

Perceptions of individual lifestyle changes in Norway's sustainability transition



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Abstract

By ratifying the Paris Agreement in 2015, Norway pledged to attempt to keep the global temperature rise to below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Through the agreement, Norway has committed to cutting 40% of emissions, compared to 1990s level, by 2030. However, the necessary emission reductions are currently not taking place, therefore, a sustainability transition is needed. This master's thesis researches how the Norwegian population envisions the sustainability transition to come about, and how they perceive the role of the individual in this transition. Data was gathered from a survey sent out by the Norwegian Citizen Panel and interviews with members of the environmental organisation Spire. The data is analysed by utilising the theoretical framework of multiple environmentalities, which builds upon the concept of governmentality from Foucault. The research contributes to the literature by adapting the framework to a Norwegian context, in the Global North region, where it has not frequently been applied before. The findings in this thesis show that people predominantly rely on the state to initiate a sustainability transition. Individual lifestyle changes are needed but should mostly come through an economy that allows people to consume environmentality friendly. These conclusions are attributed to a Norwegian, and Scandinavian, combination of the sovereign and neoliberal forms of environmentality. The thesis concludes by emphasising the need for rapid action to lower emissions and keep the 1.5°C-target alive.

Table of content

Acknowledgements.....	II
Abstract.....	III
1. Introduction	6
1.1 Research objectives and questions	7
2. Positioning Norway in the anthropogenic age of mass-emissions.....	8
2.1 Implications of the Paris Agreement	8
2.2 Norwegian environmental politics	10
2.3 Challenges to individual lifestyle changes	15
3. Theoretical framework	18
3.1 Power and discourses	19
3.2 The governing of subjects	20
3.3 Environmentality in the Global North	25
3.4 Critique, resistance, and counter-conduct	34
4. Methodology.....	36
4.1 Research design	38
4.2 Analysis.....	42
4.3 Ensuring rigour	47
4.4 Ethical considerations	49
5. Findings and analysis	52
5.1 The spire interviews	52
5.2 The Norwegian Citizen Panel survey.....	61
6. Discussion	78
6.1 Answering the research questions.....	79
6.2 Which environmentality is the most prominent among the respondents?.....	81
6.3 Towards a low-emissions society, or a future age of mass emissions?.....	83
7. Conclusion.....	85
Notes	87
Bibliography	87
Appendix	95

Table of figures

Table 1: Overview of answers to survey-questions from the Spire interviews53

Graph 1: Distribution of answers to questions 1 in the NCP.62

Graph 2: Distribution of answers to questions 2 in the NCP.63

Graph 3: Distribution of answers to questions 3 in the NCP.64

Graph 4: Distribution of answers to questions 4 in the NCP.65

Graph 5: Connection in answers between question 1 and question 2.69

Graph 6: Connection in answers between questions 2 and questions 3.71

Graph 7: Connection in answers between question 2 and question 4.72

Graph 8: Connection in answers between question 3 and question 4.74

1. Introduction

In 2015, The Paris Agreement was recognised by 193 countries, culminating COP21. The signing parties agreed to work towards limiting the increase of average global temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and attempting to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (United Nations, 2015). The described consequences of not doing so are severe and include sea level rise, intense heat waves, unreliable food production as well as increased scarcity and conflicts (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). The importance of keeping global temperature rise below 1.5°C was maintained at COP26, held in November of 2021. What may seem like a minor distinction will in reality be the cause of even higher sea level rise, more intense heat and drought, as well as increased food and water shortage (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018). Backdrop to COP26 was the contribution from working group I to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change's (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report, published in August 2021, which showed evidence that climate changes are happening faster than earlier anticipated. The report further stated how "It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021, p. 5).

In March 2022, the contribution from the IPCC's working group III announced that keeping below the 1.5°C-degree target is still possible, but the window for action is rapidly closing (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022). Getting there will require not only large emission cuts, but just as well must deforestation be turned into afforestation and resources must be distributed equally and managed sustainably. Through the Paris Agreement, Norway has committed to cutting 40% of national emissions compared to the 1990s level, by 2030. However, fulfilling the requirements are still far off, and the measures needed to reach these targets are frequently debated. This thesis presumes that a sustainability transition is required, and no matter how it happens it will demand lifestyle changes for most of the Norwegian population. This assumption is built on research presented by institutions such as the IPCC and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), as well as both consumption and production-based emission figures indicating that the population of the global north contributes many times more to climate degradation than countries in the global south (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2018; Ritchie, 2019; Sustainable development index, 2021).

1.1 Research objectives and questions

Notwithstanding research cited by the IPCC and the UNFCCC, Norwegian emission figures remain high. This master's thesis will research how people in Norway regard the sustainability transition by exploring how they perceive the need for lifestyle changes to cut emissions. The research aim is to gain an understanding of how the population envisions the path to sustainability in Norway. Likewise, the objective of the research is to uncover if people believe it to be necessary for individuals to change their lifestyles and consumption patterns to reduce emissions in line with the Paris Agreement targets.

The research sets out to answer the two research questions: "How do people in Norway envision the sustainability transition to come about?" and "How do they understand their own role within this transition?". The first question addresses the aim of the research. It will incorporate what the overall transformation is expected to entail. For instance, which actors are deemed the most important for an environmental transformation, which policies they anticipate, and not least, if they expect Norway to fulfil the demands from the Paris Accord. The second question gets more into the objective of the research. For this question it will be important to observe how much responsibility is given to individuals as actors.

The data for this research was gathered using an online questionnaire sent out by the Norwegian Citizen Panel as well as in-person interviews with young people from the environmental organisation Spire. The research is grounded in a constructivist epistemology and the data will be analysed by utilising the theory of multiple environmentalities. The theory builds upon Foucault's concept of governmentality and describes different ways people come to care for the environment. The intention is to uncover whether the theoretical framework is applicable in Norway, and if so, which of the categories of environmentality is the most prominent among the respondents. Moreover, the commitments Norway made through the Paris Agreement will be used as a benchmark of emission cuts throughout the thesis. Focusing on these targets benefits the reader as well as the participants of the research in understanding what Norway has committed to, and the work that remains.

This research is relevant for the field of geography because it touches on how people relate to the concept of a sustainability. For a sustainability transition to be successful in Norway, every aspect that plays a part in it needs to be investigated – including how the population themselves think the transition should come about. Understanding how the population perceives individual

lifestyle changes can be a step towards implementing policies that work in initiating them. Furthermore, this thesis underlines the importance of exploring the applicability of theories in previously low-prioritised areas, when utilising the framework of multiple environmentalities in the Global North. The research explores how the sovereign and neoliberal form of environmentality collaborate and are adapted to the Norwegian context.

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Firstly, it will discuss the Paris Agreement in relation to Norwegian emission levels and environmental politics. Secondly, the theoretical framework for this research is presented, while simultaneously tying the theory of multiple environmentalities to literature on individual behaviour and consumption in the Global North. After that, the methodology and research design that was utilised will be described. The fourth section is where the findings from both the interviews and the questionnaire are presented. The chapter further deals with the analysis and interpretation of this data. Then the findings will be discussed in relation to the research questions and theoretical framework, as well as locating them in a larger context. Lastly, the paper concludes by pointing to implications of the research as well as possible areas for future studies.

2. Positioning Norway in the anthropogenic age of mass-emissions

2.1 Implications of the Paris Agreement

The overall objective of the Paris Agreement is to strengthen the response to global climate change, enhance sustainable development and eradicate poverty worldwide (United Nations, 2015). The demands posed in the agreement differ for each country, depending on income and emissions levels, stating that they all have “[...] common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities” (United Nations, 2015, p. 3). Through the Paris Agreement, Norway has accepted to cut the country’s emission by 40% compared to the 1990 levels, by 2030. As of 2021, the reduction in national emissions was 4.2% (Miljødirektoratet, 2021).

The Paris Agreement is, as the Kyoto Protocol was, mainly concerned with emission numbers stemming from production within a country’s borders. Any emissions occurring during transportation and international aviation, for instance, is not attributed to any specific country, but accounted for in the international bunker fuels (Romera, 2016, p. 215). Emissions from overseas transportation is regulated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) while aviation emission are controlled by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

(United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2022). Emissions from the production and shipping of globally traded products and services are continuously rising (Peters, Minx, Weber, & Edenhofer, 2011, p. 8906). Emission figures indicate that territorial emissions from so-called developed countries have stabilised, while they are increasing in low-income countries (Ritchie, 2019). This can largely be due to outsourcing, where western companies relocate production industries to other parts of the world so that the emissions will be attributed to production countries and not the recipients of the products (Peters et al., 2011, p. 8907). Again, emissions from the transportation of the products back to the developed nations, will largely contribute to the bunker fuel statistics.

Production-based emission numbers – for production within state limits – show that Norwegian emission figures in 1990 accounted for 35.1 million ton CO₂-equivalents, and the total number for GHG-emissions was 51.4 million ton CO₂-equivalents (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2021). Therefore, the total CO₂-equivalents Norway can emit in 2030, to align with the Paris Agreement targets, is 21.1 million ton. Instead, in 2020, Norway emitted 41.2 million ton CO₂-equivalents, which is a 17% increase from the 1990-level. The numbers indicate a rise in production-based emissions towards the mid 2000s, before it peaked in 2016 with 44.8 million ton CO₂-equivalents, and started to decline (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2021). To stay on path for the Paris Agreement, Norway needs to cut nearly another 50% of the current production-based CO₂-emissions within the next eight years. In comparison, it is reported that in 2019, Denmark and Sweden had managed to cut their production-based CO₂-emission by 38% and 29% since 1990 (Naturvernforbundet, 2021).

While the Paris Agreement accounts for the production-based emissions, cutbacks on emissions caused by consumption will inevitably play a significant part in the transition to a more sustainable society. Which in turn necessitates individual consumption changes. The Sustainable Development Index uses a broad definition of consumption emission per capita, including the efforts needed to bring a certain product to the consumer. The index reveals that Norwegian consumption-based emissions in 1990 were 11.09 tonnes CO₂ per capita (Sustainable development index, 2021). Meaning that emissions in 2030 need to be 6.65 tonnes CO₂ per capita if it was to align with the Paris Agreement commitments. The most recent numbers show that emissions may have increased instead of decreased, as in 2019 the CO₂-emissions per capita were 14.38 tonnes (ibid). The increased consumption and somewhat decreased production that has taken place in Norway the last decade can perhaps be the result

of outsourcing, or “offshoring” emissions which was explained earlier. Moreover, the figures are affected by the workings of the European Union Emission Trading Scheme.

Norway has pledged to be climate-neutral by 2030, meaning that any emissions coming from Norway must be met with emission reductions in other parts of the world, regulated through the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (Meld.St.41, (2016-2017), pp. 13-14). The European Union’s trading system operates by states setting annual quotas and auctioning them off to national industries. The ceiling on the quotas is lowered every year to create less emissions (Investigate Europe, 2020). If a country is unable to stay below the ceiling, they can purchase quotas from other nations that are not fulfilling theirs. This mechanism is how Norway managed to meet the requirements of the Kyoto protocol in the first commitment period (United Nations, 2019, p. 24).

Furthermore, Norway gains offsets through supporting REDD+, a program working to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation worldwide. Participating countries can reduce some of their emissions by paying for the planting of trees in other countries, such as Peru, Zambia or Kenya, so that the trees will absorb CO₂ from the air (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2019). The program aims to contribute some other benefits as well, such as local participation and social equality (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021, p. 134). Norway is a major contributor to this program and relies heavily on it in order to “reduce” their own emission levels (Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 2019). In fact, Norway is, along with Germany, the largest individual donor to the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) Readiness Fund, ergo, the fund in charge of the REDD+ countries’ provisions (Riksrevisjonen, 2017-2018, p. 74). Nevertheless, if Norway is to accomplish the goals of being climate neutral by 2030, and a low-emissions society by 2050, emission cutbacks need to take place within national borders as well.

2.2 Norwegian environmental politics

While the Paris Agreement commitments urge Norway to cut 40% of emission compared to the 1990s-levels, the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) themselves has set the ambitious target of cutting 50-55% of emission by 2030 (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 34). And further, 90-95% by 2050. The political focus is mainly on the emission cuts required outside of the quota-arrangements, i.e., the sectors included in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme, as those will not be accounted for in the Paris Accord. Meaning that the focus is on agriculture,

transportation, construction and building maintenance, and waste management. The target for the non-quota emissions is a 40% reduction compared to the 2005 levels, within the same timeframe (ibid).

The oil and gas sector is Norway's most-polluting industry. It accounted for about 28% of production-based emissions in 2020, totalling 13.3 million ton CO₂ equivalents (Miljøstatus, 2021). Despite this, cutting emissions from this sector is not seen as a priority. For one, because the industry is subjected to quotas from the European Union Emission Trading Scheme and is hence already regulated (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 33). Moreover, Norway often brags about having one of the greenest oil extraction systems in the world, as parts of it are electrified. The emissions from the oil and gas sector stem from the extraction sites and platforms alone; mainly from turbines, which create 85% of the CO₂-releases (Oljedirektoratet, 2021b). A major contributor to the pollution following oil and gas extraction, namely the transportation, will be defined as international bunker fuels, and not counted in any country's emission calculations. Furthermore, the actual emissions from burning the oil or gas does not end up on Norwegian accounts, but on those of the countries importing and burning it. Meaning that a large part of the emissions associated with oil and gas exports and consumption is not included in Norwegian numbers for neither consumption nor production-based emissions.

Oil and gas combined accounted for over 40% of Norwegian exports values in 2020, generating over 300 million kroner in revenue (Oljedirektoratet, 2021a). Another reason to resist regulations of the industry. In fact, even a shift in government has not decreased the lust for oil. In the fall of 2021, Norway approved over 50 new oil extraction fields (Fjeld, 2021). Several of them in areas with vulnerable nature and animal habitats. Absurdly, it is predicted that as many as 19 of the new fields will not produce enough revenue over time, but rather be a losing project for the government (Mullis, 2021). Yet, with an economy still dependent on oil extraction the receiving message is that Norway has nothing to lose, but rather everything to gain by upholding the national oil and gas industry.

Regarding the sectors outside of the quota arrangements, transportation accounted for about 60% of CO₂-emission in 2020 (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 63). The transportation sector includes industrial vehicles, railway systems, shipping and fishing vessel, along with air and road traffic. Among these, about 54% of the emissions came from road traffic alone, and 52% of road traffic emissions were caused by passenger cars, according to numbers from the

Norwegian Environment Agency (Miljøstatus, 2021). A Parliament report on climate policies from 2020 urges that transportation emissions should be cut in half by 2030 (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 63). Fortunately, CO₂-releases from personal cars have been dropping since 2017 and in 2020, 8.4 million ton CO₂-equivalents were calculated to come from road traffic, which is a reduction of 3.9% since 2019 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2021). The reduction is primarily attributed to the increase in electric car ownership, which has largely been due to political subsidies such as exemption from sales tax (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 13).

A report from Miljødirektoratet et.al., (2020) called *Klimakur* details which measures are needed for Norway to make the required emission cuts by 2030. The report largely coincides with the Parliament report, which claims that continuous cuts in the transportation sector will happen through funding more electric vehicles and means of transportation (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 63). *Klimakur* calculated that electrifying transport vehicles could save as much as 6 million tons CO₂-equivalents between 2021 and 2030 (Miljødirektoratet et al., 2020, p. 13). Moreover, an upsurge is needed in electric buses, ferries and vans, in addition to a strengthening of public transportation, bike lines and walking opportunities (Meld.St.41, (2016-2017), pp. 54-55). In addition, investments in biofuels is expected to increase over the next few years which will reduce pollution from non-electric cars (Miljødirektoratet et al., 2020, p. 15). Lastly, there is only a slight mention in both the reports of zero- or low-emission flight technology. Since international aviation emission will be attributed to bunker fuels and regulated by the International Civil Aviation Organization, it is evidently not a priority for further political scrutiny as of now (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 22).

Agriculture in Norway contributes about 18% of non-quota greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, as well as the majority of Norway's methane releases (Meld.St.41, (2016-2017), p. 76). Emissions are reported to have gone down over 6% between 1990 and 2019 (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 2021). The accomplishment is largely contributed to developments in fodder and breeding (Meld.St.41, (2016-2017), p. 81). Despite its notable contribution to national emission levels, the agricultural industry in Norway only has about a 45% degree of self-sufficiency (Risbråthe, 2021). Mostly concerning meat and dairy products, while a range of fruit, vegetables and legumes must be imported. Due to the inescapable necessity of agriculture, the cuts in this area are less prominent than other sectors, and in 2020, as well as in 2017, the Norwegian Parliament had few concrete ways to combat agricultural emissions. Two cited measures are to incorporate new technology for transportation vehicles and to improve CO₂-capture in the soil

(Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 104). What is new in the 2020 report, however, is the focus on diet. Through increased informational campaigns in schools and workplaces, knowledge about healthy, sustainable, and environmentally friendly diets is intended to be distributed (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021), p. 116). The objectives of this are to cut agricultural emissions through individual choices, as well as improving public health. Nonetheless, should the government be serious about reducing emissions from the agricultural sector, redirecting some of the 11 million kroner of subsidies given to farmers every year, might be a better place to start (Landbruksdirektoratet, 2022).

Construction and cement creation contribute to Norwegian emissions as well. However, the government plans to implement Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) structures at cement factories over time, as well as at waste incineration plants (Miljødirektoratet et al., 2020, p. 22). Furthermore, heating in Norway is the source of a relatively small part of national emission, largely because most of the electricity comes from hydropower (Miljøstatus, 2021). The most significant sectors left standing then are agriculture and transportation. Which, as has been detail above, are sectors where individuals and households are responsible for a portion of the emissions through their actions and choices. The agriculture industry and transportation sector together make up about 20% of total emissions in Norway, and over 70% of non-quota emission (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021)). Individual lifestyle changes are therefore needed to cut emissions outside of the EU trading program.

For reference, a report from UK FIRES, looks at what measures need to be taken in the UK to reach absolute zero emissions by 2050. The authors of the report leave no room for vague formulations. The UK population is about 10 times that of Norway and so their production-based emissions per capita in 2018 were lower than in Norway (Ritchie, 2019). Nevertheless, the measures proposed by the writers of the Absolute Zero Report are much more invasive than those presented by the Norwegian Parliament. For instance, the scientists say that to reach absolute zero emissions by 2050, all airports need to be closed by 2030, shipping must be obsolete, rail needs to be the dominant form of travel and all personal cars need to be electric (UK FIRES, 2019, p. 7). In the key message of the report, it says: “The big actions are: travel less distance, travel by train or in small (or full) electric cars and stop flying [...]” (UK FIRES, 2019, p. 3). It further tells people to quit eating beef and lamb. (UK FIRES, 2019, p. 1). Other remedies are eating less frozen and processed food, eating locally produced, and cutting the use of inorganic fertilisers. To reach net-zero by 2050, all those requirements need to be met, and

additionally, all importation needs to happen by rail, and the total energy used to cook and transport food must be reduced to 60% (UK FIRES, 2019, p. 7). Needless to say, according to the Absolute Zero Report, citizen behaviour must change drastically if the world is to keep the 1.5°C-target alive. Seeing the politics proposed by the Norwegian Parliament in light of this report, can make us question whether they will be enough to meet the commitments of the Paris Agreement.

Seemingly, the case of weak environmental policies is not unique to Norway. The latest report from the IPCC declared that global policies implemented by the end of 2020 “would make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century” (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2022, p. 15). In fact, no country’s current policies are considered compatible with the Paris Agreement target by the Climate Action Tracker (Climate Action Tracker, 2022a). There has been attempted several ways of mapping out the possible futures we can expect, based on future emissions and mitigations, one of which is the Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSP) framework. The pathways are narratives of future societies with relation to development, economics, lifestyles, demographics, institutions, and policies (O’Neill et al., 2017, p. 172). They include trajectories of how challenging mitigation and adaption to climate change will be in the given scenarios. Though the pathways attempt to incorporate a range of different elements, future predictions are associated with degrees of uncertainty, and could still be determined by unseen circumstances. A fact we are painfully reminded of in light of the current European political situation, where the war in Ukraine has caused not only human suffering, but has also had repercussions for global food and energy markets (International Energy Agency, 2022).

The five SSPs are SSP1: Sustainability, SSP2: Middle of the road, SSP3: Regional rivalry, SSP4: Inequality and SSP5: Fossil fuel development (O’Neill et al., 2017). In SSP1 there is more human development and more equality, greater cooperation, as well as investment in renewable energy. It implies low challenges to both mitigation and adaption. SSP2 involves only moderate changes from the status quo, with slow shifts away from fossil fuels and mostly unsuccessful attempts at fulfilling development goals and reducing inequality. It induces moderate challenges to both mitigation and adaption. As for SSP3, there is more conflict and less cooperation, self-sufficiency is valued over global collaboration, which leads to minor progress on climate change and intensified inequality. It results in high challenges for both mitigation and adaption. In pathway SSP4 power is held by an elite and low-income countries

struggle to keep up with economic growth, while investments in low-carbon technologies lead to some emission reductions. Therefore, there are low challenges to mitigation, but inequality makes adaptation difficult for most of the world's population. Lastly, the SSP5 scenario entails continuous economic growth driven by fossil fuel resources, though much is invested in development, education, and health. There will be high challenges to mitigation but good potential for adaptation. Current political choices will determine which way we are headed for the future.

Before moving forwards, a short disclaimer is needed. Thinking about emissions and mitigation strategies only at a national level can at best be inadequate and at worst counterproductive. Mitigation is not linear, and as the SSPs indicate, simply cutting down on environmentally hazardous activities will not be enough to guarantee a liveable and conflict-free future. Progress must be evaluated on a global scale, as climate change and climate change mitigations will have consequences outside of environmental and natural deprivation. Such as economic decline, unemployment and forced migration, which can cause discontent, rising tensions and conflict. The world is only becoming increasingly interconnected, and as the war in Ukraine is teaching us, we cannot look at events in one place without considering the effects it will have on the global system. Nonetheless, as a way of limiting the scope of this research, it was decided to look at policies and actions on a national scale. Another reason for the domestic focus is that the data submitted to the Paris Agreement operates on this scale. And thirdly, people tend to use national emissions levels and domestic policies as their reference points when discussing climate and environmental matters.

2.3 Challenges to individual lifestyle changes

Fulfilling the requirements of the Paris Agreement is still far ahead for Norway. Doing so will require societal changes – it will require a sustainability transition. Considering how it has been deemed “unequivocal” that climate change is the result of human influence, human action is needed to limit the foreseen damage (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2021). The theory of structuration asserts that actors and institutions are continuously defining and reproducing each other (Giddens, 1986). Hence, if one of them were to change, it would have repercussions for the other. In the same way, this thesis takes for granted that both structural, political changes as well as individual adaptations are needed to reach a low emissions society – and we cannot have one without the other.

Lifestyle changes is in this thesis understood as an alteration of behaviour patterns and consumption choices, into what is termed pro-environmental behaviour: “intentionally reducing the negative impact that an action can have on the environment” (Dono, Webb, & Richardson, 2010, p. 178). As aforementioned, some of the sectors causing the most pollution are places where individuals have great power to make changes. Which was further made very clear in the Absolute Zero Report. The Norwegian Environmental Agency claim that individuals and households as well as authorities and private businesses have a responsibility to contribute to climate change adaption (Gregersen & Selseng, 2021, p. 22). Yet, in a study done by Noradapt – The Norwegian Centre for Sustainable Climate Adaption (Norsk Senter for Berekraftig Klimatilpassing) in 2020, the majority of the respondents answered that local and national governments bear the greatest responsibility (Gregersen & Selseng, 2021).

Though it has been claimed that lifestyle changes are needed for people in the Global North, this thesis does not take for granted that the Norwegian population themselves consider it necessary. Nor does it assume that better informed people necessarily make better choices. For a long time, it has been assumed that if people have access to the right information about a situation, they will act in an appropriate manner (Moloney, Horne, & Fien, 2010, p. 7616). The environmental crisis is no exception. However, it might be true as Karen O’Brien (2013) puts it: “I will consider that we may in fact be ‘barking up the wrong tree’ by assuming that more solutions-oriented knowledge about environmental problems will lead to the desired changes [...]” (O’Brien, 2013, p. 588). The knowledge-deficit model on behaviour change likewise challenges the view that education will lead to desired behaviour changes. Using examples from research on recycling behaviours, Schultz (2010) demonstrates that increased knowledge mostly results in small, short-term changes in behaviour. An increase in information can be useful in inciting behaviour changes if lack of knowledge is a barrier to action, however, in cases where people already have a basic understanding of the action (such as at-home recycling) more information is not likely to induce further action (Schultz, 2010, p. 73). The author claims this is because knowledge in itself is not a motivator for behaviour change, instead, he argues for the use of normative feedbacks – receiving information about what those around you are doing – to induce changes.

Even when people do incorporate environmental concerns into their actions and lives, it does not solve all the world’s problems. Earlier research by Langaas et al., (2020) revealed that 67% of Norway’s population express an intention of changing their lifestyles for the climate. Yet,

the actions people are willing to perform are mostly those that cause very little discomfort and have very little effect, such as recycling (Langaas et al., 2020, pp. 2-3). Researchers from the HOPE project (Household Preferences for Reducing greenhouse gas Emissions in four European High-Income Countries) had strikingly similar findings. Voluntary efforts were not enough to reduce emissions a desired amount, because people were mostly willing to implement measures that resulted in small lifestyle changes, which yielded small emission cuts (Dubois et al., 2019; Moberg et al., 2019). “Somewhat perversely, the greater the CO₂ reduction potential of mitigation actions, the less households were willing to implement them [...]” (Dubois et al., 2019, p. 150). Typically, most households made changes in waste reduction, eating less meat, and more locally produced, and using the car less. Efforts which will not add up to much in the bigger picture. On the other end, only a few households would implement changes that made a big difference. Such as, becoming fully vegetarian or vegan, selling the car, or reducing air travel by 90% (Dubois et al., 2019, p. 150).

In the knowledge-deficit model, knowledge is considered a personal predictor of behaviour. Along with this, things such as gender (Tindall, Davies, & Mauboulès, 2003), level of education (Ibáñez, Ferrer, Muñoz, Claros, & Ruiz, 2020), level of trust in governing institutions (Kulin & Sevä, 2020), and geographical as well as social and cultural background (Adger, Barnett, Brown, Marshall, & O’Brien, 2012), will affect how people understand climate change and the need for action. Additionally, there are situational predictors of behaviour, which is the context where actions are either happening or not. The context can ease actions, or it can restrain them. Ergo, even if people wish to do more for the environment, the place they live might have structural barriers in place that hinder certain actions. The examples from Schultz (2010) are location and quality of recycling bins. Similarly, structuration theory explain how individuals are conditions by the structure they live in, and their actions are limited by the norms and values of the structure (Giddens, 1986).

The knowledge-deficit model on behaviour change, as well as structuration theory, provides this research with an appreciation of why both the population and the Norwegian state are not taking the necessary actions to reduce emissions. As already established, Norway contributes notably to the world’s CO₂-emissions, and a historical lack of good environmental policies has led to a slow progression towards the Paris Agreement targets. Thus, it is intriguing to examine how the Norwegian population envisions the transition into a more sustainable society and what they perceive their own role to be within this transition.

3. Theoretical framework

This research is built on a constructivist epistemology. Constructivism is often posed as an opposite of positivism, which claims that the truth is somewhere “out there” in the world and need only be discovered. Constructivism rather believes that truth and meaning are created through a subject’s interaction with the world (Gray, 2018, p. 22). From a constructivist standpoint there is no such thing as objective truth, rather it is always context specific (Silverman, 2017, p. 138). In this sense, meaning and knowledge are highly subjective, and several, even contradicting interpretations, can be true at once. What people believe to be true will be dependent on where they live, who they surround themselves with and the information they have access to. Geographical location is often claimed to be one of the major factors in shaping people’s worldviews, as what we believe is often connected to what we can see and feel (Adger et al., 2012).

Within constructivist epistemology is the theoretical perspective of postmodernism. Postmodernism grew as an opposition to what scholars saw as grand narratives, such as Marxism. Postmodernism encourages pluralism and anti-reductionism and studies the world from different perspectives such as class, race, gender, religion and sexuality (Agger, 1991, p. 116). Knowledge is believed to be created within certain contexts and must be studied in the same way. Michel Foucault, whose work will be utilised in this thesis, is often tied to postmodernism, with his emphasis on situated discourses and practices (Agger, 1991). This work shares the perception that knowledge is distinctively produced and reflective of power structures in a given society.

In the last century, there has been a tremendous amount of social science research done on behaviour changes, and in the later years this work also tends to involve environmentally related behaviour. One prominent school of thought in social sciences is that of governmentality, founded by Foucault in the 1970s. The data collected through this master’s project will be analysed using the theory of multiple environmentalities, which builds on the framework of governmentality. The framework will be utilised as a way of organising, coding, and analysing the data. The theory of multiple environmentalities is meant to aid the understanding of how individual behaviours are shaped, specifically towards the environment and nature (Fletcher & Cortes-Vazquez, 2020). The majority of literature on this matter concerns itself with environmental behaviour of people in the Global South, for instance, people who are

experiencing the loss of rights to land or are suffering various consequences of climate degradation, such as research done by Agrawal (2005). While these perspectives are important for gaining a holistic understanding of the theory, the focus of this thesis lays elsewhere. This research aims to contribute to the literature by providing insight into how the theory of multiple environmentalities can be employed in the Global North, in relation to behaviour and consumption. More specifically, the research is done in Norway, and a Scandinavia context, which will further be important.

This chapter will be discussing literature gathered on the framework of multiple environmentalities which correlates to consumption, lifestyles, and behaviour in the social sciences. The first section will define discourses and other important terminology, before elaborating on what governmentality entails, as well as environmentality. The next sub-chapter moves on to tying the multiple environmentalities framework to literature on consumption and behaviour change. Lastly, there will be brought up some of the most widespread critiques of these theories, while underlining the importance of incorporating resistance.

3.1 Power and discourses

As an introduction to the Foucauldian mindset, this chapter be elucidating some of the terminology he frequently used. Foucault saw power as dynamic and relational, something which is executed through action (Li, 2007, p. 276). There are no single units of power, rather it works through webs of relations and cannot be defined within the previous binary of the governed and the governing (Rutherford, 2007, p. 296). Importantly, people are not merely objects on which to enforce power, but also vehicles of power themselves (Rutherford, 2007, p. 299). Hence, Foucault recognised resistance as an integral part of power, where power is reshaped when met with opposition. Power is not simply constraining, but productive, an idea which becomes evident when looking at how Foucault defined discourses.

Foucault saw knowledge and power as inseparable – power produces knowledge and knowledge constitutes power (Springer, 2010). Furthermore, it equally constructs and is constructed by rules and systems in society which constitutes a realm of what he termed discursive practices, or the order of discourse (Hook, 2001, p. 522). Within these practices, knowledge is produced and reproduced. Berg (2009) rephrases Foucault by describing discourses as “the taken-for-granted, and most often, hidden, frameworks of ideas that structure both knowledge and social practice” (p. 215). In this sense, discourses and practices form the

objects of which they speak; discourses on crime produces criminals, discourses on reason and unreason produces the mentally ill, and discourses on sexuality produces the sexually deviant (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 34). This is how Foucault ties discourses to power. Discourses both constrain and enable ways of thinking, speaking, and writing through workings of exclusion and selection. And within here lies the ability to produce new truths, new knowledge and new subjects (Rutherford, 2007, p. 295). In society one discourse will often be hegemonic and constitutes the way the population understand the world. Because of this, knowledge will always be context specific.

Foucault continued that the execution of power needs to be legitimized in order to be accepted. In the case of sovereign power, the population needs to know that the state has their best interest in mind, through the process of legitimisation Foucault characterised as biopower (Elden, 2007, p. 32). Biopower is a form of power that seeks to impose a sovereign will on the subjects while simultaneously legitimizing its own authority (Fletcher, 2010, p. 175). Ultimately, biopower seeks to alter the behaviour of the population in more favourable ways, and the expressed intention of biopower is the welfare of the population (Li, 2007, p. 275). The power is legitimized precisely by the communicated, undeniable benefits of certain interventions. Such as ways to enhance literacy rates or biodiversity – or on the other end, means to decrease the mortality rate (Fletcher, 2010, p. 175). The legitimacy of this power is upheld by expert knowledge and science, when discourses that are rooted in science or nature often have the strongest legitimacy, as they can be claimed to be “objectively true” (Rutherford, 2007, p. 298).

3.2 The governing of subjects

The theory of government was composed by Foucault during his lectures in the 1970s at the Collège de France. During a course titled “Security, Territory and Population” he summarised that government was “an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals throughout their lives by placing them under the authority of a guide responsible for what they do and for what happens to them” (Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006, p. 83). Government was intended as a critique to the earlier taken-for-granted notion that power was absolute and only top-down. It is often referred to as the “conduct of conduct”, where human behaviour is shaped with deliberate means (Li, 2007, p. 275). Entailing any kind of intentional attempt to alter human conduct to conform to specific norms (Dean, 2010, p. 18). The power used to shape the behaviour of the population is enforced from a distance, it is exercised by everyone and no one in particular (Berg, 2009, p. 217). The objective is to educate desires, beliefs, and habits rather

than intervening with one and one person. Ergo, setting conditions for people to act, making sure they “[...] will do as they ought.” (Li, 2007, p. 275).

The aim of government is for those who are subjected to the power to adapt a governmentality. Governmentality, or governmental rationality, is the process of individuals converging their behaviour to the behaviours deemed “acceptable” by the society they live in (Li, 2007, p. 276). This way, people will conduct their own conduct without the need for intervention. Hence, the intention of government is the creation of subjects and formation of certain identities (Dean, 2010, p. 18). Subjects are made through government, and subjects are made to be governed. Nonetheless, it is important for the realization of government that the subject understands themselves as free to act. Governmentality is closely tied to the idea of morality. If taking responsibility for your own actions is inherently moral, then self-regulation (i.e., governmentality) is a moral act (Dean, 2010, p. 19). The individual must understand their actions as the outcome of a critical assessment of their situation, so that they can act in accordance with their own ideals and values. It is the aspiration of governmentality that these ideals and values align with the desired ones in society.

The aspect of the conduct of conduct is useful for this research by explaining how people may think they are acting out of free will, even when they are being encouraged to act in a certain way. They control their behaviour thinking it is their own choice, when, in reality, they are being influenced by a power that comes from everywhere and nowhere at once (Rose et al., 2006, p. 90). For this research, people will answer the questions in accordance with what they see as aligning with their ideas and values. Not appreciating that these ideas and values are shaped by the bigger discourse they find themselves close to or within. Hence, the conduct of conduct perspective provides this research with the understanding that people’s answers are affected by their background even when they do not realise it themselves. This perspective further makes it possible to trace the data back to distinct discourses.

The creation of subjects can happen in different ways, and government encompasses several practices. Foucault himself developed a four-part typology, ergo, four different forms of government. This included government according to truth, government according to the rationality of the sovereign state and government according to the rationality of economics (or neoliberal government). And finally, government according to the rationality of the governed themselves, also known as the disciplinary form (Fletcher, 2017, p. 2). Government according

to truth would be conferring to religious texts, ideology or science. People's behaviour is supposed to coincide with the way they see the world. Behaviour is not shaped by incentives, but rather, by the fundamental truths that make up nature and the universe (Fletcher, 2010, p. 176). Ergo, the way to alter individuals' behaviour will be to inconspicuously alter "the truth". Next, the sovereign form of power is top-down, inflicted by powerholders such as governments and institutions. It is the direct exercise of sovereign power through the construction and enforcement of specific rules (Fletcher, 2010, p. 176). Compliance can here be enforced with the threat of violence or other punishment.

While the two former practices of governmentality are relatively easy to understand, Fletcher (2010) goes further in depth on the neoliberal and the disciplinary form. Neoliberal governmentality constitutes a 'whole way of thinking and being' (Fletcher, 2010, p. 173). Where the rationality of economics creates an external structure with economic profit being the end goal. This structure works as a space within which seemingly autonomous actors can make decisions. Individuals are understood as self-interested rational actors, seeking to maximise their utility through the most promising avenues available (Fletcher, 2010, p. 174). Hence, their motivations can be modified through the manipulation of incentives, often economic. Consequently, the neoliberal government acts on the environment rather than the individuals to create desired changes. On the other end, disciplinary governmentality seeks to create subjects that internalise social norms and values to the point where they self-regulate their own behaviour (Fletcher, 2010, p. 173). The individual is guided by the fear of deviance and immorality, or more specifically, by the fear of sanctions from society. For this reason, individuals exercise power over both themselves and others (ibid). Foucault is famous for his depiction of this in the Panopticon model, the prison where every inmate is watched at all time and therefore regulate their own behaviour as a way to avoid punishment (Fletcher, 2017, p. 2).

The above description may make the four categories of governmentality seem quite distinctive and separate. As if different authorities govern at different sites, and with diverse objectives in mind. However, Foucault recognised that the practices are connected in several ways (Fletcher, 2017, p. 4). The categories are not mutually exclusive, but rather, can work simultaneously in the same place. Either in harmony, or more or less in conflict. An individual can be subjected to several forms of governmental power and experience a divergence over which one to adhere to. As an example, if you are vegan, you do not want to eat meat, because of your belief system (governmentality accord to truth). Yet, you might experience negative sanctions from the

society you live in for not eating meat, and therefore, you may want to eat meat as a way to follow the norms of that society (disciplinary governmentality). What may happen is the individual seeking to hide that they are vegan, so to avoid confrontation with local norms. This is in itself, another form of disciplinary governmentality. Bringing on the next point, that some categories can be said to enforce or depend on each other. Fletcher (2010) exemplifies how the neoliberal form of governmentality relies on disciplinary techniques. To create rational actors within an economic sphere, you would first need to create self-interested, competitive individuals. Hence, disciplinary governmentality constructs the actors, upon which the neoliberal governmentality then works.

Governmentality has been expanded to further include behaviour related to the environment. The direction has been called green governmentality or environmentality. The term environmentality was first utilised by Timothy W. Luke, in the aftermath of the Rio Summit in 1992. The establishment of global environmental governance institutions was claimed to generate an environmental form of biopower where nature was made governable through discourses of carrying capacity and planetary boundaries (Fletcher & Cortes-Vazquez, 2020, p. 291). Conservation and environmental protection efforts were proclaimed to be for the benefit of mankind, by preventing degradation. As such, interventions were legitimised on their own premises, because saving nature would ultimately save humans. However, to properly govern nature, one first needs to control the population. In that sense, Luke (1995) declares that a form of governmentality was utilised to make the people care for the environment, namely – environmentality. Environmentality creates environmental subjects, that is, people who display a commitment to the environment, and an interest to conserve it (Singh, 2013, p. 189).

In later years, several scholars have added to the work on environmentality. With Arun Agrawal being perhaps the most well-known for his work on the making of environmental subjects in India. During the early 1900s, new restrictions were enforced on forest areas in Kumaon, which led to previously widespread practices being criminalised. Such as chopping down trees, collecting firewood, and letting animals graze (Agrawal, 2005, p. 7). Forests were demarcated, monitored, and protected from local interference from the state government. The land-grabbing was justified by pointing to forest fires set by local farmers and how unsustainable these practices were. As time passed, local people formed and became involved with forest councils all over Kumaon in an attempt to protect and engage with the forests. Agrawal noted this during his first visit in the 1980s. 10 years later, when Agrawal (2005) returned to the same area he

discovered a distinctive change in the population's perception of forest conservation. Those who previously had not cared for conservation practices, or had even participated in detrimental activities, now displayed an unmistakeable care for nature. People had come to think of their actions in relation to the environment around them, reflecting on their positive or negative impact.

According to the author, decentralisation of government led to the creation of environmental subjects in Kumaon (Agrawal, 2005, p. 14). Subjects were formed through alterations in understandings of and relationships to forests, a change led by the proliferation of governmental rule over natural resources (Agrawal, 2005, p. 16). Agrawal termed this shift a "governmentalization of the environment." (Agrawal, 2005, p. 12). Participation made people feel empowered to shape their local environment through regulating not only their own behaviours, but also the behaviours of others. However, not everyone involved in this process became environmental subjects. Variations in subject formation was by Agrawal (2005) attributed to people's different level of involvement with local councils and closeness to the forests. Taking the differences in subject formation into account, this thesis utilises Agrawal's perspective on subject formation in relation to how people understand the need to help the environment through individual actions.

Fletcher (2017) elaborated on environmentality by proclaiming that the theory can be divided into the same categories as governmentality: truth oriented, sovereign, neoliberal, and disciplinary. Thus, creating the basis of the framework of multiple environmentalities. Fletcher understands Agrawal's description of subject formation in Kumaon as an example of disciplinary environmentality (Fletcher, 2017, p. 2). The transformation in local perceptions fits the criteria of people coming to care about the environment and starting to control both their own and others' behaviours appropriately. Fletcher (2017) uses further examples from conservation practices to illuminate the other categories of environmentality. Environmentality according to truth can be found in ecology, where specific interventions are advocated for to obtain resource preservation. The arguments are often backed up by science or evolutionary evidence. It is anticipated that this legitimised form of knowledge will shape the conduct of the population. Another form of truth oriented environmentality is intertwined with spirituality, e.g., protecting nature in the name of a higher power (Fletcher, 2017, p. 2).

Additionally, sovereign environmentalism can be exemplified by the creation of protected areas, also known as fortress conservation (Fletcher, 2017, p. 2). As these areas are predominantly created by authorities or elites, it may exclude the general public from natural areas, thereby regulating their behaviour and movement. This form may also be recognised within the research done by Agrawal (2005). As for neoliberal environmentalism, economic profit continues to be the objective. Conservation efforts would be seen from a cost-benefit perspective, rather than as a moral imperative (Fletcher, 2010, p. 176). Economic incentives are meant to be sufficient in making the population choose to behave more conservation friendly.

3.3 Environmentalism in the Global North

This section will present literature from the social sciences which links environmentalism to individual behaviour and consumption. To identify relevant literature, an initial search was done in the Scopus database the 22th of October 2021. Using the keyword “environmentalism” along with “behaviour” and “consumption” to look for related articles. The search produced 102 articles, which were then filtered by reading the title and abstract to check for significance. From there, the ones with the highest relevance were downloaded and read. Relevance was based on the criteria that they portrayed one or several of the environmentalisms, and the field work was predominantly set in the Global North. As aforementioned, majority of the work on environmentalism has been situated in the Global South. As such, this geographical bias was intentional to highlight existing discussions related to this research. This literature review touches on the multiple categories of environmentalism in different ways, either singularly or in unison with each other.

Firstly, in constructivism, social institutions and processes are integrated into local context, and so are economic projects such as neoliberalism. Brenner & Theodore (2002) refers to this phenomenon as the contextual embeddedness of neoliberalism, which will be the result of national or regional institutions, frameworks, regulations, practices, and politics. The contextualisation does not only account for the fact that neoliberalism creates uneven development, where specific places are exploited for others’ benefits, creating a core-periphery dichotomy. What’s more, Brenner & Theodore (2002) proclaim that despite neoliberalism having some basic elements – such as deregulation of the state, wage devaluation, and increased insecurity – these elements will be altered when incorporated in a local environment. Historic patterns of production, labour, and economy as well as cultural and geographical components are essential to the implementation of neoliberalism in a given place. Springer (2010) concurs

with this idea and emphasises how neoliberalism is really a process, termed neoliberalisation, which continuously shapes and is shaped by local elements. Moreover, to compensate for subsequent struggles national and regional governments intervene to varying degrees, dependent on location (Brenner & Theodore, 2002, p. 356). For these reasons, neoliberalism will not manifest the same way in Scandinavia as it would in another region of the world.

Norway is located in the Global North, and in Scandinavia. There is a small amount of work done on governmentality from Scandinavia, but literature is limited, especially the attention devoted to environmentality. Nevertheless, Kivinen & Rinne (1998) look into governmentality in relation to the education system in Finland. All over the world, education is seen as a measure to shape and control the population, the authors proclaim. Through schooling, the population is trained to be law-abiding and dutiful – they internalise their role as citizens (Kivinen & Rinne, 1998, p. 44). No less in Scandinavia, where mandatory education has been in place for a long time. Typically, in Scandinavian countries, the state has had a strong position in society, and the population generally displays a high level of trust in the government. Kivinen & Rinne (1998) terms this governmental shaping of individuals welfare governmentality, a building block in the modern welfare state. Following this, the creation of subjects will vary in places with less prominent and less trusted state institutions.

The character of the Scandinavian state is vital to consider when looking at the implementation of neoliberalism in Scandinavia. During the 1990s, Sweden experienced an economic turn in a neoliberal direction, with decentralisation, marketisation and privatisation (Larsson, Letell, & Thörn, 2012, p. 7). Yet, Larsson et al. (2012) assert, not many would claim that Sweden is a neoliberal country. The country underwent a process of neoliberalisation, where the result ended up being an adaption to the already existing welfare framework. The welfare state was not so much replaced as it was reconfigured (Larsson et al., 2012, p. 8). The particular role of the state was not sacrificed but maintained as a vital actor in influencing the conduct of the population, even in economic relations (Larsson & Thörn, 2012, p. 262). Which can be circled back to the point from Brenner & Theodore (2002) on contextual embeddedness. All this is to say that though some of the research explored in this section can have similarities to the gathered data, it has been done in dissimilar contexts and the implementation of the power of government is necessarily affected by this.

Moving on, Montes, Tshering, Phuntsho, & Fletcher (2020) found that herders in the Haa Highlands of Bhutan undergo a process shaping them into cosmological subjectivities. Cosmology is in this instance understood as specific claims about nature and the environment that create certain practices and perceptions among people, which again helps them enter into meaningful relationship with nature (Montes et al., 2020, p. 362). This is where the authors draw similarities to environmentality according to truth. The mentality is not imposed on them but derives from the landscape they live in and the stories they are told of this landscape. As such, they are “living within a storied landscape” (Montes et al., 2020, p. 362). The cosmological subjects behaved in a way that did not harm the environment, rather, they saw themselves as the protectors of nature. In the name of protection, they supervised not only their own behaviour, but every individual in the grassland. Even if this way of behaviour coincides with Western understandings of environmental conservation, it differs in the fundamental understanding of nature. Environment is not a passive space to manage, it shapes humans right back through cosmological forces (Montes et al., 2020, p. 636). Notwithstanding this difference, behaviour and consumption changes are here made in accordance with “the truth”.

Another example of consumption changes made in accordance with the truth, comes from Haggerty (2007). Haggerty researched fishers of whitebait in Southland, New Zealand. In 1992 a report was released in Southland, which informed about the declining stock of Whitebaits. In the aftermath, some of the locals underwent a progression from not caring about the whitebait stock, to be so concerned they felt a need to protect the stock from overfishing. They ended up founding the Southland Recreational Whitebaiters Association aimed at conserving the stock of the popular fish. The way of preventing overfishing was to limit the quantity of fish they themselves and others could extract. Haggerty (2007) asserts that this is an example of what Agrawal meant when he wrote that people who interact with nature can experience a shift in relations to nature and resources. Specifically, the leader of the association said the consumption change was a result of increased information from the report as well as lived experiences, in addition to the desire of wanting to do the right thing for their local fisheries (Haggerty, 2007, p. 230). There is some disciplinarity at work as well, when individuals are not only responsible for the ocean degradation, but they should likewise actively try to prevent it.

In a similar vein, Machaqueiro (2020) argues that environmental frameworks presented by the United Nations shapes the conduct of local populations, and hence, creates environmental subjects imitating what they think is the right behaviour. Knowledge proliferated by institutions

such as the UN is by default rendered trustworthy and held to an expert-level (Machaqueiro, 2020, p. 443). Transnational institutions are, according to Ferguson & Gupta (2002), seen as above national states, in the way the state is often seen as above other national institutions. Therefore, people believe in it and attempt to live their lives accordingly. Moreover, Machaqueiro (2020) claims that such frameworks showcased pollution as a result of individual choices, and that by simply making better choices, people can help out the planet. Being “good” environmental subjects, i.e., making the right choices based on the right information, is something people can and should do (Machaqueiro, 2020, p. 453).

By far, the most scrutinized forms of environmentality are the neoliberal and the disciplinary, furthermore, the two of them often intertwine. Lloro-Bidart (2017) found that the employees at an aquarium in Long Beach, California used both disciplinary and neoliberal traits while educating visitors about sustainable seafood consumption. The aquarium circulated information about which restaurants offered sustainable seafood, indicating that consuming seafood *the right way* could alleviate problems of overfishing. This approach was said to give people “one thing they can do” for the oceans (Lloro-Bidart, 2017, p. 1190). Using phrases such as “consuming to conserve”, seafood consumption was placed in a cost-benefit analysis, evident of a neoliberal mindset (Lloro-Bidart, 2017, p. 1191). Moreover, the employees even narrated that the aquarium animals themselves ate sustainable seafoods. The proposed hope was that visitors would internalize these morals on their own and make sustainable seafood the norm. As such, the aquarium employees attempted to create rational actors operating within an economic sphere by imposing values of sustainable consumption upon the guests and proceeding to give them sustainable consumption options.

Another example of disciplinary power being used to shape individual behaviour, comes from Minor & Boyce (2018) and the USA. During the 1940s, the US state created a platform for limiting forest fires, immortalised by the Smokey Bear cartoon. Smokey Bear was a cartoon bear that through posters and advertisements instructed citizens to watch their demeanor in forests, being careful not to start fires. Fires in forests and wildlands were considered indisputably negative events which were generally regarded as the result of irresponsible citizen actions (Minor & Boyce, 2018, p. 80). In that sense, controlling individual attitudes and behaviours related to forest management would limit uncontrolled ignitions. From there grew Smokey Bear’s catchphrase: “Only YOU Can Prevent Forest Fires.” (Minor & Boyce, 2018, p. 84). Smokey Bear quickly became a beloved and trusted icon in American culture, as well as a

patriotic symbol, which was important for the campaign's success. The authors proclaim that the usage of Smokey Bear to prevent forest fires is a case of implementing disciplinary governmentality among the American population. Where individuals are being disciplined into self-regulation at the service of the state (Minor & Boyce, 2018, p. 80). The cartoon communicated how it is every individual's responsibility to prevent forest fires through their own actions. The aim was not to change actions directly, but to change attitudes and mindsets among the population, which would lead to long-lasting, sustainable change.

An additional instance of disciplinary environmentality concerns students taking an Outdoor and Environmental Education (OEE) course at a regional university in Victoria, Australia. Preston (2012) examines whether, and how, this course made students into environmental subjects. Virtually all the participants in the study that took the OEE course exhibited positive attitudes towards making individual changes, such as switching off lights and water, and consuming second-hand products (Preston, 2012, p. 243). Several of the students expressed guilt over not doing enough to limit their own ecological footprint. Even despite structural difficulties: "For Sue, it is up to her to make good environmental transport decisions despite the lack of infrastructure, [...]" (Preston, 2012, p. 241). Here, the student displays a considerable degree of self-regulation, as well as a will to shift the responsibility from governmental instances to themselves. Preston (2012) describes this form of environmentalism as reformist, as it does little to disrupt the status quo and leads to no changes in the current social paradigm.

Both García et al, (2020) and Jepson & Browne (2014) have researched restrictions in water managements and how it affects household consumption. García et al. (2020) in Mexico City, Mexico and Auckland, New Zealand, while Jepson & Browne (2014) focused on Texas, USA. Though the water-situation was different for the three places, they all experienced changes in the local population's water habits due to poor access to clean water. Restrictive water consumption was promoted through informational campaigns involving placards and commercials, in both Mexico City and Auckland (García et al., 2020). Among other things, it was encouraged that the population gathered and used rainwater. The campaign, driven by both the government and Civil Society Organisations, proclaimed restrictive measures would be in the best interest of people as well as the city at large. García et al. (2020) maintain that the intention of this campaign was to instil people with a water-related environmentality, and thus create self-regulating subjects.

Though people in Texas similarly went through a transformation related to water consumption, it came about a little differently. Drinking water was sold from water vendors, and people were encouraged to only drink this water, and use tap water for other purposes (Jepson & Brown, 2014, p. 1041). Water usage was kept in check by the price of water and availability of vendors. Despite the problems of water either being structural or due to natural causes, most households saw it as their responsibility to provide clean drinking water for the family. When asked if not the government had a responsibility, a woman from Texas said perhaps, but that she did not trust them to provide any water (Jepson & Brown, 2014, p. 1043). In both articles, the authors claimed to see evidence of a disciplinary mindset where people felt responsible for their own water consumption. In addition, in Texas, pricing the water can be understood as a form of neoliberal environmentality, whereas the expense helped limit water consumption. Conserving water was not necessarily done because people believed it to be right, but because it was reasonable given the circumstances.

While disciplinary and neoliberal governmentality can often be found in the same place, they conceptualise human behaviour quite differently. Fletcher (2010) differentiates between disciplinary and neoliberal power by using an example from Foucault on crime. Disciplinary governmentality would view criminals as deviants – people not conforming to society. There is believed to be something flawed with the person itself, and their morals. Curbing criminality would thus happen by replacing their morals with “normal” values and behaviours, that everyone else depicts. Specifically, the ideal is for people to self-regulate due to the fear of punishment over deviant behaviour. Prison can be considered a good place for this transition to happen. On the other hand, neoliberal governmentality would perceive criminals as rational actors much like everyone else, “seeking to maximise their utility through the most promising avenues available within their subjective horizons.” (Fletcher, 2010, p. 174). For lawbreakers the most promising avenue is simply outside of the normal trajectory. Hence, decreasing criminality requires changing the structures around people, incentivising them into making lawful choices, without intervening into their minds as such. In short, obeying the law should be made cheaper than defying it. Whereas disciplinary powers see prisons as places for people to internalise new social norms, neoliberal power sees them as merely an additional expense attempting to keep people from repeating unlawful choices (Fletcher, 2010, p. 174).

So far, the thesis has touched upon how neoliberal environmentality can be detected in several cases, interplaying with others forms of environmentality. More explicitly, several scholars,

among them McGregor et al. (2015), have pointed out how initiatives such as REDD+ are neoliberal environmentalism in the works. Fundamentally, REDD+ attempts to steer people and countries into carbon conservation because it is economically profitable. Payments are used to influence national forest governance in order to improve natural carbon capture (McGregor et al., 2015, p. 144). Hence, forest management is framed as something which can be enhanced through the market. Furthermore, rational economic behaviour is expanded into the social and cultural realm, coinciding with how Fletcher (2010) describes neoliberal governmentality.

Similarly, Wynne-Jones (2012) described how The Pumlumon Project, a Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) project in Wales, made farmers into neoliberal environmental subjects. The project, initiated by Wildlife Trust, aimed to reshape how farmers handled their businesses, and consequently, how they perceived nature. Environmental protection was encouraged when the Wildlife Trust offered money for natural areas, making it economically feasible for farmers to conserve land. The additional money could be re-invested in their agricultural business, allowing them to intensify and diversify their crops. As such, conservation was a help in delivering goods and services from the environment to the people. Ergo, the farmers were made into governable subjects who thought of conservation and food production in economic terms (Wynne-Jones, 2012, p. 1037). Wynne-Jones emphasise that the success of making farmers accept and promote PES can be attributed to how the program was adapted to the specific circumstances and everyday lives of farmers in Wales. Participants in the project even praised it for providing them with more independence and flexibility. The author notes how conservationists used to contest the idea of PES on the cause of it being an “advance of capitalist values into the realm of environmental protection” (Wynne-Jones, 2012, p. 1036). But now there seems to be a neoliberal hegemony in environmental debates.

An article from Machaqueiro (2020) supplements the previous arguments by claiming that using carbon markets as mitigation strategies simplifies climate change solutions. The climate crisis is posed as a technical problem which can be fixed by the right market-based mechanisms. Concurrently, it decreases the responsibility of Western countries to reduce national emissions. Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2021) adds to this that in Norway, debates supporting REDD+ have become hegemonic. Barely any political parties dare to challenge the narrative of afforestation as climate mitigation. Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2021) believe that the narrative of success has become so powerful because REDD+ is presented as more cost-effective than cutting emission in Norway. And, again, it reduces the incentives for Global

North nations to limit their own pollution. As such, the authors argue that carbon trading can be “[...] considered a way to justify continuous carbon emissions from wealthy actors, and with negative impacts on temporal as well as spatial climate justice.” (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021, p. 145).

Machaqueiro (2020) further maintains that the positive image of carbon trading is reproduced by the language used in research presented by the UN. Comparing transcripts from the Paris Agreement from 2015 with the Kyoto Protocol from 1997, Machaqueiro points to an evolution of neoliberalisation of the language. For instance, the Paris Agreement emphasises the need to include “all levels of government and various actors”, which Machaqueiro recognises as an attempt to decentralise the responsibility of emission reductions (Machaqueiro, 2020, p. 446). Coinciding with what Agrawal (2005) found in Kumaon. Lastly, he points out how carbon markets have not achieved the objectives they were meant to. Measures for lowering emissions, supporting the development of low-income countries, and ensuring technology transfers between countries are all lacking. Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2021) found the same thing. A REDD+ project in Tanzania had received praise for achievements in climate mitigation and poverty reduction. However, through closer study it was revealed that there was no basis for this success story, the results were exaggerated to fit the win-win narrative of forest restorations. Machaqueiro (2020) reminds us that the climate crisis brings with it complex social issues which cannot be fixed through economics alone.

The last category is now sovereign environmentality. Resettlement programs in Inner Mongolia, led by the Chinese state in the early 2000s, provides an example of just this (Zhang, 2018). Pastoralists were forcibly removed from their settlements when their practices were blamed for the increasing occurrence of sandstorms and desertification in the area. Information and knowledge about these events were spread to the population by researchers, the state, and the media. The central Chinese government gave information about how to protect rangelands, framed as a win-win situation for humans and animals. At the same time, the state, being as powerful as it is in China, could dismiss pastoralists’ own knowledge of rangelands. The local government had the responsibility to handle the resettlements more directly, fencing up areas and drawing up contracts with the farmers. The contracts, among other things, included a five year ban on grazing in the rangeland in exchange for economic and social support for the new settlers (Zhang, 2018, p. 373). The economic support was meant to pull people towards the resettlements, while the threat of strict pastoral control was meant to push them away from their

old habitats. As such, the state used threat of punishment to make subjects submit to sovereign power (Zhang, 2018, p. 375). Most, though not all, farmers showed their support for the government scheme by leaving to start a new life in the resettlement areas.

Zhang (2018) notes that there can be distinguished different forms of environmentality from the central and local government. The central government, as explained, exercised a sovereign form of power. The local government, however, relied on forms of neoliberal power by influencing the population's behaviour with economic incentives. Yet another example of how the different categories of environmentality can rely on and strengthen each other. Interestingly, people in Inner Mongolia referred to the central government as good, and the local government as bad. Appreciating the work of the former, while in different ways resisting the work of the latter. The author himself reflected that "The varied responses and discourses are illustration of the technologies of resistance because they are associated with differences in social, economic and political capital." (Zhang, 2018, p. 374).

Finally, is an article with examples from Burunge Wildlife Management Area and Babati town. Bluwstein (2017) explains how all forms of environmentality were present in the creation of these wildlife conservations in Northern Tanzania. Ecotourism is a growing business in the Global South. It requires demarcation of land under the guise of protecting nature and animals, while simultaneously benefiting the tourism industry. Therefore, the state put up fences and enforced the new boundaries. Further, authorities punished those who breached the new boundaries and rules. It has been claimed that between 2014 and 2015, more people were arrested for environmentally related offences than any other state-related offence (Bluwstein, 2017, p. 109). Really emphasising the penance related to sovereign governmentality. Additionally, nature was allocated for economic purposes, to make money from tourism, under the guise of protecting nature. This way of understanding conservation in economic terms can be attributed to neoliberal environmentality. Moreover, investors in the areas promoted an informational campaign, claiming more education would make people appreciate the positive value of ecotourism (Bluwstein, 2017, p. 108). Both truth and disciplinary environmentality was present in this campaign. The idea of a harmonious coexistence with wildlife, as well as re-establishing the population's relationship to nature was promoted. Educating people in schools and seminars, attempting to make them see the world, and more specifically nature, in a certain way relates to truth oriented environmentality. Lastly, pursuing the population's internalisation of

these values is disciplinary governmentality. Evidently, the justification of ecotourism in Northern Tanzania was equally economic and cultural (Bluwstein, 2017, p. 110).

3.4 Critique, resistance, and counter-conduct

As all social theory, governmentality and environmentality has gained criticisms of their own, e.g., that attempts at subject formation are not always necessarily successful. Examples have been brought up where there seemed to be differences in subject formations as not everyone would undergo the same transformation. Zhang (2018) explained it by differences in social and economic capital. However, Agrawal goes a bit deeper and professes that in the work of Foucault there is a lack of focus on just *how* subjects are created through government (Agrawal, 2005, p. 12). This further entails a modest recognition of variations in subject formation.

Authors such as Li (2007) has posed questions about how one can guarantee that the techniques of government succeed when what government intends to happen, and what actually happens, does not always correlate (Li, 2007, p. 277). Building on this, Rutherford (2007) notes how it is often assumed that government always operates the way it is intended. And where there can be found deviations, government is said to have failed. Consequently, government is understood as complete and unfragmented. This view can make governmentality seem more rigid than reality. In turn, this conformity may lead to neglect of internal differences and exclusion. Related to subject formation, some subjects will be rendered “the correct ones”, and used as representative, while the deviants will be ignored (Rutherford, 2007, p. 300). Rather, Rutherford suggest, government should be seen as any other form of rule, which is constructed and redefined when met with resistance.

Relating to another repeated comment, the lack of focus on resistance. Foucault wrote about resistance being a part of power and emphasised the need for room to act. Moreover, he wrote about counter-conduct, where subjects object to power, wanting to be conducted differently, through other methods or by other leaders (Kelly, 2020, p. 313). Despite this, governmentality, and environmentality, has been critiqued for not paying enough attention to autonomy. Regardless of his own statements, Agrawal’s work has received criticism itself for being monolithic and ignoring individual agency (Montes et al., 2020, p. 356). The critique stresses that subjects will express their beliefs and values and do not just conform to power uncritically. Singh (2013) compared Agrawal’s work in Kumaon to her own fieldwork in Odisha, and mentioned how the lack of focus on local agency left her frustrated. Fletcher & Cortes-Vazquez

(2020) puts it: “[...] environmentalism is often seen to focus excessively on the top-down exercise of power and thus neglect the creative ways that subalterns resist, reconfigure and exercise their own forms of governance autonomous of or in opposition to external authority” (p. 292). The critiques indicate that far too often, scholars utilising governmentality or environmentalism look to what authorities want to happen, and then search for that in society, when what should be done, is look at society as a whole (Fletcher & Cortes-Vazquez, 2020, p. 292). Because as mentioned, the intentions of government are not always fulfilled.

An example of resistance can be found in the research from New Zealand, and Haggerty (2007). Conflict is neatly visualised from the title: “I am not a greenie, but...”. It was explained how local people would limit their fishing quotas because they saw it as the right thing to do. Nonetheless, they did not want to be perceived as “greenies”, or environmental subjects. They would still contend that the real responsibility was on unions and the government, not themselves. Additionally, in Inner Mongolia, Zhang (2018) found that a high number of farmers left their estate to live in the resettlement areas. But some stayed, exhibiting their discontent with the governmental intervention. Pastoralists thought they knew best what was good for the rangelands, and stayed behind in spite of incentives (Zhang, 2018, p. 376).

Just as government does not always fulfil its intentions, so does resistance also have its limitations. For instance, when pastoralists refused to follow governmental instructions, it did not break up the project altogether (Zhang, 2018). In understanding the aspect of resistance under the effect of power, the theory of structuration can be useful. Anthony Giddens understands actors as living within a structure designed by institutions, but they are not without agency (Giddens, 1986). Individuals will internalise the norms and values of society, and hence conform their conduct in accordance with the structure. Structure is here defined as certain rules which forms society and is anchored in its institutions. The theory can be related to the Foucault’s conduct of conduct, where people control their own, and other people’s, behaviour, but will give clear reasons for their actions, thinking they are acting in accordance with their own rationalities (Giddens, 1986, p. 6). Moreover, not only are actors shaped by the structures, but they are also essential in upholding and reproducing the same structure. “[...] while the continued existence of large collectivities or societies evidently does not depend upon the activities of any particular individual, such collectivities or societies manifestly would cease to be if all the agents involved disappeared” (Giddens, 1986, p. 24). In the same way the structure

is not upheld by an individual agent, so too would the structure not be destroyed by the deviance of any singular individual – resistance has limitations in achieving its objectives.

Being aware of discrepancies in a theory is important, especially when trying to avoid some of the pitfalls that exist. Therefore, this research must be careful in making too broad conclusions or trying to force answers into certain categories. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that the participants do not reveal all the reasoning behind their answers, nor the internal conflicts they might experience. Nonetheless, while taking these criticisms to heart, governmentality is still frequently used in social sciences and the theory of multiple environmentalities can still provide useful insights into the realm of environmentally related behaviour changes.

4. Methodology

Constructivism as the epistemological focus for this research allows for interpretations to be based on the participants own experiences and interactions. Understanding knowledge and values as being shaped by discourses enables the answers to be traced back to certain discourses. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that in constructivism there will be no higher truth or right answer, only different, equally valid, perspectives to compare with each other. Similarly, postmodern self-awareness asks what the true meaning behind statements are, and where this meaning is created (Gray, 2018, p. 29). It involves critical thinking about people's values and opinions, just as Foucault's scrutiny of the production of knowledge (Rose et al., 2006, p. 86). Foucault is sometimes also categorised under post-structuralism. Post-structuralism has some common traits with post-modernism, as in the denial of a universal social science and encouragement of multiplicity (Agger, 1991, p. 117). Still, post-modernism was considered more relevant for this research due to its amplified appreciation of how meaning is represented and reproduced through language, allowing for the existence of several distinct truths (Gray, 2018, p. 29). Foucault himself did not wish to be labelled as belonging to any specific school, and rather repeated that he first and foremost was an empiricist (Foucault, 1980). And so, while the emphasis for this research will remain on post-modernism, its connection to post-structuralism is recognised.

The data collection for this thesis is twofold. Firstly, data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel (NCP) was gathered through an online questionnaire, providing information from a subdivision of the Norwegian population. Secondly, interviews were done with members of the

environmental organisation Spire. This double collection was done in the interest of observing if there was a difference between the answers from young people who are explicit about caring for the environment, and the more general population. The approach for the research is deductive, then inductive. Data was collected to test or confirm the theory of multiple environmentalities, and whether or not this can be seen as applicable in Norway. The data will hence be deductively tested against the already existing theory and two prepared research questions. However, moving on from there, the data can possibly nuance and extend the theory in a more inductive manner – especially the in-person interviews.

The Norwegian Citizen Panel is an organisation which sends out online questionnaires to a cross section of the Norwegian population three times a year. The initiative is funded by the social science faculty at the University of Bergen, and NORCE – Norwegian Research Centre. The questionnaire is created by social scientists and differs from year to year based on the contributors. The questionnaire is operated by DIGSSCORE (Digital Social Science Core Facility), which is “an infrastructure for advanced social science data collection and multi-disciplinary research.” (University of Bergen, 2021a). The questionnaire is sent out to a randomly selected section of the population; hence it is not possible to sign up, you get drafted by the national analysis company *Ideas2Evidence* (University of Bergen, 2021b). This procedure is done to avoid sampling bias. The survey examines the Norwegian populations’ perspectives on different topics, from climate change, to politics, migration, and health services. The data contributes to research and establishing new knowledge. For the participants, it is an opportunity to speak their minds about subjects that might be important to them.

Spire is an environment- and development-oriented organisation founded in 2003, stating to be fighting for a just and sustainable world (Spire, 2022). Their ambition is to spread awareness and knowledge about how to create a better and healthier planet. Some of the topics they highlight on their website are climate and environment, food security, sustainable housing opportunities, and international trade (Spire, 2022). Interviewing people from this environmental organisation was intended to ensure that the participants were especially interested in climate and environmental issues. Spire was chosen specifically because of their focus on how individuals can help create change in the world. Moreover, in the interest of full disclosure, Spire was chosen because I had attended some of their meetings and therefor had a foot in the door already.

4.1 Research design

This thesis utilises a mixed methods research design as two different sets of data were gathered: the quantitative data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel and qualitative data from interviews with Spire members. With the aim of gaining a picture of how the public perceives the need for a sustainable transition and their own role within it, working with the Norwegian Citizen Panel provided an exclusive opportunity to reach out to a substantial amount of people. This provided the research with breadth. Secondly, there was a wish to learn if people who are engaged in environmental activism would answer any differently from the participants in the NCP. The Spire interviews were done in person to gain an understanding of the reasoning behind their answers, hoping that the interviews can disclose some general explanations of the data from the NCP. However, more than anything they give insight into a specific societal group, and as such, they provide the work with depth.

In both the data collections, the unit of analysis is individuals. And the focus of the research is the perception of individual lifestyle changes in Norway's sustainability transition among the Norwegian population. The research questions attempted to be answered in this thesis are: "How do people in Norway envision the sustainability transition to come about?" and "How do they understand their own role within this transition?".

It was decided to concentrate the research on Norwegian citizens for several reasons. Firstly, being an environmentally conscious Norwegian citizen, I oftentimes found myself in discussions with other Norwegians about the need for individual lifestyle changes. I have found people's opinions to be quite diverging, which piqued my interest. Being Norwegian also entails that I could communicate with the participants in their own language, which is always an advantage. Secondly, Norwegian citizens are in the very comfortable position of having one of the highest per capita consumption emissions in the world (Sustainable development index, 2021). Norway has been at the top of the Human Development Index for a decade, but adjusting for ecological efficiency, as the Sustainable Development Index does, Norway comes out at number 157 (Sustainable development index, 2021). And so, most of Norwegian citizens should have the ability to change and to consume less. Therefore, when talking about the sustainability transition, it would be vital to get the population's own opinion on the matter. Lastly, while the research from the start sought to interview people from Norway, it did not necessitate that they were citizens, but the Norwegian Citizen Panel obviously only goes out to Norwegian citizens.

However, the members from Spire were not explicitly asked if they were citizens, it was only made sure they lived in Norway long-term.

4.1.1 The Norwegian Citizen Panel

This project is based on four questions that were sent out through the Norwegian Citizen Panel, with the Climate and Environment group. The survey from the NCP is structured, as all the participants in the same group will receive the same questions, phrased the same way. The questions were all in Norwegian because they were reaching the Norwegian population. The questions were all closed, as in the participants had to choose an alternative and could not answer freely. The NCP has a limited amount of time available for researchers, and this project was allocated 1 minute and 30 seconds. Therefore, the decision was made not to include any open questions, as one of those use about 80 second and would severely limit the amount of data possible to be gathered. Alternatively, to get more data, four closed questions were created.

Since there was no in-person contact, the only way to influence the participants would be through the formulation of the questions. However, the questions were sent in to get feedback several times, both to other researchers on the NCP and to the research committee. In all, it took about 4 months for the questions to be finalized. After that, the survey went out on a pilot-run which provided more feedback, before it eventually was posted in October 2021, as part of wave 22. This process should have eliminated any annoying phrases and bias in formulations.

The NCP uses probability sampling to choose the participants in the survey. The Panel has over 6000 active participants who are all residents of Norway over the age of 18 (The Norwegian Citizen Panel, 2021). The partakers get randomly divided into different groups that contain dissimilar questions. These groups do not coincide with e.g., the Climate and Environment group, but rather include questions from a range of different groups and researchers that participated in the NCP that year. In wave 22, as many as 13 697 people participated in the survey. In the group containing this project's questions, 2001 people where sent the questions, and the response rate was over 95%. The questionnaire was out for over a month and the data was ready for processing December 17th 2021.

4.1.2 *The Spire interviews*

Sampling members of Spire was done purposively, to achieve representativeness and comparability (Gray, 2018, p. 215). The members represent a field of interest for this research, namely, people who care about the environment. It was meant to provide a way of looking into internal differences in the data. Ergo, between those who have a higher interest in the environment, and people who might not think about it in their everyday lives. Being a member of a social change organisation can have social, educational, and personal rewards, and reasons for joining are diverse. Still, Lubell (2002) found that the strongest motivators for joining an environmental organisation are climate concern, as well as belief in the ability to affect the political system. Another important factor for recruitment is social network and background (Tindall et al., 2003).

The Spire interviewees' age is further not unimportant. Age influences how people engage with and understand the climate emergency, which will further affect how they answer the questions (Lubell, 2002). In this way, age differences could be important to inspect. While the focus of this thesis will remain on the general trends from the NCP-data to understand the mainstream opinion among the population, the Spire interviews will serve as a reminder that answers fluctuate. What's more, the interviews, being qualitative in manner, could provide insight into the reasoning and reflection people make while answering these questions, which cannot be obtained from the survey. Some of it might be transferable to the common participant, while some of it might be specific to people from Spire.

Recruiting of Spire participants was done in two ways, firstly through in-person contact at a weekend Spire-seminar, and later at a weekly meeting. Secondly, recruitment was done through their Facebook-group, where I posted asking if anyone wanted to participate in the research. Most participants were people I had spoken with before, and therefore had a relaxed tone with before and during the interviews. The participants were all between the ages of 20 and 30 years and lived in Norway long-term. They came from several different places of the country, and the north, south, east, and west regions of Norwegian were all represented. There was a mixed gender representation.

The interviews were semi-structured, and the questions were more or less the same as the ones sent out through the NCP. However, some of them were more open, which was not a possibility with the survey, because of the time constraints. The questions had gotten numerous feedbacks

and were meticulously formulated to ensure they answered the research questions, in an attempt to maintain validity. Reliability was sought by asking the participants the same questions every time. However, since the interviews were semi-structured, I mostly tried to follow the order of the questions, but at the same time let the conversation float naturally. Bias is always an issue to keep in mind when interviewing, and I did my best to not let the participants' answer affect what I thought, or the way I asked the questions. Even though the data was completely anonymous, I informed all the participants that they had the right to see the notes I made and how their answers would be used in the project. A few said they would like the notes, the others declined. All the participants asked to receive a copy of the research when it was completed.

All the interviews lasted for roughly 30 minutes. They were not recorded, instead notes were taken during the interview. Some of the interviews were done over Zoom, because the participants lived in different parts of the country from me, while others were done face to face. Most of the interviews were conducted in Norwegian, but one was done in English because the participant said they could articulate better that way. In all, seven interviews were done with Spire members. The anticipation was to get up to 10 participants, however some of the people that were contacted never responded. The aim of 10 was based on the notion from Gray that between four to ten participants often will be enough to reach data saturation within a sample size (Gray, 2018, p. 175). Meaning, the data starts to get repetitive and yields little or no new information. After the seven interviews, similarities started becoming noticeable in the answers and therefore it was decided that it would not be necessary to reach out to additional people for interviews.

In the spring I started to question whether I should do more interviews with Spire if the time allowed it. However, after some consideration I decided against it. Firstly, the interviews were never meant to be the primary source of data but were rather meant to form a basis I could compare with the survey. Secondly, the interviews were conducted over a period of little less than a month, from the end of September to the midst of October 2021, basically at the time as the survey from the NCP was out. When the interviews and survey was done within the same timeframe, both data sources can be said to measure the perception of the Norwegian population at a certain point in time, the autumn of 2021. Adding more interviews in the spring would derail the timeframe and make the data less compatible. In hindsight, I can blame myself for not trying harder to get more interviews during autumn. However, I am reminded that I stopped

trying because the data ended up becoming very similar, and a few more interviews are not likely to make a tremendous difference in this case.

4.2 Analysis

4.2.1 The Norwegian Citizen Panel

As aforementioned, the questions in the NCP were all closed. One could dispute that closed, quantitative questions are abnormal to combine with a constructivist epistemology, or almost oxymoronic. Nonetheless, the questions and alternatives themselves come from a constructivist point of view when the theory they represent is constructivist and it is worked into the questions from beforehand. Where applicable, the answer alternatives included were fashioned in such a way that they fit the four categories of environmentality. Ergo, the answers in themselves, as well as specific combinations, can be evident of specific discourses. Now, critics could proclaim that the participants have no way of knowing what theoretical framework is behind the questions. Which is true. Nonetheless, participants are usually not aware of the theoretical background of questions in a survey anyway. Just as the researcher cannot know everything the participant is thinking when answering the survey. The data will be analysed from a constructivist position, in accordance with how I understand the questions and alternatives. The section on validity will return to any possible concerns of this data collection. This sub-chapter will go through the questions sent out through the NCP and explain their connection to the framework. The questions are here translated from Norwegian, to read the original questions, see the Appendix. For later reference, the translated questions can also be found there.

Through the Paris Agreement from 2015 Norway has committed to reducing national emissions by 40% by 2030, compared to the emission levels from 1990. How likely do you think it is for Norway to reach these commitments in time?

- *Very likely*
- *Likely*
- *Somewhat likely*
- *Not very likely*
- *Not likely at all*

This is an introduction question, which will provide an understanding of how the participants sees the likelihood of a sustainability transition, and whether or not they see it happening at all.

As established, Norway needs a sustainability transition in order to meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. In this sense, this question will go under the first research question, how people envision the path to a sustainable society. Moving on, Question 2 was:

There are ongoing debates about who has the biggest responsibility to make sure we meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. Government and businesses are often mentioned, however, it can also be argued that individual citizens have a responsibility. To what degree do you consider it as necessary for the population to make individual lifestyle changes for Norway to meet the required emission cuts?

- *To a very large degree*
- *To a large degree*
- *To some degree*
- *To a small degree*
- *Not at all*

This question gives insight into whether the theory of multiple environmentalities is applicable. Specifically, among those who answer that individual lifestyle changes are needed “to some degree”, “to a large degree” or “to a very large degree”. Those are people who believe changes are needed for us to cut emissions, which expresses two things. Firstly, emission cuts are needed; secondly, at least parts of it needs to be done through individual actions. Hence, they express a care for the environment by wanting to cut emissions, and a will to conserve it through action. As such, they would fill the criteria of people who are environmental subjects (Agrawal, 2005). Nevertheless, this data will not convey whether people would make such changes. It merely reflects how the participants perceive the emission situation in Norway, and their own role within it, hence answering research question number two. These answers will need to be seen in relation to the following answers to possibly see which one of the environmentalities they adhere to.

As for the “to a small degree” alternative, it leaves a grey area, where people might think their efforts only contribute an insignificant amount, and hence, their actions are not important. This does not necessitate that they do not care for the environment. Yet, a sense of obligation towards nature is not present, and the answer will be coded as people who do not fit into the category of environmental subjects. Same goes for those who would check the “not at all” alternative. Again, the answers need to be seen in coalition with the other answers. For instance, choosing

“not at all” and then picking government as the most important actor in the next question, would indicate a redelegation of responsibility and a lesser degree of governmentality. On the other hand, if someone were to click “To a large degree” and then “government”, it could be seen as someone anticipating the authorities to create restrictions for behaviour and would therefore be coded as sovereign environmentality. Which brings on the next question:

Meeting the requirements of the Paris Agreement will most likely require efforts and collaboration from several actors in society. If you could only point to one, which actor do you consider the most signification in ensuring emission cuts in Norway?

- *The Norwegian government, through regulatory politics*
- *Private businesses, by investing in green energy and industries*
- *Civil Society Organisations, who can affect the political agenda*
- *Individual households, by reducing consumption*
- *Another actor*

The order of the categories of environmentality is firstly according to the rationality of sovereign state, secondly according to the rationality of economics, thirdly according to truth, and lastly according to the rationality of the disciplined themselves. And, additionally, an option for those who dislike all the alternatives. The alternatives may seem narrow and arbitrarily limited; however, more text and explanation could have become confusing and made the respondents unwilling to reply. The categories were created with the theory of multiple environmentalities in mind as a way to “force” the respondents to choose one category.

Those who answer that the government is responsible, implicitly say that they want the sovereign state to regulate society, with all that may bring. Since the alternatives involves the term “regulatory politics” it should tell the participants that this scenario entails acting in compliance with new regulations, compatible with sovereign governmentality. Opposingly, those who answer “private businesses”, may be under the impression that the market will “fix” the problem of climate change. Just altering the market so that green energy and industry is more profitable, will influence individuals into making different choices, and change society for the better, just how neoliberal governmentality works. Moving on, those who answer Civil Society Organisations may have lesser faith in the government and market but believe that organisations can convey information to both the government and society as a whole. Hoping that an informed public and government will make better choices for the future. In this sense,

it is the organisations' responsibility to make sure information is getting attention, so that people can act according to "the truth". Lastly, holding individual households directly responsible for their actions would create a change of norms and possibly a social pressure to do the right thing. This time not because people know "the truth", but rather out of fear for social repercussions. Making people exercise power over themselves, according with disciplinary governmentality.

The last question was:

If the Norwegian population was to change their lifestyles and consumption patterns, which governmental approach do you see as the most convenient in creating lasting changes?

- *Distributing information about the climate crisis and possible remedies*
- *Developing a green economy that makes it easier to consume environmentally friendly*
- *New environmental politics that can regulate polluting behaviours using prohibition, taxes, subsidies, etc.*
- *Encouraging the population to control their own environmental behaviour*
- *Another approach*

The order of the categories is according to truth, according to the rationality of economics, according to the rationalities of the sovereign state and according to the rationalities of the governed themselves. A non-specific alternative was added here as well. These alternatives are a little more self-explanatory than the last. The first answer represents the hope that if people know the consequences of and remedies for the climate crisis, ergo "the truth", they will change their behaviour accordingly. Secondly, developing a green economy and making green choices easier is per definition an alteration of the external societal structure, easing certain choices, and therefore fits within the neoliberal form. Third, the sovereign form encourages new politics that can regulate behaviour in certain ways, such as alternative three. And lastly, controlling your own environmental behaviour is textbook disciplinary environmentality.

The phrasing *governmental approach* in this question was decided to be necessary by me and other researcher when working out the questions. It was added so that the participants can understand where the changes are stemming from. Nonetheless, it does lay the land by insinuating that individual lifestyle changes will be the result of governmental decisions. Though the four approaches might need to be instigated by the authorities, to the public it might feel like the pressure to change is coming from other sources, such as the market or people

around you. Moreover, since this is the last question there is no danger that this phrasing would affect how the participants saw the previous ones.

4.2.2 *The Spire interviews*

The face-to-face interviews were analysed a little differently. Firstly, codes were deciphered from the transcription of the interviews, done using content analysis (Gray, 2018, p. 691). Gray defines content analysis as “[...] the making of inferences about data (usually text) by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics (classes or categories) within them.” (Gray, 2018, p. 691). The process of coding was done by first having non-recorded interviews, then right afterwards writing up my notes to complete sentences, fixing spelling errors and adding things I may have forgotten to note down. Then I read through the interviews again and reflected on what codes could be used. Lastly, I went through them one more time and started coding. While working on the first interview I added 6 codes, and after finishing the next two interviews two more codes had been added because I saw something I did not before. I ended up using the codes:

“Likelihood for reaching targets from Paris Agreement”,
“Need for structural changes”,
“Distrust in the market”,
“Need for individual changes”,
“Willingness to make changes”,
“Trust in government”,
“What needs to be done”, and
“Whose responsibility it is?”.

After coding the interviews, I wrote a 3-4 sentence summary of each interview to get an overview of the main takeaways. I then started looking for connections, similarities, and differences between the answers. From there, the answers were coded using the categories of environmentalism. The categories can be labelled as thematic codes, because using them is trying to interpret the participants’ meaning (Gray, 2018, p. 692). During this process, discourse analysis was utilised to understand the connotations of the participants’ answers. Discourse analysis is the study of language and the meaning behind language (Gee & Handford, 2012). It understands language as central to the production of meaning, as the world is understood through language (Berg, 2009, p. 216). In this way, language can be revealing of

your social background, for instance, people from higher social classes tend to use different words and phrases than people from lower classes (ibid). From this theoretical perspective, those who subscribe to a certain discourse will answer the question in coinciding ways. Hence, discourse analysis could be utilised to trace answer back to certain discourses, and more precisely, one of the four environmentality categories (Gray, 2018, p. 704). However, there was also the chance of answers not fitting into any of the categories, which could be a way to critique, build on, or expand the theory of multiple environmentalities.

4.3 Ensuring rigour

Ensuring rigour in qualitative research is very important. Qualitative research projects have been subject to criticisms such as them being too small, anecdotal, or unscientific (Gray, 2018, p. 181). Moreover, their generalizability and reproducibility have been brought under questioning. An open and honest presentation of approach and methods can help combat this. Additionally, incorporating ways to ensure validity, reliability and objectivity can maintain rigour.

Validity is ensured when the researcher is researching, measuring, or observing what they claim to be (Gray, 2018, p. 704). There is a difference between internal and external validity. Internal validity concerns whether the researcher has been able to evidentially establish a strong link between their findings and the theoretical ideas they develop from it (ibid). Ways of enhancing this validity involves reflexivity, the constant critical thinking about one's own findings. As well as having the participants check their answers and allowing for non-participants to read the research to quality check. A major component is whether another researcher would come to the same conclusion if they were to replicate the research (Gray, 2018, p. 705). Internal validity was endeavoured in this research by receiving frequent feedbacks on the survey questions before they were circulated, as well as allowing participants to read the notes taken after the interviews. As earlier mentioned, the theoretical point of view for this research may not be the same as the participants', which can have created discrepancies in how the questions are understood and further threatened the internal validity. However, efforts were made to avoid bias in the phrasings and to not ask leading questions. Other researchers have also given critical feedback on the project.

In constructivist fashion, this thesis will refrain from deeming the answers from both the NCP and the Spire interviews as absolute truths. The responses can be taken to represent specific

forms of environmentality, as they are shaped by the participants background, values, and knowledge. However, there are those who claim that surveys measure nothing more than the person's reflections and understandings at the given time. One of the cons of surveys is that answers might not fully coincide with reality. People may tend to overestimate themselves in closed questions if there is no follow-up to deepen the answer (Gray, 2018, p. 343). Additionally, they might give uncertain or ambiguous answers that cannot be detected or scrutinised. All of this can affect the internal validity of research. There is nothing to be done with people's ability to self-evaluate, however, what can be done is avoid reading too much into the answers and recognise the inherent flaws of survey research.

External validity involves generalizability, asking the question: "can the research data be generalized to other settings or cases?" (Gray, 2018, p. 343). In this case, the data from the NCP is representative for the Norwegian population. The data it gathered to be able to say something about the population as a whole (The Norwegian Citizen Panel, 2021). There would likely be small variations if other people than the ones who did, were to answer these questions. Seeing how the sampling is done randomly, if one was to do the research again, there's no saying you will interview the exact same people, and there you might not get the exact same response. Still, as a later chapter will show, the distribution of the answers follows a pattern that is not likely to change drastically with other survey participants. A generally considered advantage of survey research is that of external validity, and lack of bias (Gray, 2018, p. 343). A large number of randomly selected respondents enhance generalisability and the absence of contact between research and respondents minimises the risk of biased answers. There is of course the issue of question formulation, which has been examined.

As for the interviews, the data may not be possible to generalize to other contexts outside of environmental organisations as the relevant discourse will change dependent on your societal position (Berg, 2009, p. 216). Research would yield different results from people inside and outside of an environmental organisation because their proximity to the environmental discourse would affect the knowledge they base their answer on. Conducting new interviews with other people from Spire might yield consistent results, nonetheless, the discourse changes quickly, which could affect the answers. Still, some of the more general rationalisations from the interviews will be utilised as a way of understanding and fragmenting the NCP data, without applying all the same logic to the answers.

In addition, external reliability concerns if the research can be replicated (Gray, 2018, p. 706). The research for this thesis was not done in a social setting which is too unique for it to be obtained again. Similar concepts are objectivity, or confirmability, which address whether the study can be audited or confirmed, or duplicated (Gray, 2018, p. 185). With a clear and detailed description of the methodology, replication of this research should be possible. However, there has already been noted that changes in discourse might be an obstacle to obtaining the exact same result.

Internal reliability is about the stability of the findings and can be enhanced by triangulation (Gray, 2018, p. 184). Triangulation entails several sources of data that can be compared to each other and checked for conformity. Triangulation either involves different sources of data, several researchers gathering data or different ways of sampling. This research was done using methodological triangulation (Gray, 2018, p. 184). More specifically, what Gray (2018) terms “the between method”, where different methods were used, i.e., quantitative data from an online survey, and qualitative data from interviews. It must be noted that the notion of reliability is not universally accepted in qualitative research (Gray, 2018, p. 185). Sometimes, diverging answers can even be the ideal. In this instance, non-conformity between the survey and interviews would be seen as the result of differences in discourse where answers are a result of the participants’ background, access to information and role in society (Berg, 2009).

4.4 Ethical considerations

Another important issue to keep in mind is that of research ethics. Gray (2018) lists four principle which are of special interest. Avoiding harm to participants, ensuring informed consent, respecting the privacy of participants, and avoiding all use of deception (Gray, 2018, p. 75). Harm includes not only physical harm, but also making the participant feel embarrassed, belittled, ridiculed, or causing them severe stress and anxiety. A way of limiting the risk of this is to keep the informant anonymous. Meaning no identifying data, such as age, name, gender, living location or occupation can be written down. Data from the NCP is already approved by the NSD (Norsk senter for forskningsdata) – Norwegian Centre for Research Data. The data is anonymous and informed consent is assured. Since no direct contact with the participants were made, the only way to deceive or harm them would be through the questions. Which, as mentioned several times, were scrutinised by various researchers before they were accepted and should do no such thing.

Now, for the interviews, all the participants are between 20 and 30, and members of Spire. However, they are from many different places in Norway and their location is not given. Furthermore, their gender, name and exact age is never revealed. The participants were all informed that they would remain anonymous, that they had access to all the information that was gathered about them and that they could withdraw at any time. They were informed of all of this before the interviews started and they signed a consent form beforehand. The signature on the consent forms is the only piece of identifiable information that was collected, and they have been seen by only me. Furthermore, they will be tossed when this research is done. The information sheet provided contained information about the master's project, who was asked to participate and why the individuals themselves were being asked. Additionally, what kind of questions they would be asked, how much time the interviews would take, how their data would be used and who would have access to it was written in the sheet. I gave the respondents time to ask questions and made sure they understood all the information before we started.

The right to privacy involves anonymity and informing the participant that they have the right to withdraw at any point, also during the interview (Gray, 2018, p. 80). As mentioned, this was communicated in the information sheet, as well as vocally before starting the interviews. Last point is avoiding deception. Deception can be avoided by being honest with the respondents on exactly what the research is. An issue brought up by Gray (2018) is that researchers often misinform the participant on how long the interview will be. I told the participants the interviews would take 30 minutes max, which was true for all instances.

A little note on bias is also needed. During the interviews, I could not help but get the feeling that some of the participants wanted to answer "the right thing". That they wanted to come across as knowledgeable, reflected, and caring. And that answering the wrong thing could put them in a bad light. In my reflections I came to thinking that my duo role, as researcher and simultaneously another member of Spire, might have affected this. The participants might have seen me as someone who themselves was knowledgeable and reflected, and therefore co-opted their answers to what they may see as to fit into my worldview. However, this was certainly not the case with every interview, as some participants seemed very confident in their answers and did not care about my opinion.

4.5 Reflections on methodology and the research process

Reflexivity is vital in qualitative research as the researcher's interpretations of actions and observation will become a part of the analysis (Gray, 2018, p. 164). While quantitative research strives to reach objectivity, this idea has been accepted as futile by qualitative researchers. Researchers cannot possibly be neutral, but rather, they are selective and will only be able to make partial interpretations (Gray, 2018, p. 689). Being aware of one's lack of objectivity involves recognising one's bias. Not only during interviews and sampling, but also during analysis and classification of findings. Preconceptions about the data can lead to theoretical leaps and oversimplifications in the analysis. Personal reflexivity is when the researcher scrutinises how their personal background, beliefs and attitudes may shape the research (Gray, 2018, p. 690). It necessitates self-introspection and honesty from the scholar. I do believe that my background in Spire was not unimportant during the interviews. Furthermore, some of the people that were interviewed were either not students or doing a different study course than me, a few years below me. A few times during the conversations, participants would say things like "I don't know too much about this subject", indicating they did not feel confident to express certain opinions. I felt my educational background might have made them reluctant to say things they were uncertain of. This could alter their responses a little, however, they would clarify that their answers were based on what they thought and felt. Which is exactly what was anticipated to uncover.

There is also epistemological reflexivity, where the researcher reflects on their theoretical stance on the creation of knowledge and further assumption about the world (Gray, 2018, p. 164). I have been explicit in this thesis that my perception is closely tied to that of constructivism and postmodernism. I believe knowledge is context specific and more often than not, a result of power. Along with this, I want to revisit the complications of collecting data through a quantitative survey using a constructivist epistemology. Constructivism is inherently qualitative, as it requires thought and background knowledge, not to mention how discourses often are detected through language. Yet, I emphasise that the questions in the survey are affected by a constructivist epistemology and the words have been carefully used so to represent specific meanings.

Moving on, reflections on the methodological differences between the data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel and the interviews are needed. The possibility of personal influence during the interviews aside, doing in-person interviews is far different from answering a survey in the first

place. Talking to people face-to-face (or in some instances, screen-to-screen) makes for a completely different scenery than thinking and clicking buttons alone on a computer. During the interviews, the participants might have used more time to truly think through the questions, as the answers might feel more important when they know who is asking. Nonetheless, faults can occur both places. In person, people might lie or exaggerate their answers because of the pressure from the situation or wanting to be perceived a certain way. However, online, people might lie or over evaluate themselves because no one is there to catch them in doing so. In both instances, human error is a risk. This is something one must incorporate when doing research, and good results can be made in spite of human nature.

Even accounting for the differences, the quantitative and qualitative data can work well together. Firstly, the data can build on each other. Getting an insight into people's reasoning when answering the survey questions, as done in the interviews, can later be useful in understanding the specific answers in the NCP. Moreover, using methodological triangulation, that is both qualitative and quantitative methods, can sometimes cancel out each of the methods' weaknesses. Quantitative data can provide generalisability where qualitative data cannot. And qualitative data can provide insight into internal differences of the data where quantitative methods could not.

Another aspect is the stark difference in sample size of the quantitative and qualitative data. It would, of course, not be possible to interview nearly as many people as the sample of the Norwegian Citizen Panel. This is also the objective of the NCP, to reach a representative sample size. Qualitative interviews are not meant to provide the same type of overview data, rather, they can be used to understand what is behind the statistics. However, it has been claimed in this thesis that the answers from the Spire interviews started to become very similar, and there seemed to be a strong connection between the responses of the members. The analysis section goes deeper into this, where reflections are made on whether this can be attributed to Spire's ideology.

5. Findings and analysis

5.1 The spire interviews

The Spire members were not very optimistic that Norway would reach the commitments made through the Paris Agreement. An overview of how the interviewees answered the survey

questions, which can be found in Table 1, shows that most participants said it was not very likely. Only one person answered that it is somewhat likely, and the last participant replied “not likely at all”. The answers to this question indicates the level of understanding the participants have of the current emission and mitigation situation in Norway. Essentially, if a sustainability transition is needed to generate emission cuts, the question implicitly asked if people think this transition will happen. When the participants answered that it is not likely, it can be interpreted as them thinking the transition may not happen. Or at least not fast enough, or to a large enough degree. Should someone have answered that it is likely or highly likely, however, presumably, they would be under the impression that Norway is already doing enough to meet the requirements.

Several members knew that Norway was not, at the present time, on route to reach the targets. However, all except one person explained that they still had some hope of changes, therefore they did not want to say it was not likely at all. The last person said we can still make important changes, lower emissions, and possibly avoid some environmental degradation, but their hope of Norway cutting 40% of CO₂-emissions by 2030 had already subsided. These data are comparable to data from a survey done by Nature, interviewing researchers who worked on the latest IPCC reports. Less than 10% of the respondents thought that maintaining the 1.5°C target is likely, while over 60% believed the world will be at least 3°C warmer by the end of the century (Tollefson, 2021).

Table 1: Overview of answers to survey-questions from the Spire interviews

Participant	Reaching the Paris Agreement	Need for lifestyle changes	Most important actor	Most convenient approach
1	Not very likely	To a large degree	The Norwegian government	Environmental politics
2	Somewhat likely	To some degree	The Norwegian government	Environmental politics
3	Not very likely	To a large degree	Civil Society Organisations	Environmental politics
4	Not very likely	To some degree	The Norwegian government	Environmental politics

5	Not very likely	To some degree	The Norwegian government	Green economy
6	Not very likely	To a very large degree	Individual households	Behaviour changes
7	Not likely at all	To a very large degree	The Norwegian government	Environmental politics

All the members that were interviewed agreed that individual lifestyle and consumption changes are needed. Justifications ranged from sayings such as “we all have a responsibility” to “people in the West contribute the most, so we must do the most”. One of them even responded “big yes”, emphasising how “it all starts at home”. Nonetheless, only two respondents, the one above included, gave a clear yes-answer, ergo they were put in the “to a very large degree”-category. The rest all gave variations of “yes, but”. Meaning that they saw individual changes as important, but not all-encompassing. The difference between people in the “to some degree” and “to a large degree” category is how strongly they emphasised it. For instance, one of the respondents from the “to some degree” box gave the vague answer of “yes and no”. They said people need to change, but not enough are doing it so it will not matter as much. And one of the “to a large degree” participants said “yes, we all need to change”, the questions was rather if we change voluntarily or by coercion, through politics.

In addition to being positive towards individual lifestyle changes, all the participants said they incorporated environmental concerns into their everyday lives already. Participant 1 announced that they would be willing to cut pretty much anything from their lives if they knew it benefited the environment. They, as well as 5 other of the 7 participants were either vegan or vegetarian, and all expressed a wish to eat more ethical and sustainable. Several also talked about eating locally produced and less processed foods. Another widespread change happening among the Spire-members was cutting down on or completely cutting out aviation. Many were frustrated with public transport in Norway, especially the low cost of flying and high cost of other transportation options such as trains and buses. Participant 4 proclaimed that they would never fly domestically. They further clarified that they did not like taking the bus over flying, because it takes longer, is more expensive and more uncomfortable. However, “if the bus alternative is to be maintained, somebody needs to use it”. Participant 3 said they lived in a place with poor public transport, where the options are slim. They therefore had an arrangement with friends and colleagues to carpool instead of using individual cars.

Another measure brought up was plastic and waste reduction. While some strived to live plastic free, others emphasised the importance of using tote bags instead of plastic bags. Lastly, four people explicitly mentioned strictly buying second-hand whenever possible. A few pointed to the perceived moral obligations of making these changes. Even though there are limited repercussions for not performing these acts, the participants still felt pressured to so. Feeling guilty over doing or not doing a particular thing and sensing that people are judging you is the workings of disciplinary governmentality (Fletcher, 2010). As Dean (2010) pointed out, self-regulation can be understood as a moral act when it is presumed to benefit the greater society. Therefore, not living as sustainably as possible can feel immoral.

When asked who has the responsibility to make sure Norway cuts emissions and meets the requirements of the Paris Accord, the participants pointed to a variety of actors. This question was first left open, to note which actors were the first to pop into the participant's mind, before the four alternatives were given. Doing this, four different participants brought up the state or the government on their own. However, there were also answers such as: the oil sector, big businesses with a lot of power, the whole transportation system, and the court of law in collaboration with the government. Some mentioned the oil industry specifically, others only in passing. In general, there seemed to be a take-for-granted-ness about the need to end the oil age and move on to better things.

After the open question, the alternatives of the government, private businesses, civil society organisations, and individual households were presented. Then, five respondents gave up the government as the most important figure, though, in concert with businesses and industry. Another person elaborated that they thought it needed to be 50/50 between households and the government. People need to change, but they cannot make the changes on their own, it is the government's responsibility to create the right circumstances. As participant 7 announced, the state needs to set the frame and people need to follow the rules. Another individual explained how their trust in the government had declined in the last few years, seeing the lack of environmental action. Therefore, they did not trust the government to do what needs to be done. Rather, they put their trust into organisations, such as Spire, to affect the political agenda in the right way, playing watchdogs for the government.

Actually, all but one participant expressed some level of distrust in the Norwegian government. Mostly because the government is not well-informed and fails to deliver. One person believed

new environmental politics would only lead to opposition from society. And because politicians depend on the support from the people to gain power, promoting green politics was described by the respondent as counter intuitive. For one participant, the distrust also included the international society, as they alleged that “The Paris Agreement is just a lot of pretty words”. Despite how several people expressed a distrust in the government on fulfilling their promises, all but two participants still proclaimed the government would be the most significant actor for emission cuts. Interestingly, Participant 7 stated they had a lot of confidence in the state. They stressed that Norway is a country with an exceptional level of trust in authorities, and therefore they need to be the ones who make sure we have a sustainability transition.

Correspondingly, four of the participants had a strong distrust in the market. The participants tied our lifestyles to the current system we are in, global capitalism. A system that creates and requires overconsumption. The market was deemed selfish, capitalist, prone to failure and inherently non-sustainable. At best, the participants proclaimed, the market could create short-term solutions, but none that would last. One person believed the market could be useful in inciting a sustainability transition, but only as long as it was profitable, because that is all businesses care about. It became clear that several interviewees wanted incentives and economic goods for making sustainable choices, but they did not want the market to be in complete control – instead, it had to be initiated and controlled by the government.

While they all advocated for individual lifestyle changes, what is really needed, the respondents from Spire proclaimed, are structural changes. Mostly, structural changes that will force individuals themselves to change. Relating to the findings from Langaas et al., (2020), several Spire participants pointed out that people are not going to make the required changes on their own – they need a big actor to push them. Roughly translated, participant 4 summed it up this way: “The system is creating the overconsumption; therefore, the system needs to change so as not to incentivise people into the use-and-discard mentality”. System change would for many of the participants mean facilitating for green choices to be more economically feasible and easier to access, all the while, making polluting and hazardous choices less desirable. Such as ensuring the right to repair and making repairing cheaper than buying a new digit.

This could at first glance resemble neoliberal environmentalism, if the idea is to make environmental choices the most promising avenue for actors to maximise their utilities (Fletcher, 2010). As participant 3 said, people need incentives to care about the environment,

and economic incentives are the most effective. Nonetheless, they all advocated that such incentives must be initiated and controlled by the government, and the responsibility is not on individuals. Out of the five who answered that the government has the biggest responsibility for cutting emissions, four people also answered that the best way to get per capita emissions down is through new environmental politics. Accordingly, the system change they are promoting would rather align with a sovereign governmentality. The way the interview participants talked about the government resembled what Ferguson & Gupta (2002) termed a vertical state, a state that is somewhere “up-there”, superior to other institutions in society. They are therefore perceived to have the power to implement whatever changes are needed.

Not only did the Spire participants figure new regulations from the government necessary – they were impatiently waiting for them. While those who leaned towards the government and politics can be said to subscribe to a sovereign environmentality, some disciplinary environmentality might be detected among them as well. Participant 3 mentioned how they carpooled with friends because the public transportation options were slim. This resembles what one student from the Outdoor and Environmental Education course in Australia said. Despite the lack of infrastructure, the student believed they still had to make the right environmental transportation choices (Preston, 2012). While Participant 3 said it was the government’s responsibility to ensure ways of environmental transport, they considered it important to do what they could to limit their footprint in the meantime. They were willing to make changes where the government did not. Instead of giving in to a system that does not make environmental actions easy, both the student from Australia and the Spire member from Norway decided to regulate their own behaviour to create and maintain environmentally conscious habits.

While the majority answered government and politics, one of the government supporters said that a green economy would be the best way to reach the emission targets. Participant 5 explicitly said that changing the economy would create the most long-lasting changes. Making environmentality friendly consumption easier was alleged to change both people’s behaviour and their conception of consumption. Such as in Texas, where water scarcity led to drinking water being sold from vendors and changed the population’s consumption habits (Jepson & Brown, 2014). Having to pay for the water made the Texans more cautious of how much water they were consuming. This might have been similar to what Participant 5 had in mind when saying that a green economy can change both how people act and how they think. In any

regards, this line of thinking coincides with a neoliberal environmentality – changing individual consumption through changing the structure within which they make choices.

It is nonetheless important to remember that Participant 5 advocated for governmental control over the green economy. This person is noted under “Developing a green economy” for question 4, but not under “Private businesses” for question 3, because they did not see the market as the most important actor by itself. Agreeing with their peers again, they held that changing the economy still had to happen under the supervision of state actors. This view was repeated by most of the Spire participants and further reflected in their distrust in market forces. The perception can be related back to the article from Brenner & Theodore (2002), which explained how neoliberalism will adapt to local elements. The Norwegian economy has always had a strong state presence, justifying why Norwegian citizens argue for state involvement in economic changes, just as Larsson et al., (2012) found in Sweden.

In opposition to those above, participant number 6 held firmly that individuals are the most important actor. As seen in Table 1, they answered that individual lifestyle changes are needed to a *very* large degree, individuals are the most important actor, and the best way to reduce emissions would be to make individuals take responsibility for their climate related actions. Similar to how Smokey Bear repeated that you and only you can stop forest fires (Minor & Boyce, 2018). The cartoon was used to instil the population with cautious attitudes that would induce long-lasting behaviour changes, such as a disciplinary mentality. To highlight this, Participant 6 was a vegan and said that they consciously made environmentally friendly choices in all parts of their life. These decisions were things the respondent made on their own, even though there was no governmental incentive, and even though it at times was more expensive and time consuming than other options. The participant did, however, note that large scale changes could not all happen alone, and people need better politics to steer them. They were aware that not everyone possessed the same self-control and privileges as them.

Only one person said that Civil Society Organisations are more important than the government, however, environmental politics was still the most important approach. They did not trust that the government would do their jobs properly, so organisations are needed to set the agenda and make sure things are going the right way. Environmentality according to truth involves perceiving the world in a specific way (Montes et al., 2020), just as when Spire sees the world as a place where mass consumption has led to mass emissions (Spire, 2022). Civil society

Organisations' role in this society is, therefore, to make the government and the population see things the way they do. This is done by speaking truth to power. Essentially, influencing the government by providing them with the information they need to make the correct choices. Like what happened in New Zealand, where fishers changed their habit to protect the whitebait stock after learning that their actions were decreasing the population (Haggerty, 2007). Interestingly, no one from Spire said that the approach of distributing information about the climate crisis and possible remedies was the most important. Several pointed to the fact that this has already been done, and it has not provoked the changes we need. Just as the knowledge-deficit model on behaviour change tell us that increased information will only lead to short-term action.

Five Spire-members advocated for the need for structural changes to ensure emission cuts and the transition into a sustainable society. What is worth noting is that most of them still believed in changes *within* the current system. Simply altering the current economic and cultural system would be enough to generate the necessary emission cuts. For instance, by consuming less or second hand and having zero-emission transport vehicles. However, two people dismissed this idea, and advocated that we need a totally new system to deal with today's challenges. To put it plainly, the crisis we face cannot be fixed within the same system that incited it. What we need is not just green alternatives, but rather, to build a novel society from the ground up, by incorporating climate and environment into every aspect of it. Yet, they admitted that it is the government's responsibility to ensure such a paradigm shift. While they were hopeful that such a transition was to come about, they did not see it as particularly realistic.

The interviewees from Spire all said that Norway most likely is not doing enough to generate emission cuts, and because of this individual lifestyle changes are needed. In most cases the participants had already initiated changes in their own lives. This is basis to claim that the Spire-member were in fact environmental subjects. Most of them made these changes on their own because they felt morally compelled to. Still, they distinctly argued that individuals should not bear the load alone – the responsibility is largely on the government. Even though several different forms and combinations of environmentality can be discerned in these interviews, the expressed need for lifestyle changes to a somewhat, large, or very large degree in unison with a belief in the need for governmental restrictions reveals that at least four out of the seven participants from Spire can be linked to a sovereign environmentality. The others can also be connected to the sovereign form, but in combination with neoliberal, truth-oriented and

disciplinary environmentalism. When reading Spire's webpage, it is understandable why the answers from the members were so similar. To understand the responses better, it is useful to look at how Spire as an organisation conveys their message to new and old members.

Justice is essential for Spire. According to their webpage, they are fighting for a sustainable and fair food system, and well as more equal production and distribution of food and resources. All must contribute to fighting the climate crisis, but after ability. Meaning that countries in the Global North, who are responsible for the majority of GHG-emissions, need to make more of an effort than countries from the Global South (Spire, 2022). Same goes for the Norwegian population; individual lifestyle changes are needed, but more so from people with higher income and ecological footprints. Economically disadvantaged people should not have to pay for other people's sins. What's more, individual lifestyle changes are not the primary means of reducing emissions. Spire claims that too much power is given to individuals, saying that they can fix the crisis through green consumption. Spire does not believe the market to be the solution. Rather, they advocate for stronger political steering, such as taxes and incentives. An example from their page is making repairs exempted from value added taxes, ensuring it to be cheaper than buying something new (Spire, 2022).

Several of the things mentioned here could be recognised in one form or another in the interviews. Especially the scepticism towards the market and reliance on state interventions. The state remains the most vital actor in insuring emission cuts, as Spire's work is all about influencing the political agenda. Environmental politics could from this point of view be understood as the most convenient governmental approach. Hence, the advocacy for political changes points to the work of sovereign environmentalism where people behind the organisation seems to believe regulations could change both habits and attitudes. Moreover, relating to structuration theory, it can be understood as the actors realising how they are being limited by the structure they live in, and thereby seeking to alter it – what Foucault might have perceived as wanting to be conducted differently (Giddens, 1986; Kelly, 2020).

Furthermore, there is a bit of environmentalism according to truth to be discerned here. For instance, how it was made clear that Western countries contribute more to pollution and must therefore take more responsibility. This is presented as part of an essential understanding of the world, one we must act in accordance with. As Lubell (2002) found, people joining an environmental organisation had a strong belief that they could help change the political system.


The members from Spire seemed to display the same values as the organisations they represented, and a pattern is easy to detect among the answers. As the pattern represents the organisation's core values, it implies that even if more interviews had been done, the answers would not diverge too much.

5.2 The Norwegian Citizen Panel survey

The data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel was made available to access December 17th 2021 (Ivarsflaten et al., 2021) ¹. Upon receiving the data, they were imported into R-studio and ggplots was used to create graphs of the different questions. Initially, the separate graphs from each NCP-question will be presented, before looking into relation between them. It should be noted that there was a small percentage of people who were asked these questions but declined to answer. The Norwegian Citizen Panel allows participants to go further and finish the survey without answering all the questions. For question 1 and 2 the percentage of "not answered" was 1.4 (Ivarsflaten et al., 2021). While for questions 3 and 4, 2.4% of the participants did not answer. These rates are not abnormal, and several other questions in the survey had both lower and higher percentages of "not answered". The "not answered" category is not included in the data frame and therefor graphs, because it per definition does not provide any data or insight. That is why the N will be slightly different in the two first and the two last graphs. This discrepancy signifies that at most 50 people did not care for the questions and subsequently skipped them. This could possibly have been avoided by tweaking the questions even more, perhaps shortening them. Nonetheless, obtaining a 100% response rate seems to be close to impossible either way.

When going through and describing these findings, it is recognised that the answers are not absolutes. They are merely indicative of what people were thinking in the moment of answering. People might not have seen the questions in relation to each other, and possibly did not give it much thought. Nevertheless, these might just be the answers this research is looking for. The best thing would even be for the participants to answer the first thing that came to their minds as that could be suggestive of which discourse the participants belong to. Which actor they see as vital, and which approach they see as convenient communicates something about which narratives people have been exposed to and which reality they adhere to. Personal beliefs and understandings are from a constructivist viewpoint always context specific, they are the products of discourses. In this way, the discourses shape the answers, so the answers can be traced back to different discourses.


How likely do you think it is for Norway to reach the commitments from the Paris Agreement in time?



Graph 1: Distribution of answers to questions 1 in the NCP. N = 1972.

The first question in the Norwegian Citizen Panel concerned how likely people saw it for Norway to reach the commitments they made through the Paris Agreement. “Not very likely” and “somewhat likely” got the most votes, with “not very likely” beating “somewhat likely” by less than 5 percent. Together, they make up 77% of the participants. “Likely” got more votes than “not likely at all”, while only 1.3% (meaning 25 people) saw it as very likely. In all, the participants did not seem overly optimistic that Norway would make the needed emission cuts in time. If the somewhat-option could swing both ways, then 86% said it is unlikely, while about 50% would believe it to be likely. Again, this is comparable to the Nature survey where researchers express their concern that the 1.5°C-target will not be met.

To what degree do you see it as necessary for the population to make individual lifestyle changes for Norway to meet the required emission cuts?




Graph 2: Distribution of answers to questions 2 in the NCP. N = 1972.

In question 2, about the need for individual lifestyle changes, “to some degree” was most voted for, with “to a large degree” coming in only 7% behind. 84% thinks individual lifestyle changes are necessary to a “somewhat”, “large” or “very large” degree. If the “to some degree” voters here share the same view as the “to some degree” from Spire, it indicates that they believe individual lifestyle changes as necessary, it just isn’t *the only* necessary thing. Again, if the “to some degree” could swing both ways, the side of those who supported lifestyle changes would be bigger, with 84% vs. 56% on the less supportive side. It is quite similar to what Langaas et.al., (2020) discover, where 67% of the population expressed a will to induce changes in their lives for the sake of the environment. Here, only 76 out of roughly 2000 people believed lifestyle changes were not needed at all.

As discussed in the methodology chapter, anyone who voted “to some degree” or higher would be considered to display a commitment to the environment, and an interest to protect it. Meaning they could fit in the category of environmental subjects (Agrawal, 2005). The question directly asked if people believe individual lifestyle changes are needed for us to cut emissions, and they answered yes, all though, to varying degrees. The 15,9% who answered small or not at all, will not be considered as full environmental subjects as they display no wish to help cut

emissions. Notwithstanding this, these data provide certainty that the theory of multiple environmentalities is applicable for this research.


Now, it is imperative to keep in mind that believing in a high degree of necessity of lifestyle changes does not always transfer into making these changes. Something the HOPE project discovered, when people were not willing to perform the actions that would yield the most emission reductions (Dubois et al., 2019). It relates back to the knowledge-deficit model on behaviour change where knowledge of the climate crisis and having an understanding that we need lifestyle changes does not necessarily incentivise the population into doing the right things (Schultz, 2010). As such, even if the majority sees the need for lifestyle and consumption changes, there is no saying that they would transform their own lives.



Graph 3: Distribution of answers to questions 3 in the NCP. N = 1952.

Moving on to the third question, regarding which actor is most significant for reducing emissions in Norway. Here, the clear winner is “the Norwegian government”, accumulating almost 64%, which adds up to 1247 people. Second place, “private businesses” comes in almost 40% behind. It was really no surprise that the government got the most support, as this coincides with research from, for instance, Gregersen & Selseng (2021). What is more surprising is the

very low rate of people who chose “Individual households” – less than 6%! It is clear that most participants do not consider it to be individual households’ responsibility to ensure we meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. “Civil society organisations” received even less percentage than that, as only 46 people voted for it. Actually, more people chose “Other actor” over organisations, it seems organisations just were not seen as important.



Graph 4: Distribution of answers to questions 4 in the NCP. N = 1952.

The last question concerned which approach people saw as most beneficial in creating lasting changes among the population that could cut emissions. To see the full articulation of questions and answer alternatives, please see Appendix for both original phrasing and the full questions in English.

After “the Norwegian government” had received an overwhelming number of votes in the last question, it is a little unexpected to see most people did not in fact go for the “environmental politics” in this one. Instead, almost half of the respondents chose “green economy”. With “environmental politics” of course being the second runner up, 20% behind. “Distributing information” was here picked more often than “behaviour change” and way more than Civil Society Organisations in the latter question. Additionally, more people chose the option of

relying on behaviour change than those who said that households are the most important actor in question 3. Still, the percentages remain low in both graphs, underlining that the participants mostly did not see it as an individual requirement alone to reduce national emissions. “Other approach” is roughly the same size as the “other actor” from the former question, which will be explained further in a later section.

5.2.1 Age as a determining factor

Already, there are some differences in the data from Spire and the NCP. Most strikingly, that in the survey 45% said a green economy would be beneficial in sustaining lifestyle changes, while only one person from Spire mentioned this as a possibility. Not only, the others said they truly did not trust the market. All from Spire said we need lifestyle changes to some degree or more, and so the degree of necessity is higher among them than the NCP respondents, where some answered small degree or not at all. What’s more, Spire was more pessimistic of our ability to reach the Paris Agreement commitments in time. Now, one can ask, “can't this variance simply be the result of age differences?”. As an example, previous data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel show to a trend where young people express a higher degree of worry for about the climate crisis than other age groups (Gregersen, 2022). The representatives from Spire were in a specific age group, namely 20-30 years old, while the NCP represents all ages. The possibility of an age discrepancy was examined by looking into the distribution of answers among participants in the NCP born after the year 1990. The Norwegian Citizen Panel asks all participants when they were born, divided into 10-year age groups. The group of people born after 1990 make up 9.7% of the total participants, and 6.8% of the group where this project’s questions were, ergo, 132 people.

The data from the younger NCP-group largely corresponds to the overall trends elaborated on above. Most still said it is “somewhat” or “not very” likely for us to reach the Paris Agreement target. Yet, there is an increase of about 3% in the “not likely at all” poll. Leaning more towards the opinions of the Spire-members, however, the shift is not statistically significant. As for the necessity for lifestyle changes, the polls for some and large degree go down by a few percentages, while the “small degree” go up by 5%. It seems the younger generation is less inclined to believe in the power of individual actions. The most important actor remains the Norwegian government, however, the support for private businesses increases by almost 8%. While the support for individual households goes down in this group, along with organisations. Moreover, the most convenient approach remains developing a green economy, collecting 50%

of the votes from people born after 1990. Similarly, “environmental politics” goes up by as much as 10%. Meaning that both “distributing information” as well “behaviour changes” goes down by quite a few percentages. Among those who voted government as the most important actor, there is almost a tie between “green economy” and “environmental politics” as the most important approach. While among those who chose private businesses, 58% also chose a green economy. Which, as will be shown below, is the same level as among the overall respondents. Apparently, the young people in this survey had a high level of trust in both the government and the market.


If members from Spire are represented in this data, this research’s findings suggest that they will be present among those who chose government and then politics. Concurring with Lubell (2002), who found a link between environmental activism and trust in government institutions, where people who believed the government had a great influence on the environment were more likely to participate in environmental organisations. The percentage of “government”-voters was slightly higher among the group of NCP participants born after 1990, which could be indicative of a higher percentage of environmental conscious people among the younger generation. However, in this same data, the support for a green economy went up, which again contrasts with Spire’s view of a sustainability transition. The data from the youngest age group does not differ significantly from the general trends in the NCP data, which means the same differences remain. For one, Spire-members had a larger distrust in market forces and private businesses. Furthermore, the younger generation from the NCP displayed a somewhat lesser interest in lifestyle changes than both the majority of NCP participants, as well as the Spire-members. They were also less likely to answer anything other than “the big two” in relation to actor and approach. Consequently, while age can have influenced how participants answered the questions, it appears that age alone is not enough to explain the variances between the Norwegian Citizen Panel and Spire data.

5.2.2 *Two-variable graphs*

Using cross tables in R-studio several two-variable graphs were made, detailing how certain answers were connected. Here, the alternatives in the graphs had to be shortened to prevent the text from overlapping and becoming undetectable. The full questions can be read in the Appendix. These graphs provide tons of interesting data that might not be all that relevant for the research questions. To avoid steering of path the focus will therefore be on the data that can help answer these questions.

The graphs include margins of error and a confidence interval. In addition to the graphs, regression models were done using the same variables, which showed to a 95% confidence level for all incidents. Confidence level is an indication of how likely a repeated study would be to yield the same results. A 95% rate is within the normal perimeters and suggests that if the Norwegian Citizen Panel were to send these questions again, the results would be very similar (Stock & Watson, 2014, p. 126). Margins of error (MOE) is the percentage within which the answers might differ when repeated (Stock & Watson, 2014, p. 127). Taking Graph 5 as an example, the minimum margin of error is 0.8 while the maximum is 19.8. Meaning that redoing the survey would produce results within these interval estimates 95% of the time. As one can see from the graphs, the margins of error are larger where the N is smaller, such as among those who voted “very likely” for question 1. This is because less data makes it harder to predict future outcomes.

The dependent variable in these graphs will be the X-variable and the independent will be Y-variable. Independent variables are the causes of change on the dependent variable, which will be the resulting effects (Gray, 2018, p. 139). Such as in Graph 5, where the answer to question 1 are affected by how people simultaneously answered question 2. The R^2 number tells the level of causality between the two variables. Ergo, how much changes in the dependent variable can be explained by the independent variable (Gray, 2018, p. 139). A R^2 number of 0.1 would mean full interconnection between the variables, while 0.0 means there are no real connection between the two. Graph 5 had a R^2 of 0.28, indicating a low correlation between X and Y. Accordingly, how people view the need for lifestyle changes does little to affect how they view Norway’s ability to meet the Paris Agreement target, in this case.



Graph 5: Connection in answers between question 1 and question 2.

Confidence level: 95%. Mean MOE = 5.99. R²: 0.28.


Despite the weak contingency between the questions, the combination in Graph 5 is helpful in gaining insights into how people imagine their own role within the sustainability transition. Most of the participants either chose individual lifestyle changes to be needed “to some degree” or “to a large degree”. Therefore, seeing that those two categories are the largest among four of the five degrees of likelihood of reaching the Paris Agreement in time, is almost expected. The most popular combination was that there is not a very good chance to reach the commitments, and that lifestyle changes are needed to some degree. Even though these are both pretty moderate answers, the mixture expresses that individuals will play at least some part in the transition, even if the transition is not especially likely to come about.

The higher people perceive the need for lifestyle changes to be, the more likely they think it is we will cut emissions in time. Strikingly, 44% of those who considered it very likely that we can reach the Paris commitments in time, simultaneously said that individual lifestyle changes are needed to a very large degree. In all, other than in those who voted for “not likely at all”, very few people said that lifestyle changes are not needed to any degree. E.g., only 4% thought

it was very likely that we will meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement without making any lifestyle or consumption changes.

Within the “not likely at all”, all the different degrees of necessity for lifestyle changes were at almost parallel levels. However, combined, 63% still said that lifestyle changes are needed to some degree of higher. This is reminiscent of one of the answers from Spire, saying that we need to change our ways, but it will not be enough to meet the emission cuts anyhow. The remaining 37% might consider it unnecessary for us to change our ways to meet environmental targets that we do not need to fulfil in the first place. This is based on the observation that the “not at all” alternative related to lifestyle changes was very low in all but the “not likely at all to meet the targets”-group.

In addition, looking at how people voted for actor and then likelihood of reaching the Paris Agreement target reveal that 49% of those who chose “government” still did not think Norway would reach the targets in time, as they either voted “not likely at all” or “not very likely”. Ergo, half of those who put they faint in the government to cut emissions did not actually trust that they would make it happen. Very similar to the answers several from Spire gave, saying that the government should be doing more to reduce national emission numbers. This finding is very interesting when put in the context of Norway’s progress towards emission reductions, which will be done in the discussion.



Graph 6: Connection in answers between questions 2 and questions 3.


Confidence level: 95%. Mean MOE = 3.91. R²: 0.47.

In this second two-variable graph, one can see how people initially voted for the need for individual lifestyle changes, and then for which actor is the most vital. The Norwegian government it still the largest poll, with private businesses coming second, in all but one category. As they were the biggest overall, it is not surprising. Even those who strongly believe in individual lifestyle changes did not think that households are the primary actor to ensure we meet our commitments from the Paris Accord. However, it is notable that the higher the need for lifestyle changes, the more people seemed to vote for individual households. Culminating in the highest vote under “very large degree”, with 11%.

Another interesting trend is that the lesser perceived degree of necessity of lifestyle changes, the less did people vote for the government, and more for private businesses. This combination is indicative that people think private businesses investing in green technology is going to take the load of off individuals, entailing that we would not need environmental politics or lifestyle changes. As stated earlier, those belonging to the lower end of the degree-scale will not be considered environmental subjects, as the necessity to help the environment through individual action is lacking. This thought is enforced when seeing the connection to private businesses. Recognisably, this trend also goes the other way; the higher perceived degree of necessity of

lifestyle changes, the more did people vote for the government and less for private businesses. Meaning that governmental steering is not understood as taking the entire load of individuals. More likely, just as was told by people from Spire, the state is meant to guide the population into making environmental choices. Furthermore, the sequence can be explained by one fisher from Southland, New Zealand, who took personal responsibility to not decrease the Whitebait stock, but maintained that the actual responsibility to ensure such sustainability was on the government (Haggerty, 2007).

The black sheep here is those who voted “Not at all”, as they mostly voted for “other”. This pattern is worth devoting some time analysing, as it also comes up later. For instance, 50% of those who voted “other actor” simultaneously voted for “other approach” in question 4. Similarly, of those who voted “not at all” in question 2, the majority of them, 43%, also picked “other approach” in question 4. In all, 29 people voted “not at all” in question 2, “other actors” in question 3, and “other approach” for question 4. These combinations are demonstrative of participants who do not think we need lifestyle changes or emission reductions by any measures. Possibly, some of them are people who just tried to discard the questions, while others might disagree that we need a sustainability transition altogether.




Graph 7: Connection in answers between question 2 and question 4. Confidence level: 95%. Mean MOE = 4.62. R²: 0.46.

Graph 7 provides the overview of how participants voted for the necessity of lifestyle changes, and then which approach is the most convenient. The alternative of developing a green economy was largest overall, also in the two biggest degree-categories: some and large degree. It does, however, drop quite a bit under “not at all”. Indicating that those who see individual lifestyle changes as needed to any degree, agree that a green economy can be helpful in that manner. Only in the “very large degree” was “environmental politics” mostly selected. However, closely followed by “green economy”. The support for politics increases the more people see the need for lifestyle changes, concurring with the pattern from graph 6, among those who voted for the government. Resembling how some of the Spire-members took responsibility for their environmental behaviour pending more political steering.

“Information” received on average 13% of the votes, averaging the same percentage as “behaviour”. However, “behaviour” was lower in the three higher degrees. Implying that people who do believe in the necessity of lifestyle changes were more positive to getting the truth out, hoping that will make people change their ways, other than simply making people feel responsible for their own actions. Despite the knowledge-deficit model telling us that this information stocked approach is in vain, there are examples where it did make advances. Such as in Auckland, where restrictive water consumption was encouraged through information campaigns, and according to García et.al. (2020), succeeded in transforming the population into environmental subjects. People might hope this approach still has something to it, and that all the barking has not, in fact, been done up the wrong tree, as O’Brien (2013) feared.

Intriguingly, it is within the “not at all” the highest value for “behaviour” can be found, with 25%! Furthermore, the second highest poll for “behaviour” is within the “small degree” group. Ergo, those who did not think individual lifestyle changes are very important, still think encouraging behaviour control is the most convenient way to ensure a change in lifestyle and consumption patterns among the Norwegian population. Perhaps the question and alternatives were confusing to the participants. Or, more likely, people did not care which alternatives they chose, they just wanted to move on with the questions. These percentages do, after all, not add up to a lot of people, but the data does make for a puzzling read.



Graph 8: Connection in answers between question 3 and question 4.

Confidence level: 95%. Mean MOE = 6.01. R²: 0.34.

This graph shows the connection between most important actor and most important approach. Developing a green economy is the largest poll in three out of the five. Even among those who voted the government as the most important actor, a green economy was appreciated as a sensible way of ensuring a sustainability transition. Ergo, the state is responsible for the transition, and the transition is ensured by making it easier to consume environmentality friendly. At least according to 536 participants – over ¼ of the respondents. That fact that question 4 included the phrasing “governmental approach” amplifies this understanding. This combination can be traced back to both sovereign and neoliberal environmentality, where economic incentives initiated by the government will help save the environment. The Payments for Ecosystem Services in Wales, which farmers into environmental subjects who helped conserved land areas, is an example of this.

Furthermore, as hinted at before, the green economy-alternative gained 58% of the votes among those who chose “private businesses”. Here it seems people want for a green economy that is not completely ruled by the government. This could line up to a more typical economic environmentality where investing in green industries will shift the market, making green alternatives the most prominent arena for individual action (Fletcher, 2010). As such,

individuals will choose environmental friendliness because it pays off, and hence, their conduct is shaped through economic means. The reasoning being that even those who do not care about the environment might change their consumption habits because it becomes more convenient (Fletcher, 2010). As Graph 8 further shows, in the “household” group, 31% of people voted a green economy as the most convenient governmental approach. Ergo, people are the most important entity to change, but the economy needs to be developed in such a way to make it easier for people to change. Again, evident of a neoliberal environmentalism, but this time mixed with disciplinary tendencies.

The “politics”-alternative gained the highest percentage among those who voted the government as the essential actor for emission cuts, accumulating 34% and making up 423 participants. This is a clearer form of sovereign governmentality, wanting and expecting the government to take the lead through regulatory politics. This was the most prominent form among the Spire respondents, who wanted individual behaviours to be shaped by governmental actions. Even though this was not the most popular combination in the NCP, it nonetheless discloses that people in Norway trust and depend on the government to show the way. The reluctance of electing “environmental politics” might stem from a fear of coercion or punishment. For instance, if the measures relating to those proposed in the Absolute Zero Report were to be imposed in Norway, it would affect people’s lives immensely. Other, quite extreme examples of governmental control in the name of the environment have been researched by, among others, Agrawal (2005) and Bluwstein (2017).

Environmental politics did also gain some traction among “organisations”. The connection to civil society organisations is understandable if people think organisations can affect the political agenda and help form new politics, such as people from Spire proclaimed. New regulations should be built on the truth, such as information from environmental frameworks like the UNFCCC, which has been deemed by the masses as one of the most reliable sources of information there is on the subject (Machaqueiro, 2020). Civil Society Organisation can work as a bridge between this knowledge and decision-making processes. In the same way, organisations can play a part in creating a green economy that makes consuming green easy and affordable. This might be the idea that 57% of the “organisations”-choosers had when they voted this way. These combinations can all be indicative of environmentalism according to truth, either with a sovereign or neoliberal leaning.

Among those who elected households as the most important entity, the majority, 46%, also selected “behaviour” in question 4. Which is by far the highest level for behaviour in this graph. The combination really puts an emphasis on individual responsibility. However, it is important to keep in mind that this percentage only accounts for 51 people. It was not a very popular combination. Moreover, flipping the graph, out of the people who chose “behaviour” in question 4, only about 28% also said that individual households were the most important. Most of them still meant the government was more vital in ensuring emission cuts. Comparing this data to the question of necessity of lifestyle changes, out of those who voted “behaviour” in question 4, 66% voted lifestyle changes to be necessary to some, to a large or to a very large degree in question 2.

Even more striking, of those who claimed individual households as the most important actor in question 3, 90% voted that lifestyle changes are needed to some, to a large or to a very large degree. The “to a large degree” included as much as 41% of the votes from the “household” group. This is indicative of a disciplinary environmentality, putting the responsibility on individuals. Such as the aquarium in California that tried to persuade visitors into consuming sustainable seafood as a way to save the ocean (Lloro-Bidart, 2017). Still, stressing that this sequence did not account for a large amount of people. The number of people who chose individual households, encouraging behaviour control and a somewhat or larger need for lifestyle changes adds up to 122 people. Equalling 6.2% of the total respondents. It is among them the strongest hints of a disciplinary mindset can be found.

The highest value for R^2 , and hence correlation between the dependent and independent variable was found in Graphs 6 and 7. In both, almost half of the variations in question 2 can be explained by how people would answer question 3 or 4, respectively. Consequently, there should be a relation between how people view the need for lifestyle changes, and who they think is responsible for the sustainability transition, and how it should come about. Exemplified by how people who saw a higher degree of lifestyle changes as necessary were typically more likely to vote for “government” or “politics” while those on the other end of the scale chose more “private businesses” and “green economy”. The last graph, however, showcased that which actor people vote for is only a moderate indicator of how they want the transition to start, when the R^2 was at 0.34. The lack of coherency can be explained by the fact that “government” got over 60% of the votes, while the answers in question 4 were more divided.

5.2.3 *Environmentality of the Norwegian state*

As has been emphasised throughout this thesis, discourses shape people's knowledge and consequently their answers to the survey. In that sense, it is reasonable to look at one of the possible origins of such discourses. Though those who answered the NCP survey will have lived different lives and been influenced by different things, as Norwegian Citizens they have likely been through the same education system, which according to Kivinen & Rinne (1998) is a significant arena for socialisation. At the end of the day, the Norwegian state is responsible for shaping the education system, and the combination of parties in government will affect what and how pupils learn. A more neoliberal government will proliferate neoliberal attitudes in schools, such as preparing children for a labour market where your value is measured in how much you produce and earn (Kivinen & Rinne, 1998, p. 42) Members of Spire will also have gone through this socialisation process, but as earlier discussed, they have found a new source of information in later years, which showed to have influenced their answers. There are of course internal differences in the NCP-data as well, but considering how 60% voted the government as the most significant actor, it is worth looking into how the government presents the path to a low-emissions society, as that will be essential for how the population themselves understand it.

Where there is little political will to halt the oil industry, there is a remarkable focus on turning the platforms "green" by running them on renewable energy (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021)). Greenwashing is prevalent in the industry, attempting to sell the image that green platforms produce green oil. Electrifying platforms will cut down on the 28% of production-based emissions the platforms are responsible for (Miljøstatus, 2021), but none of the emissions associated with transporting and burning oil or gas. Moreover, Norway's climate strategy for 2021-2030, as well as *Klimakur*, places a tremendous amount of trust in new technologies and financial solutions. For instance, electrifying vehicles are expected to limit emission from fossil fuel cars, busses and ferries, and road tolls are meant to decrease the prevalence of personal cars (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021)). *Klimakur* also goes on about biofuels and CCS, e.g., Langskip, Norway's Carbon Capture and Storage adventure (Meld.St.33, (2019-2020))). This would come in addition to financial methods of emission reductions, such as state investments in REDD+ or involvement in the EU trading scheme.

The government's praise of techno-economic solutions can proliferate a neoliberal mindset among the population through legislations and political statements. Resembling how

Machaqueiro (2020) explained that carbon markets such as REDD+ and the EU trading scheme frame the climate crisis as a technical problem that can be solved with fiscal means. The governmental focus on fees and taxes can influence the population to thinking that this is the most convenient way to make people act environmentally and justify why the population in Norway sees green consumption as a way out of the climate crisis. E.g., how in the transportation sector, emission cuts are personalised and redirected to the economic sphere, saying that road tolls and gas prices will regulate human conduct. Still, the process is state led, when authorities remain in charge of the mechanisms which are meant to alter individual behaviour and ultimately reduce emissions. Further supporting the idea that the government is the most vital actor for ensuring emission cuts.

Additionally, the strong connection between governmental control and a green economy that has been evident in this data could be understood by referring back to the concept of neoliberalisation from Springer (2010). Whereas the process of neoliberalism in Norway would be shaped by the historically strong, Scandinavian state and state-led economy (Kivinen & Rinne, 1998). Hence, in times of upheaval, such as during a sustainability transition, the population will turn to the state for guidance. This also happened during the COVID-19 pandemic in Norway. In a survey from Opinion, done in 2021, 37% of the 15 000 participants said they wanted the government to implement equally strong measures to fight climate change as they had done to fight COVID-19 (Opinion, 2021). Transferred to this research, it conveys that even if the participants do believe in changes coming through a green economy, which the data suggests, they still rely on the government to control the economy.

6. Discussion

To recapitulate, the biggest answer-categories were not very and somewhat likely for question 1, to some and to a large degree in question 2, government in question 3, and green economy for question 4. These answers received quite a lot more votes than the next ones in line and looking into age differences within the data displayed only slight modifications. Therefore, it is not likely that the answers would have changed drastically if other people than the ones who did, had participated in the Citizen Panel survey. Further signified by the confidence level of 95%. Differences between the Citizen Panel data and the Spire interviews have been accounted for, and the same disparities prospered between the Spire answers and the NCP data from the age groups born after 1990. Therefore, the conclusion is that the differences cannot be explained

by age alone, rather, young people from Spire understand the sustainability transition differently than general NCP-participants. Though the Spire sample is very small to compare with the NCP, it has a distinct pattern and when looking at their webpage, it is clear that the ideas are representative for the organisation. In this way, interviewing more people might have yielded similar answers. In essence, despite the methodological differences, paralleling the data from the NCP and Spire has provided clear and reliable results.

6.1 Answering the research questions

It is important to accentuate that among the participants there are different perspectives on how the sustainability transition should be achieved, and how much responsibility is given to individuals. While most people from the NCP were certain that the government had the biggest responsibility to ensure emission cuts, the route to cutting individual emissions was more ambiguous. Remarkably, the support for governmental steering and environmental politics increased concurrently with perceived degree of necessity of lifestyle changes. Flipping the graphs further shows that those who voted for “government” and “politics” mostly believed lifestyle changes are needed to some or to a large degree. These findings match with the data from several Spire-participants, who expressed a high need for lifestyle changes and mostly stressed the combination of government and environmental politics. The connection can be explained by how Lubell (2002) discovered that a trust in the political system is linked to environmental care and participation in an environmental organisation.

On the other end, those who showed less support for lifestyle changes were more connected to the option of “private businesses” and less so to “government” in Graph 6. They also voted less for “politics”, as Graph 7 shows. From this it can be drawn that people who believe in lifestyle changes simultaneously believe in political changes, and that both are needed in the sustainability transition. Moreover, people who voted for either “government” or “politics” are statistically more likely to care for the environment. While those who are negative to political changes are more likely to be negative towards individual lifestyle changes as well. In the data from the group of NCP-participants born after 1990 the percentage for both “government” and “politics” went slightly up, which, based on this reasoning, could mean that they have a higher level of environmental concern. However, the variance from the general NCP-trends was not big enough to conclude whether it is the result of age differences alone. Overall, these findings do entail that people conceive structural changes to have consequences for individual lifestyles.

Predominantly, the data received through the Norwegian Citizen Panel makes it apparent that people in Norway envision the sustainability transition to come about with the help of the state. Over 80% saw lifestyle changes as needed to either some or a larger extent, but it seems this is not the primary way to cut emissions, made clear by the just under 6% who chose individual households as the most important actor. According to 60% of the respondents, the state still bears the responsibility, and they display a considerable amount of trust in authorities, typical of Scandinavian countries (Kivinen & Rinne, 1998). When lifestyle changes are needed, they should mostly come through a green economy that eases people's opportunity to consume environmental friendliness. In this way, the role of the individual is to make green, economic choices and limit pollution through their actions. However, while most people believed we need lifestyle changes to cut emissions, they simultaneously answered that it is not very likely for Norway to reach the targets of the Paris Agreement. This implies that people see a sustainability transition as needed, but they are unsure that it will come in time for 2030.

There are both similarities and differences between the NCP and the people from the environmental organisation. Spire members likewise said that we will most likely not reach the Paris Accord targets in time. Furthermore, they too believed in the necessity of lifestyle changes, even to a slightly higher degree than average. But where the majority of the NCP-participants voted a green economy as important, Spire-member would for the most part deny this option. They saw environmental politics, that could control behaviour through prohibitions, taxes and subsidies, as a better option. Here the role of the individual is to follow governmental restrictions and change their behaviour in an appropriate manner. Leading to the vital thing the two data collections have in common: the Norwegian government as the most significant actor. Individuals have a place in the sustainability transition, but the state remains essential in ensuring emission cuts, no matter if that is through creating new politics, initiating a green economy, distributing information, or encouraging restrictive citizen behaviour.

The findings made through the Norwegian Citizen Panel survey are based off data from a subsection of the Norwegian population and can therefore be seen to represent a trend among the population. The spire data does not have the same generalisability; however, the data serves as a reminder that large data collections have internal differences. Further, the discrepancies between the two data collections can indicate that people who participate in environmental organisations understand Norway's sustainability transition, and their role within in, slightly different than the general public.

6.2 Which environmentalism is the most prominent among the respondents?

An environmentalism can only be claimed to be present if the individual displays a commitment to the environment and an interest to preserve it. In this research, this will be people who responded that we need lifestyle changes to a somewhat, a large, or a very large degree. Meaning 84% of the Citizen Panel respondents and all of the Spire respondents. These participants are considered to be environmental subjects because they express a will to preserve the environment through their actions. Whether or not they would really do so, is, as previously emphasised, outside the scope of this research. Nonetheless, these figures implicate that the theory of multiple environmentalisms is applicable in Norway.

As demonstrated in the analysis chapter, looking at the data in different ways can make it fit into several of the different forms of environmentalism. In fact, all the four categories are represented to a bigger or lesser degree. Nonetheless, the most prominent form of environmentalism to be found among the NCP-participants was a mix of sovereign and neoliberal. The combination that represents most of the respondents are lifestyle changes as needed to some degree, government as most vital actor and a green economy allowing people to consume environmentalism friendly as the most effective way to change individual behaviour and create emission cuts. The Norwegian government supplements this view by appointing themselves as the most vital actor in Norway's sustainability transition. Though there are only a few examples of the government proposing to adjust individual lifestyles, the ones that do include altering the structures within which individuals make choices, such as subsidising electric vehicles for personal use (Meld.St.13, (2020-2021)). Implying that economic ideas have been proliferated into other societal arenas, while still letting the state maintain its role as moderator. In this way the process of neoliberalisation has adapted to the Norwegian context (Springer, 2010), and is similar to how neoliberalisation played out in Sweden (Larsson et al., 2012).

Whereas for the Spire representatives, they displayed an even greater level of sovereign environmentalism, when the majority put their faith in the government and new politics. One person chose Civil Society Organisations as more important, because they did not fully trust the government to do their job. Another person said individual households could do more because our lifestyles are causing a great share of national emissions. Still, they both maintained that the state must be involved in the transition. And in different ways, the Spire-participants all agreed that the pathway to sustainability should be led by the government and ultimately shape individual conduct through both encouragements and prohibitions.

As discussed, the NCP-data is more likely to be representative for the population than the Spire-interview. Both data sets revealed a high level of state dependency, but the Norwegian Citizen Panel participants also displayed neoliberal tendencies in their will to initiate lifestyle changes by encouraging individuals to consume environmentally friendly. On this basis it can be postulated that the most prominent environmentality among the respondents of this research is sovereign, mixed with neoliberal. This specific combination must be understood in collaboration with the concept of contextual embedded neoliberalism and highlights the importance of utilising a theory in places where it rarely has been applied. The framework of multiple environmentalities has been adapted to the particular Norwegian context in recognising the strong, Scandinavian state that applies economic measures to shape individual conduct, but still maintains their vital role.

Nevertheless, not all responses fit within this category. For one, what about those who cannot be claimed to be environmental subjects to the same degree? 16% of the respondents did not acknowledge the need for individual lifestyle changes. They either displayed a higher level of trust in the market and private businesses or they were overrepresented in the “other” options. Refusing to bow down to governmental power entails resisting not only the idea of having to alternate your lifestyle, but just as well the power that tries to shape you. In this case, it means that not everyone in Norway would choose to consume environmentality friendly or follow governmental restrictions for the sake of the environment, to the same extent. And so, if the intention of government is to make the population into environmental subjects, it has not fulfilled its intension, as there are differences in subject formations within the Norwegian population (Agrawal, 2005). Though this would be a deviation from the intention of government, it does not mean that government does not operate among other people in Norway. As Rutherford (2007) proclaimed, government is not unfragmented, and internal differences does not mean it has failed. It is important to take in the whole picture, and not only look for what government intends to produce, but also how it plays out in reality.

Another interesting find were the two of the interviewees who expressed their doubts that the necessary changes will come within the system we currently have. Rather, they said we need to build a whole new system from the ground up. One that is not built on exploitation of people and planet, but which teaches us to live in harmony with others and nature instead. While these attitudes may have been adopted from the participants’ time in Spire, the organisation’s webpage mentions nothing of the sort. This conviction further breaches with the other

participants' statements, which all advocated for a modification of the system, and not for disregarding the system itself. Though the two wanted a new system, it was argued that the state had the responsibility of ensuring this transition. The declarations of wanting the state to ensure a different world can be interpreted as a form of counter-conduct, where subjects wish to be governed differently, towards other objectives (Kelly, 2020). The ideas can further be recognised in Deep Ecology movements, which are developed from the philosophies of Arne Næss, where nature has intrinsic value, and mainstream approaches to environmentalism are too shallow to make a difference (Taylor, 2001).

6.3 Towards a low-emissions society, or a future age of mass emissions?

So far, Norway has cut 4.2% of the 40% they are supposed to by 2030. The lack of reductions in national emission figures are compensated for through the European Union Emission Trading Scheme and by supporting REDD+ (Meld.St.41, (2016-2017)). Benjaminsen & Svarstad (2021) elaborate that financing climate cuts in other parts of the world is an important part of the Norwegian self-image. Supporting this policy has “ [...] made it possible for the government to present Norway internationally as well as to its own citizens as a leader in climate mitigation, while at the same time maintaining a high level of fossil fuel production” (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2021, p. 150). The previous discussion of the Norwegian oil and gas industry supports the idea that the Norwegian state still lives in this fantasy, where an ever-expanding oil business has a place in the sustainability transition, as long as it is electrified. However, this research data challenges the notion that the population is uncritical to Norwegian environmental policies, when 48% of the NCP-respondents and 6 out of the 7 Spire interviewees did not believe that we would meet the required emission cuts in time.

As well as being sceptical to Norway's progress, the population seemed ready for the government to implement more environmental measures. The Spire-participants said so themselves, and out of the 84% of the NCPs who believed lifestyle changes to be necessary in cutting emissions, most of them voted the government as responsible for ensuring the right changes in society. Indicating that governmental responsibility does not excludes individual action. These findings are further collaborated by the earlier mentioned survey from Opinion (2021). But if the government is dependable for ensuring the right path, and does not deliver, how would lifestyle changes come about? The Spire data details that some people are already starting to make environmental choices in their life, despite the lack of governmental steering. In fact, conscious consumption, i.e., supporting sustainably labelled brands and boycotting

harmful ones, is a rising trend among environmental activists all over the western world (Willis & Schor, 2012).

No less, despite the conscious consumption trend, research from the HOPE project bears the unfortunate news that such initiatives will not be enough on its own to cut 40% of emissions by 2030 (Dubois et al., 2019). For one, because people mostly implement ineffective measures. Measures which Preston (2012) might categorise as reformist as they are not detrimental to business as usual. Based on answers from the Spire interviews, part of this might be because an environmental lifestyle is more time-consuming, more expensive and requires more knowledge than living in accordance with the status quo. As such, the choice of not living environmentally is constrained by the social context people live in, and sometimes, might not even be a choice at all (Schultz, 2010). A second aspect of this is that structural decisions made by the government, regarding for example infrastructure and energy sources, are responsible for a larger share of emissions than individual choices (Miljøstatus, 2021). No matter how many people chose to take the bus over their personal car, it will not matter if the bus still runs on non-renewable fuel.

Consequently, large-scale transformations will result in greater emission reliefs, such as phasing out the oil and gas industry. It could appear that Norway has all the knowledge of why shutting down the oil industry is important for the world's progression towards the 1.5°C target, but the state does not fully act on it. The knowledge-deficit model on behaviour change can therefore be applied to say that more information is not likely to make the state change their ways (Schultz, 2010). Instead, normative feedback can be utilised, such as looking to Denmark, who has already set out to end their oil extraction (Hovland, 2021). Suggesting that if Norway does not initiate the transition soon, we could miss out on a large potential market for renewable energy.

Notwithstanding this, moving away from oil and gas might be easier said than done. The data from this research implies that the state is considered the superior institution in Norway, supposedly able to make any adjustments necessary (Ferguson & Gupta, 2002). But, just as there are limits to an individual's act of resistance, so too are there limits to a nation-state's autonomy, because states do not operate in a vacuum. One concern is that ending Norwegian oil will only increase the dependency on oil from other countries, perhaps places that does not have "green" and conflict-free oil, like Norway. On the other hand, Norway's reluctance to end

their oil and gas industry might raise the bar for other oil nations that have less resources and potential than Norway to do the same. In any way, Norwegian decisions might have geopolitical consequences and the state is not simply free to make any adjustments they want.

While the latest IPCC report maintains that there still is time to reach the 1.5°C target, and possibly arrive at the Sustainability (SSP1) or the Middle of the Road (SSP2) pathway, time is running out, and current trends do not leave much optimism, when no country has policies that are considered compatible with the Paris Agreement target (Climate Action Tracker, 2022a). Norway's current trajectory is overall insufficient to align with the Paris Agreement commitments, however, the domestic target of reducing emissions by 50-55% is defined to be "almost sufficient" if met by 2030 (Climate Action Tracker, 2021). Nonetheless, the Climate Action Tracker operates with a fair share target, in accordance with the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities from the Paris Agreement, and incorporating this component leaves Norway's progress at an insufficient level (Climate Action Tracker, 2022b). Instead of leading the world toward the 1.5°C target, should all countries follow Norway's approach, we would be heading towards a 3°C increase above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century. Taking this back to the Shared Socio-Economic Pathways framework, a warming of 3°C is associated with the Regional Rivalry pathway (SSP3). A fate dominated by conflicts, inequality and continued environmental degradation, causing difficulties for both mitigation efforts and adaption possibilities (O'Neill et al., 2017).

7. Conclusion

The aim of this research project was to gain an understanding of how the Norwegian population envisions the path to sustainability. Based on data derived from the Norwegian Citizen Panel and additional interviews this thesis concludes that people in Norway for the most part believe the responsibility of initiating a sustainability transition falls on the government. People typically see lifestyle and consumption changes as needed to cut emission to a certain degree, albeit very few pointed to households as the most important entity for emission cuts. Predominantly, the respondents answered that the best way to initiate and sustain lifestyle changes would be through developing a green economy that makes it easier to consume environmentally friendly. At the same time, there are prevalent doubts as to whether Norway will be able to reach the commitments made through the Paris Agreement by 2030. And so, it would seem not everyone is certain that a sustainability transition will come about in time.

This research contributes to the literature by applying the framework of multiple environmentalities in Norway, as a part of the Global North region, with a focus on relating the theory to behaviour and consumption. By adapting the theory to a Norwegian context, which has an historically strong state, it was proclaimed that the data from the survey and the interviews indicates that the most prominent form of environmentality among Norwegian citizens is sovereign and neoliberal. The environmentalists from Spire had a general distrust in the capitalist market, while among the NCP, a greater part of the participants believed economic measures would bring about lifestyle changes. The largest commonality between and within each data set was the emphasis on the Norwegian government as the most significant actor in ensuring emission cuts. This characteristic has been tied to literature exploring the prominent role of the state in Scandinavian countries and how it influences the process of neoliberalisation.

Both between and within the two data collections, people answered the question about need for lifestyle changes to varying degrees. Which could be indicative of a difference in subject formation among the Norwegian population, whereas not everyone has been subdued to the same extent. While there exists previous research on differences in subject formation in other settings, looking into which factors determine whether and to what extent people in Norway are supportive of individual lifestyle changes to cut emissions would be an interesting arena for further research.

This thesis has proclaimed that most of the respondents see a sustainability transition as necessary and are ready for the state to take action on environmental matters even when it would require individual lifestyle changes. While individual actions can only go so far in reducing emissions, the population's motivation to make changes is essential to the larger transition that is needed for Norway to reach the commitments they made through the Paris Agreement. Even though there are structural challenges to a sustainability transition, it is vital for Norway to heighten the progress of emission reductions, so they can play their part in ensuring that global temperature rise stays below 1.5°C.

Notes

¹ Some of the data applied in the analysis of this thesis are based on Norwegian Citizen Panel Wave 22, 2021. The survey was financed by the University of Bergen (UiB). The data are provided by UiB, prepared and made available by Ideas2Evidence, and distributed by Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD). Neither UiB, I2E nor NSD are responsible for the analyses and interpretations of the data presented here.

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Appendix

Norwegian Citizen Panel Questions – original phrasings

Spørsmål 1:

Gjennom Parisavtalen fra 2015 har Norge forpliktet seg til å kutte 40% av nasjonale utslipp innen 2030, sammenlignet med utslippsnivået i 1990. Hvor sannsynlig mener du det er at Norge oppnår dette målet i tide?

- Svært sannsynlig
- Sannsynlig
- Noe sannsynlig
- Lite sannsynlig
- Ikke sannsynlig i det hele tatt

Spørsmål 2:

Det blir stadig diskutert hvem som har størst ansvar for å sikre at vi når klimaforpliktelsene fra Parisavtalen. Myndigheter og næringsliv trekkes ofte frem, men også enkeltpersoner kan hevdes å ha et ansvar. I hvor stor grad anser du det som nødvendig at befolkningen foretar individuelle livsstilsendringer for at Norge skal oppnå de vedtatte utslippskuttene?

- I svært stor grad
- I stor grad
- I noen grad
- I liten grad
- Ikke i det hele tatt

Spørsmål 3:

Å imøtekomme forpliktelsene fra Parisavtalen vil antageligvis kreve innsats og samarbeid fra flere parter i samfunnet. Dersom du skulle peke ut én, hvilken aktør anser du som mest sentral i arbeidet for å få ned utslipp i Norge?

- Norske myndigheter, gjennom regulerende politikk
- Det private næringslivet, ved å investere i grønn energi og næring
- Interesseorganisasjoner, som kan påvirke den politiske agendaen
- Individuelle husholdninger, ved å få ned eget forbruk

- Annen aktør

Spørsmål 4:

Dersom den norske befolkningen skal endre livsstil og forbruksvaner, hvilken statlig tilnærming anser du som mest hensiktsmessig for å skape varige endringer?

- Folkeopplysning som sprer kunnskap om konsekvensene av klimaendringer og mulige løsninger
- Å utarbeide en grønn økonomi som gjør det lettere å forbruke miljøvennlig
- Å innføre nasjonal politikk som regulerer forurensende oppførsel ved f.eks. forbud, skatter, støtteordninger, osv.
- Å oppfordre befolkningen til å ta ansvar for egne miljørelaterte handlinger
- Annen tilnærming

Norwegian Citizen Panel questions translated to English

Question 1:

Through the Paris Agreement from 2015 Norway has committed to reducing national emissions by 40% by 2030, compared to the emission levels from 1990. How likely do you think it is for Norway to reach these commitments in time?

- Very likely
- Likely
- Somewhat likely
- Not very likely
- Not likely at all

Question 2:

There are ongoing debates about who has the biggest responsibility to make sure we meet the requirements of the Paris Agreement. Government and businesses are often mentioned, however, it can also be argued that individual citizens have a responsibility. To what degree do you consider it as necessary for the population to make individual lifestyle changes for Norway to meet the required emission cuts?

- To a very large degree

- To a large degree
- To some degree
- To a small degree
- Not at all

Question 3:

Meeting the requirements of the Paris Agreement will most likely require efforts and collaboration from several actors in society. If you could only point to one, which actor do you consider the most significant in ensuring emission cuts in Norway?

- The Norwegian government, through regulatory politics
- Private businesses, by investing in green energy and industries
- Civil Society Organisations, who can affect the political agenda
- Individual households, by reducing consumption
- Another actor

Question 4:

If the Norwegian population was to change their lifestyles and consumption patterns, which governmental approach do you see as the most convenient in creating lasting changes?

- Distributing information about the climate crisis and possible remedies
- Developing a green economy that makes it easier to consume environmentally friendly
- New environmental politics that can regulate polluting behaviours using prohibition, taxes, subsidies, etc.
- Encouraging the population to control their own environmental behaviour
- Another approach