Historical Institutions, Ideological Contestation, and International Pressures for Reform

Exploring Higher Education Governance in Turkey

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Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor (PhD)
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Abbreviations

BP	Bologna Process
CHE	Council of Higher Education
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress
DP	Democrat Party
EHEA	European Higher Education Area
EUA	European University Association
JDP	Justice and Development Party
JP	Justice Party
METU	Middle East Technical University
NPM	New Public Management
NSC	National Security Council
NUC	National Unity Committee
RPP	Republican People's Party
STO	State Planning Organization
QA	Quality Assurance
TAF	Turkish Armed Forces
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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Abstract

Higher education systems and institutions worldwide are currently subjected to structural and policy reforms, which have sparked social scientific interest in analyzing reform processes in this specific policy sector. Country case studies have been a mainstay of higher education policy research, contributing to the emergence of a significant body of knowledge providing insight into national specificities playing out in reform processes.

Located within the country case study tradition in higher education studies, this dissertation analyzes policy changes specific to higher education governance arrangements at both systemic and institutional levels from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey (1923) to the present. It places particular focus on the causes and outcomes of higher education reforms along with the mechanisms linking the two.

The study utilizes historical institutionalism as an overarching theoretical perspective guiding the analysis. It also benefits from the certain insights of ideational and sociological institutionalism in explaining policy change. Process-tracing as a specific within-case method is deployed to explain how and through which mechanisms policy outcomes occurred. It draws upon a wide range of primary and secondary sources to provide a vivid description and craft a plausible explanation of policy change in the policy sector.

Overall, the study contributes to the empirical understanding of higher education policy in Turkey. It explains the causes and outcomes of change, identifies actor constellations in decision-making, and sheds light on the historical trajectory of higher education governance in the country. Theoretically, the study contributes to our understanding of policymaking dynamics in higher education by bringing relatively understudied phenomena into the forefront, such as the role of the military in the higher education policy reforms or the politics of university reforms under authoritarian single-party rules.

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CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

Setting the Stage: Rationale, Purpose, and Research Questions

Turkish higher education has recently been in the limelight in regard to academic freedom and institutional autonomy predicaments, probably more than any other aspect of it. In international and comparative research, the country achieved notoriety as being a typical case of how and to what extent populist and authoritarian governments restrict academic freedoms within universities and seek control of higher education institutions, along with a bunch of countries such as Hungary, Poland, Philippines, Venezuela, Egypt, Russia, and some others (see Douglass, 2021). This mostly stems from two government actions that took place in 2016. The first was the reaction to a public petition signed in January 2016 by more than a thousand academics, who dubbed themselves Academics for Peace, calling for the government to end its military action in south-eastern Anatolia. Many signatories faced some kind of punishment, including dismissal and suspension from their positions.[1] The second came after the failed coup attempt in July 2016. In the aftermath of the event, the government declared a state of emergency and vowed to root out followers and sympathizers of US-based retired Islamic cleric named Gülen, who is accused of being the mastermind of the putsch attempt, from the public sector. Private universities alleged ties to his cult, designated as a terrorist organization, were shut down, and academics who have been reputed to be Gülenists have been purged.

As an early-career researcher who started to study higher education policy in Turkey at the time, I had an opportunity to make firsthand observations concerning how such events have affected the academic community, how have they have been discussed, or how such events have brought academia into a public spotlight as a matter of political contestation. Politicians, media pundits, public intellectuals, columnists, academics, so-called opinion leaders, and others have discussed these matters in the heat of the moment. The public discussion was mostly framed based

[1] In November 2019, the Constitutional Court found convictions in violation of the right to freedom to express opinions, and then many of the signatories were acquitted of charges. As shown in the chapters below, the Constitutional Court has several times played crucial roles in arbitrating between the government and academics.

on political expediency or national security rather than purely academic values and considerations. Given the large-scale operation of the security forces against the ethnically-motivated separatist insurgency, the attempted coup, and the state of emergency measures, it would have been naive to expect otherwise. Some, including academics, supported the government's measure to punish the aforementioned group of academics as they either insulted security organizations and acted or expressed opinions that might be harmful in terms of national security. Others approached the issue from an academic/individual freedoms perspective and underlined that these people should not be purged based on national security considerations. The public discussion was sometimes obnoxious. Some media commentators were even provoking the public opinion further by labeling certain academics as Gülenists, terror-symphathizers, putschists, or traitors.

These two events also triggered a scholarly discussion on the situation of academic freedom and institutional autonomy in the country, both in national and international publication outlets. Many scholars have produced articles discussing the Turkish case, linking it to the recent authoritarian and populist turn of the country (see Fındıklı, 2020). Many papers were obviously politically-motivated and deprived the necessary epistemological distance a scholar should maintain in approaching its subject even though they were published by academic outlets. This is, of course, quite understandable given the ill effect of these events on certain agents or the general academic community. Still, there should have been other ways of grasping what was going on in academia, instead of stating and reporting the obvious: that there was a government deploying oppressive measures to suppress dissidents and/or those who have alleged ties to terrorist organizations in academia (for instance, see Özkirimli, 2017). I was convinced that I could have only achieved this by going beyond the non-causal description of actual developments and crafting a more comprehensive explanation that would help grasp the evolution of the relationship between powerholders and academia. The logical conclusion of this reasoning compelled me to study higher education governance, which has been poorly addressed in the debate on academic freedom and institutional autonomy. After all, these two, at best, are inseparable from higher education governance arrangements, if not totally functions of it.

A historically-rooted explanation enabling us to think about the events from a broader causal perspective came out as a convenient strategy. Paul Pierson (2004, p. 81) once classified causal arguments in the social sciences into four categories based on the time horizon of the main cause and the main outcome: *tornado* (short-term cause and short-term outcome), *meteorite* (short-term cause and long-term outcome), *earthquake* (long-term cause and short-term outcome), and *global warming* (long-term cause and long term-outcome). Much of what has been recently written on the Turkish higher education after 2016 seems geared toward tornado type of explanations in

which a short-term cause (e.g., the authoritarian and populist turn of the government) produced a short-term outcome (e.g., the violation of academic freedoms and further setback in institutional autonomy). This seems a robust and warranted causal relation to explain the recent events. The authoritarian and populist turn of governments principally helps to understand the current academic climate in many countries. After all, anti-intellectualism and the desire to ensure the compliance of academics have been the hallmarks of authoritarian, populist, or autocratic regimes. But how can we explain the *longue durée* of the history of Turkish higher education that has produced similar outcomes if this was a recent trend related to the rise of populist leaders? If many academics have been purged mainly due to their political-ideological tendencies or their engagement in public issues through intellectual intervention just like what happened recently, should not we principally look for more structural and long-term causes and come up with some alternative hypotheses that go beyond the 'authoritarian turn' argument?

These kinds of considerations prompted me to think about Turkish higher education from a more historical perspective. My working hypothesis was rather close to the earthquake metaphor, as suggested by Pierson. Could not there be some long-term causes that produce short-term outcomes? Maintaining the geological analogy, cannot we ask the question that if it is possible to conceive a specific event such as the purge of a group of dissident academics that occurs in a specific point of time as an aftershock sequence that in itself bears the traces of a mainshock rupture preceding it? These initial questions led me to look at higher education governance in Turkey closely. The choice of governance as a focus is not trivial. It is where the main contestation among actors involved lies in higher education policy sector. All major higher education reforms have somewhat been germane to deciding governance arrangements at the institutional and/or systemic levels. The distribution of decision-making power within institutions, the role of the central authorities, the nature of the relationship between the state and higher education institutions, the limitation of the power of the state in steering higher education, the definition of the concept of institutional autonomy, etc. have been at the heart of the reforms as fundamental governance related issues.

Therefore, I decided to look at the change in policies specific to higher education governance throughout the whole history of the Republic of Turkey, from 1923 to the present, with a specific interest in how the relationship between political powerholders and higher education institutions has been evolved from the very beginning. Studying for such a long time period is always cumbersome and risky for many reasons. Yet, it would also help discover processes, if any, that unfolded over many decades, which makes them 'earthquakes' with respect to the temporality

of underlying causal processes. Against this background, this study poses the following research questions:

- How have policies specific to higher education governance in Turkey changed from the foundation of the Republic to the present?
- What have been the causes and outcomes of those policies?

The first research question is descriptive and exploratory in that it aims to provide a detailed account of the context, actors, and events to produce a clear historical knowledge as to what really happened in the given policy sector on the basis of gathered evidence. The second research question is explanatory as it calls for the analysis of causes, outcomes, and mechanisms linking the two. Therefore, my research questions enable me to engage in both 'descriptive inference' through which I reach certain descriptive conclusions from the data and 'causal inference' through which I make causal claims regarding how and why particular policy outcomes occurred.

During the dissertation, I offer a diachronic reconstruction of stages in the development and evolution of Turkey's higher education policies to highlight how governance arrangements have changed. Such a reconstruction is necessary to identify the underlying drivers of change, whereby policymakers have designed, amended, and abolished the existing arrangements over time. In that sense, what I try to do is akin to what Steinmo (2010) calls the "evolutionary narrative." The basic assumption that underlies the evolutionary narrative is that outcomes are not the mere products of discrete variables operating independently on one another in predictable and repeatable ways (Steinmo, 2010, p. 10), but rather that of the interaction between multiple causal variables and contingent events that unfold in history. On the other hand, the historical reconstruction does not necessitate describing any detail of events and their causes. From the foundation of the Republic to the present, there have been many higher education reforms that considerably changed governance arrangements in higher education. I will focus on important reform moments and critical junctures in the evolutionary process.

The introductory chapter is ascribed to discussing theoretical, conceptual, and methodological considerations that will guide the study. Before proceeding to present them, it is necessary to provide a short discussion on the existing literature on Turkish higher education to position this study in the literature and clarify its contribution.

A Critical Appraisal of the Existing Literature on Turkish Higher Education

A social scientific study of any research object almost always necessitates addressing what kind of research has been done on that object prior to the actual research process. At this stage, the researcher reviews the literature and finds a problematic that has been poorly studied and hence deprived of a well-developed theoretical, conceptual, or empirical understanding. Therefore, I will critically discuss the existing literature on Turkish higher education in this section. To do this, we should first deal with the basic characteristics of the current research in higher education in Turkey, where most of what we know about Turkish higher education comes from.

Higher education studies is a relatively young field of research in Turkey. Even though there has always been an academic and intellectual interest in higher education or university-related issues, we can only observe the crystallization of a more distinguishable research path over the last decades. The emergence of specialized research centers on higher education studies, the foundation of thematic journals, the formation of professor posts in higher education, and the establishment of a national academic association of higher education researchers are developments of the last decade. In this respect, we can safely argue that higher education research in Turkey is still in its foundational stage. Therefore, the level of scientific development and knowledge accumulation in the field is far from satisfactory, even though some promising research efforts have been made.

This section aims not to provide a state of the art of higher education research on Turkish higher education. This would probably require a large-scale bibliometric analysis of published papers. I will rather provide an insight into the main forms of knowledge (and opinion) production, disciplinary tendencies that affect research, and observed problems of the available studies. Note that I will only consider one of the two major thematic research clusters in higher education research (see Tight, 2008): the research that deals with system policy, institutional management, quality, academic work, and knowledge that has attracted multi-disciplinary interest. The other cluster that I deliberately exclude includes research on teaching and learning, course design, student experience, and broad pedagogical issues tightly associated with educational scientists' interests.

The first feature of the literature I would like to point out dovetails with Teichler's (1996) keen observation on the blurred distinction between *practitioners* and *researchers* in higher education research. In Turkey, just as in many other countries, higher education is a topic on which both practitioners (such as current or former academic leaders, decision-makers, and bureaucrats operating at different levels of higher education) and full-fledged academics/professional researchers produce publications. As Teichler (1996, p. 436) aptly notes, this is expectable given that practitioners in this area probably have a complex knowledge of the field itself and high intellectual competence. Their reflections on diverse structures and practices in higher education

add to our knowledge of the field, yet a great majority of these publications cannot satisfy scientific expectations if one judges them in terms of methodological, analytical, and theoretical rigor.

Practitioners in Turkish higher education have produced publications that, without a doubt, have contributed to our understanding of the different features of policy, governance, and management in Turkish higher education. I particularly would like to put emphasis on two discernable forms that they have opted for: memoirs and policy reports. Recently, some former rectors and top-level bureaucrats have written memoirs to share their experience in higher education governance (for instance, Kuran, 2002; Kılıç-Hristidis, 2010, p. 203-333; Bermek, 2014; Ergüder, 2015; Gürüz, 2015; Özcan, 2021, etc.). These are valuable sources as they shed light on the inner operation of higher education institutions and the system, which is hard to reach by a pure researcher. They reflect normative positions of practitioners relating to the policies and practices in higher education. Nonetheless, they are also highly subjective and mostly written long after the events occur, making them less reliable.

The second form is policy reports, where authors assemble facts and evidence pertaining to various higher education issues and provide policy recommendations in a specific direction. Many practitioners, as well as experts, have produced policy reports from the 1990s to the present (for instance, Gürüz et al., 1994; TÜSİAD, 2003; Visakorpi et al., 2008; Ergüder et al., 2009; Küçükcan & Gür, 2009; Çetinsaya, 2014, etc.). This might be attributable to two interrelated factors. First, there is an aim to influence a potential reform initiative in Turkish higher education. As I will discuss later, many actors are concerned about the current situation of Turkish higher education and demand comprehensive reform. They propose their tangible policy proposals through reports to foster such a reform effort. Second, policy reports are effective communication strategies as they seek to inform debate on issues of higher education by bringing global trends in higher education into question. Thus, the trademark of all such reports is that they all intend to provide somewhat feasible recommendations and options for policymakers who can be discussed by relevant actors and put into practice by policymakers. In this respect, one can easily draw a demarcation line between such technocratic policy reports and pure social science research. These are usable documents as they manifest how certain practitioners and experts diagnose the structural problems of Turkish higher education and what they offer as a panacea. Yet, one shortcoming of these reports from a public policy perspective might be that they do not always have a well-developed explanatory account of factors or processes contributing to producing outcomes in higher education policy. This is understandable given the aims of a policy report. Still, the lack of such an understanding, sometimes combined with the eclectic engagement with (and even lip service to) global ideas, jeopardizes the very effectiveness of these reports by turning their

recommendations into readymade recipes that would instantly change everything if they were applied.

On the *researcher* side, I simply make a distinction between those who produce generic knowledge and those who focus on more specific issues. By generic studies, I refer to the historical and introductory works that provide preliminary or synoptic insights into the general aspects of Turkish higher education during the history of the Republic (Gürüz, 2003; Arslan, 2004; Mızıkacı, 2006; Doğramacı, 2007; Barblan, Ergüder, & Gürüz, 2008; Tekeli, 2010, 2011; Dölen, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d; Şimşek, 2019, etc.). Generic studies have been the linchpin of higher education studies in Turkey as historians, educational researchers, and practitioners have been prone to stocktaking and provide a general and historical overview. As the research field is in its embryonic phase, generic studies that encompass broad historical and current issues function as sourcebooks that provide nuts and bolts of Turkish higher education. I will also refer to these sources as they provide valuable information on various aspects, including policy processes and governance arrangements.

Still, it might be useful to address some inherent characteristics of these studies for two reasons: to evaluate their quality as a source and to point out potential biases they may have. First, they are almost exclusively descriptive. In fact, non-causal descriptive accounts are valuable as making strong descriptive inferences, and they are mostly the first steps towards crafting a more theoretical explanation. When they go beyond description, however, they do not always offer a systematic explanation of events. Second, these studies are mostly atheoretical. It would be undesirable from a social scientific perspective as they do not adequately account for the factors and dynamics that influence policy processes. Yet, this is also what makes them proper secondary sources because, as I will discuss later, works produced by historians using mostly primary sources and that do not propound explicit explanatory hypothesis or theory can even serve as ideal secondary sources in comparative-historical research. Third, most generic studies lack coherent conceptual and analytical scaffolding. They do not sufficiently utilize the existing conceptual and analytical toolbox of higher education research to crystallize what they understand from the concepts such as governance or autonomy, which blurs the line between "categories of analysis" and "categories of practice" (Bourdieu, 1972; Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 4-6). Categories of analysis are simply experience-distant analytical categories deployed by professional social scientists, whereas categories of practice are developed and used by ordinary social and political actors and/or practitioners. Here, the problem is the reciprocal relation between the practical and analytical uses of concepts. Since a great deal of what has been published comes from practitioners who are not very concerned with conceptual and analytical vigilance, the categories they use

reverberate with their own experiences and points of view. Finally, it should be noted that there is sometimes a salient normative dimension inherent in these kinds of publications. This is again not a problem per se. What I would like to point out is that discordant views or interpretations of specific higher education policy outcomes emanate from divergent interests, ideals, or worldviews of authors rather than scientific criteria, which, in turn, create bias the researcher utilizing these sources should take into account.[2]

Specific studies practically refer to studies within the extant literature that go beyond describing general structural aspects and focus on certain issues around higher education in Turkey. I will not reflect on these studies as I did on generic studies. Recently, there has been a growing interest among social scientists in higher education affairs in Turkey. This interest led to the emergence of new journals and research centers in higher education studies. Besides, more research articles appear in international journals on Turkish higher education, notwithstanding that the knowledge accumulation is far from satisfactory. Still, increasing specialization has contributed to the literature to advance our knowledge in many aspects. First, we know more about specific issues such as the determinants of inequalities in access to higher education, the impact of the Bologna Process-related reforms on the national system, or what drives the growth of the private sector in Turkish higher education. Second, we observe sophistication in the use of theory and method in approaching higher education issues. Third, there is an emerging endeavor to study the Turkish case as an instance of a theoretically or empirically delineated class of events, which would help generalization and theory development in the field.

Conceptualization and Operationalization of Higher Education Governance

There is conceptual inflation of governance in higher education research. It is a multifaceted and somewhat elusive concept that may refer to different levels and units of analyses, actor constellations, and modes of governing (for an overview of state of the art, see Austin & Jones, 2016). To avoid conceptual stretching and potential fuzziness, one needs to operationalize and delimit concepts along with their components and properties. To do so, I will extensively benefit from the literature on higher education governance, which, in my view, provides sufficient conceptual and theoretical equipment for conceptualization.

The first issue we need to address is the levels of governance. Scholars have examined governance arrangements at different levels of analysis, from individual to global level. A first distinction can be made between national and supra-national levels of governance. National case

[22] For instance, Doğramacı (2007, p. 27) qualifies a law amendment as an "unfortunate" event as it brings a change that would go against his university ideals.

study analyses, where scholars adopt the national unit as the main level of analysis, have been the mainstay of higher education governance research as they have considerably contributed to the emergence of international comparative research in higher education (for example, see edited volumes by Braun & Merrien, 1999; Paradeise et al., 2009; Huisman, 2009; Shattock, 2014). On the other hand, some scholars cut across national borders in analyzing higher education governance and focus more explicitly on global actors and processes (for example, Marginson & Rhoades, 2002; King, 2009). I pursue the first path in this study and conduct case study research on a national experience in higher education governance.

The analysis of the national units can also focus on different levels. Becher & Kogan (1992), for instance, identify four elements in a national higher education system, i.e., the central authority, the institution, the basic unit, and individuals, and explain change processes as an outcome of the relationship between the interaction of these four elements. Although their emphasis was on governance arrangements and broader structural and normative changes, their fourfold analytical distinction also applies to governance. Dobbins & Knill (2014) focus on three levels together which they provide the foundation for the governance of national higher education systems: the system level (the relationship between the state and individual institutions), the institutional level (patterns of governance within universities), and the intermediate level (the relationship between higher education institutions and society or external stakeholders). Others, such as Gornitzka & Maassen (2000) and Capano (2011), maintain a more traditional analytical distinction between systemic (state steering) and institutional (university) levels. In this research, I embrace the latter bipartite division between institutional and systemic levels of governance. In this parsimonious distinction, *systemic governance* amounts to the relationship between the central authorities and higher education institutions, while *institutional governance* expresses patterns of governance within individual higher education institutions. In systemic governance, governments are the main actors that steer, control, and influence the higher education policy sector through a set of formal and informal instruments. In institutional governance, the power is distributed between academic and administrative or managerial bodies. To what extent external stakeholders, such as industry or market forces, affect governance arrangements in higher education is an empirical question to be addressed.

In order to specify empirically observable dimensions of higher education governance at the systemic and institutional level, I benefit from typological theories and categorizations within the existing scholarship.[3] The first, and probably the most known, of such typologies comes from

[3] Note that no type of governance purely works in reality. As the empirical evidence on higher education governance has demonstrated, they are generally combined in diverse ways (see Capano & Pritoni, 2019). For this reason, I do not see the real governance arrangements as full-fledged actualizations of ideal-typical models but as *approximates* to one of them. For instance, systemic governance of a hypothetical higher education system can be characterized as an example

Clark's (1983) seminal work in which he differentiated the three modes of systemic coordination, also knowns as the triangle of coordination, in higher education: the market, the state authority, and the academic oligarchy. Clark's ideal-types were based on a meticulous cross-country comparison of national higher education systems in terms of how coordination is achieved through the interaction among these three forces. Clark's triangular model has been either fully adopted or revised by the subsequent scholars who have been more attentive to take recent challenges into account (Olsen, 2007; Dobbins, Knill, & Vögtle, 2011). For instance, Van Vught's (1993) distinction between *state-control* and *state-supervising* models or Agasisti & Catalano's (2006) distinction between the *centralistic* and *market* models have reduced Clark's tripartite division into binary models of systemic governance. These scholars do not conceive academic self-governance as a separate model as the state-control or centralistic model is already conceptualized in a way to incorporate the role of the academic profession in governance processes. These categorizations, among others, underline how the classical state-control system is challenged by market-based logic and practices. Many higher education researchers indeed have come to grips with the topic within the broader context of public sector modernization reforms known as New Public Management (NPM) and their impact on the higher education policy sector (Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008). Braun (1999), for instance, argued that *new managerialism* appeared as a new mode of governance. De Boer, Enders, & Schimank's (2007) *governance equalizer* model is another effort to integrate new dimensions such as competition or stakeholder guidance that emerged out of NPM reforms into the systematic analysis of higher education governance.

As I study approximately a hundred years of the Turkish higher education policy, I seek to find observable manifestations of governance arrangements that could be commonly applied to all the reform moments studied. Therefore, I am skeptical of the usefulness of accounts that lay heavy emphasis on the NPM and marketization in their models in this study. To what extent Turkish higher education has been really affected by such reform ideologies in practice is an empirical question that I will partly address. However, when it comes to higher education governance in the pre-1980 period, any analysis based on the market-oriented model would be irrelevant and anachronistic. Apart from the introduction of several market elements into higher education prior to the 1980s, the overall systemic and institutional arrangements were principally explicable without considering the influence of the market elements or managerial reform ideals. This observation leads me to seek simpler yet simultaneously powerful analytical dimensions to grasp governance arrangements.

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of a "steering at a distance" model – which means it is approximate to this ideal type more than others – even though it bears some traces of a traditional "state-control" model.

In terms of institutional governance, I build my own approach upon the works of Bleiklie & Kogan (2007) and Bleiklie (2012). Bleiklie & Kogan (2007) argues that two ideal-typical models of the university have historically shaped university governance as a *republic of scholars* and university as a *stakeholder organization*. These two models are strictly related to patterns of coordination and structures of decision-making at the institutional level. In the first model (see Polanyi, 1962), universities are expected to make decisions in a decentralized way as decision-making and institutional leadership are based on decisions of collegial members of the university that is seen as a "loosely-coupled organization" (Weick, 1976). In the second model, universities, seen as tightly coupled "complete organizations" (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000), are expected to be governed by strong leaders who, with the help of enhanced managerial structures, make decisions in a more strategic and top-down manner and satisfy the external stakeholders. Bleiklie (2012), in another paper, delves into two historically influential coordinating principles in higher education: *collegiality* and *hierarchy*. The collegial principle holds that academics make decisions on behalf of their institutions and negotiate with funders and stakeholders while preserving the autonomy of their institutions. The latter holds that institutional leaders (rectors, presidents, etc.) rather than academics and academic decision-making bodies perform the same duties. The institutional governance, thus, can be simply conceived as the tension and compromise between these two principles. In my analysis, I will focus on how specific governance reforms make the institutional governance *approximate* to one of the two models.

	Collegial model	*Hierarchical model*
Leadership		
Appointment of leaders	Elected by academics	Appointed by the state or boards
Role of the rector/president	Primus inter pares among academic colleagues	Chief executive with overarching managerial powers
Leadership style	Shared leadership	Top-down leadership
Decision-making		
Dominant actors	Academic bodies and professoriate	Institutional leaders and management
Role of academic bodies	Decision-making	Advisory
Decision-making style	Collegial/horizontal	Top-down/vertical

Table 1.1. Two institutional governance models and their comparison

In terms of systemic governance, the literature has offered a dichotomic view of systemic governance based on the role of the state in steering the system, such as Van Vught's (1993) *state-control* and *state-supervising* models or Agasisti & Catalano's (2006) distinction between *centralistic* and *market* models (see also Clark, 1983). In the first ideal type, the state (ministries and/or central bureaucratic agencies) directly coordinates, regulates, and controls most aspects of higher education as the principal funder, planner, and rule maker. In the second type, the influence of central authorities is rather limited as the state act as a supervisor and referee that steers the system from a distance. Capano's (2011) typology of systemic governance that identifies *procedural*, *hierarchical*, *self-governance*, and *steering at the distance* modes can be seen as more fine-grained versions of these perspectives. In constructing his typology, he takes into account the two variables: the level of governmental specification of the *means* to be used and *goals* to be achieved. The first two modes can be seen as subtypes of the state-control model in which the state appears as the main control and command actor. The government either specifies both goals and means through which goals are pursued (the hierarchical mode) or gives them agency to select their own goals provided that they are obliged to abide by the central rules and regulations (the procedural mode). The last two modes can be seen as the subtypes of the state-supervising model as they imply the indirect influence of the government in systemic governance. The government either chooses to leave the policy arena completely free (the self-governance mode) or set collective targets before leaving the institutions free to choose their own means (the steering at the distance mode). Gornitzka & Maassen (2000, p. 283) also identify that there is a general move towards what they call a *supermarket* steering model from more hierarchical modes of steering.

Therefore, if we understand the systemic governance in a parsimonious way for the purposes of this study, the two ideal types of *state-control* (centralistic model) and *steering at a distance* (state-supervising model) might be still useful.[4] Above all, the systemic governance is related to the role of the state and central authorities in steering higher education systems. Thus, the change in the state's approach to steer the higher education sector similarly makes it *approximate* to one of the ideal-typical models.

One last category crucial to the analysis of higher education governance is institutional autonomy. It is a buzzword in higher education policy literature, with various understandings and conceptualizations. In this study, I define it as a right and capability of a higher education institution, typically a university, to determine its own course without undue inference from the

[4] Here, I deliberately ignore the nuances between different conceptualizations for the purposes of this study. For instance, the state-supervising model and steering at a distance mode may refer to slightly different phenomena. Yet, they *more or less* indicate the same changes that occur in the role of the state in terms of governing the higher education systems. Besides, I use these typologies as ideal-typical categories rather than real ones. In reality, governance arrangements tend to be more hybrid in nature (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000; Capano & Pritoni, 2019).

state, even though within a regulated context considerably influenced by the state (Capano & Pritoni, 2018, p. 4). When understood in relation to the two university governance ideals pointed out (e.g., Bleiklie & Kogan, 2007), institutional autonomy lends itself to two different semantic realms. In a context where a *republic of scholars* ideal is dominant, institutional autonomy is understood as the right of scholars to collegially make decisions on university affairs. In this sense, it is tightly related to academic self-governance, an institutional reflection of academic freedom. If the university is broadly understood as a *stakeholder organization*, then autonomy can refer to the right of a strong leader and an accompanying managerial structure to make decisions at the institutional level by considering the interests of stakeholders. In this regard, autonomy is seen as a relational concept, locating the university in relation to its wider constituencies, including the state and the societal stakeholders.

For the purposes of this study, sticking to such parsimonious conceptualization of institutional autonomy will suffice. I will not quantitatively measure institutional autonomy by dividing it into certain components so as to create a 'scorecard.' I am rather interested in what Berdahl (1990) calls "substantive autonomy" or "*what* of academe" expressing the power of a higher education institution in its corporate form to determine its goals. This does not mean that the procedural aspect of autonomy is trivial. However, during the long timeframe I study, *what* of academe seems to have been more fundamental and controversial in terms of formal arrangements regulating it and the content of contestation on the very meaning and function of the university. Therefore, I will not only concentrate on the formal rules and regulations, and what kind of university autonomy they convey but also the discursive, and sometimes legal, struggles between various actors, mostly academics and political and bureaucratic powerholders, which arise out of the *de facto* features of the autonomy.

A Brief but Necessary Note on the Military's Role in Turkish Politics

Higher education policies have traditionally been designed, implemented, and evaluated by political parties, state actors from ministries to agencies, and representatives from the academic world. The increasing involvement of non-state actors characterizes the current trend in HE policymaking (e.g., stakeholder organizations, market forces, interest groups, etc.), which ultimately makes HE policy a multi-actor initiative. When it comes to the Turkish case, the Armed Forces has also occasionally been part of actor constellations in higher education policymaking. This fact requires introducing some general points concerning the role of the military in Turkish politics, which may help the reader to grasp better why it has appeared as an important actor influencing higher education policies at certain junctures.

The research on civil-military relations in Turkey suggests that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) has been not only a military institution but also a major political actor (see, for example, Hale, 1994; Sakallıoğlu, 1997, Demirel, 2005; Karaosmanoğlu, 2012; Sarıgil, 2014). The extant literature underlines that the TAF has considered and rendered its role as the guardian of official Kemalist principles, specifically nationalism and secularism, in addition to its assigned duty to provide security against external and internal threats. The TAF has intervened in civilian politics (in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) either through direct (i.e., coups and coup threats via memoranda) or indirect (i.e., briefings on political issues; private meetings; mobilizing social groups) ways and mechanisms with the motivation of protecting the secular order and national interests, rather than with an intent to set up a long-term military rule (Demirel, 2005; Sarıgil, 2014). If various unsuccessful coup attempts are taken into consideration, we may argue that interventionist tendencies have to some extent existed among certain military corps.

The military elite played a crucial role in establishing the Turkish nation-state out of the moribund Ottoman Empire following the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922). During the formative period of the new state, The Republic of Turkey, retired military officers filled crucial positions within single-party governments (1923-1946). The Armed Forces Internal Service Act of 1935 (*Ordu Dahili Hizmet Kanunu*, Law no. 3031) codified the TAF's duty to protect the republican regime (Article 34), which provided a legal basis for legitimizing the military interventions. The military's loyalty to the republican regime was clear, yet its notion of democracy was ambivalent and peculiar, characterized by a fundamental dilemma: on the one hand, they promoted democratic values and methods since it was an integral part of modernity, implying civilian supremacy over the military; yet, on the other hand, they abstained from acting as an agent of the civilian governments since they believed that subordination to the civilian rule would undermine their role of guardianship (Karaosmanoğlu, 2012, p. 152-154).

Therefore, as distinct from an ideal democratic polity in which armed forces are expected to operate as the agents of civilian principals without having "political autonomy" (Sakallıoğlu, 1997), Turkish civil-military relations have produced unstable principal-agent configurations during the history of the Republic. The 1960 coup, as the first military intervention in the politics, opened a new path in Turkish civil-military relations by starting a new era what is generally called "military tutelage" or "militocracy" (Sarıgil, 2014) in which the TAF kept a watchful eye over the political system and attempted to interfere in political life when it deemed it necessary. This made the military a strong veto player on critical issues in the political system despite quick formal transitions to civilian rule. In the 2000s, governments made essential legislative and institutional reforms to restrict the TAF's political power and institutional privileges as part of the general reform trend

triggered by the country's motivation to meet the European Union requirements with the beginning of its formal candidacy for full membership (see, Gürsoy, 2011).

Higher education reforms that came after 1960, 1971, and 1980 military interventions are especially important in terms of military involvement in higher education policymaking. Those reforms were either made under military rules or civilian rules backed by the military. The military juntas were influential in shaping the reform outcomes at every phase of the reforms. This study will empirically probe into the specific role that the TAF played in reform policymaking. Furthermore, it will attempt to develop some preliminary propositions that may help to think about the phenomenon of military involvement in higher education policy theoretically.

Theoretical Framework

There have been three traditionally recognized analytical approaches within the new institutionalism: rational choice[5], historical, and sociological (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Recently, a number of new perspectives have emerged within the institutionalist theory, such as ideational or discursive institutionalism, which implies a more pluralist research agenda. Historical institutionalism is the overarching theoretical perspective guiding this project. I benefit from broad historical institutionalist assumptions, concepts, and ideas in approaching my subject. Other institutionalist approaches, e.g., ideational and sociological institutionalisms, assume complementary or supporting roles as long as they also provide insights into the explanation where historical institutionalism seems not to address adequately or fall short.

In this section, I will first introduce these institutionalist perspectives by discussing their approaches to institutions and institutional change. Then, I will crystallize how I utilize these approaches in the study.

Historical Institutionalism

Historical institutionalism emerged in response to a group of prominent theoretical approaches in political science, namely structural-functionalism, behavioralism, rational choice, and Marxism, during the 1960s and 1970s (for a general overview, see Thelen & Steinmo, 1992; Immergut, 1998; Pierson & Skocpol, 2002; Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016). It particularly challenged the dominant paradigms of ahistorical behavioralism and methodological individualist rational choice

[5] I will exclude rational choice institutionalism from this study for several reasons. First, in the traditional version, the approach has an ahistorical quality, which is ill-suited to my analytical strategy. Second, I do not share the methodological strategies and logic of explanation hailed by rational choice institutionalism. Specific methods such as "analytic narratives" developed by rational choice institutionalists are akin to historical institutionalist scholarship. Yet, this method still relies upon explicit formal theorizing, game theory assumptions, and overly deductive exercises, which is incompatible with my explanatory strategy.

theory and developed paradigm-like characteristics (Ma, 2007). Historical institutionalist scholars learned and borrowed from the available approaches, and also from the old institutionalist political science tradition focusing on the role of formal political institutions in political life and came up with new assumptions and propositions (Hall & Taylor, 1996). In this respect, one can find methodological, epistemological, and ontological *legacies* of these approaches within the pluralist and eclectic corpus of historical institutionalism.

What characterizes historical institutionalism and distinguishes it from other approaches lies in the following aspects. First, historical institutionalism widens the scope of the concept of institution. As distinct from the old institutionalism defining institutions mostly principally in terms of formal rules and structures, historical institutionalists extend this definition to include "informal procedures, routines, norms, and conventions" (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 938) embedded in the politics. Still, there is no clear-cut and agreed-upon definition of institutions within the approach, which sometimes leads to confusion and conceptual stretching (see Peters, 2019, p. 84-88). Second, when interpreting and analyzing how institutions affect and shape individual behavior, historical institutionalists tend to widely combine the "calculus approach" (which focuses on the instrumental and strategic aspects of human behavior) and the "cultural approach" (which focuses on moral and cognitive underpinnings of human behavior) (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 939-940). In other words, human beings can be *both* norm-abiding rule followers and self-interested rational actors in different contexts (Steinmo, 2008, p. 126).[6] Third, the historical institutionalist school emphasizes power asymmetries, power formation, and political contestation more squarely than the other variants of institutional theory (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Immergut, 1998). Fourth, historical institutionalism is analytically distinguished by its conceptual toolbox that goes beyond mere inclination to 'take history seriously' and underlines the role of time and temporal phenomena in affecting the origin and change of institutions shaping political and economic relations (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016). *Critical juncture*, e.g., "relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest" (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348) and *path dependence*, e.g., roughly implies that institutions tend to be constrained by past trajectories, established patterns, and policy legacies when they continue to

[6] Some authors saw this point as a deficiency of historical institutionalism, for it does not offer a distinctive and coherent theory of the relation between structure and agency (Hay & Wincott, 1998). In my opinion, however, the very lack of such a theory is what makes historical institutionalism distinct and more flexible than rational choice or sociological variants of the institutional theory. It does not have a universal and a priori assumption of human agency, and even it takes an agnostic stance towards the issue itself. At any given time and place, outcomes might be either product of utility maximization (the logic of consequences), rule-following (the logic of appropriateness), or a hybrid of both (see March & Olsen, 1989). The researcher is supposed to go and look at the historical evidence to explore what drove the behavior of actors in a specific time and context. Thus, goals and preference formation cannot be separated from the political and institutional context and be taken for granted as they evolve over time through the mediation of the context in which they are embedded (Thelen, 1999, p. 374-377).

evolve, which, in turn, produces some kind of self-reinforcing mechanism such as increasing returns, normative and cognitive stickiness, or habitual lock-ins (for a general overview, see Mahoney, 2000; Sarigil, 2015), among others, are building blocks of historical institutionalist scholarship.[7] Fifth, the tradition has been methodologically associated with small-N research, historiographical modes of inquiry, comparative-historical methods, case-based methods, counterfactual and/or mechanistic thinking, and process-tracing (Fioretos, Falleti, & Sheingate, 2016). While scholars in the tradition, implicitly or explicitly, adopt epistemological and ontological underpinnings of the versions of positivism, realism, and constructivism as major philosophies of social sciences, they considerably converge to each other when it comes to methodological issues. The reason probably is that researchers in this tradition are highly sensitive to "contextual causality" (Immergut, 2005, p. 245) and "reciprocal causality" (Hall, 2003, 381-387) that can only be inferred going beyond frequentist statistics, especially standard regression techniques, devised to find a statistically meaningful relation (correlation) between a set of independent and dependent variables. Deploying historical and case-based methods is more conducive to exploring real-world processes in which relations between actors and institutions, including the unique and contingent ones that might be seen as spurious by variance-based researchers, unfold over time and produce both expected and potentially unanticipated consequences. Finally, I can point out the tendency to focus on understanding institutions over longer stretches of time and the long-term consequences of institutional structures (Thelen, 2002; Pierson, 2004) as a distinguishing feature of the approach.

When it comes to the problem of change, historical institutionalism has been widely criticized for its inability to account for and theorize change. Some scholars even argue that the approach is better suited to explain patterns of persistence rather than patterns of change (Peters, 2019, p. 89). This criticism is only partially valid. It is true that historical institutionalist scholars have traditionally relied on *punctuated equilibrium*, i.e., "short bursts of rapid institutional change followed by long period of stasis," (Krasner, 1984, p. 242) in explaining policy and institutional change until the recent conceptual innovations.[8] Borrowed from the Gouldian version of Neo-Darwinian evolutionary biology, this metaphor is operationalized in historical institutionalist agenda to account for how mostly stable and persistent institutions are punctuated by an exogenous shock that brings abrupt change. A simplified yet typical model of change is as such: institutional stasis/equilibrium → punctuated by an exogenous shock (mostly a moment of social, political, or

[7] My aim here is not to enumerate all the items in the conceptual lexicon of historical institutionalism. When I use and draw upon such concepts, I crystallize what I understand from them throughout the dissertation.

[8] As Thelen rightly argues (2002, p. 101), explanations solely based on the punctuated equilibrium model suggest that institutional arrangements are either persist or break down. The rigid dichotomy between institutional stasis (or equilibrium) and institutional breakdown is thus criticized by historical institutionalists themselves, seeking more endogenous and incremental forms of change in which human agency balances out fate. Institutional stability and change are inseparably linked to each other in many diverse ways.

economic crisis or instability) that leads to → a critical juncture in which a particular institutional arrangement is adopted among available options → which then reinforce itself (through processes such as increasing returns or positive feedbacks) and produce → a new path dependence over time.

Over the last two decades, a salient theorization effort on gradual and incremental modes and patterns of institutional change has emerged (Streeck & Thelen 2005; Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Hacker, Pierson, & Thelen 2015). *Displacement* (the removal of existing rules and the introduction of new ones), *layering* (the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing ones), *drift* (the changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment), and *conversion* (the changed enactment of existing rules due to their strategic redeployment) are offered as particular modes of gradual change by these scholars.[9] This emerging literature has provided two significant correctives to the analyses of institutional development based on path dependency and punctuated equilibrium (Capoccia 2016, p. 1096). First, it theorized how institutional change might come about endogenously, correcting the accounts that relegated change to exogenous shocks. Second, it has stressed the role of agency in institutional development and change, correcting the view based on institutional persistence, inertia, and stickiness. Therefore, scholars in this strand demonstrate that institutional change can characteristically be more gradual in terms of how it comes about and endogenous in terms of the change drivers, without ostracizing the possibility of more abrupt and exogenous forms of institutional change as propounded by the former scholars within the tradition.

Ideational Institutionalism

The ideational institutionalism represents the recent distinctive strand within the institutional theory. Labeled as *ideational institutionalism* (Hay 2001), *constructivist institutionalism* (Hay, 2006), or *discursive institutionalism* (Schmidt, 2008 & 2010), this approach purports an amalgamation of a variety of perspectives, rather than a monolithic body, that differ from themselves in terms of their allegiance to certain positions within the philosophy of social sciences.[10] Here, I prefer to adopt the notion of ideational institutionalism as this umbrella notion captures the common denominator among the perspectives, namely ideas, or more broadly, ideational elements.

[9] Capoccia (2016) posits other potentially important bottom-up change processes such as widespread noncompliance with rules, shifts in social and political coalitions that underpin institutions, and rule defection and interpretation.

[10] Some scholars even try to integrate discursive institutionalism with post-structuralist discourse theory as Schmidt's approach, according to them, does not fully exploit the possibilities of the concept of discourse (Panizza & Miorelli, 2013). In my view, such a possible integration would end up with the loss of the main gist of the institutional theory that there are identifiable patterns of change and stability in the social realm, as no entity apart from the discursive reality that "encompasses all types of social practice" (p. 316) is postulated. Even though Schmidt mostly puts institutions behind discourses and ideas in explaining the change, she still maintains the institutionalist project as institutions are causal agents that shape the behavior of actors. Institutional theory, either rooted in positivism or realism, might be compatible with weak or moderate forms of constructionism but not with strong or radical versions of it (see Elder-Vass, 2012 for a fruitful discussion on realism-weak constructionism nexus).

The rise of such an approach is part of the "ideational turn" in political science that has emphasized the explanatory power and causal effects of ideational and discursive factors in explaining institutional and policy change (see Blyth, 1997; Lieberman, 2002; Schmidt, 2008; Béland, 2009). This turn, as Blyth (1997, p. 230) puts it, has been mostly made by historical institutionalists, who have been dissatisfied with punctuated equilibrium models explaining change by concatenating it to the intervention of exogenous shocks in response to problems of change by agents. Works within historical institutionalism that go beyond this framework have been a great source of inspiration for ideational institutionalist scholars. For instance, Hall's (1993) famous article on the role of policy paradigms, social learning, and economic ideas to explain different orders of change and determination of institutional outcomes has been probably the most influential attempts within historical institutionalism that attributes analytical potential to ideational elements instead of treating them simple smokescreens for mere material interests or norms.[11] In that sense, the scholars within ideational institutionalism have offered their theoretical propositions in conjunction with historical institutionalism to either strengthen and amend it further (Béland, 2009; Blyth, Helgadóttir, & Kring, 2016) or depart from it to come up with a more distinct perspective (Hay, 2006; Schmidt, 2008).

In this study, I draw upon some insights of ideational institutionalism to bolster the explanatory capacity of historical institutionalism in explaining the change. This, by no means, entails attributing ontological superiority to ideational factors over material or structural factors or casting away the very difference between them as, for instance, post-structuralist discourse analysts who do not postulate an extra-discursive realm do. Any explanation that conceptualizes material factors as secondary variables and reduces change outcomes to manifestations of discoursive games would mean digress from the theoretical backbone of the institutional theory. Instead, I assume that a complex interplay of them may better account for a policy and institutional outcome.

A particular problem in ideational institutionalism lies in the definition of ideas. Analytically, as an *explanandum*, the category is still fuzzy and slippery as scholars have diverse ideas about what ideas are. Ideas may refer to cognitive maps, strategic constructions, narratives, frames of reference, collective memories, programmatic beliefs, ideologies, world views, identity politics, public philosophies, public sentiments, policy paradigms, policy solutions, and so on (Campbell, 1998; Schmidt, 2008, p. 306-309, Mehta, 2011). Moreover, how ideas as *explanans* impact

[11] According to Hall (1993), shifts in policy paradigms can be attributed to the aggregation of anomalies that leads to the available paradigm fail to deal with problems. In such times of crisis, the replacement of old ideas with new ones (e.g., from Keynesian to monetarism), in combination with others, may account for policy change. In other words, ideas appear as crucial game-changers, mostly when *normal policymaking* experiences a crisis. The main difference between ideational institutionalists and Hall, in this respect, might be summarized as the former's tendency to see ideas as not switchers in moments of paradigm crisis but as indispensable factors that permeate policy processes during times of stability.

institutions and drive policy and institutional change is another area that needs more explicit theorization. Despite these somewhat incipient dimensions, ideational institutionalist scholars have recently gained certain momentum in coming up with new analytical distinctions that would alleviate the confusion around the category to some extent.

Mehta (2011) offers three levels of generality concerning policy ideas: policy solutions, problem definitions, and public philosophies and zeitgeist. *Policy solutions* refer to ideas that provide solutions to specific policy problems in a given policy area. A *problem definition* is a particular way of understanding a complex problem, which in turn fosters the policy solution generated to solve it. *Public philosophies* are broader ideas about how to conceive the purpose of a public policy or government in consideration of a number of assumptions about society, politics, and economics. These three levels are not mutually exclusive; rather may influence each other and group together to respond to a policy problem in a coherent way. Campbell's (1998) and Schmidt's (2008) distinction between *cognitive* and *normative* types of ideas is another attempt at clarification of ideas based on what kind of questions do they respond to. Cognitive ideas deal with the question of what is and what to do under given circumstances, while normative ideas elucidate what one ought to do in the light of wider principles, norms, and values. More recently, Carstensen & Schmidt (2016) offered a more nuanced conceptualization by developing and delineating the category of *ideational power*. They map out three sorts of ideational power. In power *through* ideas, actors typically try to influence other actors' normative and cognitive beliefs through communicative or coordinative discourse. This is generally seen in highly institutionalized political settings with established norms of democratic argumentation and deliberation, where actors try to persuade other actors to accept their views. The power *over* ideas is manifested as a capacity to dominate and control the meaning of ideas by either directly imposing them or shaming opponents into conformity. Here, the imposition and inculcation of ideas preponderate persuasion as this kind of ideational power is often associated with coercive forms of power. The last category, power *in* ideas, refers to the situation when certain ideas are embedded in rules and institutions as general cognitive frames or normative assumptions. It is about background ideational processes that work at a deeper than more manifest policy ideas and programs.

Ideational institutionalists are more prone to see the change in political life than stability as their approach can even be seen as a mutiny against perspectives that underscore the centrality of stability. The main effort here is to endogenize institutional change by focusing on background ideational and discursive elements rather than 'ideational' exogenous shocks (Schmidt, 2010). Perhaps, the emphasis on change is too central so that it may undervalue the very nature of an institution that hints at stability and predictability (Peters, 2019, p. 135). Carstensen (2011)

suggested the concept of bricoleur to solve the tension between change and stability. It denotes the agent who tinkers with and rearranges elements from the available ideational and institutional repertoire to mold new combinations. Policies and institutions, from this perspective, are not subject to strong stability or revolutionary change but to incremental modification and continual reinterpretation.

Sociological Institutionalism

The last perspective that would inform this study comes from sociology and organization theory rather than political science.[12] Sociological institutionalism constitutes a highly vibrant and diverse body of research that sways various fields of studies, including organizational sociology and theory, public policy and administration, and business management. In this project, I will eclectically benefit from certain insights of sociological institutionalism, such as theories of isomorphism and the global diffusion of certain policy models and ideas.

The conceptual foundations of this approach can be found in the renowned article of Meyer & Rowan (1977), where they argued that organizations are shaped by their institutional environment, e.g., the widespread and socially constructed understandings (*rationalized myths*) that identify the very meaning of to be rational. This was their particular answer to the question of what gave rise to rationalized formal structure, which annoyed organization theory in the 1970s. Organizations are expected by their external constituencies to act, or at least appear to act, rationally as this is prescribed as the appropriate code of conduct. Organizations that conform to environmental institutions ensure their legitimacy and improve chances of survival by increasing resources. Even though they expand their formal structures so as to become isomorphic with the myths, they still tend to *decouple* the rationalized demands of the institutional context from their day-to-day operation, which leads to *ceremonial conformity*.

DiMaggio & Powell's (1983) celebrated paper departed from a similar point, i.e., to understand and explain the rationalization of modern society through organizations and offered more nuanced mechanisms of institutional isomorphism. They focused on how units within an organizational field become more alike when faced with environmental challenges. They (1983, p. 149) identified three pressures through which isomorphism, e.g., "a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions" takes place. *Coercive* isomorphism stems from the problem of legitimacy and political

[12] Sociological institutionalism and organizational institutionalism are often used interchangeably to refer to the same approach. Besides, March & Olsen's (1989) version of new institutionalism in political science is sometimes referred to as sociological institutionalism, which, I think, is wrong as their approach distinctively emphasizes the role of norms and values in explaining behavior. The term "normative institutionalism" would be more appropriate to name their version (Peters, 2019).

influence. Powerful actors, most probably the State, force organizations to change or adopt an organizational element mostly, but not exclusively, through imposed formal regulations. *Mimetic* isomorphism expresses organizational units' standard response to uncertainty, namely imitation. When organizational goals are ambiguous or the environment creates uncertainty, organizations tend to imitate the most successful and predominant models to cope with uncertainty and evade appearing backward or aberrant. Finally, there is a *normative* mechanism of isomorphism, which is associated with professionalization. Professionals with similar formal education and professional organizations can diffuse certain normative beliefs and orientations through networks and interlinkages, which triggers isomorphism over time.

Meyer & Rowan's (1977) theory was analytically organization-centric, whereas that of DiMaggio & Powell's (1983) was organizational field-centered. Analytical lenses of the *world society* theory associated with John Meyer and his colleagues are larger than the two. In this macro-level approach, the world society is seen as ontologically and analytically prior to nation-states (Meyer et al., 1997). Nation-states are indispensably constructed actors that are embedded in the larger world society and subject to the global cultural processes, i.e., rationalizing and standardizing ideas, norms, practices, and organizational models, that it diffuses. This perspective suggests that nation-states exhibit a striking isomorphism in their structures and policies, in spite of apparent differences in economic conditions and socio-cultural idiosyncrasies, due to the exogenous world culture penetrating local contexts and empowering local actors to make necessary changes (Meyer, 2010).

The world society theory might be helpful to understand the global diffusion of policy trends that are expected to promote policy convergence. With specific to higher education, sociological institutionalists argue that local higher educational arrangements heavily depend on wider cultural and organizational environments at the global level (Meyer et al., 2007). As global scripts define the features of proper forms and practices in higher education, national higher education systems are expected to become more similar over time. They even argue that isomorphism and diffusion arguments can provide a methodological and theoretical correction vis-à-vis the higher education research conceiving the national units as the *locus classicus* of policymaking in higher education (Zapp & Ramirez, 2019, p. 477). International organizations, professional associations, and states, among others, are argued to have constructed what is called a "global higher education regime" (Zapp & Ramirez, 2019) by embodying and sustaining a global higher education culture with distinct normative, cognitive, and regulative dimensions. Here, their research agenda even goes beyond isomorphism and convergence, let alone local-global or inter-state distinctions, and focuses on "integrated oneness" (p. 474).

To sum up, sociological institutionalism, particularly theories of isomorphism and world society, predicts considerable policy convergence and similarity in higher education. Globally institutionalized cultural scripts of modern world society are seen as the main drivers behind national higher education systems. The main driver of change here is exogenous as the environmental pressures force national and sub-national actors to react to the global developments and match their policies and structures with the nature of the environment. Here, the local actors are somewhat seen as passive receivers of universal trends who endeavor to conform to diffused policy models. They are not only embedded in wider settings but also constructed by them. However, as some institutionalists rightly suggest (Hedmo, Sahlin-Andersson, & Wedlin, 2007), even if the local actors try to imitate the global policy and organizational models, the outcome may turn out to be quite different from the original model, a phenomenon known as translation, hybridization, adaptation, or recombination.[13] Therefore, the explanatory of power of sociological institutionalism, in my view, might be bolstered by using it in combination with historical institutionalism that underlines the magnitude of national political and administrative traditions, historical legacies, and the particularities of local culture and institutions, which may filter, rather than directly reflect, external pressures and thus make policy outcomes path-dependent.[14]

Putting it all Together: Causal Conditions Derived from the Theoretical Perspectives

Having drawn on the theoretical perspectives above, the causal conditions[15] of the study consist of historical institutions, ideological contestation, and institutional pressures for reform. As is seen, the hypothesized explanatory factors of this research are directly derived from among the extant approaches within the institutional theory and causal mechanisms associated with them. In that sense, the organization of research draws near to what Sil & Katzenstein (2010) calls *analytical eclecticism* that seeks to find connections and complementarities between several theoretical approaches or perspectives that address similar phenomena and to integrate analytical elements selectively and eclectically – notions, mechanisms, interpretations, and logics – of them to generate

[13] Steiner-Khamsi aptly notes that adherents of neo-institutional world society theory in the field of comparative education revert to the notion of loose coupling as an *explanans* when they encounter profound differences between a global standard and its local manifestation (2014, p. 161). Why and how loose coupling and divergence take place requires further examination.

[14] In respect to this, I find Beckert's (2010) theoretical effort to integrate divergence into the theoretical lexicon of sociological institutionalism valuable. He argues that mechanisms of isomorphism may push institutional development toward divergence rather than convergence under different conditions.

[15] As case-based research is based on asymmetric and deterministic claims that are invariant, causal factors can be better defined as *causal conditions* rather than (independent) *variables* (Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 96). As variation is irrelevant when assessing within-case evidence, the use of causal conditions (X) and outcomes (Y) would be more appropriate than that of the traditional vocabulary of variables (for a discussion, see Beach & Pedersen, 2016, p. 95-118).

more useful theoretical and empirical insights. Let me clarify what I borrow from each and how I benefit these perspectives to craft a comprehensive explanation.

Historical institutionalism is the cardinal theoretical perspective that I benefit from throughout the study. Drawing upon this perspective, I expect path-dependent processes to be present in Turkey's national higher education policy trajectory. I also expect policy change in higher education to be sensitive to national factors such as the politico-administrative regime characteristics (Bleiklie & Michelsen, 2017) and the overall policymaking style. These elements are not immediate determinants of policy outcomes; they, however, influence the pace and substantiality of change outcomes. When it comes to change, I analytically distinguish three sets of these mechanisms that historical institutionalists suggested. First, there is *punctuated equilibrium*-based change, which implies rapid moments of institutional change that come after a long period of stasis. Second, there are *gradual* mechanisms of change such as layering, drift, and conversion that unfold incremental and slow-moving processes as actors modify, redeploy, or keep institutions constant rather than dismantle them. Third, there is *serial replacement* as it is offered by Levitsky & Murillo (2013). This concept expresses frequent and radical change patterns that occur in contexts where the democratic rules of the game are not always taken for granted. Levitsky & Murillo's (2009) main innovation lies in that they conceive *institutional strength* as a variable that varies considerably along dimensions of enforcement and stability rather than as a presupposition. Their research on Latin American politics led them to surpass the first two mechanisms of change and make a conceptual innovation by defining a third version. In my opinion, their work bolsters, rather than undermine, the explanatory power of historical institutionalism as they modify and bend the theory to apply it the contexts where the existence of strong democratic political institutions is not at stake. As we will see below, Turkish politics has suffered from military interventions and regime instability that often pave the way for serial replacement of formal rules and institutions, even in higher education. Therefore, this particular mechanism of change is of importance for especially in the pre-1980 period of Turkish higher education. Still, it should be noted that these mechanisms of change are not mutually exclusive, as the further discussion of findings will demonstrate. Similarly, institutional pathways are not exempt from gradual revisions and piecemeal modifications after they are opened. Therefore, I expect every form of change described by historical institutionalism to be relevant for this study.

Ideational institutionalism may provide insights into endogenous and ideational change mechanisms that historical institutionalism does not adequately address. As I indicated, some historical institutionalists attached particular importance to ideational elements so that the ideational institutionalists are immensely indebted to them. Still, historical institutionalists'

understanding of ideas has been confined to a relatively systematic, coherent, and programmatic set of policy ideas and policy paradigms such as Keynesianism, monetarism, and neoliberalism. This probably stems from scholars such as Peter A. Hall and Mark Blyth, who have concentrated on the field of political economy in which policy ideas are inclined to be paradigmatic in nature. Ideational institutionalists, in my estimation, advance this agenda by making several corrections. First, they include a wider range of ideational elements from public philosophies to political ideologies and from background discourses to a highly systematic set of policy ideas. Second, they see ideational elements as inseparable parts of political life. Historical institutionalists have mostly seen ideas as crisis-solving instruments that become salient in periods of crises and uncertainty. This is quite understandable and appropriate given the logic of the theory. Ideational institutionalists expand this agenda and come up with a perspective that is more sensitive to ideational factors beyond times of critical juncture and instability. Third, they have developed a more comprehensive theory of *ideational power* (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016) that differentiates power *through*, *over*, and *in* ideas. Historical institutionalism has been mostly interested in power *through* ideas that mostly express processes of policy definition and solution through the use and communication of powerful ideational elements in densely institutionalized political settings. The power *over* ideas variant, on the other hand, is much more valuable for the purposes of this study, as it is associated with the coercive and institutional forms of power since the beliefs and ideas of others are mostly disregarded by powerholders. Consequently, I expect that ideational power relations, which I conceptualized as ideological contestation, might be a potential source of policy change in certain sequences in the historical development of higher education policy in Turkey.

Sociological institutionalism, lastly, may help to crystallize the causal condition of international pressures for reform. Here, the main locus of interest lies in how the environmental forces that provide the global models, norms, and practices affect organizational fields. Therefore, theories of isomorphism and world society predict that organizational units and national systems of higher education will become more similar over time as the power of global trends is irresistible by 'embedded' local actors. For instance, the global knowledge-society myth is argued as one of the main drivers of university expansion and the empowerment of the university as an organizational actor with strategic decision-making capacity (Krücken & Meier, 2006; Meyer et al., 2007). National policies and discourses are also expected to converge globally and take a similar stance towards the global trends in quality assurance, university-industry relations, autonomy issues, etc. Whereas historical institutionalism is more susceptive to distinctive national trajectories that can buffer convergence or produce partial convergence, sociological institutionalism stresses that local actors are prone to engage in processes of convergence, especially in times of uncertainty. In

higher education policy, the Bologna Process has been generally, for instance, analyzed as a convergence-promoting process for the member countries (Heinze & Knill, 2008). In this study, I use the concept of international pressures for reform to refer to the influence of regional and global trends and models in higher education on actors in the national policy field of higher education. Those models and trends are either ceremonially or genuinely referred to by local actors when they demand and/or make reform in certain aspects of higher education. To what extent they influenced local policy outcomes, on the other hand, is an open empirical question.

	Historical Institutionalism	*Ideational Institutionalism*	*Sociological Institutionalism*
Typical levels of analysis	Nation-states or policy and institutional fields at the national level (Meso-level)	Ideational and discursive relations between the individual or collective actors within institutions (Micro-level)	World society or global institutional environment (Macro-level)
Theorized mechanisms of change	Punctuated equilibrium Gradual mechanisms of change (displacement, layering, drift, conversion) Serial replacement	Bricolage (continual re-interpretation) Ideational power relations (power through over and in ideas)	Isomorphism (mimetic, normative, coercive) Dispersion of global scripts and models
Expected sources of change	Both endogenous and exogenous	Endogenous	Exogenous
Expected pace of change/implications of change outcomes	Different combinations of abrupt/gradual pace of change and moderate/radical change implications are possible	Mostly incremental or evolutionary change with moderate implications	Not specified – National and sub-national units are to converge to global imperatives either way

Table 1.2. Three institutionalisms in terms of their approach to change

In light of the discussion on different variants of institutional theories and their respective strength and weaknesses (table 1.2.), I crystallize what I understand from the hypothesized causal conditions. Historical institutions refer to historically established and regularized practices and legacies that affect higher education policymaking as well as the relation between the state and higher education institutions. At a national level, structural characteristics of political-administrative tradition appear as a crucial explanatory factor that helps why certain policies are preferred, and others ignored, and how they are implemented (Bleiklie & Michelsen, 2017). As I will discuss later,

Turkey's political-administrative system that comes close to the Napoleonic tradition is an important factor that has been capable of making many governance arrangements path-dependent. On the other hand, historical models of French, German, and lately American higher education have inspired Turkish higher education over more than two hundred years. Western models have been eclectically emulated, borrowed, and adjusted from the late Ottoman Empire to contemporary Turkey so that they constitute an inextricable component of different Turkish visions of the university in terms of what it is, what it could be, and what it should be (Öncü, 1993, p. 145). In short, I take into account historically anchored institutions shaping higher education and the political-administrative tradition that affects policy outcomes.

By ideological contestation, I mean the ideological and worldview-oriented contestation among actors in the given policy area. This is what we will more clearly see in certain periods of policymaking in higher education in Turkey. To achieve the rapid process of re-formation, the single-party governments especially combined their coercive and institutional power with power over ideas to promote the official ideology disseminated through educational institutions, intellectual production, and press organs.[16] The other moments of reform in higher education have also been affected by ideational controversies as many policymakers have had recourse to certain ideological elements both to legitimize their actions and eliminate their opponents. Hence, this is an important factor I take into consideration in combination with the other forces hypothesized to shape higher education policy outcomes, particularly during the reform moments.

By international pressures for reform, I simply refer to the policies diffused from the regional and global models and trends in higher education, such as quality, internationalization, mobility, managerial ideals, Bologna-related policies, etc., on the national higher education policies in Turkey. This 'external' dimension has always been a source of change rather than inertia, as policymakers worldwide have felt the need to respond to them in some way. This study will look for empirical evidence for how and to what extent governance in Turkish higher education has been influenced by these convergence-promoting trends.

[16] Whether Kemalism (or Atatürkism) is an ideology or worldview has been a matter of contention. Heper & Criss (2009, p. 24-25) argues that it had been formulated as a political philosophy/worldview to legitimize wide-ranging reforms by Atatürk and his associates, yet the post-Ataturk bureaucratic-intellectual elites and their allies in the Republican People's Party and civil bureaucracy took it as an ideology and considered themselves its guardian. Either way, the fingerprints of Kemalist ideational elements have been on the reform processes.

Methodological Considerations

On Analytical Strategies in Higher Education Research

Before giving more specific information on methods and data sources, I would like to clarify my main methodological position that would also help locate this study within the broader field of higher education research. This entails addressing the recent contributions scrutinizing methodological and explanatory accounts in higher education research.

In her effort to map international higher education research in terms of the methodological and analytical strategies adopted, Kosmützky (2015) makes an ideal-typical distinction between international comparative studies (type 1) and global or transnational studies (type 2). In the first type, the researcher starts with the national system or nation-state as a relevant analytical unit. Even if the research focuses on meso- or micro-levels within the national system, the explanation here attributes the national unit. The second type, to the contrary, investigates the global or transnational phenomena related to higher education going beyond the nation-state as an analytical category. Here, the autonomy or particularities of national cultures, traditions, and historical legacies are either simply ignored or trivialized. The current state of higher education research shows the preponderance of global and transnational topics over international comparative research (see the bibliometric analysis of Kosmützky, 2015). This is not surprising given the visible impact of globalization on national higher education institutions and systems. As discussed above, specific to world society theoreticians, scholars conducting global and transnational research criticize the 'methodological nationalism' of international comparative studies that embraces national units as their analytical category. Against this critique, Kosmützky (2015, p. 360) upholds the nation-state as a relevant analytical category for three reasons. First, most of the material for empirical research (documents, statistics, ideas, etc.) is practically present at the national level. Second, the national unit is a clearly defined entity that is easier to handle and operationalize. Third, nation-states are still one of the most influential actors in higher education in terms of governance, legislation, and regulation so that their agency cannot be overlooked in the face of global trends.

With respect to the two types of research, my project obviously corresponds to type 1, namely the family of international comparative studies. Prima facie, this statement might seem problematical, as it labels a study that focuses on a single country as part of the international comparative research. Studies focusing on single countries can be seen as comparative as insomuch as they specify what marks off a national higher education system from another in institutional arrangements, how national specificities play out in reform processes, and develop a conceptual understanding that may provide further effort of theorization (Bleiklie, 2014, p. 385). Single country studies are also implicitly comparative as they provide evidence and material to a body of empirical

work engaging in comparison (Carnoy, 2006, p. 554). In this respect, Bleiklie (2014) includes single country studies in his typology of comparative research in higher education, along with the categories of juxtapositions, thematic comparisons, identifying causal regularities, and grand theories. More recently, Cantwell (2020) identified four avenues for explanatory research in comparative and international higher education research: bounded case studies, multi-method investigations into specific phenomena, mechanism-based approaches, and macro-social analysis. In this classification, case studies are seen as extremely valuable as they offer the chance to identify 'local causalities' that inform further comparative research and abstract theorization and generalization (p. 155). A similar observation and emphasis on the value of cases studies that illuminate local causal pathways come from not a methodology paper but from an empirical account of hybrid modes of systemic governance:

> "[The] emphasis on the different paths and governance hybrids is very important because it pushes on the relevance of thick descriptions and the case study method to grasp the specific channels of causality: if governance reforms can produce only hybrids due to national idiosyncratic characteristics, then thick descriptions are necessary and useful for deeply understanding national paths" (Capano & Pritoni, 2019, p. 14).

In this study, I endeavor to shed light on a national path that has been largely underexamined. I believe that such an in-depth analysis of a country case sensible to a set of endogenous and exogenous factors would provide leverage for further comparative research that could benefit from the insights this study provides.

Case Studies and Process-Tracing

This study is based on a case study research design. Case study methods have been utilized widely in all branches of social sciences over a long period of time. However, they have been in the limelight over the last decades in terms of their ability to contribute theory development and advantages in identifying causal relationships in small-N research in social sciences, especially in political science (George & Bennett, 2005, Rohlfing, 2012, Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Beach & Pedersen, 2016; Gerring, 2017). Political scientists began to understand a case not as an isolated and standalone empirical phenomenon but as an *instance* of a population of similar empirical phenomena (Levy, 2008). By doing so, they discovered the potential of case studies in helping the construction of new theoretical propositions and the revision or validation of the available ones.

The case study approach thus connotes a detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode or test historical explanations that might be generalizable to other cases (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 5). The concept of the 'case' needs clarification. The case refers to a spatially delimited phenomenon, a unit, observed at a specific point of time or over a period of time (Gerring, 2017). As distinct from views that conceive the case study of a study of contemporary events, case studies can be safely seen as part of the comparative-historical research tradition in social sciences (see Lange, 2013). In political science, the nation-state (or country) is the typical case as it is the predominant unit in which policies are made. This study attempts to elucidate higher education policies specific to governance arrangements at a national level across a temporal frame, from the foundation of the Republic of Turkey to the present. In that sense, it employs a longitudinal analysis focused on the chosen case over time. This helps to establish the temporal ordering of events in a chronological way, which is essential to separate out relevant factors and clarify causal relationships. As a single-country case study, it aims to contribute to the *type 1* literature in higher education research as indicated above.

Given the potentials and limitations of the undertaken research project, I believe that the case study approach lends itself as the most instrumental methodological strategy to tackle the main research question. The case study approach enables the researcher to achieve high conceptual validity, test the available hypotheses or derive new ones, explore causal mechanisms, and address causal complexity while making substantial room for intensive description (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 19-23). These are harder to achieve with statistical methods or formal models. Still, this does not mean that case studies are exempt from potential pitfalls and limitations. Perhaps, the most known of such is the question of selecting cases. There are different recipes and advice on how to reduce selection bias, although there is yet to have a consensus in the field. One particular point of discussion is whether or not select cases on the dependent variable or the outcome of interest. Variance-based scholars advise against selecting cases based on dependent variables (Geddes, 2003, p. 93-95); they rather underline the need to select cases among a large population of cases on scores on independent variables without knowledge on the dependent variable scores. This advice is obviously impractical in case-based research. First, in small-N research, scholars tend to approach research questions from the perspective of trying to understand the causal processes that produced outcomes about which they have prior knowledge (Lieberman, 2005). Second, in case-based research, making deterministic and asymmetric claims about the causal conditions, instead of assessing the values of X have upon values of Y, is a major concern that makes it differ from variance-based thinking (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). Finally, the so-called "no-variance problem" might be irrelevant for qualitative researchers as they can select one (or a few) outcomes

of exceptional interest and focus on it to achieve greater insight into the phenomenon and its causes, especially if previous theories, conceptualizations, and empirical studies provide limited insight (Collier & Mahoney, 1996, p. 72).

I will draw upon process-tracing as a specific within-case method. Process-tracing is a relatively young and developing within-case method that has been deployed for different purposes and in combination with other methods (George & Bennett, 2005; Bennett & Checkel, 2015; Beach & Pedersen, 2019). It is a method for tracing causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes and gaining a greater understanding of causal dynamics that produce outcomes of a particular case through detailed historical analysis of how mechanisms operate in real-world cases (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 1). The analytical focus here is not causes (X) or outcomes (Y) per se but causal mechanisms that link a set of causes to the outcomes of interest. This requires clarifying the concept of causal mechanism that has been probably conceptually stretched to the point of referring to a plethora of phenomena in the social sciences (see, for example, Bunge, 2004; Mayntz, 2004; Gerring, 2008; Hedström & Ylikoski, 2010; Waldner, 2012; Bennett, 2013).

As far as I understand it, causal mechanisms imply a 'mechanismic' understanding of causality as distinct from covariational (Humean) causation as regular conjunction or association between X and Y (Gerring, 2008). In the mechanismic view, there are more complex relations linking X and Y, which go beyond regular associations. Furthermore, I ontologically conceive mechanisms as *real* processes rather than *analytical* constructs, following a scientific realist approach (Bunge 2004, George & Bennett, 2005, p. 135-136). Finally, I adopt a systems understanding of mechanisms that conceptualizes mechanisms as processes in a concrete system capable of bringing about or preventing a change in the system or some of its parts (Bunge, 1997, p. 414). Beach & Pedersen (2016, p. 79-80) similarly defines causal mechanisms in terms of entities (actors, organizations, or structures) engaging in activities (i.e., parts of mechanisms) that produce change by transferring causal forces from causes to outcomes. In this understanding, mechanisms are seen as empirical events that help to explain the relationship between causes and outcomes as distinct from accounts conceptualizing mechanisms as intervening variables.[17]

There are also different ways of performing process-tracing analysis. George & Bennett (2005, p. 210-212) distinguished between four variants of process-tracing: detailed narrative, use of hypotheses and generalizations, analytical explanation, more general explanation. More recently, Beach and Pedersen (2019, p. 9-12) have differentiated process-tracing into four variants: theory-

[17] In their seminal book, George & Bennett (2005, p.6) prescribed process-tracing as a method to study mechanisms as a series of intervening variables. Recently, Bennett & Checkel (2015, p. 7) dropped the term intervening variable and instead embraced the analysis of "processes, sequence, and conjunctures of events within a case" as an integral part of the method.

testing,[18] theory-building, theoretical revision, and explaining-outcome. These ideal-typical classifications are useful to map different ways of doing process-tracing, yet actual research does not often fit into these clear-cut categories. A theory-testing process-tracing, for instance, could end up with theory-building and/or theoretical revision efforts if the researcher could not find sufficient evidence for a hypothesized mechanism and instead engage in developing new theoretical insights drawn from the empirical analysis.

In this study, I rather pursued an 'abductive' strategy (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012), meaning that I started with theory and empirics and moved back and forth between them iteratively until reaching a point where I can uncover a mechanism that is sufficiently associated with the outcome. The gist of the process-tracing method is not to make a full-fledged explanation that exhaustively controls all actualized and potential causal conditions and/or mechanisms but rather to trace whether there is sufficient within-case evidence to build a mechanism that can account for the elements of the outcome of interest or not.

The understanding of the evidence is multifarious in social sciences. In process-tracing, the researcher is interested in finding the 'empirical fingerprints' that activities of entities leave on the case. Therefore, evidence is strictly dependent on the case being studied and the theoretical approaches utilized. Beach & Pedersen (p. 172) distinguish four types of mechanistic evidence. *Pattern evidence* is associated with predictions of statistical patterns in the empirical record. *Sequence evidence* pertains to the temporal and spatial chronology of events within a given timeframe. *Trace evidence* is a kind of evidence whose mere existence provides proof. *Account evidence* deals with the content of empirical material.

Finally, the paper embraces a detailed narrative style in process-tracing that is crucial to provide "comprehensive and continuous storylines regarding the causal process" (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 109). As Collier rightly argues (2011, p. 823), "careful description is a foundation of process-tracing" as the method is interested in the unfolding of events over time. Thus, a 'thick description' of specific moments such as formal rule-making sequences in the policy process is key to performing process-tracing. This point is not trivial as the descriptive inference is logically prior to causal inference. Thus, a fine-grained description is crucial to open the black box of a series of events linking causes to outcomes as far as possible if process-tracing is not understood as minimal tests of absence or presence of hypothesized mechanisms.

[18] Theory-testing is generally associated with deductive-nomological explanations, yet, in process-tracing, it is not deployed to falsify or affirm a lawlike generalization in a formal way but used in a heuristic and pragmatic fashion to cater to the best plausible explanation of a given phenomenon. What is traced is empirical fingerprints of theorized mechanisms (Beach & Pedersen, 2019, p. 4). Such an approach is theoretical by not formally testing theories but by constructing narrative as suggested and informed by theoretical assumptions (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2017).

The Strategy of Periodization

During the dissertation, I divide the history of higher education in the Republic of Turkey (founded in 1923) into three distinct periods: that of 1923-1946 (chapter 3), 1946-1981 (chapter 4), and 1981 to the present (chapter 5). In historically oriented social science research sensitive to processes and sequences, it is necessary to give a methodological justification according to which different periods are sliced out. However, as Katznelson (2003, p. 289) writes in his discussion on periodization in comparative historical social science, "no periodization scheme is innocent" as each, consciously or unconsciously, makes assumptions about how to read and animate the past. In this short subsection, I will clarify the logic behind the preference of my threefold periodization. Before proceeding, let me first discuss the available preferences of periodization in the existing research by focusing on major works.

Students of Turkish higher education in the Republican era, especially those interested in its development and evolution, have deployed different periodization criteria. In his study on the university history in Turkey, Dölen (2010a, 2010b, 2010c), for instance, wrote several volumes around the institutional history of the *Darülfünûn* and Istanbul University. His periodization, therefore, strictly depends on the trajectory of this institution. Arslan (2004), another historian of Turkish higher education, preferred to compartmentalize his discussion by focusing on what happened under the rule of every government in terms of higher education. Şimşek (2019) similarly embraced the government-centric criteria for his periodization. This catalog-like logic of periodization allows one to follow the chronology of numerous actions by different governments comprehensively. The tradeoff is that such an approach makes the authors sometimes miss the higher education-specific developments as their focus lie in what measures governments took related to higher education. Tekeli's (2010) periodization is not based on a clear-cut criterion. His chapters address loosely defined periods, such as "the developments in the organization of higher education after the Republic" or "the story of universities after Council of Higher Education." Tekeli's contribution to the history of Turkish higher education is undeniable. Yet, this should not hamper us from saying that his periodization seems half-baked and lacks nuance. Barblan, Ergüder, & Gürüz's (2008) synoptic account similarly lacks a clear strategy of periodization. The authors seem to deploy two different criteria without mentioning why. The first pertains to party rules and the second to higher education-related developments such as the period of "expansion and turmoil." Hatiboğlu (1998), on the other hand, rests on major laws and regulations related to higher education as a criterion of periodization. As it is seen, historiographical studies have either left matters of periodization implicit in their narrative or adopted an arbitrary method to break history

into different pieces. From a social scientific point of view, this means leaving many questions related to causality, sequencing, and temporality unanswered.

In this study, I embraced a strategy of periodization that is primarily informed by historical institutionalist assumptions. Lieberman (2001) identifies four sets of periodization strategies that have been deployed in such analyses: the institutional origins strategy, the institutional change strategy, the exogenous shock strategy, and the rival causes strategy. My strategy is close to the institutional change strategy that involves periodization according to moments of institutional change in country cases. The turning points or splitting periods are defined by moments at which institutions are rearranged in concrete ways to produce new legacies. Then, periods can be distinguished in light of the distinct institutional characteristics.

The 1946 Reform, for instance, opened a new path in terms of higher education governance that is clearly different from the former institutional status quo, and it lasted until the 1981 Reform. Despite many challenges, including military interventions, campus unrest, political violence, and several reform attempts, the institutional underpinnings and legacy of higher education governance at the institutional and systemic levels remained to maintain and reproduce itself.[19] The 1981 Reform, on the other hand, represents a turning point as it led to disruption from the former institutional status quo and governance arrangements in higher education. As I will ground in later, we are still in the institutional trajectory that was configured at this moment, and therefore it can be conceived as one distinct period.

When it comes to the first period (1923-1946), I deployed a further criterion beyond the 'institutional change' strategy. This period deserves to be treated as a separate era as it is characterized by regime change, e.g., the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the nation-state of the Republic of Turkey. Regime changes and state-building processes are well-known examples that are seen as period markers in comparative historical research. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 can thus be seen as an important turning point that can serve as a dividing line for the analysis. When it comes to the date 1946, it marks two turning points that led to substantial changes. First, the single-party rule (1923-1946) ended. Second, policies specific to higher education governance were reformed. In fact, the second event was causally linked to the first event as many reforms were made in relation to the country's democratization after the end of WWII.

[19] Dölen (2010d) and Hatiboğlu (1998) similarly see this period (1946-1981) as somewhat distinct and characterize it as "the autonomous university" era. This is reasonable naming as the "scientific and administrative autonomy" of universities, as different from the former or later periods, was guaranteed by laws and regulations.

Data

This study gathers different sources of evidence from various primary and secondary sources to explore changes in policies specific to higher education governance. What distinguishes them is a matter of contention in the literature. For the methodological purposes of this study, I follow the criterion offered by Beach & Pedersen (2019, p. 207) in distinguishing primary and secondary sources from each other. Eyewitness accounts of a given process – accounts and empirical materials such as documents produced by participants at the time an event occurred – have been considered as primary sources, while sources that are based on primary sources are regarded as secondary. In what remains of the section, I will define my sources and crystallize how I benefit from each of them according to this logic of distinction.

Primary Sources

Documents: I will primarily draw upon official government documents to track policy outcomes. These, first and foremost, include legal documents of a different rank – e.g., the Constitution, acts, legislative decrees, statutes, bylaws, and their amendments along with judicial sources such as Constitutional Court decisions – which extensively regulate many aspects of higher education and university affairs. The documents I use cover a long period of time from the late Ottoman era to the present. Those are mostly available online through *Resmi Gazete*, the official national journal publishing new legislation and official announcements. Similarly, legal documents related to higher education in the late Ottoman era are accessible through *Düstur*, the official Ottoman collection of public laws and regulations.

The extensive use of legal documents is not a choice but a necessity, without which this study would have been impossible. Turkey is seen as a typical example of Napoleonic administrative tradition (see Painter & Peters, 2010) as the country inherited significant elements from the French tradition and reformed its institutions based on this model during the 19th century (Turc et al., 2016; Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019). In Napoleonic tradition, the law is drawn upon as a fundamental tool in the hand of the state to intervene in society (Painter & Peters, 2010). This leads to a legal formalism whereby formulating and implementing law preponderates getting things done. The praxis of solving societal problems by making new rules and regulations paves the way for the excessive production of laws and other legal measures that constitute an intricate collection of written law. Moreover, interest groups and organizations have almost no legitimate role in policy processes as it is understood as undermining state authority and autonomy (Bolukbasi & Ertugal, 2019, p. 359). The absence of formal interest representation combined with partisan control of

bureaucracy by the executive often brings about sudden and sweeping new regulations and annulments of former ones.

Legal documents are generally accepted as 'hard' primary sources as the researcher does not need to strive hard to evaluate the authenticity and accuracy of such publicly available official documents. Furthermore, the broad use of legal documents functions as an antidote to a 'cherry-picking' kind of bias in selecting evidence. When this problem may occur in benefiting from, for example, secondary sources, a chronological and exhaustive pursuit of legal documents eliminate a potential selection bias. In that sense, they are very helpful as 'sequence evidence' in dealing with the timetable of events correctly. They are also 'official' expressions of change or stability in higher education policy.

Interviews: Interviews, especially elite interviews conducted with policy actors, are highly relevant data collection tolls for case study methods such as process tracing. Tansey (2007) particularly identifies four purposes of such interviews. First, the researcher can use interviews to corroborate what has been established from other sources such as documents and secondary sources. Second, interviews can be used for additional purposes to gather data about what key actors think and believe. Third, interviews might be helpful to make inferences about characteristics or decisions about a larger population, such as politicians and civil servants. Finally, interviews may help to establish actions and decisions laying behind events. I mainly use interviews for the first and third purposes outlined here. Formal policy processes and legislative reforms, to a great extent, can be traced through written documents and archival records. Still, to gain a more comprehensive insight into the explanatory factors and corroborate what has been inferred from other sources, in-depth interviews appear as a useful data collection technique. Interviews are also useful as they can shed light on hidden or semi-opaque elements of policy actions that cannot be directly ascertained through written sources.

I conducted semi-structured interviews to better understand the recent (more specifically the post-1981 period covered in chapter 5) period of Turkish higher education. This choice has some rationales. First, it is highly difficult to find a key informant that would provide first-hand information on the policy processes before the 1980s. Even if we had found such an informant, this would still make up a relatively weak data point due to the increasing fallibility of human memory. Therefore, conducting interviews with the actors of the recent past, who have either been involved in or closely observed higher education policy specific to governance arrangements, emerged as a more reliable strategy.

The selection method is based on purposive sampling, a non-probability sampling where the researcher's knowledge of the population and the study's purpose guide the selection process (Tansey, 2007). As the target population is rather small and the important policy actors are known, such a strategy is warranted. I especially targeted actors who are or were active participants of policymaking processes rather than passive observants. The underlying rationale behind this lies in the assumption that leaders or actors occupying crucial positions possess more information on the policy processes and have the agency to somewhat influence them.

I can divide my interviewees into two broad categories following Teichler's (1996) aforementioned classification, notwithstanding the blurring boundaries between them.

- Practitioners: High-ranking (mostly former) bureaucrats at the central agencies (mostly the Council of Higher Education) that play crucial roles in the higher education policy sector and systemic governance. Many of these bureaucrats had also been operated as former rectors or vice-rectors, so they also have experience in institutional governance.
- Researchers: Researchers studying higher education policies from a social scientific perspective. Still, most of these researchers have in some way taken part in policy processes as policy experts or advisors.

I interviewed 12 experts, starting from early 2020 to late 2021. The project has been notified to the University's data protection official at the Norwegian Centre for Research Data, as required by the Personal Data Act. The interviews lasted 45-90 minutes, depending on interviewees' devotion and communicativeness. I conducted all the interviews in Turkish and transcribed them as such. For the purpose of quoting, I translated certain parts of the interviews into English. Six interviews were carried out in interviewees' offices and tape-recorded with their permission. Others were conducted through video conferencing software as the COVID-19 related lockdowns prohibited face-to-face interaction.

I mainly posed three groups of open-ended questions to the interviewees and coded them as such: questions pertaining to systemic governance, institutional governance, and other issues. In coding the interview data, I also made a distinction between 'empirical' and 'normative' parts, even though it is sometimes difficult to distinguish them. The term empirical refers to answers that address informative and descriptive issues, whereas the normative connotes those that reflect informants' convictions and ideals concerning higher education governance and the reflection of these on their understanding of Turkish higher education.

One adverse impact of the pandemic was some active high-ranking bureaucrats' reluctance to have an interview via video conference tools through which the interview can be digitally recorded. This is understandable as active civil servants are more vigilant in their interaction with laymen as they do not want to provide information that potentially might be sensitive in political terms. Therefore, the interviewees are not recognizable in the text as their identities are partially anonymized for their protection. The more nuanced information on the profile of informants can be found in the Bibliography.

Other Primary Sources: I also draw upon a variety of documents as primary sources. Those are primarily materials that provide information or reflect various actors' understanding of higher education governance. Such sources include party and government programs as well as publications from government agencies on higher education (see the list in the Bibliography). They are highly useful and informative as they cover higher education governance and reforms. Still, I maintain a degree of vigilance in approaching those materials, considering that they were produced for different purposes. The development plans, for example, aim at shaping the overall higher education strategy of the country from an evidence-based perspective, while a party program rather reflects a policy vision and promise.

Where available, I also make use of archival records such as minutes of crucial parliamentary and/or commission meetings where evidence on the motivation of actors involved in reforms in higher education can be fathomed out. They particularly provide both 'trace' and 'account evidence' by detailing, for instance, what was discussed in a meeting in a written form and how those relate to the actual outcome. In that sense, they are generally considered 'hard' primary sources

Similarly, I sometimes benefit from public speeches of important political figures and diaries or memories of participants of events. These are 'soft' primary sources that might be approached by taking something with a pinch of salt. Public speeches or statements, for example, are often given to justify certain policy preferences and hence might not easily reflect the real motivation of policymakers. Still, when there is sufficient evidence at hand accumulated through other sources corroborating with them, they can be used as evidentiary material.

One problem that hampered the well-structured use of documents was their availability. For instance, it is not always possible to access specific minutes of meetings among policy actors as they are confidential. But this does not mean that they should be ignored. When they are available, I make use of them in my analysis.

Secondary Sources: Throughout the dissertation, I also utilize a wide range of secondary sources, i.e., the existing literature on Turkish higher education. I will not further discuss these sources as I have already provided a critical appraisal of the secondary sources above. Despite some shortcomings or limitations indicated above, publications of practitioners and researchers will be an important source for this study as they provide valuable information or data concerning various aspects of Turkish higher education. Some of those also engage in developing arguments and opinions regarding the problems of Turkish higher education and how to solve them. These properties make secondary materials important sources for the study. Throughout the dissertation, I benefit from secondary sources as sources of data and information providing all types of evidence described above as long as I deemed robust, rather than as sources of opinion or judgment.

Regardless of the specific techniques they use, historically oriented social scientists need to look at secondary and historiographical resources that provide evidence. Skocpol (1984, p. 382) once wrote that "a dogmatic insistence on redoing primary research for every investigation would be disastrous" for a social scientist engaging in comparative-historical research. She rather recommended a thorough appropriation of secondary sources, e.g., books and articles written by scholars specialized in the area of interest. This, however, may lead to a problem of selection bias when a social scientist draws upon available monographic material to produce his/her own narrative or draw inferences about theories (Lustick, 1996). The use of secondary sources necessitates being clearer concerning the deployment of such sources. To mitigate problems of selection bias such as confirmation bias and convenience sampling when engaging secondary sources providing evidence, I mostly followed the criteria offered by Møller & Skaaning (2021). The first criterion is *conceptual consistency*. This basically means that an empirical feature described in a secondary source must be relevant to the researcher's own definition or understanding of that feature. For example, the concept of 'higher education governance' may refer to different phenomena, levels of analysis, or set of relations in secondary sources. When engaging a description or analysis on governance in Turkish higher education, I always assessed what the author exactly means by this notion, its explicit or implicit connotations, and how it is relevant to my operationalization of the concept. The second criterion is the *vantage point* of prior works. By this, Møller & Skaaning (2021) mean to take the purpose of prior works into consideration when sifting through empirical evidence. They argue that ideal secondary sources are those produced by historians who use mostly primary sources and do not propound explicit explanatory hypotheses or theory. The gist of this advice is that secondary sources written by social scientists who themselves mostly utilize secondary sources and/or have explicit theoretical ambitions might be more likely to induce confirmation bias. Therefore, I gave more weight to historiographical and

atheoretical accounts in the face of theoretically inclined accounts as part of my evidentiary record. The third criterion is *updated evidence*. According to this criterion, the researcher should always look for the most recent evidence or interpretations in the literature, which may overturn or contradict the former evidence presented by a relatively older source. I followed this advice and looked at the most recent publications to see if there is new evidence that necessitates abandoning the former.

The important methodological point is comparing and contrasting secondary sources with each other and with the other data sources. Combining different sources and data collection methods is crucial to gaining a well-grounded grasp of the research object. It also complies with the idea of 'triangulation' in the social science methodology, which roughly refers to the combination of data drawn from different sources. In this study, I do so not to achieve the objective of a full-blown data congruence but rather to check the information coming from different sources against each other to detect inconsistencies between them and reduce shortcomings of each.
Statistical data: This is a qualitative study based on case study methods. Quantitative techniques have not been used to collect and analyze data. However, I provide some descriptive data on quantitative aspects of the Turkish higher education system in the appendix section of the dissertation. The gist of this is to give a structural picture of the system in a nutshell, which might be helpful to introduce the basic characteristics of the higher education system to the audience. The data is drawn from the official statistics of the government agencies.

Chapter Outline

This dissertation consists of six chapters, including the introduction (chapter 1) and the conclusion (chapter 6). Here, I provide a guideline to the four main chapters that constitute the backbone of the project.

Chapter 2 examines the historical evolution of Turkish higher education prior to the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. The aim of this chapter is threefold. First, it provides a historical background of Turkish higher education to the audience who is unfamiliar with it. Second, it offers a causal interpretation of the *longue durée* of higher education in the pre-Republic era with a view to highlighting its legacy. Third, it compares the university with the madrasa as two distinct forms of higher learning. To this end, the paper mostly – not entirely – relies on an array of evidence gleaned from secondary sources, e.g., the existing historiographical scholarship. I offer a parsimonious historical reconstruction that focuses on understanding which factors had been responsible for the rise and fall (and sometimes coexistence) of different institutional types: the madrasa, the professional school, and the university. Drawing upon the available historiographical

evidence, I suggest that the development and change in the organization of higher education had been strictly intertwined with the politico-administrative system of the empires (e.g., the Seljuk Empire and the Ottoman Empire) so that it symbiotically coevolved with the imperial bureaucracies.

Chapter 3 seeks to discover change mechanisms that underlie two university reforms during the single-party era (1923-1946) in terms of higher education governance arrangements, relying on data consisted of diverse sources, including laws and regulations, government and party programs, intellectual debates, and the secondary academic literature. Theoretically, the chapter reconciles the insights of historical institutionalism with ideational institutionalism to craft a comprehensive explanation. I argue that the 1933 reform was mainly triggered by the ideological and political controversy between the faculty members of the *Darülfünûn* and the ruling party elite. The reform produced an idiosyncratic version of the *state-control model* with respect to higher education governance, which intentionally mixes authoritarian elements with modernization efforts. The 1946 reform, on the other hand, was rather a product of the need to adapt the country to the changing environmental conditions after the end of WWII, signaling the country's transition to a multi-party politics based on assumed democratic principles from after a period of authoritarian single-party rule. The reform thus marked democratization in governance structures, granting universities a high level of institutional autonomy, indicating a turn towards a *self-governance model.*

Chapter 4 discusses how policies and governance arrangements changed in the period 1946-1981 to unearth the forces brought to bear on reform processes. This period was marked by military interventions, comprehensive legislative and constitutional reforms, academic purges, and student unrest, which have considerably influenced the higher education policy. Based on a variety of sources, I examine two reforms: the 1961 reform that came after the 1960 coup d'état and the 1973 reform that came after the 1971 military intervention. These two reforms, together with the 1981 reform that is scrutinized in Chapter 5, exemplifies the phenomenon of extraordinary policymaking in higher education, where military actors directly or indirectly influence policy processes in times of crisis. In addition to the analysis of reforms, this study also provides a dense background discussion on general higher education policies and political events that are central to better grasping the causes and outcomes of reforms.

Chapter 5 is the final empirical chapter, addressing the last forty years of Turkish higher education policy specific to governance arrangements from 1981 to the present. In this chapter, I allocate a wide space to the analysis of the 1981 reform that was one of the products of the 1980 coup d'état. I claim that the 1981 reform opened a new path that implies a considerable break from the former institutional status quo in terms of systemic and institutional governance. To put it

simply, the reform embraced hierarchy rather than collegiality as the main principle of coordination at the institutional level. It also introduced a dominant central agency responsible for the coordination, planning, and steering into the higher education policy area, indicating a sharp turn to the centralistic mode in systemic governance. The last four decades have been characterized by policy inertia in terms of governance issues despite the changing environmental realities, apart from the minor institutional adjustments. Several failed institutional change attempts have produced gradual institutional changes that have not substantially altered the institutional status quo.

Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter that summarizes the dissertation's main empirical findings and theoretical contribution.

CHAPTER TWO

The Historical Origins of Turkish Higher Education: An Attempt at Reappraisal

Historians of Turkish higher education are prone to disagreements as to where the real origins of Turkish higher education lie. Two broad positions can be discerned regarding this controversy. On the one hand, some argue that the history of Turkish higher education dates back to madrasa education that began in the 11th century (Ergin, 1977; Tekeli & İlkin, 1993; Akyüz, 2007). On the other hand, others contend that the roots of the Turkish higher education actually lie in the 18th century as the first Western-style of higher education institutions came into being in this century (Hatiboğlu, 1998; Gürüz, 2003; Şimşek, 2007). A crucial source of controversy seems to stem from the different notions of what higher education is about and what characterizes a higher education institution. The former position holds a broader concept conceiving madrasas as specific forms of higher education which are equivalent of the medieval European universities in the Islamicate world, while the latter solely takes into consideration the development of Westernized and secularized educational institutions in the Late Ottoman Empire by suggesting that the madrasas cannot be evaluated as integral parts of the evolution of the Turkish higher education if one embraces the idea that the European models have been the sole source of the model which spread throughout the rest of the world.[20]

This disagreement should not be surprising for those who are familiar with mainstream Ottoman and Turkish historiography, which has put a huge emphasis on the problem of historical continuities and ruptures. This chapter does not intend to reproduce the tug of war between these poles. Many authors implicitly or explicitly assume that the transition from madrasas to the Western-inspired higher education institutions is beyond any doubt a major point of departure to

[20] The inclusion of the madrasa period as a historiographic element of Turkish higher education does not automatically imply that these authors hold positive opinions as to the historical past of these institutions. Ergin, for instance, notes that these "obsolete and degenerated institutions" have a historical value simply because they were part of the old Turkish culture (Ergin, 1977, p. XIV). In the same vein, those who conceive Westernization as the real inception of Turkish higher education do not automatically have negative judgments concerning the long history of madrasas. Still, the existence of a plethora of normative, semi-academic, and ideologically-driven narratives of Turkish (higher) education have long inhibited the development of a social scientific understanding of the *longue durée* of the problem. My main endeavor in this chapter is to touch upon the historical unfolding of my subject without falling into the trap of reductionism and finalism.

elucidate the vagaries and vicissitudes of the historical and organizational evolution of Turkish higher education. In their effort to describe the evolution of the higher education system in Turkey, Barblan, Ergüder, & Gürüz (2008, p. 19-20), for example, lay stress on an essential difference between the historical development of higher education in Europe and Turkey. Whereas higher education institutions and systems have grown gradually, over the centuries, out of the medieval universities in the Western European countries, the higher education system in Turkey arises out of a substitution process, e.g., a move from existing educational institutions, whether secular or religious, in the Ottoman Empire to the universities and other types of institutions adopted by the European institutions. Yet, what they underemphasize is the fact that madrasas somehow managed to co-exist side-by-side with the Western-inspired institutions even until the foundation of the Republic. Therefore, one needs to maintain a greater degree of vigilance in order to grasp ever-changing power constellations among a set of actors, which have marked Turkish higher education from its very beginning.

The chapter aims to offer a brief historical reconstruction regarding the development of Turkish higher education. I contend that such a historical overview would be deficient if it had tossed out the madrasa period of which historical legacies and institutional repercussions, to some extent, have left their mark on later developments. I construct the narrative by focusing on certain aspects such as the relationship between higher education institutions and external authorities and powerholders, institutional autonomy and governance, and the prevailing understandings in regard to the role of higher education. It should be noted that such a historical account is quite selective in its nature, in the sense that it focuses on specific historical junctures that shape the evolution of Turkish higher education rather than on laborious depiction of details.

The Madrasa as an Institution of Higher Learning

In the Arabic language, madrasa literally amounts to a "place where a studying or learning takes place." A more specialized medieval use of the term referred to the institutions providing intermediate and advanced instruction in Islamic law, jurisprudence, and related subjects (Walbridge, 2004, p. 418). As the history of the institution shows, the study of Islamic law is one of the essential functions and the defining characteristics of the madrasa.

The most venerable authority on the history of madrasas, George Makdisi (1961, 1970, 1981, 1990a, 1990b) identifies three phases in the evolution of the madrasas into higher learning institutions in his body of writings. The first phase was the development of teaching circles (*halqas*) for several subjects, including Islamic law and sciences, grammar, philology, and literature in masjids, mosques, and private homes from the beginning of Islam to the 10th century. Therefore,

Makdisi (1981, p. 10) sees the mosque or masjid as the first institution of learning in Islam. In this period, education was informal and personal in its character, and it was common for students to travel intensively to study with prominent scholars (*ulama*) who themselves were also accustomed to itinerate to seek other places to teach and find personal patronage. During the 10th century, the increase in the number of students and scholars led to the construction of khans as inns that were used for teaching activities. The mosque-inn or masjid-khan complex, built by virtue of philanthropic activities for education, functioned as both the place of learning and the residence or hostel of students.

The third phase is the emergence of madrasas as distinct modes of organizations in the 11th century. We thus observe an institutional development from the masjid to the masjid-khan complex to the madrasas as separate institutional settings (Makdisi, 1981, p. 27).[21] This phase is generally considered as the real beginning of higher education in the Islamicate world. The first spurt to construct madrasas officially as institutions combining yet transcending the function of both mosques and khans occurred in the 11th century in the (Great) Seljuk Empire (Makdisi, 1961; Ephrat, 1993; Walbridge, 2004).[22] The Seljuk grand vizier Nizam al-Mulk founded a multi-campus madrasa system – associated with his name as a founder and patron – throughout the central provinces of the Seljuk Empire, the most important of which was the Nizamiyya in Baghdad that was founded in 1067.[23] The madrasa, a specific form of higher education institution dedicated to the teaching of Islamic jurisprudence (*fıkıh*) pursuant to one or more of the four Sunni Islamic legal schools (the Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali), and other fields of study that are ancillary to the study of law, soon spread to the other parts of the Islamicate world and became the most dominant form until the beginning of the Ottoman modernization in the 18th century. Nizam al-Mulk, who innovatively utilized the law of *waqf* as a significant tool of the public policy aiming at building self-sufficient madrasas in major cities throughout the entire Seljuk realm (Arjomand, 2006), played a crucial role in this process and appeared as the first patron of higher learning institutions in the Islamicate world.

Nizamiyya madrasas were different from the earlier forms of learning in terms of the size of endowments that they guaranteed, which helped them to secure a sustainable funding source, a

[21] A similar process of evolution can be seen in Europe, where some cathedral schools evolved into the institution of university – the studium generale – the course of the 12rd century (Jaeger, 2013).

[22] There had been similar higher learning institutions in the Islamicate world prior to the Nizamiyya madrasas, such as Ez-Zitouna of Tunis or Al-Azhar of Cairo as relatively older institutions of that kind. However, it was the Nizamiyya madrasas that built an institutional framework that would be emulated by the subsequent madrasas in many other Islamic dynasties, including the Ottoman Empire.

[23] The fact that Seljuk Empire (1037-1194) was a medieval political entity founded and governed by Sunni Muslim Oghuz Turks, together with high-ranking Sunni Persian bureaucrats such as Nizam al-Mulk himself, have provided the basis for arguments that this historical moment constitutes the real basis of Turkish higher education.

large student body, and a relatively predictable curriculum under the supervision of paid lecturers (Ephrat, 1993). Even though it was customary for rulers, wealthy merchants, and others with private means to provide financial support to scholars from early times on, the institutionalization of charity for educational purposes by the law of *waqf* paved the way for the rise of madrasas as distinct learning centers. The *waqf*, founded and controlled by its donor, was an immovable property that is withdrawn from the market exchange and alienated for the provision of a specified fine-tuned service under Islamic law (Kuran, 2005). Madrasas were exclusively funded through the income of these pious foundations and endowed with permanent sources of income along with land or rent-generating property, through which the salaries of the faculty and the stipends for the students were paid. In other words, madrasas have been in a symbiotic relationship with the practice of *waqf* during their long history.

Makdisi, in his detailed analysis on the impact of the law of *waqf* on madrasas (1981, p. 35-74), demonstrates that the founder of a madrasa had wide discretion in the administration of the foundation, the appointment of trustees to manage the property, the designation of beneficiaries, and the distribution of income. These issues were to be customarily specified with certain stipulations in endowment deeds at the time of establishment. The only limitation to the founder's freedom of choice was the general tenet that all of these procedures should be performed in compliance with the general Islamic laws and principles. This gave the founder the capability to influence or determine the *modus operandi* of these institutions immutably.

It is very crucial to grasp the double function that the law and practice of *waqf* have played in the Islamicate world. It was the kernel of civil society in medieval Islamic societies since it legally guaranteed the recognition of a sphere independent from the direct state intervention (for a discussion, see Arjomand, 1999). A common motivation of the founders of religious endowments was to draw near to God by donating for divine purposes or simply to escape a possible confiscation of property. Irrespective of their motivation, this practice fulfilled a special social role for centuries. When it comes to the foundation of madrasas, however, the law of *waqf* was mostly utilized by the members of the royal dynasty or the ruling elite who had the financial capacity to set up them more than anyone else. Therefore, the establishment of madrasas on charitable trusts by members of the political elite and dynasty, in due course, could be said to have bolstered the patronage relations between the rulers and scholars since the founders held considerable power over appointments of the teaching staff.

The literature on Nizamiyya madrasas is imbued with arguments that underline the assumed political characteristic of the institution. As suggested by some scholars, madrasas were, in the first place, probably established as a means of furthering the tenets of a certain sect (*madhhab*) or a

faction against the others (Hodgson, 1974, p. 47). It is argued that the Seljuk Empire, as the most powerful Sunni Muslim political organization of the period, embraced an irreconcilable anti-Shi'i policy geared towards suppressing Shi'i movements in their territory and promoting the legitimacy of their state in the name of the true Islam (Lapidus, 2002, p. 141-142). As the Fatimids – the Ismaili Shi'i caliphate based in Cairo, claiming themselves as the supreme religious and political authority of Islam – was conceived by the Seljuks as the major threat to the Islamic unity (Berkey, 2003), the Nizamiyya madrasa system was the reflection of a need for institutionalization in the Seljuks' effort to counteract their Shiite propaganda (İhsanoğlu, 2005, p. 269), to strengthen Sunni orthodoxy against the threat of Shi'ism (Arjomand, 1999, p. 284), and to train Sunni scholars who were supposed to contribute to the Muslim unity. Furthermore, Nizam al-Mulk personally retained exclusive power over the appointment and dismissal of professors in prominent madrasas to direct them to serve the state's ends and guarantee the political loyalty of the professor-jurists (Hallaq, 2009, p. 53-54). Safi (2006, p. 96-97) even goes further and contends that the madrasa was, in an Althusserian sense of the term, an ideological state apparatus, which succeeded in restoring the social order and the balance between the various religious sects and legal schools, training Sunni bureaucrats for the Seljuk regime, and contributing to the re-establishment of Muslim social unity.[24]

To sum up, the madrasas had to operate under the auspices of powerful patrons, even if their academic activities were not subjected to systematic central control and regulation (Berkey, 2007, p. 45). They were useful to the ruling elite in providing a way of supporting the civilian elites on which they relied as a channel to influence the city, as hothouses of religious specialists and agents of social control and legitimation (Chamberlain, 1994, p. 90). We see here a peculiar contract between the rulers and madrasa scholars that would have shaped the institutional development in higher education for centuries in the Islamicate polities. Berkey (2007) expresses this contract as a *quid pro quo* according to which the ulama had a leeway to determine the method of transmitting and spreading knowledge in exchange for providing religious and ideological legitimacy to the Sunni Islamic regimes.

In the next section, I will examine madrasas closely by comparing them with their counterparts in the Christian West, namely the university.

[24] That being said, a historian specialized in the history of the Seljuk Empire has recently argued that the religious policies of the Seljuks were often capricious and contradictory than the former studies had generally asserted (Peacock, 2010, p. 99-127; 2015, p. 208-215). According to his interpretation, the argument that the Seljuks were adamant protectors of Sunnism is contestable. The Seljuks rather saw religious and sectarian conflicts as a matter of political expediency for their supremacy. The author, however, does not refuse the fact that the madrasa was interwoven with the political authority, mentioning even certain madrasas that propagated an official version of Sunni Islam. He rather tones down the starkness of the former arguments, claiming that the madrasa served as a means of extending political patronage over a bureaucratically and ideologically valuable group of people, namely the ulama, rather than being as a full-dress state policy.

Madrasa versus University: Similarities and Differences[25]

Any attempt to make a comparison between the madrasa and the (medieval) university needs to take into consideration the fact that these were "two different forms of social organization" (Makdisi 1995: 151), respectively, based on the charitable trust (*waqf*) and the corporation. As İhsanoğlu (2019, p. xxxv) points out, some scholars in Arab and Turkish historiography has tended to see a strong organic link between these two institutions, based on the evidence that the college system of English universities, Oxford, in particular, was avowedly influenced by the Islamic institution of *waqf* as an instrument of securing funds through the perpetual endowment. This influence alone, however, could not justify the claim that colleges extensively imitated madrasas. A comparison between the Nizamiyya madrasa in Baghdad in the 11th century and the University in Paris in the 13th century as archetype organizations would help us to epitomize the differences between these two forms of higher learning.

The first and foremost difference is the emergence of the university as a corporate form in medieval Europe as distinct from Islamic and Chinese higher education institutions of the era (see Huff, 2011, p. 145-167). *Universitas* denotes an aggregate of persons, a legal corporation, a guild, or a juristic person in Roman law (Rashdall, 1895, p. 7). Rooted in Roman law, corporations as forms of organization had already developed in Europe. By the 13th century, the schools in Paris had grown into a *studium generale* with specific privileges confirmed by the Pope and the French king (Perkin, 2007, p. 163), a process that enabled them to organize themselves against the cathedral clergy and the citizens. In due course, universities appeared as autonomous legal entities organized as the guild of students, the guild of masters, or a combination of both. The corporate status of universities, giving them collective legal rights and privileges guaranteed by charters issued by the towns or a ruler, helped them to remain relatively neutral or go beyond the influence of secular and ecclesiastical authorities' endeavor to make universities "ideological heavy artillery" (Perkin, 2007, p. 169) in their struggles for political supremacy. According to some scholars, the medieval universities even evolved into a separate estate or a third force within the medieval society, ranked alongside the spiritual (*sacerdotium*) and the temporal (*regnum*), or the Church and the state (Grundmann, 1952)[26].

[25] Arguments in this section are mostly based on Fındıklı (2021c).

[26] Still, a degree of caution might be necessary since the institutional autonomy was not a taken for granted property of the medieval universities. Cobban (1992) aptly argues that the university autonomy from ecclesiastical and secular authorities was false dawn or something of a chimera because of the fact that they were often weaker to combat encroachments of these external forces. For the purposes of the comparison, the crucial criterion is yet not the *actualization* of autonomy, but rather the *capacity* to collectively formulate and claim that autonomy vis-a-vis the external forces.

On the other hand, the legal basis allowing the foundation and recognition of corporations as fictitious juristic persons with rights and obligations was no counterpart in Islamic law (Schacht, 1982, p. 124-133; Kuran, 2005). Islamic law, in general, and the law of *waqf* in particular exclusively recognized biological/physical persons as juristic persons who are the subjects of legal transactions. Therefore, in contradistinction to medieval European universities, madrasas had no legal rights and privileges to make their internal rules and regulations, the right to buy and sell property, to have legal representation in forums, to make contracts, to sue, and to be sued (Huff, 2003, p. 179-189). Unlike a corporation, a madrasa was deprived of the agency to designate self-governance, for its rules of operation had been irrevocably inscribed in the deed. The lack of the idea of a fictive corporate personality can be argued to have debarred madrasas from achieving corporate status, and formal procedures influence change through institutional innovation. Hallaq (2009, p. 47) even asserts that the introduction of the madrasa did not constitute a new form of education; it was still a teaching circle (*halqa*) bestowed upon an external legal framework that allowed the instructional activity to be conducted under the auspices of inalienable endowments. For this reason, the image of the madrasa was associated with a set of endowed buildings – a mosque, library, sleeping quarters, dining halls, and classrooms – in which scholars and students meet. The understanding of the madrasa as a *community* with its own interests was probably not the case. The prevailing form of autonomy was the *individual* autonomy of scholars, stemming from the religious charisma and authority of the ulama as a representative, producer, and transmitter of apocalyptic tradition and religious knowledge as well as their *quid pro quo* relations with the rulers and notables. Still, in the absence of institutional autonomy and the separation of religion and state, the sultans as caliphs had never entirely renounced their ultimate rights to intervene in the generation and application of knowledge.

The legal tradition upon which the madrasa is built thus induced many processes and procedures related to higher learning to become *personal* rather than *institutional* in its character. For instance, the system of certification in medieval universities, the *licentia docenti* (the license to teach), was very different from the *ijaza* (the permission to teach) in that the former was an institutional document conferred by the licensed masters acting as a corporation with the consent of Church authority, whereas the latter was at the personal prerogative of the master bestowing it in the absence of any official regulation (Makdisi, 1970). This had some positive implications for freedom of teaching in madrasas since the professors were the only authorities in granting licenses in the absence of the ecclesiastical authority in Islam (Makdisi, 1990b). It made the transmission of

knowledge flexible, inclusive, and personal.[27] However, from a different perspective, one can also argue that this source of freedom engendered a negative feedback mechanism in the sense that it hampered the institutionalization of relatively uniform educational practices over time by making the curriculum, the duration of education, the methods of examination, and the selection of topics and materials entirely personal, informal, unstandardized, and sometimes arbitrary.

In addition to the legal traditions on which madrasas and universities founded, the second and equally critical factor that made the trajectory of universities and madrasas divergent was the differences in the political organization and authority structures underlying them. In Europe, the separation of powers between the landed aristocracy, the clergy, and the sovereign led to competition, and sometimes conflict, between the members of these relatively autonomous groups during the Middle Ages, and hence led to the emergence of a *modus vivendi* by limiting each other's power (see Chaney 2012). Universities benefited from such a fractured power structure and relative weaknesses of central authorities to carve out a space for themselves in the social structure and even to bargain between different entities (sovereign, aristocracy, clergy, and cities) to protect their autonomy and rights. In the Islamicate world, on the other hand, rulers opted to use their armies to prevent the emergence of a strong landed aristocracy and allied with religious scholars to suppress institutional innovations. Kuru (2019), in his comparative-historical work, argues that the emergence of the Seljuk model of "ulama-state alliance" in the 11th century was a critical juncture before which Muslims had achieved socio-economic and intellectual progress and after which they began to experience socio-economic and scholarly stagnation. Nizamiyya madrasa system, as I discussed above, was the institutional symbol of this alliance and it drew the boundaries of intellectual creativity and boundaries. The Seljuk and Ottoman state authorities, made the central control of madrasas norm by systematically influencing the formation of ulama, the *waqf* deeds, and the appointment of the teaching staff.

The differences between the authority structures and the political organization, however, do not automatically mean that European university scholars were distant to powerholders. Quite the contrary, scholars of both medieval universities and madrasas were close to power elites, and, in this sense, they both had to deal with powerholder in one way or another. As Bleiklie (2018) suggests, medieval European scholars were also close enough to political, religious, and economic power to generate support and resources and adequately distant to prevent direct intervention in academic affairs. Still, as distinct from their counterparts in Islamic polities where relatively

[27] As both the transmission of knowledge and the conferral of licenses were highly personal endeavors, the student had to seek a particular master/scholar rather than an institution and to intimately submit himself to the chosen scholar wholeheartedly (Nasr, 2001, p. 73-74).

monolithic and centralized power structures were at issue, they had the opportunity to make use of the fragmented, decentralized, and competitive authority structure shared by the Pope, emperor, kings, princes, and barons. This enabled them to seek protection in another place when they were expelled from one.

Another similarity, on the other hand, might be seen in the integration of scientific inquiry into the organizational structures of higher education institutions. The pedagogic and curricular tradition of the Middle Ages in both the Christendom and the Islamicate world was saliently religious and hierarchical in its nature, giving precedence to the study of Christian theology and Islamic law, respectively. In terms of power and prestige, the faculty of theology was at the summit of the university hierarchy, with the faculties of law and medicine coming below, and the faculty of arts being ranked last (Verger 1992: 41-45). The members of the faculties of arts were less prestigious and paid less than theologists, jurists, and medical scholars during the Middle Ages. Madrasas were primarily devoted to the study of Islamic law based on curricula decided entirely by a professor who himself was, to some degree, open to directions. The natural or rational sciences were included as ancillaries and in so far as they served the study of Islamic law. Although the Islamicate world had the most advanced scientific knowledge in astronomy, medicine, mathematics, and optics from the 8th to the end of the 13th centuries, these achievements took place in hospitals and observatories rather than madrasas which occasionally harbored scholars practicing science sub rosa within the prevailing educational arrangements (Huff 2003: 152). The madrasa began to replace institutions inclusive of foreign sciences from its beginning (Makdisi 1981).

To sum up, I rearticulated some ideas directed towards explaining the roots of the institutional development in higher education in the Middle Ages. I particularly underscored two differentiating factors that may account for why the university and madrasa produced different outcomes in many aspects, especially in organization and governance. First and foremost, the lack of an idea of a fictitious legal person – which made possible the rise of universities as corporate bodies – in Islam precluded the possibility of madrasas being autonomous institutions. In addition to the legal tradition upon which the respective institutions were founded, the difference in the political organization and authority structures was another crucial factor that made their trajectory divergent. The politico-administrative system that prioritizes the domination of central authority over institutional spheres gradually integrated madrasas into the bureaucratic apparatus. Madrasas had no legal capacity and bargaining power to protect themselves from either the intervention of founders of the charitable trusts or the personal involvement or tutelage of the ruling elite. They had to, either voluntarily or involuntarily, make an alliance with the political powerholders to survive. This negative feedback mechanism would have affected later governance arrangements in

higher education in the Ottoman Empire, where the sultans, viziers, or influential members of the royal family took a close interest in how madrasas and other educational institutions were governed and who taught there. This issue will be covered in the remainder of this chapter.

Higher Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1299-1922

The historical development of the higher education system and institutions in the Ottoman Empire is demanding to encapsulate. In an aim to provide a more concise overview, this section is divided into three sections, respectively dealing with the classical period in which madrasas were at the center of higher education, the reform period in which Western-style of higher education institutions came into the picture, and the period in which the first Ottoman university was attempted to be founded. Nonetheless, it does not address all crucial sequences or events. The historical account offered here is the nuts and bolts rather than the minutiae of turns and twists. Therefore, institutions such as the *Enderûn Mektebi*[28], those which were operated by diverse religious communities of the Empire, and the foreign and missionary schools[29] are consciously ignored.

The Classical Age

The Ottoman polity came into existence in the northwestern part of Asia Minor at the turn of the 14th century after the Mongol invaders defeated the Seljuks in 1243 in the Battle of Köse Dağ. In the chaotic environment of post-Mongol Anatolia, which dissolved into a great number of Turkish principalities, the Ottomans upsurged as stronger than the others and gradually extended their territories through the conquests (see İnalcık, 1973; Imber, 2002). The early Ottoman dynasty, administrative and military elite, wealthy scholars, and benefactors continued to establish madrasas in the conquered cities as following the same template they inherited from the Seljuk Turks (İhsanoğlu, 2005; Atçıl, 2016). Hence, the institution of *waqf* was similarly made functional to meet the financial needs of both scholars and students. Until the introduction of Western-style institutions, the madrasa was the only game in town.

Two interdependent factors played crucial roles in the emergence and spread of the Ottoman madrasas in the classical era, roughly from 1300 to 1600 (İhsanoğlu, 2008). First, the

[28] This was a highly selective boarding palace school in which the elite military and civilian administrators of the Ottoman Empire were trained for years from their early childhood. This in-house school was more like a prototype of gifted education based on a versatile curriculum through which pupils were trained in Islamic sciences, natural sciences, languages, history, art and music, law, applied administrative sciences, and physical/military education. For details, see Miller (1941).

[29] Especially during the 19th century, hundreds of such schools at all levels of education were founded in all parts of the Ottoman land. These schools were either closed down or integrated into the national education system in the early Republic era. One of these institutions was the Robert College, the precursor of today's Boğaziçi University, set up in 1863 by the American Congregational missionary Cyrus Hamlin as the first American higher education institution established outside the United States.

ever-growing expansion of the lands that came under the Ottoman sovereignty through conquest and annexations made state administration gradually more complex in terms of its size and the functions it fulfilled. Second, immigration and settlements into these conquered lands paved the way for the formation of Muslim urban life in which madrasas played a pivotal role. Madrasas were expected to provide public service to the society, providing knowledge of religious and legal issues and training the legal and administrative manpower. Moreover, the ulama assumed another important task in the early Ottoman era in assisting the sultans in their effort to enhance their legitimacy, which was based on an ecumenical imperial ideology. Until Sultan Selim I (1512-1520), the scholars developed discourses directed towards legitimizing the superiority of the Ottomans vis-à-vis both the other Sunni Islamic states and the Shi'i forces such as the Safavids posing a challenge to the Ottoman dominance.[30] The sultan was henceforth claimed to have been the leader of the Holy War, the successor to the Seljuks, and the ruler of the entire Islamicate world as caliph (Imber, 2002, p. 115-127).

Providing data regarding the prevalence of madrasas might help grasp the magnitude of the function they fulfilled (see table 2.1.). The first Ottoman madrasa was founded in İznik in 1331 by the second Ottoman monarch Orhan Beg. Until the end of the 16th century, the number of madrasas saw a constant rise in parallel to the political and economic advancement of the Ottoman Empire Researchers studying madrasas in the classical period identified at least 350 of such institutions, covering a vast territory from the Arabian Peninsula to the Balkans. However, such quantification blurs the differences among madrasas with regard to their resources, size, and prestige. Some of them, especially those which were founded by members of the royal family, enjoyed generous resources and greater prestige.

Orhan's reign	10
Murad I's reign	7
Bayezid I's reign	23
Mehmed I's reign	7
Murad II's reign	38
Mehmed II's reign	30
Bayezid II's reign	33
Selim I's reign	8

[30] How scholars provided services to legitimize the Ottoman dynasty and its policies in the classical era were thoroughly discussed by Atçıl (2016). If we remember the political and ideological motivations that lie behind the construction of the Nizamiyya madrasas in the Seljuk era, we can assume the existence of a policy legacy in the madrasa's role in legitimizing the order. Madrasas, both in the Seljuk and in the Ottoman eras, championed Sunni Islam as represented by the respective empires against the Shi'i dynasties and increasingly emerged as integral parts of the polity.

Süleyman I's reign	106
Selim II's reign	17
Murad III's reign	42
Mehmed III's reign	5
Madrasas with uncertain dates	24
Total	**350**

Table 2.1. The number of madrasas constructed in the Ottoman cities during the Classical Age (1300-1600) (İhsanoğlu, 2004, p. 12)

After the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, Mehmed II allocated a huge amount of resources for the construction of the *Sahn-ı Seman* madrasas, which surpassed the previous Ottoman investments in education in both scale and benevolence. His motivation was to make Istanbul the scientific and educational center in the Islamicate world, attracting eminent religious scholars and natural scientists of his time. Under the reign of Mehmed II, several developments that would have affected the relationship between the government and the madrasas took place. The first was the official stratification that classifies madrasas into different levels concerning their curricula and scope (Uzunçarşılı, 1988). The second was Mehmed II's attempt to monopolize the patronage of scholars by abolishing charitable trusts supporting the higher learning institutions constructed before his sultanate and interfering in the appointments of scholars to the madrasas endowed by the people outside of the royal family (Atçıl, 2016). Although this policy was reversed and the former rights regarding endowments were reinstituted after his death, the sultans' close interest in patronizing madrasas continued.

The other important development was the codification of a law code (*Fatih Kanunnamesi*) in the last quarter of the 15th century, providing provisions regarding the government and the relations between its part. This complex legal text, inter alia, specified both the appointment, promotion, and salaries of the academic personnel as well as the privileges and rights of scholars that would pursue the government service. Certain provisions can be interpreted as an endeavor to mold madrasas into a relatively standardized, centralized, and formal shape that the former were destitute of. This reform also paved the way for the emergence of an identifiable bureaucratic career pattern for scholars who could be employed in judicial, financial, and scribal offices along with their educational duties, forming an institutional and legal framework through which they were part of the ruling elite (Akgündüz, 1997). It can also be seen as developing a strictly hierarchical legal academic establishment (*ilmiye*) that began to integrate the ulama into government service more formally (Nizri, 2014, p. 25). As far as the relationship between these scholars and the government

concerned, they appeared as "scholar-bureaucrats" (Atçıl, 2016, p. 5-8), who remarkably differed from their predecessors and contemporaneous non-bureaucratic scholars in that they were officially recognized by the state and became an organic part of the ruling elite. The ulama, fulfilling various functions as madrasa teachers, Islamic scholars, judges, preachers, imams, advisors, clerks, etc., also began to enjoy privileges in regard to taxation, punishment, and benefits for their children (Nizri, 2014, p. 26). The increase in the number of government-controlled madrasas and the well-defined lifetime career path in bureaucracy thus seems to make officialdom quite an attractive option in the eyes of scholars.

During the reign of the Süleyman I (1520-1566), a larger madrasa complex with a higher status, e.g., Süleymaniye madrasas, were endowed and constructed under patronage of the sultan himself. The growth of the system reached a peak in this period with the formation of more than one hundred organizations under a complex hierarchical system (Akgündüz, 1997). Besides, some of the provisions of Mehmed II's law code regarding madrasas were amended so as to meet the new requirements of the enlarging state apparatus. Süleyman I maintained the decisive centralization policy, bringing almost all madrasas under the financial and administrative control of the state, although the extent of governmental control changed from case to case. Hence, the degree of autonomy considerably shrank and, in fact, experienced a semantic shift. Since the politico-bureaucratic logic of the state permeated, if not colonized, the madrasa system, the problem henceforth was not to gain professional and scholarly autonomy *from* the polity but rather to achieve a relative degree of operational autonomy *within* the polity in the face of the other bureaucratic groups.

In this century, the Ottoman imperial bureaucracy underwent important changes in parallel to the expansion of the Empire. The gradual specialization and compartmentalization of the bureaucratic machine led scholar-bureaucrats to form a distinct hierarchy to themselves. Officials were divided into three distinct subdivisions: the military service (*seyfiye*), the scribal and financial service (*kalemiye*), and the judicial and educational service (*ilmiye*) (İnalcık, 1973). The last bureaucratic hierarchy was constituted by the Ottoman learned elite who received the necessary education in madrasas to serve the state as professors, judges, and jurists throughout the entire Ottoman land. The emergence of the *ilmiye* thus can be seen as a critical turning point in which scholars were directly affiliated with the government as part of the ruling class through the institutionalized nexus between the higher education system and the bureaucratic-judicial domains. They operated both as legislators and interpreters of Islamic law and ideologues of imperial rule. With partial exceptions, being close to power and serving the state had not been deemed inappropriate with respect to scholarly prestige or academic freedom. Rather, they likely had a

notion that they had their own autonomous sphere within the Empire, and their scholarly independence was not easily harmed (Atçıl, 2016). While making their utmost effort for the flourishing of the Empire, they carved out a niche for themselves in this establishment, which, according to some scholars, can be characterized as an aristocratic household from the 17th onwards (Zilfi, 1988; Nizri, 2014).

The Reform Era

The 18th century is generally considered as the beginning of the reform and modernization in Ottoman historiography. This century also marks the introduction of Western-style higher education institutions into the Empire. The relative backwardness in the military power and technology of the Ottomans vis-a-vis the rising European and Russian forces was the main impetus behind the reforms. For that reason, it was not surprising to see that the first reform efforts aimed at ameliorating the military capability through the education of the military cadre (see Tekeli & İlkin, p. 24-52).

The first reform in the military education was the establishment of the *Humbaracı Ocağı* (The Corps of Bombardiers and Mortars) in 1735 under the direction of a general of French origin, Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval who had converted to Islam and became a general in the Ottoman army with the name of Humbaracı Ahmed Paşa. What made this institution wholly new was its focus on science education with a distinct infrastructure, which was quite different from the traditional madrasa education (Karaca, 2012, p. 39-45). Students were exclusively educated in geometry, ballistics, mathematics, trigonometry, and engineering fields.

A similar military academy, the Imperial Naval Engineering School (*Mühendishane-i Bahr-i Hümâyun*), were founded in 1773 under the supervision of another Frenchman military officer of Hungarian origin, François Baron de Tott, who was recruited by the Ottoman army as a military adviser to organize naval science and technology. The defeat of the Ottoman Navy by the Russians in a battle during the Russo-Turkish War (1768-1774) necessitated the foundation of such a school to train the officers in the naval forces based on a state of the art curriculum. This imperial academy is considered the first full-fledged Western-type higher education institution in the whole Islamicate world in general and the beginning of engineering education in Turkey in particular (Karaca, 2012). Furthermore, a similar military academy for the land forces, Imperial School of Military Engineering (*Mühendishâne-i Berrî-i Hümâyun*), was founded in 1795 under the reign of Selim III who was a pro-reform ruler regarded as an enlightened monarch. Both schools were embodiments of the technology and higher education transfer between the two countries. Military academies recruited some French professors to teach and help to increase the organization of teaching,

training, and curricula. These two schools were merged in Republican Turkey to form today's Istanbul Technical University.

These professional academies stamped their mark on the development of higher education during the 19th century. The Imperial School of Military Medicine and Surgery (*Tıbbhâne-i Âmire ve Cerrahhâne-i Mamûre*) were founded in 1826 to train doctors and surgeons for the modernized armed forces. This was followed by the establishment of the Imperial Military Music School (*Muzika-i Hümâyun*) in 1831 and the Imperial School of Military Sciences (*Mekteb-i Ulum-i Harbiyye*) in 1834. All these military colleges were the results of Mahmud II's (1808-1839) vast reforms, including the abolition of the Janissary corps and the reorganization of the army. Therefore, the ruling elite maintained the former higher education policies giving priority to the foundation of military academies during the first half of the 19th century. During the 1830s, the government pursued another educational policy based on sending state-sponsored students to Europe to study and bring their knowledge and expertise back to their homeland (Alkan, 2008). Parisian institutions were the first addresses of the selected students. Institutions in Berlin, London, and Vienna were among the other popular destinations.[31] This policy tool has been very persistent and sticky in creating the so-called human capital, so much so that most of the late Ottoman and Republican Turkish governments allocated resources to send students abroad to pursue post-graduate education.

One of the radical moves of Mahmud II was the abolishment of the autonomy of the *ilmiye* corps through the centralization and administration of all endowments under the direct state authority by means of the establishment of the Ministry of Imperial Endowments (*Evkâf-ı Hümâyûn Nezâreti*) in 1826 (Akyıldız, 2004, p. 54). The Ottoman state thus monopolized the control over the incomes of endowments and constituted a channel to transfer the revenues of endowments to the state treasury. Hence, madrasas as institutions and the *ilmiye* as a collective actor lost their discretion over the economic resources they had enjoyed. From that moment on, the madrasas and their graduates continued to lose their significance in both educational and administrative systems vis-a-vis the rising Westernized educational enterprises and their graduates.

The first civil *grande école* was the School of Civil Administration (*Mekteb-i Mülkiye*), which has evolved into the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University in 1950, was established in Istanbul in 1859 to train civil servants for the state. Among others, the most prominent professional schools were the School of Civilian Medicine (*Mekteb-i Tıbbiye-i Mülkiye*, 1866), the Imperial Law School (*Mekteb-i Hukuk-i Şahane*, 1878), the School of Public Finance (*Mektebi Fünun-u Maliye*,

[31] Mahmud II's educational reform model was, to some extent, inspired by that of the rebellious Egyptian governor Mehmed Ali Pasha, who had sent students to foreign countries to study and established many higher-level institutions (Alkan, 2008, p. 23).

1878), the School of Fine Arts (*Mekteb-i Sanayi-i Nefise-i Şahane*, 1882), the Higher School of Commerce (*Ticaret Mekteb-i Âlîsi*, 1882), the School of Civil Engineering (*Hendese-i Mülkiye*, 1883), and the Civilian Veterinary School (*Mülkiye Baytar Mektebi*, 1888). These schools thereafter merged into the young universities of the Republic as either faculty or department structures.

The School of Civil Administration, together with the military academies, were the bedrock of the modernist and liberal ideas that influenced the so-called modernization reforms in the late Ottoman period (Mardin, 1994, p. 47-53). As Findley (1989) demonstrates, the graduates of these schools were the protagonists of the gradual shift from traditional patrimonial officialdom to a rational-legal bureaucratic system defined by law and rational plan during the late Ottoman and early Republican Turkey. This outcome, in hindsight, was ironic or unintended due to the fact that the state had initially designed these schools with the sole intention of raising the military and civil officers who would be vital actors in salvaging the Empire, rather than with the purpose of inculcating students with a new *Weltanschauung* through which they would question the fundamental grounds of the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy.

How can we interpret these reform efforts? To begin with, the establishment of such novel higher education institutions was directly related to the need for increasing the quality and capability of the military, which was assumed to would have prevented the Empire from being dissolved. Therefore, it is crucial to note that the reform endeavors began with the modernization of the army, which culminated in introducing higher education institutions inspired by European models. This was followed by the foundation of institutions specialized in providing education in civil administration, diplomacy, and statecraft. In this respect, it would be no exaggeration to say that higher education was evolved symbiotically with the Ottoman (military and civil) bureaucracy. Probably, the military dimension of the educational transformation was the root cause that made it legitimate in the eyes of all relevant actors so that the resistance to change was tolerable.

Moreover, the introduction of these institutions into the system can be read as a bifurcation in the organization of higher education for the first time in the history of the Empire. From that time to the end of the Empire, Western-type higher education institutions, first professional schools, and then a university, had to have thrived in a track distinct from the deeply-rooted madrasa system. Having preferred to bring a new training system into play as a new path instead of *displacing* the existing one, the reformers triggered an incremental institutional change process that can be labeled as a *layering* (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). The co-existence of these two sets of institutions created idiosyncratic tensions and power struggles between the reformist/secular and conservative/religious actors (some of which were addressed by Bein, 2011), which in turn partly explains the erratic path of development in higher education in the late Ottoman period. As some

observers (Davison, 1961, p. 176; Frey, 1965, p. 29-72) have pointed out, the emergence of such an educational dualism ultimately split the ruling elite into two parts: more modernist graduates of the professional schools and the more conservative graduates of the madrasas.[32] This turf war, in plain terms, ended up with the eventual dominance of the modernist wing and the gradual exclusion of the ulama from some of the critical bureaucratic and governmental positions, although judicial bureaucracy relied heavily on madrasa graduates until the end of the Empire.

Another point is the eclectic and pragmatic engagement with European science, technology, and higher education. Even though the European models were the sole source of influence, policy borrowing, and organizational emulation, it was the pragmatic needs of the state, first and foremost, that induced the rapid and eager adoption of French-style professional and vocational schools. By means of the intense Franco-Ottoman cooperation in the modernization of the Ottoman army and military education during the 18th century (see Firges, 2014), the French *grandes écoles* model was firmly implanted into the Ottoman higher education system. These schools have represented a privileged non-university segment of the higher education sector in France, characterized by highly selective admission procedures and awarding degrees (Musselin, 2004, p. 125). The underlying logic giving rise to them was the need to train administrative, economic, political, and technical elite outside of the general public university system. As elite production and reproduction machines, these schools were far more favorable models than universities for the Ottomans if their urgent need for qualified personnel was taken into consideration. The particular effort of the reformers, however, was to render these schools more Turkish by altering some of their inherently French qualities. They also looked at other European cases, mostly Prussia, to selectively import some elements to upgrade these schools.

Last but not least, one of the most crucial outcomes of the higher education reform efforts during the Late Ottoman period was the emanation of a new conception of education and knowledge that was unfamiliar and peculiar to religious scholars. As Berkes rightly argues (1998, p. 99-106), the new conception of education found its expression in the word *maârif*, which represents a challenge to the traditional concept of *ilm*. The word *maârif* originally meant "knowledge, cognition, cognizance, or acquaintance" (Findley, 1989, p. 138), referring to many different features of education and learning. Yet, in the late Ottoman context, it was deployed to refer to the education and learning organized to produce and transmit science (*fen*) for technological, industrial, and military purposes (Yalçınkaya, 2015). The name of the first intermediate-level school for training civil servants, for instance, was named as the *Mekteb-i Maarif-i Adliye* (1838), a preference

[32] Note that some of the madrasa graduates were far from being traditionalists resisting any effort to modernization, and they visited modern schools in addition to madrasas. Yet, this fact does not change the reality of the power struggle between different elite segments.

that reflects the applied and practical nature of the education relevant for some technical and practical purposes, which was deemed by the Ottoman reformers as one of the main drivers that lie behind Western advancement. The knowledge, *ilm*, that had been generated and transmitted in madrasas throughout centuries had, on the other hand, different religious, ethical, epistemological implications, although it also had a vast area of practical application with regard to Islamic law.

The reform movement catalyzed the emanation of the idea to establish a university during the mid 19th century among a group of statesmen and scholars. The next subsection briefly reconstructs the story behind the establishment of the first Ottoman university.

The Genesis of the Ottoman University

The *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876), a period in which a number of social, political, and educational reforms were carried out under the guidance of a group of a reform-minded statesmen, marks the institutionalization of the notion of *maârif* with the foundation of a central body, *Maârif-i Umûmiye Nezâreti* (the Ministry of General Education) in 1857 and with the promulgation of the *Maârif-i Umûmiye Nizamnâmesi* (The Regulations of General Education) in 1869.[33] As Findley concisely states, the most vital step in educational reform in this term was probably the transition from establishing unique schools to the founding of a generalized public system of schools (1989, p. 134). The first step was taken by the Temporary Council of Education (*Meclis-i Maârif-i Muvakkat*) in 1845 with a blueprint envisaging a three-tier system of primary level (*sıbyan mektebi*), intermediate or secondary level (*rüşdiye*) and a higher level (*darülfünun*). This transitory body swiftly evolved into a ministry and became the first distinct centralized policy-making organ specific to the educational system in 1857. The 1869 regulations regularized a five-tier system: *sıbyan* and *rüşdiye* (primary levels), *idadîye* and *sultanîye* (secondary levels), and *âliye* (tertiary level). Thus, the reforms did not only marginalized the role and place of madrasas and the ulama within the educational ecosystem[34], but also disqualified the non-Muslim religious communities that had enjoyed a vast autonomy in opening their own schools, bringing the organization of education at any level under the centralized state supervision[35] (Alkan, 2008).

[33] These regulations were influenced by the reform proposal of the French Minister of Education and educational reformer Jean Victor Duruy who had operated as the reform adviser to the Turkish government (Berkes,1998, p. 179; Somel, 2001, p. 51). They are, thus, another embodiment of the French influence on the Turkish educational arrangements.

[34] That being said, they still were a considerable component of the late Ottoman education. The 1869 law engendered a gradual decline rather than an abrupt setback.

[35] *Maârif* encompasses education at all levels, from primary to postgraduate. So do the regulations of the Ministry. Nevertheless, I turn a blind eye to the educational developments at primary and secondary levels, for my vim and vigor are bounded by higher education. The developments such as the beginning of state-funded compulsory education, the transmission of the official state ideology to the pupils, and the establishment of central agencies to standardize and administer education, which took place in 19th century Ottoman Turkey, were quite synchronous with and parallel to

What is of utmost importance in this term when it comes to higher education is envisioning the *university* as an integral part of the education system for the first time in the 1845 report of the Temporary Council. This was the first attempt to establish the first Ottoman university, i.e., *Darülfünûn* (the House of Sciences), which would be distinct from both madrasas and professional academies in its scope and organization (İhsanoğlu, 2019, p. 23-26). Still, the delay was inevitable due to some infrastructural and financial problems. In the period of preparation, European-style grandiose university buildings, libraries, and laboratories designed by an Italian architect were constructed. Moreover, an *Encümen-i Daniş* (the Society of Knowledge), a kind of learned society, inspired by the *Académie Française*, whose primary purpose was to prepare the books in the Turkish language to be used in the *Darülfünûn* was set up in 1851 (Chambers, 1981). This institution, for the first time, offered an official venue for intellectual discussions geared towards promoting scientific research and enlightening the public regarding scientific issues.

After such a period of preparation, the *Darülfünûn* was founded in 1863, and lectures started immediately thereafter. It commenced offering public lectures targeting a wide audience without seeking a specific requirement for admission. The lectures had to be ceased in 1865 due to a fire that destroyed the library and laboratories (İhsanoğlu, 2019, p. 30). The construction of the new university building was completed until the promulgation of the Regulations of General Education (1869), which decrees the foundation of a university in Istanbul (Art. 79). According to this comprehensive regulation, the *Darülfünûn* were to be re-instituted with three faculties of law, natural sciences, and literature (Art. 81-83). The institution had been actually planned to include five faculties as in the French universities: theology, law, medicine, natural sciences, and literature. Yet, since the theology was already present in madrasa education and medicine was offered in professional schools, the university re-opened with the three faculties in 1870 as *Darülfünûn-i Osmanî*. This time, it had its permanent academic staff composed of Turkish and French scholars, president (*nâzır*) appointed through an imperial order, financial resources largely coming from the state treasury, academic program, and curricula, and a sufficient number of students accepted for a three-year education based on an entrance examination (İhsanoğlu, 2019, p. 32-42).

With the introduction of the university, the extra-madrasa higher education system experienced a transformation into a binary system comprised of professional schools and universities as two distinct forms of an educational organization (Erden, 2006, p. 39). Therefore, the introduction of a university was not an act of parting from the French model, but rather a genuine convergence to the higher education *à la française*, whose trademark was the binary division

the developments occurred in Prussia, France, Austria-Hungary, Italia, France, England, and Russia. For comprehensive analyses, see Somel (2001) and Fortna (2002).

between these two sets of organizations. Another indication of the emergence of the binary structure was the exclusion of the subjects with strong professional and vocational connotations, such as engineering, commerce, or agriculture, from the university. The university, in this way, was given a role in research and knowledge production in basic sciences in contradistinction to professional schools whose role were exclusively limited to the training of cadres for the military and public administration through the transmission of application-oriented knowledge.[36] The emergence of binary structure in the mid-19th century was an institutional creation that would condition the evolution of the Turkish higher education system during a period longer than a century.

The *Darülfünûn-i Osmanî* was short-lived. In 1874 reorganization, it was re-named as *Darülfünûn-i Sultanî* and came under the patronage of the *Lycée Impérial Ottoman de Galata-Serai*, which was an elite French-speaking and French government-backed high school in Istanbul. This decision made by Safvet Paşa, the Minister of Education of the period, prima facie seems quite unconventional. Nonetheless, it evinces specific power relations between a set of actors within the Ottoman educational and bureaucratic fields. The surface cause of this decision was to provide more sustainable funds to the university with the generous support of the high school and thus to reduce the financial burden on the state. Yet, one of the underlying reasons was probably to cut loose the university from the pressures of the madrasa establishment whose members felt insecure about their near-monopolized place in both legal education and profession. The gradual secularization in judicial bureaucracy and the beginning of the secular Continental law education at the university disturbed a considerable number of people among this group (Tekeli, 2007). The ideological and political contestation among the actors advocating different types of legal education, in a spectrum covering the positions from the most conservatives seeing the Islamic law as the only relevant law form to those who advocated the total exclusion of the Islamic law in favor of the Continental law, (Nur, 2015, p. 113-115) elicited varying symbolic and material power constellations in the higher education policy field.

Furthermore, as one of the philosophy professors of the *Darülfünûn* documents based on an official correspondence between the Turkish ambassador to Vienna, Şekip Efendi, and the Sublime Porte, a pro-autocratic faction within the government would thwart the institutional development of the university during a half-century (Aynî [1927], 1995, p. 56). The ambassador's description of the University of Vienna as a "site of conspiracy" on the basis of the student uprisings during the revolutions of 1848 in the Austrian Empire very likely shaped some

[36] However, it should be noted that, despite this initial motivation, *Darülfünûn*, in practice, occasionally went beyond the mere education function by contributing to the formation of new scientific knowledge.

statesman's perception of the university from the very beginning of the process and made them fear the possibility that the *Darülfünûn* would be similarly home to the anti-monarchy activism and liberal reformist ideas. Yet, as indicated above, although the stunted development of the *Darülfünûn* prevented it from playing this ideo-political role, the students and graduates of professional schools carried the banner for the revolutionary ideas in the late Ottoman era. This fact underlies the ambiguous attitudes of the Ottomans towards higher education. From its very beginning, it had been thought of as an instrument for the transformation and salvation of the state apparatus, particularly the army. The ruling elite had seldom hesitated to transfer knowledge, expertise, and manpower from the European countries for this end. However, they were not equally eager to face the *unintended consequences* – i.e., any outcomes going beyond the mere aim of military and bureaucratic modernization, such as the unwanted tendencies of Westernization, including the spread of constitutionalist, pro-parliamentarism, and democratic ideas among students – that the European-style higher education would create. Higher education was originally thought of as an enterprise by the state, within the state, and for the state. For that reason, as Turan underscores (2010, p. 143), in addition to their research and teaching functions, Ottoman higher education institutions have also been thought of as ideological training centers par excellence for the future leaders of society.

After a couple of reorganizations, interruptions, and trials-and-errors between 1845-1900, the *Darülfünûn* was re-opened in 1900 under the reign of Abdülhamid II for the fourth time as a full-fledged university with the name of *Darülfünûn-i Şahane* through a regulation (*Darülfünûnu Şahane Nizamnamesi*). Previously founded medical and law schools became affiliated with the university. More importantly, a new faculty of theology (*Ulûm-ı Aliye-i Diniye*) was built within the university's scope. The Ministry of Education thus reversed its earlier decision of refraining from establishing such a faculty on the grounds of the notion that the theology education had already been provided by madrasas. This was an enunciation of the conviction that madrasas were no longer hothouses of religious sciences. As a result, madrasas lost their monopoly over education in religious science in addition to their ever-declining role in law education. When the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (*İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti*) came into power in 1908 following the Young Turk Revolution that reinstated the Ottoman Constitution and Parliament, they totally reorganized the madrasa system with the regulation of 1910 (*Medaris-i İlmiye Nizamnamesi*). Under the influence of 19th-century positivism and materialism, the Young Turks standardized the curriculum allocating a wide room for teaching natural and social sciences together with the traditional Islamic sciences (Mardin, 1994). With the promulgation of the Regulation for the Reform of Madrasas (*Islah-ı Medaris Nizamnamesi*) in 1914, the government centralized, regularized, and nationalized the

madrasa education, consolidating its authority over their curriculum, faculty, duration of education, pedagogy, administration (Bein, 2011, p. 60-61). An interesting arrangement was the reorganization of madrasas into a three-tier system modeled on the state education system. This strategy was probably aimed at transforming madrasas into centralized and controllable modern public school systems. According to another provision, the graduates of the third level madrasas were to hold a diploma (*icazetname*) which was granted not by an *individual* professor but by the *institution* itself. If the comparison that I made between the corporate character of the *licentia docenti* (the license to teach) and the individual character of the *ijaza* (the permission to teach) is recalled, this marks the closure of a long and sticky system of certification. Madrasas irrevocably vanished with the proclamation of the Law of the Unification of Education (*Tevhîd-i Tedrîsât Kanunu*) by the newly-established Republic of Turkey in 1924.

When it comes to *Darülfünûn*, one can observe some efforts to overhaul it in its many aspects. The ruling party leaders were in a close relationship with the German Empire, which evolved into an alliance in WWI, from 1908 to 1918 (see Gencer, 2001). As the grand ideologue of the party and the sociology professor at the university, Ziya Gökalp played a key role in promoting the merits of the Humboldtian university model (Tekeli, 2010, 140-144). If the dual nature of the Humboldtian university as both a public service institution and autonomous corporation (Schimank & Lange, 2009, p. 55-56) is taken into consideration, the attractiveness of this model for the CUP can be easily grasped. They were seeking a model in which professors are subordinate to or at least non-dissident of the state but largely autonomous regarding teaching and research. Emrullah Efendi, who was a prominent educationalist and the Minister of Public Education of the time, gave another intellectual support for the university overhaul. He developed an idea for the reform of the education system, arguing that the whole system should be organized from top to bottom, beginning with the university to the secondary and primary level schools (Dölen, 2008, p. 5-12). This idea is called the "theory of the tree of life" (*tuba ağacı nazariyesi*), since this mythical tree has its roots in the sky and its branches growing upside down to earth. He believed that the further development of higher education institutions could generate a group of elite pundits who would, in turn, use their expertise to enhance education at lower levels. Improving higher education institutions was the most urgent need, and he drafted regulations in 1912 concerning the organization and governance of the institution through a special commission.[37]

[37] This draft, however, did not pass as law due to the differences of opinion within the government (İhsanoğlu, 2019, p. 74-79). As we understand from the preamble of and justification for the regulations (*Darülfünun'un Suret-i Teşkil ve İdaresine Dair Kaleme Alınan Nizamnâmenin Esbab-ı Mucibesi*), Emrullah Efendi aspired to make "Istanbul Darülfünûn" an institution with two separate tasks: the *dissemination* and *development* of all sciences. The first task boils down to the education of students as future professionals, whereas the second underscores the task of scientific knowledge

The Kaiserreich, on the other hand, also built an intimate relationship with the Turkish government and sought to form cultural channels of influence on its WWI ally by supporting all cultural, scientific, and educational initiatives in Turkey by means of *Deutsch-Türkische Vereinigung* (Turkish-German Association), no matter how far-fetched (Fuhrmann, 2011, p. 134-135). As a result of this mutual affinity, Prof. Dr. Franz Schmidt, a *Geheimrat* (privy councilor) of German schools abroad, was appointed by the Turkish government as an advisor to the Ministry of Education in 1915 (Kreiser, 1990). After this official collaboration, over 2000 young people were sent out to study in German schools and vocational institutions as part of a "one-way exchange program" during WWI (Maksudyan, 2016, p. 144). Besides, a great number of students were sent to pursue undergraduate graduate and post-graduate education in German universities.

However, a more important move was the official invitation of twenty German professors to the *Darülfünûn* in the war years (Dölen, 2007, 91-102). These professors started working at the Turkish university in 1915 and turned back to their countries when the Central Powers lost the war in 1918. This was the inception of the influence of the German university model on the Turkish understanding and organization of higher education, later strengthened by the employment of a large group of academics fleeing from German universities under the Nazi regime in 1933. A philosophy professor at the university in this period notes that German scholars made a substantial contribution to the advancement of the university, despite the war conditions (Aynî, 1995, 72-74). They founded tens of research institutions and laboratories throughout the entire country, brought up-to-date experimental science methods and practices, introduced a chair system in which chairholders were acted as directors of institutes, helped to the formation of specialized libraries, contributed to the scientific journals published by the university, to name a few (Tekeli & İlkin, 1993, p. 96-97; Dölen, 2008, p. 34-41). Still, they were not able to transform the *Darülfünûn* into a Humboldt-inspired research university because of the lack of time and the resistance coming from the proponents of the French model.

The major outcome of this period was the enactment of the regulations about the university (*Darülfünûn-i Osmanî Nizamnâmesi*) in 1919. Even though such regulation had been on the agenda for a couple of years, the Ministry of General Education did not succeed in carrying it into effect, probably due to the political turmoil and instability at the governmental level during WWI. This regulation officially recognized the scholarly autonomy (*ilmi muhtariyet*) of the *Darülfünûn* (Art. 2). The term institutional autonomy was not clearly enounced, but the provisions regarding the internal governance arrangements were *de facto* granting it. The rector (*emin*) is to be elected by the

production and the education of tomorrow's scientists. In a sense, his university ideal was based on a combination of distinctive French and German university characteristics of the time.

academic staff and approved and overseen by the Ministry (Art. 19). In a similar way, the deans (*reis*) are to be elected by the faculty members. The Senate (*divan*) appeared as the locus of academic power since it was composed of the participation of at least two academic representatives from each faculty in addition to deans and the rector (Art. 23). In the absence of a board of trustees, council, or another body that would incorporate representation from the sphere of politics, bureaucracy, or economy, the Senate emerged as the academically-dominated decision-making body in administrative, scientific, and judicial matters. In 1922, the partial institutional autonomy and legal personality of the university were officialized through legislation (*Darülfünun'un Şahsiyet-i Hükmiyesi Hakkında Kararname*). Thus, the moribund Empire of the Armistice Period[38] somehow managed to bequeath a university with corporate autonomy to the Republic.

Conclusion

This chapter briefly surveyed how higher education was organized in the long history of the Ottoman Empire (and the Seljuk Empire), by focusing on the three distinct institutional types; the madrasa, professional schools, and the university. To put it simply, institutional types rose and fell within the Ottoman system of higher education in different eras depending upon the needs of the politico-administrative system of which they were part and the external pressures for modernization and change.

To a great extent, the madrasa system catered for the Empire's need for loyal functionaries by producing scholars, judges, imams, muftis, jurists, and bureaucrats of other types throughout the entire Ottoman land until the 18th century. This period, in varying degrees, was characterized by the alliance or *quid pro quo* between madrasas that generate "scholar-bureaucrats" and political power. The link between the madrasa system and bureaucratic-judicial domains was institutionalized through the emergence of *ilmiye* as a distinct career path within the imperial bureaucracy.

The military defeats of the Ottomans during a series of battles stemmed from the technological incompetence in the 18th century can be conceived as exogenous shocks that transformed the needs of the state system. The Empire heavily invested in organizing higher education around the professional schools, first in the military and then in civil fields of expertise. The rise of these institutions brought with it a new conception of science and knowledge and triggered a bifurcation in the organization of higher education in which the madrasa system

[38] This was a period that began with the entry of The Armistice of Mudros into force in 1918, followed by the occupation of the capital city (Istanbul) and the subsequent partitioning of the Ottoman Empire by the Allied Powers, and ended up with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 as a consequence of the decisive victory of the Turkish National Movement at the end of the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1923).

experienced a decrease in its size, funding, and influence. The late Ottoman reformers conceived European-inspired professional schools as indispensable tools in the Empire's hands to transform the state and society.

The university as an organizational form came into being in the mid-19th century and earned its spurs at the end of the century after a series of attempts. Compared to the madrasas and professional schools, the university is a latecomer to the higher education system. This was the period in which European university models spread worldwide as the main organizational patterns of higher education either through colonialism and missionary activities or as a product of policy borrowing and emulation. The Turkish university, as distinct from its European counterparts that have developed gradually out of medieval universities, thus lacks a long tradition and its accompanying practices. The idea of establishing a university, which would go beyond the functions of madrasas and professional schools and engage in sciences of the era, was obviously a favorable one. Yet, even the prominent Ottoman reformist bureaucrats and intellectuals were still unclear in terms of its potential gains and jeopardies (Yalçınkaya, 2015, p. 144). The university would become the main organizational form of higher education only after the abolishment of madrasas and the gradual transformation of professional schools into academies and universities during the early Republic.

Before proceeding to the next chapter, let me highlight some general points that can be helpful to understand the impact of the Ottoman legacy on the Republic of Turkey with regard to higher education. First, the Republican elite continued the late Ottoman practice of modernization in higher education, characterized by policy borrowing, emulation, and adaptation. Despite the differences in the instrument they used or the models they took inspiration from, the state elite in two polities have consistently looked abroad and transferred knowledge, expertise, and systemic features from the Western countries. The interplay between foreign models and domestic institutions produced a complex story of institutional adaptation and hybridization, which will be partially addressed in the upcoming chapters. The second point is the strong and central role that the state played in steering, designing, and reforming higher education. The Ottoman political-administrative tradition left a particular imprint on the Republican bureaucracy in this respect. As it will be shown, the involvement of extra-state actors and stakeholders in matters related to higher education remained relatively limited.

In addition to the modernization agenda and strong role of the state, I would suggest that the late Ottoman understanding of the very purpose of higher education also considerably affected the visions of the Republican elite. In the late Ottoman era, the prevalent role attributed to higher education was to train certain numbers of qualified professionals and loyal bureaucratic cadres for

the state. This understanding based on the elite form of higher education in the Trowian sense of the term can be argued to have been historically sticky so that expansion as a policy strategy has mostly been approached with suspicion by certain policy and academic actors despite the ever-growing demand for higher education. There have always been shortcomings in matters such as financing and human resources through which the state could have created and sustained a large public university system that would meet the massive demand for higher education. Still, I would argue that the 'elitist' vision of higher education might be a cofounder with material factors (e.g., financial and human resources capacity of the state) in belating the massification of higher education (for data, see Appendix and Çetinsaya 2014, 37-88). Even though my main focus is not massification and expansion of higher education, the data I collected seems to suggest a historical lock-in effect of elitist vision of higher education arrangements that may have been a factor hindering the growth until the late 1990s, going beyond the mere role of preparing a small minority of the population for the elite roles. Still, this is a preliminary observation that should be further tested, considering more sophisticated evidence.

CHAPTER THREE

The Higher Education Policy and Governance under the Single-Party Rule, 1923-1946

This chapter focuses on the policy change specific to governance arrangements in higher education during the single-party era (1923-1946) characterized by the rule of the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP; *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*). I treat the single-party era as an analytically distinct period for some reasons. First of all, this era marks the foundational period of the Republic of Turkey, where what is left out of the deceased Ottoman Empire. Higher education policy should be seen in the context of the young Republic's broader modernization, and reform attempts to eliminate the proponents of the Caliphate and Sultanate, to build a secular nation(-state) with a new set of values, and to substitute Turkish nationalism for Ottomanism and Islam. Second, this era can be conceived as a period of institutional formation and design in which the young state endeavored to build new institutions or replace the old ones. Third, an analysis of higher education policy of the era requires to go beyond premises of policymaking developed upon principles of democratic multi-party political systems. In the absence of a competitive and pluralist political environment and a full-blown market and civil society actors that would be influential, the authoritarian ruling party was the predominant actor in higher education policymaking.

I will particularly deal with the two major university reforms in this period; the university reforms of 1933 and 1946. The *Darülfünûn*, as the only full-fledged university, was at the center of most of the policy attempts geared towards organizing and steering higher education in the single-party era. Even though the Republic also inherited a group of higher-level academies and colleges from the moribund Ottoman Empire, none of them sparked reform debate as the *Darülfünûn* had.

The chapter begins with a short discussion on single-party literature with a special focus on the Turkish experience. It both intends to inform the reader concerning the broader political and context of the country during the given period and to locate the Turkish case in relation to the broader population of the cases.

Single-Party Regimes and the Turkish Experience: A Brief Discussion

In his review article on communist single-party rules, Kalyvas (1999, p. 324-325) writes that there is a striking theoretical void in the study of single-party rules within research on political parties. The relevant research is rather full of typologies developed in the 1960s and '70s in which theory building was associated with producing typologies for what had to be explained. As he (1999) rightly emphasizes, the underlying explanatory logic of these typologies was mainly conditioned by the premises of modernization theory, functionalism, and old institutionalism. However, despite these shortcomings, they are still useful in placing the RPP experience in a comparative perspective and identifying its basic characteristics.

Maurice Duverger paid special attention to Turkey's single-party experience in his seminal book on political parties. In comparing diverse single-party experiences, Duverger (1959, p. 275-280) offered an interpretation of Turkish experience as a peculiar category of a single-party which should be distinguished from fascist and communist parties. As distinct from these systems in which the single-party claims a permanent rule of the party, Duverger labeled the RPP as a provisional single-party and a "temporary guardian" (p. 280) whose role was to Westernize Turkey by fighting the obstacles to reforms and make the transition to a pluralist democratic system smooth. Although it was not democratic in its nature, it was non-totalitarian.

A more sophisticated theory of single-party systems was offered by Huntington (1970). Drawing upon the modernization theories of his term, Huntington argued that single-party systems were to be found in societies where the modernization process paved the way for the breakdown of traditional society and gave rise to the political mobilization of new social groups. The single-party system was a solution for relatively more modern social forces to suppress counter-revolutionary groups in a bifurcated society that polarized around socio-economic or ethnic-religious lines. Huntington, then, make a distinction between *exclusionary* parties which accept the bifurcation and use the party as a means of mobilizing support from their constituency and restricting the political activity of the subordinate group and *revolutionary* parties which attempt to eradicate the bifurcation by liquidating and/or assimilating the subordinate groups (see table 3.1.). He labeled the Turkish single-party experience as an *exclusionary* system in which Westernized urban classes and politico-bureaucratic elite excluded the peasantry and landlords from the political power.

	Policies Toward Bifurcation	
Basis of Bifurcation	**Exclusionary**	**Revolutionary**
Ethnic-religious	Ulster Liberia	Nazi Germany

Economic	Kemalist Turkey Nationalist China	Communist regimes Mexico

Table 3.1. Bifurcation and one-party systems (Huntington, 1970, p. 17)

Moore's (1970) was another attempt to construct a typology of single-party systems. In contradistinction to Huntington, Moore argued that established single-party systems could be understood not as products of bifurcation in changing societies but as ideological responses to prevailing legitimacy crises. Therefore, single-parties articulated new legitimating criteria derived by and for the party rather than any other political or social groups on the way for the task of creating a new political culture. Moore (table 3.2.) offered a four-fold typology of single-party regimes based on the functions and goals of the prescribed ideology. According to this typology, Atatürk's Turkey was a *tutelary* regime harnessing an instrumental ideology (Kemalism) to partially transform the society in line with the aim of putting Turkey on a level with the most advanced civilization of the time.

	Goals	
Functions	Total Transformation	Partial Transformation
Instrumental	**Totalitarian** Stalinist Russia Maoist China Nazi Germany	**Tutelary** Atatürk's Turkey Yugoslavia Tunisia
Expressive	**Chiliastic** Fascist Italy Nkrumah's Ghana Ben Bellah's Algeria	**Administrative** Mexico

Table 3.2. Single-party ideologies (Moore, 1970, p. 57)

Sartori [1976] (2005) offered another typology of single-party systems, which have been more authoritative than the typologies mentioned above. Sartori sorted out three varieties of single-party systems: totalitarian, authoritarian, and pragmatic unipartism (table 3.3.). We can safely say that one-party systems represent an anomalous conceptual category for Sartori since all other six party systems in his general typology (e.g., hegemonic, predominant, two-party, limited pluralism, extreme pluralism, and atomized systems) assumes a competitive political regime. Whereas the first two subtypes of single-party systems had been underpinned in the literature, the third type, e,g., pragmatic unipartism, is a new category that differs from the others with its lesser coercive capacity and lack of ideological cohesiveness. Scholars utilizing Sartori's typology to locate the RPP (for instance, Özbudun, 1981, p. 97-98; Tunçay, 1981, p. 12-14) concur that it cannot be seen as a

totalitarian instance of unipartism. They placed the Turkish experience in between the authoritarian and pragmatic types in its evolution.

Criteria	**Totalitarian unipartism**	**Authoritarian unipartism**	**Pragmatic unipartism**
Ideology	Strong and totalistic	Weaker and nontotalistic	Irrelevant or very feeble lower
Coercion, extraction, mobilization	High	Medium	Lower
Policies vs. outer groups	Destructive	Exclusionary	Absorptive
Sub-group independence	None	Limited to non-political groups	Permitted or tolerated
Arbitrariness	Unbounded and unpredictable	Within predictable limits	Bounded

Table 3.3. Single-party types and their characteristics (Sartori, 2005, p. 202)

Juan Linz's seminal work on totalitarian and authoritarian regimes [1975] (2000) has drawn attention to the authoritarian regimes as a non-democratic and non-totalitarian ideal type. His basic argument was that authoritarian regimes were essentially different from totalitarian regimes on four key dimensions: pluralism, ideology, leadership, and mobilization. Authoritarian regimes lack elements such as a guiding utopian ideology, unlimited charismatic leadership, and intensive or extensive political mobilization that characterize the totalitarian regimes (see also Linz & Stepan 1996). Linz (2000) argued that all single-party regimes were necessarily authoritarian. He situated the Turkish case as an example of a "bureaucratic-authoritarian regime," a concept that had been initially developed by O'donnell (1973) to analyze Latin American politics. Thus, the Kemalist regime was aiming at carrying out basic processes of modernization, especially secularization and educational reform, creating preconditions for competitive democracy like that of the more successful Western cases (Linz, 2000, p. 173).

Typologies are theoretical constructs used when variables are measured nominally (Geddes, 2003, p. 51). What makes typologies useful then is their capability to capture the crucial differences between types. Even though we do not have a full-fledged theory on single-party rules, we can still deduce some general assumptions based on the available literature. Those assumptions are minimal but sufficient to guide our discussion on the higher education policy of the period.

A1: Turkish single-party regime was non-totalitarian.

The single-party system in Turkey was not characterized by the radical eradication of the social bifurcation (Huntington), a total transformation of society in line with a well-articulated ideology

(Duverger; Moore), and a mix of ideational and coercive elements that makes it totalitarian (Sartori; Linz). Similar ideas have also been expressed by some prominent Turkish scholars who have studied political parties in Turkey (among others, Tunaya, 1960; Özbudun, 1981; Tunçay, 1981). According to these accounts, RPP tolerated a limited pluralism in contrast to the totalitarian regimes of the time.

A2: Turkish single-party regime was temporary and transitory.

The underlying assumption is that the Turkish single-party system was temporary since the leaders of the party did not consider it an ideal or favorable system as captured by Duverger's term "temporary guardian." The tutelage of the single-party was essential for the rapid modernization of society in a top-down way (Moore) and to exclude the proponents of the sultanate or caliphate from the power structures (Huntington). Thus, this regime was a necessary step in Turkey's transition to democracy.

A3: Turkish single-party regime was ready to make the transition to liberal democracy when internal and/or external conditions change.

The aim of the Kemalist regime was inherently pragmatic (Duverger; Sartori). Its goal was to Westernize Turkey and eliminate the barriers that hamper the transition to democracy. In other words, the politico-bureaucratic elite (Linz) aimed at creating new institutions and political culture that would make a transition to a democratic system ineluctable (Tunaya, 1960). Weiker (1973, p. 4) endorses such explanations, arguing that tutelage during the single-party period was a definite benefit to both modernization and democracy in Turkey. To sum up, these early studies on single-party systems have all presented the Turkish case as an example to be appreciated for its merits. The tutelage or enlightened despotism of the Kemalist regime was a necessary evil to make the country modern and democratic.[39]

When it comes to higher education policy of the era, the Turkish single-party experience can contribute to the understanding of a somewhat blindspot in higher education research: how higher education policy processes are influenced by the developments in a political environment characterized by the rule of authoritarian single-party governments. There has been a recent interest

[39] The inherent normative core of those studies was strong so that they pardoned certain authoritarian measures of the RPP and similar parties in endorsing their merits in modernization. Köker (1990) offers a critique of modernization theory-based assumptions, arguing how the ideology of tutelage is itself antidemocratic since the tutelary power is supposed to authoritatively decide when the society is ready for a transition to democracy. On the other hand, some political scientists studying the RPP and Kemalism question the assumption that the RPP really intended to make the conditions for democracy eligible (Köker, 1990; Parla & Davison, 2005). They raise serious objections by focusing on the ideological tenet of Kemalism. However, these arguments are irrelevant for our purposes as we know that the RPP played a crucial role in the transition to liberal democracy even if its ideology had contained considerable antidemocratic components.

in the role of political parties and partisan politics in higher education policy (see Ansell, 2008; Jungblut, 2015). Yet, the nature of the case that is put under the scope here necessitates going beyond the emerging research agenda. To begin with, most of the studies linking party politics to the higher education policy take a well-functioning multi-party political system operating on democratic principles for granted. This project may be extended to include single-party systems and regimes lacking assumed democratic principles. Second, most of the research outputs in this research strand have focused on cleavage-based Western European political party systems, which have allowed researchers to deduce party preferences with regard to deeply-rooted cleavage lines. For example, we can extrapolate a social democratic party to support a massified as well as free or affordable access to higher education, while we can expect a liberal party to promote a market competition on the supply side and cost-sharing on the demand side, assuming general policy preferences of these parties would apply to the higher education policy field. We need further research to see what to expect from political parties in systems in which there are no entrenched societal cleavages (or the possibility for the social forces to organize along with these cleavages); in systems that experienced radical regime change processes; and during critical junctures providing considerable leverage to parties to induce fundamental policy change beyond anticipated outcomes. Finally, the research agenda on party politics in higher education policy is geared towards providing explanations and analytical tools for the role of parties in higher education policy change from the 1980s to the present. This tendency is immensely reasonable since most of the major reforms in higher education in the world have taken place during this period. The tradeoff is that many studies give too much emphasis on institutional isomorphism and policy convergence processes that only have taken place during several decades by tossing out what role political parties played in higher education policymaking in different settings before it was 'cool.'

Higher Education Policy during the Early Republic, 1923-1933

The higher education system inherited by the newly founded Republic of Turkey had had its constitutive governance arrangements designed by one of the last Ottoman governments. As discussed in the previous chapter, *Darülfünûn-i Osmanî Nizamnamesi* (1919) was the main regulatory document providing arrangements as to the governance of the only university in Turkey, namely the *Darülfünûn*. This institution was at the center of both policy discussions and reform efforts during the single-party era. The first legislation was the law on the Legal Personality of Istanbul Darülfünûn (*İstanbul Darülfünûnunun Şahsiyeti Hükmiyesi Hakkında Kanun*, Law no. 493) enacted in 1924. This was an amendment of the prior law rather than being an expression of a new policy design. The law brought minor changes in terms of internal organization, institutional governance,

and scholarly autonomy of the university (see the previous chapter). The most important modification was the provision that the university is governed with an annexed budget (Art. 2). Furthermore, the law granted financial autonomy to the university, stating, inter alia, that the university and its faculties can accept endowments and dispose of real estate (Art. 3). This law, in appearance, strengthened the institutional and statutory autonomy of the university, providing substantial elements of financial autonomy in addition to scholarly independence that had already been stated in the previous regulations. Yet, if we scrutinize the preamble of law (Hirsch, 1998; p. 208-209), we can see that the main reason behind the provisions related to the legal personality and the financial autonomy was the need to provide a legal basis for making university as an organization capable of receiving all kinds of donations. The preamble directly quotes the name of Princess Fatma of Egypt – a member of the Ottoman aristocratic family, i.e., Kavalalı dynasty, that ruled Egypt around 150 years – who made a lavish bequest by endowing some of her real estate properties and revenues to the university. The legislators, thus, hoped to benefit from these generous funds in meeting the fiscal deficit to fund the university, given the economic damage of the successive wars.

The Republic also inherited a number of vocational and professional academies and continued this tradition during the early Republic by establishing more of these kinds of institutions. These elite institutions maintained to produce governors, administrators, diplomats, and military officers, in line with the Republican values promoting secularism, nationalism, etatism as articles of faith for students and staff. The Law School (1925), the School of Language and History and Geography (1935), The Institute of Technology for Agriculture (1933), among others, were the new academic institutions established in the new capital city of the Republic. By doing so, the founding elite aimed at putting an end to the monopoly of Istanbul as the only city in which higher education was provided. One of the oldest and prestigious institutions of the late Ottoman era, e.g., the School of Civil Administration, was also moved to Ankara and named the School of Political Science (1936). These institutions formed a basis for the first full-fledged university, namely the Ankara University, founded after the formation of the Republic.

One of the first steps in reforming the education system was the enactment of the Law on Unification of Education (*Tevhîd-i Tedrîsât Kanunu*, Law no. 430) on 3 March 1924. This law made the state monopoly in the provision of educational services, mandating that all educational institutions, along with foreign schools founded by missionaries, are obliged to operate under the Ministry of Education. The educational intentions of the RPP were not only steadfast in imposing the monopoly of the state over education but also in redesigning the system in conformity with the secularist ideology of the ruling elite. For that reason, the party abolished all of the 479 madrasas

and the other religious schools following the enactment of this law (Sakaoğlu, 2018, p. 241). Thus, the educational dualism that emerged in the 19th century between the religiously-oriented schools and the others, which was based on relatively secular curricula, came to an end. By abolishing madrasas, the government dissolved the binary education system, which is commonly known as school-madrasa (*mektep-medrese*) dualism. We can observe *displacement* (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010) as a mode of institutional change at work at this juncture. The Ottoman reformers in the 19th century, as discussed in the previous chapter, had preferred *layering* as a strategy, adding new educational institutions at all levels on the existing ones and begetting a bifurcation in the system. As the hegemon political actor of the new Republic, the Kemalist reformers did not have to negotiate their power with other actors with vested interests as their Ottoman counterparts had had to. Hence, the institutional change they triggered was abrupt and rapid similar to other experiences involving radical transformations such as revolutions and regime changes.

Governments and political actors remained relatively passive or showed limited interest in higher education policy until the early 1930s. This was due to the fact that investing in primary and secondary education was a more vital instrument for achieving certain state goals, including economic development, construction of republican citizens, and, more importantly, nation-state building (Szyliowicz, 1973; Williamson, 1987; Tiregöl, 1998). Building a secular nation-state and constructing a national identity was particularly crucial for the fledgling Republic, a successor of a multi-ethnic empire ruled by sultans who also claimed to be the caliphate of the whole Islamicate world. As the Ministry of Education's circular of 19 December 1923 declared, schools were obliged to indoctrinate loyalty to the Republican principles and love to the nation. The social and political socialization function of education was crucial to foster new values and official ideology among the young citizens of the country. In other words, primary education was important for providing basic training for the workforce and molding the pupils' minds in conformity with Republican principles and ideals.

Therefore, the Kemalist education policy was indeed a part of a broader Republican agenda aiming at forging a unified or monolithic nation around the officially proclaimed principles (Fortna, 2012, p. 23). The educational reform was taken seriously so that the government invited several foreign experts to make recommendations for reorganizing the existing education system. The most famous of these recommendations were made by American philosopher and educational reformer John Dewey in his two reports on the Turkish education system in 1924 (Dewey, 1939). Yet, there was an apparent discrepancy between Dewey's policy recommendations and the Turkish government's policy aims. Dewey, for instance, criticized the unification in education, underscored the dangers of centralization and lack of control at the local level, and recommended giving more

autonomy to schools (Biesta & Miedema, 1996, p. 10-12). The Turkish state did not follow these policy recommendations, while some advice about improving teacher quality and training was duly noted (Turan, 2000). This reflects an inner tension between the Turkish government's eclectic strategy of modernization/Westernization from above – based on achieving organizational/bureaucratic rationality and efficiency as well as internalizing all the cultural dimensions that made Western societies modern through the imposition of beliefs, behaviors, and institutions in a top-down fashion (Keyder, 1997) – and the pluralism, autonomy, democracy, and structural differentiation that any modernization process that has a normative commitment to the enlightenment project intrinsically embodies.

To sum up, during the decade from 1923-1933, single-party governments have intensively aimed at reforming the education system in accordance with their political agenda. They occasionally intervened in higher education policy – and when they did, it was sporadic in its nature – going no beyond than rearranging minor aspects of what was already in effect. Governments and bureaucratic actors' lack of interest in higher education policy can be accounted for by the fact that both the social reality and the aims of the new regime compelled them to utilize most of the resources and energy on an extensive overhaul of the education system at lower levels. This was a sine qua non, given the ignorance of the masses and the low literacy rate at around 30 percent in cities and around 5 percent in rural areas during the mid-1920s (Williamson, 1987)[40]. Besides, the governments lacked enough economic resources to adequately fund higher education institutions as they were left with a devastated land and impoverished population due to the havoc of WWI and the War of Independence. For these reasons, it is hard to find any reference to the public importance of problems regarding higher education during the period. Higher education as a policy issue was absent from both political/intellectual debate, government programs, and Parliament's actual work. Apparently, this does not mean that no legislative measures or proposals concerning the higher education policy area come out during this period. Nonetheless, these legislative acts were germane to either usual administrative affairs – especially the establishment of new academies/faculties, the creation of new academic posts, and the invitation of foreign scholars – or minor amendments of rules and regulations governing the academic field. Yet, the university question began to attract considerable public and policy attention during the early '30s. The next section will concentrate on how *Darülfünûn* became a hot topic among the political and intellectual circles, as well as the reasons that led the RPP to make the first university reform of the young Republic.

[40] The challenge was not only to increase the literacy rates per se but to mobilize the entire country to learn the new Turkish alphabet composed of Latin rather than Arabo-Persian letters, following the alphabet reform of 1928.

Towards the 1933 University Reform: Reasons and Justifications

The educational policy efforts in the first decade of the Republic, as discussed above, primarily concentrated on educational development and schooling. In the first place, the governments endeavored to massify primary and secondary education. This infrastructural improvement was accompanied by pedagogical and ideological projects directed towards imposing and inculcating certain revolutionary values to pupils on the way towards creating the favored citizens of the Republic.

The RPP sought to establish a power monopoly during the 1920s by purging, banishing, or executing their opponents who held pro-caliphate and pro-sultanate ideals or repugnating the party policies, drawing upon the provisions that the Law on the Maintenance of Order of 1925 (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*, Law no. 578). In the 1931 party convention, Kemalism's six principles are inscribed in the party program: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, reformism, and étatism. Based on this ideological imprint, the party increased its governmental authority on the grounds that an authoritarian government was necessary to carry out further reforms and to preserve those already at hand (Karpat, 1991). In order to make state and party identical, the RPP preferred to dismiss public officials considered anti-RPP and suppress or shut down non-governmental organizations leaning towards liberalism or socialism. Newspapers and periodicals with liberal or left-wing tendencies were mostly shut down after the adoption of a law in 1931, which gave the government the authority to shut down any press organ spreading news or ideas contradicting the general policies of the country (Zürcher, 2004, p. 179-181).

Against this backdrop, The *Darülfünûn* become a cause celebre among the political and intellectual circles during the early 1930s. This institution was one of the few organizations with a relative degree of institutional autonomy in an environment where most non-state actors had been either controlled or shut down. As a scholar puts it, it was the only "pressure group" that the single-party governments could not directly control (Mazıcı, 1995). The ruling party elite and its organic intellectuals were committed to accomplishing a cultural transformation of the country under the party's leadership, and, for that reason, state intervention to the *Darülfünûn* was immediate and inevitable.

One of the most important reasons that made a university reform necessary was the ideological and political dissidence between the faculty members and administrators of the *Darülfünûn* and the ruling party elite. There was striking heterogeneity among the faculty members in terms of their political attitudes and ideological tendencies, which bothered the Kemalist elite, who had been trying to mobilize all educational institutions to comply with the Kemalist principles. All other higher education institutions, including the professional and technical colleges inherited

from the empire, were in line with the Kemalist message. et, the *Darülfünûn* was relatively distinct from the other modern academies exclusively created to equip civil and military bureaucratic cadres of the modernizing Turkish state. From its inception in the late Ottoman period, the *Darülfünûn* had grounded on the study of literature, languages, history, philosophy, religion, and natural sciences, and evolved as a center of ideas in the humanistic and liberal tradition of contemporary Europe (Öncü, 1993, p. 147). Some of its scholars had the intellectual capacity to provide different interpretations of the Turkish Revolution, criticize the RPP's policy choices, or, at least, become reluctant in championing the Kemalist reforms. Finally, we should note that the existence of some staff with Islamist tendencies among the cadres of the institution seemed to be an obstacle to transforming it into a more positivist direction (Berkes, 1997, 48-70).

The most severe criticisms towards both the *Darülfünûn* as an institution and its faculty members appeared at the *Kadro*, arguably the most important magazine and the intellectual circle during the early '30s. *Kadro* was so important in the sense that its authors substantially contributed to the formulation of many policy principles and ideological elements of the RPP rule, particularly in the 1930s. Seeing themselves as the vanguard of Kemalism, the *Kadro* movement advocated dirigisme, corporatism, and state-planning a la Soviet-style, not only in economic policy but in many areas of socio-cultural life (for details, see Harris, 2002). The Great Depression damaged the reputation of liberalism, and the rising tide of totalitarian practices in Soviet Russia, Germany, and Italy started to entice many Turkish intellectuals as an alternative option. In this context, academics supporting politically and economically liberal ideas were also started to be rebuked. The university should be strictly aligned with government policies with no dissent remaining.

Burhan Asaf (1932a), a prominent intellectual of the period and a *Kadro* author, leveled a harsh criticism towards the *Darülfünûn* after the Turkish History Congress in 1932. Asaf reprehended some of the historians and Turkologists, particularly Zeki Velidi Togan, from the *Darülfünûn* as they argued against the main assertions of Turkish History Thesis[41] put forward in the Congress. Yet, his main aim was to disparage the institution itself because it fell behind the Turkish Revolution. To pay its debt to the Turkish Revolution, this institution should be immediately regenerated. Going further, Asaf (1932b) even urged the government to establish a "party school" by combining the Civil Administration School and the School of Law in Ankara, which would educate future bureaucratic and political cadres in compliance with a monolithic ideology and worldview. In his eyes, higher education institutions should be re-organized as

[41] This thesis was an official pseudoscientific and politically motivated study of Turkish history, focusing on the ancient historical, linguistic, and ethnic origins of the Turks by neglecting the Islamic and Ottoman legacies. The new interpretation of history was seen as crucial in building the secular Turkish identity and re-shaping its collective memory. During the rest of the single-party period, it becomes a part of the national pedagogy and history teaching.

appendages of the party organization, whose primary function would serve the advancement of the republican ideals. We can follow similar ideas in the essay of Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, who was another important intellectual figure of the *Kadro* movement. He (1933) similarly held that the *Darülfünûn* should reflect the society in which it is embedded and serve it in many aspects, including achieving certain political aims. Aydemir had expected the *Darülfünûn* to have provided analysis and explanation of how etatism, reformism, and nationalism can help Turkey progress. However, it failed to produce a single academic paper analyzing the causes of the Turkish Revolution and how to advance it (Aydemir, 1933). The *Darülfünûn*, according to the *Kadro* author, did not actively take part in the re-establishment of their country as distinct from its Russian and Italian counterparts.

All the criticisms that appeared in *Kadro* and other pro-government newspapers and magazines (see Dölen, 2010b, p. 1-8) molded the public opinion and urged the government to carry out a politically motivated operation against the dissident academics and to secure the uniformity between the ideals of the Turkish Revolution and the operation of the *Darülfünûn*. The crucial point is that these criticisms did not belong to only a couple of fervent Kemalist intellectuals craving to shape the ideology of the RPP. The members of the government were substantially influenced by those ideas and even used them to justify the necessity of a reform. Reşit Galip, the Minister of Education at the time, formulated the main reasons behind the 1933 University Reform in accordance with the ideas discussed by the *Kadro* authors:

> "In the nine years between 1923 to 1932, the gaze of the entire Turkish intellectuals has been turned towards the Darülfünûn … No other national issue has aroused interest as much as the Darülfünûn issue. No other institution has received as much criticism. Yet despite all this attention and criticism, the Darülfünûn has failed to show the expected improvement, development, and progress. There have been momentous economic and social reforms in the country. Darülfünûn has remained an impartial observer. There have been essential developments in the economic area. Darülfünûn has appeared unaware of these. There have been radical changes in the legal system. Darülfünûn has contented itself with merely including the new laws in its instruction program. There was the alphabet reform and new language movement. Darülfünûn never heeded them. A new conception of history swept the entire country as a national movement. It took three years of waiting and effort to arouse Darülfünûn's interest. The Darülfünûn has become static; retired into its shell; withdrawn from the external world in moderate isolation" (Translation is mine; In Hirsch, 1998, p. 312).

These sentences indeed reveal one of the underlying reasons behind the Reform: To make the university a regime apparatus that would further develop and disseminate the official principles of the Kemalist Revolution and serve the state's political, economic, and cultural purposes willingly. If we think it with Olsen's (2007) seminal article discussing the different visions of the university, we can safely assert that the Republican elite imagined a "university as an instrument for national political agendas." This was their particular answer to the question posed by Olsen: What kind of university for what kind of society? The university, in this vision, is conceived as an instrument for contributing to the implementation of policies as defined by the government and achieving national priorities. Given the overall project of Kemalism – which aims at not only building a new nation-state out of a moribund empire but also implementing an array of social and cultural reforms to construct a totally new and Westernized Turkish society – we could grasp the prescribed role to the university. The *Darülfünûn* not only failed to fulfill its role in contributing to the state's agenda but also became a site of political dissent. It was seen as a betrayer to the ideals of the Turkish Revolution and in conflict with the external/political actors. The reformers envisioned a university as an ideological instrument of the Turkish Revolution that should not even pretend to be neutral. This was the main theme covered by the majority of intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats of the period. The unwillingness of this institution to serve the national political agenda triggered many accounts to bring university autonomy into question. As Olsen notes (2007), autonomy does not come without a compromise in this vision; rather, it is given on the condition that the university will effectively play its prescribed role.

On the other hand, we have sufficient material suggesting that the Republican elite was also interested in reforming the *Darülfünûn* to increase its research capacity and teaching quality, among other things. The technical problems had been already there, and they were salient regardless of the political and ideological dissidence between the government and the university. Creating a university that would be on a par with a prominent European counterpart was one of the reformers' ideals trying to reach the most advanced civilizational level of their era (Ergin, 2009). When the university reform, e.g., a full-fledged overhaul of the *Darülfünûn*, came to the government's agenda towards the end of 1931, the Ministry of Education set up a reform committee. The government officially invited Albert Malche, a Swiss pedagogy professor from the University of Geneva, to chair the committee and to prepare an elaborative report that would diagnose the problems of the university and offer remedies. Malche presented his report to Turkish authorities after four months of investigation as a foreign and objective observer. The following were the most crucial

observations and policy proposals of the Malche report [1932] (1939) concerning university governance[42]:

1. The scholarly autonomy and legal personality are requisites for any university, and they should be maintained. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the state should not take part in steering the university affairs. Autonomy ought not to be understood as a detachment (p. 5) even if it refers to the right to self-governance (p. 24). The *Darülfünûn* cannot use its autonomy to digress from the authoritative discretion of the Ministry, of which it is an agent.
2. The administrative responsibility of the university pertains to the rector (*emin*). Yet, his position is incomparable to that of an American university president who has broad authority in administrative matters or a Swiss rector who is not more than being a representative of his colleagues. The rector should focus more on scientific matters, and s/he should be supported by an administrative body that would carry on day-to-day operations (p. 8). For the university reform to be successful, the rector should act as a loyal representative of its principal, namely the Ministry of Education (p. 23);
3. The appointment and dismissal of professors should not be under the responsibility of collegial bodies of the university but of the Ministry (p. 10). Although the academic profession should carry the right to nominate someone as a prospective professor, the Ministry ought to be in charge of the final decision of employment and unemployment processes.
4. Implementing the reforms should be entirely within the purview of the government through the Ministry of Education. The *Darülfünûn* should accept the necessity that a government commissioner can substitute the rector during the period of transition to make sure that all reforms will be implemented safely and immediately (p. 24-25).

As can be seen, the proposals by Malche concurs with the RPP leadership's point of view since it offers to deal with the administrative problems through the strengthening of the central control over the university. He sometimes seems to find a middle course between central control and institutional autonomy in university governance when he argues that the right of autonomy cannot be used without the *direct* supervision of the state after pointing out that autonomy is a right to self-

[42] Malche's identifications and suggestions concerning other aspects of the *Darülfünûn* were far from being original. In fact, Atatürk himself, as one can see in his own handwritten comments and notes on Malche's report (Kocatürk, 1984), was not quite satisfied with the report as he noted that many points raised by Malche had been apparent issues that any Turkish reformist intellectual could immediately establish.

governance that should be maintained. These kinds of internal inconsistencies can be attributed to the government's exhortation or pressure on him. Nevertheless, what he did was to support the overall Kemalist project of modernization from above. Therefore, he gave the green light to the complete and rapid overhaul of the university under state tutelage, even if his suggestions may not actually reflect his real ideal of the university. Examining the draft law draft that he prepared after submitting his report, we encounter a relatively different and coherent set of recommendations. In this draft, Malche lays out a self-governing university in which the academics elect leaders, and decisions are made collegially in the absence of direct supervision of the Ministry (Dölen, 2010b, p. 131-141). Nevertheless, the government did not even discuss this law draft, let alone enact it. The reform would produce outcomes that the draft had neither offered (such as the tight control of the university by the central authorities) nor imagined (such as the purge of the unwanted academic staff).

Malche also made some suggestions in his report regarding improving research capacity, increasing publication performance, raising faculty members' salaries and funds, building better libraries and laboratories, and so on. The important point is that the authorities had largely known all these structural problems. The report just confirmed these problems and provided potential methods of dealing with them. The government duly noted these solutions; however, it did not have the mere intention of ameliorating such aspects. It was full of zeal for its aim – the creation of a new university that would serve the state agenda without any incongruous voice – and certain that it could not have implemented such a reform with the existing academic staff.

The Ambiguous Legacy of the 1933 Reform

The reform committee completed its comprehensive work within a year, and the Parliament legislated the new law immediately after. The adoption of the Law on the Annulment of the İstanbul Darülfünun and the Establishment of a New University by the Ministry of Education (*İstanbul Darülfünununun İlgasına ve Maarif Vekâletince Yeni bir Üniversite Kurulmasına dair Kanun*) on 31 May 1933 marks the end of the *Darülfünûn*. This law did abrogate not only the entire institution (Art. 1) but also all prior provisions and regulations regarding its functioning (Art. 12). As an empowering act, it also authorized the Ministry of Education as the sole power responsible for re-establishing a new university within a year (Art. 2). The Ministry also had the prerogative to designate the academic staff either employed in or dismissed from the new university (Art. 5). The term university was used for the first time in an official document in Turkish history to replace the former term *darülfünunun* (the house of sciences). An ensuant law (*İstanbul Üniversitesinin Muvazenei Umumiye Alınmasına dair Kanun*, Law no. 2467) incorporated the university budget into the general

budget, meaning that any issue related to income-generating or spending will be the under the responsibility of central administration through ministries. The new university, thus, had to operate under the tutelage of the government, deprived of autonomy to decide financial, administrative, staff, and even academic matters.[43]

The Reform removed the rector election, a procedure that had been embraced in 1919. The government embraced the authority to appoint the rector who would govern university affairs with broad authorities. The secretary-general (*umumi kâtip*), appointed by the Ministry of Education, was a person assisting the rector in administrative matters. The rector and the secretary-general were in practice representatives of the Ministry, rather than being administrators of an autonomous institution. This was a turn into a hierarchical mode from the collegial one, as the distribution of authority within the institution clearly changed on behalf of the rector. Academic bodies had to content themselves with mere advisory roles without hoping to shape or participate in decision-making processses.

By the power vested in him by the Act, Reşit Galip, the Minister of Education and a fervent defender of the Reform, held the idea that liquidating academics would be a favorable option as many of them were ineligible for carrying the Turkish Revolution onward (Tunçay & Özen, 1984). Yet, the main problem was to find both qualified and loyal academics to fill new positions. Even though the single-party governments had continued the late Ottoman tradition of sending promising students to Europe to pursue graduate education,[44] he available human capital was far from satisfying the ambition of creating a university in the same league as Western universities. A contingent event created a window of opportunity for the reformers: Hitler's rise to power in 1933. In addition to the academics who maintained their positions after the closure of the *Darülfünûn* and the young researchers who returned to their homeland after having studied in European countries, the German scholars could be offered a position at the new university.

The Nazi regime had passed the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service immediately after Hitler's rise to office in 1933, ordering that civil servants descended from non-Aryans, especially from Jewish parents, and members of any communist organizations were to be expelled. As the universities and research institutions in Germany were almost entirely public

[43] In his memoirs, Ernst E. Hirsch (1997, p. 360), an émigré law scholar who worked in Turkey for years as an academic and advisor to governments in legislative issues, writes that the underlying logic of the reform was to place the university, deemed as an infant institution, under the tutelage of the government. Until the university reached its maturity, it could not be given autonomy in financial or administrative matters. This kind of argument is consistent with many of the abovementioned studies on the single-party era. The conundrum inherent in this line of argumentation is that it does not specify any objective or measurable criteria according to which one can determine whether an institution grows mature or not.

[44] Even a specific law, the Law Regarding the Students that would be Sent to Foreign Countries (*Ecnebi Memleketlere Gönderilecek Talebe Hakkında Kanun*, Law no. 1416), was enacted in 1929 to regulate the procedures related to selecting students, awarding scholarships, and specifying the terms and conditions of their obligatory public services.

institutions, their academic staff were subject to the purge decrees as being civil servants. According to some estimations, 1200 Jewish and left-wing professors lost their jobs immediately after the enactment of this law, and 650 of them left their country in the first two years (Bentwich, 1953, p. 4-13). The wave of forced scientific migration was bound to continue towards the end of WWII. The displaced scholars could continue their careers neither in Germany (and Nazi-occupied countries) nor in any other totalitarian countries of the 1930s, where political nonconformity is not tolerated. The international academic community tried to respond to the Nazi actions by seeking ways to help the displaced scholar. To that end, British universities and learned societies formed the Academic Assistance Council in 1933 to provide them with an allowance and place them permanently or temporarily. The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars was another institution founded in New York with support from the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Foundation. They managed to help a considerable number of displaced scholars through scholarships and grants despite the Great Depression (see Bentwich, 1953; Burk, 2005).

The displaced scholars themselves established a similar rescue organization in Switzerland, e.g., *Die Notgemeinschaft deutscher Wissenschaftler im Ausland* (the Emergency Society of German Scholars Abroad) somewhat earlier from the British and the US organizations. The head of this organization was Philipp Schwartz, who had been dismissed from the Frankfurt University, had close ties with Albert Malche, the Swiss higher education advisor to Turkey. Malche informed Schwartz that the university reform in Turkey would be beneficial for both the Turkish side and the displaced German scholars (Tomenendal, Özdemir & Mercan, 2010). The Minister of Education formally invited Schwartz to Turkey to hold a formal meeting and negotiations to select professors from different disciplines and with the highest academic credentials who would be employed at the newly inaugurated Istanbul University. Albert Einstein, as a world-renowned scientist, also seems to get involved in the negotiations between the Turkish government and the *Notgemeinschaft* through his letter to the Prime Minister of Turkey of the time, emphasizing the fact that they indeed have chosen highly experienced and prominent scholars to work in the new Istanbul University (Reisman, 2007, p. 264). Initially, more than 40 professors were invited from the members of the Notgemeinschaft on five-year contracts. Until the end of World War II, the total number of foreign scholars employed in Turkish higher education institutions went beyond 300.[45]

[45] There is a considerable body of historiographical and prosopographical literature on refugee scholars and their Turkish experience. The aim of this chapter is not to thoroughly discuss who they were and how they influenced the university system or contributed to the development of science in Turkey. The reader may have recourse to the following resources among others: Widmann, 1973; Schwartz, 1995; Seyhan, 2005; Reisman, 2006 and 2007; Şen & Halm, 2007; Ergin, 2009; Tomenendal, Özdemir & Mercan, 2010; Ege & Hagemann, 2012; Kadıoğlu & Erginöz, 2019.

The fascinating historical puzzle is how a country like 1930's Turkey, without a mature and well-known university system, even lacking some infrastructural capacities, managed to attract such a high number of scholars. This outcome was due to the combination of different external and internal conditions. We can understand these conditions as the factors that impede the massive academic immigration of refugee scholars to countries with a university system similar to the level of Germany. In the first place, the United States and Britain, as such kinds of countries, had relatively restricted immigration laws (Reisman, 2007). The 1924 Immigration Act of the US, for instance, set certain quotas for immigration to prevent "racially undesirable" groups, including Jews, among many others, from coming into the US. Turkey had no such a law yet had a long record of inviting foreign experts and scientists to the land in relation to the country's efforts of modernization. The other crucial factor was the great economic crisis of the 1930s, which hindered many Western countries from securing employment for a great number of displaced scholars (Burk, 2005). Turkey, as a relatively backward and peripheral country in terms of the level of economic development it achieved, was not crushed by the crisis as seriously as the heavily-industrialized countries. The third factor was probably the surge in anti-Semitism in the world, especially after the Nazis came to power. Yet, as Shaw documents (1993), Turkey in this decade was a relatively safe and peaceful place for Jews. The government's effort in suppressing Nazi-inspired anti-Semitic movements was known. This image was consistent with the old Ottoman practice of rescuing Jews from massacres and persecution that they had been through in Europe during the 15th and 16th centuries (Ergin, 2009). Lastly, Turkey had the whip hand over others that fought Germany in the first World War, for it had had a relatively better relationship with its WWI ally, which would be key to employing the displaced scholars. Having communication channels with German authorities was critically important as all the academic appointments had to be ratified, and their actions should be, at least indirectly, monitored by the Nazi authorities, although the Nazi government itself had liquidated these people (Widmann, 1973; Şen & Halm, 2007).

The reformers dismissed 157 professors out of a total of 240 (Tunçay & Özen, 1984, p. 230), in replacing the *Darülfünûn* with the Istanbul University. It is important to understand that Hitler's antisemitic policies did not only give leverage to the Turkish government to liquidate such a huge number of academics but also toned down the criticisms toward and resistance to the purge. Thus, they achieved to kill two birds with one stone: 1) The purge of ideologically dissident academics, meaning the articulation of the university to the political regime under a tight state-control model. 2) The employment of a considerable number of prominent scholars from Germany, which would promise an improvement in teaching, research, and reputation. These outcomes thus reflect the ambiguous legacy of the Reform. On the one hand, it commenced the

tradition of academic purge, motivated by the tendency to remove academics who are politically and ideologically deemed dissidence in terms of the state's aims. As we will further address several times in this study, the purge has been an effective and durable instrument for governments to suppress undesirable voices in academia throughout the history of the Republic. Furthermore, the reform institutionalized the distrust of academics by annulling the institutional autonomy of the university and transforming it into a regime apparatus. The Turkish History of Reform Institute (*Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü*) was, for instance, founded after the Reform to systematize and spread the doctrine of the Turkish Revolution through compulsory courses and exams. The foundation of such an institute was quite consistent with the etatist policies of the single-party governments and hailed as a great success by the *Kadro*-affiliated ideologues of the regime such as Asaf (1933) and Aydemir (1934). In an assertive article titled "The Meaning of the University", Asaf (1933) endorsed the government action by arguing that the liberal concepts of "science for science" or "scholarly autonomy" had already died in favor of a more etatist and centralist understanding of university and science. His approval of the highly interventionist university policies of the totalitarian countries, including Nazi Germany, was also tragic, considering Turkey's efforts to rescue the displaced scholars.

On the other hand, the reform left a significant legacy for the development of research culture in Turkish universities. As some of the refugee scholars themselves noted, Turkey succeeded in establishing arguably "the best German university of its time" with the influx of émigré scholars (Tomenendal, Özdemir & Mercan, 2010, p. 74). Reşit Galip even drew an analogy between the Byzantine scholars who left the country after the conquest of Constantinople and the Jewish scholars who fled Germany after the Nazis came to power (Schwartz, 1995). Just as Byzantine scholars contributed to the emergence of the Renaissance in Europe, German scholars could initiate a Turkish Renaissance. The historical irony here was that émigré scholars, who could be regarded as the very victims of Western modernity and progress from a critical perspective, were seen by the Turkish side as the very agents of Western modernity, who would help Turkish reformers in implementing their civilizational transformation project aiming at reconfiguring the institutional and cultural spheres. The extent to which they contributed to this project is open to discussion. Yet, they left their mark on the university system in Turkey, revamping it pursuant to the Humboldtian model within the framework specified by the government.

The University Reform of 1946: A Reluctant but Necessary Restoration

The 1933 reform was the response of the Kemalist elite to the "university question": institutional autonomy was wiped out; curricula was considerably centralized; financing and employment were

placed under the Ministry of Education's control; dissident or neutral academics were liquidated; the mission of the university was redefined in accordance with the political and cultural transformation of the country; the quality of teaching and research was upgraded with the employment of foreign scholars. Governments and policy actors believed that they solved the problem to a considerable degree through these reform efforts. The immobility of the single-party governments in higher education policy subsequent to the 1933 reform verifies this belief. One can hardly find a section on higher education-related matters in government programs during these terms, apart from reiterations of usual administrative procedures. Moreover, the economy appeared as the number one policy issue both on the government agenda and in public opinion during this period. The government announced a five-year development plan in 1933, laying out etatist and interventionist principles of economic policies. With the advent of the 1940s, the main policy issue was security. Although Turkey managed to remain neutral and stay out of WWII until the very end, it allocated half of the national budget on military spending and increased the army capacity tenfold (Zürcher, 2004, p. 99).

What was needed was to establish new higher education institutions that would support the political and economic targets of single-party governments. The Higher Agricultural Institute, founded in Ankara in 1933 following a German model, was central to enhancing productivity and providing solutions to the problems in agricultural production that were key to the country's economic growth expectations. The interesting point was that this institute's academic and higher administrative staff were almost exclusively non-Jewish Germans, who were directly sent to Turkey on the grounds of a bilateral protocol between the Turkish and German governments. It was crucial for the Third Reich to have scholars in various institutions in Turkey in order to pursue a soft Nazi cultural propaganda and influence Turkish intellectuals (Tomenendal, Özdemir & Mercan, 2010). The new capital city, Ankara, became a hub of German professors who were compliant with the Nazi regime, while the former center, Istanbul, become a safe port for Anti-Nazi émigré scholars.

The single-party regime established another institution in Ankara in 1935, the Language, History, and Geography Faculty, which would inquire about the aspects of Turkish culture and raise teachers and scholars with a genuine knowledge of the national culture. Taking into consideration of suffocating political and intellectual climate of the 1930s, which gave tiny room for any kind of dissidence, these institutions were expected to spread the Kemalist message. But, at the same time, one should not overlook the fact that how Kemalist ideology actually inspired plenty of intellectual strata, including journalists, teachers, scholars, writers, and a variety of professionals with its vision of founding a secular, modern, nationalist, and developed country (Zürcher, 2004, p. 181). These people indeed saw themselves as the enlightening elite force of the

young Republic, with the aim of illuminating their unenlightened fellow citizens. For that reason, they were willing to sacrifice many things in order to act with a strong sense of *noblesse oblige*, as many scholars, for instance, opted for being organic intellectuals of the regime over being free-floating academics pursuing their disinterested curiosities. Thus, from the 1933 Reform to the end of the single-party era, higher education institutions had been the embodiment of the statist, secularist, and nationalist ethos of the Republican regime, and the hatchery for the bureaucratic cadres.

The reform in higher education was added to the government agenda after the end of World War II, within the ruling party's response to the changing international context. The intense and imminent Soviet threat over Turkey and the structurally fluid international order in the sequel of the WWII opened a critical juncture in which the ruling elite had to make a decision concerning the country's future orientation and foreign policy strategy. Here, we can see the two analytically distinct components of a critical juncture: *permissive* and *productive* conditions (as conceptualized by Soifer, 2012). Permissive conditions pertain to conditions that change the underlying context in which divergence from the previous stable pattern could emerge. Productive conditions are the aspects of a critical juncture that produce the initial outcome. In our case, the immediate Soviet threat and the changing international order acted as permissive conditions that opened the possibility of the transition to democracy as part of the emerging Western Bloc. Turkey had to side with either the Western or the Eastern Bloc in order to secure its survival, and the ruling elite (with purpose and resources that acts as a productive condition) pursued the first path.

This short critical juncture analysis is nothing new. It is just a more analytical summary of a well-developed discussion. Scholars studying Turkish experience of transition to democracy and multi-party system from an authoritarian single-party rule, in chorus, have expressed how external factors and the structurally fluid international context were important in pushing Turkey towards political and economic change in the immediate postwar era (see Yılmaz, 1997).[46] Washington also appreciated the strategic and geopolitical importance of Turkey in its commitment to the defense

[46] This is by far the most prevalent view explaining Turkey's transition to democracy. However, there are competing or complementary explanations. Some scholars, especially those we referred to in discussing the single-party literature, insist that the founders never imagined authoritarian single-party rule as a permanent project.. Some others underline the personal leadership and decisiveness of İsmet İnönü, the second president after Atatürk, in catalyzing the transition process. He indeed played a critical role in the transition to a multi-party system to bring the country in line with the changing international conditions due to the triumph of democracies over totalitarian regimes despite an extremist (antidemocratic) group within the party (Ahmad, 2002, p. 102). Some other researchers stress the role of class, arguing that the business had become increasingly critical of the etatist economic policies and pushing for replacing it with liberal ones to secure their interests (Keyder, 1987). Still, Turkey had more urgent reasons to move closer to the Western Bloc, specifically to the United States, for the Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, bringing the regime of straits into question, and stipulated harsh conditions to renew the friendship treaty with Turkey subsequent to the WWII.

of anti-communist regimes throughout the world, and, for that reason, provided financial, political, and military support to the country in the postwar period by virtue of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, respectively (Zürcher, 2004, p. 208-209). It was obvious that Turkey had to adjust itself firmly to the political and economic principles enshrined by the Americans – namely, a democratic system with a pluralist political field and an economic system based on free enterprise – in order to fully gain the advantage of this emerging relationship. This was a state-led process of democratic transition or "democratization from above" (Yılmaz, 1997) in response to the external shock created by the changing postwar international context.

We can thus understand the adoption of the new University Act of 1946 (*Üniversiteler Kanunu*, Law no. 4936) in the context of the democratic transition of the country. This was most apparent in the announcement of the multi-party system, but it also extended to certain policy fields, including higher education. The growing political opposition further pushed the government to change its policies concerning higher education governance. The Democratic Party, established in 1946 as a liberal alternative to the RPP, declared its preference of higher education institutions being scientifically and administratively autonomous in its party program (Demokrat Parti, 1946, Art. 38). Moreover, academics who had been dissatisfied with the strict state-control model and the lack of autonomy took advantage of the changing political climate and get down to bring forward explicit proposals for substantial reform.[47] The ruling party was also convinced that the former institutional status quo could not be sustained in the changing environment and it similarly embraced the university autonomy as a pledge in its election campaign prior to the 1946 elections, backing down from its centralist tendencies (Şimşek, 2019).

Against this backdrop, the new University Act was legislated by a unanimous vote in 1946 as the second major legislative reform on higher education during Republican history. It was thus both a consequence of an effort to give a democratic image to the regime and also a concession to the sprawling liberal opposition both within the ruling party and from the new opposition party (Öncü, 1993, p.156). The Act granted institutional and scientific autonomy along with corporate status to the universities and faculties, defined as "institutions of advanced science, research, and teaching" (Art. 1). This was a clear return to the 1919 regulations and the resurgence of the Humboldtian model after an interim period of 1933-1946. The German professors in Turkey, needless to say, were functional in both preparation and legislation of the Act (Hirsch, 1998; Tekeli,

[47] Among these proposals, Hirsch's report [1946] (Hirsch, 1998, p. 175-197) entitled "University Autonomy" (*Üniversite Muhtariyeti*) draws attention as a rigorous reform document. After discussing philosophical implications of the concept of autonomy and historical university experiences in different countries, Hirsch proposes policymakers considerably loosen the central grip on the university in administrative, financial, and academic affairs. We detect similar concerns and suggestions in the *Istanbul University Report* prepared by jurist and rector S. S. Onar (1945). In this report, Onar argues that the 1933 reform has already completed its mission, and hence it should be replaced by a new act based on principles of decentralization, scholarly freedom, and autonomy in administrative and financial matters.

2010). The Act also brought previously separate faculties under the newly founded Ankara University and recognized the autonomy of Istanbul Technical University, which has its roots in the mid-18th century. Yet, professional and vocational schools remained as a distinct track since they were kept out of the purview of the new law. The new law did not abolish the existing binary structure between universities and professional academies initially imported from the French system but preferred to Germanize the character of the duality by diverging from its original inspirer (Erden, 2006, p. 45). During the late Ottoman Empire, professional academies, just like the *grandes écoles* in France, enjoyed greater prestige and status in comparison to the university as they had the main role in educating the elite. The new legislation, similar to the German understanding, brought greater prestige to the universities in the face of any other type of organization because of their research orientation.

With regard to systemic governance, the most outstanding development was the weakening of the central control at various levels. The Act considerably weakened governmental control over universities by reducing the role of the Ministry into an approving authority (Art. 14). It also introduced a new supreme body, the Interuniversity Council, that would become key to ensure countrywide coordination between the existing universities (Art. 13). Consisted of the rectors and deans of all universities in the country plus one elected member from each Senate, the Interuniversity Council was designed as an advisory forum sitting above universities, which may help the Ministry in policy design and implementation related to higher education. The Minister of Education had the discretion to convene this forum when s/he deemed necessary.

The diminution of central control and steering capacity was pertinent not only to the fallback of the state but also to the authority of the rector, whose executive power was squeezed by a range of collegial bodies, most importantly the Senate – the most powerful organ of the institutional governance, the Senate comprised of the rector, former rector, deans, and two elected professors from each faculty. The core tasks of this body were the self-regulation – the preparation of laws, bylaws, and regulations that pertain to university affairs – and the internal coordination of academic affairs (Art. 10). The Board of Directors was an executive body in charge of implementing the decisions taken by the Senate (Art. 11). Although the rector, deans, and the secretary-general had a seat in this body, the provision did not allow elected professors to take part in the Board. The rector, on the other hand, was subordinated to the other organs, e.g., the Senate and the Board, within the tripartite division of authority. As a professor elected by high-ranking academic staff based on an absolute majority principle, the rector was responsible for presiding over the governing bodies and representing the corporate body of the university (Art. 12). Where the governing bodies assumed effective roles in university governance, the rector was primus inter pares rather than a

strategic/agenda-setting manager. Even though the personal traits of the rector were crucial for institutional performance, they were, to some extent, tempered by the collective structure of the institutional decision-making process, which tasks him/her with implementing and overseeing decisions.



Figure 3.4. Simplified structure of higher education governance (the 1946 Reform)

As a consequence, the external pressures for democratization and liberalization paved the way for the University Reform of 1946 and the retrieval of the autonomous university, at least on paper. In the parliamentary debate on the adoption of the law, the Minister of Education of time, Hasan Âli Yücel, uttered their inherently ambiguous understanding of the concept of autonomy. After saying that universities and science should be scientifically autonomous, he underlined that scientists are obliged to deserve this autonomy. The 1933 Reform that abolished autonomy was a necessary act of tutelage, for the old institution required to be disciplined. (Eronat, 1999, p. 413). As we will see in the next chapter, however, Turkish universities have been strained at translating their *de jure* autonomy enacted by laws into *de facto* autonomy since there has often been some political or ideological sensitivity that breaks the link between them.

Conclusion

This chapter discussed the causes and outcomes of two subsequent university reforms in Turkey during the single-party era and the mechanisms linking them.. To sum up the results, I argued that the university reform of 1933 was mainly triggered by the ideological and political controversy between the faculty members of the *Darülfünûn* and the ruling party elite. The latter had been displeased by the lack of "unity in ideas and ideals" among the faculty members (Mazıcı, 1995) and sought to establish a university with faculty members sharing the official ideals of the new regime. They saw liberalism and its reflections on the academic world, such as academic freedom, scholarly autonomy, or science for science, morally bankrupt and irrelevant in the new regime that should take inspiration from totalitarian countries of the time. The party elite considered this institution utterly inadequate to serve their political and cultural ambitions and preferred to found a new institution that would be "under strict control engaged in producing ideas in the required direction and giving scholarly support to the government." (İhsanoğlu, 2019, p. 119). The new university was established on a vision that prefers ideational unity over diversity and strict control over regulated autonomy. The reform produced an idiosyncratic version of the *state-control model* that intentionally mixes authoritarian elements with modernization efforts. Whereas the single-party governments, on no account, renounced their influence and control over the political orientation of the university, they eclectically adopted and borrowed policy instruments in a way that they do not ultimately undermine the strict state control over the university affairs. The change mechanisms were thus *endogenous*, and the implications of change were *radical* in terms of its effects.

As for the university reform of 1946, the principal driving force was to adapt the country to the changing environmental conditions after the end of WWII. The reform, among others, was an expression of Turkey's effort to make an impression that the country wishes to have a liberal democratic form of government and adopt its political institutions. It was further accelerated by the growing liberal opposition from academic circles and the new opposition party, the Democratic Party, demanding an institutionally autonomous university capable of governing its internal affairs through collegial bodies in the absence of central oversight. The new Act thus underpinned democratization in governance structures with an intention to grant universities a high level of institutional autonomy by loosing central control over them, indicating a turn towards a *self-governance model*. The mechanisms of change were primarily *exogenous*, and the outcome of change was rather *gradual* as the state only renounced the direct ways of controlling universities. All in all, the 1946 reform opened a new path in higher education that is usually called "the era of the autonomous university" in the scholarly literature, which would last until the 1981 reform. This will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

Under the Shadows of Military Interventions, Political Violence, and Ideological Contestation: The Conflict over Higher Education Governance from 1946 to 1981

This chapter delves into higher education policy change specific to governance arrangements and related issues in the period that begins with the 1946 university reform and ends with the 1981 reform in higher education. In terms of governance, the 1946 Reform opened an institutional path based on the principle that universities should be institutionally autonomous entities governed through their own elected bodies and leaders with limited central oversight. This is why this period is sometimes called "the era of autonomous university" in Turkish university historiography (Dölen, 2010d). Even though the policy outcomes of the 1946 Reform managed to survive, at least formally, until the 1980 coup d'etat that radically altered many aspects of higher education, the stickiness of the path had been tested through a series of challenges such as military interventions, political violence, and academic purges. The explanation of how those factors have influenced higher education governance arrangements occupies much of the discussion in this chapter.

The chapter begins with a short presentation of an academic purge as a case that illustrates the fragility of academic freedom and institutional autonomy under conditions where ideological contestation is perceived as a threat by powerholders.

The Anatomy of an Academic Purge

Transition to multi-party politics in 1946 from an authoritarian single-party rule was a prerequisite for Turkey to become part of the Western bloc. As discussed in the former chapter, the major outcome of this transition in terms of higher education governance was the adoption of the University Act of 1946, which reinstated the statutory autonomy of universities after a period of tight state control. The new Act embraced *collegiality* rather than *hierarchy* as the main principle of coordination. It held that both institutional leaders (e.g., heads of department, deans, and rectors) and the members of the academic committees (e.g., the Senate and administrative boards at the faculty and university levels) are elected by and among faculty members to make decisions on behalf of the institution and negotiate with external actors/stakeholders while maintaining the institutional

autonomy. The former law, the University Act of 1933, had clearly adopted the notion of hierarchy, making the rector as the mere servant of the Ministry, who make decisions on behalf of institutions in pursuance of the interests of the main funder, namely the state, and control the academic members from above.

In fact, universities managed to retain nominal autonomy when their members (academics and students) actively engaged in public contestation in times of social and political transformation. Despite its Humboldtian formulation of institutional autonomy and academic freedom, the new Act allowed central authorities some leeway in interfering with the university affairs that had been delegated to the academic profession. When listing the tasks of the university, it emphasized that the university ought to raise students who would "adhere to the ideals of the Turkish Revolution" (Art. 3/a). These kinds of vague clauses were open to being used as a pretext by governments to attempt to intrude into the internal affairs of universities. Nevertheless, the changing political environment, i.e., transition to multi-party politics and the engagement with the Western Bloc, would bring new ideological position-takings in which communism would appear as a new threat.

As briefly mentioned in the former chapter, The Soviets declared that they would unilaterally cancel the Friendship and Neutrality Treaty of 1925 between the Soviet Union and Turkey. This was followed by Soviet territorial claims on the northeastern part of Turkey and the attempt to re-negotiate the Turkish Straits regime designated in the Montreux Convention of 1936. Since the Soviet Union appeared as a vital threat to national security, the left-wing and communist intellectuals and movements started to be marginalized or suppressed by the government. Turkey's commitment to the Western bloc at the very beginning of the Cold War through the Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine further triggered anti-communist sentiments, which would, in turn, evolve into a witch hunt through which students and academics who had affinities for communism were either been perceived as fellow-travelers or traitors. We may call this practice "Turkish McCarthyism," albeit on a lesser scale in comparison with its American counterpart, accusing government employees, including academics, of being communist or Soviet sympathizers.

This can be seen in the process of expulsion of several professors from the Faculty of Language and History and Geography of Ankara University in 1948 under accusations of making communist propaganda. Yet, the process leading to their dismissal was long and troublesome. The daily newspapers renowned for their ties with the RPP, such as *Cumhuriyet, Tanin,* and *Vatan*, started to publish provocative articles targeting left-wing publishing houses, periodicals, and newspapers towards the end of 1945, including Yalçın's (1945, December 3) piece calling for a demonstration against communist publishers. The next day, a large group of nationalist, Islamist, and anti-communist students rallied in Istanbul and ransacked the printing houses where the left-wing daily

Tan and journals *Görüşler* and *Yeni Dünya* were published (Berkes, 1997, p. 354-356). This raid that is known as the "Tan incident" was more than just an act of violence. Its first ramification was a diplomatic escalation in which The Soviet Union sent a diplomatic note to Turkey, indicating that this was an orchestrated attack against the Soviet Union (Koçak, 2010, p. 816-817). The other was the government's abuse of this event to suppress academic freedom of publishing and disseminating ideas, urging academics not to publish in so-called communist newspapers, periodicals, and journals.

Immediately after the incident, the Ministry of Education released a memorandum restraining university professors and teachers from publishing articles and essays concerning domestic or international politics (Çetik, 2008, p. 32). Taking a further step, the Ministry formed a committee of investigation calling for action against the professors who had contributed to the left-wing political journals. On the basis of this report, the Ministry suspended several professors from their academic posts. Suspended professors, i.e., Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes, and Pertev Naili Boratav, appealed to the State Council for reinstatement. The Council, despite the political pressure, overruled the Ministry's arbitrary decision against those professors by arguing that they could not be inculpated solely due to the dissemination of ideas unless they inculcate students with their political opinions (Çetik, 2008, p. 33). Nonetheless, this judicial sentence failed to quiet down the unrest at the Faculty of Language and History and Geography. A group of 67 students who had anti-communist and ultra-nationalist tendencies submitted a petition to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Internal Affairs by adjuring them to expulse the Marxist professors on 1 March 1947 (Dölen, 2010d, p. 141). As a response, another group of 108 students publicly filed a counter-petition criticizing the attacks on the left-leaning professors and accentuating the importance of scientific and institutional autonomy of universities. The escalation between the student groups became more visible when the anti-communist students demonstrated on campus, urging the university administration to cancel all the lectures given by the professors promoting communist propaganda. The university Senate preferred to mollify protestors by opening an investigation against the targeted professors, an action in line with the demands of the protestors amid pressure from the Ministry. After a series of hearings, the Senate decided that they may dismiss the professors from the profession on the grounds of a provision in the new university Act, which necessitates the discharge of academics "who committed an offense against the honor and dignity of the person" (Art. 46/d).

Yet, the Senate members could not agree if they were authorized to dismiss professors without a court verdict and decided to consult the Parliament as to the correct interpretation of the law. When the Senate passed the buck to the Parliament, a large group of anti-communist

students from all higher education institutions in Ankara conducted a rally that easily deteriorated into mayhem, where they took hostage the rector of the Ankara University and forced him to resign (Dölen, 2010d, p. 146-146). After this incident, the Senate conceded to sacrifice academic freedom and institutional autonomy to prevent a further act of violence on campus, reaching a decision to dismiss the so-called communist professors on 10 January 1948. The dismissed professors used their right of objection by appealing to the Interuniversity Council, the ultimate authority to amend decisions of the university senates concerning the disciplinary decisions. As the chair and member of the Interuniversity Council, the Minister of Education was in hopes of influencing the other members – the rectors, deans, and representatives from senates of all universities in the country – to take a resolution that would expulse the leftist professors. However, the members of the Interuniversity Council unwaveringly resisted the governmental and ministerial pressures and nullified the decision of the Senate by reiterating that there is no sufficient legal evidence to dismiss those faculty members. (Çetik, 2008, p. 46). Thus, a higher authority overruled a decision despite the pressures from above (the government) and below (the anti-communist students).

The Ministry of Education was steadfast in its endeavor to expulse professors from their position one way or another. In spite of the former judgment of the State Council, the Ministry again formally appealed to the Council and requested that the inquiry of the professors reopen. The State Council then decided that the three professors could be put on a criminal trial. After a two-year hearing, which attracted public attention, the professors were acquitted of all offenses that they had been charged in 1950 (Dölen, 2010d, p. 150-151). The point was the Ministry had been well aware that the trials would not come up with the expected results for the whole process was based on a political conflict rather than well-justified legal reasoning. For that reason, they decided to bring the matter to the Parliament in 1948 as part of the negotiations of the personnel cadres and budgetary allocations of universities. On the parliamentary sessions, the RPP, the ruling party, attempted to expulse the professors by cutting the budget for their chairs, an attempt that sparked a heated debate between the members of the RPP and the opposition party, namely the Democrat Party (DP). The members of the DP provided support to the professors in the parliamentary negotiations. For instance, Adnan Adıvar, who was elected from the DP list, criticized the government's attempt by arguing that the parliament cannot abrogate chairs of autonomous universities by specifying the names of chair-holders (Hirsch, 1998, p. 1134). Another DP member, Sadık Aldoğan, condemned the RPP's attempt to undermine university autonomy by arguing that the Parliament should avoid imposing nationalism as a dominant ideology on universities (Hirsch, 1998, p. 1193-1196). These objections did not suffice to hamper the RPP. With a political act under the guise of a legal operation, the three professors were removed from

their positions as the financial source allocated to their chairs was temporarily cut by the law amendment. Thus, for the first time in Turkey, a group of professors was dismissed through the annulment of their cadres in the parliament in 1948 (Arslan, 2004, p. 194). In addition to the three famous professors, about 25 German professors were also technically dismissed as their positions were abrogated (Hatiboğlu, 1997, p. 179).

Given the fact that the University Act of 1946 was an expression of the abandonment of the former centralized governance model, based on the heavy state control of almost all aspects of universities' operation, in favor of a systemic governance model where the state loosens its grip on universities and grants them greater institutional autonomy, we can interpret the government's effort to infringe the law and purge the unwanted faculty members from universities as a persistence of the authoritarian policy legacy that, in turn, draws the line of the academic freedom and institutitonal autonomy.

From a theoretical perspective, this case is important to demonstrate how a distance between formal rules and their application might be long in circumstances under which 'informal institutions' can affect the rules of the game. Helmke & Levitsky (2004, p. 729) argues that even though there are effective formal rules in force, actors who dislike them can alter the substantive effects of formal rules without openly violating them, predicating on *accommodating* informal institutions. The Turkish state, as the major sponsor of universities, has conceived the university "as an instrument for national political agendas," which can have a certain degree of autonomy only if it contributes to the agenda without crossing the line drawn by the official ideology and state interests. This can be seen as an informal institution violating the spirit of the formal rules concerning university autonomy and academic freedom. The political and/or bureaucratic actors have sometimes tended to interfere in the university affairs without a direct attempt to change the formal rules but to shape their interpretation and application when academics go beyond the role of a civil servant and develop a political agency in the form of critical-universalistic intervention into the public sphere.

Higher Education Governance under the Democrat Party Rule, 1950-1960

Higher education governance during the DP era can be, in simple terms, read as a function of the tension between political power and universities. I will examine how the university turned into a site of ideological contestation to the degree that it would affect the 1960 coup d'état and the subsequent reform. Before that, we should discuss the introduction of the American university model and its implications for the university organization and governance.

The DP won the 1950 general election with a landslide victory. This historical moment marks both the end of a long single-party regime of the RPP – which, in turn, were relegated to be the main opposition party – and the transfer of power to the former opposition party through democratic ways. As a center-right party, the DP attached credence to the merits of the pro-free-market economic policies against the statism, championed populism against bureaucratic elitism, and embraced a moderate, secular discourse against the militant secularism – which helped it to gain wide support from different segments of society (see Demirel, 2011).

As discussed above, Turkey positioned itself in the Western bloc immediately after WWII. The Democrats maintained the same policy preference when they came to power. They were explicitly motivated to strengthen ties with the US, finding its expression in the motto of making Turkey a "little America" in many aspects of the social, political, and economic spheres. This was consistent with the post-war American foreign policy strategy of providing technical assistance – in the fields of agriculture, health, and education, among others – to the new allies in the developing world to foster development and win the hearts and minds to limit the Soviet influence in countries such as Turkey and Iran (for a detailed account of educational assistance to these countries, see Garlitz, 2008). The land-grant universities, characterized by their emphasis on teaching and research in engineering, agriculture, and applied sciences without totally excluding classical liberal education, were a particularly crucial export item in overseas technical assistance. The DP governments made use of this opportunity to establish new universities that would be remarkably different from those dominating the system until that time, which were steeped in the continental models. In a short span of time, four campus universities were established in different regions of the country based on the American university models: Ege University (1955), Karadeniz Technical University (1955), Middle East Technical University (1956), and Atatürk University (1957). The emulation of the American model was not a mere window-dressing kind of inspiration. It was materialized through the involvement of American educational advisors and the utilization of specialized loan grants provided by the aforementioned technical assistance programs.

In the first place, the lack of Turkish familiarity with the American university models, more specifically the land-grant approach, posed hurdles at the organizational level. A typical Turkish university used to be a federation of statutorily autonomous faculties that encompass preparation for a certain type of profession or occupation such as medicine, law, science, or engineering. Faculties were composed of chairs (*kürsü*) as the basic academic unit at the lowest operating level, each led by a senior professor as chair-holder assisted by subordinate researchers including associate professors (*doçent*) and assistants (*asistan*), who served to the chair as lecturers or research

fellows. The main organizational gist of the chair system was its emphasis on academic self-regulation by the professoriate, a prominent aspect of what Clark called "academic oligarchy" as a coordination mechanism (1983, p. 140). The classical German idea of state-university partnership based on a mutual agreement and corporatism to achieve certain goals was intrinsic to the 1946 Reform. The introduction of the land-grant university model brought the department organization with it as the basic academic building block. The new universities were organized around the departments that would spread power and responsibility among a group of professors of senior and junior ranks. The department, as a unique organizational model, assumes that all members of the scientific staff within the department are equal in terms of participating in the decision-making processes (Altbach, 1998, p. 63). This amounted to an obvious power dissipation for senior professors who had traditionally wielded a considerable personal authority as well as an increase in the role of not only the junior academic staff but also the rector and the university management.

The transition from a chair organization to a department organization was only one aspect of Americanization in Turkish higher education. Turkish professors also seem to have found the idea that a university has the responsibility of serving the society not only with education but also with applied research in agricultural and mechanical sciences that would help develop industrial sectors and boost agricultural production highly bizarre for fields with practical implications was supposed to fall into the remit of vocational higher schools or professional academies (Agency for International Development, 1967). For that reason, the social prestige of a university professor led many balk at the idea of doing applied research in the newly founded Atatürk University that, above all, was designed as a university to produce and disseminate knowledge for agricultural development (Garlitz, 2013, p. 181). The advisors from the University of Nebraska, who came to Turkey to give technical assistance and transplant the land-grant approach to eastern Turkey with emphasis on agricultural sciences, came to accept that they would not be able to transfer the whole concept to Turkey in the same form that it existed in the United States since there was a discrepancy between the Nebraska team and the Turkish officials in terms of the understanding of the function, organization, and operation of a university (see Garlitz, 2008, p. 143-175). The system in which Turkish academics operated was bounded by continental traditions and institutions imported and adapted from Europe for several centuries, making it cumbersome for the land-grant model to thrive. Thus, incumbent institutions proved to have a distinct advantage over the new entrant, not because the continental models were necessarily better than the American land-grant model, but because their lock-in effects made the transition to a new model path-dependent.

The turn towards emulating American structures and practices in higher education turned out to be only partially successful with respect to the newly established universities, except for the

Middle East Technical University (METU) (Erden, 2006, p. 47). The idea of founding a technical university came into being to help meet the urgent demand for regional planning and better housing in the early 1950s (Reed, 1975, p. 221). Charles Abrams, an American urbanist and housing expert, came to Turkey as a United Nations consultant to the Turkish government and submitted a report on urban planning and housing problem including the recommendation that a technical university that would train architects, urban planners, and engineers should be established (Çalışkan, 2012, p. 6-7). The UN sent another mission, chaired by G. Holmes Perkins of the School of Fine Arts of the University of Pennsylvania, to actualize this idea in 1955. The new university was not designed as an institution that would exclusively focus on urban issues, but as a full-fledged university that would produce knowledge, especially in natural sciences and contribute to the creation of qualified workforce and researchers in the Balkans, Caucasus, and, as the name suggests, the Middle East. The METU that began instruction in the English language in 1956 as an institute attained its status with a separate charter of its own (Law no. 7307) in 1959 after two years of preparation (Law no. 1957).

Having a special legal status, The METU departed from the continental traditions of the existing Turkish universities. The university was to be governed by a board of trustees consisting of nine members appointed by the government for six years. Similar to an American state university, the members of the Board were to be external participants, of whom at least two-thirds have to come from the non-public sector, without any duty at the university other than their service in the Board (Art. 3). The Board was entitled to appoint the rector, deans, and faculty members in addition to its authority in designating the administrative and academic structure of the institution. It was also entitled to appoint an "advisor rector" (*müşavir rektör*) who would assist the rector in academic matters, particularly research and teaching (Art. 5). The advisor rector was supposed to fulfill the duty that provosts typically perform in North American higher education institutions. Overall, there was a clear transfer of authority from the Senate and academic boards to the Board of Trustees and the rector with wide managerial powers. The university also enjoyed its exceptional status in terms of financing education and research. The annual budget of the METU was a lump sum grant donated by the Parliament, which leaves a great deal of discretion to the institution, whereas the budgets of other universities were allocated through traditional line-item budgeting mechanisms restricting the financial autonomy of institutions. The METU preserved its unique status until 1976, when the Constitutional Court abolished the Board's power in personnel and financial matters (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi, 1976, p. 170-196).

The DP's accession to power in 1950 with an overwhelming electoral victory represents a milestone in Turkey's experiment in democracy. The political power passed into other hands for the first time in the history of the Republic after a twenty-seven years period of the RPP rule. The DP successfully brought various social groups together, opposing the political-bureaucratic hegemony of the RPP, including landed proprietors, professionals, businessmen, peasants, and industrial workers who had accumulated resentment against the Kemalist state elite. Academics were also leaned towards the DP in the first place, for the party seemed to be committed to the university autonomy and academic freedom, which had suffered from ideologically motivated interventions and purges, as part of its general program in economic and political liberalization.

The DP's stance towards university autonomy took a new turn as the party unleashed an attack against the bureaucratic elite whom they saw as a collaborator of the RPP, the main opposition party. Amongst the many measures taken by the DP to curtail the autonomy of bureaucracy from the executive, some had implications on the academic profession and the institutional autonomy of universities. In amending an article in the University Act of 1946 in 1953, the DP proclaimed that academics who speak out on political issues or engage in political activity might end up losing their jobs (Law no. 6185). The aim obviously was to inhibit academics from being a member or involved in an activity of political parties when considered that some prominent professors had been affiliated with the RPP. The parliament passed another law within the following year, empowering the DP government to place academics under ministerial control and subsequently retire public servants, inclusive of academic staff who either were over sixty or had twenty-five years of civil service (Law no. 6435). This legal arrangement enabled the DP government to dismiss academic and administrative staff at universities for ideological non-compliance. The government applied this law several times to suspend and dismiss outstanding academics acting as public intellectuals. For instance, the dean of the prestigious Faculty of Political Sciences of Ankara University, Turhan Feyzioğlu, was suspended by the Ministry of Education in 1956 based on the provisions of this law. Although students protested these decisions by boycotting lectures and a group of academics resigning, the DP government remained firm on its stance towards universities.

The authoritarian turn of the DP government caused disappointment and resentment among academics, especially during the second half of the decade. Another ruling party was again transgressing the institutional autonomy of universities and academic freedom of faculty members with a motivation to repress dissidents and make universities compliant supporters of political agendas. It is crucial to note that the DP's assault on university autonomy was only a piece of its

growing set of anti-democratic measures that, amongst others, were oriented towards the press and the RPP – which even alienated liberal and anti-Kemalist intellectuals who had propped up the DP from the outset by reason of its promises to bolster civil society by improving freedoms and democratizing the legal arrangements. Yet, many academics were not against the DP simply because of its authoritarian actions, but because of they, together with other civil servants, lost ground to actors the DP era brought about, such as the officials of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry in influencing public policy (Öncü, 1993, p. 157). A great majority of academics did not hesitate to join the informal coalition of "vigorous forces" (*zinde kuvvetler*), an emerging informal oppositional elite establishment composed of a group of intellectuals, military officers, and bureaucrats who found themselves marginalized in a new environment where the economic development strategy gave rise to the new actors with different mindsets. Apart from that, the oppositional elite, especially the military officers, were disturbed by the DP's populist use of religion for political purposes (Karpat, 1970, p. 1671), which they saw as an aberration from the Atatürk's secular reforms. Their frustration was easy to understand, given that they were the backbone of the republican elite and the guardian of the Kemalist reforms and principles.

Thus, the university again became a site of ideological contestation. The university was perceived by the DP government as a political agent, a monolithic organizational entity operating as it were a sovereign state, as Menderes, the prime minister of the time, put in straight terms when he accused academics of mistaking the university for a "papacy" (Arslan, 2004, p. 287). This was partly true because of the fact that the academic community engaged in public contention through the mobilization of particular academics and student groups rather than as a single organizational entity. Nonetheless, the Democrats actually saw them as ideological fortresses of the RPP that they had politically turned against them and sought for various alternative solutions to bypass their influence, including establishing new types of higher education institutions that would comply with government policies. At this juncture, the professional schools of business and commerce, which had been seen as inferior to universities, turned the crisis between the DP and the universities in Ankara and İstanbul into an opportunity to demand a better legal and financial infrastructure (see Üsdiken, 2009, p. 12-17). The DP decided to reorganize these schools by converting them into Academies of Economic and Commercial Sciences (*İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademileri*) in 1959 with a legislative act (Law no. 7334). The new law extended the duration of their study programs from two to four years and created a separate academic track (Üsdiken, 2004, p. 20). The law also gave them scholarly autonomy as well as the right and responsibility to conduct academic research in addition to their main function of providing training for citizens who would be functional for the economic development of the country. Those academies benefited from a de facto institutional

autonomy, as long as they served the external interests and acted as if they were separate universities specialized in business and commerce.

The 1960s came with a growing tension between the ruling party and the oppositional forces. The Democrat's repression of political opposition became increasingly excruciating because of their decision to found a special committee of the inquest (*tahkikat komisyonu*) to investigate any oppositional activities described as subversive and to charge perpetrators – a measure that would directly violate constitutional principles such as the separation of powers. This triggered further discontent among the academic community and led a large crowd of students, especially the members of the National Turkish Students' Federation (*Türkiye Milli Talebe Federasyonu*), one of the two major student organizations, to gather in Ankara and Istanbul to rally against the regime. When the police were sent to suppress the student protestors, dangerous clashes took place in which one of the students died. The universities were closed for a period immediately after the incident, yet this only provided extra motivation to students in their struggle against the political regime (Roos, Roos & Field, 1968). The government tried to counter protests by declaring martial law but unintendedly conduced demonstrations to spread to many other cities. The DP, amid growing public unrest, was overthrown on 27 May 1960 after a ten-year period of rule as a result of the first coup d'état in the history of the Republic of Turkey, orchestrated by a secret military junta acting outside the chiefs of staff's chain of command. This coup started a period in which the military, either directly or indirectly, would involve in higher education policymaking since then.

The 1960 Coup and its Consequences for Higher Education Governance

The 1960 University Reform

When a military group took power on 27 May 1960, they were heavily supported by a substantial part of the bureaucracy, the press, academia, and intellectuals: an alliance of the old elite (Karpat, 2004, p. 116-117).[48] The putschists formed a military commission called the National Unity Committee (NUC) immediately after the coup to create a favorable political milieu and constitutional order before handing over their authority to an elected civilian government.[49] The

[48] Both civilian and military bureaucratic groups experienced a relative decrease in their policy/political influence and social status during the DP rule. Academia is also badly affected by authoritarian measures in the latte DP rule. These two salaried groups also suffered from inflationary economic policies of the DP in the late 1950s, which further aggravated their politicization manifesting itself as an aversion to the DP rule (Tekeli, 2011, p. 159). But perhaps a more important common denominator uniting the so-called vigorous forces was the view that the DP was reactionary, anti-secularist, conservative, anti-Kemalist, and thus unfit to govern the country (Karpat, 2004, p. 288).

[49] The NUC was actually divided between the moderates who wanted to hand over power to the civilians as soon as possible and the radicals who intended to retain power for a longer period to implement reforms that would radically alter the political structure and institutions before restoring power to the civilians. The intra-group conflict ended up in the victory of the moderates who expelled the extremists from the military government. This outcome substantially accounts for why the military rule lasted only around one year and a half (May 1960-September 1961).

academic community was expected to play a key role at this juncture, by not only implicitly endorsing the coup, but also actively supporting the coup. The law professors from Istanbul and Ankara University prepared a report legitimizing the coup, based on the reasoning that the DP government had acted unconstitutionally and therefore the coup aimed at putting Turkish democracy on the right track (Göney, 2011). Most of those professors also became a member of the constitutional committee formed under the presidency of Sıddık Sami Onar, who was the rector of Istanbul University and one of the ardent proponents and collaborators of the coup, to prepare a constitutional draft.

As part of the coalition of the so-called vigorous forces, academics working in harmony with the military government found an opportunity to influence the NUC in amending the University Act of 1946. The new law (Law no. 115), adopted a couple of months after the coup, removed the traces of continental-style ministerial oversight of universities by revoking the authority of the Ministry and the Minister in overseeing universities in the name of government (Art. 14). The law strengthened the role of the Interuniversity Council in systemic governance, giving it ex officio powers to make ultimate nationwide decisions on crucial aspects of higher education (Art. 13). The Council, composed of rectors, deans, and elected representatives from each university in the country, had been an advisory body designed to assist the government via the Ministry of Education in agenda-setting and policy formulation related to higher education. However, the new legal arrangement de facto converted the Council into a supreme body with binding decision-making powers since its decisions were not subject to any governmental or ministerial approval. To sum up, the Reform neither altered the existing systemic governance arrangements radically nor introduced new structures or processes. It only fine-tuned the relationship between the Ministry and the Council to empower the latter one.

The same understanding of autonomy applies to the institutional level. The Senate, universities' utmost decision-making body whose members were consisted of solely senior academics (e.g., the rector, deans, and elected academic representatives), was further empowered by the new law. It had the authority to draft laws and bylaws concerning university affairs and submit them to the Ministry; to put the proposals coming from sub-councils into operation; to make decisions regarding university affairs (Art. 10). The Senate's decisions were exact, and there was no other designated authority to apply against them apart from disciplinary actions. The Senate also had the power to oversee the actions of the rector who acquired novel responsibilities due to the shrinking authority of the Ministry over universities. The rector was responsible for monitoring faculty activities in teaching, research, and administration to see if these tasks were performed properly (Art. 12). Yet, the notion of collegial governance characterizing the new legal arrangement

limited the hierarchical authority of the rector in the face of the increasing power of the self-governance of the academic community.



Figure 4.1. The simplified structure of higher education governance (the 1960 Reform)

These amendments were probably beyond the expectations of many pro-coup academics who had a statist mindset since they reduced the primary role of the state into providing financial resources universities need to operate. The new legal arrangement did not only restored the institutional autonomy of universities but also led the university to acquire almost a privileged and prestigious status within a highly centralist bureaucratic system. Furthermore, the new Constitution, adopted after the law amendment on universities in 1961, provided a constitutional guarantee on university autonomy, specifying that universities, as corporate bodies, were only to be governed and controlled by organs the members of which had been elected by their peers (Art. 120). The Constitution of 1961 also stipulated that a university organ cannot be dissolved, or a faculty member cannot be discharged by any external authority.

Nevertheless, in a similar way to what happened in the former reforms of 1933 and 1946, this restoration also came with a price. Law 114, issued simultaneously with Law 115, dismissed

147 academics from different universities, some of whom were quite prominent, without providing any reason or justification. It was highly momentous and ironic that the military government fired a considerable amount of professors with a separate law while fortifying university autonomy in all aspects with another legal arrangement. The purge was shocking even more for the pro-coup figures such as Sıddık Sami Onar, who, along with rectors of five other universities, resigned the rectorship upon proclamation of Law 114. The more confusing was that there was no declared basis of the decision on who was to be discharged. The military officers, or, more specifically, the members of the NUC, had probably no sufficient acquaintance with all of the academics to be banished. The list was probably compiled by a group of scholars who were closely linked with the NUC (Şimşek, 2019, p. 2010-215). Apart from that, there was no common denominator, not even several common denominators that could be found, which would include all the 147 (Weiker, 1962, p. 285). The names listed in the law were pretty diverse. As discussed above, the former academic purges were politically motivated in the sense that they had intended to clear universities of dissident academics. Yet, in this case, only several dismissals were evidently political, targeting academics who were seen reactionary, radical, communist, or pro-DP in their political inclinations. A great deal of ousted academics were scholars without declared or recognized political tendencies. The NUC rationalized the purge based on different grounds: some academics had hampered the necessary reforms in higher education by putting their own interests above those of their institution; some had been highly unqualified to occupy a position at a university and impeding the promotion of young and skilled personnel; some, particularly law and medicine scholars, had also been practicing their profession outside of the university at their private offices, and so on (147'ler Meselesi, 1962; Weiker, 1962; Göney, 2011). In spite of an immediate uproar and pressure from the vast majority of academia, student organizations, the press, and the intellectuals, the NUC remained steadfast in its position in rejecting any attempt that would result in the repeal of the purge law. Only after the end of the military regime, the civilian government made it possible for the dismissed academics to apply for reinstatement to the Senates of their respective universities with a legal arrangement in 1962 (Weiker, 1962).

The outcomes of the 1960 regulations for higher education governance were thus ambiguous. How a military government simultaneously fired a significant amount of scholars from universities and made the legal arrangements boosting university autonomy and academic freedom still remains an enigma for many students of Turkish higher education. One thing was certain that the interim military government, or at least some of its members, did not conceive university autonomy or academic freedom as intrinsically valuable principles of academia as far as their act of purge is concerned. All the endeavors to improve university autonomy in its all aspects through a

new law and constitution and to considerably shrink governmental control on universities were most probably due to protect universities from potential encroachments of prospective governments that would, just like that of the DP's, prevent universities from undertaking their missions to play the role of a guardian of the republican regime. To put it another way, the autonomy was a gift given by the strong component of the "vigorous forces," e.g., the military, to the weak one, e.g., academia, in exchange for their brave efforts to oppose the DP, to set the scene for and legitimize the military coup, and for the help building the new constitutional order following the intervention. As we will see below, the subsequent military and civilian governments would be equally eager to retrieve what they had given before.

Expansionary Demands and the Rise of the (Private) Non-University Sector in Higher Education

The post-coup era in Turkey inaugurated the period of coalition governments replacing the former single-party governments.[50] The first coalition was formed through the partnership of the RPP and the Justice Party (JP) that substituted the DP shut down by the military government. It is crucial to note that these governments had to operate under the military tutelage of the Armed Forces, which, in turn, confined the political and technical capacity of the country's policy-making system to a certain extent. The coalition governments were weak, ephemeral, and unstable, which made them unable to cope with emerging policy problems such as the increasing demand for higher education stemming from the economic, social, and demographic change that the country underwent.

The first major structural factor that influenced the higher education sector was the transition to state-led import-substituting industrialization strategy from a relatively free market-oriented approach, aiming to foster the creation of industries that would produce goods t formerly imported from abroad (Öniş, 2010). his strategy was thought to be the optimal one to improve the balance of payments of the country that had been faced with a crisis in the late DP era and to generate know-how and expertise that would accompany and contribute to economic development. The second major structural factor was demographic. The growing young population and the ever-increasing numbers of high-school graduates exerted pressures on the higher education system. The demographic growth was, without a doubt, accompanied by a socio-cultural factor. As the sociologists of education have demonstrated well in many different contexts, a strong desire for upward social mobility through attaining higher education was also a key factor in Turkey, forcing the system to expand. Thus, the major higher education policy problem that the policymakers had to solve in this term was to re-organize the higher education sector in order to

[50] The only exception until 1983 was the center-right single-party government formed by Justice Party between 1965 and 1971.

meet the highly trained manpower need of the flourishing economy and the increasing social demand for places in higher education (Tekeli, 2011).

The State Planning Organization (SPO), founded after the 1960 coup, immediately analyzed the overall economic condition of the country and prepared consecutive five-year development plans (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1963; Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1967) that produced a comprehensive picture of higher education in terms of manpower needs. The STO plans shed light on the widening gap between the demand for graduates and higher education institutions' supply for the respective periods, particularly in the fields of engineering, medicine, and education (cf. Okyar, 1968). Despite the increasing demand and the manpower requirements of the economy, the state avoided establishing new public universities during the 1960s apart from the Hacettepe University; an institution evolved into a university in 1967 from a pediatric medicine institute affiliated to the Ankara University (Reed, 1975, p. 212-221). The universities introduced *numerus clausus* policies to restrict access by deploying tools such as student selection and entrance examinations during the mid-1960s.

As a response to the growing demand, the non-university higher education sector expanded considerably through the establishment of new institutions throughout the country during the decade, a development that coincided with the emerging trend in Western European countries. The first set of institutions coming to the fore in this period was the "academies" providing training in commerce, economy, engineering, architecture, and fine arts, among others. The term "academy" in the Turkish context is used to refer to the professional higher schools primarily providing publicly funded[51] education at a bachelor's level. For that reason, this term should be conceived as the equivalent of "the non-university higher education sector," "the college sector," "the polytechnic sector," or "the universities of applied sciences sector (*Fachhochschulen*)" in different contexts. The proliferation of those academies did not make a huge and immediate impact on the overall operation pattern of the higher education system since it was conceived as a further consolidation of an already binary system, consisting of the university and professional schools that the Republic inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

What made a considerable impact on the operational pattern and the prevailing value configuration on the higher education system was not the establishment of new state-run academies, but the emergence of for-profit private institutions springing up to respond to the increasing student population (for an early assessment of Turkish private colleges, see Öncü, 1971) There had not been any private higher education institutions in the country until 1962. The

[51] In order to emphasize that these institutions were funded through public money and to discern them from their private counterparts, some of the academies were named "state academies;" e.g., the State Fine Arts Academy and State Academy for Engineering and Architecture.

emerging private higher education institutions gained their legal status through the adoption of the Private Education Act (Law no. 625) in 1965. Within a decade, 44 of such private higher education institutions were founded in areas of engineering, architecture, pharmacy, dentistry, journalism, business, and so on, by courtesy of the governments treating these institutions as an effective way of sharing the cost of higher education provision with the flourishing private sector. (Şimşek, 2019, p. 217). Particularly the central-right JP governments (1965-1971) viewed private institutions helpful to meet the massified demand for higher education to a considerable extent.

The rise of private higher education triggered many controversies among the actors of higher education. The first was the ideological cleavage between political parties and organized societal actors on private institutions' provision of higher education. The burgeoning leftist parties and movements, both radical and moderate ones, opposed the idea of private education and strongly advocated free public higher education on the ground that private schools could trigger inequality of opportunity in access to higher education. The second controversy was concerning the extent to which these institutions were capable of providing qualified education. The Chamber of Architects, for instance, refused the register the graduates of private architectural schools to restrain them from practicing their profession, for they found the education these schools provided of poor quality (Tekeli, 2011, p. 161). The concerns about the quality of these institutions were indeed warranted by a well-rounded report of a parliamentary commission of investigation published in 1968 upon the close investigation of 21 of such institutions (Cumhuriyet Senatosu, 1968). The third controversy was not only related to private higher schools but also to publicly-funded academies and professional schools. Universities were alarmed by the unbridled expansion of the non-university sector and their tendency to orient their activities in a way that would make them similar to universities. The process was a full-fledged example of what higher education researchers call "academic drift" (see Neave, 1979; Morphew & Huisman, 2002) or "academization" (Kyvik, 2009, p. 135-165), referring to a process through which the non-university institutions depart from their original institutional commitments and embrace structures and practices that are tightly associated with universities as organizational forms. As the non-university institutions of the higher education sector, both public and private ones, emulated universities with regard to curriculum, organization of courses and programs, internal governance, and functions, universities and professional associations litigated to the different instances of the judiciary with the complaint that non-university institutions illegally operate in the jurisdiction of universities by exerting functions that normally fall under universities' responsibility.

The legal tug war of culminated in a decision of 1971 by the Constitutional Court, adjudicating that the operation of private institutions of tertiary education unconstitutional and

hence establishing any kind of tertiary institutions are prerogative of the state (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi, 1972, p. 131-153) Immediately after the decision, private institutions were annexed to state academies with their students. After the rapid rise and fall of the private non-university sector, the state took all the responsibility to meet the growing demand for higher education in turbulent times.

The Campus Unrest and the Military Intervention of 1971

After the 1960 coup, Turkey witnessed a gradual upsurge of student movements of all shades, from boycotts and sit-ins to occupations and guerilla warfare. The reasons and outcomes of the rise of student radicalism in Turkey have been heatedly debated in the literature and have nothing to do with the aims of this research (see Szyliowicz, 1972; Kışlalı, 1974; Landau, 1974). Our interest here is limited to demonstrating how the campus unrest characterized by student protests affected university life along with some regulations about higher education in Turkey by comprising a basis for another military intervention and a consecutive rearrangement. The phenomena such as the growing popularity of leftist ideologies on campus or student radicalism were beyond any doubt not unique to Turkey, especially after the 1968 student protests all over the world. However, what probably made the Turkish case peculiar was that academics and students had already played a considerable part in engaging in public dissidence by helping the military in toppling the DP regime and preparing a new constitution, as part of what they saw as the "vigorous" forces of society. The Kemalist notion of revolution from above under the guidance of a group of progressive elite forces was accommodated to the Marxist ideologies by student organizations as they left the RPP and moved en masse towards the left. In order to contain the radical leftist movements, the extreme right, ultra-nationalist groups, and Islamists were organized, a development that exacerbated the political violence and terrorism in the country until the 1980 coup.

Student protests between 1968-1971 gained a severe character in the major universities where frequent boycotts, sit-ins, and occupations conduced toward suspension of teaching activities and temporary closure of some universities. In the first place, students protested against the problems that arose from the provision of higher education, including the poor quality of lectures, high student-faculty ratios, shoestring budget, the lack of students' participation in the internal decision-making processes, outmoded examination system, and the repressive attitudes of faculty members towards students, among others (Tekeli, 2003, p. 161-162). In some universities, students groups occupying universities established "occupation committees" (*işgal komitesi*) and submitted their general reform drafts to university senates in an effort to make their demands meet (for instance, see İstanbul Üniversitesi İşgal Komiteleri Konseyi, 1968). Teaching and research

assistants, who had been disturbed by the heavy workload and the domination of senior faculty members, immediately participated in the boycotts in universities. Such primarily academic factors motivated student activism in Turkey, like in many countries. Nevertheless, additional triggering factors such as distributional problems, ideological polarization, and political instability led student activism to take a new turn, transforming itself into a far-reaching movement addressing major societal problems. Therefore, in a short period, student activism escalated into street demonstrations against the center-right JP government, the Vietnam War, and Turkey's close political and military ties with the United States (Sayarı, 2010, p. 199).

In the advent of 1971, Turkey was in a state of chaos (Ahmad, 2002). The universities had to suspend their operation due to the violence. Militant leftist students were transforming themselves into urban guerillas by robbing banks, kidnapping and attacking American diplomats, and fighting with far-right ultra-nationalist student groups and the police. The ideologically rival student groups engaged in armed conflict, which ended up with tens of deaths from both sides. The left-wing unions went on strike in certain branches of manufacture. In addition to the surge of socialist student and worker movements, the foundation of a new Islamist political party, the National Order Party, refusing Kemalist principles aggravated the military that was watching an opportunity to intervene in politics. Under these circumstances, the Chief of General Staff and the commanders of the army, air, and naval forces issued a memorandum addressed to the president and prime minister on 12 March 1971. The military demanded the formation of a credible and powerful government that would end the anarchy on campuses and streets and carry out reforms envisaged in the Constitution (Hale, 1994, p. 184-185). This was the second intervention of the TAF to topple an elected government, albeit in a less direct and decisive way. The military did not directly assume power yet sent an ultimatum, saying that they would take over the power directly if the demands were not met. The military intervention led to the formation of several technocratic non-party civilian interim governments backed by the military until 1973.

When it comes to higher education, both military and the interim government were eager to curb the institutional autonomy of universities. To this end, they amended the provisions on universities (Art. 120) in the constitution as part of their extensive constitutional revision. The amendment gave the Council of Ministers the authority to seize control of universities, faculties, or any other administrative unit within universities when freedoms of learning and teaching are under threat. For the first time in the history of the Republic, the strengthened Executive had the authority to seize the power of universities or its administrative units when it deemed it necessary. The crucial point here was that the clause did not mention which situations necessitate the seizure of power and how long it would last. The constitutional amendment further restricted institutional

autonomy with a provision saying that universities are governed "under the observance and supervision of the state" (Art. 120/2). The return of the state as a supervisor and overseer amounted to a clear setback for the Interuniversity Council that had been holding the power of overseeing universities since the 1960 regulation in the absence of direct ministerial oversight.

All in all, the amendment regarding universities in the constitution was a reflection of the loss of trust in the academic community. It was clear that the legislator had to abrogate technical provisions about university autonomy that had hampered law enforcement officers to enter into campus areas and university buildings to respond to the campus unrest. Nevertheless, the overall amendment was more drastic than that, implying the end of an era of consensus among the academic, political, and civilian and military-bureaucratic elite on the substantial importance of university autonomy. Despite all interventions coming from the military or the authoritarian governments, universities had maintained their statutory autonomy, i.e., constitutionally and legally defined and guaranteed university autonomy in administrative matters, and academic activities, during the period 1946-1971. The interventions from external forces were mainly triggered to suppress or dissident voices or engage universities to canalize into the political agendas. Yet, the principle that universities should be governed by collegial bodies whose members are elected by the academics themselves was a commonly held and unquestioned practice. The military-backed 1960 regulations had even removed the central control of university activities by the Ministry by delegating it to the Interuniversity Council, a body fully composed of academics. The main gist of this regulation was to protect universities from a political intervention that any government would seek. However, the university now became the very arena of politics in its most violent forms. Under these conditions, universities did not *deserve* autonomy. herefore, the constitutional amendment of 1971 purposively removed the expression that universities have "scientific and administrative autonomy," and added the phrase that they are to be governed "under the observance and supervision of the state."

The Failed Reform of 1973: Increasing Central Control over Universities

The military-backed interim regime had achieved most of its reform objectives directed towards reinforcing the state against civil society within two years, including making a new law on higher education. It was enacted as another major legislative reform that brought some fundamental changes, particularly the systemic governance of the higher education system. It was also the second reform attempt that came after a military intervention. But, as distinct from the 1960 Reform that were substantially formulated and endorsed by academics, this one came into existence despite the considerable resistance from academia. Nihat Erim, the first prime minister of the interim period

and one of the architects of the new law on universities, clearly stated in his speeches[52] and writings[53] that the military and civilian bureaucratic elite were heavily troubled with not only the violent student upheaval but also the aberration of some academics from the Kemalist principles of the Constitution in favor of Marxist ideologies. Indeed, some well-known Marxist professors were arrested for propagating a communist worldview. As it turns out that the military-bureaucratic elite interpreted the campus unrest as the malfeasance of the greater institutional autonomy and academic freedom bestowed on scholars and universities on the condition that they operate in line with the official ideology. In other words, the "gentlemen's agreement" between the vigorous forces of military officers, high-level bureaucrats, and academics – which had been formed against the DP regime to guard the secular order and the state apparatus – seemed to be violated by the latter group. The chosen policy-making strategy was to institutionalize central bureaucratic bodies to curb academics and student politics rather than establish formal accountability mechanisms. Indeed, apart from the ones regarding "state control and supervision," the provisions of the new act concerning institutional governance, personal issues, academic procedures, etc., did not extensively differ from the formal legislation.

To secure heavy state control over universities, the new law laid down the establishment of two new central bureaucratic bodies in addition to already existing Interuniversity Council: The Council of Higher Education (*Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu*) and University Supervisory Board (*Üniversite Denetleme Kurulu*). A corollary of this arrangement was the downgrade in the powers of the Interuniversity Council that had enjoyed being the ultimate supervisory authority over universities with binding decision-making powers in academic and administrative matters. When it is taken into account that this Council was fully dominated by academics, i.e., rectors, deans, and elected academic representatives from each university, without incorporating representation from the world of politics, industry, or business, it would be safe to say that it operated as the coordination agency by an academic oligarchy at a national level. The new act placed the Interuniversity Council in a lower position, where it could operate as an advisory body on academic matters in a similar way to the traditional Rectors' Conferences in some European countries (Art. 9).

The most important innovation of the new act was the constitution of the Council of Higher Education, a supreme body responsible for ensuring policy coordination among higher

[52] Immediately after the military memorandum, Erim criticized left-wing academics sharply: "A member of the teaching staff occupying a chair in the University can analyze objectively all doctrines and all thoughts from a scientific angle; but he cannot use the university chair as a means of brainwashing the 22 to 23-year-old young people. Our universities are State universities. Because they are State universities, one should always keep in view the basic principles of our Constitution" (State Information Organization, 1972).

[53] In his memoirs, Erim similarly argues that the boundaries of the freedom of teaching are drawn by loyalty to the Constitution (2018, p. 298-304). Therefore, if a lecturer teaches in a way to suggest that Marxist ideals are superior to the ideals of the Republic depicted in the Constitution, this would mean abusing the freedom of teaching.

education institutions and conducting research and evaluation in pursuant of the policy targets of the national development plan to steer higher education (Art. 4). In fact, the idea of such a national governing board was nothing new, and there had been some strong arguments in the academic milieu for such a supreme body (Umunç, 1986, p. 447). With the establishment of this Council, the controversy centered around how it should be organized and what powers and authorities it should hold. The Act declared that the Minister of Education would chair the Council, whose members will include an elected representative from each university and an equal number of bureaucrats as governmental representatives appointed by the cabinet upon ministerial recommendation (Art. 5). Composed equally of academics and bureaucrats, the Council had the authority to prepare short and long-term plans for structural aspects of higher education (improvement of institutions, manpower planning, resource utilization, training of the academic staff, distribution of posts, etc.), to review draft legislation and bylaws regarding higher education institutions, and to ensure coordination among institutions to make them operate in line with the national development plan (Art. 6).

The final, and probably more strict, supervisory body was the University Supervisory Board founded in the cabinet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister (Art. 7). This body was assumed to take control of universities in special but unspecified circumstances and to demand from the competent authorities to start prosecution on campus-related affairs (Art. 8). These provisions were a direct and decisive response of the state to the campus unrest and political dissidence of academia. In terms of central control, the provision brought a more retrograde model, institutionalizing stricter supervision over universities than had been in effect after the 1946 reform. The higher education system thereby was taken under close supervision than ever before through three different supreme boards.

The introduction of these systemic control bodies naturally came under attack by not only the academic community but also the law societies, intellectuals, and some politicians. Universities, including Ankara, Istanbul, and Istanbul Technical, applied to the Constitutional Court with similar justifications for, among others, reversal of the law provisions as to the Council of Higher Education and the University Supervisory Board, based on the argument that clauses regarding their composition, operation, and powers of these bodies are conflicting with the constitutional provisions about the university autonomy. After months of consideration, the Constitutional Court adjudicated in 1975 that the clauses in the new University Act in regard to the composition and powers of these two supreme boards are null. (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi, 1975, p. 58-164). Following the judgment of the Constitutional Court, both of them were inhibited from coming into effect and performing their assigned duties. The Court, by its verdict, forestalled the

central control over universities that could have easily been turned into control of universities for governments' own partisan purposes (Umunç, 1986). The only supreme board remaining was the Interuniversity Council with truncated authorities, reducing it into an academic advisory body rather than a supreme board with binding decision-making powers. Thus the reform that aimed at building a heavy state-control regime in higher education with three supreme boards unintendedly engendered a vacuum of central policy control, coordination, and planning. The higher education governance thereby, to a considerable extent, maintained its former characteristics after the failed reform attempt. Even though the reform was still on the agenda afterward and there were proposals offered by influential actors such as the Interuniversity Council (Üniversitelerarası Kurul, 19 October 1978 – 26 June 1979) to make amendments to the existing Act, no meaningful change occurred until the 1980 coup.

Nonetheless, the rapid reform in higher education, especially concerning the systemic governance arrangements, was born dead due to two reasons. From a policy perspective, it was based on poor policy design and triggered by urgent motivations to repress and eliminate radical student movements and political dissidence from academic life, rather than to offer concrete and well-designed solutions to university problems.[54] From a social standpoint, the legislative reform sparked off a strong opposition not only within the academic oligarchy and the student movement active at that time (although they opposed in different ways and for different reasons) but also among the broader social and political circles. Therefore, when the temporary coalition for reform that the military intervention gave rise waned, so did the reform.

Conclusion

The three-and-a-half decade of Turkish higher education (1946-1981) examined in this chapter are probably the most tumultuous years of academic life in Turkey, interrupted by military interventions, legislative reforms, academic purges, and student unrest. The period also is convenient to see how the complex interplay of historical institutions (e.g., historically embedded politico-administrative regime characterized by heavy state control and regulation) and ideological contestation (value-oriented and ideational conflict among actors in the policy area) collaboratively produced a change in higher education policies specific to systemic and institutional governance arrangements.

Turkey's gradual and eclectic adoption of Napoleonic politico-administrative regime and instruments during the late Ottoman and early Republican eras were discussed in the former

[54] One of the problems that the higher education system experienced was the increasing demand for attainment. Between 1973 and 78, ten new universities were founded across different regions and cities to meet the demand. This expansionary wave, unfortunately, coincided with the period of violence.

chapters. One aspect of this tradition is the legalistic conception of administration, which associates administration with a hierarchical set of laws and regulations (legalism) that are used to intervene in society with limited incorporation of organized interests in the agenda-setting and policy formulation process (unilateralism). Legalism in higher education manifests itself in the practice of designing almost all aspects of institutional and systemic governance through the constitution, national laws, bylaws, and other legal arrangements. Unilateralism is a general tendency, which was further exacerbated in periods of military interventions. The government actors' exclusion of a great majority of actors from policymaking processes obligated those most interested in the policy to appeal to the Constitutional Court. The judiciary, mostly through the Constitutional Court, was embroiled in conflicts of interests related to higher education. This made the Court more than a mere arbitrator since its final judgments on academic purges, the status of private higher education institutions, the establishment of new universities, the powers of the METU Board of Trustees, the restrictive provisions of the University Act of 1973, among others.

The period between 1960 and 1980 thereby brought a unique actor constellation in higher education policymaking through direct or indirect involvement of supreme court justices and military officers. The Constitutional Court was founded in 1962 as another guardian of the regime, which was designed to protect the regime from an extra- or above- political position in addition to its formal duties. The military intervened in politics three times (1960, 71, and 80) during the given period, and these were followed by comprehensive legislative arrangements and amendments concerning higher education (1960, 73, 81). Since all major legislative reforms came after a military intervention, the participation of academic guilds, universities, or other interested parties as veto players or actors with vested interests in the formulation and design processes were either limited with pro-coup elite or out of the question. The policymakers' cognitive limits in grasping the problems and specific characteristics of the higher education institutions produced relatively poor-quality reforms and unanticipated outcomes.

Another reason for the poor policy design, especially in the 1970s, was the state's reflex to suppress the student unrest of 1968 rather than propose sweeping and well-designed changes to the system. 1968 Turkish student activism was undisputedly far more violent than the 1968 student protests in the United States and Europe. Yet, the political and bureaucratic actors turned a deaf ear to the initial demands of protestors, which had been mostly academic in nature, and preferred to exert all their efforts to extinguish the student movement. Military commissions decided upon arrest, imprisonment, and execution of many radical student leaders after the 1971 intervention. In other words, policy actors used the crisis situation not to respond to some of the demands of educational change as seen in France's rapid university reform of 1968 – *Loi d'orientation* of Minister

Edgar Faure – (see Tarrow, 1993) but to restrict university autonomy and increase central control. More than that, the degree of the central control that the interim government devised resulted in a policy reform failure with the decision of the Court. Therefore, a democratic balance between autonomy and control could not be formed.

As the campus radicalism evolved into a large-scale conflict between ultranationalist and militant leftist political groups, the higher education system came to a deadlock in the late 1970s. The leftist militant groups conceived guerilla tactics and political violence vital to their ultimate political strategy of replacing the "bourgeois democracy" in Turkey with a socialist regime.[55] Such a massive campaign of political violence played a crucial role in the downfall of the country's fragile democratic system through another coup d'état in 1980, whose consequences on higher education will be examined in the next chapter.

[55] According to the figures, more than 5000 people lost their lives, and thousands got injured because of political violence between 1976 and 1980 (Sayarı, 2010).

CHAPTER FIVE

The New University Regime: Higher Education Governance in the Post-Coup Era (1981 to the Present)

This chapter begins by examining the governance regime in higher education designed under the interim military rule (1980-1983) with a specific emphasis on the new agency responsible for systemic governance. I deal with the problem of how reformers designed the new governance architecture and why they preferred it as such. I put considerable effort into describing the main features of higher education governance and its implications for universities. The rest of the chapter explores the extent to which governance arrangements have changed during the last four decades. By doing this, I focus not only on successful change outcomes that are rare but also on various failed institutional reform attempts and deadlocks.

Higher Education Policy at a Critical Juncture: Forging Reform under the Military Rule (1980-83)

The military coup of 12 September 1980 is a watershed moment in the history of contemporary Turkey, for it profoundly influenced the form and substance of governance and politics of the country. Some scholars present it as the inception of a new era, namely the "Third Republic," in the political history of Turkey[56] as the Constitution of 1982, prepared and adopted during the direct military rule (1980-83), fundamentally changed the governmental architecture. Following the coup, the four chiefs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) – The Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Gendarmerie – led by the Chief of Staff, General Kenan Evren, established a National Security Council (NSC), which ruled the country with an iron fist under martial law until the elections in November 1983. Immediately after the military intervention, the NSC dissolved the Parliament, suspended all political parties, suppressed numerous civil society organizations and unions, and ordered detention and arrestment of tens of thousands of people. After these draconian measures, the NSC settled down to redesign the political sphere and the entire society. Still, in common with

[56] Note that there is no official periodization in Turkey, such as the First Republic (1923-1960), Second Republic (1960-1980), and the Third Republic (1980–). Some scholars adopt this kind of classification by using the term republic to refer to specific constitutional regimes. The three constitutions, adopted in 1924, 1961, and 1982, contour the political regime characteristics in the respective periods.

the other takeovers, the junta did not envisage a permanent military regime but aimed toward a transition to civilian parliamentary rule as fast as possible once they restored the order (Karpat, 2004, p. 367).

The higher education policy field was, without a doubt, high on their agenda, so they had to deal with it before returning back to the barracks. The TAF had rendered the political violence precipitated by the extreme political and ideological polarization between militant right-wing and radical left-wing groups during the 1970s as one of the major reasons compelling them to stage a coup. In a press conference following the coup, Evren declared anarchy would not be allowed in universities under the guise of freedom and independence (Evren, 1991, p. 40). The junta leaders vowed to hold universities responsible for inflaming the anarchical situation in the country, equalizing the term autonomy with anarchy. The NSC easily linked the political violence to the student upheavals as they regarded university campuses as bastions of radicalism, some academics as instigators of politically-motivated acts of violence, and some students/student groups as perpetrators of terrorist activities (INT 5). In a sense, both students and universities as institutions were treated like scapegoats as it was later understood that the terrorist incidents carried out by university students were less than that alleged (Tunçay, 1983, p. 682).

The short period of military rule subsequent to the 1980 coup d'etat was an adequate example of what historical institutionalist scholars called critical juncture, e.g., a relatively short period of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents' choices will affect the outcome of interest (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). More specifically, critical junctures are moments of institutional uncertainty and fluidity in which certain institutional arrangements are adopted among a set of alternatives in a way to generate new developments with path-dependent traits (Mahoney, 2000). Selecting new options among an array of plausible alternatives is of the essence as any choice is to potentially open a new institutional path and thereby channel future institutional movements in a specific direction. As the logic of the concept suggests, we can only identify a critical juncture ex post as the new institutional arrangements that were made during this moment have to have shown path-dependent characteristics over a medium or long run (Capoccia, 2016, p. 1116).

With regard to the higher education policy field, the junta leaders were decisive in coming to grips with the so-called 'university issue'. A wide-ranging change in higher education policy – especially in the systemic governance arrangements – was very viable and likely, which would mark a departure from the institutional status quo of the pre-critical juncture period. The NSC was the ultimate authority to decide the path to be chosen, yet there were also other actors seeking influence to push the decision-makers in favor of their preferred institutional solution.

In the policy formulation phase, the NSC delegated the task to prepare a draft of the bill on higher education to an expert commission within the Ministry of Education (Tekeli, 2010, p. 206).[57] The Commission immediately started to receive opinions of local and foreign academics and experts on different parts of the draft, yet – as it can be understood – hampered the Interuniversity Council, the most important central body in systemic governance of higher education, from taking part in the Commission's activities. The Ministry of Education clearly expressed that they did not need any opinion expressed by the Interuniversity Council (Arslan, 2004, p. 486), which summarizes the NSC's estrangement from the academic establishment. The Interuniversity Council, without a doubt, was uncomfortable with being excluded in the formulation stage. Its members, along with university rectors, managed to see the draft only after its first version was completed. They delivered their mostly negative opinions as to the provisions of the draft law and put forward proposals to rectify them, which the Commission would, to a large extent, have disregarded (Ateş, 1984).

The military regime insisted on legislating an all-inclusive law on higher education to form a unified and central regulatory structure (this can be inferred from the NSC's minutes of meetings; Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, 1981a & 1981b). The Expert Commission was probably lacked the human resources, administrative capacity, and specialty to come up with a satisfactory bill. After all, the dissolution of the parliament, suspension of political parties, and exclusion of academic institutions from the process debarred the military government from a considerable administrative and knowledge capacity in policymaking. This led the NSC General Secretariat to form another expert commission comprising military officials, educational specialists, and legal advisers. This parallel commission was responsible for further developing and refining the draft bill proposed by the main commission. A third commission was simultaneously set up in an advanced stage of formulation, made up of ministers responsible for different policy areas (Arslan, 2004, p. 489). This third sub-commission was tasked with deliberating the final content of the law draft and submitting it to the Cabinet of Ministers after examining the existing draft and suggestions concerning it closely. The NSC really needed to consult influential figures that would help them accelerate the process by offering tailor-made suggestions.

At this stage, we witness the penetration of a policy and institutional entrepreneur into the policymaking process by conveying his ideas to resolve specific policy problems. This entrepreneur was İhsan Doğramacı, who was invited by the NSC General Secretariat to articulate his ideas,

[57] The new Minister of Education, Hasan Sağlam, was not a civilian but a general appointed to his position following the military intervention. Yet, this commission was mostly composed of bureaucrats and experts of the Ministry.

particularly on governance problems.[58] Doğramacı was a versatile person with multiple identities and skills that enabled him to operate in different fields of action. He was a prominent medical scientist and educationalist with international experience (e.g., he had worked in various Turkish, American, English, and French universities and hospitals), an organizational founder (e.g., he has founded the Hacettepe Institute of Child Health in 1954, Hacettepe University in 1967, several foundations, and would have founded Bilkent University in 1984), an academic administrator and leader (e.g., he had, among others, served as dean of the Faculty of Medicine of Hacettepe University, rector of Ankara and Hacettepe Universities, chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Middle East Technical University in different periods), and a senior international technocrat (e.g., he had been, among many others, the president of International Pediatric Association, vice-president in and board member to the World Health Organization, chairman of the Board of the United Nations Children's Fund, vice-chairman of the World Health Assembly in different periods).[59] The military government perceived him as the right person due to his immense and overlapping experience as well as his multifarious institutional and social ties (Evren, 1991, p. 480). He was also known as a person who had already had some reform ideas on governance issues in higher education, given his former activities and statements. In addition to his professional merits, he had also been known for his moderately republican political tendencies – a favorable feature in the eyes of junta generals who were at odds with so-called politically extremist academics and administrators.

By examining official minutes of proceedings of the NSC's commission meetings, we understand that Doğramacı's ideas were rather discussed in the context of the systemic governance in higher education and the potential structure and tasks of a new central organization to be founded (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi Tutanak Dergisi, 1981a & 1981b). As we discussed in the former chapter, the University Act of 1973 (Law no. 1750) had laid down the establishment of two new central bureaucratic bodies in addition to the already existing Interuniversity Council: The Council of Higher Education and University Supervisory Board, both were repealed by the Constitutional Court. The NSC was adamant on reanimating these organizations as one supreme body – as the Council of Higher Education (the CHE, *Yükseköğretim Kurulu*, *YÖK*) – responsible for systemic governance. The minutes of commission meetings show that there was a particular disaccord on how to structure such an organization and which authorities and tasks to give it. We can distinguish

[58] General Kenan Evren, the leader of the junta and the president of Turkey following the coup, writes in his memoirs that he ordered Necdet Üruğ, the secretary-general of the NSC, to be directly involved in legislative reform efforts in higher education to finalize the process as fast as possible (Evren, 1991, p. 374). As it turns out, Üruğ came into contact with Doğramacı, who was then a guest professor at the Paris V and wanted him to submit his own alternative draft (Tekeli, 2010, p. 208-209).

[59] The biographical information is extracted from Özsoylu (1995) and Phillips (1997).

two positions on that matter. On the one hand, there were those, especially the Minister of Education Hasan Sağlam, who promoted the idea that either a new ministry responsible for higher education affairs should be founded or the Minister of Education should be the head of the CHE. The underlying rationale was to attach the CHE, which had been given too much autonomy and leverage in the law draft, to the Ministry in one way or another. This suggestion was based on a somewhat tightened version of the Continental model in which universities have considerable autonomy to make decisions on internal matters and the government to finance and regulate the system.

The other position envisaged the CHE as a supreme body that is largely independent, equipped with vast authorities, and only responds to the President of the Republic. This was, more or less, a representation of what Doğramacı had premeditated. The main idea, as later would have expressed by the first two presidents of the Council, was to establish the CHE as a "buffer institutition" (Doğramacı, 1992) or a "national intermediary body" (Sağlam, 1995) that would mediate between the state and universities as in North America and British Commonwealth countries such as the University Grants Committee (or its successor Universities Funding Council) in the United Kingdom or state boards in the United States. Doğramacı, in a way, proposed a modified version of the Anglo-American model of systemic governance as a panacea to most of the system-level problems in Turkish higher education. Turkish higher education had to move away from a 'degenerated' and 'outmoded' version of the Continental model to adopt a system with close affinities with the Anglo-American model (Doğramacı, 2007; Sağlam, 1995). The enacted law, as we will see, would have reflected most of what had been suggested by him.

Thus, Turkish higher education embarked on a new path that evinces a considerable rupture from the former institutional arrangements. This was a centralist path in systemic governance, paving the way for strict state control and tutelage over universities deprived of administrative and financial autonomy. Doğramacı, as a policy and institutional entrepreneur, used the window of opportunity that stems from uncertainty and instability to push his favored remedy. He was not the grand designer of the reconstruction of Turkish higher education, yet substantially instrumental in routing it in a direction it may not have gone otherwise. More specifically, he used his "social skills" (Fligstein, 2011) to draw attention to systemic governance problems, offer a paradigmatic solution inspired by the Anglo-American model, frame his ideas in a way to influence powerholders' perception of issues, and advocate his policy preferences against the academic elite opposing his suggestions. When the CHE was founded, the President of the Republic appointed him as the head of this organization. From 1981 to 1992, Doğramacı thus also had a chance to directly influence almost all policy issues related to higher education.

In the sections that follow, we will explore the contours of the reform in terms of both systemic and institutional governance arrangements in detail. Yet, before this, we should first map the more general changes that the new legislative reform brought.

The 1981 Reform: Mapping the Changes

The Higher Education Act of 1981 (Law no. 2547), accepted and enacted by the NSC in November 1981, has been the most comprehensive legislative arrangement in higher education.[60] Although this Act is notorious for its provisions that altered the systemic governance in Turkish higher education, which led some scholars to see it as the "CHE act" (Şimşek, 2019, p. 300-303) in a reductionist fashion, other measures it took considerably extended the scope of changes.

First, the legislation introduced an ideological control element to higher education. The junta generals were quite confident that if university students had been better indoctrinated in line with a certain ideological framework, they would not have been captivated by extreme ideologies.[61] Therefore, indoctrination and discipline, two fundamental elements of a Military Academy, would be among universities' primary missions. In enumerating the aims of higher education (Art. 4), it clearly expresses that higher education aims to train citizens to be deeply loyal to Atatürk's nationalism as guided by his reforms and principles; to bear national, moral, humanistic, and cultural values of the Turkish nation; to feel pride and honor of being Turkish; to hold the interest of society above personal interests; to be imbued with the love of family, country, and the nation; to be aware of their duties and responsibilities towards the Republic of Turkey and render these into the everyday behavior, and so on. The same article also pays lip service to the importance of promoting freethinking, scientific research, socio-economic development, etc. Yet, portraying universities as centers of freethinking, expression, and research and then asking them to inculcate ideology is obviously contradictory (Turan, 2010, p. 154) since the Act itself set the ideological boundaries of the so-called freethinking and freedom of teaching and research.

Second, the Reform abolished the binary structure in higher education, which had made a clear distinction between universities and non-university higher education institutions, namely, academies and professional and/or vocational schools, and replaced it with a unified national

[60] Until the end of the military rule in 1983, this law was amended several times. Two laws (Law no. 2653 and Law no. 2880) and one legislative decree (L.D. no. 41) either amended some of the provisions or added new regulations onto the existing ones. Our analysis here is based on an assessment of these legal documents, including the new Constitution of 1982, in toto.

[61] This point was clearly expressed by the junta leader Evren in a press conference a couple of days later after the coup. He stated that university professors have had produced left, right, reactionary, and separatist ideas rather than pro-Atatürkist ones. He also stated that the whole education system, from primary to higher, should be based on Atatürkist/Kemalist doctrine (Evren, 1991, p. 27-38). The compulsory course titled the Principles of Atatürk and the History of Turkish Revolution was a direct instrument of indoctrination, which is still part of all undergraduate programs' curriculum.

higher education system in which the university is the only organizational form, apart from military and police colleges that are regulated separately (Umunç, 1986; Erden, 2006). All diversity within the field between Humboldt-inspired traditional public universities or American-inspired campus universities, or between fine art academies and professional schools was replaced by a standardized system in which the organization of departments and academic programs are identical. This was a radical institutional change, e.g., *displacement*, that removed the former institutional arrangements in the organizational field, which had their roots in the late Ottoman era, and replaced it with new ones in a coercive way. Different academies and professional/vocational schools were either amalgamated to form new universities or incorporated into the existing universities. By doing so, the reformers hit two birds with one stone. In the first place, they ended the intra-organizational field conflict within higher education and homogenized the field in terms of organizational forms. As we discussed in the former chapter, the mushrooming of the non-university sector and the concomitant academic drift process, i.e., non-university institutions' emulation of structures and practices tightly associated with universities and search for higher status, had triggered many problems that even turned into judicial contestation. In addition, the reformers achieved to ensure a similar unification and standardization in terms of the regulatory framework. Prior to the Reform, higher education institutions had been regulated by a variety of laws, and even some of them were affiliated to ministries other than the Ministry of Education. The new Act brought all higher education institutions under one common legal framework and ensured regulatory uniformity through the CHE.

Third, the transition to the department system as a basic academic unit of universities from the chair system was completed. The chair system integrated into Turkish university structures through several Humboldtian-inspired reforms had been the kernel organizational unit placed under faculties. As a recognized senior scholar in his field, the chair-holder had vast authority over academic activities within his/her chair comprised of junior scholars, assistants, and administrative personnel (Tinto, 1974). For the first time, the mostly failed Reform of 1973 introduced the departments as core units in addition to chairs. The 1981 Reform, on the other hand, was decisive in the transition to the department-based organization in which academics from all levels are gathered under the same disciplinary roof. This was another indicator of the turn towards the Anglo-American model from the former Continental-oriented structures and practices. Similarly, graduate schools/institutes were founded as separate units to organize graduate education and award post-graduate degrees.

Fourth, the Reform enabled foundations to establish non-profit private universities (the *vakıf üniversitesi*; literally meaning "foundation university" in Turkish) with the approval of the CHE

and an act of the Parliament. This marks the introduction of market elements into a public university-dominated system, apart from a short period between 1962-1971 in which for-profit private higher education institutions had operated. As discussed in the former chapter, the main motivation was the need to respond to the demographic pressure on the higher education system. Private universities were seen as instrumental in satisfying the increasing demand for higher education and relieving public institutions to a considerable extent. The state encouraged big business groups to found private universities through tools such as subsidies, tax reductions, or land appropriations despite wide-ranging criticisms that higher education was a public good and privatization could lead to further inequalities in access (Şenses, 2007). As a result, some 20 of them were founded from 1984 to the late 1990s by different market actors such as family-owned big business conglomerates, affluent industrialists with philanthropic orientation, educational foundations and enterprises that had already run private primary and secondary schools, and quasi-public organizations such as chambers of commerce, etc. In the 2000s, private universities continued to blossom, and they – more specifically the research-oriented ones – started to be seen by the CHE not only as instruments to meet the ever-increasing demand but also as strategic institutions that could increase the country's competitive capacity in the global knowledge economy (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, 2007). Private universities are governed by an individual board of trustees that is the highest decision-making body at the university, which gives them more autonomy in financial (i.e., setting tuition fees and allocating budget) and administrative matters (i.e., forming organizational structure and managing internal affairs) in comparison to public universities even though they have to abide by the general rules and regulations laid down by the CHE. The board system in institutional governance had been practiced by the Middle East Technical University, having a special legal status among public universities until the reform of 1981. The reformers, on the other hand, did not allow public universities to be governed by individual boards based on the argument that the CHE was itself envisioned and designed as a "national board of trustees" (Doğramacı, 1984; Sağlam, 1995). While private universities can incorporate representation from politics, bureaucracy, and business through their board of trustees, public universities' administrative boards – not to mention senates – are exclusively dominated by academics. This is an interesting outcome as the reform created a new binary division between public and private universities that considerably differ from each other in terms of, among others, their sources of financing and institutional governance, whereas it abolished the former binary system made up of universities and non-university institutions.[62]

[62] Institutional diversity in Turkish higher education is a controversial topic. Some scholars argue that the 1981 reform has strongly homogenized organizational forms in the field by coercively promoting sameness (see, Mızıkacı, 2006, p. 17-18; Gürüz, 2008, p. 75-78; Visakorpi et al., 2008). This argument is warrantable if one conceives institutional

Fifth, higher education institutions were given permission to provide open and distance education (Art. 5; Art.12). During the 1970s, the Ministry of Education was responsible for distance education, a tiny sector in the provision of higher education. The open and distance education programs (*açıköğretim*), modeled after the Open University of the UK, was designed as a band-aid solution to help the growing demand to higher education where the available programs were far from meeting the growing demand (Gür, 2016). As open education programs are easy to enroll, convenient to the working learners and adults, and cost-efficient as they charge only a nominal contribution fee, they became an integral part of higher education. Today, the students enrolled in these programs constitute a significant portion of the whole student population in higher education (see Appendix).

Last but not least, the reformers, just like what their predecessors did in the former reform moments in higher education, saw academic purge as an instrument or even a necessary condition to make reform work. The military regime immediately suspended tens of unwanted academics, mostly senior academics with left-wing tendencies, under the Martial Law of 1402 as part of a wide-range purge in the public sector without providing justification (see Özen, 2002). Besides, many junior scholars such as assistant professors, doctoral students, and research assistants were expulsed by their rectors. Furthermore, over three hundred senior academics either resigned or retired to protest the academic purge and the new regulations making the academic work environment more oppressive than ever (Tunçay, 1983). All in all, the Reform again amounted to not only making changes in institutions, rules, or practices but also in the academic cadres and staff.

Higher Education Governance after the CHE

The most important outcome of the reform, without a doubt, was the establishment of the CHE. This section will therefore explore its organizational properties (e.g., what kind of organizational creature it is) and roles and responsibilities in systemic governance. It will also examine the new institutional governance mode that has produced ongoing tension between the academic profession, central authorities, and political actors in terms of institutional autonomy and academic freedom.

diversity as only characterized by the existence of a robust non-university sector. Recently some scholars have turned their attention to the differences between universities and produced typologies that grasp diversity in terms of financing, institutional governance, strategies of universities, size, research vs. teaching orientations, the language of instruction, and so on (see, Üsdiken, Topaler, & Koçak, 2013 and Arlı, 2016). Based on the findings of these studies, we can conclude that Turkish universities have produced a de facto institutional diversity over time despite the restrictive provisions of legal arrangements.

The Council, as discussed above, was described by its founders and presidents as an example of buffer organizations or intermediary agencies in higher education. So, what is a buffer organization? Such organizations have received relatively less attention in the literature on higher education policy. Slightly older research (see De Boer, 1992; El-Khawas, 1992, Braun, 1993) suggests that the main gist of such organizations is the *standing-between* character that enables them to mediate between different constituencies, particularly between the state and higher education institutions. They can be organized as governmental, non-governmental, or quasi-governmental entities in different national settings. They can also serve different purposes, including policy planning and formulation, allocation and negotiation of financial resources, evaluation and monitoring, implementation of government policies, and representation of the interests of institutions, among others.

De Boer (1992, p. 36-37) argues that it is beneficial for governments to use intermediary agencies in policy processes for various reasons. First, such agencies reduce the number of organizations with which the government has to interact from many to one. Second, such organizations, assuming that they have sufficient bureaucratic capacity, can gather the relevant information concerning the higher education sector, which would inform government policies. Third, they can solve conflicts of interest between higher education institutions more effectively than the government. Finally, a buffer organization can be a partner of the government for implementing policies based on their authority and legitimacy.

Recently, intermediary agencies have received renewed attention from scholars studying higher education and knowledge policies (Braun, 2008; Capano & Turri, 2017; Jungblut & Woelert, 2018) in the context of 'agentification' discussions in public administration theory and practice (see, Pollitt & Talbot, 2004; Verhoest et al., 2012). In analyzing the role of agencies in systems in which agencies are key to achieving higher education policy coordination, Capano & Turri (2017, p. 227-228) offer a typology of agencies based on their *policy autonomy* that depends on the level of legal powers and governmental capacity to steer. A *dominant* agency is one holding both wide-ranging legal power and the capacity to use its delegated power to steer the system coherently. This agency is typically the central policy actor in the national higher education system. An *additional* agency has considerable legal power yet cannot operate as a main actor in policymaking due to the lack of capacity or governmental will to intervene in the field. An *administrative* agency has limited formal powers, yet it can assume a de facto dominant role in the absence of government plans and directives. Lastly, the *instrumental* agency lacking both formal legal powers and the capacity to act, which makes it the weakest ideal-type.

The CHE is close to the ideal type of *dominant* agency. It has institutional autonomy along with a substantial policy autonomy derived from both the legal powers it holds and the governmental capacity to steer as a principal. In terms of the first dimension, the CHE has all-pervasive legal powers and duties bestowed upon it through the Constitution and the Higher Education Act. Decisions made by the CHE do not need to be approved by any other governmental or political authority to enter into force. The provision of the Constitution of 1982 concerning the CHE as a "supreme body" is as follows:

> "The Higher Education Council shall be established to plan, regulate, administer, and supervise the education provided by institutions of higher education, to orient the activities of teaching, education and scientific research, to ensure the establishment and development of these institutions in conformity with the objectives and principles set forth by law, to ensure the effective use of the resources allocated to the universities, and to plan the training of the teaching staff" (translation is mine, Art.131).

As the constitutional provision puts succinctly, the CHE has wide-ranging legal powers and duties in almost all aspects of higher education. The constitutional basis of its competency further cements the legal power of the Council so that any reform effort to restrict its jurisdiction or remit would require a consensus on a constitutional amendment. The Higher Education Act of 1981 (Art. 7) enumerates far-ranging tasks and responsibilities of the Council. These include:

- to prepare long and short-term plans for the establishment and improvement of higher education institutions;
- to prepare long-term plans for training academic staff either domestically or in foreign countries;
- to provide coordination among higher education institutions in harmonious, constructive, and durable ways;
- to set boundaries of growth to make sure that universities operate efficiently;
- to suggest proposals regarding the establishment of new universities or merge of the existing institutions into a university;
- to decide the establishment, merge, or closure of departments, institutes, research centers, and similar academic units by taking into consideration proposals made by universities;

- to determine the number of academic positions for faculty members (e.g., assistant professors, associate professors, and full professors) by taking financial, university-specific, disciplinary-related, and other matters into account;
- to examine and evaluate the annual activity reports submitted by universities;
- to determine the enrolment capacity and quotas of universities and specify general principles regarding admissions in relation to manpower planning;
- to submit proposals about annual university budgets to the Ministry of Education;
- to propose candidates for the rector to the President of the Republic to be appointed;
- to appoint deans of faculties among candidates recommended by rectors.

Fulfilling these tasks is impossible without a governmental capacity to lead policy – e.g., own financial resources, specialized administrative units, and bureaucratic staff. The CHE can be seen as an agency akin to what Braun (2008) calls 'superministry' responsible for higher education, and to some extent, research and science policies by means of its specialized departments. What is unusual is that the CHE has ministry-like qualities even though it was organized as a bureaucratic agency. In that sense, it is one of the rare organizations responsible for the governance of an entire policy sector with powers in decision-making, implementation, and supervision. In the parliamentary systems, those authorities mostly reside in ministries. In this case, ministries, especially the Ministry of Education, only have minor roles in higher education.

The executive board of the CHE is responsible for supervising the activities of the entire organization, which makes the appointment of executive board members, also known as CHE members, a politically delicate issue. The Higher Education Act of 1981 (Art. 6), in its original version, stipulated that the Executive Board of the Council is composed of 25 members[63] (including the President) appointed by the President of the Republic. Eight (e.g., seven members and one president) are directly appointed by the President of the Republic, preferably from among those who have served as rectors. The Interuniversity Council elects eight others among those who have at least twenty-five years of experience in the academic profession. The Council of Ministers designates six from among distinguished high-ranking bureaucrats, be it active or retired. Two other members come from the Ministry of Education, and the Chief of General Staff chooses the last one remaining. Thus, the board's membership composition reflects a balancing act between the state authority and academic oligarchy as two forces responsible for the governance of the

[63] Note that the numbers of members to the Executive Board changed over time, starting from a regulation in 1987 (L. D. 301).

higher education system, excluding representation from the market constituting the third element of Burton Clark's famous triangle of coordination (1983).

The rise of such a dominant agency, on the other hand, occurred through the disempowerment of the other agencies that had been in charge of systemic governance, particularly the Interuniversity Council. This agency was a national body – composed of rectors, deans, and elected representatives from universities – tasked to assist the government in agenda-setting and policy formulation and to make binding decisions in certain aspects of higher education. According to Capano & Turri's typology (2018), this Council showed *additional* agency characteristics during the period between 1960-1980. Although it lacked governmental capacity, i.e., specialized staff, bureaucratic units, etc., it had an opportunity to affect policymaking due to both the government's incapacity and its will to use its delegated power to the full extent. The new Act (Art. 11) considerably truncated the legal powers and authority of the Interuniversity Council and transformed it a mere academic advisory body that would assist the CHE in areas such as determination of academic promotion procedures, teaching and learning standards, publication and dissemination policies, and the general principles of doctoral education. Moreover, the General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces was also given the authority to appoint a professor from the military to the Council as a member, which reflects the Armed Forces' will to be informed about internal processes.

Over the last 40 years, the CHE has maintained its position as the most important actor – even as "the owner of higher education" – (INT 6) in Turkey's higher education policy. As I will examine later, there have been serious reform attempts vowing to alter its structure, restrict its powers, or abolish it entirely. Yet, none of these has succeeded in producing tangible outcomes or changing the core of the existing arrangements. What occurred was mostly moderate *layering*, e.g., revisions, legislative amendments, or additions to the existing rules and regulations – in total constitutes what an interviewee calls "a rag bag of regulations" (INT 9).

Institutional Governance: The Fall of Academic Power

The Reform of 1981 also brought substantial changes to institutional governance arrangements. Conceptually, the most crucial outcome can be summarized as the adoption of the *hierarchical* principle of coordination at the expense of the *collegial* principle of coordination at the institutional level (Bleiklie, 2012). As we discussed in the former chapter, the institutional status quo of the pre-coup period concerning university governance was based on a version of the collegial principle in which academics as a peer group make decisions on institutional matters. Despite the external pressures and crisis, academics had the privilege and authority to elect their own institutional

leaders, especially rectors, who, in turn, use a delegated authority bestowed on him/her by a group of peers. The Reform maintained the former tripartite division of authority at the institutional level: The rector, the Senate, and the Board of Directors. Yet, it considerably altered the distribution of power between these organs.

The rector, in terms of his/her duties and responsibilities, was equipped with vast authority making him/her a super-administrator embodying the role of both a university president as the chief executive officer and a provost as the chief academic officer.[64] The Reform thus fundamentally changed the conventional mode of relationship between the other organs and the rector. While this relationship was traditionally based on the rector's accountability to the Senate and the Board of Directors for his/her activities, now the rector is only able to be held accountable to the CHE. The Senato was converted to a symbolic advisory body on academic matters (Art. 14) from a strong decision-making organ whose decisions had been binding for the rector. The Board of Directors was turned into a supporting organ that would help the rector in administrative affairs. The rector appears as both decision-maker and implementer. As pointed out by some interviewees, the relationship between them is one-sided and hierarchical:

> "There is a serious hierachy within universities. The Senate and other boards are not considerably effective. When the rector signals the direction of a decision, the Senate takes the decision in that particular way. The Senate only exceptionally take a decision that would be against the rector's will. Deans and other academic leaders are either directly appointed or approved by the rector and they prefer conformity with the rector's policy orientations. The rector has practically and legally can adopt a one-man rule. Only if s/he believes of the merits of shared governance and participatory decision-making, s/he can make decision-making processes more democratic. And, only if s/he wants it" (INT 2).

> "The rector is like a king of the university. The Senate or any other academic body cannot stand against the rector. As we have witnessed, only the academic power within elite and long-established universities, or individual faculties within those universities, have managed to resist, and probably will to do so, a rector's controversial decision or act" (INT 5).

> "The center of gravity within the institutional governance is the rector. We have rector-centered universities. The University Board has no decision-making capacity; it is just

[64] One informant even notes that some of the rectors he knows complain about the broad authorities they have as this considerably increases the bureaucratic paperwork (INT 9).

> supposed to help the rector in administrative affairs. The Senate is similarly expected to help the rector in academic affairs. The rector receives opinions from these bodies, but s/he [the rector] is the one who both makes decisions and implements them (INT 12).

On the other hand, the new Act abolished the election procedure for rector position and laid down that the President of the Republic is to appoint the rector among candidates, with the highest professorial ranks, nominated by the CHE (Art. 13).[65] Similarly, deans are to be nominated by the rector and appointed by the CHE (Art. 16). The rector had the direct authority to appoint other leaders such as institute managers and heads of departments. Thus, the transition from a system in which leaders are elected to reflect the common will of academics as the *primus inter pares* among equals to a system in which institutional leaders are appointed by superior leaders or bodies to ensure hierarchical control over decision-making processes at the institutional level was complete. In other words, the rector appointment was a function of conflict and consensus among the President of the Republic, the Council, the government, and universities at a given time. Since Turkish academics used to perceive the election of leaders as an integral part of institutional autonomy, the debate over institutional governance has mostly concentrated on the procedural change in the election and appointment of institutional leaders during and after the Reform, rather than other change aspects:

> "In the reform debate, two issues eventually come to forward. 1. Who will designate the rector? 2. Who will designate the executive board members of the CHE? Other issues, let's say the limits of authority of the rector or income generation of universities, are of secondary importance. Oddly enough, these are perceived as mere technical issues and people can easily come to terms on them" (INT 8).

The transition from elected bodies and leaders to appointment-based procedures in institutional governance was primarily motivated by the will to end the political polarization that had reflected on election processes (Gür & Çelik, 2016, p. 301).[66] Indeed, as discussed in the former chapter, universities had been hotbeds of political dissent and ideological contestation between various left-wing and right-wing groups during the 1970s. Furthermore, election processes could have been

[65] Doğramacı notes that his law draft was almost completely enacted with some minor modifications (2007, p. 23). One of these was his suggestion that candidates for the rector position be selected from outside of universities. Although the Act enacted that half of the candidates can be externally nominated, in practice, they are generally appointed from inside the university.

[66] It is, however, controversial if the transition from election to appointment really ended the politicization. Many stakeholders have criticized the rector appointments for being politically motivated exercises of power and continue to do so.

ended up with the election of a professor with a 'radical' worldview. This made rector elections politically sensitive as faculty members tend to vote for candidates with whom they had ideological affinities, ignoring the criteria such as merit, experience, or promises of candidates (INT 1). This, in turn, led election processes to lengthen out for months in which election campaigns within universities became highly politicized. Hence, from the rector to the departmental heads, the determination of institutional leaders was a delicate matter. Therefore, some informants find the appointment-based determination of the rector proper as it helps alleviate the ideological polarization within universities during electoral periods (INT 2; INT 7).

The reformers wanted to solve the election problems completely by switching to a system in which all leaders are appointed and held accountable to a superior authority. Yet, this seemingly reasonable and urgent motivation was accompanied by a deeper ambition geared towards re-designing governance and decision-making structures within universities to ensure their conformity to the will of the Council. A centrally appointed rector, both in theory and practice, was actually the agent of the CHE. The rector, not the university as an organization, was the one bestowed upon autonomy as s/he is singlehandedly entitled to act on behalf of the corporate body of the university in the absence of meaningful share of his/her managerial power. By intensifying almost all major responsibilities and powers, which previously disseminated among different bodies, in the hands of the rector, the Council both undermined the power of academically dominated decision-making bodies and assured the compliance of universities into the Council's policy aims. When the President of the Republic simultaneously appointed rectors to all 27 universities (8 of which were founded during the military government) in 1982, he preferred mostly right-wing nationalist figures loyal to Doğramacı's CHE (Tekeli, 2010, p. 216-217). As one of my informants rightly argues, the political polarization at the institutional level was replaced by the ideological conformity to the political center:

> "The higher education system in Turkey is directly linked to the President of the Republic through the Council. University administrations have to set their priorities by taking into consideration the priorities of the political center [e.g., the government and the President]. Public universities have to ensure a more immediate political and policy conformity with the center, while private universities have a chance to remain relatively aloof. Yet, they [private universities] are also influenced by the general political climate in their relation to the center and generally prefer to remain apolitical" (INT 2).



Figure 5.1. The simplified structure of higher education governance (the 1981 Reform)

Conceptually, it is vital to note that the rise of top-down institutional leadership style and the concomitant decline of academic power in the distribution of institutional decision-making authority is not attributable to the "new managerialism" (Deem & Brehony, 2005) or "new public management" ideals (Bleiklie, 1998) proceeding to influence higher education around the same period. Even though the moment of the Reform indeed corresponds to the early 1980s where these kinds of policy prescriptions have started to justify and structure reform efforts in the higher education policy sector across the globe, we do not have sufficient evidence to substantiate any causal relationship between these policy ideals and the legislative reform in Turkey. First, neither the Reform outputs nor the discourses of reformers concerning organization and governance of universities indicate that they imagined university as a "complete organization" (Brunsson and Sahlin, 2000) with strong corporate enterprise-like properties and a high capacity of strategic decision-making. Instead, they even removed the term institutional autonomy from the Act and reduced the autonomy into its scientific dimension (Art. 3/d). Intensifying decision-making power, which had been traditionally vested in the professoriate, in the rectorship hence was not stirred by a project to make universities strategic actors with vast managerial resources, but the aspiration to

control universities from inside through a centrally appointed loyal rector who would ensure universities compliance to the will of the central authorities as well as protect universities from potentially harmful effects of political mobilization and violence, and to indoctrinate students according to the principles specified by the Act. Furthermore, reformers did not introduce instruments or mechanisms closely associated with the 'managerial revolution' other than some minor modifications. We, for example, do not witness the introduction of performance monitoring and measurement tools, organizational quality assurance and evaluation mechanisms, or output-based funding procedures let alone the effort to make universities business-like competitive enterprises.[67] To sum up, what happened was the rise of managerial authority without an increase in corporate autonomy and the growing distrust of the academic profession without the introduction of managerial tools to ensure accountability. These policy ideals and practices, as I will discuss below, would have come to the agenda of policymakers only after the 2000s, in which the country started to perceive the need to adapt its relatively sluggish higher education system to global trends that stem from regional or more general global reform scripts.

In a nutshell, the transfer of institutional authority from collegial bodies to the managerial level did not reflect the normative change in policymakers' understanding of organization and governance of universities. It rather reflected the military government's urgent need to end aforementioned politicization of universities and to take necessary measures geared towards controlling them – both in the traditional sense of policy control and polito-ideological control over faculty and students – through a powerful central agency. Under this mode of relationship, the coordination instruments such as accountability for performance, quality, and resource utlilization were only tangential concerns. While castigating the former mode of governance based on the mere collegial principle of creating introverted, sluggish, isolated, and politicized institutions resembling the image of an ivory tower, and eulogize the American universities' societal relevance and service to the industry and regional development (third mission), the reformers, however, did not bring fundamental changes to more directly link universities to their surrounding environment, namely the market and the society. As some of the interviewees underscore, this is why there has not been a healthy and structured relationship between autonomy and accountability in Turkish higher education:

> "Universities and academics traditionally tend to demand autonomy freed from accountability, while the central authority wants to control almost every aspect of higher

[67] Two interviewees particularly noted that Turkish higher education governance had not been redesigned according to the NPM-like principles but, over time, exposed to its certain prescriptions (INT 7; INT 9).

education going beyond holding them accountable for their use of public money. We should break this cycle and reach a healthy balance between them (INT 10).

The War over the Fate of the CHE: Reforms Attempts and Deadlocks

Very few bureaucratic organizations have created as much controversy as the CHE in the recent history of Turkey. From its very foundation to the present, the Council has been sharply criticized by different stakeholders in higher education. In the 1980s and 1990s, universities, academic unions, intellectuals, political parties, business actors, and others have engaged in public discussion on the fate of the CHE – e.g., whether to abolish it entirely or reduce its power considerably (partly covered by T. C. Başbakanlık, 1992; Arslan, 2004; Tekeli, 2010; Şimşek, 2019). During the 2000s, the discussion over the CHE mostly evolved into a fine-grained expert discourse of policy recommendation reports by think tanks, business associations, and academic associations, which, despite nuances between them, reflects a consensus on the transformation of the Council into an effective coordination agency from a leviathan-like powerful organization to achieve decentralization in Turkish higher education (see, for example, TÜSİAD, 2003; World Bank, 2007; Visakorpi et al., 2008; Ergüder et al., 2009; Küçükcan & Gür, 2009).[68]

We have neither space nor intention to discuss the tug of war around the CHE here. What we can do is to show how the reform debate in higher education again turned into a discursive battlefield in which those who underscore the historical and institutional specificity of academic organizations (mostly academics); instrumentalize the issues related to higher education in the political and ideological struggle with their opponents or foes (mostly political actors and various interest groups); call for a modernization of Turkish higher education to keep it up with the global reform trends (mostly, but not necessarily, bureaucrats, experts, and technocrats). One way or another, we see that activities of entities (actors and organizations) are mediated by these three factors – as we conceptualized as historical institutions, ideological contestation, and international pressures for reform – influential in shaping reform discourses and outcomes.

During the first post-coup civilian governments (1983-1991) led by dominant the center-right Motherland Party (*Anavatan Partisi*), the only reform initiative was the 1991 amendment (Law no. 3708) that created a diversification within organizational forms by allowing the foundation of institutes of technology and the conversion of some public universities into special-status universities (Arslan, 2004, p. 520-541). The special-status universities were entitled to be governed by their own board of trustees whose members were to be determined by the President of the

[68] Note that all my informants also agree that there is a need for reform, although they have differences in their reform ideas and proposals.

Republic, local industrial and business organizations, mayors, and the academics from other universities. The main motivation behind this was twofold: 1) to save some prestigious and relatively older institutions from the restrictive measures of the Council and give them more autonomy in administrative, financial, and staffing matters, 2) to create diversity within a growing system by giving some institutions elite and research-intensive status and enabling them to collaborate with local stakeholders directly. The social democrat center-left opposition party, the Social Democratic Populist Party (*Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti*), applied to the Constitutional Court on the grounds that creating special-status and foundation universities and the system of institutional governance based on board of trustees – meaning the involvement of market actors – are against constitutional and statutory provisions on higher education (Anayasa Mahkemesi Kararlar Dergisi, 1992, p. 457-495). The Constitutional Court, as the ultimate body tasked with settling the conflict, once more overruled certain provisions of the amendment in the next year and doomed another reform initiative to be partially implemented. The Court found provisions concerning the formation of special-status universities unconstitutional while finding the one regarding the creation of institutes of technology in line with the Constitution.

As the Social Democratic Populist Party became the junior coalition partner of the center-right the True Path Party (*Doğru Yol Partisi*) after the 1992 elections, it embraced a more radical and direct approach to higher education reform aiming at abolishing the Board entirely (Gür & Çelik, 2016, p. 305-306). The left-wing party was led by some prominent academics, such as Erdal İnönü, who had been a theoretical physicist at the METU, strongly opposing the 1981 reform and aspiring to reinstate the pre-coup governance arrangements, i.e., the transfer of the power from managerial to elected academic administrators and bodies again in the absence of a supreme body such as the CHE. Nonetheless, as İnönü himself (1996) later admitted, they were deprived of sufficient political support to undertake such as restoration. Although academic unions and associations largely supported their proposal and put pressure on the True Path Party, the reform had to be a product of reconciliation between the two partners of the coalition. Doğramacı and appointed rectors were against any policy change as to the governance arrangements since they believed that the current system was compatible with the global trends in university governance and institutional autonomy. The president of CHE engaged in debates by arguing that most of the academics in Turkey had a wrong and outdated notion of institutional autonomy, according to which they saw academics as possessors of non-accountable universities (Doğramacı, 2000). Doğramacı and the CHE published papers and reports discussing new trends in autonomy according to which universities are seen as entrepreneurial institutions governed by non-academic leaders in a way to be more open to the demands of external stakeholders. This perspective would

have been reasonable if the new arrangements had really increased the autonomy of Turkish universities according to relevant indicators. On the contrary, the country's position in the relative autonomy indexes developed by international organizations such as the OECD and the World Bank was low (Tekeli, 2010, p. 271-272). Thus, the rhetoric based on lip service to legitimize the effects of international trends did not actually reflect the actual practices in the field.

Under these discursive battles, the coalition partners finally achieved a partial consensus on the amendment and passed a law modifying the Higher Education Act's provisions concerning the procedures of appointing the rector (Law no. 3826) in 1992. Accordingly, the rector was to be appointed by the President of the Republic among a list of three candidates endorsed by the CHE from a list of six candidates who took part in elections. This was only a narrow victory for the social democrat coalition partner as their reform proposal targeted the CHE itself. The amendment did not change anything concerning the structure, power, or authority of the Council. Yet, still, a minor change in the rector appointment procedure led Doğramacı to resign from his position as the President of the Council as a reaction to the amendment. According to him, the system in which faculty members are involved in determining the rector was not preferred by the developed countries – a piece of information that was only partially true (Doğramacı, 2007). His successor, Mehmet Sağlam (1992-1995), embraced a low profile and cooperative approach towards universities until his resignation.

During the presidency of Kemal Gürüz (1995-2003), the CHE again become the object of public contestation, albeit in a different way. He was ardent in drafting a comprehensive reform act and had, with his colleagues, prepared a report discussing historical trends and current developments in higher education, science, and research policies along with the policy recommendations for Turkey (Gürüz et al., 1994). When he came with a blueprint for reform, which did not directly address heatedly debated issues of centralism and autonomy, the coalition government of the time was not interested in higher education reform. On the other hand, the five-year development plan (1996-2000) prepared by the SPO (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1995) came up with pro-market reform proposals, calling for the delegation of authority from the CHE to the university level (decentralization) to make universities resilient actors with corporate autonomy and powers in income generation and spending, and the enhancement of state-university relations in all aspects.

The ongoing discussions concerning higher education on the heavy state-control, centralism, and the problems of autonomy were replaced by the issues related to secularism when the pro-Islamist Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*) won the general elections of 1995. The field-specific or technical problems of higher education were put aside, and the whole policy field turned into a

mere reflection of the rising ideological and political tension between the new government and the Kemalist and secular forces led by the Armed Forces. On February 28, 1997, the military leadership-dominated National Security Council issued an 18-point list memorandum to the Welfare Party-led government on a Council meeting. The memorandum demanded the government take immediate legislative and administrative measures to prevent the rise of antisecular and religious developments and to avoid any actions that would put the secular order and principles of the Republic in jeopardy (Milli Güvenlik Kurulu Kararı'nın Eki, 28 February, 1998). The military intervention – known as the "postmodern coup" or simply "the February 28 Process" as the military did not directly take over the control but preferred to give an ultimatum intimidating the Welfare Party – were also concerned with educational policy and demanded, for instance, greater state control over the Islamic education sector and further inculcation of Kemalist principles through education (recommendations 2-4). However, the government was incapable of implementing them as Prime Minister Erbakan resigned, and the Welfare Party was shut down by the Constitutional Court several months later than the memorandum.

Against this backdrop, the CHE, as supported by the military and the new coalition government, consolidated its bureaucratic power further and took restrictive precautions than ever to contain Islamic 'reactionarism' within higher education institutions. The Gürüz administration implemented the headscarf ban policy more strictly and intensively because this would help prevent the secular nature of campuses and depoliticize universities (Seggie, 2011). The Council urged the rectors to discipline or dismiss faculty members if they reject to follow the dress code by changing the disciplinary regulations of 1985. Uncooperative rectors, administrators, and faculty members were suspended. The Council also made changes to the national university procedures geared towards making the access of graduates of religious vocational and vocational high schools to undergraduate programs almost impossible. (Gür & Çelik, 2016, p. 308-309). Despite these and other repressive actions undermining academic freedoms and the crescendo of public criticism raised by a variety of actors, the CHE gained strength throughout this period.

This does not mean that the reform demands faded away. The SPO's five-year development plan at the turn of the millennium established that higher education institutions yet yo have extricated themselves from a centralist and bureaucratic governance structure, undermining the strengthening of the university as an organization capable of making most of its decisions and competing with its counterparts (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2000, p. 82-84). As a highly influential public organization, the SPO clearly recommended the transformation of the CHE to a coordination and planning agency that would delegate most of its power and authority to

universities. Thus, this document officially confirmed that most of the problems of Turkish higher education originated from or related to the CHE.

When the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, *JDP*) came to power alone in 2002, the Minister of Education of the new government pledged to make a reform in higher education in their government program (Neziroğlu & Yılmaz, p. 7993-8090) came with a reform proposal to amend the Higher Education Act. The law draft intended to increase the power and authority of the Interuniversity Council and to replace CHE with a low-profile coordinating body (Şimşek, 2019, p. 396). It also aimed to increase the decision-making capacity of universities by delegating some of the Council's power to individual higher education institutions. The CHE opposed this draft and urged rectors and even high-level military actors such as the Commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Yalman, to put pressure on the government (Tekeli, 2010, p. 344). Even though the Parliament approved the final version of the law draft, the President of the Republic, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, vetoed it in 2004 (Law draft no. 5171). Hence, another reform initiative to deal with 'the CHE problem' was doomed to fail. The JDP governments shelved the reform bill and pursued an alternative strategy during their rule (2002-), based on maintaining the institutional status quo. As one informant pessimistically argues, the reform over the fate of the CHE is highly unlikely to implement as:

> "The basic instinct of the CHE is to maintain its existence and power. They know what is going on in the world, yet they do not want to keep up with it. They do not want to 'steer at a distance', they would like to 'steer from inside'. The redundance of the Council's regulations suffocates universities. Yet, there will be no consensus on how to reform the CHE, as it have not been for the last 40 years, since it is a highly powerful instrument. It is like an atomic bomb in the hands of political powerholders and they tend to retain it for their own security" (INT 6).

To sum up, all reform efforts to change the systemic and institutional governance arrangements and the existing institutional pathway, i.e., the path opened through the 1981 reforms, in higher education failed. The Council, using its constitutional and legal power and authorities, usually operated as an influential buffer against policy change and compelled other actors to stick to the existing institutional status quo from which it draws advantages. Therefore, both the vested interests of the CHE and the lack of a wide-ranging political consensus among policy actors to implement a substantial reform led to institutional persistence.

The Bologna Process, Internationalization, and Quality Assurance: Piecemeal Revisions as a Surrogate for a Substantial Reform

During the 2000s, we witness the introduction of new discourses and agendas into higher education policy in Turkey. Internationalization, Europeanization, the Bologna Process (BP), quality assurance (QA), knowledge economy, competition, etc., have been started to be seen in the discourses of local actors as either genuine reform-oriented discussions or as mere lip-service to international trends in higher education. The common denominator of all was to achieve some kind of change that would help weaken the centralist governance system, which, according to many, prevents Turkish universities from leaping forward and keeping up with the global developments.

Turkish higher education has been integrating itself to European Higher Education Area (EHEA) through instruments, among others, such as the Erasmus program, the ENIC/NARIC networks, the Jean Monnet program, the BP, and the Lisbon Convention over the last several decades (Onursal-Beşgül, 2017). Turkish policymakers especially saw the BP as an opportunity to make improvements in various aspects of higher education through policy transfer and learning. The country became part of the BP in 2001 and set out to implement the reforms under the guidance of the CHE and the Interuniversity Council. The Turkish National Agency (The Center for European Union Education and Youth Programs) was established in 2003 as an ad hoc agent of Europeanization, and a national team of Bologna Experts, composed of 300 experts, was formed in 2004 to contribute to the implementation of the BP (INT 10). This was supplemented by the foundation of Bologna coordination commissions as administrative units within universities, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Bologna actions at the institutional level.

At the outset, responsible agencies focused on the most easily implementable action lines, such as adopting the European Credit Transfer System and adopting the three-cycle degree system (bachelor, master, and doctorate). The 1981 Reform's American-inspired changes in degree structures, study programs, the organization graduate education, and the like, were turned into an advantage in the country's enthusiastic espousal of the BP ideals in comparison to many other systems within the EHEA. As high-level bureaucrats and experts who took part in the implementation of the Bologna Process in Turkey point out, the Turkish higher education had already been compatible with most of the requirements, and for that reason, the country was ahead of many countries within the EHEA in this respect (INT 3; INT 4; INT 5). After these easy pickings, the implementers gave attention to other aspects such as mobility, learning outcomes, lifelong learning, and internationalization. The BP has considerably increased awareness concerning such policy scripts and trends and helped the country to formulate its higher education strategy (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, 2007). It also helped promote the country's image in the

international arena as a successful implementer of the BP. Nonetheless, as some of the domestic structures had already converged to the BP action lines, this was an "automatic success story" (INT 6) rather than a serious reform effort. Still, due to the pro forma and artificial implementations and the lack of a profound structural reform at the systemic level (Erdoğan, 2015), the BP did not help solve the ingrained problems of higher education. As one informant aptly puts it, the BP seems to be bound to be another example of an 'alla Turca' top-down bureaucratic reform tradition which prioritizes to make formal changes to regulations, instead of making the change process more participatory and democratic by ensuring the participation of relevant stakeholders (INT 9).

One interesting point is that both official documents (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, 2007) and the dominant expert discourse in Turkey do not see the BP as a process of 'Europeanization' in higher education (for the concept, see Vukasovic, 2013) but conceive it as a process of internationalization or even 'Americanization.' This is partly caused by the effort to distinguish the BP as a project that is not directly linked to the EU with which Turkey has had a relationship with ups and downs over the last decades as a candidate country (Onursal-Beşgül, 2016). Moreover, there is also a widespread opinion among informants that European higher education has lagged behind in the US higher education in many aspects, and the leading motive of the BP was to increase Europe's competitive advantage in the knowledge-based economy (INT 3; INT 7; INT 9; INT 10; INT 11). As the BP is grosso modo perceived as the 'Americanization of Europe', the Bologna-related reforms have been justified by presenting them as instruments of (further) Americanization of Turkish higher education, rather than as convergence towards a common European model:

> "In essence, Europe tries to Americanize its higher education through the BP. We had already started to Americanize our system in some respects. What we have done as part of the BP was mostly to make some formal changes. We [Turkey] do not converge towards Europe, we all [the whole EHEA] converge towards America" (INT 3).

The least developed component of the BP in Turkey was the establishment of a national QA agency and the revision of the national QA system.[69] While the country had not run into difficulties implementing some BP policy objectives, quality-related issues posed fundamental challenges. The CHE, as in many other areas, had been the main responsible for QA, in cooperation with the Interuniversity Council, at the national level, and the idea of establishing a separate QA agency was

[69] My purpose is limited to showing how QA shaped the reform debate and outcomes rather than discussing its development in Turkey. For details, see Sağlamer, 2013; Bugday & Gounko, 2014, and Fındıklı, 2021b.

not a concern until the country's membership in the BP (INT 9). The CHE has been singlehandedly assuring the quality of higher education institutions and study programs as it has been the ultimate authority responsible for establishment and accreditation. Yet, such a system was characterized by bureaucratic, one-sided, and ex ante control of activities, which was incompatible with the international trends and the BP objectives that embrace academic peer review as an instrument of QA. At the institutional level, academic leaders were responsible for QA. Apart from prominent universities that have adopted QA procedures in collaboration with international institutions – such as the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology (ABET) that led to the emergence of national accreditation and quality enhancement body (*Mühendislik Eğitim Programları Değerlendirme ve Akreditasyon Derneği, MÜDEK*) in science and engineering fields, and the European University Association (EUA) that have evaluated some universities under its institutional evaluation program – there was not a settled system of national QA (Sağlamer, 2013) The domestic policy actors felt the pressure and developed some strategies to change the national QA system gradually.

The first step taken was the enactment of the 2005 regulation on the Academic Evaluation and Quality Improvement in Higher Education Institutions (*Yükseköğretim Kurumlarında Akademik Değerlendirme ve Kalite Geliştirme Yönetmeliği*), which set the standards and guidelines of evaluation and quality development in teaching, research, and other areas according to the EHEA standards and guidelines. The regulation also established a national commission (*Yükseköğretim Akademik Değerlendirme ve Kalite Geliştirme Komisyonu, YÖDEK*) responsible for coordinating the quality processes in cooperation with universities, yet this was practically a sub-commission under the CHE and lacked the capacity to operate as a national agency for a growing higher education system. The CHE also led work on the national qualifications framework (*Türkiye Yükseköğretim Yeterlilikler Çerçevesi*) to advance the endeavor in quality improvement. Yet, the nitty-gritty of the QA was the necessity of creating an independent national QA agency, an issue which was very demanding as the CHE initially played a very negative veto player role to block the initiative on the formation of such a separate agency (INT 12). The CHE administrations considerably resisted such a process, arguing that they were the very guarantee of QA at the systemic level, and there is no need to establish a new agency (INT 7). The SPO's development plan was an important document getting involved in reform debate with clear policy recommendations. While giving the reformers credit for what they had done within the scope of the BP, it also firmly warned that those were insufficient to increase Turkish universities' autonomy and competiteveness in the knowledge society (Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 2006, p. 40). It pushed for the enhancement of financial and administrative autonomy of universities and the restructuration of the CHE as an agency responsible for coordination and standard-setting.

The discussions of QA (for example, see Gür & Özer, 2012) can be ultimately seen as a discussion on the fate of the CHE. In other words, what was changing was not the heated debate on the Council itself but the conceptual framework and reform proposals structuring the debate. Abolishing the CHE and establishing a national QA agency instead was an option, albeit not very feasible as the Council is a constitutional body, and hence its abolition would require a constitutional change. The conversion of the CHE from a highly powerful supreme board to a mere national QA agency instead of establishing another national agency was another option. This was a rational suggestion as the CHE had already been doing most of the quality work. Nevertheless, neither the CHE nor the governments in earnest were willing to make this transition as their vested interests mostly suggested otherwise. The most likely option was establishing of a national QA agency without considerably undermining the CHE. However, The Higher Education Quality Council (*Yükseköğretim Kalite Kurulu, YÖKAK*) was founded in 2015 under the auspices of the CHE with tasks of performing the external evaluation of higher education institutions in terms of research, teaching, and administrative dimensions based on the internal evaluations submitted by them and coordinating other activities related to QA in line with national and international standards. It became an autonomous national QA agency in 2017 with an amendment in the Higher Education Act and became part of the European Network for Quality Assurance in 2020, which makes it a latecomer to the quality trends in comparison to other action lines of the BP. As discussed by an informant who involved in national and international (through the EUA) institutional evaluation processes as a reviewer:

> "The quality issues were at the forefront of the BP so that Turkey felt the urgency in creating a national QA agency that would be independent from the CHE. We were among a few countries without such an independent agency within the whole EHEA so that we became desolated. The establishment of the national QA agency is the most important development in Turkish higher education within the last five years. The QA provides the only genuine opportunity for Turkey to reform its higher education since nobody can object to the demand for quality. It is the only way through which we can go beyond ideological conflicts that hamper the consensus on a comprehensive reform" (INT 6).

Conclusion

The last forty years of higher education governance in Turkey can be read as a story of unsuccessful reform attempts. In spite of a series of reform initiatives that, albeit in different manners, have proposed redesigning the systemic and institutional governance structures have failed to break *path*

dependence of the post-coup institutional arrangements. While the 1981 reforms opened a new path that implied a significant break from the earlier institutional status quo, nothing worth altering the current path has happened apart from minor arrangements that triggered a gradual and moderate institutional change.

The post-1981 policy trajectory of Turkish higher education shows that powerful incumbent policy actors tended to preserve the institutional status quo as the available institutional arrangements give them the upper hand in political contestation. This process exemplifies the *drift* as a mode of gradual institutional change that mostly occurs when the strong veto players impede the wholesale institutional replacement even though the environmental conditions change fundamentally (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010; Hacker, Pierson, & Thelen, 2015). This concept implies policy inaction or inertia as the powerful actor groups deliberately prevent institutional recalibration and adjustment despite the changing environment and realities. In our case, the Council has often been the major veto player and change blocker that resisted institutional innovation by forming alliances with other influential political and policy actors – from the President of the Republic to the ruling parties, from the Armed Forces to the Constitutional Court in different periods – and benefiting from its constitutional guarantees. Moreover, political parties in power have acted similarly when their reform attempts became unsuccessful and availed themselves of the Council in accordance with their political agendas. The lack of a wide-ranging consensus among actors demanding change has been another factor that consolidates the current governance regime organized around the Council. For these reasons, the pre-existing structures have drifted into the shifting environment without a major adaptation or update of the available institutions despite Turkey's increasing internationalization and integration into supra-national policy developments (such as the BP) over the last decades that made other models of higher education policy and governance with possible converging effects.

As the recent work on the theory of gradual institutional change suggests, the drift might be better understood as policy inaction rather than change as it is characterized by the strategic neglect to update the institutions and policies (Béland, Rocco, & Waddan, 2016; Koreh, Mandelkern, & Shpaizman, 2019). As policies and institutions are purposely frozen, what is changing becomes not themselves but their impact due to the changing environment. We can, however, still see the drift as a second-order change mechanism as it does not directly add new institutional elements onto the existing ones or unsettle the coherence of them, yet lay the way open for the application of order gradual change mechanisms, namely the *conversion* and *layering*.

A strategy of *conversion*, which refers to redirection and reinterpretation of institutions or policies toward purposes beyond their original intent (Hacker, Pierson, & Thelen, 2015, p. 180),

has been brought to policy agenda from time to time. Over the last decades, the redirection and reappropriation of the Council from a high-power systemic governance body to a less-powerful coordination agency or a national QA agency have been proposed and discussed. Here the aim has been to canalize the Council to new ends rather than abolish it entirely or substantially undermine the legal regime upon which it was built. As I discussed above, all of these proposals have failed. What we observe is the introduction of a set of new rules, practices, and institutions, e.g., *layering* (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010), alongside the existing ones. The BP in particular and the global reform trends, in general, have influenced Turkish higher education and triggered the gradual change without dismantling the old institutions. For instance, we can see the establishment of the national QA agency that operates side-by-side with the Council and the introduction of new procedures and practices related to QA as examples of gradual institutional change based on layering. This prima facie might be seen as an instance of convergence towards the global policy trends. Still, the story behind its emergence was cumbersome to the degree that would let an informant say that "its existence in its current form is a miracle" (INT 8). All in all, however, this would not change our overall theoretical observation that the forces of inertia and inaction seem to have outweighed the forces of change and revision in Turkish higher education after the 1981 Reform.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

The conclusion chapter is organized around two main sections. The first section respectively presents the empirical findings of the three main empirical chapters of the dissertation. More particularly, it summarizes the causal arguments as to the various reforms studied in a process-tracing understanding, following Beach & Pedersen's (2019) guideline that helps to simplify immensely complex causal relationships. In this way, it clarifies the contribution in explaining higher education policy outcomes specific to governance in different periods of Turkish higher education. The second section mainly focuses on theoretical lessons learned in studying the Turkish case. Similarly, it presents arguments by separating them along with the three main chapters. Even though it is difficult to detach the theory and empirics from each other, analytically isolating the theoretical implications of the dissertation would help advance the general message of the study that would inform further researchers in higher education policy in some respects.

Empirical Findings

University Reforms during the Single-Party Era (1923-1946)

Chapter 3 focused on the single-party era in Turkey with the intent to explain how higher education policies regarding governance changed. Particularly, I centered upon two major University Reforms of 1933 and 1946 as those were major policy outcomes that considerably altered higher education governance arrangements.

I mapped the causal mechanism I offered to explain the 1933 University Reform outcomes below (figure 6.1.). In this basic framework – from which I will also benefit in the upcoming subsections – the upper side disaggregates theorized causal mechanism as a series of (theoretical and/or case-centric) parts composed of entities engaging in certain activities to transmit causal forces from X to Y. The lower side specifies which specific within-case evidence provides observable manifestations of each part of a mechanism. As the gist of the process-tracing analysis is to build a plausible explanation of the outcome, rather than exhaustively controlling all the

possible factors or variables, the explanation I offer should be seen minimally sufficient for producing the outcome.

Causal Condition (X)	**Part 1** "dissent"	**Part 2** "power over ideas"	**Part 3** "justification"	**Outcome (Y)**
Ideational and political controversy (between the government and the cadres of the *Darülfünûn*)	Individual faculty members and/or the institution as a whole either do not fully comply with the party policies or overtly dissent them	The single-party government does not tolerate non-compliance and seeks to control the *Darülfünûn* to turn it into a university as an instrument for its political agendas	Organic intellectuals (affiliated to or supporters of the regime) mold public opinion and policymakers' perception, justifying why a radical university reform is necessary	The 1933 Reform: removal of the institutional and scholarly autonomy; transition to a strict state-control model in governance; tutelage of the government; its articulation to political agendas
The *Darülfünûn*, as one of the rare organizations maintaining a considerable degree of autonomy, acts as a pressure group in relation to government policies	Academics do not give scholarly support to the government or criticize its policies (such as the rejection of the Turkish History Thesis by prominent professors)	The party elite, particularly the Minister of Education, express such views in different settings (e.g., speeches, writings, official documents)	Numerous criticisms appearing in pro-government newspapers and magazines (especially in *Kadro*) targeting individual academics or the institution as a whole and promoting etatist and anti-liberal ideas	Comprehensive legislative and institutional change; the purge of dissident and neutral academics

Figure 6.1. The simplified causal mechanism for the 1933 Reform

According to my analysis explaining the outcome of interest, the main trigger that motivated the single-party government to make a university reform was the ideational and political controversy between the party elite and the cadres of the *Darülfünûn*. This institution had stayed out of the cultural and institutional transformation of the country under the leadership of the party-state even in the early 1930s. Moreover, both individually and institutionally, it had been either reluctant in championing Kemalist reforms or critical of government policies. Pro-government intellectuals adamantly criticized the institution and its specific faculty members and, in this way, accelerated

the reform process by urging the policymakers and molding the public discussion about the institution. The University Reform of 1933 removed any traces of institutional autonomy given in the former regulations and made the university come under the tutelage of the central administration. It created an idiosyncratic version of the *state-control model* that intentionally mixes authoritarian measures with modernization efforts.

The last point, namely the modernization effort, brings us to an important methodological point we should assess: controlling for other potential causal conditions (known as omitted independent variables acting as confounders in the variance-based research) that might have influenced the causal relationship. In our case, we have data indicating that the single-party government was interested in a university reform geared towards dealing with the infrastructural problems that improve, among others, research capacity and teaching quality. The setup of a reform committee within the Ministry of Education (1931) and its invitation of Albert Malche (1932) to prepare a report and law draft that would guide a prospective reform are pieces of evidence of such interests. Thus, the will to modernize the institution seems to be another causal condition (X2) in addition to the ideational and political controversy (X1).

In process-tracing, control for other potential causes (and hence equifinality) occurs at the *within-case* level as we can isolate the workings of individual causes and causal mechanisms empirically from each other and evaluate their relation to the outcome (Beach & Pedersen, 2018, p. 853). As we conceive causal mechanisms as deterministic and invariant processes in studying individual cases, *overdetermination* (i.e., the presence of more than one sufficient cause in a case) and *equifinality* (i.e., the presence of multiple causal paths leading to the same outcome) are not severe problems. Social and political outcomes are rarely triggered by one causal condition. The particular virtue of process-tracing is that it helps us empirically isolate individual causes and mechanisms, if more than one, from each other and to see if they are accounted with a plausible explanation for the outcome.

In our analysis, the causal mechanism linking X1 to Y1 was both *present* and *sufficient* to produce the outcome, irrespective of a potential effect of X2, as we can distinguish this specific mechanism and observe the fingerprint it left in the empirical record. When we separately trace the causal mechanism triggered by X2, however, we are not confident that it is to produce the same outcome. We know that the government did not enact the law draft prepared by Malche or make a law comprising provisions regulating the quality and research capacity of the *Darülfünûn*. Therefore, even though we can detect another causal condition, the mechanism it triggered breaks down before producing the expected outcome. In their effort of modernizing the institution, the government did not carry out its promise of designing a legal and institutional framework of such

modernization as recommended by the reform committee but rather seized a contingent opportunity created by Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and his liquidation of Jewish and communist scholars. The government, in a way, devolved its mission of modernization to refugee professors it employed by giving them room to improve the quality, capacity, and prestige of the institution in teaching, research, and service to the national policy agenda.

The governance arrangements remained the same until the 1946 University reform that marked a significant change and, in a way, return to the pre-1933 status quo in higher education governance. This reform should be understood as a part of the democratic transition of the single-party rule initiated in response to the changing international context in the postwar period. The government decided to side with the Western Bloc to secure its survival in the critical juncture. It immediately inaugurated democratic transition in the political system, above all, as a foreign policy preference geared towards securing the much-needed US military and political support (i.e., The Marshall Plan and Truman aids) and placing the country in the Western orbit (i.e., NATO membership). This decision was expedited by the rising discontent with the single-party policies. In the field of higher education, the discontent was raised by the academics who had been dissatisfied with the tight state-control model of the 1933 regulations. The Democrat Party, the fledgling opposition party, also supported the academic community in their quest for a more democratic university (figure 6.2.).

Causal Condition (X)	**Part 1** "democratization"	**Part 2** "demands for reform"	**Outcome (Y)**
Changing international context creating external pressures for democratization and liberalization	The ruling elite decides to give way to democracy and place Turkey in the emerging Western Bloc	The opposition party and academics take advantage of the changing context and demand substantial university reform	The 1946 Reform: restitution of institutional and scholarly autonomy; loosening of central control; empowerment of academics and professional bodies in institutional governance
The immediate Soviet threat and the need for Western support	Transition to a multi-party political system; relative democratization and liberalization in certain policy sectors	The Democrat Party Program; papers, reports, and law drafts prepared by academics demanding autonomous university	Legislative change converging to the pre-1933 arrangements

Figure 6.2. The simplified causal mechanism for the 1946 Reform

To sum up, the new Act of 1946 led to democratization in governance structures to grant universities a high level of institutional autonomy by softening central control, which indicates a turn towards a *self-governance model* characterized the 1919-1933 period. In other words, the "necessary tutelage" of the state ended, and the university governance was "democratized" in compliance with the state changing its shell. This also opened a new path in higher education governance that, de jure, would last until the 1981 Reform, despite a series of challenges.

The Conflict over Governance (1946-1981)

Chapter 4 explored changes in higher education policies aimed at redesigning governance arrangements during a term that started with a university reform (1946) and ended with another one (1981). This was an intense period punctuated by military coups, political violence, and ideological contestation, which, in turn, shaped the conflict over deciding how universities should be governed and the higher education system should be steered. More than that, unconventional actors, such as the Armed Forces and the Constitutional Court, temporarily engaged in actor constellations in higher education policy as arbitrators or policymakers and hence influenced the policy content and outcome.

At the beginning of the DP rule (1950-1960), academics and universities enjoyed the easing of central control. Soon after, nevertheless, the university again turned into a site of ideological contestation in which the politicization of academics incited the DP to amend the University Act of 1946 several times. The DP's authoritarian measures against the RPP, the press, universities, and civil society during the late 1950s led to the emergence of an informal oppositional bloc against the DP, consisted of a substantial part of the (military and civilian) bureaucracy, the press, academia, and intellectuals. Following the 1960 coup, a temporary military committee called the NUC was formed to make a new constitution and institutional reforms in certain areas.

Causal Condition (X)	**Part 1** "oppositional alliance"	**Part 2** "collaboration with the junta"	**Outcome (Y)**
The DP government's authoritarian measures against academia	Academics and student organizations join the emerging oppositional bloc ('vigorous forces') against the DP government	Academics seize the window of opportunity (for reform) opened when the military junta stages a coup and overthrow the DP government	The 1960 Reform: consolidation of academic power at institutional and systemic levels; weakening of the central control

The amendment of the University Act of 1946; legislation (1954) empowering the government to place academics under ministerial control; dismissal of some prominent academics over political opposition, etc.	Academics' politicization (e.g., joining opposition parties or censuring the DP through the press); student protests the DP government	Statements and writings by academics that endorse and legitimize the coup; academics take part in the formal rule-making process	Legislative amendment and constitutional guarantees to university autonomy

Figure 6.3. The simplified causal mechanism for the 1960 Reform

Academics working in tandem with the military government (1960-61) found an opportunity to be directly influential in amending the University Act of 1946 as they were included in the formal rule-making process. With respect to systemic governance, the amendment (Law no. 115) considerably weakened continental-style ministerial oversight of universities by revoking its authority in overseeing universities in the name of the government. The power and authority of the Interuniversity Council were enhanced, turning it into a de facto supreme coordinating body. At the institutional level, the decision-making power of academics and academic bodies such as the Senate was further amplified. The Constitution of 1961 provided a constitutional guarantee on university autonomy, providing that universities, as corporate bodies, were only to be governed and controlled by organs, the members of which had been elected by their peers (Art. 120).

From the late 1960s and onwards, the country witnessed a gradual upsurge of student movements of all shades, from boycotts and sit-ins to occupations and guerilla warfare. In the advent of 1971, many universities in big cities had to suspend their operation due to the violence and conflict between adversary leftist and right-wing student groups. The campus unrest and radicalization of student movements, combined with other societal factors such as distributional problems and political instability, urged the Armed Forces to issue a memorandum under a chain of command. After the military intervention, an interim technocratic government, backed by the military, assumed power and took firm measures to respond to the crises under martial law. The government immediately amended the provisions on university autonomy in the Constitution (Art. 120) to give the Council of Ministers the authority to seize control of universities, faculties, or administrative units within universities when freedoms of learning and teaching are under threat.

The University Act of 1973 (Law no. 1750), enacted during the interim regime (1971-73), did not substantially alter institutional governance arrangements as the constitutional amendment

gave the state prerogative to intervene in university affairs when deemed necessary. The military-backed government rather preferred to secure heavy state control over universities through newly established central bureaucratic bodies: The Council of Higher Education and University Supervisory Board. The former was a supreme body responsible for systemic coordination among higher education institutions and conducting research and evaluation pursuant to the policy targets of the national development plan. The latter was assumed to take control of universities in special but unspecified circumstances and demand the competent authorities to start prosecution on campus-related affairs.

Those measures would have produced a radical change in systemic governance, marking a departure from the institutional path established in 1946. Nevertheless, the academic community refused acceptance of such measures, and universities immediately applied to the Constitutional Court for reversal of the provisions regarding the composition and powers of these two supreme boards. As the Constitutional Court adjudicated to make those organizations null, they were inhibited from coming into effect and performing their assigned duties shortly afterward. This was an unintended consequence for reformers as probably the most important products of their reform attempt became obsolete. The hierarchical control regime they had aimed to build by means of different central agencies unintentionally engendered a vacuum of central control in times of campus unrest.

The New Governance Regime: The CHE and After

Chapter 5 delved into the last four decades that commenced with the 1981 Reform made under the interim military rule (1980-1983). The military leaders rendered the political violence precipitated by the conflict between student groups, the politicization of academics, and campus unrest as a major reason behind the coup, in addition to other factors. Therefore, when the Armed Forces seized power by overthrowing the civilian government in 1980, preparations for a far-reaching reform in higher education immediately began.

This was a critical juncture, a short period of relative indeterminacy that gives powerful agents to forge outcomes in a more voluntaristic manner than normal operating conditions would allow. The military government, as the unrivaled powerholder and decisionmaker during the interim military rule, not only doubted but also evidently questioned the legitimacy and appropriateness of the existing institutions underlying the higher education governance. They were willing to reformulate the paradigm in governance and select one of the institutional options over the other during the rare moment characterized by political openness and the lack of a serious structural constraint. The government delegated the task to prepare reform bills to several

commissions and benefited from the services of certain institutional entrepreneurs promoting concrete and tailor-made ideas and solutions to problems of higher education.

The 1981 Reform brought momentous changes to many aspects of higher education. Probably the most important one was the foundation of the CHE. As examined above, the Council was designed as a powerful central agency with far-reaching responsibilities in systemic governance. The reformers considerably truncated the power and authority of the Interuniversity Council and turned it into a mere academic advisory body. The CHE would henceforth be the ultimate authority to determine both goals and means through which goals are pursued, which indicates a clear turn towards a hierarchical mode in systemic governance.

Causal Condition (X)	**Part 1** "discontent with academia"	**Part 2** "will for a radical reform"	**Outcome (Y)**
Campus unrest and student radicalism	The military government holds universities responsible for inflaming the 'anarchy' after seizing power	The military government uses its unrestrained power in an attempt to establish a heavy control regime in higher education, making a sweeping reform	The 1981 Reform that marks a rupture from the former institutional status quo and opens a new path in higher education governance
The conflict between leftist and rightist student groups as part of large-scale political violence (1976-80)	Statements by military leaders and officials indicating their discontent with the politicization of academia, the existing arrangements, and the 'misuse' of autonomy	The NSC's minutes of meetings, among others, provide evidence of strong will among the junta within this direction	Comprehensive legislative reform and constitutional amendment; the purge of the sheer number of academic staff

Figure 6.4. The simplified causal mechanism for the 1981 Reform

The empowerment of the managerial level, especially the rectorship, and undermining academic and collegial bodies as decision-making organs at universities was the most important outcome of the Reform in terms of institutional governance. It equipped the rector with unprecedented powers and responsibilities sufficient to turn him/her into a strong administrator from the former *primus inter pares* role. As an ultimate decisionmaker at the institutional level, the rector was no longer accountable to university organs or the faculty but directly to the Council for his/her actions. The Senate, which had operated as an influential collegial decision-making body prior to the Reform,

was converted into a symbolic advisory board that acts upon instructions by the rector. The Reform thus embraced *hierarchy* rather than *collegiality* as the main principle of coordination at the institutional level.

In the new governance regime, administrators at all levels are to be appointed from top to bottom. The President of the Republic was to appoint the rector to public universities among candidates nominated by the CHE. Similarly, deans were to be nominated by the rector and appointed by the CHE. The rector also had the direct authority to appoint other leaders such as institute managers and heads of departments. Having switched to the method of appointment from the method of election in determining leaders, the reformers hoped to prevent political polarization that had affected electoral processes in universities in the past and to ensure the 'right persons' to take office.

Over the last four decades, the CHE has been animadverted by different stakeholders in higher education. Change agents constructed their reform demands concerning the status and authority of the CHE, without which a revision in any aspect of higher education was nigh on impossible. Nonetheless, a series of formal reform attempts have failed at a stage of the policy process, sometimes even after parliamentary approval. In methodological terms, these reform attempts can be seen as cases where the outcome is absent, but the causal condition is present. Even though we are able to trace mechanisms until a certain point, they break down before producing the expected outcome. The mechanism breakdowns are attributable to the existence of strong veto players tending to preserve the institutional status quo and lack of consensus among change agents. In the former reforms we explored, those factors were irrelevant as they were designed and implemented either under the authoritarian single-party rule or temporary military governments exploiting martial law. In other words, those were typical top-down initiatives that did not require cling to democratic principles of 'consensus politics' or bargaining among various actors and veto players.

This does not mean that there have not been any changes to formal rules and regulations. Nonetheless, from our theoretical perspective, those changes should be seen as minor revisions and amendments deprived of the quality to break the path dependence of the post-coup institutional arrangements. We observe gradual and minor change processes such as *drift* and *layering*, especially in relation to international and regional policy trends and initiatives that have affected Turkish higher education to a certain degree by promoting convergence-promoting pressures. Still, leaving aside several Bologna-related policy adjustments and QA reforms, available arrangements specific to higher education governance, as we conceptualized it in this study, remain substantially the same.

Theoretical Lessons Learned

Higher Education Policymaking under Authoritarian Single-Party Rules: Taking Institutional Strength and Ideational Elements Seriously

Chapter 3 provided an explanation of two University Reforms during the single-party era (1923-1946). This chapter enabled me to learn some theoretical lessons that might be relevant for improving our understanding of similar empirical phenomena.

The first lesson pertains to the political environment characterized by single-party rule. The study of higher education policy recently developed an interest in understanding the role and influence of political parties in higher education policymaking. These studies have either focused on the re-distributive dimension in higher education policymaking by focusing on party preference on public spending from a political economy perspective (Ansell, 2008) or differing views and preferences of parties concerning how to achieve control in higher education (Jungblut, 2015). The case I examined similarly seeks to link change processes to partisan and ideological influence on higher education policy with a crucial difference. I dealt with a political environment characterized by the rule of an authoritarian single-party government rather than that of the multi-party systems operating on assumed democratic principles. Therefore, the hypotheses or theoretical propositions regarding a causal relationship offered by these studies cannot be expected to hold true under the circumstances I examined. The case I studied has different scope (or contextual) conditions, and it should be seen as an instance of higher education policy change under authoritarian single-party rules.

The second lesson revolves around the institutional theory. While studying this particular period, I realized that some of the theoretical assumptions I had held did not entirely help when they met with the empirical reality. Scholars operating in historical institutionalist tradition or the ones who occasionally deploy it in understanding and explaining certain empirical phenomena tend to presume that institutions are substantially strong, unequivocal, and dense entities that are capable of structuring and disciplining social and political action in a consistent manner so that they likely produce positive feedbacks or increasing returns over time (Pierson, 2000). In a word, as Levitsky & Murillo (2009) rightly argues, we usually tend to treat *institutional strength* as a presupposition rather than a variable that varies considerably along dimensions of enforcement and stability. The *institutional weakness* should be taken into consideration as an important condition if the researcher goes beyond settings characterized by highly democratic and/or well-established industrial backgrounds. Following the work of Levitsly & Murillo (2009) that revamps historical institutionalism to make it better work in political settings in which strong institutions cannot be taken for granted, I approached the single-party era in Turkey as a period where institutions were

weaker in compared to the other periods studied. This weakness basically stems from the fact that it was a period of institutional re-design and re-formation in which the political elite undertook wide-ranging reforms to create a new set of rules and institutions undergirded by an official ideology of national development and modernization, which would have distinguished the young Republic from its predecessor, the Ottoman Empire, in many aspects of socio-cultural, economic, and political spheres. Therefore, I assumed a temporary weakness rooted in the rapid process of institution building intertwined with the broader efforts in the nation- and state-building, rather than a structural institutional weakness associated with low state capacity or so-called failed states (Onoma, 2009).

The third is about the role of ideational power in institutional and policy change. Reading a considerable amount of primary and secondary material related to higher education policy of the period provided me with the fingerprints of one of my hypothesized causal conditions, e.g., the ideological contestation between actors in the given policy area. But what kind of contestation was this? Carstensen and Schmidt's (2016) distinction between three modes of ideational power, e.g., power *through* ideas, power *over* ideas, and power *in* ideas, helped to refine the problem. Historical and ideational institutionalists have gained ground in identifying 'power through ideas' where actors try to influence other actors' cognitive or normative beliefs through mostly coordinative or communicative discourse. This kind of ideational power dimension can be expected in highly institutionalized policy settings with well-established democratic norms of deliberation, argumentation, and bargaining. Sociological institutionalists, on the other hand, have particularly theorized 'power in ideas', e.g., relatively static and structural background ideational processes such as norms, cognitive frames, public philosophies, or meaning systems that operate at a deeper level and shape institutions in which agents act. The 'power over ideas,' on the other hand, is manifested as a capacity to dominate and control the meaning of ideas by either directly imposing them or shaming opponents into conformity. To achieve their goals in the state- and nation-building, the single-party governments indeed combined coercive and institutional power with power over ideas to promote the official ideology disseminated through educational institutions, intellectual production, press organs, and so on. This was also apparent in the 1933 University Reform, where the ideational controversy between the party elite and academics became a major causal factor, as I discussed earlier.

Drawing upon the case study findings and the existing institutional theory literature, I reflected on the relationship between institutional strength and ideational controversy from a heuristic perspective (Fındıklı, 2021a). In this subsection, I will not reiterate the whole argument but at least specify certain assumptions underlying it.

In a policy setting, these two causal conditions – which can also be conceptualized as independent variables in a variance-based research design – can interact with each other to produce different change outcomes (see table 6.5). Here, I hypothesize about what to expect in terms of character and implications of change and the sources and drivers of change. The term *radical* might refer to many different aspects of change, but I use it here to emphasize the rapid character and implications of change so that it encapsulates both temporality and substantiality. The term *gradual* is understood as the exact opposite of it. Endogeneity and exogeneity may also connote different phenomena, such as what we see in the statistical terminology. Here, I use these terms to indicate the source of change as they are commonly deployed in the institutional theory in that meaning (for an overview, see Koning, 2016). Exogenous explanations are the ones positing that institutions change through interaction with the environment or simply the external world that shakes the institutional order and stability mostly through sudden and large-scale events (e.g., wars, financial crises, or moments of socio-political instability). Endogenous accounts, on the other hand, underscore how processes taking place within institutions due to the relations between embedded actors produce either moderate or substantial change.

		Institutional Strength	
		Low	*High*
Ideational	*Low*	Exogenous; gradual	Exogenous; radical
Controversy	*High*	Endogenous; radical	Endogenous; gradual

Table 6.5. Expectations about change regarding institutional strength and ideational controversy (adapted from Fındıklı, 2021a).

The analysis of the 1933 University Reform during the single-party era exemplifies a situation where institutions are relatively weak and ideational controversy is high (III. quadrant). The pattern of a policy of change was endogenous in terms of its sources and radical in terms of how it comes about. To what extent can policy outcomes be expected to occur that particular way in similar settings where these two causal conditions are combined, an open empirical question to be tested across other cases. What we learn from this and other similar cases as well as the emerging literature on institutional strength is that weak institutions are more prone to produce radical change outcomes – conceptualized as breakdown, displacement, or replacement in the literature – as rules are not (yet) systematically enforced and/or policy actors' preferences are not constrained by narrowly defined options (Levitsky and Murillo, 2009, Onoma, 2009). If institutional weakness is combined with a considerable ideational controversy among a variety of embedded actors, then

decision-makers will probably exploit a wider repertoire of actions that would trigger change endogenously.

Overall, my theoretical takeaway is that higher education policy research may use historical and ideational institutionalist approaches in tandem by stressing the potential complementarities between them, instead of conceiving them necessarily rival explanations.

The Role of Military Interventions and Extraordinary Policymaking in Higher Education: Some Preliminary Inferences and Propositions

Chapter 4 focused on the period between 1946-1981, which started with the end of the single-party era and ended with the introduction of a new act in higher education that came after the 1980 coup d'état. One of the main institutional features of this era was the norm that universities should be scholarly and institutionally autonomous organizations. Even some scholars call this period an era of "autonomous university" (for instance, Dölen, 2010d) as autonomy was inscribed in laws and regulations related to higher education. Still, this term was utterly challenging in terms of *de facto* autonomy as it was challenged and undermined by a variety of developments. One of the idiosyncratic aspects of this term was the influence of military interventions (1960, 1971, and 1980) in higher education policymaking and legislative reforms. This is not something we considerably know about. This fact motivated me to theoretically think about the role of the military in higher education policy as a reform actor. Studying the Turkish cases and reading about the experiences of countries from different regions of the world with similar experiences convinced me to the fact that we could not fully grasp this phenomenon through our conventional approaches.

Research on higher education has made considerable progress over the years in identifying the constellation of actors involved in policymaking processes in different institutional settings. Higher education policy is mostly made by the interaction among a group of (individual or collective) civilian actors. Therefore, it is not surprising that most of what we know comes from research on how the interaction among *civilian* actors, e.g., political parties, a range of state actors, market forces, representatives from academia, etc., to produce certain policy outcomes in processes of *ordinary* policymaking (table 6.6., quadrant I). The actorhood and influence of the military, however, has been largely unexplored. This is because armed forces appear as policy actors in higher education, mostly in times of extraordinary policymaking (quadrant IV). The involvement of the military in policymaking has consequences as it contradicts our presumptions rooted in democratic theory, characterized by the principle of civilian supremacy over the armed forces.

		Types of Actors	
		Civilian	**Military**
Nature of	**Ordinary**	I	II
Policymaking	**Extraordinary**	III	IV

Table 6.6. Possible combinations of policy actors and the nature of policymaking

I benefited from Keeler's (1993) notion of extraordinary policymaking in conceptualizing the role of the military in higher education as a reform actor. He uses this concept to construe the situations in which a policy window for substantial reform is opened by either a government's achievement of an impressive mandate associated with an impressive electoral victory or by the onset of a severe socio-economic and/or political crisis. In the second situation, military governments can assume the role of a reform government to respond to an ongoing crisis, as we saw in the Turkish experience. For the second situation, Keeler (1993, p. 441-442) particularly describes two mechanisms that a crisis can drive: the *urgency* mechanism and the *fear* mechanism. A crisis can trigger a sense of urgency among political and bureaucratic elite predicated on the assumption that already severe problems will be aggravated by inaction (see also Gourevitch, 1986). A crisis can also prompt a sense of fear if it is combined with a large degree of social mobilization based on the assumption that inaction may bring subversive results (for example, see Tarrow, 1993). During the late 1960s and the entire 1970s, the country witnessed student unrest that gradually turned into a violent protest wave and politically oriented conflict, accompanied by a growing public dissatisfaction with the economic and distributional problems in the society. The incumbent military and bureaucratic elite were dissatisfied with the different governments' responses to the socio-economic crisis, student upheavals, and political violence. Crisis-driven military governments (after 1960 and 1980 coups) and interim technocratic governments backed by the military (after 1971 military intervention) took the stage and drove substantial policy and institutional change in many policy areas, including higher education.

What can we expect during sequences of extraordinary policymaking when military actors dominate reform processes? Drawing upon the evidence of the Turkish experience provides and available secondary literature on countries where the military became a reform actor in higher education, I generate some preliminary hypotheses about the most expected outcomes.[70] These are not sweeping claims that are expected to apply a vast range of similar cases, but rather theoretical

[70] Note that in a separate paper currently under review, I provide a more thorough discussion by benefiting from research that illuminates similar cases across Latin America, South Europe, Africa, and Asia. Here, I considerably abridged the discussion and focused on theoretical propositions.

propositions that might be tested through other cases within the scope conditions[71] of the argument. Some case studies have "hypothesis generating" functions (Lijphart, 1971) as they are conducted by researchers in areas where there is either no theory or rudimentary theoretical propositions. Therefore, what we learn from the Turkish case and similar cases could inform further analysis on the role of militaries in (extraordinary) policymaking and reform process specifically, but not exclusively, in the higher education sector by suggesting new hypotheses, potentially important variables, or mechanisms, thereby helping a potential subsequent theory-building effort.

Proposition 1: We can expect that policy design under such circumstances will likely end up being poorer and quicker, reflecting the need to take rapid action without a serious public debate and participation from a wide range of actors. Extraordinary policymaking actors can be expected to come up with solutions that are not sufficiently pondered upon; if not, they entirely give a knee-jerk reaction to severe societal and policy problems. Thus, the policymaking process would probably result in the formation of rapidly but poorly designed policies and institutions.

Proposition 2: When military actors become the sole or dominant reform actors in higher education policymaking, they will most likely induce formal change with radical implications rather than informal change with a moderate impact. This is because the military governments tend to take a highly coercive and exclusionary stance towards both organizations (universities, academic associations, unions, etc.) and individuals (academics and students) within the higher education sector (Salto, 2020) rather than to see them as potential partners with vested interests in formal rule-writing processes. Given the power concentration of military governments and their exclusion of potential veto players from formal policymaking processes, we can then expect more top-down and formal types of institutional change that involve a sweeping shift in legislation and even in constitutional provisions. Military governments, however, can include an incumbent academic elite segment in formal rulemaking and reform processes. If this is the case, the reform outcomes can be expected to be moderate and favor the incumbent elite more likely.

Proposition 3: In political settings where crises situations challenge institutions and democratic values underpinning the political system are eroded, the primary mechanism of change would be more likely "serial replacement"[72] rather than punctuated equilibrium or gradual modes

[71] I have already implied two necessary conditions that should be present in all potential cases, namely an extraordinary policymaking sequence (1) in which the military temporarily emerges as sole or dominant policymaking actor (2). Additionally, there should be an identifiable reform attempt in the HE policy sector, even though this has not always resulted in formal institutional change.

[72] As I discussed in the introduction chapter, this change mechanism is a recent innovation within historical institutionalist scholarship, and it refers to frequent and radical institutional change patterns mostly discussed in relation to Latin American countries where factors such as electoral volatility, regime instability, poignant social and economic

of change. Following the logic of this change mechanism, we can expect that armed forces could alter the existing institutional arrangements in a higher education policy field radically when they intervene in civilian politics or topple civilian governments.

In sum, extraordinary policymaking sequences in the context of the higher education policy sector and the role of the military as a policy actor shaping higher education reforms appear as two interesting phenomena that higher education research can tackle. This study humbly contributes to the literature by bringing them into view.

Thinking about Failed Institutional Change Attempts and their Consequences

Chapter 5 traced the last four decades of higher education policy to see to what extent governance arrangements changed or remained persistent. Using the terminology of historical institutionalism, I succinctly argued that the 1981 reforms opened a new institutional path in higher education governance structures and practices that has not been significantly altered by a series of formal institutional change attempts within the ongoing institutional sequence, thereby producing outcomes associated with gradual institutional change without disrupting the institutional status quo. What is theoretically challenging here is to grasp the role of failed institutional change attempts in their relation to gradual change and institutional stickiness.

In their seminal work that theorizes gradual and endogenous institutional change, Mahoney & Thelen (2010) provided a dynamic framework to understand the role of actors and their coalitions in driving institutional change. Rather than seeing actors as mere 'winners' and 'losers,' they identified different types of "change agents" and "defenders of status quo" whose characteristics are mediated by the properties of political context and the institution in which they are embedded. In this framework, the mode of interaction between these two groups often generates an outcome, i.e., gradual institutional change of some type. But what happens when the tension, conflict, or even collaboration between different change agents and status quo defenders produces no meaningful formal institutional change?

In a recent paper, Issar & Dilling (2021) deal with such a problem and contribute to historical institutionalism by bringing the issue of failed institutional change attempts and their effects on institutions for discussion. They define failed change attempts[73] simply as events where

inequalities, or large-scale institutional borrowing affect pace and pattern of institutional change (see Levitsky & Murillo, 2013).

[73] Note that failed institutional change attempts can be formal and informal. Informal attempts are associated with actions of influential groups such as stakeholders, constituents, or interest groups who have some kind of institutional power to have an impact upon the change processes through lobbying, backchanneling, or some other way. On the other hand, formal attempts express formal bids at institutional change, including proposals to change or amend formal rules and regulations. Therefore, they are much more visible and trackable (Issar & Dilling, 2021, p. 3-4). In this section, I use the term failed institutional change attempts to only refer to formal ones.

change agents attempt to change existing institutions at a specific time yet fail to realize it. They differentiate failed change attempts from similar concepts in the literature such as "policy failures" or "near-misses." Policy failure studies are typically interested in how a policy fails in the implementation process (McConnell, 2015). Sometimes policies are not implemented as intended: they either did not achieve the goals their proponents vowed to achieve or disappoint stakeholders and constituents in the given policy sector. In a failed change attempt, bids reaching a formal decision point cannot reach the policy implementation phase as they fail to cross the decision point. "Near misses" is another concept used by Capoccia & Kelemen (2007, p. 352) to denote reform attempts that were very close to being implemented but narrowly defeated or reversed. Issar & Dilling (2021) depart from this concept as it automatically implies closeness. Failed attempts are not necessarily near misses that failed by a very narrow margin. Sometimes they fail by a wide margin, or the defeat may become decisive.

A thought-provoking theoretical puzzle that failed institutional change attempts evinces is to assess how and to what extent they leave their marks on the post-failure institutional trajectory and what strategies change agents can pursue after their attempt fails (Issar & Dilling, 2021). The unsuccessful institutional change attempts in higher education in Turkey during the last four decades are highly instructive in this respect. We observed various attempts to radically change the most important law, namely the Higher Education Act of 1981, or repeal it by making a fundamentally different law. These attempts were either blips – e.g., minor amendments that did not significantly change the subsequent institutional trajectory – or total failures as they have been prevented by veto players and defenders of the institutional status quo. The amendment in the procedure of the appointment of the rector in 1992 (Law no. 3826) exemplifies a state of affairs where change agents, namely the social-democratic coalition partner supported by unions and academic associations, had originally come with a much more comprehensive legislative proposal with ambitious aims. The president's veto of the comprehensive 2004 reform bill proposed by the JDP government and approved by the parliament (Law draft no. 5171) epitomizes another major situation in which change agents missed an opportunity even when their formal bids for change passed the level of parliamentary approval.

When it comes to change agents' strategies, we can expect that they can pursue several strategies after their attempt fails (Issar & Dilling, 2021, p. 9-10). If they are persistent, they would possibly seek new alliances, build coalitions, or garner concessions to promote their change proposals and policy ideas further. Yet, to the contrary, they can back down after one or more unsuccessful change attempts, and this, in turn, can inoculate the institution against future change attempts. Sometimes, they change the scope of their proposal and come up with new bids geared

towards more piecemeal and hence feasible change attempts. These are all quite possible scenarios, and we can find their empirical fingerprints across different cases scrutinizing post-failure institutional trajectories in different contexts. Still, we should know that all these expectations predicate on change agents rather than the substance of the proposed change itself.

The post-1981 institutional trajectory in Turkish higher education embodies a case where change agents themselves have repeatedly changed – even to the degree that some former change agents became ardent status quo defenders such as the JDP – but the spirit and the substance of the proposed change remained quite similar. To put it simply, change agents more or less have demanded more autonomous universities – which may either imply a call for academic self-governance or strong strategic decision-making capacity – and less centralist governance at the systemic level, while status quo defenders have sought to maintain the available arrangements as they mostly have benefited from it. Still, it is possible to observe some changes in the strategies of both change agents and status quo defenders within the last two decades characterized by the increasing international pressures for reform.

During the last two decades, I observed two developments within the higher education policy field that imply a change in the strategies of change agents. First, after the failure of several sweeping formal institutional change attempts, those who demand change in some aspects of higher education governance have gone after piecemeal (rather than wholesale) change to achieve at least some of their ideal institutional arrangements. In other words, several unsuccessful attempts seem to have incentivized them to shift strategy and instruments rather than to have renounced their claims and accepted the status quo. Second, they have extensively benefited from international policy developments and trends in higher education to move the institutional arrangements in their desired direction. Specifically, they stress the necessity of reform to adapt the country to the BP-promoted actions, QA trends, knowledge economy, etc.

These findings and observations have given me food for thought. For one thing, I realized that failed or unsuccessful change attempts have been greatly ignored by higher education researchers even though they are, in fact, recurrent occurrences that can be observed across diverse institutional and political settings. Methodologically, analyzing failed attempts necessitates to esteem the value of "negative cases" (Mahoney & Goertz, 2004) and "near misses" (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007), i.e., the cases where the outcome of interest (change) is absent despite all other conditions are present. In higher education research, scholars engaging in small-N research, including me, have extensively (and understandably) focused on "positive cases" where the outcome of interest is present. Therefore, we have considerable knowledge of 'higher education reforms' in terms of actors involved, causal factors triggering them, contextual conditions affecting

their implementation, and so on. However, we know very little about unsuccessful reform attempts or near misses in higher education and their effects on the post-failure trajectories. Studying failed reform attempts can thus broaden our horizons in grasping the higher education policy outcomes and hidden faces of institutional development at the national or sectoral levels.

Moreover, the nexus between failed institutional change attempts and modes of institutional change, if any, that we observe in the post-failure sequences can be scrutinized theoretically and empirically. As propounded by Issar & Dilling (2021) and discussed by me specific to the post-1981 period, gradual modes of change, especially *drift* and *layering*, are highly expected outcomes in the post-failure trajectories. There is, without a doubt, a need for considerable comparative research to see if this expectation really holds in most of the other cases. Furthermore, we might be ready to expect some more 'informal' institutional change mechanisms in certain settings. Helmke & Levitsky (2004) argues that even if available formal institutions are strong and effective, actors who are somewhat dissatisfied with them can still come up with *accommodating* or *complementary* informal institutions. The latter refers to informal institutions coexisting with effective formal institutions, while the former connotes the ones that alter the effects of formal institutions without directly violating them. I argue that we can probably find *accommodating* informal institutions in some post-failure institutional settings as these institutions are often created by actors "who dislike outcomes generated by the formal rules but are unable to change or openly violate those rules (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 729).

The actor constellations in Turkish higher education policymaking have been quite dynamic, producing various change agents who have pushed for their agendas by challenging existing institutions and incumbents who have relied upon their structural privileges to maintain the status quo during the periods studied. In the case of contested institutions, such as that of higher education in Turkey, the main difficulty lies in explaining their stability and persistence under conditions of regular change attempts. My findings suggest that the 'political coalitions' of incumbents are crucial to explaining stability as they defend the existing institutions against attacks from coalitions of challengers (Hall & Thelen, 2009). This is especially apparent where the struggle over the fate of the CHE has been the focus of contention. Such coalitions of status quo defenders can resist an institution's dismantling or strongly influence the fate of the change attempt.

Final Reflections

In the ways specified above, this dissertation makes certain empirical and theoretical contributions to the literature. Before bringing the conclusion chapter to completion, I would like to convey some general messages of the study further.

This dissertation is concerned not only with the causal story of policy change specific to higher education governance in a national context but also with the question of whether and how this matters politically. This was something that prior studies mostly abstained from. The study took a wider perspective by suggesting that the fate of higher education governance in Turkey can be read as part of a larger struggle among the different segments of the Turkish elite over determining the very role and character of academia. Such a perspective is compatible with the argument of certain historical institutionalist accounts viewing institutions as the political legacies that reflect historical struggles and foundational conflicts (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010).

The study also benefited from the insights of ideational institutionalism over the ideational power elements as a repository of change (Carstensen & Schmidt, 2016). This was especially the case during the single-party era, as ideological controversy among actors was a source of contention and change. In this respect, historical and ideational institutionalist approaches can be thought of as supplemental rather than opposing.

On the other hand, sociological institutionalist assumptions were instrumental in exploring the influence of the external pressures on the national trajectory of policy change in higher education. The main driver of change in this approach is typically exogenous as the environmental pressures force national and local actors to react to the global developments and match their policies and structures with the nature of the environment. This is, of course, not a linear process as the external policy models or scripts are mediated by national variables that filter them in certain ways. Turkey's experience with the BP, among others, has particularly been explored in this study to see the interaction between the push and pull factors that sociological and historical institutionalist approaches respectively put forward. Further research may explore in what aspects the Turkish case seems deviant or diverging and in what aspects it converges to the global trends.

Overall, the findings of this study can serve as secondary empirical material for further studies that would either compare the Turkish case with other cases to detect similarities and differences or delve further into the subject. The conceptual and theoretical understanding that I offered is far from being perfect. Still, it can provide insight into national specificities and context-dependent factors affecting Turkish higher education policy.

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List of Interviewees

INT 1: Former vice-president of the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey

INT 2: Former advisor to the president of the Council of Higher Education

INT 3: Former vice-president of the Council of Higher Education

INT 4: Former rector and the president of the Higher Education Quality Council

INT 5: Higher education researcher and member of the Turkish National Team of Bologna Experts

INT 6: Former rector and former member of the Council of Higher Education with supranational leadership experience in higher education

INT 7: Former advisor to the president of the Council of Higher Education and higher education researcher

INT 8: Former rector and former president of the Council of Higher Education

INT 9: Higher education researcher and former advisor to rectors

INT 10: Former vice-president of the Council of Higher Education

INT 11: Current rector

INT 12: Higher education researcher and former rector with supranational leadership experience in higher education

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APPENDIX 1

Interview Guideline

General Themes Guiding Interview Questions

- Focus on systemic governance (simply understood as the relationship between the state and higher education institutions)
- Focus on institutional governance (simply understood as the patterns of governance within universities)
- Factors and forces that influence and shape higher education governance in Turkey
- Crucial moments for higher education in Turkey (particularly reforms that affected higher education governance arrangements)

Main Questions

- How can you describe the state's role in systemic governance in Turkey?
- How has the role of the state in governing the higher education system changed over the last four decades (or after the 1981 Reform)?
- What is the most powerful actor in systemic governance in Turkey and why?
- How does the current systemic governance regime affect universities? (especially in terms of institutional governance and university autonomy)
- What kind of interests are represented in the space between the state and universities, and to what extent are they influential?
- How would you describe the role of market forces in higher education in Turkey? Are they being included in institutional or systemic governance structures as stakeholders? (changes over time – since when?).
- How would you assess higher education institutions' (i.e., universities and other academic organizations) role in higher education governance?
- Do universities have adequate institutional autonomy to determine their course or set their own goals?

- Where does the locus of authority lie in universities? (the rector/the Senate/academic profession; changes over time – since when?)
- What have been the effects of the Bologna Process on Turkish higher education? What do you think are the intended and unintended consequences of the Bologna-related reform efforts in Turkey?
- What other global, international, or regional policy developments and trends (other than the Bologna Process) do you think have affected Turkish higher education governance?
- What makes Turkish higher education governance converge to global trends and or vice versa?
- What do you think is the most important policy development in Turkish higher education recently?
- Do you think the current higher education governance arrangements should be reformed? Why and how?

APPENDIX 2

Basic Data on the Turkish Higher Education System[74]



Figure A. 1. Number of universities by type, 2020-21



Figure A. 2. Number of universities by type, 2011-2020

[74] I obtained the data from the official statistics published by the CHE (https://istatistik.yok.gov.tr/) and reorganized them to give basic information on universities, students, and academics.



Figure A. 3. Student numbers by university type, 2020-21

N=~8.2 million (including all degree programs and types)



Figure A. 4. Student numbers by university type, 2011-2020



Figure A. 5. Access to higher education, 1980-2020



Figure A. 6. The ratio of the enrolled students by years, 1980-2020



Figure A. 7. Students by degree programs, 2020-21



Figure A. 8. Number of teaching staff, 2016-2020

Foundation date	*Public universities*	*Private universities*
1930-1939	1	
1949-1949	2	
1950-1959	4	
1960-1969	1	
1970-1979	11	
1980-1989	8	1
1990-1999	25	19
2000-2009	41	25
2010-2019	36	34
Total	**129**	**79**

Table A. 1. Dates of foundation of the Turkish universities (excluding other higher education institutions such as professional or vocational colleges and academies)

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