding of how FRPs adjust to formal political systems. I suggest that the "democratic spoiler" assumption be abandoned in the case of examining oppositional FRPs adjustment to formal politics. After all, the assumption is premised on rebels' wartime violence and military characteristics, and the assignation of these elements as anti-democratic. As previously argued, military characteristics and violence does not equate to anti-democratic sentiment. Given that the political systems oppositional FRPs are included into are non-democratic also devaluates the argument that rebels opposition to the political system and the pre-war government reflects anti-democratic sentiments. In other words, rebels' wartime characteristics do not necessarily mark them as spoilers. Given that the regimes rebels are included to are semi-violent, and relatively oppressive systems where government has much power, and opposition parties have limited power, it makes little sense to presume that oppositional FRPs would be the actor "spoiling" democracy-building, if indeed such an obstruction were to occur.

Former rebel parties as anti-system actors

However, this is not to say that FRPs do not challenge the formal political system or need not undergo changes to meet the demands of formal politics. Rebels are revolutionary actors who oppose and reject "the legitimacy of the political system and the pre-war regime" (Allison 2010; de Zeeuw 2008; Deonandan 2007, 233; Höglund 2008; Manning 2004, 54; 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 134). As shown, rebels discover extra-systemic sources of power in wartime and create socio-political orders and practices that contradict the mentalities and practices of formal political norms. This opposition, and the desire to change the formal political system is something rebels carry with them into post-civil war politics. Therefore, I argue that FRPs should be defined by their anti-system characteristic, or FRPs lacking recognition of the political system. In the following paragraphs I use previous FRP literature to argue for how this anti-system characteristic manifests itself in rebels' ideology and political struggle, behaviour and violence.

Former rebel parties are defined as socio-political movements originating in civil society and social protest movements (Berti 2013; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Løvlie 2013; Lyons 2016a; Nissen and Schlichte 2006; Wittig 2016, 143). These groups emerge in opposition to the political regime (Wittig 2016, 143). This opposition is made on behalf of some referent groups, and the grievances that the government and the existing political system represent for these groups (Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Purdeková, Reyntjens, and Wilén 2018; Wood 2001). These perceived injustices form the basis of the political struggle of FRPs. This political struggle is further manifested into an ideology that describes an alternate vision of society that rebels desire to implement in place of the current political system (Curtis and Sindre 2019, 399–400). This ideology is further used to justify rebels' opposition to the adversary regime (Berti 2019, 515; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 401; Jo 2015). FRPs ideology and political struggle are thereby part of their anti-system characteristic challenging the political regime.

Consequently, rebels' turn to violence and war, in pursuit of this ideological vision becomes part of the anti-system characteristic. The military characteristics of FRPs, such as absolutism, maximalism, violence, secrecy, hierarchical structures and internal obedience (Allison 2010; Berti 2013; 2019; Burihabwa and Curtis 2019; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama 2019; Lyons 2013; 2016a; 2016b; 2016c; Manning 2007; Manning and Smith 2016; Sindre 2016a; Söderberg Kovacs 2008), thereby become necessary manifestations of the new form the anti-system struggle has garnered. The turn to violence can also be read as a sign of rebels' persistence when other channels prove unfruitful when facing a non-inclusive pre-war regime (Wittig 2016, 143). Rebels militarism and violence is thereby likely seen by FRPs as necessary to implement changes in the political system and are manifestations of the anti-system struggle.

Rebels anti-system struggle further becomes manifested in non-violent behaviour. The state-like structures rebels build in conquered territory during war (Arjona 2014; Arjona 2016; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Berti 2013; Börzel and Risse 2010; Kasfir 2015; Lyons 2013; 2016b; Mampilly 2011; Pearce 2020; Staniland 2015), serve as a manifestation of what an alternative political system would look like. The mobilisation of civilian support, and the involvement of citizens into rebel governance (Berti 2013, 12; Lyons 2016a, 1028; Arjona 2014; Arjona 2016; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Aalen and Muriaas 2017; Börzel and Risse 2010; Kasfir 2015; Mampilly 2011; Lyons 2016b; Pearce 2020), mark efforts to spread

and sustain the anti-system vision of society.[23] These wartime behaviours thereby deviate from the norms of the political system and present extra-systemic sources of power and legitimacy for FRPs.

These anti-system characteristics of FRPs, as manifested in wartime political struggles and ideology, violence, and non-violent behaviour, continue to stay with rebels as they transition from the battlefield to formal political systems. Studies in the continuous movement wave has emphasised these continuities. These anti-system wartime practices and mentalities challenge the system, by relying on extra-systemic source of power and legitimacy. FRPs thereby challenge the political system by operating by a parallel set of rules (or a parallel system), separate from the formal political system. The extent to which FRPs continue to rely on these separate systems and norms is, thus, I contend, an important underlying dimension of what is measured when measuring how FRPs adjust to formal political systems. In this thesis, I therefore disaggregate the anti-system characteristics from notions of democracy (and peace), and examine it on its own.

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[23] As described by Mao (Tse-Tung 1961b; 1961a).

Chapter 5: Analytical framework

The purpose of this chapter is to create an analytical framework fulfilling three purposes. 1) Conceptualize and operationalize a dependent variable of how and whether FRPs adjust their anti-system characteristic to political system norms. 2) Identify independent variables affecting FRPs' adjustment. And 3) propose causal mechanisms connecting and explaining how and why the dependent variables affect the dependent variable. The framework uses insights from the literature on radical Islamic parties, and the concept of moderation, in addition to the insights from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 to construct this framework.

5.1. Conceptualising and operationalising the dependent variable

Conceptualisation of anti-democratic moderation from studies on radical Islamic parties

Moderation is defined as a radical party's movement from an anti-democratic position towards an increasingly democratic position, driven by the party's inclusion into formal democratic politics (Huntington 1991; Tezcür 2010a; Wickham 2004). The concept has two indicators; behaviour and ideology (Ashour 2009, 3; Bermeo 1997, 307–8; Huntington 1991, 168–70; Tezcür 2010a, 10–11, 78–81; Wickham 2004, 206). Moderation can be said to occur when an anti-democratic party has made critical changes on individual issues of ideology and behaviour that previously made the party unsuitable to operating within a democratic system (Ashour 2007, 14; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 178–79; Maeda 2016, 215; Tezcür 2010a, 6). At stake in anti-democratic moderation is therefore the threat radical parties pose to democracy and its potential to undermine democratic systems (Bermeo 1997, 307–8; Schwedler 2011, 350; Tezcür 2010a, 81). Analysing moderation thereby entails an examination of the anti-democratic characteristics possessed by the parties studied, and the extent to which these characteristics have changed to fit democratic system norms. Anti-democratic moderation is seen to have two outcomes: *moderation*, where the party moves towards democratic system-norms, and *radicalisation*, where the party moves away from democratic system-norms (Brocker and Künkler 2013, 173,175; Schwedler 2011, 350).

Conceptualisation of anti-system moderation in former rebel parties

For the purposes of this thesis, anti-system moderation is defined as "a movement from a position of rejection of the legitimacy of the political system, towards a position of system abidance and acceptance." The concept measures change in FRPs' anti-system characteristic, towards political system norms. Anti-system moderation is conceptualised and measured in

three indicators; ideology, (non-violent) behaviour, and violence.[24] The outcome of anti-system moderation are measured and assessed independently for each indicator. *Anti-system moderation* can therefore be said to occur when a rebel party has made critical changes on individual issues on violence, ideology and non-violent behaviour that previously marked the party's resistance to the political system and reticence to system-abiding means of attaining power. If FRPs moderate, they support and legitimise the political system. If FRPs do not moderate, they undermine the political system. At stake in FRPs' anti-system moderation is therefore the legitimacy of the political regime and its norms. In the framework, anti-system moderation has three possible outcomes; 1) *moderation*, or changes towards system recognition and abidance. 2) *Radicalisation*, or changes *away* from the system, towards increased opposition, non-abidance to system rules, and increased reliance on extra-systemic wartime means of legitimacy. And 3) *non-moderation*, where do not move in either direction. The conceptualisation and operationalisation of anti-system moderation are presented in figure 3.

Figure 3: Illustration of anti-system moderation in former rebel parties

Figure 3 illustrates the three indicators (non-violent behaviour, behaviour and violence) of anti-system moderation and the directionality of the three potential moderation outcomes (moderation, radicalisation and non-moderation), compared to an ideal-type version of a system-abiding oppositional party.

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[24] For further information on the construction and justification of these indicators, see chapter 6.

Limitations to moderation

Anti-democratic moderation is understood to be a limited process. Radical parties are driven by inflexible, dogmatic religious ideologies, where behavioural tactics and means are justified through ideological rationales (Schwedler 2006; 2011; Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway 2006; Tepe 2012; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 172-173, Pahwa 2017). As its supports and the members of the party themselves proscribe to these ideologies and the world-views that entails, moderation might be interpreted as a de-evaluation of the party's identity, and might damage voter turnout and internal legitimacy (Tepe 2012;Tezcür 2010a, Schwedler 2006, 152; Gurses 2014). Radical parties are therefore limited to change that can be justified by their ideology, and that is coherent with their past ideological identity. Anti-democratic moderation does therefore not entail a complete reconfiguration or abandonment of rebels behaviour, ideology and goals (Brocker and Künkler 2013, 177; Clark 2006; Pahwa 2017; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004; Wickham 2008).

Like anti-democratic moderation, anti-system moderation in FRPs is expected to be a limited process. As previously shown, former rebel parties are driven by relatively inflexible ideologies, where behaviour and violence are determined by ideological justifications (Berti 2013, 25; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Börzel and Risse 2010; Cohen, Hoover Green, and Wood 2013; Kasfir 2015; Løvlie 2013; Mampilly 2011; Sanín and Wood 2014, 221–22; Whiting 2018: Wilson 2016; 2020). Moderating on ideology and behaviour risks a potential loss of identity, voters and internal legitimacy for FRPs (Berti 2019; Curtis and Sindre 2019; Manning 2008; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2016a). Anti-system moderation in former rebel parties is therefore limited to re-interpretation coherent with previous ideological identities (Berti 2013, 532; Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2020; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406; Sindre 2018; 2019; Whiting 2018; Wilson 2020). This indicates that even where large extents of moderation occur, former rebel parties are likely to retain some level of anti-system characteristics. Therefore, one should not expect former rebel parties to become actors without any reservations towards the system. Instead, the concept of anti-system moderation should be used to access the degrees to which the reservations towards the system are mitigated by concessions and legitimisations of it.

Operationalisation of anti-democratic moderation in radical Islamic parties

Studies on radical Islamic parties have operationalised moderation along two indicators: behaviour and ideology.

Behaviour

Behavioural moderation is operationalised as whether radical parties replace non-electoral, non-democratic and non-pluralist behaviour with electoral and conciliatory behaviour (Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Clark 2006; Gurses 2014; Huntington 1991; Mufti 1999; Pahwa 2017; Schwedler 2011; Tezcür 2010a; Wickham 2004). Studies tend to examine whether radical parties engage in vote-maximisation and parliamentary cooperation and, and whether "other"[25] anti-democratic behaviour is abandoned (Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Clark 2006; Elman and Warner 2008; Huntington 1969, 20; 1991, 169; Mufti 1999,114; Schwedler 2011, 362-363; Tezcür 2010a, 71; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004, 327; Wuhs 2013,190).

Ideology

Ideological moderation is operationalised as whether there have been changes in party ideology showing increased support for political pluralism, popular sovereignty, democratic elections, and the rule of law (Ashour 2009; Bermeo 1997; Huntington 1991; Tezcür 2010a; Wickham 2004). Studies also examine to address additional changes in what is deemed anti-democratic elements of ideology, such as extremist and absolutist interpretations of Islam, and exclusionary rhetoric of non-Muslisms (Schwedler 2011; Tezcür 2010b, Freer 2018; Pahwa 2017).

Operationalisation of anti-system moderation in former rebel parties

The framework operationalises anti-system moderation in former rebel parties along three indicators: behaviour, ideology and violence.

Ideology

Ideological anti-system moderation is operationalised as whether FRPs have re-interpreted their ideology to soften its wartime critiques of the system, and whether their goals are adjusted to be achievable within the constraints of the formal system. What this entails for the FRP will depend on the nature of rebels' ideology. Examples of anti-system moderation is the move from secessionism to regionalism (Sindre 2019), from dogmatic and orthodox Islamic

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[25] Examples include reliance on social networks, radical supporters, the use of violent mobs, boycotting or abstention from parliamentary proceedings, subverting electoral processes, or contradicting institutional checks and balances, be it by norms or legal rules(Bashirov and Lancaster 2018;Clark 2006; Gurses 2014; Mufti 1999; Pahwa 2017; Shwedler 2011).

aspirations to more moderate Islamic aspirations (Berti 2013, 2019) or from capitalist eradication to social-welfare-heavy economics (Sprenkels 2019).

Violence

Anti-system moderation of violence is operationalised as whether former rebel parties have given up a) their capacity of violence and b) use of violence. The indicator is tied to the argument presented in Chapter 4, that FRPs' political violence is a manifestation of its anti-system characteristic and challenge the political system and that violence is a political tool. Violence thereby represents an extra-systemic source of power and legitimacy, that contradicts political system norms.

(Non-violent) Behaviour

Generally speaking, FRPs' political systems are non-democratic, post-civil war regimes. Anti-system behaviour is operationalised as the extent to which rebels adopt three forms of behaviour: 1) Adopt electoral-minded and parliamentary logics. 2) Participate in informal authoritarian practices. And 3) stop relying on wartime extra-systemic practices.

FRPs' political systems are non-democratic regimes. Such non-democratic operate by electoral and legislative parliamentary logics, and parties need to (at least in part) use these channels to survive electorally, pass legislature, and attain basic power within the system (Brancati 2014; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009a; Levitsky and Way 2012; Levitsky and Way 2002; Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik 2020; Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009b; Gandhi and Reuter 2013; Lust-Okar 2006; Gandhi and Heller 2018; Levitsky and Way 2010; Seeberg 2012). However, in non-democratic regimes, parliamentary and electoral channels are also accompanied by authoritarian informal practices. Authoritarian and hybrid regimes contain informal practices such as inter-elite bargaining and networks of patronage, which can serve as alternate ways of passing policy and attaining power (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust-Okar 2004; Erdmann 2004; Williamson and Magaloni 2020, 1528–29; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2012, 88–89).

When examining how FRPs adjust their behaviour to fit the norms of these systems, the framework therefore examines *both* whether FRPs adapt to parliamentary and electoral practices, *and* whether they participate in authoritarian informal practices. As the existence of and participation in authoritarian practices might decrease the incentives for parliamentary and

electoral incentives, I argue that the two measures should be looked at collectively when assessing the degrees of anti-system moderation that has occurred on the behaviour indicator.

Rebels also defy system norms by continuing to rely on extra-systemic practices from wartime. These practices include the continuance of state-like structures built in conquered territory during war and the provision of patronage services to core constituents (Berti 2013; 2019; Pearce 2020). Changes in these behaviours, should however, include an assessment of whether this is part of political norms in the systems. For instance, both post-war societies and hybrid regimes are known for cultures of patronage (Berti 2013, 186; 2019; Løvlie 2013, Lust-Okar, 2004; Pearce 2020; Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019).

5.2.Causal mechanisms of moderation

Studies of radical Islamic parties argue that moderation occurs through the causal mechanisms of a strategic cost-benefit analysis (Ashour 2007, 14; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 179; Tezcür 2010a, 69). If the potential benefits of moderation outweigh the potential costs, moderation will occur; if the potential costs outweigh the benefits, moderation will not occur. This process is an internal party process (Ashour 2007, 14; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 179; Maeda 2016, 215; Tezcür 2010a, 69). Individual issues of ideology and behaviour are discussed internally in the party. If the strongest voices within the party see moderation as strategically beneficial for the party's goals, moderation occurs (Ashour 2007, 14; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 179; Maeda 2016, 215; Tezcür 2010a, 69).

These mechanisms are expected to work differently for internal and external independent variables. Internal variables, or variables describing internal party dynamics are expected to affect the cognitive lenses behind the cost/benefit calculation, (Tezcür 2010b, 69). If powerful internal party actors favour moderation, moderation is like to occur (Ashour 2007, 15; Tezcür 2010b, 74). If powerful internal party actors are opposed to moderation, moderation is not likely (Ashour 2007, 15;Tezcür 2010b, 74). Whether actors are in favour or against moderation is assumed to be correlated to the strictness of ideological interpretation held by different party factions (Ashour 2007; Schwedler 2011).

The attention paid to key party actors' attitude towards moderation fits with the writings on factional divides within FRPs, between hard-liners, who oppose change based on rigid ideological worldviews, and pragmatists, who support moderation (Berti 2013; Berti and

Knobel 2015; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; De Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2013; Lovlie 2013; Sindre 2016; 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). Several FRP scholars point to this tension as a divide between those wishing to accommodate electoral and parliamentary channels and use them to increase rebel power, and thereby changing ideology, behaviour and giving up violence, and those that do not (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; De Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Lovlie 2013; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). These divides should therefore transfer to differing attitudes on anti-system moderation. In the framework, I term the divide as two different *orientations* of moderation; those in favour of moderation, who are *moderates*, and those who oppose it, who are *hard-liners*.[26] In line with studies on radical Islamic parties (Ashour 2007, 15; Schwedler 2011; Tezcür 2010b), hard-liners are assumed to have a negative correlation to moderation, while moderates have a positive correlation to moderation.

External variables are expected to figure into the cost/benefit calculation of moderation by providing the strategic costs and the benefits to achieving rebels' goals. Structural conditions of the political system present rebels either with opportunities incentivising rebels to see moderation as favourable to them, *benefits*, or with punitive measures make continued non-moderation or radicalisation disadvantageous to the party, *costs* (Brockler and Künkler 2013, 180, 182; Clark 2006, 205; Schwedler 2006, 152; Wuhs 2013, 189; Yadav 2010). External political actors are expected to influence the implementation of opportunities and costs awarded by structural variables, and thereby affect moderation outcomes (Ashour 2009, 14-15; Brockler and Künkler 2013, 180; Maeda 2016; Menchik 2018; Schwedler 2006, 152; 2011, 364-365; Tomsa 2012; Tezcür 2010a, 75).

This view is reflected by the FRP literature's identification of structural variables, as providing incentives for change towards the rule of the system, electoral channels and parliamentary channels (Berti 2013; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; de Zeeuw 2008; Lovlie 2013; Reilly 2006; (Reilly, Nordlund et al. 2008; Sindre 2018; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). The continuous movement wave also connects external actors to the effect of structural incentives (Berti 2013; Ishiyama 2016; Ishiyama and Marshall 2019; Pearce 2020; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). In

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[26]The thesis uses the term *hard-line* as it is commonly used to refer to internal elements of insurgency groups in wartime, especially Islamic insurgency groups (Newsinger 2007; Menkhaus 2010; Duyvesteyn and Schuurman 2011; Strand and Suhrke 2021; Wood 2016; Panwar 2017), and the term *moderate* as it is commonly used in studies of radical Islamic parties (Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 173,175; Schwedler 2011, 50; Gurses 2014, Wuthrich and Cifti 2020).

the framework, I therefore presume that the internal and external factors affect the cost/benefit mechanisms driving anti-system moderation in former rebel parties, in a parallel way to that described by the literature on anti-democratic moderation in radical Islamic parties.

5.3. Independent variables
The framework sorts the independent variables into internal and external variables.

5.3.1 Internal variables
Party leaders

The orientation of party leaders is identified as an important variable affecting moderation in radical Islamic parties (Ashour 2007, 15, Tezcür 2010a; Harmel and Janda 1994, 267). Radical Islamic parties are often run by charismatic leaders with strong followings, who strongly influence the political vision and actions of the organisation (Ashour 2007, 15; Tezcür 2010a, 11; Wickham 2004). Whether these charismatic leaders favour or oppose moderation is therefore expected to influence the party's actions and the opinions of party members, thereby impacting moderation outcomes (Ashour 2007, 15; Tezcür 2010a, 11; Wickham 2004). Change of party leaders, particularly if this new leader has a different view on moderation, is also expected to impact moderation (Harmel and Janda 1994, 267; Ashour 2007, 15; Tezcür 2010a, 11; Schwedler 2006, 13; 2011, 36; Wickham 2006).

 FRPs are also often led by strong, charismatic leaders (Aalen 2020; De Zeeuw 2010; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Pearce 2010; 2020). Whether these leaders are willing to adjust to system norms matters for the party's actions (Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; De Zeeuw 2008; Pearce 2010). FRP leaders and their orientation as either hard-liners or moderates is therefore expected to impact moderation outcomes. Changes in party leaders are also expected to lead to changes in party policy and behaviour in FRPs (Aalen 2020; Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Manning 2004; Whiting 2018).

H1: A moderate leader has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.
H2: A hard-line party leader has a negative effect on anti-system moderation.
H3: A change from a hard-line to a moderate party leader has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

Party factions

Studies on radical Islamic parties identify party factions' orientation as impacting moderation outcomes (Abdullah 2018; Ashour 2007; 2009; Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Langohr 2001; Tepe 2012; Kurzman and Naqvi 2010; Schwedler 2011; Wickham 2004). Particular attention is paid towards the orientation of the dominant party faction, whether it is replaced, and whether its replacement has a different orientation on moderation (Abdullah 2018; Ashour 2007; 2009; Bashirov and Lancaster 2018; Harmel and Janda 1994, 267; Langohr 2001; Tepe 2012).

Studies on former rebel parties have similarly focused on power-struggles between factions of different orientations (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; De Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011, 374-375; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Sindre 2016; 2018; 2019, Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018). In several of these studies, the orientation of the faction emerging victorious from the factional power-struggle has been identified as directly affecting party change (Berti 2013; 2019; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Lovlie 2013; Sindre 2018; 2019). I would expect dominant party factions to have a particularly strong influence in FRPs, as many FRPs have a practice of expelling factions who lose internal power struggles (Berti 2013: 2019; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Manning 2007, 2008; Sindre 2016a; Sprenkels 2019). If other party factions no longer reside inside the party, the influence of the remaining dominant faction gets even stronger. The orientation of the dominant party faction is therefore identified as having causal importance for the outcome of anti-system moderation.

H4: A moderate dominant party faction has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.
H5: A hard-line dominant party faction has a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

Party members

Presence of hard-line members

Radical Islamic parties have been shown to rely on radical members, whose ideologically rigid worldviews make them oppose party moderation (Ashour 2007; Gurses 2014; Mueller and Strøm 1999; Panebianco 1988, 10; Schwedler 2011, 360; Tezcür 2010b; Tepe 2012). As moderation is a collective party process, requiring at least some internal party support, these radical members are expected to influence moderation outcomes negatively.

Former rebel parties are also known for the presence of hard-line members who resist party change (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Løvlie 2013; Sindre

2016b; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019; Whiting 2018). These hard-line members have been shown to strongly impact the parties (Manning 2008; Sindre 2016b, Söderberg Kovacs 2019), even in cases where they form a minority of party members (Berti and Knobel 2015). The presence of hard-line members is therefore thought to prevent anti-system moderation.

H6: The presence of hard-line party members has a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

Organisational diversification

Studies on radical Islamic parties have argued that the influence of radical members can be counteracted by the entry of new members (Ashour 2007; Panebianco 1988, 10-11; Wuhs 2013, 189). Members who join the party after it enters formal politics are hypothesised to have aspirations as politicians and are therefore expected to be more responsive to strategic incentives for moderation (Ashour 2007; Panebianco 1988, 10-11; Wuhs 2013, 189). This entry of new members is referred to as *organisational diversification* in the framework.

The entry of new members is also assumed to lead to increased system-abidance in former rebel parties, as these members are thought to be less radical and absolutist than ex-combatant members (Berti and Knobel 2015; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Whiting 2018). As this thesis argues that anti-system moderation is the change away from wartime practices and mentalities, members joining after war would be presumed to be less attached and exposed to rebels' wartime practices, and thereby be more moderate. Thus, the effect of diversification of party members should apply to former rebel parties.

H7:Organisational diversification of members has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

Party culture and organisation

Studies on radical Islamic parties argue that party culture and party structure determine internal party actors' influence on moderation. Their function is thereby an exogenous variables. Two aspects of party culture and organisation are emphasised: tolerance for dissent, and the inclusiveness of decision-making. High tolerance for dissent and inclusive decision-making structures are thought to aid moderate party actors in attaining power, contributing positively to moderation (Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway 2006, 9-10; Harmel and Janda, 1994: 265; Løvlie 2013, 587; Strøm 1990; Tezcür 2010a, 11; Schwedler 2006, 13; 2011, 36; Tepe 2012;

Wickham 2006). Low tolerance for dissent and centralised decision making is thought to strengthen the influence of already-dominant radical party actors, and is negatively correlated to moderation (Ashour 2007, 15; Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway 2006, 9-10; Harmel and Janda, 1994, 265; Løvlie 2013, 587; Schwedler 2006, 13; 2011, 36; Tezcür 2010a, 11; Wickham 2006).

Studies on former rebel parties show that several FRPs have centralised, hierarchical decision-making structures (Allison 2010; 2016; Close and Prevost 2007; Deonandan 2007, 233; Ishiyama and Batta 2011, 373; Ishiyama and Marshall 2013; Løvlie 2013; Manning 2007; 2008; Sindre 2016a; Söderberg Kovacs 2019). Simultaneously FRPs are documented to have internal debates on larger issues (Aalen 2020; Berti and Knobel 2015; Løvlie 2013; Whiting 2018, 297-299, Sprenkels 2018; 2019). Rebels' decision making structures can thereby be both inclusive and non-inclusive, and can both facilitate and prevent moderate actors from advancing within the party.

H8: Centralised decision-making structures prevent the advancement of moderate actors within the FRP.
H9: Decentralised decision-making structures aid the advancement of moderate actors within the FRP.

Studies further suggest that FRPs have a relatively low tolerance for dissent, being driven by strong obedience cultures (Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Ishiyama and Marshall 2013; Løvlie 2013, 580; Sindre 2016b). That being said, the literature is rife with studies commenting on factional divides (Berti 2013, 188; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 400; Ishiyama and Batta 2011,373; Løvlie 2013, 584–87; Manning 2008; Sprenkels 2019, 537; Wilson 2020, 617; Whiting 2018, 298–301). The presence of these factional divides suggest that FRPs do have a tolerance for dissent. Studies also note a pattern where party factions who lose internal power struggles are expelled from the party (Berti 2013: 2019; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Manning 2007, 2008; Sindre 2016a; 2016c; Sprenkels 2019). This suggests that FRPs tolerance for dissent, while present, is limited. This indicates that dominant party actors' orientation strongly impacts moderation, but that FRPs' cultures simultaneously may allow room for the emergence of moderate actors who can take over dominant positions.

H10: Cultures of low tolerance for dissent increase the effect of party leaders and dominant party factions have on anti-system moderation.

H11: Cultures of higher tolerance for dissent facilitates the emergence of moderate actors within the party.

5.3.2 External variables

Structural variables – Radical Islamic Parties

Electoral results

The literature on radical Islamic parties argue that electoral results influence moderation outcomes. The literature presumes that radical parties will moderate on core ideological and behavioural issues to garner majoritarian, moderate votes in vote-maximisation efforts (Schwedler 2014; Tezcür 2010a, 71; Sánchez-Cuenca 2004, 327; Wuhs, 2013, 190). Therefore, positive electoral results serve as benefits of moderation, and negative or unsatisfactory electoral results serve as a cost of non-moderation (Cavatorta and Merone 2013; Cavatorta and Garcia 2017; Freer 2018; Harmel and Janda 1994; Janda et al. 1995).

Institutional design

The literature on radical Islamic parties argues that moderation depends on whether institutional design makes it beneficial for rebels to moderate, and whether it penalises radical behaviour and attitudes (Abdullah 2018; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 179; Clark 2006, 205; Pahwa 2017; Pokladniková and Yildiz 2009; Tepe 2012; Wuhs 2013, 178-190). On the benefit side, studies examine whether design elements such as national thresholds for parliament, proportional versus direct voter systems, and state funding for parties provide radical parties with opportunities to benefit from the system (Abdullah 2018; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 179; Clark 2006, 205; Pahwa 2017; Pokladniková and Yildiz 2009; Tepe 2012; Wuhs 2013, 178-190). On the cost side, whether the system has institutions that enforce horizontal or vertical accountability that can punish radical parties radical behaviour is emphasised (Ashour 2009,12; Brocker and Künckler 2013, 182; Clark 2006, 205; Wuhs 2013, 189).

External actors – Radical Islamic Parties

The effectiveness structural incentives have on moderation depend on the actions of the political actors in the political system, and whether they act in accordance with system incentives or whether they contradict them.

Voter orientation

The effect of electoral results in studies on radical Islamic parties follow the median voter theorem[27] which is dependent on the existence of a moderate electorate (Brockler and Künkler 2013, 180; Maeda 2016; Menchik 2018; Schwedler 2006, 152; Tomsa 2012). If voters do not desire moderation and therefore vote for radical parties despite their radical nature, positive electoral results may not contribute to moderation.

Other political parties

The function of parliamentary cooperation is also dependent on other political parties' willingness to tolerate radical parties and their ideological position being more moderate than the radical party (Brockler and Künkler 2013, 180; Langohr 2001; Lust-Okar 2005; Menchik 2018; Tomsa 2012).

Government action

The benefits and costs provided by institutional design can be contradicted or enforced by government action. If governments show tolerance towards and provide radical parties with opportunities, it incentivises moderation (Ashour 2009, 14-15; Schwedler 2011, 364-365; Tezcür 2010, 75).

Financial donors

Financial donors who endorse the radical rhetoric of Islamic parties may also undercut the punitive measures or financial tolerance/support, especially if the party has few alternative sources of revenue (Elman and Warner 2008, 17).

Structural variables – Former rebel parties

Electoral results

Electoral results are identified as an independent variable affecting FRP change in much of past literature (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Berdal and Ucko 2009; Berti 2013; de Zeeuw 2008; Close and Prevost 2007; Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013; 2020; Ishiyama et al. 2019; Lyons 2005; Manning 2007; 2008; Matanock and Staniland 2018; Reilly 2006; 2013; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 137; Whiting 2018).

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[27] Wherein vote-maximising parties will moderate on core ideological and behavioural issues to garner majoritarian, moderate votes (Cox 1990; Downs 1957).

However, electoral incentives for moderation may be weak in many post-civil war contexts. Highly polarised electorates and lingering intergroup hatred may make extreme positions beneficial for parties (Allison 2010; Ezrow, Tavits, and Homola 2013; Ezrow, Homola, and Tavits 2014, 535; Themnér 2017, 9; Themnér and Utas 2016; Reilly, Nordlund et al. 2008). Therefore, voters in such systems are not necessarily opposed to the use of violence or wartime rhetoric (Berti 2013, 6-7). Additionally, in many post-civil war contexts, voting is often based on clientelistic, kin-ship or community-based identities, not policy concerns (Berti 2013, 186; Pearce 2020; Reilly 2006; Söderberg Kovacs 2008, 2019). Therefore, the median voter theorem mechanism underlying electoral incentives might not apply to FRPs' context. Instead, I suggest that the impact of electoral results on anti-system moderation is dependent on rebels earlier direction of moderation. Positive electoral results support and legitimise rebels current direction of moderation, and negative electoral results reject it.

H12:Positive electoral results cause former rebel parties to continue on their direction of anti-system moderation.
H13:Negative electoral results cause former rebel parties to change their direction of anti-system moderation.

Core constituents

The extent to which FRPs undergo anti-system moderation depends on whether they continue to rely on wartime sources of extra-systemic legitimacy. One of these sources of extra-systemic legitimacy is the reliance on core constituents, or wartime supporters corresponding to the referent group rebel parties claim representation on behalf of (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Close and Prevost 2007; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Pearce 2019; Sindre 2016b;Söderberg Kovacs 2019). FRPs are shown to be highly responsive to core supporters (Berti 2013; Løvlie 2013, Manning 2008; Sindre 2018; 2019; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2019). These core constituents are often hard-line in orientation (Allison 2010; Løvlie 2013; Sprenkels 2019; Pearce 2020). FRPs' anti-system moderation is therefore expected to be limited to change that is acceptable to their core constituents, to avoid alienating them.

H14: Moderate core constituents have a positive effect on anti-system moderation.
H15: Hard-line core constituents have a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

Institutional design

Both waves in FRP literature have focused on whether electoral politics provide legitimate opportunities for rebels to win seats, whether rebels are tolerated or repressed within the system, and whether punitive or competitive measures exist to discourage rebels from displaying absolutist wartime rhetoric and behaviour (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Berti 2013; Burhibabwa and Curtis 2019; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama et al. 2015; Løvlie 2013; Manning 2004, 60; Manning 2004, 60; Manning and Smith 2016; Sprenkels 2019; Söderberg Kovacs 2008; van der Goor and de Zeeuw 2008; Whiting 2018). Institutional design has also been shown to matter for legislation in autocratic contexts (Brancanti 2014; Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik 2020; Seeberg 2012), indicating that these concerns would also apply to FRPs' contexts.

H16: Institutional design ensuring both competition and inclusion of former rebel parties has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

External actors

The effectiveness of structural incentives for moderation depend whether political actors in the political system act in accordance with structural incentives, or whether they contradict them. The influence of these actors is particularly strong in post-civil war societies, known for weak, underfunded institutions and low degrees of horizontal and vertical accountability (Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2007). Autocratic and hybrid regimes are also known for institutions that are manipulable by authoritarian governments (Howard and Roessler 2006; Magaloni 2006; Levitsky and Way 2012; Levitsky and Way 2010). This indicates that external actors strongly influence the structural incentives for moderation in FRPs' context.

International actors as system enforcers

Many post-civil war societies have international actors acting as third-party enforcers, in this thesis referred to as *system enforcers*, where international actors take on enforcing institutional checks and balances and system rules (Allison 2006; 2010; 2016; Berti and Knobel 2015 64-65; Close and Prevost 2007; Curtis and De Zeeuw 2009; de Zeeuw 2008; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 94; Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Manning and Smith 2016; Sindre 2018; Touval 1982; Walter 1997, 340; Walter and Snyder 1999; Whiting 2018).

International actors as system enforcers may put weight behind institutional design, or may contradict it.

H17: International actors as system enforcers who act in accordance with system incentives have a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

H18: International actors as system enforcers who contradict system incentives have a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

Government as system enforcer

The absence of strong institutions give government in post-civil war countries much control over the political system. Whether the government backs up institutional incentives and provides FRPs with incentives to moderate should therefore influence anti-system moderation. Government tolerance and actions are identified as influencing FRPs' change in several studies (Berti 2013; Ishiyama and Marshall 2019; Sindre 2019; Sprenkels 2019). Governments also have strong impacts in non-democratic regimes, where the delineation between government and the system is often thin (Diamond 2002, 24; Ekman 2009; Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002; 2010; Magaloni 2006). That being said, government influence over institutional design can, in post-civil war contexts, be limited by power-sharing agreements (Gates et al. 2016; Horowitz 2014; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Spears 2000; Vandeginste 2011) and if present, by international actor prescence (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 94; Walter 1997, 240). Therefore, whether the government acts in accordance with structural incentives for moderation, or whether it contradicts these incentives matters for anti-system moderation.

H19: Governments that act in accordance with system incentives have a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

Other political parties

The actions of other political parties can also affect institutional incentives. Political parties can pressure FRPs to comply with system norms through offering cooperation, and making these opportunities conditional on moderation (De Zeeuw 2008; Kumar and de Zeeuw 2008; Manning 2004, 60). The desire to be recognised by these parties, and the strategic benefit offered by such cooperation could incentivise moderation. Political parties may also compete over core constituents or general electorates with FRPs, causing moderation by competition (Berti 2013; Manning 2008; Sindre 2019, 502; Whiting 2018). The effect of such competition

and cooperation is dependent on the orientation of other political parties. If other political parties are more moderate than FRPs, cooperation and competition likely lead to moderation. If other political parties are more radical than FRPs, cooperation and competition likely prevents moderation.

H20: The conditional tolerance of more moderate political parties has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

H21: Former rebel parties' competition with more moderate political parties has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

H22: Former rebel parties' competition with more radical political parties has a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

International actors as a legitimising audience

External actors may also influence FRPs directly without impacting system incentives. Rebels seem concerned with gaining recognition from international community actors (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; 64-65; Ishiyama and Marshall 2019; Løvlie 2013; Sindre 2018, 29-30; Sprenkels 2019, 548-549; Whiting 2018). If international actors place recognition as conditional on system-abiding behaviour, this desire for recognition may contribute to moderation.

H23: Gaining legitimacy from moderate international actors has a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

Financial donors

Another external actor influencing FRPs without impacting system incentives is financial donors. As with radical Islamic parties, financial donors may undercut or contradict incentives to moderate by providing alternative sources of funding and thereby provide a source of political legitimacy (De Zeeuw 2010, Ishiyama and Batta 2011). Financial donors thereby act as a legitimising audience. Financial donors who are hard-liners are likely to support hard-line party actors, and thereby provide an incentive for radicalisation or non-moderation. Financial donors who are moderates are likely to support moderate party actors, and thereby incentivise moderation.

H24: Hard-line financial donors have a negative effect on anti-system moderation.

H25: Moderate financial donors have a positive effect on anti-system moderation.

War continuities

As argued in chapter 4, the political system oppositional FRPs are included into are characterised by war/peace hybridities, where elements of war continue into post-war politics. These wartime continuities refer to how military fighting or peace-making concessions form structural dynamics that intertwine with the logics of the political system (Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 149, 153). These structural dynamics influence institutional design, the electoral landscape, and the degree of trust as well as power-relations between FRPs and other political actors (Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 153). In other words, war continuities serve as an exogenous variable, determining the effect of system incentives, and the effect of external actors have on moderation outcomes.

Peace-deal continuities

The framework has constructed two variables describing these war continuities. The first variable, *peace-deal continuities*, refer to structural factors stipulated by peace deals. *Peace-deal continuities* are expected to cause the presence of international system enforcers, and to impact institutional design through power-sharing agreements (Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 153). Literature on peace-making also suggests that the content of peace deals shape the relationship between government, armed actors and civilians (Bieber and Keil 2009; Dyrstad, Bakke, and Binningsbø 2021; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; 2007; 2010; Jarstad 2006; 2009; Jung 2012; Kyed and Gravers 2015; Pinaud 2014; Roeder and Rothchild 2005; Thomson 2020). Thus, peace-deal continuities are expected to influence the effectiveness of government action, other political parties, how rebels interact with supporters, and system incentives for moderation.

H26: Peace-deal continuities are an exogenous variable determining the impact of institutional incentives on anti-system moderation.
H27: Peace-deal continuities are an exogenous variable determining the impact of political actors on anti-system moderation.

Wartime continuities

The second variable, *wartime continuities,* refers to structural conditions resulting from military fighting, mobilisation of supporters, and wartime interaction between FRPs and other political actors (Lyons 2016b; Manning 2007, 268-269; 2008, 153; Staniland 2015). These developments are expected to affect the relationship between FRPs and other political actors, FRPs' relationships to civilians, the nature of the wartime electorate, the effectiveness of institutional design, and the degree of international actor involvement (Ishiyama and Batta 2011; Lyons 2016b; Manning 2004, 60; 2007, 268-269; 2008, 153; Manning and Smith 2016, 982, Piccolino and Speight 2017, 41; Richards 2005, 5; Staniland 2015, 460; Wittig 2016, 148). Thus, wartime continuities are expected to determine the effectiveness of government action, other political parties, international actors as system enforcers, and system incentives for moderation.

H28: Wartime continuities are an exogenous variable determining the impact of institutional incentives on anti-system moderation.

H29: Wartime continuities are an exogenous variable determining the impact other political actors have on anti-system moderation.

Chapter 6: Methodological Concerns and Research Design

This chapter accounts for the purpose, validity and reliability of the decisions made regarding the measurement, data and research design of the analysis presented in chapter 7. It also contains a rationale for the construction of the dependent variable, anti-system moderation and organising independent variables into external and internal variables.

6.1. The research design

6.1.1 Aims of analysis

The aim of the thesis' analysis is to test the empirical validity of three elements of the framework presented in chapter 5. These three elements are: a) the concept of anti-system moderation, b) the hypotheses, and c) the cost/benefit mechanism .As the thesis seeks to fill the gap in synthesized knowledge on FRPs, it was also a goal to test these elements of the framework in a larger number of cases.

6.1.2 Alternative designs considered

Few methods are available for achieving these aims, due to their focus on both causal mechanism and a larger number of cases. Statistical methods were considered, but were discarded, as they are rarely capable of testing multiple hypotheses, or assessing causal mechanisms unless they are part of a randomised control trial (Kittel 2006, 666; Seawright 2019).There is also little accessible statistical data on FRPs' ideology and behaviour. Qualitative small N case studies were also considered, as the methods in-depth analysis at low levels of abstraction allows assessing causal mechanisms and testing multiple hypotheses (Beach 2020, 164,168; Kuehn 2013, 54–57; Lieberman 2015, 244,246,249; Ragin 2014, 82; Rohlfing 2008, 1494, 1511). Conducting a larger number of qualitative small N case studies, as needed to fit the goal of analysing a larger number of cases, does however, lie beyond the scope of the thesis. The design was therefore discarded.

6.1.3 Research design chosen

The design chosen is to use previously published case studies from FRP literature as the data for analysis. The studies compile previous studies writing on the ideology and behaviour of oppositional FRPs. 13 case studies are identified as relevant, covering 10 FRPs. The data are coded according to the framework to see whether the cross-case patterns of the data: a) fit with the three indicators of anti-system moderation, b) confirm or reject the hypotheses, and c)

indicate support for the cost/benefit mechanism. The design follows the logic of a systematic review, in that it attempts to cover all the available data from previously published literature that is relevant to a specific research question, without reference to the concepts or theory used in the data (Averis and Pearson 2003; Hughes, Taylor, and Green 2008; Mulrow 1994).

6.1.4 Benefits of the research design

The research design allows for an analysis of a medium N number of cases, addressing external validity, while simultaneously accessing in-depth, internally valid and reliable data. This allows for a testing of all the aims of the analysis. The external and internal validity of the framework can thereby be tested simultaneously, circumventing the usual trade-off between in-depth research and the number of cases in research design (Kuehn 2013, 56). The design thereby fulfils the desired aims of analysis, to test the validity of anti-system moderation, the 29hypotheses, and the cost/benefit mechanism. It also tests whether the framework is compatible with past research in the field of FRPs.

6.1.5 Limitations of the research design

 The fit of the data to the research question may be limited. This is a common problem in systemic reviews (Hughes, Taylor, and Green 2008; Mulrow 1994). The data may not contain information on all the desirable indicators or variables of the framework. The fit of the data therefore introduces limitations to the analysis. For the independent variable, no studies contain data on FRPs participation in informal autocratic practices. The "behaviour" indicator is therefore not fully consistent with that of the framework. Violence is not part of the main focus of analysis in the majority of studies. The basis for concluding on the independent variables effect on "violence" indicator is thereby reduced. For the independent variable, no study will have considered all the 18 independent variables. A lack of data on an independent variable does therefore not equate to its lacking presence in a particular case, but might be an omitted variable. An additional weakness of the design is the subjective nature of some of the coding decisions which could impact reliability. Nonetheless, as the studies cover ideological and behavioural change in FRPs, and look for causally important factors, the studies likely include independent variables of strong causal importance to anti-system moderation. The impact of omitted variables in individual studies is also lessened by the variety of authors and the numbers of studies. Despite these limitations, the studies compiled form the best available current data on anti-system moderation for a larger number of cases.

6.2. Selection criteria

To be included in the study, the previous studies have to meet four selection criteria. The studies have to: (1) analyse oppositional FRPs, (2) analyse the party at a point in time that is at least seven years after inclusion into institutional politics (to give sufficient time for party to adjust), (3) contain data on both ideology and behaviour in the parties. And (4) be published in peer-reviewed academic journals, or by academic book publishers.

6.3 Data

Of the studies identified in the literature review, 13 studies meet these criteria. An overview of the studies is presented in table 1.[28] The data cover 10 FRPs. 11 studies are journal articles, 2 are books. As the studies are written by experienced scholars and have undergone academic peer review the measurement validity and reliability[29] of the empirical data are evaluated as high. The 10 FRPs/cases analysed vary in several aspects. Their political systems vary in regime type, party systems, and continent. The FRPs vary in ideological type and years spent in the formal system. Variation on the dependent variable is also expected. Hamas and Hezbollah are known for using violence, SDS is known to be ideologically radical while Sinn Féin is known to be behaviourally moderate.

6.3 Construction, operationalisation and coding of variables

6.3.1 Constructing the indicators of the dependent variable

Anti-systematic moderation has three indicators: (non-violent) "behaviour", "ideology" and "violence". The indicators are chosen with two goals in mind. Firstly, ensuring measurement validity[30] in the concept of anti-system moderation in FRPs (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530; Gerring 2012a, 727; 2012b, 159). Secondly, to measure anti-system moderation in a way that minimizes conceptual stretching[31] of the concept of "moderation"[32]. Establishing measurement validity is crucial for the validity of causal inferences (Gerring 2012a, 733, 735,

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[28] A list of the cases with full citations is also included in the appendix.

[29] Where reliability, in relation to measurement, is understood to mean precision, or the extent to which random error is introduced in the coding and operationalization of a concept (Gerring 2012b, 159).

[30]Where measurement validity is defined as measurement contains all relevant elements of interest to meaningfully capture the ideas contained in the corresponding concept without introducing systemic bias (Adcock and Collier 2001, 530; Gerring 2012a 727; 2012b, 159).

[31] Avoiding a concept losing or changes its meaning and when it is extended/travels to a new context or set of cases (Sartori 1970, 1034 ;Goertz 2006, 69; Collier and Mahon, 1993, 845).

[32] As used in studies on radical Islamic parties.

Table 1: Overview of the data used in the analysis

Study	Which FRPs do the studies look at	Which aspects of FRPs related to moderation does the study focus on?	Type of work and place published	Type of study	Years since inclusion into formal politics
Manning 2004	The Serb Democratic Party	Changes in behaviour and ideology, internal party actor focus.	Article, *Studies in Comparative International Development*	Small N comparison (4 parties)	9 (SDS)
Manning 2007	The Serb Democratic Party, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, Renamo	Changes in behaviour and ideology, internal party actor focus.	Article, *Democratization*	Small N comparison (5 parties)	13 (SDS), 5 (FMLN), 15 (Renamo)
Manning 2008	The Serb Democratic Party, Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, Renamo,	Changes in behaviour and ideology, some internal party actor focus.	Book, Palgrave Macmillan	Single case	13(SDS), 16 (FMLN), 16 (Renamo)
Berti 2013	Hezbollah, Hamas, Sinn Féin	Changes in ideology, behaviour and violence, internal party actor focus, using moderation as concept.	Book, Johns Hopkins University Press.	Small N comparison (3 parties)	9(Hezbollah) 7 (Hamas) 22 (Sinn Féin)
Løvlie 2013	Hamas	Changes in behaviour, with some focus on ideology, mention of violence. internal party actor focus.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Single case	7(Hamas)
Berti and Knobel 2015	Sinn Féin	Changes in ideology and violence, internal party focus.	Article, *International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution*	Single case	25(Sinn Féin)
Sindre 2018	Partei Aceh	Ideological moderation, with some focus on behaviour of party, internal party actor focus, using moderation as concept, mention of violence.	Article, *Political Geography*	Single case	13(FMLN)
Whiting 2018	Sinn Féin	Changes in behaviour, internal party focus, using moderation as concept, mention of violence.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Single case	27(Sinn Féin)
Berti 2019	Hezbollah, Hamas	Changes in ideology and behaviour, some internal party actor focus, mention of violence.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Small N comparison (3 parties)	25(Hezbollah) 16 (Hamas)
Pearce 2020	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola	Ideology and practices for mobilizing core constituents in region governed by FRP during wartime.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Single case	18(UNITA)
Sindre 2019	The Serb Democratic Party, Partei Aceh, Tamil National Alliance	Ideological moderation, with some focus on behaviour of party, mention of violence, using moderation as concept,	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Small N comparison (3 parties)	24 (SDS), 13 (PA), 18 (TNA)
Sprenkels 2019	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front	Changes in behaviour and ideology, internal party actor focus, mention of violence, using moderation as concept.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Single case	27 (FMLN)
Söderberg Kovacs 2019	Revolutionary United Front Party	Changes in ideology and behaviour, internal party actor focus, mention of violence.	Article, *Government and Opposition*	Single case	19(RUFP)

737; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 34). This goal is therefore prioritized before maintaining conceptual coherence.

Measurement validity is ensured by including all three indicators. The "behaviour" and "ideology" indicators are consistent with those used for anti-democratic moderation in radical Islamic parties (Brocker and Künkler 2013; Schwedler 2011a; Tezcür 2010b; Wickham 2004).The third indicator of violence is included as violence forms an essential part of FRPs' anti-system characteristic, and because FRP violence is compatible with the dynamics of moderation. FRP violence is hypothesised to be part of a cost/benefit analysis (De Zeeuw 2008), and to be justified through ideology (Berti 2013, Berti and Guiterezz 2016, Berti 2019, Berti and Knobel 2015, Curtis and Sindre 2019, Sanín and Wood 2014). The inclusion of "violence" in the concept indicators prioritizes measurement validity over concept validity.

6.3.2 Operationalisation and coding decisions of the dependent variable

The three indicators are coded on an ordinal index scale from 0 to 3 on each indicator. 3 indicates full moderation, or a general compliance with system-norms, and few anti-systematic characteristics. 0 indicates minimal moderation, and almost all anti-system characteristics retained. For the definition and differentiation of index scores per indicator, see table 2. The index scores eases comparison between cases.

Table 2: Coding scheme for index scores of anti-system moderation

	Violence	Behaviour	Ideology
Score of 0	Active use of violence to almost same scale as during civil war.	Have made almost no moderating changes to behaviour.	No changes made to ideology.
Score of 1	Active use of violence, at significantly smaller scale than during civil war.	Small behavioural changes. Most wartime behaviours retained.	Minimal changes made to ideology, so that party survives and is accepted into political system.
Score of 2	Have not undergone demilitarisation, do not actively use violence.	More behavioural changes. Substantial anti-system behaviour still displayed.	Substantial changes made to ideology, goals changed to fit constraints of the political system.
Score of 3	Demilitarisation.	Party by and large complies to norms of system behaviour and displays a few anti-system/system-opposing behaviours.	Ideology re-interpreted to goals realisable within the constraints of the political system.

Violence

The "violence" indicator measures the extent to which FRPs have retained their use of violence in a way that diverges for system norms. The indicator operationalizes rebels' *capacity* for violence, measured by the studies' mention of demilitarisation, and *active use* of violence,

measured by the studies' mention of violent incidents.[33] The logic of the indicator is that violence represents a source of alternate extra-systemic power for FRPs. This impression is influenced by FRP literature's writings on the utility of violence for FRPs in formal politics (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; De Zeeuw 2008; Wittig 2016).[34] FRPs' sacrifice of violence represents a sacrifice in potential power, and marks a move from anti-system to system-abidance.

The "violence" indicator has four coding outcomes. FRPs actively use of violence and thereby retaining capacity for violence), is coded as 0 and 1, where 0 signifies violence at almost wartime levels and 1 signifies episodic violence at significantly lower level than wartime. Cases where FRPs retain their capacity, but not the active use of violence, are coded as 2. Cases where FRPs demilitarize and thereby stop its use of violence are coded as 3.

Ideology

The "ideology" indicator measures whether FRPs ideology changes to increased recognition for the formal political system. Two types of changes are measured: a) movement away from wartime critiques of the political system, and b) change to goals realizable within the constraints of the political system. The operationalisation is premised on (Berti 2013; 2019; Berti and Gutiérrez 2015; Sindre 2019) whose studies of FRPs' emphasise moves away from unrealizable goals and absolutist rhetoric due to strategic incentives. The content of ideological moderation depends on the type of ideology of rebels.[35] An overview of the types of anti-system moderation for each ideological type in the analysis is shown in table 3.

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[33] For the majority of systems, episodic electoral violence does not qualify as an episode of violence, or a break from system norms, as electoral violence is quite common in post-war countries (Björkdal et al 2016; Deglow 2016; Höglund and van Baalen 2016; Urdal and Becko 2008).
[34] The concept is also influenced by the realist school of International Relations, where military power is conceptualized through deterrence and the potential for violence as much as its actual use (Carr 1939; Morgenthau 1946; Walt 2002).
[35] As noted in chapter 2, this separation into ideological types is based on definition of ideological moderation as specific to ethnic-secessionist movements (Sindre 2019; Wittig 2018).

Table 3: Coding scheme for "Ideology" Indicator

	Ethnic-secessionist-movement	Islamic movement	Marxist-socialist movement	Liberation movement
Score of 0	Goal of secessionism and use of ethnic-exclusionary rhetoric.	Desire to implement trans-national Islamisation of society and sharia, no/low tolerance of non-Muslim populations.	Continued desire for Marxist-structured state (centralisation), planned economy.	Continued rhetoric of alternative state, state government as oppressor, portraying liberation movement as a "state within a state"
Score of 1	Secessionism claims, softening of ethnic-exclusionary rhetoric.	Desire to implement national Islamisation of society and sharia, some recognition of non-Muslim populations and secular governance.	Continued desire for planned economy, while focusing on social welfare programs and reform.	Continued rhetoric of FRP as state-bearing party, with alternate visions of statehood.
Score of 2	Abandon secessionist claims, move towards regionalist identity, shows signs of political pluralism.	More moderate vision of Islam, envisioned as interlinked with existing secular government, tolerance for non-Muslim.	Tolerance of market economy focus on socialist welfare programs and reform, benefits.	Rhetoric of opposition party, focus on empowerment of those marginalized by government.
Score of 3	Move towards full regionalism, commitment to political pluralism.	Moderate vision of Islam, envisioned under or intermixed with secular government, high tolerance for non-Muslims.	Embrace of market economy, with socialist welfare reform elements.	Rhetoric of opposition party, focus on development projects, government co-operation and those marginalized by political system.

Behaviour

The "behaviour" indicator measures the extent to which former rebel parties change their behaviour to conform to political system norms. The list of system-abiding behaviour consists of 1) parliamentary co-operation (including parliamentary alliances and parliamentary bartering), 2) electoral-mindedness (pursuing vote-maximisation, acceptance of elections and active campaigning in elections), and 3) participation in informal authoritarian practices (such as intra-elite bargaining). In the analysis, this last element of participation in informal authoritarian practices is not included, due to the fit of the data.

System-abiding behaviour is contrasted by the maintenance of wartime anti-system behaviours. This includes 1) the rejection of system-abiding means of power, such as abstaining from political participation or rejecting parliamentary alliances, positions in coalition governments (Berti 2013; Manning 2008, 65; Sindre 2019; Whiting 2018). 2) Active disruption of system-behaviour, such as sabotaging parliament proceedings (Manning 2008, 69). And 3) continued reliance on rebel governance structures, such as welfare provision or cadre training (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly 2015; Berti 2013; Berti and Gutiérrez 2016; Pearce 2020; Wilson 2020).

Where core constituent support prevents vote-maximizing efforts, they may also comprise anti-system behaviour.

6.3.2 Construction and Coding of The Independent Variables

Construction of the independent variables

The independent variables are sorted into two categories: external variables, or characteristics of the political system, and internal variables, belonging to internal party processes. The distinction follows from the distinction between internal factors and external factor in political party research (Ishiyama and Marshall 2015; 2017; Janda et al 1994; Manning 2004; 2007; 2008; Panebianco 1980). This distinction seemed natural, as moderation is a phenomena of *voluntary internal party change*. If follows that external variables will have a limited impact on moderation, unless it is accompanied by internal party actors who desire moderation. The distinction between external and internal independent variables thereby allows for an analysis reflecting this causal relationship.

Coding of the independent variables

The variables are measured by their presence, and their effect on moderation outcomes. Variables are coded for one of four effects: 1) contributing to moderation, 2) preventing moderation, 3) contributing to radicalisation, or 4) having no impact on moderation. Variables are identified by explicit reference in the studies, or by implicit reference. Where variables are identified by implicit reference, some degree of subjective assessment is involved.

Chapter 7: Analysis

The purpose of the chapter is to represent the results of the coding of the 10 FRPs, to conclude on three elements of the framework. These three elements are: a) the concept of anti-system moderation, b) the 29 hypotheses, and c) the cost/benefit mechanism. The analysis should aid in answering the research question "*What are the independent variables of causal importance and the causal mechanisms driving anti-system moderation in former rebel parties?"*

7.1 Anti-system Moderation: Index Scores

Table 4: Index Scores for Anti-system Moderation

Former Rebel Party	Country	Author and year of study	Moderation outcomes		
			Ideology	Behaviour	Violence
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)	Angola	Pearce 2020	0	1	1
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	Bosnia Herzegovina	Manning 2004 Manning 2008 Sindre 2019	1	2	3
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN)	El Salvador	Sprenkels 2019 Manning 2007 Manning 2008	2	2	3
Partei Aceh	Indonesia	Sindre 2018 Sindre 2019	2	3	3
Hezbollah	Lebanon	Berti 2013 Berti 2019	2	2	1
Renamo	Mozambique	Manning 2004 Manning 2007 Manning 2008	1	2	
Sinn Féin	United Kingdom	Berti 2013 Berti and Knobel 2015 Whiting 2018	2	3	3
Hamas	Palestine/ Gaza	Løvlie 2013 Berti 2013 Berti 2019	2	2	0
Revolutionary United Front Party (RUPF)	Sierra Leone	Söderberg Kovacs 2019	0	1	3
Tamil National Alliance (TNA)	Sri Lanka	Sindre 2019	2	2	3

Table 4 shows the coding of the moderation outcomes on three indicators, ideology, behaviour and violence, using a 0-3 point index scale, for the 10 cases. The table also contains FRP names, countries of inclusion, and the studies that compile the data used to analyse each case.

Table 4 shows that the published literature contains information that can be used to analyse anti-system moderation on all three indicators. All 10 FRPs have moderated on at least two indicators, and six FRPs have moderated on all three indicators. This suggest that FRPs tend to moderate their anti-system characteristic as a result of being included into formal political systems.

The means scores shown in Table 5 are 1,454 for "ideology", 1,909 for "behaviour" and 2,364 for "violence". The mean scores suggest that the 10 FRPs have moderated to the largest extent on violence, to smaller extent on behaviour and to the smallest extent on ideology on a cross-case basis. This fits with claims of the difficulty and limitations to moderating ideology as posited by FRP literature (Berti 2013, 532; 2019; Curtis and Sindre 2019, 406; Chemouni and Mugiraneza 2020; Manning 2008; Pearce 2020; Sindre 2016b; 2018; 2019; Wilson 2020; Whiting 2018). That no FRPs are coded at an index score of 3 on ideology further supports this claim. It should however be noted, that the "behaviour" indicator does not include informal autocratic practices, which might lower the index scores of FRPs in autocratic regimes on this indicator. This would effect UNITA and Renamo especially.

Stated in terms of the primary causal mechanism, the descriptive statistics may suggest that moderation of ideology has higher costs than moderation on behaviour. The "violence" index scores are relatively large spread, being bifurcated at either higher values (3) or lower values (0 and 1) with no values in the middle category (2). The "violence" indicator also has the highest standard deviation at 1.120 index points. This suggests that FRPs tend to moderate completely on violence, or to no or very small extents.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics for the moderation indicators

	N	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min value	Max value	Percentile (25)	Percentile (75)
Ideology	11	1.455	0.820	0	2	1	2
Behaviour	11	1.909	0.944	0	3	1.5	2.5
Violence	11	2.364	1.120	0	3	2	3

When comparing the scores on the moderation outcomes (see Table 5) within each FRP the "ideology" and "behaviour" scores appear correlated. No FRPs have a divergence of more than one index point in these scores. The argument that behavioural moderation requires an accompanying moderation of ideology is thereby strengthened (Schwedler 2006; 2011; Brown, Hamzawy, and Ottaway 2006; Tepe 2012; Brocker and Künkler 2013, 172-173, Pahwa 2017). No similar cross-case pattern is seen regarding violence and ideology, or violence and behaviour.

7.2 The Independent Variables

In the following section, I go through the coding of the independent variables in the 10 cases. The section tests the empirical validity of the 29 hypotheses, covering 18 variables, as presented in the framework in chapter 5. The variables' fit to the causal cost/benefit mechanism is also assessed. Where relevant, newly found causal mechanisms are also addressed.

7.2.1.The Internal Variables

Internal variables describe the internal dynamics of the FRPs and include the orientation of party leader, dominant party factions and party members. Changes in party leader, dominant party faction, and changes in member composition are also noted. In addition, organisational structure and culture is analysed as an exogenous variable affecting the influence and power of these internal party actors.

Party Leader

Orientation of Party Leader

The orientation of party leaders had an impact on moderation outcomes in four parties. In three FRPs, Hezbollah, Sinn Féin, and SDS, the variable contributed to ideological and behavioural moderation In Sinn Féin, the variable also contributed to the moderation of violence. Hypothesis, H1, that a moderate party leader is positively correlated to anti-system moderation is confirmed for three cases, Hezbollah, Sinn Féin, and SDS. The presence of a hard-line leader is identified as a variable preventing behavioural and ideological moderation in one FRP: Renamo. Hypothesis H2, that a hard-line leader is negatively correlated to anti-system moderation is confirmed in one case: Renamo.

Change of Party Leader

Change of party leader, from a hard-line to a moderate leader, had an impact on moderation outcomes in four parties. In three FRPs: SDS, Hezbollah and Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable also contributed to a moderation of violence. Hypothesis, H3, that a change from a hard-line to a moderate party leader is positively correlated to anti-system moderation is confirmed in three cases: SDS, Hezbollah and Sinn Féin. A similar change to a moderate party leader is had no effect on moderation outcomes in the case of RUFP.

Causal mechanism: The proposed causal mechanism that the orientation of party leaders plays a role in determining party attitudes and outcomes of moderation is thereby supported. Moderate leaders desire moderation, while hard-line leaders desire non-moderation.

Party Factions

The Orientation of Dominant Party Factions

The orientation of dominant party factions had an impact on moderation outcomes in eight parties. In five FRPs, Hamas, Hezbollah, Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin, and SDS, moderate dominant factions contributed to ideological and behavioural moderation. In Sinn Féin the variable contributed to violent moderation. In these five parties, moderate factions replaced hard-line dominant factions as part of a power-struggle after joining the formal political system (Berti 2013, 33,39, 148-149, 106; 2019, 523; Berti and Knobel 2015, 61-62 64: Løvlie 2013, 538; Manning 2004, 62-63; 2008, 95-96; Sindre 2018; 29-30; Whiting 2018, 296-299). Hypothesis H4, that moderate dominant party factions are positively correlated to anti-system moderation, is confirmed in five cases: Hamas, Hezbollah, Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin, and SDS.

In three FRPs, FMLN, Renamo and RUPF, hard-line dominant factions prevent ideological and behavioural moderation. In Renamo and FMLN the dominant wing defeated power challenges from moderate wings, who were expelled from the party (Manning 2007, 256, 266-267; 2008; 56, 70-71, 138; Sprenkels 2019, 537-538, 548-549). Hypothesis H5, that hard-line dominant party faction is negatively correlated to anti-system moderation is confirmed in three cases: FMLN, Renamo and RUPF.

Causal mechanism: The proposed mechanism, that the orientation of dominant party factions influences moderation outcomes is supported. Dominant moderate factions desire moderation, presumably seeing it as having strong benefits. Dominant hard-line factions desire non-moderation, presumably seeing it as having high costs.

Party Members

Presence of hard-line party members

The presence of hard-line members had an impact on moderation outcomes in five parties.
In all five FRPs, RUPF, Renamo, FMLN, Hamas and Sinn Féin the variable prevented ideological and behavioural moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable prevented moderation of violence. In RUPF, Renamo and FMLN, hard-line party members supported dominant hard-

line factions[36] (Söderberg-Kovacs 2019, 7-8; Manning 2008, 68; Sprenkels 2019, 337-338). In Sinn Féin and Hamas, dominant moderate actors catered to hard-line members resistance to moderation, achieving moderation by compromise (Berti and Knobel 2015, 60-66). In FMLN, a hard-line party leaderships' desire to moderate for strategic benefits were limited by hard-line members unwillingness to accept such changes (Sprenkels 2019, 440). Hard-liners thereby slowed down and prevented the moderation process. Hypothesis H6, that the presence of hard-line members has a negative impact on anti-system moderation in former rebel parties is confirmed in five cases: RUPF, Renamo, FMLN, Hamas and Sinn Féin.

Causal mechanism: This suggests that hard-line party members serve as a source of legitimacy for dominant party factions and party leaders. Moderation decisions require some degree of hard-line member support. Where dominant party actors desire moderation, hard-line members slow down or prevent moderation. Where dominant party actors desire non-moderation, hard-line members provide support.

Organisational diversification

Organisational diversification had an impact on moderation outcomes in three parties. In four FRPs, Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin and FMLN, the variable contributed to ideological and behavioural moderation. In Sinn Féin, organisational diversification contributed to moderation of violence. In these parties, organisational diversification led to the emergence of a moderate faction, who either became influential or dominant[37], and thereby contributed to moderation (Berti 2013, 138; Berti and Knobel 55; Manning 2008, 56, 138; Sindre 2018, 28-29; 2019, 497; Whiting 2018, 296-299). In one FRP, Renamo, organisational diversification had no impact on moderation. The moderate wing lost its power struggle within the party, was subdued, and therefore had no impact on moderation (Manning 2007, 256; 2008; 56, 70-71). Hypothesis H7, that organisational diversification is positively correlated to anti-system moderation is confirmed in three cases: Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin and FMLN.

Causal mechanism: Organisational diversification thereby results in the emergence of moderate party factions.. The causal importance of the variable depends on this moderate wing gaining power and influence within the party, which depend on other variables, including party

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[36] Moderate party leader and dominant moderate faction in Sinn Féin, dominant party faction in Hamas.
[37] Influential but not dominant in FMLN, and dominant in Sinn Féin and Partei Aceh.

culture and organisational structure. The proposed mechanism that the orientation of party members affect party attitudes and outcomes of moderation is supported.

Organisational structure and culture

The organisational structures and party cultures internal in FRPs act as an exogenous variable, determining the power and influence party actors have in the party, thereby influencing moderation outcomes.

The centralisation of decision-making structures

The centralisation of decision-making structures had an impact on moderation outcomes in three parties. In one FRP, Renamo, centralised decision-making structures prevented ideological and behavioural moderation. In Renamo, centralised decision-making structures strengthened the power of the hard-line leader and the dominant party faction, excluding moderate factions and members from decision making and reducing moderates' influence on moderation (Manning 2008, 55-56). Hypothesis H8, that centralised decision-making structures increase the causal importance of the orientation of party leaders and dominant party factions is confirmed in one case: Renamo.

 In two FRPs, Hamas and Sinn Féin, decentralised decision-making structures prevented behavioural moderation. In Sinn Féin, it prevented moderation of violence. The two FRPs have decentralised decision making structures, in which several councils and organisations are consulted for important party decisions (Løvlie 2013, 574; Berti and Knobel 2015, 54). These decentralised decision-making structures decreased the impact moderate party factions had on moderation, countered by the presence of hard-line actors in decentralised councils, who slowed down or prevented moderation (Berti 2013, 106, 116-177; Løvlie 2013, 574-575; Berti and Knobel 2015, 62). Hypothesis H9; that decentralised decision-making structures decrease the causal importance of party leaders' and dominant party factions' orientation is confirmed in two cases: Hamas and Sinn Féin.

Causal mechanism: The centralisation of decision-making structures is an exogenous variable affecting the power awarded to dominant party actors. Decentralised decision-making structures decrease the power of party leaders and dominant party factions. Centralised decision-making structures increase the power of party leaders and dominant party factions.

Moderate dominant party actors in decentralised structures are likely to lead to lower degrees of moderation than moderate dominant party actors in centralised structures.

Tolerance of dissent

Tolerance of dissent had an impact on moderation outcomes in five parties. In two FRPs, Renamo and RUPF, low tolerance of dissent prevented behavioural moderation. In RUPF, it also prevented ideological moderation. In both parties, hard-line dominant party actors[38] oppressed moderate party actors[39] once these actors tried to influence party lines on moderation (Manning 2008, 44; Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 7,10). Hypothesis H10, that cultures of low tolerance for dissent increase the causal influence of dominant party actors is confirmed in two cases: Renamo and RUPF.

In three FRPs, Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin and Hamas, tolerance for dissent contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to moderation of violence. In the parties, moderate factions emerged as dominant party factions by openly challenging dominant hard-line factions in internal party processes (Berti 2013; 103, 116, 149-152, Løvlie 2013, 579, 587; Sindre 2018, 29-30; 2019, 497; Whiting 2018, 297-299).These processes required some degree of tolerance for dissent. Hypothesis H11, that higher tolerances for dissent allow moderate factions to emerge and challenge existing hard-line party actors is confirmed in three cases: Partei Aceh, Sinn Féin and Hamas.

Causal mechanism: The tolerance for dissent thereby act as an exogenous variable, affecting the upwards mobility room and conditions for moderate party factions to gain power within the party. Moderate factions are more likely to become dominant if tolerance for dissent is higher, and are less likely to become dominant if tolerance for dissent is lower. Higher tolerances for dissent thereby contribute positively to moderation, while lower tolerances for dissent contribute negatively to moderation.

7.2.2. External Variables

External variables describe the dynamics of FRPs' political environment. This includes structural incentives which provide the costs and benefits of moderation, determining FRPs

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[38] A strong hard-line party faction backed by hard-line members in RUPF, and a hard-line strong leader and an accompanying hard-line dominant party faction in Renamo.
[39] A moderate party faction in Renamo and a moderate party leader in RUPF.

decisions on moderation. Structural incentives include electoral results, core constituent support and institutional design. External variables also include the role and actions of four external political actors: international actors, governments, other political parties and financial donors. In addition, wartime continuities and peace-deal are exogenous variables affecting the impact of costs and benefits provided by the other external variables.

Electoral results

Electoral results had an impact on moderation outcomes in seven parties. In four FRPs, SDS, FMLN, Hamas and Sinn Féin, positive electoral results contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to moderation of violence. In the four cases, positive electoral results were preceded by moderation (Berti 2013, 160-165, 170, 156; Manning 2004, 58, 63; 2008, 121; Løvlie 2013; Sprenkels 2019, 548-549). Positive electoral results prevented ideological moderation in three parties, UNITA, FMLN and Renamo. In Renamo, the variable also prevented behavioural moderation. These positive electoral results were preceded by non-moderation (Manning 2008, 44, 47,83, 120-121; Pearce 2020, 476, 479; Sprenkels 2019, 548-549). Hypothesis H12, that positive electoral results cause FRPs to continue their direction of moderation, be it non-moderation or moderation is confirmed in seven cases: SDS, FMLN, Hamas, Sinn Féin, UNITA, FMLN and Renamo.

In two parties, Sinn Féin and SDS, negative electoral results are identified as impacting moderation outcomes. In Sinn Féin, negative electoral results occurred after continued non-moderation on violence, thereby contributing to moderation of violence (Berti 2013, 160). In SDS, negative electoral results occurred after moderation of ideology and contributed to a radicalisation of ideology(Manning 2008, 83; Sindre 2019, 502). Hypothesis H13, that negative electoral results lead FRPs to change their direction on moderation is confirmed in two cases: Sinn Féin and SDS.

Causal mechanism: Electoral results thereby act as a benefit to FRPs. Positive electoral results act as an endorsement and benefit of FRPs' direction on moderation, and incentivise continuation of the same direction. Negative electoral results act as a rejection and cost of FRPs' direction on moderation, and incentivise a change in direction on moderation. Electoral results' function as a benefit/cost can be explained by how elections divide power and its role in ensuring electoral (and thereby political) survival. Electoral results also mark voters as a legitimising audience for FRPs' actions.

The orientation of core constituents

The orientation of core constituents had an impact on moderation outcomes in seven parties. In three FRPs, Sinn Féin, Hamas and SDS, moderate core constituents contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to moderation of violence. Hypothesis H14, that moderate core constituents positively affect anti-system moderation is confirmed in three cases: Sinn Féin, Hamas and SDS.

In four FRPs, UNITA, FMLN, Hamas and RUFP, hard-line core constituents prevented ideological moderation. In Hamas and RUFP, the variable prevented behavioural moderation. In one party, SDS, hard-line core constituents contributed to ideological radicalisation. Hypothesis H15, that hard-line core constituents have a negative effect on anti-system moderation is confirmed in four cases: UNITA, FMLN, Hamas and RUFP.

In three FRPs, UNITA, FMLN, RUPF, core constituents maintained their hard-line orientation, thereby preventing moderation. In these four parties, hard-line actors dominated the party. In Sinn Féin, SDS and Hamas, core constituent changed their orientation, from hard-line to moderate, resulting in corresponding change in the FRPs' direction on moderation. For Sinn Féin and Hamas, it appears that dominant moderate party actors saw the potential to "win over" moderate core constituents, whose attitudes had become more friendly towards the FRP, as a benefit of moderation (Berti 2013, 100, 126; Berti and Knobel 2015, 65; Løvlie 2013, 583-584; Whiting 2018, 298-299). In SDS, it appears that ideological radicalisation was driven in a bid to re-capture newly turned hard-line core constituents (Sindre 2019, 305; Manning 2008, 83, 98, 112).

Causal mechanism: Core constituent support thereby act as a benefit to FRPs. Maintaining or increasing core constituent support is a priority for FRPs, and losing it is a cost. Where core constituents are hard-liners, FRPs limit their moderation to avoid losing core constituents. Where core constituents are moderates, FRPs moderation appears to increase. FRPs have also changed their course on moderation as a consequence of change in orientation of core constituents. A speculation as to why core constituent support is a priority for FRPs is that the legitimacy of the FRPs political struggle rests on its claim as the main representative of the group/community core constituents represent.

Institutional design

Formal institutional design had an impact on moderation outcomes in five parties. In four FRPs, SDS, FMLN, Sinn Féin and Hezbollah, formal institutional design contributed to ideological and behavioural moderation. For Hezbollah and Sinn Féin, the design element was inclusive power-sharing agreements, for FMLN and SDS, the autonomy granted to federal and municipal level politics (Berti 2013, 49, 165-167; Manning 2008, 12; Sindre 2019, 494; Whiting 2018, 292, 300). In FMLN, SDS and Hezbollah, this was coupled with as multiparty electoral design where the FRPs had good chances of gaining seats in parliament (Berti 2013, 49, 165-167; Manning 2008 120-121; Sprenkels 2019, 37; Whiting 2018, 290, 292). In Sinn Féin, the presence of strong, democratic institutions also played a role in ensuring the functioning of institutional design (Whiting 2018, 301). Common for institutional design in all four cases is that they provided opportunities for the FRPs to gain power within the system, through competitive, multiparty elections(Berti 2013, 165-167; Manning 2008, 73-75; Sprenkels 2019, 536-537; Whiting 2018, 290, 292, 299, 301). Hypothesis H16, that institutional design ensuring both competition and inclusion positively impacts anti-system moderation is confirmed in four cases: FRPs, SDS, FMLN, Sinn Féin and Hezbollah.

In one FRP, Renamo, institutional design prevented behavioural and ideological moderation. The institutional design was an electoral and parliamentary two-party design with high barriers of entry for new parties (Manning 2007, 265). Renamo was the only opposition party in the system and faced little competition from other parties (Manning 2007, 265-266). This left the party with few incentives to moderate, contributing to non-moderation on behaviour and ideology. The case partly confirms H16, by indicating that institutional design ensuring inclusion without competition does not correspond to anti-system moderation.

Causal mechanism: Institutional design influences whether incentives for FRPs to moderate are in the system. The tolerance and inclusion of institutional design provide benefits of moderation, while the degree of inter-party competition determines the opportunity costs of not moderating. If institutional design provides benefits to moderation, FRPs will moderate. If institutional design does not provide benefits to moderation, FRPs will not moderate.

International actors as system enforcers

International actors as system enforcers has an impact on moderation outcomes in three parties. For one FRP, SDS, international system enforcers contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In the case, international system enforcers ensured institutional structural incentives or opportunities of moderation and punitive measures against non-moderation or costs (Manning 2004, 58, 60; 2008, 96). Hypothesis H17, that international system enforcers who act in accordance with system incentives have a positive impact on moderation is confirmed in one case: SDS.

For two FRPs, Hezbollah and Renamo, international system enforcers prevented behavioural moderation and moderation of violence. In these parties, international actors provided explicit support for the FRP, allowing the party to circumvent system-abiding behaviour and demilitarisation (Berti 2013, 46, 48-49, 64-65; 2019, 526-527; Manning 2007, 257, 259; 2008, 48, 53). Hypothesis H18, that international system enforcers who counteract institutional incentives negatively affect moderation is confirmed in two parties: Hezbollah and Renamo.

In two FRPs, Hezbollah and SDS, international system enforcers eventually withdrew from the political systems. In SDS, where the international actor had ensured the post-war political order and strong incentives for moderation, withdrawal removed the costs of radicalisation (or non-moderation). This caused a radicalisation of SDS's core constituents, in turn causing ideological radicalisation in SDS (Manning 2008, 96, 98, 122; Sindre 2019, 493). For Hezbollah, where Syria had protected the FRP from institutional pressures to moderate, withdrawal exposed Hezbollah to systemic pressures and the costs of non-moderation, leading Hezbollah to moderate (Berti 2013, 64-65; 2019; 526-527). These two parties confirm the influence of international system enforcers on moderation outcomes in FRPs.

Causal Mechanism: International actors as system enforcers thereby affect moderation outcomes by either a) enforcing that the costs and benefits implicit in institutional design are realised. Or b) protecting FRPs from these same systemic pressures, reducing the consequences and function of institutional costs and benefits. The variable thereby acts as a determinant of the effectiveness of institutional design.

Government as system enforcer

Government action in the role of system enforcers has an impact on moderation outcomes in four parties. In two FRPs, Sinn Féin and Hamas government action contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to moderation of violence. In these two parties, governments have shown tolerance and recognition of FRPs and their political cause through concessions, cooperation and political compromises (Berti 2013, 164; 2019, 519; Berti and Knobel 2015, 55; Løvlie 2013, 538; Whiting 2018, 291 304, 305). For Sinn Féin, this includes pressures, but not demands to demilitarise (Berti 2013,164-166, 170-172; Whiting 2018, 291-292). Hypothesis H19, that governments who act according to system incentives positively affect anti-system moderation is confirmed in two parties: Sinn Féin and Hamas.

In two FRPs, Renamo and UNITA, government action prevented behavioural and ideological moderation. In these two parties, autocratic governments used their powers as system enforcers to limit FRPs' opportunities in the system. This was done by compromising the competitiveness and function of parliamentary and formal institutional channels (Pearce 2020, 479; Manning 2008, 43, 54-55). This led both FRPs to rely on extra-systemic sources of power. In other words, government action created few benefits or opportunities for participating in the political system and thereby created few incentives for anti-system moderation. The two cases show how government oppression of FRPs, and manipulation of the political system negatively affects moderation.

Causal mechanism: Governments as system enforcers affect moderation outcomes by affecting the costs and benefits implicit in institutional design. The Renamo and UNITA case illustrate a second mechanism, that governments may exclude FRPs from system opportunities or manipulate the system so that it no longer provide incentives for FRPs to moderate. In both cases, government action influences the effectiveness of institutional design.

Other political parties as system actors

The role of political parties as system actors had an impact on moderation outcomes in two parties. In both FRPs, Sinn Féin and Hezbollah, the variable contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In the two cases, other political parties put moderation as a condition of parliamentary bargaining or parliamentary alliances (Berti 2013, 56, 157-162; Berti and Knobel 2015, 165-167; Whiting 2018, 292). Hypothesis H20 that the conditional tolerance

from more moderate political parties positively impacts anti-system moderation is confirmed in two cases: Sinn Féin and Hezbollah.

Causal mechanism: Other political parties as system actors affect moderation outcomes by providing opportunities and pressures in line with system incentives. It is uncertain whether these opportunities are effective because of their strategic benefit or if political parties act as a legitimising audience. Presumably, non-FRP political parties might also affect moderation by not providing acceptance and alliances.

Competition over core constituents with other parties

Other political parties' competition with FRPs over core constituents had an impact on moderation outcomes in five parties. In four FRPs, Partei Aceh[40], Hamas, Hezbollah and Sinn Féin's the variable contributed to ideological moderation. For Partei Aceh, Hamas and Sinn Féin it also contributed to behavioural moderation. In all four cases, FRPs desire to "win over" core supporters from other parties or prevent other parties from doing the same was the incentive behind motivation (Berti 2013, 32-22, 45-46, 156, 15; Manning 2008, 83; Sindre 2018, 29-30; 2019, 502-503; Whiting 2018, 300). However, only in Partei Aceh and Sinn Féin were these other political parties more moderate than the FRPs.[41] Hypothesis H21,that FRPs competition with more moderate political parties has a positive impact on anti-system moderation is thereby confirmed in two cases: Partei Aceh and Sinn Féin.

In two FRPs, TNA and SDS, competition with other political parties over core constituents prevented moderation or contributed to radicalization. In TNA, the variable prevented ideological moderation, and in SDS, it contributed to ideological radicalisation. In both these parties, the FRPs competed with more hard-line political parties,[42] who had larger support among core constituents than the FRPs (Manning 2008, 83; Sindre 2019, 502-505). Hypothesis H22, that FRPs competition with more hard-line political parties has a negative impact on anti-system moderation is confirmed in two cases: TNA and SDS.

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[40] In the case of Partei Ache, SIRA is treated as a political party (as it fits with the causal mechanisms and dynamics as political parties in the framework), despite being a student-run activist network.
[41] The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDPL) and the Information Centre for a Referendum on Aceh (SIRA) respectively. Hezbollah's main competitor Amal and Hamas' rival Fatah cannot be argued to be more moderate regarding the political system.
[42] The Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) respectively.

Causal mechanism: Competition over core constituents with other political parties determine the effectiveness of core constituent orientation. If FRPs compete over *moderate* core constituents with other political parties, they are likely to moderate to prevent the other party from making "gains" in core constituents. If FRPs compete over hard-line core constituents with hard-line political parties, FRPs will likely radicalise, or make no change on moderation (non-moderation). Again, a speculation as to why core constituent support is a priority for FRPs is that the legitimacy of the FRPs political struggle rests on its claim as the main representative of the group/community core constituents represent.

Competition over electorate with other parties

Competition with other political parties over the electorate has an impact on moderation in three parties. In two FRPs, Sinn Féin and Hamas, the factor contributed to behavioural and ideological moderation. In one FRP, SDS, the factor contributed to ideological radicalisation. SDS competed with a more radical party and Sinn Féin competed with a more moderate party (Berti 2013, 161-162; Manning 2008, 83; Sindre 2019, 502; Whiting 2018, 300). Hypothesis H22, that FRPs competition with more hard-line political parties has a negative impact on anti-system moderation is confirmed in one cases: SDS. Hypothesis H21,that FRPs competition with more moderate political parties has a positive impact on anti-system moderation is thereby confirmed in one case: Sinn Féin.

Causal mechanism: However, all three FRPs compete in electoral constituencies consisting mostly or solely of core constituents. Consequently, electoral results measure core constituent support. Therefore, I would argue that competition over core constituents, rather than the wider electorate, is the primary causal mechanism driving these instances of moderation. The cases do however, illustrate that rebels desire for core constituent support can be compatible with electoral incentives.

International actors as a legitimising audience

International actors as a legitimising audience has an impact on moderation in three parties. In all three FRPs, Partei Aceh, Hamas and Sinn Féin, the variable contributed to ideological and behavioural moderation. In the three parties, recognition came from moderate actors in the international community and was preceded by FRP moderation (Sindre 2018, 29; Berti 2019, 517; Berti and Knobel 2015, 64-65). Hypothesis H23 that recognition from moderate

international actors positively correlates to anti-system moderation is confirmed in three cases: Partei Aceh, Hamas and Sinn Féin.

Causal mechanism: Gaining the political legitimacy of international actors is a potential benefit of moderation. If international actors recognise FRPs after the parties have shown tendencies to moderate, and keep such recognition dependent on continued moderation, the variable might positively contribute to moderation.

Financial donors

Financial donors had an impact on moderation outcomes in five parties. In all five FRPs, financial donors were international actors. In three FRPs, Renamo, Hezbollah and FMLN, contributions from financial donors prevented ideological moderation. In one FRP, Renamo the variable also prevented behavioural moderation. In Renamo, the contributions were made by moderate international community actors and were followed and sustained through continued non-moderation on behaviour and ideology (Manning 2007, 257, 259; 2008, 48-49). In two FRPs, Hezbollah and FMLN, financial contributions came from hard-line actors (Berti 2013, 41; Sprenkels 2019, 547, 549).In three FRPs, Hezbollah, SDS and FMLN, cessation of financial donations from hard-line actors contributed to ideological moderation. In one FRP, Hamas, cessation of financial income flows from moderate actors prevented behavioural moderation. Hypothesis H24, that hard-line financial donors have a negative impact on moderation is confirmed in four cases: Hezbollah, FMLN, and SDS. Hypothesis H25, that moderate financial donors positively impact anti-system moderation is confirmed in one case: Hamas.

The studies analysed indicate that financial donations were interpreted as endorsements of a hard-line leader Dhlaklama in Renamo, and hard-line dominant factions in Hezbollah, FMLN and SDS, and a moderate local chapter in Hamas, supporting these respective actors' vision of moderation (Berti 2013, 41-43; Manning 2007, 257, 259; 2008, 53; Sprenkels 2019, 547, 549). When the donations stopped in the latter four cases, these actors lost the support and legitimisation provided by financial donors, and their internal positions were weakened (Sprenkels 2019, 547,549; Manning 2007, 257, 259; 2008, 48, 53).

Causal mechanism: Financial donors thereby act as an additional channel for international actors as a legitimising audience and provide benefits and costs to moderation by directly

supporting or rejecting dominant party actors. The orientation of the dominant party actors matters, but, upon closer notice, the Renamo case might indicate that the orientation of the donor is less important for moderation outcomes. If hard-line party actors are supported, moderation does not occur. If moderate party actors are supported, moderation occurs.

External exogenous variable: War continuities

War continuities are an exogenous variable hypothesised to determine the effect of structural independent and external actors. War continuities are separated into two variables: peace-deal continuities and wartime continuities.

Peace-deal continuities

Peace-deal continuities had an impact on institutional incentives in two parties. In both FRPs, Sinn Féin and SDS, peace-deal continuities' effect on institutional design contributed to behavioural moderation. In the cases, peace-deal concessions to rebels saw the establishment of regional self-governing bodies, where electoral constituencies largely overlap with core constituents (Berti 2013, 164-167; Manning 2008, 73-75; Sindre 2019, 494; Whiting 2018, 292, 300). This interference by peace-deal continuities made rebels' wartime reliance on core constituents and the regional component of ethnic-secessionist ideologies compatible with political system norms. The variable thereby decreased the cost of behavioural moderation. Hypothesis H26, that peace-deal continuities are an exogenous variable determining the effect of institutional incentives on anti-system moderation is confirmed in two cases: Sinn Féin and SDS .

Wartime continuities

Wartime continuities had an impact on the orientation of institutional incentives in five parties. In two FRPs, Renamo and FMLN, wartime continuities' effect on electoral arenas prevented Ideological. In Renamo the effect of the variable also prevented behavioural moderation. In both cases, wartime continuities resulted in polarised electoral arenas between FRPs and the government, where FRPs enjoyed unconditional legitimacy as the only viable opposition to the government and as the dominant representatives of their core constituents (Manning 2007, 260, 265; 2008, 43,123; Sprenkels 2019, 537). The subsequent lack of inter-party competition decreased incentives to moderate for electoral or core constitute support gains.

In three FRPs, TNA, Partei Aceh and Hezbollah, wartime continuities' effect on FRPs competition with other parties over core constituents contributed to behavioural moderation. In TNA and Partei Aceh, the variables effect also contributed to ideological moderation. For TNA, wartime dynamics saw the defeat and destruction of the LTTE, removing TNA's competitor over core constituents (Sindre 2019, 504-506). This left TNA free to moderate its behaviour and ideology despite the majority of core constituents being hard-liners[43] (Sindre 2019, 504-506). Hezbollah joined formal politics party because it allowed the FRP to consolidate its wartime advantage in core constituent support[44] over competitor Amal, into electoral and parliamentary power (Berti 2013, 45, 56). Fighting in Indonesia resulted in the exiling of GAM's[45] leadership and political wing, which created the conditions allowing the socio-political activist network, SIRA to gain more core constituent popularity than GAM (Sindre 2018, 27-28). This eventually led to SIRAs incorporation into Partei Aceh as a moderate faction, in turn leading to Partei Aceh's ideological moderation. This incorporation was incentivised by GAM's disadvantage in core constituent support relative to SIRA. Hypothesis H28, that wartime continuities are an exogenous variable determining the effect of institutional incentives is confirmed in five cases: Renamo, FMLN, TNA, Partei Aceh and Hezbollah.

Wartime continuities and peace-deal continuities combined

Wartime continuities and peace-deal continuities combined had an impact on international actors as system enforcers in two parties. In one FRPs, Hezbollah, the combined effect of wartime continuities and peace-deal continuities prevented moderation, while in one FRP, SDS, the effect contributed to moderation. The establishment of Syria and the OHR[46] as international system enforcers in these two cases were both a result of peace-deal agreements and the military involvement of these actors in wartime[47] (Berti 2013, 46-49; Manning 2008, 73-75; Sindre 2019, 493). In these two cases, the power of international system enforcers resulted both from their previous use of military force and their stipulated role in peace-deal concessions.

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[43] This is not to say that core constituent orientation and opinion do not impact TNA's actions. Sindre's study indicates that it does.
[44] Premised on military power and rebel governance.
[45] The Free Aceh Movement – the wartime name of Partei Aceh.
[46] Office of the High Commissioner.
[47] Wherein the OHR was a result of NATO's involvement.

Wartime continuities and peace-deal continuities combined had an impact on institutional incentives and , and other parties action in two parties. In both FRPs, RUPF and UNITA, the combined effect of wartime continuities and peace-deal continuities prevented ideological and behavioural moderation. In the two cases, initial peace talks were interrupted by a return to violence by the FRPs (Pearce 2020, 479: Söderberg-Kovacs 2019, 8). The resulting military fighting left the parties accepting peace from a position of weakness[48] resulting in few concessions made in peace-deals, and little goodwill from other political actors.(Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 8; Pearce 2020, 470). As a result, and government and political parties did not show tolerance for the parties, leaving the parties with little incentives to moderate. As a result, RUPF and UNITA relied on extra-systemic sources of legitimacy to gain electoral support from hard-line core constituents in order to survive electorally, preventing behavioural and ideological moderation (Söderberg Kovacs 2019, 2, 11; Pearce 2020, 478, 486-487). In the cases, the combination of wartime and peace-time continuities has an effect on the actions of government and other poltical parties.

Overall, this results in the following hypothesis conclusions for war continuities: Hypothesis H26, that peace-deal continuities are an exogenous variable determining the effect of institutional incentives is confirmed in four cases: RUPF, UNITA, Sinn Féin and SDS. Hypothesis H27, that peace deal continuities are an exogenous variable determining the effect of other political actors is confirmed in two cases: RUPF and UNITA.   Hypothesis H28, that wartime continuities influence the effect of institutional design is confirmed in five cases: RUPF, UNITA, TNA, Renamo and FMLN. Hypothesis H29, that wartime continuities is an exogenous variable influencing the effect of other political actors is confirmed in six cases: Hezbollah, TNA, Partei Aceh Renamo FMLN and SDS.

Causal mechanisms: Wartime continuities thereby affect the base starting point of the power dynamics between FRPs and their competitors, affecting the degree of competitiveness and pressures faced by FRPs in the system. War continuities also affect FRPs bargaining position in peace negotiations. Peace-deal continuities, in turn, affect how beneficial the post-war institutional design is to FRPs and can award official powers to international system enforcers, and affect the degree of trust and willingness of other political actors in the system to tolerate

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[48] Both parties had lost their leaders, in RUPF, the whole of party leadership were imprisoned, and the party had little popularity among the population, while in UNITA's case, the party was left with little room for effectively opposing the government party, MPLA.

FRPs. War continuities thereby act as an exogenous variable to the other external independent variables.

7.3. Implications of the analysis

7.3.1 General patterns

Internal variables

The coding of the 10 cases indicates that orientation of internal party actors, as either hard-line or moderates, and the power and influence these actors have play a role as determinants of anti-system moderation. Dominant party factions and party leaders, as strong voices within the party, impact moderation decisions. On a cross-case basis dominant party faction appears to play a larger role than party leaders. Seen together with the index scores in table 5, a pattern emerges, where the domination of moderate actors correspond to higher moderation scores (in Hamas, Sinn Féin, Hezbollah,and Partei Aceh), and the domination of hard-liners correspond to lower moderation scores (in Renamo, RUPF, and UNITA).

The analysis finds that dominant party actors depend on party members' support to build legitimacy for moderation decisions. This appears particularly to be the case for hard-line members. Additionally, the analysis finds that the entry of moderate members create moderate party factions, that if they become dominant or gain influence within the party, contribute to moderation. The centralisation of decision making structures and the tolerance of dissent act as exogenous variables determining the influence and power of internal party actors, thereby affecting the impact internal actors have on moderation. Overall, the coding of the 10 cases support that hard-liners and moderates have different views on moderation, indicating support for a (cognitive) bias in the cost/benefit mechanism.

External variables

The coding of the 10 cases suggests that structural incentives and external actors provide opportunities and disadvantages affecting FRPs' power within the formal political system. These opportunities and advantages influence the incentives present for parties to undergo moderation. Structural variables provide incentives that present either costs or benefits of moderation, whose effect is further determined by external actors' actions. War continuities (be it wartime or peace-deal continuities) act as exogenous variables determining the effect of both external actors and structural variables. Individual FRPs decision to undergo moderation

therefore depend on the collective benefits and costs provided by external variables in each case.[49] Consequently, none of the external independent variables can be claimed to be necessary or sufficient on their own. The external variables can thereby be classified as contributory causes[50] of anti-system moderation.

Connecting these variables to the outcomes of moderation in table 5 shows that the parties with higher moderation scores correspond to cases where external variables create several and strong incentives for moderation, as seen in FMLN, Partei Aceh, TNA, Hamas, and Sinn Féin. The parties with lower moderation scores correspond to cases where external variables do not offer such incentives for moderation, like in RUPF, UNITA, Renamo and SDS. In other words, where it benefits FRPs to moderate, they will do so. This supports the proposed causal mechanism that cost/benefit analysis drives FRPs.

Internal variables and internal variables combined
The coding of the 10 cases suggests a connection between the orientation of dominant actors and incentives for moderation. In seven parties- SDS, Partei Aceh, FMLN, Hezbollah, Renamo, Sinn Féin and Hamas- moderate actors have either entered or gained power after the party joined formal politics. This development is attributed to structural benefits to moderation provided by the political system. Thus, external variables may contribute to moderates gaining power within FRPs. Similarly, where external variables provide few incentives to moderate, as in UNITA, Renamo and RUPF, the party remains dominated by hard-liner actors.

Furthermore, several studies (Berti 2013; Berti and Knobel 2015; Løvlie 2013; Manning 2008; Sprenkels 2019; Whiting 2018) show that disagreement between moderates and hard-liners evolve around whether structural benefits are trustworthy (hard-liners tend to be more sceptical), and the relative costs of moderation (that hard-liners view to be higher). This indicates that moderates and hard-liners have different degrees of trust towards the political system, and have different interpretations of the cost/benefit analysis. Relating back to the thesis argument that anti-system moderation measures movement away from specific wartime attitudes and practices, this indicates that hard-liners are more entrenched in wartime

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[49] An overview of these combinations in the individual cases are provided in the appendix.
[50] As defined by Frey (1976) and Martin (1978) as variables that are neither necessary nor sufficient.

mentalities and wartime pasts than moderates, and that this might be the foundation for the (cognitive) bias distinguishing hard-liners and moderates.

The connection between external incentives to moderate and the orientation of dominant party actors can therefore be explained by whether the incentives provided by the system corroborates hard-line or moderate biases. Structural incentives for moderation increase or decrease the power of internal party faction by supporting or de-evaluating their cost/benefit interpretations. However, the cases suggest that not only the cost/benefit analysis matters for the outcomes of moderation. The Renamo case illustrates that the culture and organisational structure of the FRP also determines whether hard-liners or moderates dominate the party.

This is not to say that structural incentives have no impact. Anti-system moderation does occur in RUPF, UNITA and Renamo, where moderates are absent or have no impact on moderation outcomes. However, the index scores for these parties are low, residing at 0 or 1 for "ideology" and "behaviour". In contrast, the parties dominated by moderate actors, Partei Aceh, Hezbollah, Sinn Féin, Hamas and TNA, have index scores between 2 and 3 on behaviour and ideology. This suggest the following; FRPs are likely to become more moderate if the political system provide incentives for them to moderate. However, structural incentives are insufficient causes for high scores of moderation (at index scores 2 or 3). For that, structural incentives dependent on moderate actors' presence within FRPs.

7.3.2 New discoveries: connections between specific variables
Party members, core constituents and dominant party actors
A novel discovery from coding the 10 cases is the connection between core supporters, party members and dominant party actors of the same orientation. In three parties (RUPF, UNITA, FMLN) where hard-liners stay dominant within the party, they were supported both by hard-line party members, and hard-line core constituents. In four parties, Sinn Féin, SDS, Partei Aceh and Hamas, moderate party actors emerged and became dominant while supported both by moderate party members and moderate core constituents. Given the close connections between core constituents, FRPs, and FRPs' political cause, it is furthermore possible that these moderate actors emerge from the same group of moderate core constituents. This remains however, a speculation.

Core constituents and electoral vote-maximisation

Another discovery of the analysis is how FRPs appear to have little interest in electoral vote-maximisation. Only one FRP, FMLN, shows a desire for vote-maximisation independent of efforts to maximise core constituents support. The four other cases with vote-maximisation, Hamas, TNA, SDS and Sinn Féin, are all systems where electoral constituencies overlap with core constituents. A possible explanation for this is that all the FRPs, with the exception of RUPF, have sufficient voters to survive electorally. This suggests that FRPs value core constituents and the legitimacy they offer to be a higher benefit than the opportunity cost of not increasing electoral votes. Rebels reliance on extra-systemic means might therefore reduce the incentives of structural design in the formal political system. However, where extra-systemic means are made compatible with the logics of the formal political system, as they have where core constituents make up the majority of electoral constituencies, they mark a pathway to ensure that FRPs follow system incentives.

7.3.3 Cross-case causal impact of the independent variables

Table 6 shows the cross-case impact of the 18 variables, based on the coding of the cases. It list the causal impact each independent variable had, by number of cases. To illustrate, electoral results has an effect on anti-system moderation in 7 FRPs in total, impacted violence in 1 FRP, ideology in 7 FRPs, and behaviour in 5 FRPs. The table thereby allows for a comparison of the relative causal weighting of the variables in a Medium-N basis. Four variables appear to have an especially strong causal impact on moderation. These four variables are: a) the orientation of dominant party factions, b) wartime continuities, c) electoral results, and d) the orientation of core constituents. The orientation of dominant party factions and wartime continuities have a causal impact on moderation outcomes in 8 FRPs. Electoral results and the orientation of core constituents have a causal impact on moderation outcomes in 7 FRPs. This suggests that these four variables should be paid attention in future research.

That these four variables include both external and internal variables further confirm the presence of interaction effects between moderate party actors and institutional incentives in causing anti-system moderation. As core constituents overlap with electoral results in three cases (Hamas, Sinn Féin and SDS), the weighting of the two variables combined shows how wartime continuities and system norms That wartime continuities is among the variables with

the strongest impact further support the argument in favour of conceptualizing FRPs political context as war/peace hybrid societies.

Table 6: The cross-case impact of independent variables

Independent variables	Number of FRPs where the variable affected moderation outcomes			
	Behaviour	Ideology	Violence	Number of FRPs in total
Orientation of Party Leader	4	4		4
Change of Party Leader	4	4		4
Orientation of Dominant Party Factions	8	8	1	8
Organisational diversification	3	3	1	3
Presence of hard-line party members	5	5	1	4
Organisational structures: centralisation of decision making	3	1	1	3
Organisational culture: tolerance of dissent	5	4	1	5
Electoral results	5	7	1	7
The orientation of core constituents	5	7	1	7
Institutional design	5	5		5
International actors as system enforcers	3	3	2	3
International actors as an audience from which to seek legitimacy	3	3		3
Government as system enforcer	4	4	1	4
Competition over core constituents with other parties	3	6		5
Other political parties as system actors	2	2		2
Financial donors	2	4		5
Wartime continuities	8	7		8
Peace-deal continuities	5	3		5

7.3.4 Do the independent variables affect the different indicators differently?

Based on table 6 it appears that independent internal variables affect behavioural and ideological moderation equally. The external independent variables generally affect behavioural moderation in more cases than ideological moderation. In other words, the benefits and costs of institutional design and external actors have a stronger effect on behavioural moderation than ideological moderation. This may also indicate that ideological moderation has higher costs than behavioural moderation for FRPs. The exception to this general pattern is external variables related to core constituents, which have a stronger impact on ideology than behaviour.

The violence indicator shows a somewhat different picture. Except for the variable of international actors as system enforcers, all the other variables that had an impact on moderation of violence occurred in Sinn Féin. This shows that internal and external variables can affect the moderation of violence. However, the external validity or transferability of the Sinn Féin case to other FRP contexts are somewhat limited, given that it is a liberal democratic system with stable institutions. The impact of international system enforcers, allowing Hezbollah and Renamo to retain their violence, is perhaps a pattern better pursued, as these contexts have larger transferability to FRPs more generally. Given that demilitarisation is often a demand made and enforced by international actors during the end of war, it makes sense that international actors also have the power to remove these pressures.

Chapter 8: Concluding Remarks

8.1 The thesis summarized

In this thesis, I have attempted to answer the research question "*What are the independent variables of causal importance and the causal mechanisms driving anti-system moderation in former rebel parties?"* in a bid to help fill the knowledge gaps on generalised knowledge and causal mechanism in previous literature. The path towards answering this question led me to a larger conceptual debate on the nature and characteristics of former rebel parties and the political systems they moderate towards. I have argued against employing a Western-European conceptualisation of politics when analysing FRPs, and seeing oppositional FRPs as democratic spoilers. Implicitly I have also argued the one should be cautious about analysing FRPs and their development in ways that reflect an underlying goal of returning to "politics as normal". Instead, I suggest that the non-democratic and hybrid war/peace nature of FRPs political environment needs to be factored into analysis. I have also argued that in light of these changing conceptualisations in context, FRPs should be viewed as anti-system actors rather than anti-democratic actors. FRPs' adjustment to formal politics should thus, I contend, measure whether FRPs make changes in this anti-system characteristic.

I have further argued that a useful way of analysing FRPs' adjustment of its anti-system characteristic is through the concept of "anti-system moderation". The thesis contains a newly constructed analytical framework for analysing anti-system moderation. The framework proposed that anti-system moderation occurs through a causal mechanism of a cost/benefit analysis and identified 18 independent variables with potential causal importance to anti-system moderation, and presented 29 hypotheses describing the dynamics of these independent variables. The validity of anti-system moderation as a concept, the proposed causal mechanism and the causal effect and direction of the 18 independent variables were then tested in a medium-N analysis of 10 cases, using 13 previously published studies from FRP literature as the data.

The analysis resulted in the following findings. Firstly, the analysis corroborated that anti-system moderation has empirical validity and can be disaggregated from anti-democratic moderation in previous research. Secondly, the analysis revealed that all FRPs analysed moderate towards the system . Thirdly, the analysis confirmed that all 18 variables identified have a cross-case causal impact on moderation. And fourthly, that anti-system moderation in former rebel parties occur through the causal mechanisms of a cost/benefit analysis. The

analysis suggests that participation in formal political systems cause former rebel parties to adjust to system norms. It also suggests that formal political systems provide incentives for moderation, and that where such incentives are present, rebels will moderate, as it benefits them to do so. The analysis also finds that moderation depends on the will of internal actors to moderate. If internal party actors desire moderation, the effect of structural incentives is stronger. Four variables appear to have a particularly strong impact on anti-system moderation on a cross-case basis: (1) the orientation of the dominant party faction, (2) electoral results, (3) core constituent support and (4) wartime continuities. The importance of wartime continuities also supports the notion of conceptualising FRPs' contexts as war-peace hybrid spaces. The findings suggest that institutional design making the maintenance of FRPs' wartime behaviours and logics coincide with system norms, such as core constituent overlapping with electoral constituencies, contributes to system abidance.

8.2 Implications for the academic field and recommendations for future research

The results of the thesis points towards the usefulness of a continued debate on FRPs and their context in more general terms, and the value of synthesising literature more generally. The results also indicate that addressing the characteristics of the political system rebels adjust to will be important for future research, as it results in increased understandings of FRPs. The results also indicate the usefulness of further investigation into FRPs anti-system characteristic and the causal mechanism driving FRP change. In particular, the elements not examined in the analysis, such as oppositional FRPs participation in authoritarian informal practices, or a larger exploration of oppositional FRPs' violence as part of anti-system moderation might be fruitful. Further exploration into the connections between moderation of violence, and how it affects ideological and behavioural change within FRPs is also recommended. Applying the entirety or parts of the framework presented in chapter 5 to new in-depth qualitative case studies, particularly known autocracies, is also likely to provide new insights. Whether the concept of anti-system moderation proves useful for understanding FRPs in the immediate aftermath of war, or in peace-making might be another topic to explore.

Overall, however, the findings indicate that we should be careful about presuming normative goals or specific conceptualisations of societies or politics in our research and our theories, without considering how these goals align with those of the actors we study and the empirical realities these actors face. Therefore, a fruitful avenue for future research would be to examine how FRPs understand themselves as organisations, how they interpret their own identity,

history, and the political project they are engaged in. Increased understandings of how FRPs understand the game of politics in post-civil war societies would also be helpful for understanding FRPs better. This would particularly be true of the continuities between peace and wartime. The thesis also shows the merit of synthesizing research, and enabling cross-case comparison between studies of FRPs. The thesis therefore recommends further synthesis in the field researching FRPs, and research addressing the gap of lacking generalised knowledge.

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Appendix

Table A: Overview of FRPs studied by qualitative means in previous literature

Table A :Overview of FRP studied by qualitative means in previous literature

Country	Military acronym	Military name	Party acronym (if changed)	Party name (if changed)	Entry into formal politics	Years in politics	Political struggle/ ideology	Studies	Position in politics
Angola	UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola			2002	19	Liberation Movement	Pearce 2010; 2020	Opposition
Angola	MPLA	Movimento Popular para Liberação de Angola			2002	19	Liberation Movement		Government
Bosnia-Herzegovina	SDS	Serbian Democratic Party			1995	26	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Sindre 2019, Manning 2008	Opposition
Bosnia-Herzegovina	HDZ	The Croatian Democratic Union			1995	26	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Sindre 2019, Manning 2008	Government
Burundi	CNDD-FDD	Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie			2005	16	Ethnic Nationalism	Nindorera 2008, Wittig 2016, Rufyikiri 2017, Burihibabwa and Curtis 2019	Government
Cambodia	FUNCINPEC	National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia			1992	29	Royalists	De Zeeuw 2010	Opposition
Colombia	FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia	Comunes/ FARC	Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común	2017	4	Marxism/Socialism	Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz 2017; 2018,	Opposition
DR Congo	MLC	the Movement for the Liberation of Congo			2003	18	Liberation Movement	Koko 2016	Opposition
DR Congo	RCD - Goma	Congolese Rally for Democracy			2003	18	Ethnic Nationalism, Liberation Movement	Koko 2016	Opposition
East Timor	FRETILIN	Frente Revolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente			2002	19	Liberation Movement	Sindre 2016	Government
El Salvador	FMLN	Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front			1992	29	Marxism/Socialism	Allison 2006, Wade 2008, De Zeew 2010, Sprenkels 2016, Allison 2006, 2010	Opposition
Eritrea	EPLF	The Eritrean People's Liberation Front	PFDJ	People's Front for Democracy and Justice	1991	30	Liberation Movement/ Marxism	Lyons 2013	Government

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Table A (Continued)

Ethiopia	EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front			1991	30	Marxism/Socialism	Lyons 2013, Aalen 2020 Aalen and Muriaas 2017, 2018	Government
Guatemala	URNG	Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca			1998	23	Ethnic Nationalism	Alison 2006, 2016	Opposition
Honduras	FMLH	Frente Morazanista para la Liberación de Honduras	PUD	Democratic Unification Party of Honduras	1992	29	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Allison 2006	Opposition
Indonesia	GAM	Free Aceh Movement	PA	The Aceh Party	2005	16	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Sindre 2016, 2018, 2019	Opposition
Israel/Palestine	Hamas	Islamic Resistance Movement / Harakat al Muqawama al-Islamiyya		Hamas	1996	25		Berti 2013, Løvlie 2013, Berti and Guitérrez 2016, Berti 2019	Non state context
Kosovo	KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army	PDK	Democratic Party of Kosovo	1999	22		Manning 2004, Manning 2007; 2008, Hensell and Gerdes 2016	Government
Lebanon	Hezbollah	Hezbollah			1992	29		Berti 2013, Berti 2016, Berti 2019	Opposition
Liberia	MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia	CDC	Congress for Democratic Change	2003	18	Liberation Movement	Söderström 2011, 2015, Hensell and Gerdes 2016	Opposition
Liberia	LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	PRODEM	Progressive Democratic Party	2003	18	Anti-Communist	Söderström 2011, 2015, Hensell and Gerdes 2016	Opposition
Mozambique	Frelimo	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique			1992	29	Liberation Movement		Government
Mozambique	Renamo	Resistência Nacional Moçambican			1992	29	Marxism	Manning 2008, Manning 2008, Pearce 2010	Opposition
Namibia	SWAPO	the South West African People's Organizaion			1990	31	Marxism/Socialism	Southall 2013, Metsola and Helber 2007, Söderström 2019	Government
Nepal	CPN -M	Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist	CPN -M	Unified Communist Party of Nepal – Maoist //Communist Party	2006	15	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Ishiyama and Batta 2013, Ishiyama and Marshall 2015, Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013	Government

Table A (Continued)

Nicaragua	FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front			1979	42	Islamist, Secession	Allison 2006	Government
Northern Ireland	IRA	Irish Republican Army		Sinn Féin	1998	23	Ethnic Nationalism, Secessionism, Liberation Movement	Berti 2013, Berti and Knobel 2015, Berti 2019, Whiting 2018	Opposition
Rwanda	RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front			1992	29	Liberation Movement	Lyons 2013, Purdeková, Reyntjens and Wilén 2018	Government
Sierra Leone	RUF	Revolutionary United Front	RUFP	Revolutionary United Front party	2000	21	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Richards and Vincent 2008, Söderberg Kovacs 2019	Opposition
South Africa		Umkhonto we Sizwe	ANC	African National Congress	1994	27	Ethnic Nationalism, Secession	Southall 2013, Muriaas, Rakner and Skage 2016, Aalen and Muriaas 2017, 2018	Government
South Sudan	SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army	SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement	2011	10	Islamist	Young 2008, Podder 2014	Government
Sri Lanka		Various Tamil insurgency groups	TNA	Tamil National Alliance	2006	15	Liberation Movement	Sindre 2018	Opposition
Tajikistan	UTO	United Tadjik Opposition	IRPT	Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan	1997		Marxism/Socialism	Ishiyama and Widmeier 2013	Opposition
Uganda	NRA	National Resistance Army	NRM	National Resistance Movement	1986	35	Ethnic Nationalism, Liberation Movement	Lyons 2016	Government
Western Sahara	SPLA	The Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army			No formal system		Ethnic Nationalism, Liberation Movement	Wilson 2016, 2019	Non-state context
Zimbabwe	ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union	ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front	1975	46	Liberation Movement	Southall 2013, Muriaas, Rakner, Skage 2016	Government

The table is based on a canvassing of the literature on former rebel parties, and represents an approximate overview of the parties previously studied by the field. The table shows the acronyms, year of inclusion, country of inclusion, number of years active in formal politics, and position in formal politics for the parties, as well as which studies cover which parties table contains 36 parties, in 30 countries.

Table B: List of the 13 studies analysed in the thesis

Full citation	Shorthand citation
Berti, Benedetta. 2013. *Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.	Berti 2013
Berti, Benedetta. 2019. "Rebel Groups between Adaptation and Ideological Continuity: The Impact of Sustained Political Participation." *Government and Opposition* 54 (3): 513–35.	Berti 2019
Berti, Benedetta, and Ariel Heifetz Knobel. 2015. "Reframing War to Make Peace in Northern Ireland." *International Journal of Conflict Engagement and Resolution,* 3 (1): 53–70.	Berti and Knobel 2015
Løvlie, Frode. 2013. "Explaining Hamas's Changing Electoral Strategy, 1996-2006." *Government and Opposition* 48 (4): 570–93.	Løvlie 2013
Manning, Carrie. 2004. "Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (1): 54–76.	Manning 2004
Manning, Carrie. 2007. "Party-Building on the Heels of War: El Salvador, Bosnia, Kosovo and Mozambique." *Democratization* 14 (2): 253–72.	Manning 2007
Manning, Carrie.2008. *The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.	Manning 2008
Pearce, Justin. 2020. "From Rebellion to Opposition: UNITA's Social Engagement in Post-War Angola." *Government and Opposition* 55 (3): 474–89.	Peace 2020
Sindre, Gyda M. 2018. "From Secessionism to Regionalism: Intra-Organizational Change and Ideological Moderation within Armed Secessionist Movements." *Political Geography* 64 (May): 23–32.	Sindre 2018
Sindre, Gyda M. 2019. "Adapting to Peacetime Politics? Rebranding and Ideological Change in Former Rebel Parties." *Government and Opposition* 54 (3): 485–512.	Sindre 2018
Söderberg-Kovacs, Mimmi. 2019. "The Legacy of a Revolution That Never Happened: The Post-War Politics of Former Rebel Party RUFP in Sierra Leone." *Government and Opposition*, August, 1–15.	Söderberg Kovacs 2019
Sprenkels, Ralph. 2019. "Ambivalent Moderation: The FMLN's Ideological Accommodation to Post-War Politics in El Salvador." *Government and Opposition* 54 (3): 536–58. .	Sprenkels 2019
Whiting, Matthew. 2018. "Moderation without Change: The Strategic Transformation of Sinn Féin and the IRA in Northern Ireland." *Government and Opposition* 53 (2): 288–311.	Whiting 2018