Communication theorist James W. Carey distinguishes between two different views of communication in the later work of John Dewey. A transmission view takes communication as transmission of messages for the control of distance and people, while a ritual view sees communication as a process of maintaining society in time and as constructing and maintaining a cultural world. Carey argues that a transmission view is dominating in Dewey’s later work, as well as in 20th century American communication studies, and he sets out to elaborate a cultural approach to communication from a ritual view. However, Carey fails to recognize that Dewey develops a ritual view, as well as a transmission view. This article considers how Dewey employs both views in conceptualizing two general aspects of communication. The article further takes account of the ontological basis of Dewey’s communication analysis and how this basis is inspired by several pioneering social theorists: G. Tarde, T. Veblen and B. Malinowski. Moreover, although Dewey’s communication analysis fails to discuss obstacles for lay-expert communication suggested by its own examples, the article points out how his methodological conception of social inquiry integrates both views of communication and anticipates current strands of Participatory Action Research. The article ends by comparing and contrasting Dewey’s ontologically based communication analysis with Carey’s cultural approach to communication.

Keywords
John Dewey, James W. Carey, transmission view of communication, ritual view of communication, cultural approach to communication

Introduction
With Robert Park American communication and social science scholars started to explore the work of John Dewey (1859–1952). Communication theorist James W. Carey has more recently reflected on Dewey’s contribution to American communication studies while distinguishing two different views of communication in Dewey’s later work. A transmission view of communication, Carey points out, sees communication as ‘a process whereby messages are transmitted and distributed in space for the control of distance and people’ (2009a: 13). By contrast, a ritual view of communication ‘is directed ... toward the maintenance of society in time’ and conceives communication in terms of ‘the construction and maintenance of an ordered, meaningful cultural world that can serve as a control
and container for human action’ and has as its ‘archetypal case ... the sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality’ (2009a: 15). Although the two views differ in conceptual and empirical focus they are not mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, a transmission view is dominating, Carey argues, not only in Dewey’s mature work but in 20th century American social science generally and in communication studies in particular. Generalizing across major trends and paradigms in communication studies Carey sees a transmission view as underlying, firstly, research that has studied causally antecedent aspects of the communication processes and that has been concerned with ‘the conditions under which persuasion or control occurs’ and thus ‘the precise psychological and sociological conditions under which attitudes are changed, formed, or reinforced and behavior stabilized or redirected’ (2009b: 34). Secondly, under a functionalistic paradigm, the task has been ‘to discover those natural and abstract functions that hold the social order together’, for example ‘the role of the mass media in maintaining social integration’ (2009b: 34–35). Given the dominating role of a transmission view, Carey wants to return to pioneer social theorists and thinkers who have rather suggested a ritual view of communication, such as Dewey and ‘colleagues and descendants of Dewey in the Chicago School: from Mead and Cooley through Robert Park to Erving Goffman’ (2009a: 19). By retrieving and developing this part of Dewey’s legacy Carey argues in favour of a distinctively cultural approach to communication. On an epistemological level, Carey further draws on Dewey’s theory of inquiry and calls for reflexivity concerning the use of communication models. On Carey’s account models do not only serve as cognitive representations but offer guidance for action; hence, they are not only models ‘of’ but ‘for’ communication and may thus contribute to creating what they model (2009a: 23, 25).

In this article, I explore, challenge, and extend Carey’s reading of Dewey through four lines of argument. Firstly, contrary to Carey’s interpretation that a transmission view is dominating in Dewey’s later thinking, I point out that Dewey’s mature work not only involves but develops the distinction between a transmission and a ritual view of communication. Through this distinction Dewey in Experience and Nature (EN) (1925) conceptualizes two general aspects of communication: an ‘instrumental’ and a ‘consummatory’ aspect. Secondly, in EN and other later works, Dewey outlines ontological and naturalistic perspectives on culture and meaning that provide for complementarity between the two views of communication, and that suggest parallels to Carey’s cultural approach. In developing these perspectives he draws on prominent late 19th and early 20th century social theorists: Gabriel Tarde (1843–1904), Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942). Thirdly, however, I show how Carey’s call for reflexivity in social science bears on Dewey’s communication analysis: Dewey’s examples suggest asymmetric distributions of capacities for communication and action but he fails to discuss how these asymmetries would serve as effective obstacles for lay-expert communication and lay political participation. Fourthly, I
consider how both views of communication are integrated in Dewey’s methodological principles for social inquiry and how they thus sustain Dewey’s principles aimed to address social or political issues and invite lay participation. Following the readings of Thomas Reid and Betsy Taylor (2003) and Ira Harkavy and John Puckett (2014) I point out how Dewey’s principles anticipate strands of Participatory Action Research in contemporary social science. Fifthly and finally, I compare and contrast Dewey’s communication analysis with Carey’s cultural approach to communication, focusing on epistemological and ontological underpinnings. Although Carey refers to and uses Dewey’s theory of inquiry I argue that Dewey would not support the social constructivist position endorsed by Carey.

**Dewey’s communication analysis: a transmission and a ritual view**

Carey argues that a transmission view is dominating in Dewey’s mature work, and that Dewey ‘came to overvalue scientific information and communication technology as a solvent to social problems and a source of social bonds’ (2009a: 18). On closer inspection, however, Carey’s interpretation may more aptly characterize Dewey’s early social thought. Partly inspired by Herbert Spencer (1877), Dewey’s unpublished 1892-lectures in political philosophy takes a society’s social division of labour to be organized through ‘the communicative medium’ of language and modern communication technologies (Dewey, 1892: 53). Like Spencer and other major 19th century social thinkers, Dewey depends heavily on an organism model of society, comparing language to ‘nerve fibers’ for transmission of nerve signals in a physical organism (Dewey, 1892: 52). During the three first decades of the 20th century, however, his conceptualization of society develops. No longer assuming that a society has an organic unity Dewey thinks that ‘a modern society is many societies more or less loosely connected’ (MW9: 25) and that ‘[t]he unity of society is purely conceptual’ (MW15: 232). As I return to in the next section, Dewey goes on to develop ontological and naturalistic perspectives that sustain his analysis of communication and that in effect replace his former organicist model. Yet I first turn to the most comprehensive analysis of communication in Dewey’s later works, an analysis that Carey hardly touches on.

In chapter five of *EN* (LW1: 132–161) Dewey starts out in accordance with George Herbert Mead’s seminal analysis of the ‘the vocal gesture’.

He first considers an imaginary example: through exchanging verbal and non-verbal signs, person A and person B coordinate their actions with regard to a certain natural object. More specifically, B responds to A’s request for practical assistance in picking and appropriating a flower. In line with Mead Dewey emphasizes how use of linguistic signs involves mutual responsiveness and perspective-taking, or, as suggested by the example, how ‘response to another’s act involves contemporaneous response to a thing as entering into the other’s behavior, and this upon both sides’ (LW1: 141). More generally, since the example emphasizes how
an exchange of signs serves as means for controlling an environment, Dewey would assume a transmission view of communication. A transmission view is more generally suggested in that Dewey takes communication as means to achieve social ends beyond the sign exchange as such, such as in ‘establishing cooperation, domination and order’ (LW1: 157). More abstractly, Dewey qualifies such processes in terms of an ‘instrumental’ aspect of communication (LW1: 144).

As Dewey’s analysis further shows, however, through communication social ends may be achieved that could not be seen in isolation from the processes of communication themselves. A communicative exchange may turn into ‘an immediate enhancement of life, enjoyed for its own sake’ (LW1: 144). As the example above suggests, communicating agents may come to appreciate an object, natural or artefactual, by conferring new meaning on it and its use. Their articulation of a valued object’s meaning may transform the communicative exchange into a shared esthetic appreciation. In so far, Dewey points out, the communicative exchange is consumed as a social act. In accounting for this ‘consummatory’ aspect of communication, Dewey explores a ritual view of communication, rather than a transmission view. More generally, he draws on a ritual view in considering how a communicative exchange can be ‘enjoyed for its own sake’ (LW1: 144) as exemplified by ‘poetry, song, the drama, fiction, history, biography, engaging in rites and ceremonies hallowed by time and rich with the sense of the countless multitudes that share in them’ (LW1: 158).

Dewey further develops a ritual as well as a transmission view by considering contexts of institutionally and technologically mediated communication. He develops a transmission view through the example of traffic regulation. The example is to show how ‘the regulatory force of legal meanings’ enables and sustains coordination of traffic actions through the gestures of a traffic policeman. While the ‘proximate meaning’ (LW1: 149) of the policeman’s gestures is apprehended and immediately responded to by lay agents, their ‘ultimate meaning’ more abstractly concerns ‘the total consequent system of social behavior’ with regard to the ‘security of social movements’ (LW1: 149). Conditions for understanding the ultimate meaning are thus given by the institutional context of traffic regulation, remote from the traffic situation itself. The meaning of the traffic officer’s signal is taken up into ‘written and published language, a topic of independent consideration by experts or by civic administrators’, and ‘placed in a context of other meanings, (theoretically and scientifically discussed)’ (LW1: 151). Technicality and abstractness is added by the fact that the concept security must be understood in its union with that of jurisdiction and with that of the ‘comity of jurisdictions’ (LW1: 154, my emph., T.M.), which in the USA secures a citizen subjected to extradition between two single states entitlement to privileges and immunities. Hence, Dewey’s example emphasizes how conditions for understanding the institutional import of concrete regulatory gestures come with mastering specialized legal or administrative discourses.
Dewey further develops a ritual view through considering the social significance of literary arts. Briefly commenting that cultural communities have emerged historically through use of ‘forms of language’ in ceremonies and forms of art, such as ‘the drama’ (LW1: 145), he points out that the development of ‘literary forms’ made possible participation in more comprehensive communities ‘through imaginative identification’ (LW1: 145). By specific reference to the American context, however, Dewey had earlier noted that, in ‘the literary career of our country’ ... the newspaper is the only genuinely popular form of literature we have achieved’ (MW12: 14). Hence, when taken together, his considerations point in a different direction than Walter Lippmann’s classical and epistemologically oriented analysis of news media (1922) and rather anticipate Robert Park’s seminal analysis of newspapers’ ‘human interest story’ (1940: 681), which Carey interprets in terms of a ritual view of communication. Moreover, in The Public and Its Problems (TPIP) (1927) Dewey takes newspaper circulation and its enabling technologies to have effected a sense of belonging to a nationwide polity. Phenomena such as ‘the mails, telegraph and telephone, newspapers, create enough similarity of ideas and sentiments to keep the thing going as a whole, for they create interaction and interdependence’ (LW2: 306). His observation would thus be consistent with the historical thesis advanced by Benedict Anderson (1991[1983]) that the production and circulation of newspapers in the USA enabled a nationwide ‘imagined community’.11

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Dewey develops a ritual and a transmission view not only through concrete examples but also by theoretical considerations. While Carey sees the failure to explore a ritual view as due to the fact that ‘the concept of culture is such a weak and evanescent notion in American social thought’ (2009a: 16), Dewey in EN and other works draws on prominent European social theorists in developing ontological and naturalistic perspectives on culture and meaning. As we shall see, these perspectives support a complementarity between a transmission and a ritual view of communication.

Dewey’s account of culture and meaning: the influence from Tarde, Veblen and Malinowski

From the early 1920s onwards Dewey’s ontological thinking is informed by different sources in late 19th and early 20th century social theory, in particular the work of the French sociologist Gabriel Tarde and the Polish-British anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski, but also that of the American economist Thorstein Veblen. Notably, Dewey does not adopt and endorse Malinowski’s functionalism, which Carey sees as an important source for the domination of a transmission view of communication in American social science.13 Rather, Dewey embraces Malinowski’s account of language as a mode of action and explores an anthropological approach to the meaning of linguistic utterances. I start, however, with the inspiration from Tarde and Veblen.
While Tarde exerted a strong influence on early 20th century American psychology through his *Laws of Imitation* (1890), Dewey holds that Tarde’s lasting contribution is rather to be found in his speculative work. Dewey thus appreciates Tarde’s abstract reflections that ‘all psychological phenomena can be divided into the physiological and the social’ (MW10: 54) and that beliefs and desires are ‘functions of associated behavior’ (MW10: 59). In particular, Dewey stresses Tarde’s generalized notion of society by which there is, in Dewey’s phrasing, ‘no more a problem of the origin of society than there is of the origin of chemical reactions; things are made that way’ (MW10: 59). In several later works, Dewey revisits and develops these Tardean reflections. Firstly, the comparison of the origin of human associations with that of physical processes is developed through a consideration of how human societies depend on natural and technological infrastructures. Supported also by Veblen’s work (1904; 1912 [1899]; 1919), Dewey ponders how implementation of new technologies transforms social organization, leaving inherited social and political institutions maladapted to evolving social relationships. As noted above, he observes how technologically mediated communication through telephones, telegraphs, and the press has enabled and sustained the sense of belonging to a nationwide and not only a local community. Secondly, Dewey further considers how mental phenomena and meaning depend on social and biological processes. In *EN* he speculatively contends that processes involving sentient organisms is a precondition for human communication and for human minds having and sharing meaning:

‘Organic and psycho-physical activities with their qualities are conditions which have to come into existence before mind, the presence and operation of meanings, ideas, is possible. They supply mind with its footing and connection in nature; they provide meanings with their existential stuff’ (LW1: 220).

Moreover, in later editions of *EN* and other works Dewey further suggests how resources from Malinowski’s anthropological work (1946 [1923]; 1931) can complement his Tarde- and Veblen-inspired naturalistic considerations. Firstly, Malinowski (1931) puts emphasis on mutual dependencies of material and immaterial culture. Drawing on Malinowski’s work Dewey stresses how immaterial elements of culture, such as ‘the system of values, ideas (meanings), and … principles that exercises regulative influence upon the nature and course of human associations in cultural groups’, only exist as based in economic and social activities (Dewey 2012: 292n3). In turn, however, material artefacts exist due to group members’ knowledge and skillful practices. Dewey quotes Malinowski (1931): ‘Artifact and custom … mutually produce and determine one another’ (2012: 290). Secondly, Malinowski’s work (1946 [1923]) enables a distinctively pragmatic perspective on language as ‘primarily a mode of action’ (LW1: 160n4). Linguistic signs acquire meaning through
practical use and through performatively contributing to action. Moreover, Dewey takes Malinowski’s pragmatic account of meaning to provide a basis for his own general distinction between an ‘instrumental’ and a ‘consummatory’ aspect of communication. Hence, he sees Malinowski as supporting the overall view that ‘communication is not only a means to common ends but is the sense of community, communion actualized’ (LW1: 160n4). Yet, as Dewey makes clear on a later occasion, Malinowski can provide such basis only through an anthropological interpretation of linguistic utterances ‘in their own context of culture’ (LW3: 3) and by taking account of ‘the culture of the people in question’ (LW3: 20), noting with the anthropologist that this applies to communication in our modern society as well as to communication in so-called ‘primitive societies’.

In line with the inspiration from Malinowski, Dewey outlines an account of meaning as a primary element of culture and as practically and materially embedded in group practices. In *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (LTI) (1938) Dewey stresses how meaning is determined through the use of linguistic signs in a variety of social practices. While meaning could be abstractly studied in terms of a sign system or an ‘inclusive [public] code’ (LW12: 55), the pragmatist recognizes with the anthropologist that a ‘multiplicity of meaning-constellations … hang together … because they are current in the same set of group habits and expectations’ and ‘because of … customs and institutions’ (LW12: 55–56). Practically embedded meanings in turn enable and regulate group members’ articulations of specific beliefs:

‘[E]very cultural group possesses a set of meanings which are so deeply embedded in its customs, occupations, traditions and ways of interpreting its physical environment and group-life, that they form the basic categories of the language-system by which details are interpreted. Hence they are regulative and "normative" of specific beliefs and judgments’ (LW12: 68).

Dewey’s anthropologically inspired account of meaning may support a certain complementarity between a ritual and a transmission view in communication analysis. As suggested by the traffic regulation example above, in analyzing communication sustained by meaning-constellations embedded in regulatory or administrative practices, a transmission view may provide the most relevant perspective. On the other hand, in taking account of practices where embedded meanings enable extensive popular participation, such as religious practices, a ritual view would prove relevant. In addition, in so far as a ritual view considers communication as ‘the representation of shared beliefs’ (Carey, 2009a: 15), this view would be applicable whenever group members articulate and share beliefs in virtue of meaning constellations ‘deeply embedded in a cultural group’s customs, occupations, traditions and ways of interpreting its physical environment and group-life’ (LW12: 68). Hence, in ways consistent with Carey’s cultural approach, Dewey’s account of meaning...
would support application and development of a ritual view. Moreover, although Carey’s cultural approach does not stress a complementarity between the two views like Dewey would do, there are more general parallels between their respective approaches. In taking practically embedded meaning-constellations as a basis for communication Dewey’s account would be congenial to Carey’s approach. In fact, in outlining his cultural approach Carey briefly notes that, ‘In Dewey’s view words take on their meanings from other words and in their relations to practical activity’ (2009c: 61). Developing this Deweyan account, Carey contends that communication, whether mass or interpersonal, needs to be accounted for in terms of ‘an ensemble of social practices into which ingress conceptions, forms of expression, and social relations’ (2009c: 65). Let me briefly expand on two implications of Carey’s condensed statement. Firstly, in line with Dewey’s anthropologically inspired account Carey would analyze cultural conditions of communication by considering ‘a set of historically varying practices’ (2009c: 64). For Carey as well as for Dewey such analysis would rule out universal explanatory frameworks; in fact, they both reject nomological or law-like accounts of cultural phenomena. Rather, as Carey (2009c) makes explicit, the task of considering utterances or texts as enabled and conditioned by particular historical practices is an hermeneutic one. Secondly, practically embedded ‘conceptions’ underlying communication need to analyzed as a source of, in Dewey’s phrasing, a group’s ‘ways of interpreting’ itself and the world (LW12: 68). In contemporary terms this calls for consideration of a double hermeneutic at play: social scientists are studying the social world through lay agents’ interpretations of it. Carey embraces this hermeneutic condition in stressing that a given form of communication must be interpreted as relating to ‘to the senses of life historically found among a people’ (2009b: 34). Yet, this condition is recognized indirectly already in Dewey’s anthropologically inspired approach and more explicitly in his elaborate definition of culture as including a community’s normative self-understanding concerning moral and political legitimacy. However, Dewey’s account of meaning further evokes more critical hermeneutical considerations concerning capacities and obstacles for communication and how the latter should be represented and analyzed. In accounting for meaning in terms of practically embedded language use, Dewey suggests that communicative ability and understanding vary with level or mode of participation in social practices. As Dewey points out: ‘[a] word means one thing in relation to a religious institution, still another thing in business, a third thing in law, and so on. This fact is the real Babel of communication’ (LW12: 56). This plurality of practical and institutional conditions of communication is ‘a mark of our existing culture’ (LW12: 56). Given increasing specialization, professionalization and division of labour in society, such plurality involves asymmetries in capacities for action and communication across groups and segments of society. Although Malinowski (1931) stresses the importance of reconstructing agents’ intellectual and practical capacities in their
respective social contexts, Dewey’s communication analysis fails to discuss differences in capacity and how such differences should be represented. This makes it useful to consider Carey’s point about reflexivity in social science.

**Communication analysis and reflexivity**

Carey calls for reflexive awareness of how views or models of communication work both inside and outside of social science. Generally, he points out, ‘[m]odels of communication are not merely representations of communication but representations for communication: templates that guide, unavailing or not, concrete processes of human interaction, mass and interpersonal’ (2009a: 25). In particular, social scientists need to be aware of how their development and use of models may affect the social reality they purport to describe. By alluding to Dewey’s theory of inquiry Carey calls for developing a reflexive ‘sense of the problematic … by divesting life of its mundane trappings’ (2009a: 20). In fact, Carey’s call for reflexivity critically bears on Dewey’s own communication analysis.

Dewey’s communication analysis in *EN* tacitly involves attributions of capacities to judge means and ends of action. Adopting a terminology Dewey develops elsewhere, this means attributing capacities for practical judgement. Practical judgements are considerations of whether available means would be suitable or sufficient for the achievement of a certain end, or whether an end would be agreeable to other ends or values. In either case, a practical judgement provides reasons for or against a certain line of action. Exerting practical judgment amounts to appraising, which Dewey distinguishes from mere prizing, a non-cognitive attitude of immediate acceptance or rejection of something as good or bad. Going back to Dewey’s first example, involving person A and B, both parties are assumed to have equal capacities for practical judgment: the utterer proposes an end (appropriation of a flower) and suitable means to achieve it (the receiver’s assistance), and the receiver considers the proposal. However, in the other examples we find asymmetric attributions of judgmental capacities in ways that call for reflexivity in Carey’s sense. In the examples where a ritual view is predominant, Dewey considers the use of forms of literature like ‘[l]etters, poetry, song, the drama, fiction, history, biography’, but also ‘rites and ceremonies’ (LW1: 158). Presentation and use of literature ‘are ends for most persons’ (LW1: 158) and would thus not serve as means for some further practical objective. Literature provides articulations of community ends or values and may as such ‘supply the meanings in terms of which [community] life is judged, esteemed, and criticized’ (LW1: 158). However, in so far as such articulations invite or provide occasion for practical judgement, Dewey attributes such judgment to ‘an outside spectator’ for whom these forms of literature ‘supply material for a critical evaluation of the life led by that community’ (LW1: 158). On
this account, capacities for practical judgment would belong to an intellectual or philosophical expertise, rather than to ordinary community members. In effect, lay members would be rendered as valuing literature only through *prizing* rather than *appraisal*.

A similar asymmetrical distribution is suggested in examples where a transmission view dominates. In the example of traffic regulation, lay agents understand ‘the proximate meaning’ of legal concepts (LW1: 149) through responding to the gestures of the traffic policeman. Since the ‘ultimate meaning’ of the legal concepts is determined in abstraction from particular traffic situations, however, ‘experts’ or ‘civic administrators’, able to use and reason with the concepts in specialized discourses, are required (LW1: 151). Dewey’s example shows how an understanding and appraisal of the final import of traffic regulation is the privilege of experts, while lay agents are left with abilities for *prizing* in concrete situations, say, by enjoying traffic safety or by lamenting lack of safety or accidents following upon such lack. Yet, in suggesting a rationale for attributing intellectual capacities and resources he introduces another example. He compares the regulatory force of legal concepts to the technological use of scientific concepts for controlling natural events. In both cases, Dewey contends, ascertaining and stating ‘meanings in abstraction from social or shared situations is the only way in which the latter can be intelligently modified, extended and varied’ (LW1: 150). However, this comparison fails to reflect on different conditions for concept use and communication in the two cases.

The comparison not only fails to distinguish between human communicative beings, on the one hand, and entities controlled through technological intervention and manipulation, on the other. The comparison further abstracts from crucial institutional conditions. In fact, in commenting on the first example Dewey admits that jurisdiction, or power to deal legally with specific affairs, is ‘determined with respect to consequences found desirable’ or to when ‘[a transaction] has consequences which it is deemed socially important to regulate’ (LW1: 56). However, judgments of consequences as desirable or as being in need of regulation are *policy* judgments that in a representative democracy should be brought up for legislators’ consideration. Legislators’ judgments and decisions are in turn democratically accountable to their constituents, in particular to those who are affected by enduring and adverse consequences of transactions and who Dewey in *TPIP* famously terms ‘the public’. Only by abstracting from these social and institutional circumstances could one see regulation primarily as a matter of expert legal judgment. In enforcing legislators’ and administrators’ democratic accountability, however, and by stressing the public’s need to inform and assess legislative policies, one could not merely attribute capacity for practical judgments to experts.

In the applications of a transmission and a ritual view in the examples above, expert judgements become socially separated from communicative processes involving lay community
members. In Dewey’s abstract terminology, this means that the instrumental aspect of communication, through which articulations of means–ends relations are critically assessed, becomes separated from the consummatory aspect, through which social ends or values are enjoyed. Thus ‘instrumental’ or critical assessments of means and ends lose their basis in the communities whose values should guide articulation and assessment of ends, and whose life conditions and resources ought to be crucial for assessing the achievability and desirability of ends. In fact, toward the end of his communication analysis, Dewey suggests a more problem oriented approach:

‘[T]he great evil lies in separating instrumental and final functions. Intelligence is partial and specialized, because communication and participation are limited, sectarian, provincial, confined to class, party, professional group. By the same token, our enjoyment of ends is luxurious and corrupting for some; brutal, trivial, harsh for others’ (LW1: 159–160).

Nevertheless, Dewey’s communication analysis misses an opportunity to reflect on these problems and to critically assess them as ‘a mark of our existing culture’ (LW12: 56). Moreover, the analysis fails to consider how attribution of asymmetries in judgmental capacities may itself contribute to what is described and to reinforce or generalize occurring separations of ‘instrumental and final functions’. In particular, the communication analysis fails to consider how its own results may assume the status of expert social knowledge that would exemplify that ‘intelligence is partial and specialized’.

We have seen, however, that Dewey’s perspectives on culture and meaning provide for a complementarity of the two views of communication and hence offer conceptual means to consider how ‘instrumental’ and ‘consummatory’ aspects of communication would be either socially integrated or disintegrated. In fact, in his methodologically oriented work Dewey can be seen to draw on his account of meaning and to use the two views in complementary ways. More specifically, in suggesting a method for social inquiry Dewey considers how expert and lay judgements could be integrated through communication.37 In the next section I show how Dewey employs both views of communication in outlining methodological principles aimed at enabling lay participation and at sustaining and expanding democratic participation. His methodological provisions may thus suggestively exemplify Carey’s point that models of communication are not only representations of but representations for communication or ‘templates that guide … concrete processes of human interaction’ (2009a: 25). These provisions enable hermeneutic sensitivity for the self-understanding of lay agents and the suggested communication with lay participants would enhance reflexivity concerning cultural or social biases of inquiry.
Social inquiry: integrating a transmission and a ritual view

Dewey’s suggested method of social inquiry in *TPIP* may be seen to integrate a transmission and a ritual view. I will first consider some historical and political reasons behind this integration through two examples of social inquiries with which Dewey was acquainted. Like classical works in the Chicago school of sociology both examples focus on urban immigrant communities. Yet unlike the former these examples have explicit normative aims.

Firstly, Dewey was familiar with the famous settlement house Hull House in Chicago and the investigations that Jane Addams and other residents conducted into urban immigrant communities and the living and working conditions of their members. To take one prominent example, together with other settlement houses Hull House residents interviewed one thousand newsboys about their working conditions. Communication mattered here not only through the conducting of interviews: longstanding communicative engagement with neighboring immigrant communities was a precondition for formulating the problems inquired into. Moreover, this engagement enabled moral identification with the communities and their concerns. In particular, the Hull House inquirers used their investigation to work for progressive-reform legislation against child labour. By promoting rights and legal protection of poor immigrants, the final aim of the investigation was thus a better integration of immigrants in society and in the political community. The role of communication would thus not be limited to obtaining relevant information through interviews or what could be considered through a transmission view. Rather, since the communication involved moral identification with members of immigrant communities and aimed at their social and political integration, the example also suggests the relevance of a ritual view. In the second historical example Dewey took active part in the research: toward the end of World War One he lead a research group that studied the Polish exile community in Philadelphia and in particular the political attitudes of its leaders. Conducted through interviews and text analyses its aim was to bring up new information for the consideration of the US government in order to obtain its support for an independent and democratic Poland after the war. Although like the Hull House investigation this study was driven by central values of the political community, it had larger focus on control over information processes in public space. In particular, the Polish study sought to correct and contradict a Polish press agency in Washington seen as concealing relevant sources of information and as serving policy goals that conflicted with American democratic values.

While these two historical examples may suggest different priorities of a transmission and a ritual view, the examples taken together provide a relevant historical background for Dewey’s own idea of social inquiry. In ways that reflect both examples’ focus on relevant sources of information Dewey stresses that, in a democracy, regulatory policies should be informed by inquiries that engage
people’s needs and concerns. In *TPIP* he warns that ‘[n]o government by experts in which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to their needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed in the interests of the few’ (LW2: 365). In being effectively ‘shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve’ experts become incapable of developing policies for ‘regulation of common affair’ (LW2: 364). Moreover, lack of communication may lead to social and cultural insulation where experts become ‘high-brows’ or members of a ‘specialized class’ (LW2: 364). Hence, Dewey suggests, without direct communication with relevant lay agents, experts lose an opportunity to become reflexively aware of their being influenced by special or private interests.

It is not enough that lay citizens serve as mere sources of information. Drawing on his account of meaning Dewey later suggests that articulations of problems for inquiry should employ resources derived from meaning constellations embedded in lay agents’ social practices. In ways similar to the Hull House investigators, Dewey thus recognizes the need to establish adequate cultural and social conditions for communication between experts and lay agents. Furthermore, in developing adequate procedures social inquirers should learn from institutions and practices of political democracy. Democratic practices involve heuristic use of ‘consultation and discussion which uncover social needs and troubles’ (LW2: 364). In particular, popular government ‘forces a recognition that there are common interests … [while] the need it enforces of discussion and publicity brings about some clarification of what they are’ (LW2: 364). Taking these historical lessons, inquirers should engage communicatively with relevant groups to determine problems for inquiry and persistently discuss what public interests the inquiry should serve. Although Dewey’s concern with relevant sources of information shows the pertinence of a transmission view, the emphasis on establishing shared cultural conditions of communication, as well as the evocation of democratic practices and institutions, suggest the relevance of a ritual view as well. In particular, the proposal of maintaining and developing the polity’s received practices confirms the pertinence of a ritual view, which generally concerns ‘the maintenance of society in time’ (Carey 2009a: 15).

Yet, what specific role does Dewey attribute to lay citizens in inquiry? As James Bohman has pointed out, Dewey’s proposal involves a division of cognitive labour and an assignment of distinct capacities to lay participants, as well as to experts. In Dewey’s own terms,

‘[i]nquiry … is a work which devolves upon experts. But their expertness is not shown in framing and executing policies, but in discovering and making known the facts upon which the former depend … It is not necessary that the many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed investigations; what is required is that they have the ability to judge of the bearing of the knowledge supplied by others upon common concerns’ (LW2: 365).
In contrast to his communication analysis in EN Dewey now argues that lay citizens have a capacity to judge (or appreciate) the relevance of expert contributions and that this capacity is needed. In fact, in supporting the argument by his account of meaning he points out that judgmental capacities are enabled by collective cultural resources or meanings. In a culture suffused by science and technology, circulating meanings may endow lay agents with an ‘embodied intelligence’ that aids understanding and enables ‘judgment of public concerns’ (LW2: 366–367). This lay capacity, Dewey holds, is fulfilled through intercourse and communication in local communities. Such community based fulfilment, however, is also to define the realisation of the lay-expert cooperation as such. Ideally, through experts’ sustained engagement with lay citizens’ concerns and cultural backgrounds, and through citizens’ skilful assessment of expert contributions, the two parties would mutually adapt to each other through process of inquiry. A ritual view of communication may thus support an idealized description of how citizens and experts may eventually see themselves as participants in a community based undertaking with a joint aim.

Dewey emphasizes that the results of inquiry should be distributed and used in a wider social and political environment. He points out that ‘communication of the results of social inquiry is the same as the formation of public opinion’ (LW2: 345). As suggested by the Polish study, Dewey points out that the use of research results in policy development needs to take into account the workings of the news media. To communicate results effectively social inquirers should thus adapt to ways of presenting news in newspapers and radio. Yet inquirers’ communication would not simply be about contemporary events but politically significant connections between events. As in the Polish study, inquirers may need to consider transnational connections between domestic and foreign events. Moreover, in keeping with the form of news presentation, expert inquirers would abstain from highbrow style in order to extend its effective outreach to large segments of society. Hence, the extensiveness of outreach, as well as the aim of social and political influence, indicate the pertinence of a transmission view of communication. Yet, a ritual view would come into play here as well. As seen above, Dewey’s comment on how news media and communication technologies in the USA have ‘create[d] enough similarity of ideas and sentiments to keep the thing going as a whole’ (LW2: 306) is consistent with Benedict Anderson’s historical account of imagined national communities (1991[1983]). In so far, Dewey’s proposed adaptations to news media practices would presuppose inquirers’ identification with a nationwide political community, and, hence, suggest the relevance of a ritual view.

Summing up, Dewey could be seen to propose two methodological principles of social inquiry: the first promoting expert-lay cooperation and lay citizen participation in inquiry; the second prescribing distribution and use of results to inform and justify policies. While a ritual view underlies the articulation of the first principle and a transmission view articulation of the second view, a full
articulation of each principle requires integration of both views. To consider the pertinence and continuing relevance of Dewey’s methodological integration of the two views of communication, I follow Reid and Taylor (2003) and Harkavy and Puckett (2014) in taking Dewey’s proposal as a precursor of strands of Participatory Action Research.

**Dewey’s methodological principles and Participatory Action Research**

Dewey’s conception of social inquiry resonates with Kurt Lewin’s research (1946; 1947), which forms the point of departure for Action Research in North America and Europe. In particular, Dewey’s emphasis on using results of inquiry to improve social conditions accords with Lewin’s idea of action research as committed to changing and improving situations for groups or organizations. In ways that recall Dewey’s concern for lay agents as sources of information Lewin’s pioneering research on leadership styles and their industrial efficiency put emphasis on communication between all group members in identifying problems and deciding on division of work tasks. Lewin’s emphasis on well-informed group decisions suggests the pertinence of a transmission view of communication. Moreover, while Lewin’s research was conducted on a small social scale, educational action research in UK in the late 1960s and early 70s was funded by the government to inform public policy making. Again, as in Dewey’s proposal to inform policy development through extensive distribution of results of social inquiry, a transmission view would be central. However, through later developments concern has been raised for more profound lay or community participation, and for the role lay people should have in setting an agenda for research, in data collection and in controlling the use of outcomes. These developments further stress the relevance of Dewey’s principle concerning expert-lay cooperation. Leading advocates of Participatory Action Research (PAR) have distinguished ‘genuine participation’ from ‘mere involvement’, where the former means ‘sharing in the way research is conceptualized, practiced and brought to bear on the life world’ (McTaggart, 1991: 171). Although Dewey grants no distinct methodological role to lay participants in data collection, his considerations of how the formulation of problems requires communicative engagement between expert and lay are congenial to current understandings of PAR. In particular, his observation that experts’ specialized culture may be a barrier to communication anticipates similar concerns of PAR scholars. In stressing the collective nature of resources (meanings) for participating in inquiry, as well as the local community basis for assessment of relevance, Dewey foreshadows the methodological emphasis on community participation and collective reflection in PAR. Moreover, by suggesting that lay participation may develop a polity’s democratic practices, Dewey’s consideration resonates with participatory research initiated in African and Latin-American contexts in the 1960s and 70s, as well as with the generalized idea of
PAR as a political process with ‘people working together toward rationality, justice, coherence and satisfactoriness in workplaces and in other areas of people’s lives’ (McTaggart 1997: 6). As seen above, Dewey’s stress on a communal and democratic basis of inquiry is supported by a ritual view of communication; hence, his relevance for PAR suggests the continuing methodological significance of a ritual view.

Still, in Dewey’s case a ritual view of communication would support a highly idealized account of lay-expert cooperation. Dewey’s idealized community basis for inquiry may seem out of step with PAR researchers’ critical concern with structural conditions that have tended to remain in the background in action research in Western contexts. For example, Steven Jordan critically notes how industrial research projects’ blindness to structural conditions has inadvertently ‘co-opt[ed] workers’ knowledge’ through an ‘overt concern with organisational change and learning on terms and conditions established by multinational corporations ..’ (2003: 191). Nevertheless, living in the aftermath of what historians of economics have called the ‘First Great Globalization’ culminating in World War One, Dewey was well aware of the transnational scope of economic activities and how local communities and ‘face-to-face associations’ were ‘conditioned by remote and invisible organizations’ (LW2: 296). Although he did not specify how social inquiry should be conducted under conditions of a globalized market, a classical PAR case in the Appalachian region in the USA can be used to consider the relevance of Dewey’s conception of social inquiry.

The Appalachia land ownership study (1983) ‘is recognized as a pioneering effort in the interdisciplinary field of participatory action research ... in the United States’ (Scott, 2009: 186). It was initiated in 1979 when a team of community organizers, activists, and academics collaborated to conduct a systematic study of landownership and taxation in Appalachia, a region stretching over six states in the Eastern USA where coal and mineral corporations established an enduring economic stronghold already in the late 19th century. By the 1970s local Appalachian communities faced loss of control over agricultural land, along with ‘severe and persistent poverty, high unemployment, low educational attainment, poor infrastructure, a lack of social and health services’ (Scott, 2008: 242), as well as serious environmental consequences of surface mining and stripmining coal. Since several of the land owning corporations were absentee owners, and one major landowner had been based in London since the beginning, the case provides a focus on structural and transnational circumstances often missing in other industrial PAR projects. Moreover, the tight cooperation and mutual commitment of community organizers and social scientists in stating the overarching problem, and in planning and carrying out the research, conforms with Dewey’s ideal of citizen participation as supported by a ritual view of communication. The relevance of a ritual view is further indicated by the study’s role in sustaining communal and civic identity through the development of state wide civic organizations. Yet, in line with Dewey’s conception of social inquiry, a transmission view can
also be highlighted. Findings of the Appalachian study were conveyed to local politicians while informing demands for strengthening local land owners’ rights against mining, for increasing federal power to confiscate corporate land for alternative economic development, as well as for more effective environmental regulation. More generally, the complementary focuses on communication in this classical PAR case support Harkavy’s and Puckett’s qualification of it as ‘“neo-Deweyan” in its organization’ (2014: 255).

In addition to Dewey’s relevance for interdisciplinary oriented PAR, his relevance for recent and partly historically related developments in communication studies deserves to be mentioned. Originated by communication scholars in a Latin American context Participatory Communication (Research) has evolved since the 1970s to address issues in communication for development (Dervin and Huesca, 1997; Servaes, 2001; Servaes [ed.], 2008). Dewey’s (and Carey’s) work is congenial to these communication scholars in virtue of the latters’ critique of dominant communication models of ‘information transfer and communication as extension’ (Dervin and Huesca, 1997: 50) and of ‘“diffusion of innovations”’ (Servaes, 2001: 9), and by their emphasis on the ‘cultural identity of local communities and of democratisation and participation at all levels’- international, national, local and individual’ (Servaes, 2001: 10). A similar focus on lay participation, but with more emphasis on promoting social justice on part dominated and marginalized groups, is characteristic of the recent Communication Activism Research (Carragee and Frey, 2016), although this research is mainly restricted to a North American context.

**Conclusion: Dewey and Carey’s cultural approach to communication**

For his cultural approach to communication Carey finds relevant points of departure among ‘descendants of Dewey in the Chicago School’ (2009a: 19). As seen above, however, Carey fails to appreciate how a ritual view of communication, as well as a transmission view, is developed already in Dewey’s later philosophy. Carey equally neglects how Dewey’s ontological and naturalistic perspectives on meaning and culture provide for a certain integration of both views in communication analysis. Still, we have already noted ways in which these perspectives accord with Carey’s own cultural approach: methodologically, they would rule out nomological and law-like accounts and provide for hermeneutic sensitivity for agents’ self-understanding. If we consider other and more abstract epistemological and ontological underpinnings, however, we may point out divergences as well as convergences between Carey’s and Dewey’s respective approaches.

Their approaches converge in rejecting ontological and methodological individualism. In criticizing the longstanding dominance of a transmission view in American communication studies and social science generally Carey targets a deeply seated or ‘obsessive individualism, which makes
psychological life the paramount reality’ (2009a: 16). Dewey’s Tarde-, Veblen-, and Malinowski-inspired perspectives would concur with Carey’s consideration in effectively rejecting methodological and ontological individualism. In his social theory Dewey takes the social group as the basic unit of analysis, not the individual. He further takes meaning to be irreducible to psychological states or processes. In fact, by rather conceiving meaning-constellations as embedded in social practices, Dewey, along with Mead (1934), prepares ontological grounds for Carey’s cultural approach.

However, Carey’s use of perspectives from Dewey’s theory of inquiry has a more ambiguous status. On the one hand he subscribes to Dewey’s general account of how social science inquiry develops from and responds to practical and social problems. Carey points out that, for Dewey, ‘knowledge most effectively grew at the point when things became problematic, when we experience an ‘information gap’ between what circumstances impelled us toward doing and what we needed to know in order to act at all’ (2009a: 20). Carey’s reflexive point that models are not merely representations but offer guidance for action has unmistakenly Deweyan and pragmatist roots. For example, he adopts Deweyan terminology by considering how symbolic forms are ‘capable of clarifying a problematic situation’ or how symbolic forms can map ‘an environment’ differently for various practical purposes (2009a: 21). However, Carey’s goes on to make global constructivist claims in ways that would diverge from Dewey’s epistemology. Using the term ‘create’ in an epistemologically undifferentiated sense, Carey contends that ‘our models of communication … create what we disingenuously pretend they merely describe’ (Carey 2009a: 26), and that communication generally is ‘a process whereby reality is created, shared, modified, and preserved’ (2009a: 25). Rather than supporting a general constructivist stance toward ‘the symbolic production of reality’ (Carey, 2009a: 19) Dewey’s theory stresses that symbolic resources enable inquirers to define situations as problems to be grappled with, practically and cognitively, and that by assigning meaning to phenomena emerging through interventions inquirers make phenomena more adaptable to human purposes. Moreover, Dewey’s naturalism would rebut global constructivist claims: as seen above, it conceives human communication as anchored phylogenetically and ontologically in biophysical processes, as well as in practically embedded constellations of meaning. Due to its naturalistic underpinnings Dewey’s theory of inquiry would see evolving scientific discourses as conditioned by human organisms and their material environments. Hence, although Dewey would share Carey’s view of the cognitively enabling role of cultural artefacts, linguistic and technological, he would also emphasize the conditioning and constraining role of human biology and biophysical environments for communication and inquiry.
Notes

1 See Park and Burgess, 1921: 36–37; Park, 1938.

2 See in particular his essay ‘A Cultural Approach to Communication’ (2009a). As he makes clear in an other text (2009d), however, his distinction between a transmission and ritual view of communication draws on Harold Innis’ distinction between space-binding and time-binding cultures.

3 ‘Neither of these counterposed views of communication necessarily denies what the other affirms. A ritual view does not exclude the processes of information transmission or attitude change’ (2009a: 17).


5 See in particular § 221 of Spencer, 1877 (1877: 477–478).

6 Dewey, J. (1892) ‘Political Philosophy’ (Lecture Notes). Special Collections, Morris Library, Southern Illinois, Carbondale, Box 62, Folder 1 and 2. Citations are specified with page references since this manuscript is provided with consistent pagination throughout.

7 Through communication, Dewey argues, economic agents across national borders gain knowledge about each other that enables them to coordinate their activities (see Dewey, 1892: 49–55, 155, 164–165).


9 See LW1: 140–142.

10 ‘[A]s meaning, future consequences [of the thing] already belong to the thing. The act of striving to bring them existentially into the world may be commuted into esthetic enjoyed possession of form’ (LW1: 144).


13 See Carey, 2009b: 42. Malinowski’s psychological functionalism takes culture to serve an individual’s human needs. This functionalism is defined elsewhere in the text from which Dewey quotes: ‘Culture consists of the body of commodities and instruments as well as of customs and bodily or mental habits which work directly or indirectly for the satisfaction of human needs’ (1931: 625). Consider also: ‘Culture is then essentially an instrumental reality which has come into existence to satisfy the needs of man in a manner far surpassing any direct adaptation to the environment’ (1931: 646).

14 In his address to the American Psychological Association in 1916 Dewey assesses the influence of Tarde’s work on American psychology and social science (see MW10: 53–54).

15 Although Dewey gives no specific reference Tarde’s works, the probable source is Tarde’s Monadology and Sociology (2012 [1893]). See in particular Tarde’s comment: ‘But this implies first of all that everything is a society, that very phenomenon is a social fact. Now, it is remarkable that science, following logically from its preceding tendencies, tends strangely to generalize the concept of society. Science tells us of animal societies, of cellular societies, and why not of atomic societies? I almost forgot to add societies of stars, solar and stellar systems. All sciences seem destined to become branches of sociology’ (2012[1893]: 28).
Rhetorically Dewey asks: ‘What would social phenomena be without the physical factor of land, including all the natural resources (and obstacles) and forms of energy for which the word "land" stands? What would social phenomena be without the tools and machines by which physical energies are utilized? Or what would they be without physical appliances and apparatus, from clothes and houses to railways, temples and printing-presses?’ (LW3: 47).

See in particular MW15: 241, 269 and LW3: 45–46. See also Rick Tilman’s study of Veblen’s influence on Dewey (1998).

See LW2: 306.

‘Meanings are not possible apart from the existence of certain psychological processes, but meanings are not psychic any more than they are biological, but distinctively the social fact. Language is not an expression or utterance of thought complete psychically, but the characteristic social process incapable of reduction to psychical terms’ (MW15: 239). See also LW3: 48–50.

Dewey quotes Malinowski (1931: 622): '[t]he organization of social groups is a complex combination of material equipment and bodily customs which cannot be divorced from either its material or psychological substratum’ (Dewey, 2012: 290).

Note Dewey’s quote from Malinowski (1946 [1923]): ‘A word is used when it can produce an action, and not to describe one’ (LW1: 160n4).

For a fuller account of Dewey’s theory of meaning, see Midtgarden, 2008.

See for example Carey’s comments that ‘… communication research attains precision or persuasiveness only when it is placed within history and culture; within, that is, the historical experience of particular peoples’ (2009b: 50), and that ‘… communication as such has no essence, no universalizing qualities … Communication simply constitutes a set of historically varying practices and reflections upon them.’ (2009b: 64). Compare with Dewey: '[S]ocial science … is not concerned with abstract uniformities in the sense in which physical science, by abstracting from historic change, can deal with them. It is concerned (1) with establishing certain correlations within complex cultural phenomena, connected with particular and concrete groups, and (2) with tracing the historic processes of change due to contact of cultural groups previously isolated…’ (MW15: 235–236). See also his later comment: ‘Every social phenomenon … is itself a sequential course of changes, and hence a fact isolated from the history of which it is a moving constituent loses the qualities that make it distinctively social. Generic propositions are indispensable in order to determine the unique sequence of events, but as far as the latter is interpreted wholly in terms of general and universal propositions, it loses that unique individuality in virtue of which it is a historic and social fact’ (LW12: 494).

The term ‘double hermeneutic’ was coined by Anthony Giddens (1984: 284) although it resonates strongly already in the work of Charles Taylor (1971).

On Carey’s account, the task of the communication scholar is ‘to try to find out what other people are up to, or at least what they think they are up to; to render transparent the concepts and purposes that guide their actions and render the world coherent to them’ (2009c: 65).

‘The state of culture is a state of interaction of many factors, the chief of which are law and politics, industry and commerce, science and technology, the arts of expression and communication, and of morals, or the values men prize and the ways in which they evaluate them; and finally, though indirectly, general ideas used by men to justify and to criticize the fundamental conditions under which they live.’ (LW13: 79, my emphasis, T. M.)


Directly inspired by Malinowski (1931) Dewey in fact stresses the need to consider material culture in connection with ‘the existing system of knowledge, of beliefs about value … within the social organization’ (2012: 290–291).

30 See in particular MW8: 17–21.


32 ‘[T]o value’ means two radically different things: to prize and appraise; to esteem and to estimate’ (MW8: 26). On Dewey’s account, to appraise is ‘to judge it to be good’ whereas to prize is ‘to find good apart from reflective judgment [which] means simply treating the thing in a certain way, hanging on to it, dwelling upon it, welcoming it and acting to perpetuate its presence, taking delight in it’ (MW8: 26). As Dewey makes clear on a later occasion, however, the distinction assumes a continuum in so far as ‘possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal’ (LW1: 298).

33 Note Dewey’s presentation of the example: ‘A proposes the consummatory possession of the flower through the medium or means of B’s action; B proposes to cooperate—or act adversely—in the fulfillment of A’s proposal’ (LW1: 142).

34 In the last chapter of EN Dewey develops a conception cultural criticism where philosophy is given a key role (see LW1: 295–326).

35 ‘The public consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for’ (LW2: 245–246).

36 See LW2: 364.


38 See Park, 1915; Thomas, 1918–1920; and Park and Miller, 1925.

39 Dewey was on the board of Hull House for several years while he worked at the University of Chicago (see Haddock Seigfried, 1996: 73–8).

40 Addams, 1911: 303–304.

41 Addams, 1911: 304.

42 ‘Confidential Report of Conditions Among the Poles in the United States’ (MW11: 259–331).


44 See MW11: 256–258.

45 ‘Problems which induce inquiry grow out of the relations of fellow beings to one another, and the organs for dealing with these relations are not only the eye and ear, but the meanings which have developed in the course of living, together with the ways of forming and transmitting culture with all its constituents of tools, arts, institutions, traditions and customary beliefs’ (LW12: 48).


47 LW2: 366.

48 ‘[T]hat expansion and reinforcement of personal understanding and judgment by the cumulative and transmitted intellectual wealth of the community … can be fulfilled only in the relations of personal intercourse in the local community’ (LW2: 371).

49 See LW2: 347–348.

50 LW2: 347–349.

51 See Adelman, 1993; Colucci and Colombo, 2018. In the USA Dewey can be seen as a main source of inspiration for educational action research in particular, see Schubert and Lopez-Schubert, 1997.

The research projects in question were the Educational Priority Area project and the Community Development Projects in England and Wales where ‘[s]ocial reform was to be constructed rationally using information coming out of the dialogue between social science researchers and policy-makers.’ (Adelman, 1993: 16).

See for example Tandon, 1988; McTaggart, 1991.


See Hall, 1992.


See Gaventa, 1980: 53.

Such organizations are Alabama Arise (see Scott, 2008: 244) and Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, which tackles ‘broad environmental, political, and social justice issues, ranging from opposing mountaintop removal and industrial hog farms to promoting low-income utility assistance programs and youth recreation centers’ (Scott, 2008: 243).

‘Persons living in association form a group, which may be taken as the fundamental concept’ (MW15: 236).

See in particular his comment: ‘Meanings are not possible apart from the existence of certain psychological processes, but meanings are not psychic any more than they are biological, but distinctively the social fact. Language is not an expression or utterance of thought complete psychically, but the characteristic social process incapable of reduction to psychical terms’ (MW15: 239).


See for example Carey, 2009c: 53–54; Carey, 2009d: 119. For an instructive account of Dewey’s view of the indispensable role of linguistic signs and technological artefacts in knowledge processes, see Hickman 1990, in particular chapter two (1990: 17–59).

References


