



People as infrastructure?

An ethnographic study of urban inequality in the neighborhoods of Dakar



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Master's thesis in Social Anthropology

University of Bergen

Spring 2024

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Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis has at many occasions been a blast. As I reread my field notes, I went back to the scenario and remembered the way in which things were said, often with a charming smile and a hint of irony. I want to thank all my interlocutors and the people of Teranga for giving me great memories and insight to your culture—and of course for making this project possible.

Thank you so much Modou and Meïssa at the department of geography at UCAD for your openness, for helping me and providing important knowledge and insight. I am grateful for the help from my inspirational supervisor Bjørn Enge Bertelsen, thank you for your admirable expertise and guidance. I also want to express my gratitude to the project “Enclaving: Patterns of global futures in three African cities” for the funds I received in relation to my fieldwork. I am grateful for the help I received from Haakon with the makings of the maps, and Håkon for revising this paper. A special thank you to Aly, Pape, Clémentine, and the other people I met for making me feel so welcome and safe. My great fellow Anthropology students, thank you for the coziness, mental support and technical help. Much love for Mamma, Pappa, Anna, Karoline, and my dear friends for both visiting me during my fieldwork and for having faith in me and my project.

Jërëjëf!

Abstract

This thesis explores the ways in which security, class and prestige, inequality and forms of housing is structured and lived in times of urbanization and development in urban Dakar. I view these topics in the different scales they are organized and unfold, through felt experiences of the city and, last how they are structured on political and economic levels. Particularly, I seek to explore how modernism, traditionalism and prestige are navigated alongside a long period of globalization and French influence. Further I discuss security through privatization of the city and prestige as a part of the urban inequalities of the city. These topics are intertwined, I argue and relevant to measure and understand the ways in which urban inequality is lived and structured in Dakar. Through the analytical framework of “people as infrastructure”, this thesis explores the extent to which contemporary Dakar can be understood in this manner. Relational connections and networks have been seen as the infrastructure of many African cities, but as my ethnography shows, this is challenged by increased forms of security measurements, privatization and enclaving. Additionally, these elements are used to show prestige and express class differentiation and thus exclusion of marginalized citizens in significant parts of the city. *La Corniche Ouest*, illustrated on the front page of the thesis, has become both a symbol of a metropolis and embodied upper-class space making visible the urban inequality and spatial segregation. However, the concept of *Téranga* is still emphasized as an important marker of the sociability, namely hospitality and the idea that you should be helpful and open to your neighbor. I discuss whether this concept, relating to people as infrastructure can maintain within the continuous stream of new people and new forms of housing, transforming the physical infrastructure in some parts of the city and leaving everything up to its residents in less favored areas of a reconfigured urban order.



Figure 2. Map of Dakar

Picture from Google Maps, generated in Photoshop by author and Haakon Kjelbergnes.

Chapter 1. Introduction

“Every home in the village has open doors [no doors] to their house, everyone is always welcome”.

—Resident of a Dakar neighborhood (2023)

“The president [Macky Sall] has done a lot of good things for the construction and development of the city. But people are dying because they cannot afford food, and that, he does not care about”.

—Sociology student at the University of Dakar (2023)

On my way from Blaise Diagne airport located about 40 kilometers from Dakar early January 2023, I found myself in a warm and dusty typical black and yellow Senegalese taxi looking like a typical 1970s Toyota Corolla. As we drove towards the city on the newly built highway—adorned with the signs “Welcome to the highway of the future” [*Bienvenue sur l’autoroute de l’avenir*] from the French construction company *Eiffage*—I had the feeling that I could have been anywhere in the world. Although I had a two-hour drive ahead of me in the morning rush, it was as if I was all the time almost reaching the city center: The stream of clustered unfinished housing projects signaled to me being in the suburb just before the city. However, as I would eventually see, it turned out to be endless peripheries that I passed through.

As we *did* eventually come closer to what is defined as the city of Dakar and its densely populated suburbs, people were moving in every direction, and the roundabouts were full of street vendors in the heat of the beginning of the day. Moving closer to the destination, the scenery completely changed. It went from construction of unfinished detached houses to gated construction sites adorned with posters and billboards of well-secured luxury high-rises to come on these premises. I could finally see the sea surrounding the city and the edge of the city opened. Here, there were fewer cars, the defined streets had palm trees and vantage points overlooking the sea and, noticeably, there was barely a person on the street,

walking or sitting. As I did not have the address to the apartment I was going to live in and no cell reception I asked the taxi driver to take me to Radisson Blu, as I had recognized it on Google Maps a few days earlier. The taxi was checked by the security guard as it entered the gates of the fanciest hotel I had been to in my life.

Construction booms rest uneasily with deepening impoverishment; spectacular built environments are coupled with intense predation; socioeconomic inequalities can be staggering. Cities are torn between becoming mirrors of everywhere and amplifying a distinctiveness that sometimes proves to be simply the repetition of an injunction to be different (Simone 2019: 12).

Abdoumalig Simone's illustration of one perception of cities in what was "formerly known as the Global South" (2019: 11), imply a form of homogenous and narrow perspective of this part of the world on many observers. Further, the so-called Global South is often used to distinguish from the Global North, and while this thesis attempts to uncover Dakar's uniqueness, as the taxi ride illustrated, it may nevertheless, and at some levels also mirror cities from across the world. However, as the taxi ride illustrated, the development seen through the construction boom is creating great urban inequalities—both within the city and between the city center and its peripheries.

The political situation in Senegal and historical remarks

The media coverage from Senegal the first months of 2023 during my ethnographic fieldwork consisted to a large extent of youth demonstrations responding to threats to the local democracy, in conjunction with the imprisonment of the popular Presidential candidate Ousmane Sonko in relation to the 2024 election. A new wave of demonstrations occurred when Macky Sall, at the time current president extended his term.

Senegal is known as being one of Africa's most stable democracies (Dahou & Focher 2009) and political protests are common as well as permitted. During my fieldwork from January till June, demonstrations took place throughout the country resulting in the death of at least a dozen citizens, including teenagers shot by the police (Amnesty International 2023). As explosions fired outside the classroom and university aulas in March 2023, my classmates at the University of Dakar cheered for their brave peers that fought for their cause. While I was

sitting there rather anxious before the class, I asked why they were cheering to which one responded what a dictator Macky Sall was.

Interlocutors and friends posted videos of people taking to the streets to celebrate the electoral victory of new president Bassirou Diomaye Faye in late March 2024. While Faye took the place of Ousmane Sonko, as observers point out, they are close colleagues and friends and he was therefore an accepted substitute (BBC 2024). The president prior to Macky Sall, Abdoulaye Wade had big plans for the country and the development of its capital's infrastructure and development. These plans included getting international attention and attracting foreign investors, focusing mainly on spectacular urban development in the areas around the city center and *La Corniche Ouest*, while ignoring the needs of the majority of the population (Jónsson 2024: 15).

Sonko's approach on the other hand are cutting the ties to foreign actors (especially the French) which was manifested in setting fire to for example French-owned Auchan grocery stores (Senenews 05.06.2023). However, while most of the battle between the security apparatus and the protestors took place in the growing suburbs of Dakar, the neighborhoods of the securitized parts of the city remained mostly calm. Lack of change, growing poverty and high unemployment rates during Sall's consecutive two periods in power also contributed to the dissatisfaction and political engagement among, especially, the young Senegalese population (Jónsson 2024).

These sentiments starkly contrast to the imaginations of development and wealth I encountered every day in the areas from the city center, following the coastal road [*La Corniche*] to the Almadies (See Figure 2 on page IX). Despite the growth of the city since the Wade era in the 2000s, the ordinary resident of the city is struggling to bring food to the table. May this great resistance be a way for youths to claim insurgent citizenships (Holston 2008) in a city of inequality? Can the commonly viewed stable and peaceful country have created an increased fear in the population? Urban gating and securitization of neighborhoods is after all in many instances a result of particular instances and social change that has created urban fear (Waldman & Ghertner 2023). As this thesis will further ethnographically explore, emerging development projects of urban gating and securization of neighborhoods in Dakar offer points of entry to better understand the political implications and experiences of such changes as it relates to people's everyday lives and how they interpret, navigate, and respond to such changes.

Senegal's first president after their independence from France, Léopold Sédar Senghor, served for 20 years—from 1960-1980. Senghor is a legendary figure in Senegal and across

Africa who took part of the *négritude* movement which sought to decolonize and appreciate Black values and legacy (Diouf 1998: 672). His party *Partie Socialiste* was the only legal party during this period before he resigned to Abdou Diouf in 1981, making Senegal one of the early in the region to obtain (partly) democracy before the wave of democratization to Africa in 1989 (Dahou & Foucher). European presence in what was at the time called Senegambia¹ date back to 1659, but the colonization by France lasted until independence in the late 1950s (Diouf 1998). However, Senghor's successor era was marked by economic recession and a growing rural-urban migration. As had been claimed about Senghor, Diouf's profit- and decision making catered to a small elite (Dahou & Foucher 2009). The economic crisis in the 1980s, including an outbreak of conflict in the Casamance province in the south of the country, made people skeptical about politics (ibid). Political activism and media coverage were factors in the democratization and the replacement Abdoulaye Wade with an opposing party in 2000 (ibid).

However, Wade have been reputed for the attempts of 'beautifying' and develop selectively favored areas without improving citizens position (Jónsson 2024). Abdourahmane Seck stressed the lack of organized and political challenge to an alternative narrative to the imaginaries and expectations of the necessity to "develop" the country in a certain direction since independence where everything else was seen as backwards (2015: 15).

From the perspective of my interlocutors, both Wade and his descendant Macky Sall was seen as cooperating with the imperial forces that continue to exploit them—the French—and therefore argue that they are still colonized. For instance, In the classroom as I watched people cheering on the ongoing protests, another student emphasized that Sonko finally told the people the truth about the exploitation they are undergoing and that he will change the system. This political mobilization might be the political opposition that will change these developmentalist narratives (Seck 2015), that are prominent in the privatized housing projects taking place in Dakar.

Dakar as a metropolis, city or mega-city?: Urban anthropology and theories

Whilst city regions often are characterized as centers of the countries' global economies, these are often subject to forms of hierarchies and normative labels. Ananya Roy (2009) points to the tendencies to view and read "great cities" such as New York, Chicago, and Paris as "world cities" because of the global financial capital-making. On the other hand, urban formations in

¹ Separated by colonization into Senegal and Gambia.

so-called “Third World countries”, such as Mumbai, Jakarta and Dakar are viewed as “Mega cities”, on the basis that these cities are “big but powerless” (2009: 821).

Drawing on Roy, I would argue that Dakar is a metropolis because of its “worlding” of the city, where global capital and financial activity meet in and through points of urban compression. From the “global woman” (nannies, maids etc.) that the city generates, migration to its intense forms of commodity exchange, Dakar is both national and transnational (Roy 2009)—as well as— traditional, Western modern and African modern at the same time. This complexity of Dakar was made clear to me by some of my interlocutors. They would, for instance, complain by stating that “the prices of housing here is the same as in Paris, New York or Toronto!”.

To me, this and other aspects—that I will also show ethnographically later in the thesis—show *both* a distance towards *and* a connection to cities like these. Dakar is, then, akin to what Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall (2004) argue Johannesburg to be, namely a metropolis because of the city’s complex relations to being African, European, and American all at once, in both overlapping and rupturing ways. They indicate that former African colonies’ social form sometimes are understood as not African “enough”, because of colonizers impacts on the society. Though Senegal is no longer colonized, it is still highly influenced by France manifested in, for instance, consumption patterns, French military presence, French retained as official language and still, as many West African countries, using the French colonial currency, the CFA Franc. On the other hand, Dakar – as Johannesburg – is also American in its culture of consumption and its extensive trade of and consumption in commodities (see also Mbembe & Nuttall 2004: 367). Dakar’s intertwining of global identities including housing prices comparing to Paris and New York, illustrates both a purchasing power and constant change that is in line with a metropolis.

Reflecting also what researcher Ismaël Moya states, namely that Dakar is a West African metropolis (Moya 2015: 152), some of my interlocutors said that they had moved to Dakar for this very reason. On my way home from the University (UCAD²) a late January afternoon in 2023, I accompanied a fellow student from Mauritania, as we both lived in the same area. Living close to the administrative and economical city center and right next to the newly renovated seaside promenade, everyday encounters consisted of involvement with different shapes and forms of security. Entering my quiet and sparsely populated neighborhood in Fann Hock, I

² Université Cheikh Anta Diop.

would often firstly pass a truck filled with police officers wearing uniforms and machine guns. Walking further in, numerous private security guards would sit in front of people's houses, offices and apartment complexes. Police officers were from time-to-time patrolling the streets outside my apartment. Upon entering my video surveilled apartment building, I could lock up the gate to the entrance or knock for the security guard to open. While my classmate was certain I lived next to the "nicer area" by the public garden himself shared a room with two other students at the edge of Fann Hock. As he was one of few foreigners in our class for ameliorating in French, I asked why he chose to move to Dakar to which he replied:

The Universities and formations are better, you have more opportunities, its more developed here, safer and more job opportunities [than Mauritania, and other neighboring countries].

In conversation with people from neighboring countries such as Guinea Bissau, Gambia or Mali these also often expressed similar reasons for moving. Such movements have sustained in and through Dakar for hundreds of years, bolstered also by its connection to European colonial history, its practical geographic placements which connects Dakar to the trans-Saharan trade, its independent and democratic state and the massive migration flux (Moya 2015). Nevertheless, Moya underlines the difficulties of making comparison—which I will seek to do in this thesis in order to look at urban differences—in this context because of the intertwining between modernity and tradition and the inseparability of the local with the global (2015: 152). Reflecting also on the questions raised by Moya about the urban nature of Dakar and how one can approach it both comparatively and in its own right, in this thesis I will map and explore the ways in which modernity and tradition, as well as how the local, global and regional is related and feed into one another in the production of the metropolis of Dakar. My argument here, is that cities such as Dakar should be viewed as a world city in the way that it, as Simone (2019) argues, mirrors and take part in the globalizing world yet works in its own way with local distinctiveness.

To understand the relational making of urban space, AbdouMaliq Simone and other scholars have in the last decades drawn attention to the notion of "people as infrastructure" to approach the urban, emphasizing "economic collaboration among residents seemingly marginalized from and immiserated by urban life" (Simone 2004: 407). By paying mainly attention to African cities, his argument is to go beyond infrastructure in a physical sense, such as sewage systems, road network and electricity. Instead, he approaches infrastructure as social

networks that connect people to each other, the place they inhabit and consequently how they produce and reproduce these spaces. People as infrastructure also include “attempts to derive maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements” (2004: 411), which he exemplifies through the improvisation and specializes skills acquired in the transport depot in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) where young men improvise between different tasks and connections, from driver to baggage loader to selling the tickets without a formal payment plan.

These types of connection and ways of maximizing outcomes can be seen in various places in Dakar—although each connection and task is challenging to trace for an outsider such as myself. Similar dynamics are found for example in markets where (usually) young men work as intermediaries who finds customers in the street and bring them to people’s shops—to which they are paid for by the owner. These modes of collaborating in the urban environment are what makes a livelihood for many of the residents in Dakar, but also shows a way of creatively and improvised organizing from the ground up compared to the one-way route decided by state regulated infrastructure. Yet, as expressed in the recent political protests in Dakar, concerning in part peoples’ position within urban development projects—or exclusion from them—it raises the question to which extent the physical infrastructure is perhaps now increasingly interacting with the relational modes of people as infrastructure as people are yearning for change.

Discourses of urbanization, belonging and development in Dakar

The landscape and population of urban Dakar have been through a series of expansions during the last decades. These processes are also readily available to the ethnographer—in particular as they are visible through seemingly everlasting building sites, the widespread presence of housing project advertisements and construction work in a city which is continuing its growth and, as is sometimes labelled, “development”. Yet, despite these visible and tangible (construction) developments, during my fieldwork in Dakar from January to June 2023, there was a noticeable great concern from the inhabitants about the future of the city: Rising prices, a sense of overpopulation, an experienced lack of jobs and a dynamic of locals being pushed further out of the city because of the increasing presence of wealthy people and foreigners³, were common everyday topics. In a conversation with a woman, whom I will call Aminata, that was living in my neighborhood at the time of my fieldwork, about the future of Dakar, she put it this way:

³ A process sometimes labelled gentrification.

Before Dakar can change, people's mentality must change, or else it is going to get even worse. Living in Dakar is expensive, and it is going to become more expensive. Us Senegalese can no longer live here, the city will be consisting of people from other countries and the richest Senegalese people, because they are the ones who can afford to stay.

Aminata was referring to the rising prices and new housing developments most Senegalese cannot afford. However, despite acknowledging this, and in her multiple encounters and conversations with me, she continuously expressed her love for living in Dakar, despite what her family thought of her leaving them and the natal village without finding a husband and living alone, as is customary in Senegal. At this point, she kept on taking different courses at the University to be able to keep living in Dakar, and to give people who asked a reason for doing so, even though she knew (and expressed) that she did not believe that the courses would give her a job.

The fear of not getting a job after the studies was common among my fellow students at the University, reflecting high unemployment rates in terms of formal, salaried work. Some of the things that attracted her to Dakar was what she called the "modern" way of thinking and living there. As examples, she listed that she could dress how she wanted without getting any comments, she could talk about anything with her friends and there was a lot of events and parties to attend. It was as if she was making use of this situation, living close to the university as a student while she still had the chance to, because she knew it would only be temporarily.

There is a paradox in her statement: The continuing flow of urbanization of Dakar (Cissé 2022), mostly consist of rural people who come in search for work from other towns and villages in Senegal. Despite discourses of development and opportunities, such as in the case of Aminata and my Mauritanian classmate, many of my other interlocutors stressed the fact that they do not actually wish to live in Dakar permanently: Most people come for work or studies, and usually leave their family in the village with the intention of moving back. Yet, this is often an unattainable goal due to lack of work in the rural areas.

As is well-documented, market-driven deregulation of agriculture of the Global South in the 1980s and 1990s, on the initiative of the World Bank led to government subsidies being removed, and public utilities being privatized (Melly 2010: 40). The regional currency CFA franc was devalued, and the economy stagnated (2010). This shift is one of the reasons for the rapid urbanization in Dakar, as was repeated by many of my interlocutors: "The villages have nothing left". Mike Davis sees these structural adjustments and associated austerity measures

in this part of the world as a result of the neoliberal order where urbanization combines with high unemployment as a mass producer of ‘slums’ and of heightening exclusion and economic inequality (2004). Davis’s point seem to resonate with the elderly widow, Soda, that lived in an area colloquially called “*Cité Imbecile*” instead of *Cité Darou Salam* which is the original name—a so-called slum:

I want to go live with my relatives in Touba⁴, we live so comfortably there. We have a community, a lot of family members and a good life. You don’t have to worry about space or getting food. But I cannot, because there is no work for me there and I don’t have any money.

Here, she is referring to the lack of space in the narrow *cité* and the difficulty of affording food. It was often said by my interlocutors that most of the population in Dakar come from and have their families in other parts of the country. In conversations with interlocutors, many used the example of the celebration of Eid-al-Fitr⁵ [*Tabaski*]⁶, when noting that few of the inhabitants are initially from Dakar. I was always told to wait and see until the feast that the streets would be empty, because everyone would go back to their village to celebrate with their family. And it was true that the usually busy city was emptied of people, cars and taxis were gone from the road and small businesses was closed during that time in April. This reflects that most of the inhabitants are rural migrants, who leave their family behind in search of work. Achille Mbembe argues that migrant workers are bound to experience the metropolis in the face of insecurity, uncertainty, and unpredictability, because the place was not of their choosing (2004: 364). This was, as briefly indicated above, Soda’s case, who was forced to live in precarious circumstances in order to pay for her living. The housing situation in Dakar and other African cities has captured the readership of global news media.

The newspaper *The Economist* (2024) demonstrates that 70 percent of the housing needed in Africa by 2040 is not yet built, in line with Austin Ablo’s notes on housing being the most urgent challenge facing rapid urbanization (2023: 444). Facing these challenges calls for development and housebuilding to house the future population and is why I find it important to study this process. The fate that meets inhabitants such as Soda in the current process of

⁴ Touba is a religious city situated a few hours further into the country.

⁵ Eid is an Islamic holiday where the end of Ramadan is celebrated.

⁶ About 96 percent of the Senegalese population are Muslims (Islamic Development Bank n.d).

urbanization is one of dire urban inequality and the possibility to live and take use of the inner-city.

The neighborhoods [*quartiers*] of Dakar, the Cité and the urban:

The different types of neighborhoods in Dakar are often distinguished between “popular neighborhoods” [*quartiers populaires*]⁷ and “residential neighborhoods” [*quartiers résidentiels*]. While residential neighborhoods are characterized as calm and upscale with more space and less people, “popular neighborhoods”—or working-class neighborhoods are typically considered densely populated and chaotic (Versluys 2008).

While my main interest in this project lays in enclosed neighborhoods accessible for wealthy residents, I also wished to discover various areas, some, often labeled by interlocutors as “ghetto” (also in French), to attain a more complex understanding of the city. If I said that I wanted to visit such an area I would sometimes receive a surprised look and hear that “the area is a little bit [...] special or weird”. The quote above was for instance said about an autoconstructed neighborhood (Caldeira 2017) by the young man Bamba from the working-class neighborhood Medina, seemingly uneasy by saying this. When I asked what he meant about special he responded that they have almost nothing and live in “shacks”. Yet, most of the time the word “ghetto” was used with an ironic distance as interlocutors would laugh or pause to say the word—seemingly uncomfortable calling it that and self-aware of their own fortunate living-situation.

The official term in Senegal for talking about these areas, is the French word *bidonville* which translates to slum (Beier 2023). In the word on the street, however, these areas were often referred to as ‘ghettos’ or ‘zones’, and their popular use rather than the formal designation underlines why I will use these terms in this thesis. The use of the word ‘slum’ is often associated with ‘third world’ countries and ‘the global south’ (Beier 2023), typically in ‘mega-cities’ (Roy 2009). In light of what Beier claims is a problematic Eurocentric urban scholarship, the use of the word contributes to a problematic form of urban hierarchization, not only in research, but also within the cities in which these neighborhoods exist (Beier 2023: 107). Beier addresses the “absolute otherness” that is distinguished in the urban life of the residents, and the stigmatization deriving from the term being integral to daily discrimination (2023: 108).

Bearing this in mind when using these terms that locally and globally can work as marginalizing on both the city in itself and certain neighborhoods, I will examine and describe

⁷ Would more correctly be translated into working-class neighborhoods.

certain areas juxtaposing official designations with the actual use of my interlocutors. Despite interlocutors of mine stressing mainly the crime and unemployment in working-class neighborhoods and the peripheries, they were also emphasized as sites of important “urban culture making”, such as the suburban working-class area Pikine. During a conversation with Aïcha and Cheikh about prestige and security in different neighborhoods, they pointed out that many creative people such as musicians and artists are based in Pikine. They emphasized, however that this could be because of “their circumstances”, including hardship, unemployment, crime as well as a large young population. Nevertheless, many famous wrestlers—key figures in popular culture in Senegal—and artists are based in Pikine, and the positive reputation and status this creates—as opposed to badly reputed suburb—is manifested in for example T-shirts with print such as “*living in Pikine is cool*”⁸ (Prothmann 2018: 261). Wrestling is according to interlocutors a way of earning a lot of money for young men, which create the opportunity of upward mobility in areas such as Pikine. Collectivity and identity are created through characteristics such as being street-smart and hustling combined with a global lifestyle in terms of clothing, music and activities such as clubbing and eating fast food in Almadies or the city center (Prothmann 2018).

The term *Cité* is used both officially and in the vernacular for describing specific neighborhoods that separate themselves from other parts of the area. The residences of a *cité* often consist of homes with homogenous architecture and social classes. Such neighborhoods are often distinguished from the other houses in the area and are often prestigious and advertised as ‘well secured’ [*bien sécurisé*] in Dakar.

However, regarding who was allowed to inhabit certain *cités* was more controlled and strict a few years back: While some of the closed areas in Dakar was originally built to house people of certain professions such as for example only government officials, judges or only professors, such as *cités* for university professors (mesr.gouv.sn)⁹, thus this criterium has been removed in the past decade in some cases¹⁰. However, the contemporary French *cité* are on the contrary understood as marginal areas with mainly an immigrant majority (Lepoutre 1997).

⁸ In Wolof: *Deuk Pikine Mo Neex*

⁹ Ministry of Higher Education, Research and Innovation (*Ministère de l'enseignement supérieur de la recherche et de l'innovation*)

¹⁰ According to residents, neighborhood chefs and post-doctor in geography at UCAD Modou Ndiaye. Elaboration in chapter 3.

This was the case, for example, with the above-mentioned *Cité Imbecile*. Yet, most commonly, they often have a common entrance with a barrier which is controlled by a security guard, sometimes with a banner with the name of the *cité*. The *cité* is often surrounded by some type of barriers or larger empty spaces to secure its residents.

I will in this thesis approach the *cité* in Dakar in relation to Teresa Caldeira's notion of "urban enclaves" (2000) as this underlines the way these are used to privatize space and security, create homogenous prestigious space, and endangering and excluding 'the other'. For, as I will show, most of Dakar's *cités* are thus homogenous prestigious neighborhoods that through amongst others delimitation, reduced public space and security increasingly remove public space and exclude unwanted residents. The *cités*, similar to the enclaves, "are changing the city's landscape, its patterns of special segregation, and the character of public space and of public interclass interactions" (Caldeira 2000: 258). As I will show throughout the thesis, *cités* marks homogenous prestigious spaces and take part in pushing certain city dwellers out of these areas as new infrastructural housing projects continues to develop and separate classes.

Every neighborhood in Dakar has a *chef de quartier* (neighborhood chief) and he, it is most often a man, is in charge of decision-making, amongst other tasks. One of the chief's purposes is to avoid overloading the city hall for cases that can be solved internally, including protecting residents from being prosecuted by law. This might be seen as a way of localizing powers where the objective is to solve problems more effectively and give more room for the residents to join decision-making. The chief is in charge of funds received from the city hall and its redistribution to the residents based on their needs. When asking interlocutors and people in the street about someone to speak with in certain areas I was always told to go to the chief. This shows the centrality of the chief's role, but also a localizing of power to each neighborhood. As I did not know anyone who knew someone in *Cité Imbecile*, I planned to go through the chief to ask for someone I could talk to, as is done in other research in Dakar (Santos et al 2015) and I was encouraged to do so by interlocutors.

In practice, carrying out this plan was more complicated as he was a rare sight. Soda explained that since he had 'become rich', he no longer lived in the neighborhood, and therefore only showed up once a week to deal with residents' cases. Soda seemed annoyed with his infrequent presence, as she stated that a chief should be someone that lives in the neighborhood and argues that he gives the municipality's money to his friends and family, and not those who actually need it. In this case, the chief's rare presence in the *cité* implies that its residents are not being taken seriously, and that they are not getting the same resources as other

neighborhoods. My repeated efforts to encounter the chief without luck illustrated and reinforced this point for Soda. While the Chief functions as a security net in times of precarity such as lack of money—these benefits were according to Soda inaccessible for some of the residents.

Field description and research method

By providing a select overview of some dimensions in Dakar, I have introduced the city as a metropolis undergoing new building practices in line with urbanization and I have also hinted at widening gap and distance between urban residents. During my six months of fieldwork in Dakar, I aimed to follow up on my interest in urban inequality and housing which grew during the writing of my Bachelor's thesis on enclaving. Based on articles about enclaving (Low 2001; Caldeira 2000; Nielsen et al 2020) and imaginations from Dakar ethnography (Melly 2010; Hann 2013), I had a preconceived idea of how the city would look like before arriving. However, after spending some time exploring the city, I was struggling to see a clear link between the enclaves I had read about and the presumed enclaves of Dakar. Even though Dakar did not have enclaved fortresses with thick brick walls as Caldeira (2000) has described, I decided to pursue the topic of enclaving and use some of the same methods which is often used in this type of research. For example, researchers often conceptualize the enclave as going beyond the physical enwalled estate or large gated community and approach it through “the securitization, consumption and aestheticization of space, and to explicate the terms on which the enclaved subject dictates wider patterns of urban development” (Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 282). For, these other elements of enclaving such as aestheticization, securitization and privatization of space, were certainly factors of the development of the city.

However, during fieldwork I found studying these urban phenomena difficult because people were often busy and enjoy the anonymity that comes with a city where there is constant movement. Feeling like an intruder in people's space, my topic was not necessarily something many of those I encountered found it interesting to talk about. Furthermore, many saw the topic of enclaving as irrelevant—often adding that it was not their business, and that living conditions was based on how hardworking people are. Underlining this meritocratic point of view, Aminata said during a conversation: “If you live in a beautiful home, it is because you have worked hard”. However, such a view was not always shared, as Fatou here expresses.

If someone receive money from their brother, they don't bother to work. You can see in my neighborhood for example [a suburban area with a lot of unemployment], many lay around all day and play some football with their friends in the evening.

She referred to this as a normality while we sat in a taxi on our way home from a friend of hers in January, as she was trying to explain some of the economic dynamics of the city. In this view, while those who do well in terms of economy are seen as well-deserving, it is nonetheless every now and then looked upon with a certain skepticism.

It must be noted that there was a certain difference between these women that might affect their perspective. Firstly, Fatou was a bit older and in a more economic stable situation than Aminata. She was in her thirties, working in a regional startup company and now living in an apartment with other international people. She grew up with her family in Rufisque, a densely populated suburb of Dakar, but moved to the city when she started studying. It is well-observed by scholars that elite spaces such as enclaves are difficult to access and to perform participant observation within (Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 282). For example, in most residential areas I visited during the day people were absent as residents was either at school or work. Aïcha who lived in a four-floored apartment building where the entire building belonged to her family in a residential area in Parcelles, describes the dynamics in these types of neighborhoods:

Here for example, most people are doctors or working in administration, they don't have time to be in the street. The children have a car picking them up in the morning and dropping them off in the afternoon. When they get home, they have private teachers. In the weekends, people take their kids somewhere with the car.

One of my responses to this absence of people, was following the flows and adhering to methodological snowballing, i.e. meet people through activities such as surfing, French classes and social events and meeting friends of friends. For, 'hanging around' is also participant observation (Zahle 2017). Further, hanging around at certain places and with certain people also contributes to a snowballing (O'Reilly) of interlocutors in informal dialogs, which made one contact introduce me to another one that later introduced me to others or simply 'follow the bodies' as Scheper-Hughes emphasizes (Scheper-Hughes, in O'Reilly 2012: 171). Studying urbanization and development processes in an unequal urban landscape made multi-sited

fieldwork as a method a necessity, as I found that one single area was not sufficient to make a representation of my research.

Jaffe & de Koning states that “while certain working-class neighborhoods may harbor some of the contested, localized social life that anthropologists traditionally studied, people’s lives often spread out and across the urban landscape” (2016: 15). The case of Pikine shows that people from working-class neighborhoods also are highly mobile (Prothmann 2018). This was also illustrated by my several visits in Soda’s *cit * when she spontaneously had left to go to Touba or other cities to visit relatives.

To make a sufficient representation of how diverse Dakar is in terms of urban inequality based on place, I found it relevant to compare areas (Wiederhold 2016). Every area differed to the next, and it is all of these areas that make up the city I wished to study and made a bigger representation in my case. The downside of this comparative strategy was less in-depth research in one area. However, at the same time, I would not see the same general trends and holistic view without discovering the distinct places that relate to each other in the changing city of Dakar and experiences of urban inequality for my interlocutors.

In periods where I did not have a clear plan for the days, I would ask to join people when they went different places or to just follow them around. This could be anything, from joining someone from my house to a bar in 5-star hotels in Almadies to taking the bus to register at a vocational school in Pikine or sitting behind on a scooter to sell car-parts in different parts of the city. Similarly (Jaffe & De Koning (2009) followed their interlocutors around to see what they wanted them to see—in their case—where and how they mapped safe and dangerous areas. When walking home after dark, I would always be given instructions of watching my stuff in certain areas, ordered to take a taxi when crossing specific areas and told which roads to take. This was particularly relevant for understanding narratives of security in Dakar, which I explore throughout the thesis. Studying urban phenomena often differs from traditional anthropological method (as commonly associated with the Malinowskian fieldwork), yet, I will argue, participant observation still “provides access to hidden aspects or segments of urban life” (Jaffe & De Koning 2016 :14). Contrary to studying rural spaces, urban life more often unfolds in many different areas, which is why mobile (participant) observation, or interviews can be useful to understand several aspects of life (2016).

In order to attain a level of ethnographic depth and continuity to my work, in addition to the mobile and snowballing method, a part of my fieldwork also consisted of collecting life histories. Du Boulay & Williams explains that as anthropologists we rely on evidence from

“individuals in a society which receive, recreate and transmit that culture over time” (1992: 248). This is because of interlocutors’ choice of talking about selected events, how they reflect on these and how they accord these value (Du Boulay & Williams 1992: 248). When passing a story on, then, the narrative is bound to vary by both the anthropologist and the reader (1992: 248), based on individual understandings of the world.

Navigating from the point of view of this insight, I often therefore asked more open questions during interviews to let people talk about what they were concerned about, avoiding to push my own narrative onto people. By freely choosing events that is a part of their story indicates that place was important markers of their life and who they are. Though not directly emphasizing someone’s life story in this thesis, this gave important insights into people’s perception of place and neighborhoods—urban as well as rural—as crucial to their identity and wishes for the future, but also depth to people’s understandings and use of Dakar’s different neighborhoods in times of urban change. These were often manifested in young men’s aspiration to be able to build a house for their family and mother—which was usually mentioned by my interlocutors, as well as other economical ambitions such as to provide for family members. Mothers were frequently mentioned (and not the father) in these cases when the father had several wives, consequently several households, no contact with father, widowed mother or a father that lived in another country. There is also a social expectation for men to build a home for women in Dakar (Melly 2010), and as Grysole notes, the house is one of the key symbols of success (2018: 665). At other times the aspiration was to move to a better neighborhood or—a securitized *cité* as Aminata also elaborates on in chapter 3.

Field access and reading the field

After arriving in Dakar, a combination of luck and very open and helpful people quickly broadened my network. Firstly, my residency in the neighborhood [*quartier*] Fann Hock was crucial to make the snowball start rolling. The house was inhabited by and the workplace of, many people with various backgrounds that helped me set up my first interviews. They would from the beginning also accompany me to these interviews, which made the interviews feel less formal and safe for both me and the person being interviewed.

Zahle notes that ‘gatekeepers’ are crucial to attain inside information, because they are people who have some access to the field you wish to study (2017: 474). Some of my interlocutors functioned as gatekeepers in the way that they set up interviews with people from certain areas and would ask to accompany me to interviews. In terms of language, it was

sometimes necessary to bring along a translator in the cases where Wolof or other Senegalese languages were used. Though French is the official language, the most spoken language in Dakar is Wolof, in addition to other Senegalese languages. Despite French being the language taught in schools, it is mostly used by highly educated, ‘formalized’ workers and people working with tourism speaks French. I was able to communicate in French on arrival in Dakar but took French classes at the beginning of the fieldwork which both made me confident to do interviews in French, as well as gave me many relevant contacts. I also enrolled myself in a course on African civilization at University Cheik Anta Diop, set up for “French-learners”, where I also asked students and lecturers for help and input for my thesis.

Some of my interviews were translated from Wolof to French, some in French, while others were done in English. The use of a translator, translating and the switching of languages during interviews can have made something get ‘lost in translation’. For example, I had a friend accompany me during an interview with the neighborhood chief of *Cité Touba Renaissance*, because of the unknown language barrier and I thought that I would be taken more seriously if I brought a *gatekeeper*.

During the interview the chief switched between French and Wolof and when he spoke Wolof, my friend would translate immediately back to me. After the interview we continued to discuss the *cité* when I asked him what he thought about the conversation. He then mentioned some (to me) new information,¹¹ and when I asked why he thought this, he said because the chief had told him. This indicates that he sometimes would leave things out, but I do not know whether this was because he thought that it was self-explanatory, unimportant or if he did not want me to know. The information I received was therefore sometimes selective and interpreted by a second part before it came to me in some of my interviews. However, the number of interviews, many conversations with citizens and the months spent in the city might compensate for the potential slips in, especially, translated interviews. I have also used an extended field-method approach following my departure from Dakar, as I continuously read and follow news about Dakar on social media and stay in touch with people through social media during the writing of this thesis. This follow-up in a period of much political tension has provided me with further insight to political dynamics and context.

¹¹ I elaborate on this new information in chapter 3.

Sometimes, however, I got the impression that people felt comfortable around me because they knew that my western values were different from “typical” Senegalese values. For instance, a day during Ramadan, I was walking by the beach with two fellow Muslim students. Before the walk I was visiting one of the students’ family homes where they were discussing how difficult the fast was. During the walk they stopped by a hidden sandwich shop and ordered a sandwich and a coffee each. I asked if their family knew that they were not fasting, which one responded to:

No, of course not. Life here is difficult, there is no jobs, and everyone is watching you. In the US for example it is easier to get money, there is more freedom, and nobody cares what you do.

In my experience, the idea was that what they perceived as “Westerners” do not care if you do something that you should not. Therefore, telling me would not have any social consequences and I became, in addition, someone they could vent frustrations to.

As opposed to what I expected, men were easier to approach and more commonly approached me. This may be connected to the fact that men more both *more frequently* make use of public space and use public space *differently* than women in Dakar. As a young white woman, I stuck out by appearance but also by acting different and appearing in other spaces places than many Senegalese women. For example, I would approach whomever I wanted and moved around without needing approval, as will be discussed further in Chapter 2, or receive skepticism (with exceptions of course), opposed to what was expected from a “good” Senegalese woman. I was in a privileged position when I wanted to visit semi-closed neighborhoods or construction sites, because the security guards or residents would often think I wanted to buy or that I was living there. Though certain expectations were made to Schwander-Sievers during her fieldwork in Albania as a woman, she stressed that being both a foreigner and a researcher gave her more freedom and less expectations than local women (2009). As in Schwander-Sivers context, Senegal is predominantly a patriarchal structured but did not in my case limit my research in terms of gender.

Every situation, conversation and observation are viewed through perceptions based on the person I am, my experiences and the way I see the world. Though who I am, and the way I act play a crucial role in the information I received, the information was analyzed through my lenses, and the way I perceived it. Stephanie Newell states that “appropriate methods for

researching Lagosian cultural history in archives [...] often exclude African subjects and filter local perspectives through a racist colonial optic” (2019:10). She refers to the difficulty of finding non-Eurocentric historical documents to back up her research.

Informed by the sensitivity to the gaze we as Western and white subjects bring to the field—and to the thesis—for me it has been important to reflect on the way in which the world is understood. In Newell’s work on perceptions of dirt in Lagos, she emphasizes the outsider’s (i.e. the researcher’s) view of peoples’ othering. Making categorizations or taking the “worst” examples from interlocutors without taking their complexities into account must be considered (2019: 12). Some aspects of informants’ descriptions may therefore unintentionally get lost in the work. Similarly, I sometimes include quotes said by people, that do not have the possibility to explain every detail of what they meant. My ethical concern here, has been to not unfairly quote someone without thinking through the contexts in which it was said. Du Boulay & Williams argues that despite how “raw” a material may seem, it has been selectively and purposely used and acquired with an interpretive purpose in mind (1992: 249). All my interlocutors are anonymized with the use of pseudonyms and some details about the people are changed or generalized. There is one exception to this measure of anonymity, and that concerns the inclusion of the name of a Senegalese researcher Modou Ndiaye, who, in parts of the fieldwork shared insights with me from his similar research interest and to which I am grateful.

Structure of the thesis: People as infrastructure?

In this chapter I have briefly given a contextualization of Dakar and neighborhood organizations in its processes of urbanization and development. I have situated Dakar in the urban literature, focusing mainly on theories of ‘the Global South’ (Ananya Roy 2009; Mbembe & Nuttall 2004; Simone 2004, 2019) and introduced the topics I will discuss in the following chapters. The field site and anthropological methods used have been listed, as well as difficulties and ethical considerations briefly addressed. This thesis is structured around the research question of how urban inequality is unfold in Dakar and emphasize this question through the domains of enclosed housing and privatization, class, and security. I will explore these overlapping elements which, I argue, are connected processes of inequality in separate Chapters, in light of urbanization and development narratives. Overall, each chapter in this thesis will be discussed in relation to security as it constitutes a major part of the contemporary neo-liberal cityscape

(Glück & Low 2017). Also, to situate contemporary Dakar, I find it is necessary to illustrate the current political situation that in many ways mirrors the urban inequality taking place.

Chapter 2 will discuss urban inequality in a more general manner reflected in neo-liberal developments, rapid urbanization and how wealth and poverty is expressed in the different neighborhoods of the city. This Chapter tries to illustrate the deep inequality amongst the growing separations between the classes, and also where the middle-class fit in this equation. The growing juxtaposition is an element of the privatization and enclosing of the city for the urban poor, which I will discuss in Chapter 3. This Chapter will also discuss trends of urban enclaving in both material and non-material forms and stress the new urban spaces that are created through exclusion and stigmatization. The new exclusive private and securitized developments is expressed in Chapter 4, which will deal with prestige and class. I will map and discuss ‘traditional’ prestigious forms of housing conflicted with new ‘modern’ apartment buildings changing the sociability as well as contradicts with values of housing and neighborliness. These elements of the urban will be seen in light of the colonial and neo-liberal policies that shapes the homes and class structures of the city.

More specifically, this thesis will examine the hierarchization of the city’s neighborhoods, influenced and reinforced by popular opinion, neo-liberal policies, and the *performance* of security—the actors and those affected by it (Diphorn 2019). The ways of which security, housing developments and privatization is used to create both prestige and distinguish the marginalized other is ethnographically discussed, and I try to show how intertwined these processes are both on a structural and relational scale.

The overall framework for the thesis will be to investigate the argument of understanding people as infrastructure (Simone 2004) i.e. as a city that bind people together through the people and their connections. It also illustrates the point that it is the people, not the infrastructure that makes up the city—keeping in mind that “the anthropology of infrastructure has favored the category of modernity at the expense of a critical engagement with capitalist processes, to the point of airbrushing capitalism out of the picture” (Buier 2022: 8)—even in a self-proclaimed Marxian analysis, as Buier argues. Solid infrastructure are often goods reserved to favored areas, and thus contribute to increase the urban inequality.

However, as I will show, this concept, first written about twenty years ago, is being challenged and undermined by privatization, securitization, and class imaginations, which hinder people from moving freely in the urban landscape. The neo-liberal subject becomes, I argue, more and more restricted in the city by these transformations. This notion of relying on social networks is highlighted by the commonly used concept of hospitality [*téranga*], which I

will elaborate on in chapter 3. Based on the idea that Senegalese society is collectivistic and despite various ethnicities and religious beliefs, the Wolof term *téranga* was often made explicit by the expression I frequently heard “we are together” [*Nio Far, on est ensemble*]¹², as a response to gestures or help—symbolizing the fact that we are all connected. It is tempting then, to see this in relation to Benedict Anderson’s concept of *imagined communities* which sees the nation as an imagined entity despite likely never meeting every person in the country (2006). By collective instances such as the Friday prayer in Senegal, people are tied together by a mass imagination of collectivity. In conjunction with the most important Muslim prayer of the week [*jumma*], people dress up in traditional clothing (Kastner 2018: 12), which creates a sense of community by doing the same thing at the same time. Imagined communities creates a sense of nationalism by relating to others across class, gender, ethnicity and other differences that constitutes the city (Anderson 2006: 36), which in Senegal is illustrated by the importance of *téranga*.

¹² In Wolof: *Nio Far*. In French: *On est ensemble*.

Chapter 2. Urban development or growing disparities?

An early afternoon in April, Modou Ndiaye showed me around to some of the hidden housing settlements of the ethnic group Lebou in the city center. Modou Ndiaye from University Cheikh Anta Diop, who was at the time undertaking very relevant urban research in Dakar, was referred to me by a fellow researcher in my apartment building. Ndiaye was kind enough to show me around and to discuss some of his findings with me. The city center or—Plateau as the area is called—was the old colonial center, which today is marked by some of its architecture with colonial houses and buildings in the heart of the center. They are combined with modern high-rise offices, restaurants and apartment buildings. I had walked these streets several times a week the last couple of months without noticing much else than apartment buildings and by passers. Now that I took a closer look with Ndiaye, I could see that behind these tall modern buildings, large communities of housing were hidden behind them. Ndiaye points out that these people have taken their land back, but most likely, they will only stay there until the ‘owner’ of the land decides to build something on the property.

The Lebous, considered by Brendan Kibbee as an indigenous population were inhabiting the city center of Plateau long before they were displaced by the Europeans (Kibbee 2018). Today, their living is hidden behind the more outstanding building processes in Dakar with luxury apartments and posters hanging around the city saying ‘what is luxury’ [*c’est quoi le luxe*]?¹³ in correlation to what Bruce Grant called *paper architecture*—imaginaries of what the future will look like (Grant 2014: 504). In post-Soviet Baku, futuristic buildings become a political landscape of new forms of social exclusion because most of the residents cannot afford to inhabit these buildings that continue to appropriate the city. As me and Cheikh, who I will properly introduce in this chapter, walked by the coastal road answered to my question about people’s perspective of this ‘development in progress’: “I think people find it frustrating, because it is not for them”.

The neo-liberal shift and urban expansion around the world have led to changes in the urban landscapes, particularly in terms of growing urban inequalities (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 73). In many cities this means a juxtaposing of the growth of gated communities and luxury apartments with an expansion of irregular settlements and precarious housing (2016: 74).

¹³ See Figure X

Reflecting this global trend, a key scholarly question has been the apparent growing middle class in sub-Saharan Africa (Ablo & Bertelsen 2022, Mercer 2020)

Further, in a country as Senegal and paradoxically, despite numerous organizations working for the social and economic development of the county, the same actors often contribute to an uneven access to public space—deepening patterns of—spatial and social exclusion. Resourceful countries often buy or lease from not as resourceful sub-Saharan countries, only to take out resources and bring it back home (Sassen 2016). The aid from international organizations holds a promise of development that promote certain ideals and theories about ‘progress’ (Hoelscher et Al 2023). Despite rapid urbanization and transition of cities in African countries, these often transform without much structural economic change. While discourses of urbanization often are viewed as a modernization process that also include economical change, these narratives are based on early European and American urbanizing process, and, arguably have little relevance in African cities (Hoelscher et al 2023: 254).

In Dakar then, I argue that the urbanization process, is moving towards an urban development in favor of the rich, where the development of the city creates precarious and marginalizing housing for the city’s many poor. In relation to a state intervention strategy, the Zero Slum Program [*Programme Zéro Bidonville*], the Senegalese government has the object of creating 100 000 new housing units. Meanwhile, urban transitions are highly political processes (Hoelscher et al 2023), which is manifested in neo-liberal governance such as in the new city of Diamniadio (Ndiaye & Fall 2021). The question is then, how will the city house its residents in context of rapid urbanization? As I will show, new housing projects such as SD City in the new city of Diamniadio, initiated by the state to deal with the lack of space and housing in the city, but have in reality turned into housing for the wealthy. In this chapter I will show that it has created temporary displacements and further expulsions in the case of *Cité Imbecile*, while luxury apartments are on the rise. In relation to this I will discuss how middleclass residents navigate these differences, something also changing the sociability. To emphasize the intersectionality, I will discuss women’s sometimes ‘double burden’ in the urban landscape. Lastly, I will discuss the evident spatial segregation that for the most part is the peripheral urbanization (Caldeira 2017) making the city less accessible for the urban poor.

“For the city yet to come”: the promise of development

—Abdoumalig Simone (2004) named his book on the changing African lives in different cities throughout the continent. Moving through the city of Dakar, it seems as if there is always a new

building project every place you go. If not the rapid construction of a big apartment building project, housing developments are typically either temporal self-built houses or a vertical extension of houses all over town and the suburbs. “Everyone knows that you should invest in property” was an expression I often heard. Though ambiguous, people look at the high rise of luxury apartments as problematic in times of homelessness and lack of affordable housing. On the other hand, people often take pride and find hope in seeing the city “modernize” and “develop” its physical infrastructure.

This was visible through the fact that interlocutors often brought me to the city’s most ‘developed’ places to hang out and the lifestyle of for example Aminata¹⁴. How urban dwellers live and move around is often determined by “the techniques of actors” in urban governance. The latter referring to the process’s stakeholders who “collectively decide how to plan, finance and manage urban areas” (Ablo 2023: 444). Taking use of and living in these areas are of course bound to income. Ablo argues that the privatization of housing in many sub-Saharan cities is a highly political process. States’ failed attempts to develop cities often results in actors seeking profit in the market-led housing processes, where private actors propose a ‘quick fix’ to the housing problems caused by the ever-growing urbanization (ibid).

The lack of housing opportunities for the typical resident is visible for example in establishments of irregular settlements in Dakar. However, new housing projects such as new luxury apartments and private cities, is not seen as favoring for the majority of the population. As one of my interlocutors noted: “They keep on building luxury apartments for the rich, but they don’t build anything for the people”. I accompanied a friend to visit Babacar in his apartment in Mamelles, a photographer that was at the time reporting the ongoing protests in Dakar in April. My friend had told me that he was very politically active and engaged and therefore brought me along to her visit. When I asked what he thought of the housing developments in the city, he was one of several interlocutors who responded with the above quote. An example explaining why such a number of people might have this perception, is the case of Diamniadio.

The creation of the new town Diamniadio, situated on the outskirts of Dakar was initially a state-led project that was envisioned to host middle-class residents. The project was launched in 2021 as a part of decentralization strategies from the government to avoid overpopulation in the city center. SD City was one of the enclaves taking place in this new city. Diamniadio was

¹⁴ See introduction.

initially inhabited by a rural population, living of agriculture, that now lives alongside the new closed-off city. Ndiaye & Fall (2022) shows that the prices in the area have increased drastically (despite what may have been the state's intention) and thus in reality only host upper class people. Though the soil was bought by the state, the housing projects are run by private property developers, who often have profit as their primary motive.

It has in reality created one new rich town and divided it from what is often referred to as old Diamniadio: inhabited by the rural population who cannot afford to take place in the new city (Ndiaye & Fall 2022). In the vernacular the city is there referred to either Diamniadio *riche* or Diamniadio *pauvre* (poor). Murray describes that real estate agents have turned such projects away from the public authority with private control and management (2015). The ways in which this is done in the case of “Waterfall city” outside Johannesburg, a private enclave or ‘new city’ that strives to keep out outsiders, including public actors such as the executive power, presence of rival businesses and permission for taxis to stop or park inside the enclave (Murray 2015). The enclave is highly controlled by the private proprietors that has created an *extrastatecraft* (2015: 515) where the city manager is referred to as the mayor and promises a governing of the enclave that creates profit. This new form of urban governance creates an uneven balance between the profit-making of urban areas and public authority and interest (2015: 515).

A forty-minute drive out from the city center, I arrived at the gates of SD City an early afternoon late March with a friend of mine, as I was told it was difficultly accessed with public transportation. Situated in “the middle of nowhere” as it felt—a remote area surrounded by fields—we parked the car inside the gate and walked around the huge, enclosed area with parks, shops and restaurants and tried to find some residents to talk to. The area was quiet and peaceful and almost felt like an oasis as it was separated from the rest of the city. Even though it was an isolated area which almost felt like entering a ghost town, the walls covering the condominium were high and the security check strict. As we entered with a car and said that we were interested in the project we were let in.

Parked inside the gate, we suddenly come across a young man that had just finished his studies in the new city, currently unemployed, living in his friend's apartment while he was abroad. He had earlier rented in the neighborhood but could no longer afford to. When he moved there a few years earlier there were almost no people and even difficult to get necessities, but now there were more people and more stores and facilities, he recounted, seemingly happy. He had not been in Dakar to see his family for several weeks, nor left the gates: “Because it's calm here, I like the people, and we have everything we need”. As we were talking, one of the project

developers walked by. He began mentioning that all the houses were already sold, but that people buy and sell and that it is why it has become so expensive.

He referred, thus, to liberal processes where each property buyer raises the prices when they sell to the next buyer, making properties less accessible to people with limited economical resources. When I asked what kind of people that lived there, they both responded, “rich people” followed by mentioning the high price of the homes and the different countries of origin they were from. This assists an urban governance where private stakeholders profit from the housing situation, while it creates misfortune for others who are effectively excluded from such areas by being changed into an object of economic speculation and investment. This exemplifies the ways in which development is often perceived as benefitting some and ultimately creating a bigger division between the urban rich and the urban poor. As Ndiaye & Fall (2022) claims, people from different classes no longer interact and are physically separated, by the walls of the closed city in the case of the neo-liberal housing market in Diamniadio. This was also something Ndiaye tried to illustrate through the hidden settlements of the Lebou’s in the city center. In Foucault’s theory of governmentality, this shift from state-led to privately led urban processes is changing the power dynamics in urban governance (Ablo 2023: 456) While the intention of the state was to hinder overpopulation in the capital, private actors are not necessarily motivated by the public good in a similar way as a municipality would be. The lack of regulation in the ever-increasing prices of housing leaves areas such as Diamniadio only accessible for a small group of wealthy people, shaping, reinforcing, and exacerbating class divides.

Can we speak of an urban middleclass?

Scholars have emphasized the lack of middle classes in the sub-Saharan context (Gastrow 2020), while others note the increase (Mercer 2018). Gastrow (2020) links the Angolan middleclass to aspirations of formally built homes as opposed to the popular desire of self-built homes. Formal housing is in the Angolan context viewed as the correct and proper way of living, ingrained in colonial understandings of homeliness (Gastrow 2020). According to Gastrow formal housing is also linked to imaginations of status and the transnational (2020: 509-510). Mercer (2018) underlines understandings of middle-classness in sub-Sahara as increasingly visible through the display of wealth—or *conspicuous consumption*. Such ethnographies about the middle-classes are seemingly embedded in discourses of the common juxtaposition of the categorizations poor and wealthy in the region.

The concept of middleclass is fluently defined and is defined differently by different people, particularly when looking through the lens of a Western society. Some of my interlocutors claimed that there are no middleclass in Senegal, because if something happens you can lose everything. A typical saying was: “You can have a prestige job as an engineer or a doctor but still not be middleclass, because if you get sick or lose your job, you have no safety net, and can lose your house because you must pay medical bills”. Combined with the neoliberal policies in Senegal, the state provides very little economic assistance which create a great uncertainty for its citizens (Grysole 2018). On the other hand, Peter Lockwood (2023) stress scholars debates concerning whether Africans raising wealth is real or a product of conspicuous consumption. However, several of my interlocutors considered themselves middleclass citizens, one of them was Cheikh. During one of my informal conversations with him while we walked in his neighborhood in Ouest Foire, a relatively newly built area he states:

Some people choose an area just to say that they live there. For example, this is a new area where everyone builds their own houses, and building yourself is something people take pride in. For example, my sister and her husband built a big house with four floors in Rufisque. After a while her husband retired, and they could no longer afford to buy food. This says something about how important it is to have nice things, nice cars, even more important than food sometimes. Eventually they started renting out parts of the house in order to survive.

The story about Cheikh's sister confirms with the display of wealth, but also the precarity of their situation and pressure to prove themselves. This was something he also referred to at other occasions, as he accompanied me to several interviews. During an interview with Papa, Cheikh mentioned this as a response to Papa's statement: “Senegalese people are always searching for a more comfortable life and a better place to live”. This was during a visit in Grand Yoff, a working-class area with a reputation for being densely populated, having a high rate of unemployment and violence. They rented the top of an apartment building with a big terrace where the mother was cooking for a dinner party later that evening. Papa, the father had a Master's Degree in international commerce and knew Cheikh through a painting job he did at a museum Cheikh had an exhibition in. Papa and his family migrated to Grand Yoff when he was young because of the tense situation in Guinea Bissau.

Cheikh was currently renting his two-room apartment in Ouest Foire, but his dream was to build his own home where he could have his mom move in. He worked in a regional NGO,

made photography and films on the side and had an university degree. He came to Dakar for his studies and now lives alone. Lockwood reflects on middle-class Africans' aspiration to move from kin and neighbors in natal homes to the emergence of individualism and moral economies of solidarity, in accordance with Cheikh had previously done (2023: 480). In his case of middleclass youth in Nairobi he argues that expectations of receiving economic help from kin and neighbors is in the way of youths upwardly mobile status. The precarious state between aspiring to receive middle-class status and the "negative reciprocity"—giving and not getting anything in return - Lockwood describes as the negativity of aspiration (2023: 480). In Dakar, similar dynamics change creates a frustration among many.

It's Africa. We have the newly rich and then we have the poor. People are millionaires, but the people are struggling. The rich will give money to their brother and wife, but not to the people. Before, everyone in the neighborhood would be together, the neighbor's grandma was your grandma, the neighbor would pay for another neighbor's education but today nobody gives a shit. People are so fragile that if you tap someone's shoulder they could explode. If you tap, and one day he does not have money he will break down.

Ousmane, the forty-something year old man that lived and grew up in my neighborhood quotes this during an interview as we were talking about the economic situation in Dakar. He lived with and came from a family with government positions in a big house but worked informal jobs from day to day. Frustrations over money came in different forms, also by Cheikh who shared his frustration with people that expected to receive money from him as we were walking in the street:

My dad called me yesterday and asked why I had not given him any money yet, this far into Ramadan¹⁵. I just told him that I did not have any, but then he answered, "*yes you do, you just don't want to give*".

During the conversation he sees some shoes he likes and walks into the shop. I mention to him that he said that he did not have any money

¹⁵ There are expectations that you should be extra generous during Ramadan.

Yes, but it annoys me [that he must give money to his father], it should not be an obligation. Besides, I did not know him until I was 16 and I already pay for my siblings' education. They don't understand that I have dreams, I want my own house and a car.

Cheikh who had moved alone to a new well-reputed area were proud to help family, but showed frustration when it was not on his term because he aspires for his future. As Lockwood argues, "it is because they have not 'made it' that they are keen to guard their budgets" (2023: 480). 'Make it' —is understood here as— to attain middle-class status. Fatou¹⁶ also stresses that a rich family member must share their money with close ones to be socially accepted. Herself had moved out of her family home in the outskirts of Dakar and was now living alone in an apartment building. She elaborates to me that the problem of sending money is that the receivers will not work for themselves. She refers to her natal village where a lot of men are just lying around all day doing nothing, walking around with friends and playing some football in the evening. It is seen as common knowledge in Dakar that unemployment and lack of jobs are causing major problems. This might be her way of saying that people should work for themselves and not rely on relatives.

Lockwood (2023) illustrates how a desire of living privately in for example urban enclaves is caused by a sense of burden from economical transactions, but at the same time a longing to be considered successful in other people's eyes. The inability to give peers what is socially expected because it stands in the way of own material wishes and social status reflects on the conspicuous consumption of the debated middleclass (Lockwood 2023). Fatou's comment about people from her natal village who does not work for themselves and Cheikh's about his father's expectations reflects on the annoyance of situations. While he felt that he could not give as much money to his father as was expected of him, he was still looking at new shoes that would make him keep up with his materiality and social status. They had both left their popular neighborhoods and now lived private lives, alone in apartments in quiet residential areas. In their new neighborhoods where they did not already know their resourceful neighbors, they do not need to be concerned about neighbors' expectations. Lockwood views this emerging middle-class not as "Africa rising" but an anxious one (2023: 492). In the sense that they must be careful of their money because their economic situation is precarious, this is true for at least Cheikh. Their statements also show how prestigious and important a neighborhood is for the sense of class and identification of the self. Moving to middle-class neighborhoods eases the

¹⁶ Goes further with her statements in chapter 1.

stress of the expectation of neighbors and family in their natal respective neighborhoods, while the new residency confirms with their class position. However, this might affect relations with family and friends, as the father of Cheikh illustrated because there is still an expectation or annoyance with not sharing when 'able' to.

The zero poor program

If you ask anyone for money for food, they will say that you are an imbecile. They will tell you to do some construction work and receive about 2000 CFA¹⁷ a day. Most of them cannot work because they don't know Wolof, because they speak another language in their village. But because of the state, they don't have another choice than to move because they have nothing to do in their village.

As the city "develops", people's lives change as a result, and as the quote above from Aminata during a conversation about the rural-urban dynamics in the country implies—many gravitate towards the city to beg for money. This is a trend not unique to Dakar: throughout sub-Saharan Africa, agricultural deregulation was a result of the implementation of neo-liberal policies by the World Bank programs in the 1980s and 1990s. This increased the rural-urban migration and the urban informal economy in these countries (Ablo 2023: 443). This is also a well-documented case in the Senegalese context (Dahou & Foucher 2009), where urbanization has been doubled the last fifty years, and almost forty percent of Senegal's housing today consist of what is being labeled as "slums" [*bidonvilles*] by the state (Ministre de l'urbanisme, du logement et de l'hygiene publique 2017).

Informal economic activities are often central to 'slums' (Ablo 2023), which included the case of Soda in *Cité Imbecile*. Her room in the so-called slum was in proximity to the big HLM market [*Marché HLM*]. She sewed clothes for people she knew and by requests for a very small salary, her daughter whom she lived with, worked at the market selling diverse articles. In general, she rarely leaves the cite, because as she stresses: "Everything costs". It was, for economic reasons necessary to live approximate to their livelihood-activities, but renting this central to the city would not be affordable in other areas. Caldeira (2017) similarly stress the inconvenient placements of areas with affordable housing for the working classes which creates a spatial segregation. Their homes, often far into the suburbs and thus far from the job

¹⁷ About 3 euros

opportunities in the city (2017) reduces mobility and affordability. As urban residents such as Soda tries to make a living approximate to livelihood activities end up displaced with the justification of informality—in what appears to be displacement of unwanted groups.

On the discourse of formal/informal in Dakar, Jónsson (2024: 80) argues that the motor of the economy is informality and is what brings the food and housing for the majority of the citizens. As in other contemporary metropolitan cities of the Global South, informality is the primary mode of production of space (Roy 2009). First, Jónsson address the stigmatic effect of classifying the ‘informal’ through its association with illegality and chaos. Consequently, she notes the frequent police harassment and eviction of public spaces in relation to informal jobs such as the case of street vendors (Jónsson 2024: 76). This criminalization of labor, particularly in the city center is integral to the politics on what image the state wants to give of the city. However, informal workers such as the street vendors and Soda, selling self-sown clothes to acquaintances do in fact pay tax and duties in Dakar, yet they do not receive the services, security, or social protection in their work like formal workers (Jónsson 2024: 78). This criminalization of ‘informal activities’ also complicates what Simone (2004) stressed to be the creative strategies of supporting the livelihood of these marginalized groups.

Second, this informality is often used as justification for example to evict residents of “slums” [*bidonvilles*], as part of the state program “*Programme Sénégal zero bidonville*” (MULHP¹⁸). While the objective has been to remove urban dwellers from precarious housing to sustainable housing units, they are in reality either pushed out to the suburbs or of the city all together. Urban scholars have emphasized the growing frequency of slum evictions in the global south in its attempt to promote development and becoming ‘world-class cities’ (Weinstein 2021). In the extension of this, Bertelsen (2021) show in the case of Maputo how the urban poor experience encouragement from the government to stay in their marginalized position to work as security guards and domestic workers for the rich in their gentrified neighborhoods.

Whether by intent or not, political forces and implications of the privatizing development of housing can be seen in clear effect to increasingly remove the urban poor away from the city. In Dakar, this is manifested in the makings of the city’s core a place of progress and gentrifying dynamics as illustrated by the expulsion of ‘informal activities’ in the city center (Jónsson 2024) and in Soda’s *cit e*. Many of these settlements are situated approximate

¹⁸ Ministere de l’urbanisme, du logement et de l’hygiene publique (urbanisme.gouv.sn 2024)

to favorized residential neighborhoods. For example, *Cité Imbecile* was situated by the highway and close to the city center. Particularly, during the Wade era¹⁹ (2000-2012) the objective was to beautify, modernize and develop certain areas of the city – especially the city center and the coastal road areas [*La Corniche*] (Jónsson 2024: 77). If “at the heart of urban life was the belief in the capacity of the human to operate according to the maximization of its position” (Simone 2019: 27), the residents of such areas do not get the opportunity to improve their position within the city. This is backed up by Appadurai’s identification of slum evictions as urban cleansing in the process of urban renewal (2000), similarly Waldman & Ghertner refers to slum removal as “encroachments of the poor” (2023: 284). As will be discussed later on in the thesis, this sometimes takes extreme and violent forms, as the bulldozing one morning in June 2023 of *Cité Imbecile* conforms to the brutality of the urban cleansing.

A city for men?

Class distinctions are, however, not the only form of social categorization that layers the unequal access to the urban city. Class must also be seen as operating intersectional with other notions of identity, such as gender.

Walking by the coastal road [*La Corniche*] in the late afternoon or evening, seeing a woman without a man by her side was a rare sight. Through the long sandy beaches, newly paved promenade and by the exercise equipment, this lively public space is mostly frequented by men. Modernization theorists have emphasized the positive effect of urbanization for women in terms of gender inequality and change of traditional gender roles. Hoelscher et al (2023: 367) points to increased opportunities in terms of non-traditional activities, education, employment, and political participation for women. However, they stress the importance of having a place-based view when looking at elements of urbanization, because these changes vary (Hoelscher et al 2023). Though different groups of women share similar gender responsibilities and expectations, urban women’s situation is highly affected by class (Chant 2013: 10). As I saw in Dakar, greater opportunities for women (particularly in education and formal labor) were often determined by economy and class. Most Senegalese women follow their expected traditional roles with watching the children, taking care of the house and cooking. Additionally, they also study or work—sometimes because they want to, but other times because they must. While middle and upper-class families often have maids, cleaners and paid help in the house, saving

¹⁹ The presidency of Abdoulaye Wade

the women some time while additionally working, lower-class families are often depended on two incomes, while the women also are expected to do everything concerning the household.

For working-class women, (but also middle-class women) this often meant a double “burden” of working full days in addition to taking care of the children, husband, and the house. This double burden shows the complexity of the entrenched view of associating women with domesticity and as being closer to ‘nature’ than men, combined with women acquiring new expectations (Ortner 1997). The concept of “feminization of poverty” is used to show the intersectionality and extra weight this carry for women, which means that poverty often affects women more severely than men (Chant 2007: 167). She also emphasizes a *feminization of responsibility and obligation*²⁰ where women’s efforts go unacknowledged, helping fathers or husbands unpaid both inside and outside the house in unevenly perceived responsibility (Chant 2007: 176). This notion was particularly distressed by Fatou’s comment about the men “doing nothing all day”. The women however, still performing their responsibilities.

Senegalese ethnography on women shows that the choices for work, especially for working-class women are very limited (See Jónsson 2024; Kane 2011). Soda, for instance, as she said herself, she was getting old and tired, but had no choice but moving into the *cit * to provide for herself and her adult daughters after her husband died. She expands, that unfortunately she has no sons which are the ones that are expected to take care of their parents when they get old and take them into their household. While it is common for Senegalese women to work and it has been for a long time, this usually do not change the patriarchal structure where the husband is the head of the household (Kane 2011). Senegal is a patriarchal society, and the socio-cultural ideal is that women leave their family and move to their husband’s family home when they get married. Though this is the ideal, many of the women I encountered (mostly middle-class women) were back in their family house because of different circumstances. One woman stressed the complication when men had several wives²¹ and infidelity. Some considered the polygamy outdated and problematic, and did not want this in their marriage, but was conflicted by family members expectations to put up with the infidelity or several girlfriends. Aïcha stressed the fact that her family was kind to let her stay in the family house while she was having trouble with her husband. Fatou already expressed families’ norm of taking sides with the husband and expecting daughters to put up with the husband’s choices:

²⁰ With ethnography from the Gambia

²¹ Polygamy, or having several wives is common in Senegal.

Most women do not like that their husband have several wives and do whatever they want, it creates a lot of chaos, but it will take a long time before these rules [social expectations] will change. The families will always take the husbands side and say that you should put up with it.

We were talking about this after a visit to one of her friends that had recently moved back home after divorcing her husband because her husband had made another woman pregnant. These middle-class women seemed to feel trapped by social expectations and own wishes for their future as they had high-standing careers and knew that they were doing well on their own. On the other hand, Aminata explained how she did not feel these expectations from her close friends or family but from the society at large. She explains explains in further detail:

An unmarried woman is supposed to live with her family, but because I left for studies [from a village nearby] this gives me a reason to leave my family home. I am a young woman who rent a room in Dakar alone, it is not good at all. A girl living alone is forbidden, but on my mother's side of the family they are very mixed, so they do not care too much. Some of them has married French people and even Christians. You are supposed to live with a family so that they can control what you do. If you live alone people will think that you are a prostitute or bring boys to your bedroom.

Aminata had asked a friend if she wanted to share an apartment with her and the response had been: "are you crazy? Do you want my parents to kill me?" Yet, she had other family members in Dakar that she did not contact, because she knew that as a "Typical Senegalese family" they would not approve of her way of living. I turned to look at a fellow student at the University doing his homework at the terrace, to see if he agreed. He nods and confirms that it is exactly as she says. On the contrary, I observed that men frequently rented a room without any commentaries about this.

The scenery in the introduction of this chapter illustrated that men continues to constitute the majority of public space and confirms with what Aminata said about controlling what women do. For middle and upper-class women Waldman & Ghertner (2023) argues that the extension of enclaving into public space such as private shopping malls continues to keep women out of the public space. They elaborate: "the assault of the public city so well documented in the

literature hence cannot be understood outside of the marketization of feminized consumption, with privatized self-realization proffered as the fix to the sexual violence of the public city” (2023: 285). While use of private shopping centers²² is often frequented by middleclass urban women (2023), and work as liberating spaces, I argue that it prevents women from entering public spaces.

Controlled areas such as the Sea Plaza and the coastal road were often promoted as “safe places”—safe places for women. By promoting certain private and closed areas for women it creates new forms of excluding women from public space, thus creating imaginations of new spaces that might otherwise not be “appropriate” for them. On the other hand, gendered consumption-promotion of public space such as in enclaves “portrays safety as a lifestyle choice” and see them as places of sexual and gendered freedom (Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 284). Waldman & Ghertner argues that such gendered benefits are extensions of enclaved citizenship, but not social changes as working-class women become a part of the ‘threats’ that the non-enclaved subjects constitutes in the neo-liberal city (2023: 284)²³. While the gendered situation for women around the world might be moving towards a more equal path in urbanities (Hoelscher et al 2023)—as Fatou expressed—it will take a long time before certain expectations that continues to weight on women will change. Emphasizing the views on cities as liberating spaces, women are still required to navigate strict expectations and social norms, which was visible through the public spaces of the coastal road [*La Corniche*], where women were seldom alone. While the importance of class is manifested in the feminization of poverty that aggravate the situation for working-class women, it also highlights the lack of social mobility. The point illustrated by Bertelsen (2021) about Maputo’s service workers, shows an imagination and encouragement of these workers to work *for* the wealthy—as to stay in ‘their place’, can also be understood as the categorizing of the narrow female labor choices for working class women.

Who has the right and access to security?

In some of the neighborhoods here it’s so extreme that you cannot pass it in the evenings. There is not much police presence here, but a lot of things happen, and they cannot do anything. I don’t like to say this, but there are too many people here. If someone does well, they move out of the area. This government... They prioritize the areas [*quartiers*] that is closer to the city center and not the areas further away. If you go to the suburbs,

²² Sea Plaza is a highly securitized shopping center.

²³ See figure 4.

it's even worse than here. Over there it is a catastrophe, you will find a family of ten in two rooms. The government prioritize the areas closer to the city because there are many expats, and they try to create an image of Senegal out of these areas. In areas like Almadies there are checkpoints and military police everywhere. Here you don't see the police before Parcelles, even though you often witness assaults. They [the government] does nothing for the peripheries and suburbs.

During the visit at Papa's home in Grand Yoff, he constates that the security there is a big problem, even though he stresses that security is difficultly defined. I was curious about his opinion on the security of the neighborhood, because from what I had heard from people in other neighborhoods, it did not have a good reputation. A large amount of the people living there, are people from neighboring countries and other regions of Senegal, which migrates for two main reasons according to Papa: "First, to seek a better life, second because there is nothing in the other regions of Senegal", sometimes to find something to bring back to their natal village. Most people quit school early in search of work, but the number of young unemployed are plenty, which is usually the people involved with criminal activity, he adds. In Dakar, security is both a private and a public matter, leading to the question of which citizens have the rights of security—and in what forms and shapes.

How do we understand a fluid notion like security? Setha Low and Zoltán Glück defines security as "a modality of constructing danger, enemies, fear and anxiety, and the measures taken to guard against such constructed threats – is everywhere a social and spatial process" (282: 2017). According to Jeffe & de Koning, one person's placement in the social hierarchy ascertains whether they will be understood as a potential threat to a security group. This will further affect their movements within the city based on people's interpretations of their presence (2015: 155-156). Reflecting these readings, the use of the term security and safety [*sécurité*] is in constant flux among the citizens of Dakar, especially when it comes to mapping the security and safety of different areas—meanings and experiences also sometimes varying from person to person.

The concept *security blur*, was introduced by Diphorn & Grassiani to show how particular phenomena or actors are overlooked as isolated actors because of their complexities (2019: 2). Security contains a set of different actors, motivations, meanings and power dynamics that overlap and are intertwined that render them blurred or unclear. The security blur does here manifest in the conduction of security on a structural level by politicians and ruling laws, but also economic, classed and social conditions including race, gender, and ethnicity

(Diphorn & Grassiani 2019: 7). While the police and military police [*gendarmérie*] patrollers, checkpoints and video surveilled areas of Almadies and the coastal road are stationed by the legislating laws, they favorize certain raced and classed people—precisely because these areas are inhabited by most of the white expatriates and wealthy residents. They also discuss the effective layer of security which concerns the actual effect of the performed security (2019), which is experienced as unfair and restricted as Papa’s area was not receiving sufficient protection from the police.

Security was always talked about, no matter the person or neighborhood, and it is true that security is a fluid term which would often change in accordance with both positions of gender and class, as described above. While hanging around in the common area outside of Soda’s house drinking Touba²⁴ coffee and eating beignet bought at the local market, she turns serious while talking about her *cit  *. “Everyone knows that when it gets dark, it’s dangerous to hang around here”, and told that she never went outside her corner of the *cit  * after sunset. As she did not consider the *cit  * safe, she thought we were particularly vulnerable without her protection as outsiders. Though I was used to being seen as an outsider based on my European appearance, here, my friend from Medina was also given skeptical looks. However, we had already greeted the neighbors of Soda and passed the market with her at an earlier occasion and were accepted as her guests in “her corner of the *cit  *”.

An early afternoon in the end of May was the last time I visited “Cit   Imbecile”. It was during a period of many demonstrations in conjunction with the imprisonment of the popular presidential candidate Ousmane Sonko. The overall ambiance in the city was tense, also in the *cit  *. When I asked if Soda and her daughter wanted coffee from the market nearby, I was for the first time told by Bamba that I should stay inside the house because the protesters were mostly “anti-France”, and therefore offered himself to go buy. Bamba came back with the coffee, and we sat down in Soda’s house when we heard an explosion close by which made all seven laying on a mattress outside jump up. We decided to get back, and as we left, Soda insisted to accompany us as she rushed us out of the *cit  *. Bamba mentioned all the people sitting around drinking alcohol and smoking weed, while I focused on the man I saw with running blood from his head. Everyone seemed stressed, myself included especially because we were repeatedly asked what we were doing there. Returning safely into my neighborhood, the streets

²⁴ Touba is a popular traditional coffee named after the city with the same name.

were completely empty of cars, noise and people apart from the police, making clear and visible the spatialized inequality of safety in times of unrest.

Peripheral urbanization: Spatial differentiation

The rapid urbanization in Dakar is to a large extent reserved to what Caldeira (2017) labels *peripheral urbanization*. Peripheral urbanization is land that must be built on by its residents, often slowly and unevenly with a starting point as precarious and unfinished (2017: 5). With time however, as these houses and neighborhoods improve, the poorer residents will be displaced to other cheaper parts that are more precarious or difficultly accessed (2017: 6). Caldeira refers to Ghertner's (2014) indirect argument that the term gentrification should not be extended to the Global South, because it is based on Euro-American cases. In the case of Turkey, the scholars she refers to analyze these processes as "enclosure of urban space" (2017: 17 in notes). Peripheral urbanization is spontaneous and improvised (Caldeira 2017), this results in few or no basic necessities or services such as hospitals, roads or water supply or what can be called infrastructure, especially at the beginning of people's installation. This also results in lack of work or money-making activities in these areas.

This is illustrated in Dakar by the many who work in the city but live in the growing periphery. I will take the apartment building I was living in as an example. In the house there were three people cleaning the house every weekday, all three of them lived quite far into the city's periphery. They would be at work before I woke up and leave in the late afternoon. One of them, Mabo lived in the village of Lac Rose and said that the public transportation to work would take about two hours, so instead he took the bike which took approximately the same amount of time both back and forth. Though he had to leave his wife and children behind, he was often too tired or broke to go back in the evening and stayed a few days on a bed in a cupboard where he claimed to be eaten up by mosquitos. By taking public transportation he would additionally spend most of the money he earned that day.

The same was true for the student at the terrasse during the conversation with Aminata. His cousin was helping his brother with the security of the house, as he was the houseowner. He was living close to Rufisque and studying at the University nearby our house. He explains that it would take him around three hours to get to school in the morning because of traffic, and it was tiring him out. Therefore, he often stayed a few days in the week sharing a bed with his cousin. "Peripheries are, undoubtedly, about inequality. They are poor, precarious, discriminated against, and frequently violent" (Caldeira 2017: 9). This extract was clearly

illustrated in my house, because while the other residents of the house took their Vespa scooter to go to Almadies in the morning or a taxi to Plateau and were there in 10 minutes, Mabo and the cousin had to leave their house at the middle of the night to take part of the city.

An early afternoon in March, I went to read at a research center that had a library not far from the University. When I arrived at the desk, I decided to ask the woman working in administration whether there were any anthropologists working in the center. She then introduced me to a sociology master's student, Serigne, that was by chance sitting in the library, and agreed to talk to me in the garden during his break. During his study, they had also looked at the social structures of different neighborhoods in the city. Serigne stressed that people move to the city because they have to in order to get a job and for administrative purposes, but that they have to live far out of the city due to housing costs, which creates a new set of problems. Himself was living in a suburb with his family and because it is expensive and the bus takes a long time, he sometimes spends all night at the University to save time and money. Here, the student and Mado finds improvising ways of deriving "maximal outcomes from a minimal set of elements" (Simone 2004: 411), while these solutions continue to work as temporary solutions for the peripheral residents.

While the residents in my neighborhood were highly mobile, including already being in the heart of the city, getting around was to a much larger extent restricted and improvised by most urban dwellers. De Koning & Jaffe underlines that people's movements in the city and mobility depend on financial resources, physical ability and existing transport infrastructures (2016: 41). Returning here to the notion of people as infrastructure, this can be seen as especially relevant for the people of the suburbs in Dakar, navigating great distances between their home livelihood-activities often situated in the city center. Their strategies of navigating everyday life confirms with relying on their networks for saving money and time by borrowing a bed.

The city that keeps on coming

The discourses on development and progress have put a mark on the urban landscape both materially and relationally since Simone (2004) emphasized "the city yet to come". The state-initiated gated Diamniadio project, that was supposed to house middle-class residents in order to keep up with the urbanization, took a neo-liberal turn and sold the land to project developers. I have discussed the rise of the middle-class, that have had increased attention in sub-Saharan African literature as a response to the common narrative of African cities as having either rich

people or poor people, as Ousmane put it. While the middle-class is emerging “anxiously” (Lockwood 2023: 492), also in Dakar it resulted for Fatou and Cheikh in moving neighborhoods to ease the pressure of providing family and neighbors. However, as Nidaye & Fall (2022) stresses, the Diarniadio project in reality created a rich part that closes to the poor part of the initial residents of the area, which the middle-class dwellers nor can access because of the ever-increasing prices pushed by the liberal governance and notion of housing as profit and investment. The state initiative Zero Slum Program has been put up to control the ways in which people try to claim their right to the city. The spatial segregation is also manifested in the peripheral urbanization (Caldeira 2017), where “slum-residents” are evicted to and experience less security in every sense of the word (Jaffe & de Koning 2017). Many women experience the pressure to maintain their “traditional” roles of maintaining the household while also working to make ends meet, such as Soda experiencing the *feminization of poverty* (Chant 2007). Through the rise of new private developments such as SD City, new areas become unattainable to less fortunate citizens through continually privatization and securitization of desired areas.

Chapter 3. Material and symbolic distinctions: enclaving and privatization

Large urbanization and development projects have taken place on the African continent during the past decades, parallely, foreign planned development and projects have been critiqued by anthropologists and other urban researchers (Guma & al 2023). Some of these critiques are dealing with the capitalization and financialization of cities and housing, making them domains of increasing inequality and spatial marginalization (Ablo & Bertelsen 2022: 370). The housing projects' objective is often marketed as 'fixing' urban infrastructural 'problems' and their critiques often concern their unintended outcome (Guma et al 2023: 2552) such as growth of 'slum' settlements and lack of affordable housing (Ablo & Bertelsen 2022). The projects are often based on neo-liberal ideologies, finances and designed by foreign investors and promoted as the future of what a so-called "world-class" city should look like (Guma et al 2023: 2552).

New private cities (Ablo 2023) and enclaves (Nielsen et al 2020) are examples of forms of private urbanism that are, they argue, increasingly being built, and researched throughout the continent. One of the arguments I will follow concerning increasing privatism and closed condominiums is the exclusionary effects on public space and the urban poor. My initial plan with my project was to look exclusively at enclaving, having the impression that urban Senegal was following the trends that has been seen in amongst other countries in the Global South such as South Africa or Ghana (Ablo & Bertelsen 2022, Murray 2015). However, as fieldwork showed and as I have already indicated in Chapter 1 and 2, this process was seemingly more complex in Dakar. In this chapter I explore this complexity further, for instance through the concept of *téranga*, which symbolizes the great value placed on open doors, in addition to earlier public protests against the increasing privatization of the coastline. As I will show, these urban dynamics in Dakar has simultaneously occurred in the changing development of closed housing clusters in the city over the last decades in combination with socio-economic factors.

In search of field locations, Fatou suggested to me that I should visit *Cité Batrain*. Following Google Maps, I walked down a street in Ouakam until I reached a barrier with a security guard. I asked if I could enter, to which he nodded as he casually lifted the barrier. Probably looking confused as I did not know what to say, he asked if I was interested in buying. Walking through the sandy streets of the *cit*é, I was surrounded by several floored houses in colorful shiny varnish with embroideries. Several housebuilding projects were taking place. The whole place was

surrounded by brick walls, behind them were empty fields and a military base. The only people I encountered in the *cité* was doing errands, walking with building materials or washing equipment. After a while, a security guard standing by a box branded “security post” [*poste de sécurité*] came over.

Through daily interaction with security personnel, I had noticed that acting professional was important, but most shifts consisted of long hours with sitting around with not much to do. I took the opportunity to ask him some questions. He stated the necessity to have security because many billionaires [in CFA Francs] own properties in the *cité*, even though usually nothing happened. He also mentions that at night, officers from the military base on the other side of the wall used to patrol. As I run out of improvised questions, he went on to say that nothing was good in Africa and that it looked dark for the future. “The rich people only help their own families and no one else”. The topic of increasing individualism and decrease of help from relatives and neighbors were common topics but are highly rooted in the general economic juxtaposition of Dakar. Why the conversation suddenly went from the security of the *cité* to the lack of hope for the future was unclear to me. Was it since we were talking about his job? Or the fact that some lived in these private and highly securitized places, while most people lived in the far-off peripheral suburbs without any security guards like himself?

Privatization of the coastline: *La Corniche*



Figure 3.

Wall covering up one of the constructions by the coastal road advertising for ‘The new face of Dakar’ [*Le nouveau visage de Dakar*], referring to the development of the area [*Corniche Ouest*]. Picture by author (12.01.2023).

As the sun set one afternoon in March, I and a friend from my collocation went for a run as it was getting chillier outside, but still bright along the coastal road [*La Corniche*]. The apparent newly paved street surface throughout the kilometers—as opposed to mostly sandy streets—made up a great running route while approaching the view of the sea. As most days of the week, we were not the only ones profiting of this time of the day. The pavements were full of people either jogging or taking a walk. The outdoor public workout-equipment stationed several places along this stretch was packed with people, furthermore several of the beaches was used to play football, exercise, or to jog in large groups. In a small public square in front of the University, people were sitting on the paved plaza—some buying ice-cream from an ice cream truck watching the sunset.

Though packed with people, this was another type of crowded than I would spot in most other crowded places in the area. The people taking use of this space were acting differently, making it clear that this was more of a place to ‘see and be seen’ as Setha Low (2014) emphasizes, with regards to the symbolic interpretation and manipulation of architectural design in a plaza. The ‘non-exercising’ was either talking a romantic stroll with their partner or taking a walk with fellow students at the University. The apparent stream of people in this period of the day, constituted often of people living in the area, many of which were from the campus and who had just finished their work or studies for the day. Though the entire coastal road is not a plaza, its architecture, with different design of the bricking, it is a place to “hang out” yet, not too long, which manifest in the lack of seating. Unlike most public space in Dakar, street vendors and people selling food from a kiosk, table or directly from pans, is rare on this stretch. If one were to look at this *space—La Corniche*—through the lens of Bourdieu’s *habitus*; status and class position as embodied practices, then these spaces are embodied middle-class spaces (Low 2014: 467). The middle or affluent class embody the material and spatial form through my informant’s description of the calm, being active and outside, but not “hanging around” outside doing nothing all day.²⁵

The city of Dakar is surrounded by the sea, and where there are not sandy beaches, there are extraordinary cliffs. While this whole coastline used to be a space used by the ethnic group

²⁵ See methodology section for comment made by Fatou.

Lebou and their fishing boats (Fall et al 2022), it has now given way to luxury hotels and restaurants which increasingly take up such space. At this particular site—*La Corniche*—it is rare to encounter passers-by during daytime except from cars and taxis. A Congolese chauffeur I got to know lived in a far-off suburban area with his brother, and once told me that the coastal road was his favorite part of the city. However, he rarely visited it himself because there was no place for him to park the car and by bus it would take hours. In my street in Fann Hock, I would often encounter policemen walking down the street despite the streets being empty. Melly, who has done research on housing in Dakar, points to the fact that the coastal road from Plateau to Almadies is a privileged space for the new elite and has taken part in decentralizing the former center of Plateau—creating a new city formed around these neighborhoods (2013: 395).

In James Scotts' (1998) high modernism theories, he argues that urban planning schemes operate with assumptions of universal law that ultimately fail because they have not been planned according to local socio-cultural and ecological circumstances. Scott emphasizes the failing of such plans through the term *metis* because they fail to include local practical knowledge (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 124). Illustrated by *Le nouveau visage de Dakar* and government wishes of making this part of the city the representation of a great city (Fall et al 2022), it has accomplished its projected plans in the sense that only people who can afford to take use of this space and keep the wanted clientele.

Fall et al (2022) stress that the erection of housing and private establishments such as hotels and restaurants in this area is violating the laws structured by the DPM (Maritime public domain) [*Domaine Public Maritime*] i.e. the ministry in charge of the sea and coastal areas. In this regard it is the investors and wealthy that can afford to build and privatize these public spaces protected by law (Fall et al 2022). While the construction further and further towards the sea is a continuing process to which I witnessed during my fieldwork, this has caused protest among urban residents. The protests to protect these areas started as a result of a proposed wall in relation to a diplomatic representation in these coastal areas in 2014, which resulted in the setup of sports equipment and public use elements mentioned above (Fall et al 2022: 62).

While informal use of public space such as in irregular settlements are in most cases marginalized and discriminated towards by the state, there has also been a privatization of informality in line with neoliberalism (Roy 2009: 82). Roy expresses therefore that informality is not simply synonymous with poverty, but characteristics of class power because these are no more legal than marginalized settlements (2009: 83). Similarly, the growth of luxury apartments

at the edge of the sea can be understood as land grabbing, where only certain fragments of the urban population have the money and/or power to acquire such space. The local perceptions of these privatizing dynamics were articulated to me when, two friends of mine and I were walking from the African Renaissance statue down to Mamelles when we spotted a tall apartment building under construction that was situated in-between the statue and the Mamelles lighthouse, another popular monument. The two monuments are situated on each their hills in the same area with a view over the city. The tall building stood out by its length and would for sure disturb the landscape that was visible. As a response to this one of my friends said, looking upset “everything can be bought for money in Dakar”.

Driving or walking past the newly built riverside from the city center, out to the most favorable residential neighborhoods you see checkpoints, armed police, and military police [*gendarmerie*] every five minutes. While taking use of this space—especially in the evening, plain-clothes police officers would sometimes come by to check for ID, resulting in a fine or being evicted from the area—or spend the night in jail. I asked the classmate I was hanging out with during a police search why I had to bring ID. To this he answered that aggressive people and thieves does not carry their ID, therefore they want them off the streets. Also, under the understanding that the people frequenting these areas did not belong here and should not be there. This is reflected by the frequent policing in these areas, compared to popular districts. The bureaucratization of the security in these specific areas is also linked to the formalization in these areas. After all, Graeber argues that the police are bureaucrats with weapons (2012: 119). In this lies that executive forces such as the police and military police [*Gendarmerie*] are bureaucratic tools of control. Graeber, although talking about industrialized democracies refers law enforcement such as—police officers are “the legitimate administration of violence (2012: 120).

Though informalized in different ways, for instance deciding themselves whether to let something pass or to take a bribe in my interactions with the police, it is the police, as a legitimate administrator, who always have the right to define the situation (2012: 120). First, by having the control that are internalized in the citizens through *the structural violence*, such as the “the subtle or not-so-subtle threats of physical force that lie behind everything from enforcing rules about where one is allowed to sit or stand [...] in parks or other public spaces” (2012: 105-106). Second, though here showing the state legislation of the power of security in the city, could this be another way of ‘formalizing’ certain areas, in line with its associations to order and prestige? In effect, these are formation that navigate the way in which we map both

security, prestige and access to different areas. The endless security posts of the executive forces centering around the coastline are formed by the legislative power – the state and though Graeber does not necessarily talk about actual violence, it is a type of structural symbolic power and control over citizens that always implicitly threatens with physical violence (2012). The legislative forces thus have the potential to use violence and therefore controls the access of certain spaces.

The militarized areas of the city center, the coastline and Almadies are in the case of Dakar a way for the state to decide which places the citizens are ‘worth protecting’, which ones they need protection from, but they also bureaucratize areas that are expected to be formalized. The neighborhood chiefs are in a manner supposed to function as a security provider where problems are solved internally instead of involving formal instances such as the police—which creates a *security blur*—here between “informal” and state-run security. Could the formalization of the coastal road areas also threaten established forms of “informal” security and self-organization?

The case of *Les Almadies*

I quickly understood that *Les Almadies* was ‘the place to be’, at least if you could afford it. The number of high-rise buildings, offices and restaurants made the place look like a second city center. Situated by the coast, the beaches are surrounded with bars, beach- and nightclubs and surf schools attracted a particular clientele. In the case of Almadies, frequenting the coastline is very rarely done by others than the well-funded. The accessibility is quite limited due to among other things, lack of public transport and higher prices than other areas—which I will elaborate on in chapter 4. In addition, most of the space is occupied by private restaurants, bars, and nightclubs. Very few spaces are available for public use and in several ways, these are spaces created for and used by internationals. Embassies, international organizations, highly securitized villas, and modern apartment complexes accommodate most parts of the space. The restaurants sell alcohol and serve sushi, pizza, hamburgers, and individual plates of fish or meat.

During Eid [*Tabaski*]²⁶ I was invited to a celebration lunch with the family of a friend in this area. As we drove into the driveway of their home, we were instructed by the security guard where to park, before he opened the gate to the big house with a large garden. I was instructed to sit at the women’s dining table as we got into a conversation of how it used to be

²⁶ Islamic holiday to celebrate the end of Ramadan

in Almadies when the daughters grew up. The sisters were all in their late twenties, expressing how much the area has changed since they grew up. The beaches were surrounding forests and there were no restaurants occupying the seaside. I mention to them my project and the different views I have observed about the area, to which one of the sisters interjects:

Yeah, here [in Almadies] you can find villas and expensive housing, but right next to them you will find shacks and people inhabiting unfinished building projects. It's not like in Ghana or South Africa for example, where social groups are really divided.

To which one of the other sister answers:

Actually, it is a good deal for both parties because they make an agreement where the ones building their home doesn't need to pay for a guard to watch the place, if someone cannot afford to build for a period [and the people living there have a place to stay].

Here, they distinguish Senegal from urban trends of other countries in the region in accordance with *téranga*'s notion of neighborliness. While their point was to some extent to show that this area was inhabited by all classes, it illustrates that the rich are offered protection for free because others cannot afford their own home. However, it is also clear that these women took part of the least accessible part of the city in a securitized neighborhood that is increasingly closing the public spaces that can afford to live there. Almadies constitutes of areas that contribute to the reduction of public space and privatization of these coastal areas, through both housing and paid-for activities such as restaurants and bars.

However, their statement does portray some of the diversity found in Almadies. It is true that these areas are not exclusively inhabited by rich people, but for the most part it is. And for those guarding their house while they build, and for instance live abroad, they are surely precarious, as some of these settlements (such as the ones below) were gone the next time I arrived.



Figure 4.
Spontaneous settlements in front of apartment buildings in Almadies. They were removed after a few days. Picture by author (17.05.2023).

“Cité Rich” and “Cité Ghetto”

On a sunny afternoon in late April inside the labyrinth of streets narrow enough to fit one person in width, I sit on an empty bucket waiting for Soda. Some of her neighbors, a father and a son sharing a house consisting of one room sits on a blanket outside smoking a joint. The bucket I sat on were one of those used for bringing water to the neighborhood. It is late in the afternoon when she calls my accompanying friend Bamba to say that she is not coming and that we could stay in her place while she was away.

While many recent scholars have focused on walling of the rich, walling off the poor is not a rare sight in Dakar. These are ancient brick walls surrounding land that is often owned by the state or others. Inside these walls there is in several cases communities living in ‘irregular settlements’, such as *Cité Imbecile*. It is situated by the highway and can be accessed by a small bridge over the highway by foot. To access the *cité* with a vehicle you need to do a detour

around the entire *cit * to access from the back. The houses are densely built including the small markets at its center, and cars therefore cannot fit into the center of the *cit *. The few times I encountered a scooter in this area they were almost drowning in sand, spilling it all over the place while the driver was close to falling off. Likewise, it is unlikely that emergency vehicles could enter effectively. Security provided by the state also consist of firefighters, ambulances, and access to doctors/hospitals²⁷ (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 80), which it here fails to do for these citizens. The way in which numerous people are pushed into the narrow spaces inside the walls amplifies the separation of poor residents. In accord with the hidden settlement in the city center, the walling of the poor might explain why Dakar have not followed the trends of wealthy enclaving to the same extent as some of their regional neighbors as pointed out by the sisters in Almadies.

Despite such walling both among the wealthy and among the poor, when following up on my original plan to looking at enclaved areas, according to some of the people I met, this did not seem to exist in Dakar. As I described to interlocutors the areas I was looking for, not much came to mind. People with knowledge to the commonly gating of communities in for example Brazil (Caldeira 2001), the US (Low 2001) and South Africa (Murray 2017) such as Fatou and the sisters in Almadies separates this “phenomena” from Dakar. Many responded with: “It’s not like in Europe, South Africa or the US here, maybe in Saly”. However, the neighborhoods that unites as “*cit es*” or “residences” are numerous. *Cit * originally stems from the French use of the word but is differently used in Dakar. According to my French friends and French teacher at the University of Caen in Normandie²⁸ the term *Cit * is used to talk of a “ghetto” or clustering of low-cost apartments in the suburbs. However, the earlier use of the word in France was of middle-class neighborhoods. In David Lepoutre’s book *C ur de banlieue* from 1997 he does fieldwork in a Parisian suburban *cit *. He states that even though they were originally built and functioned as socially and economically heterogenous neighborhoods, they have turned into low-income housing. They are often inhabited by immigrants and can according to Lepoutre be seen as ‘ghettos’ or displacement of migrants (1997: 25). I asked my interlocutor Aminata about the *cit es* of Dakar:

²⁷ See chapter 2.

²⁸ Also in French popular music and rap

Living in a *cit * or *r sidence* comes with a status and people will say that you are rich, that's the problem. *Cit es* are often in already nice areas, but you can see that the houses inside the *cit * are better than the houses outside it. You can see that those who live there are rich. But if you live in an expensive house, that means that you are working hard, have a good salary and can afford to pay for it. But on the other hand, you have *cit  riche* and *cit  Ghetto* [she says and laughs]. Sometimes the people that live there does not pay, and someone else pays for them. It also has the security, which makes them rich neighborhoods. But for the security... I don't know.. there are thieves everywhere. But if you have money, you will live in a *cit * or *r sidence* well secured.

Cit  imb cile is one of these areas that some would call a "Cit  ghetto". The name translates to imbecile, which is an insult that means to say someone are stupid. In July 2023, one month after I left Dakar, I received a message from Modou Ndiaye that the *cit * had been demolished, which was well documented in Senegalese newspapers. In the comment section of an article of the expulsion of the inhabitants that made over 3000 people homeless, this comment received 200 likes:

You have to pay rent. It's the Guineans who come to build slums and contribute nothing to the country's economy. Either foreigners contribute to the development of our country, or they should be evicted and sent home instead of creating an eyesore in the heart of Dakar (Seneweb 2023).

The News article notes that many of the inhabitants of the *cit * were people from Guinea and other African migrants. In the case of this *cit *, I argue, the closing of the area has another function than the rich *cit es*. Situated approximate to the residential area Hann Maristes and other residential areas, it is very much enclaved and hidden from the neighboring areas. According to the newspaper *Le journal de Dakar* one of the reasons for the abolishment of the *cit * was neighbors fear of the drug trafficking and consumption of alcoholic beverages in this area (2023). I had not noticed, but Bamba told me after the visit mentioned above that many of the people was drinking alcohol and smoking weed. This was also highly the case in areas with many foreigners such Fann Hock or Almadies, but it usually happened behind closed doors or in bars/restaurants by resourceful white foreigners.

Xenophobic attacks in South Africa in 2008 that took the lives of about 60 people (assumed to be migrants from African countries) highlights xenophobic attitudes towards other

Africans (Sharp 2008). While the attacks were justified by for example the amount of crime committed by immigrants and them being a competition in the labor market and in services for poor (Sharp 2008: 1) other scholars recalls these tendencies as Negrophobia rather than xenophobia (Kerr et al 2019). Though not as visible, these comments and the displacement of mainly migrants in *Cité Imbecile* shows similar attitudes towards other African migrants in Senegal.

When the *cité* was abolished, the residents were evicted from the area. While the wall around the *cité* may already have been there before the people, the effect is different of the shielding of the habitants, yet similar to some extent. On the one side, it is very closed off from the neighboring areas and people that does not live there does not enter – however they do not have security personnel or decide who is allowed to enter. On the other side, whereas the rich *cités* has a prestigious effect, the walling of this *cité* has an additional stigmatizing effect as being locked away and hidden from the society such as the hidden settlements in Plateau.

Are urban/suburban enclaving declining?

My first experience with a closed condominium was a surprising one.²⁹ Fatou, who lived in my neighborhood had told me I could come with her to see a childhood friend of hers, after I told her I was looking for enclosed neighborhoods in conjunction with my project. She spent a lot of time in this *cité* when she grew up, because her aunt used to live there, and therefore also made friends there. The taxi ride to *Cité Fayçal* felt like forever, and it was definitively a far-off suburb. Fatou had been negotiating with the taxi and found the price to be cheaper if we were set off by a crowded roundabout full of people, street vendors, markets, and noise. We walked for about two minutes, and as we passed the corner, all the noise was gone. Tall trees surrounded the condominium and made the whole area feel cool like in an oasis. By the entrance there was sitting about five men inside and outside of the security post for controlling who entered. Fatou went over to the glass door and told the name of the person we were visiting and left her ID with a security guard before he opened the gate for us.

On the inside of the walls, it suddenly felt like being in a ghost town. It was completely quiet, not a person in the street and many of the huge houses seemed abandoned years ago. The outline of the *cité* was very grandiose, but it had definitively decayed. Even Fatou was surprised because there had been many years since she last visited, and the way she remembered it was

²⁹ Referring to my assumptions of enclaves based on literature on the topic.

with children running around and the houses that were inhabited by people she knew, were now uninhabited.

Her friend lived in a huge house with a big garden and a gate to the street. She had come back to her family home after divorcing her unfaithful husband. She explains that if you say that you are going to this *cité* to the taxi driver, he will raise the price drastically, compared to if you say the street where we were put off, because people have the impression that only rich people live here.

You would not even need the security here, because people do not come here. They think that we are the VIPs³⁰, that we are of another social class and therefore they have no interest in coming here. But it's not the way it used to be here. It used to be more exclusive and regulated, because this area was initially built for judges, ministers, and government officials in the 1970s. Now, you don't need any formal status to live here, but many left these areas and kept their empty houses. My dad is a judge and Fatou's aunt is a judge, that is why they were living here.

Similarly, SICAP³¹ neighborhoods and other profession-based enclaves have removed the necessary status to inhabit these places, which indicates a change in policies regarding regulations of residents. Whether this is the primary factor in the decaying of the enclave or not is uncertain, but many of the houses still belonged to people living abroad according to Fatou's friend and her aunt's house was not inhabited temporarily by constructors for the French construction company *Eiffage*. Austin Ablo stress private housing developments as futuristic projects with aspiration of living in a space of the future. In the ACL project (a gated private mixed-use housing development) in an Accra suburb, it was supposed to be a model of how an African city should be and grow. However, few of the houses have been bought and the further investment has stopped—some of which had to do with the fact that the residents in this area could not afford housing in this area (Ablo 2023). Similarly, as was illustrated by the cheaper taxi price in the area we stepped out and the distinguishing noted by Fatou—the residents of this area would not be able to afford living in this *cité*.

³⁰ Very important person

³¹ See Chapter 4.

Removing the demand for titles was also done in *Cité Touba Renaissance*, which was built by the state exclusively for high ranked military and government employees in 2008 according to the neighborhood chief. According to the neighborhood chief, the *cit * was originally built exclusively for people in the government like colonels, military leaders, and ministry personnel. Later when the state sold the land for anyone to buy, the prices for buying became very high³², but that anyone can live there, and that the residents are a mix of different ethnicities, nationalities, and classes. I went back to *Cit  Touba Renaissance* after learning that traditional way of organizing houses was to have an open space for common use in a circle in the middle of houses pointing inwards the circle. I remembered that there had been a big open empty spot in the middle of the cite with nothing but a few benches and threes. Two months later I found the area covered with walls, security guards sitting outside the three-meter-long fences. There were big posters with pictures of the planned outcome of five apartment building project and a note saying that the project is authorized by the republic of Senegal. When I looked up the company online, I found several articles expressing the inhabitants of the *cit *'s anger towards the property developer and promotor. Stating that they stole the last public space in the neighborhood to build six apartment buildings, that were meant for public matter like school, mosque, or gardens (Seneweb News 07.05.2023), (Actusen 28.08.2023).

After being accepted to have a conversation with the chef one of the house staff lets us in. A lot of construction cars drives in and out through the day, and there is construction everywhere. After the interview with the neighborhood chief, I have a conversation inside the *cit * with Bamba whom translated some of the parts of the interview from Wolof. He elaborates that it is not yet enough security because the *cit * is not yet done, but that when it is finished, there will be.

Right now, there are many people that come and go, constructors for example. Many people are working here, cars that bring stuff like materials in and out. When everything is calm [concerning the construction], it will be stricter concerning the security and they will regulate who comes and goes.

As we discuss, he finishes off by saying he does not really see the meaning of upgrading the security, because the *cit * is placed in an already prestigious and safe neighborhood. Further,

the chief states that what differentiates this neighborhood from other areas is the “calm” [*la tranquillité*] and the lack of problems, whereas other areas have a lot of noise. Which I will discuss in the following chapter thus describe prestigious neighborhoods. However, he constates that the prices have skyrocketed since he moved there. The *cité*'s entrances are equipped with barriers with a 24/7 guard present, and many houses including the chief's house had a private fence and additionally 4 security cameras. Yet, he emphasizes that the neighborhoods surrounding the *cité* are the same way. This might be because most *cités* are situated in already quiet and securitized areas as Aminata stated. When I ask the chief about this, he precises that all the open spaces have been bought by someone, so there is no room for common space. This *cité*, though similar in appearance and history in terms of landowner status was situated in Mamelles by the coastal road, a very prominent area while *Cité Fayçal* was in the city's outskirts.

Likewise, SD City was considered “too far from Dakar”. Thus, brand new and still underdoing construction, it appeared to me as a ghost town. The project planner stressed the fact that it was “not very attractive here because everyone wants to live in the city”. Though most of the housing was already bought—many saw it as an investment opportunity—such as the landlord of the student but did not wish to live there themselves. Also, as in the case of the ACL project (Ablo 2023), the original population could not afford to take use of this space. During a visit to my Tanzanian friend Lulu in their family apartment in Point E we discussed the different areas in Dakar with her Swiss husband during an aperitif [*apéro*]. Her Swiss husband was working in an in a well-established international organization that paid for their family of four. Her husband mentions that they built new housing for UN employees in one of the clustering in Diamniadio, but that

No one wants to live there because of its desolateness, and there is so much traffic [to get into the city]. They could at least have put up some trees around [the *citées*] or something. You might as well move to Saly, and many wants to, but there are no schools for the kids.

The comment about the trees was referring to the dryness and not so-aesthetic outline of the area. Saly is village approximate to Dakar, that for many of the rich inhabitants of Dakar function as a vacation place. During a trip to Saly I noticed the great difference to Dakar. The quiet paradise like beaches were occupied by luxury hotels and gated communities, where the

beaches was almost empty. The chairs put out were for guests of the hotel only, and it felt like a maze to leave the beach, because the guards would not let us pass through the many gated neighborhoods. From here, unlike Dakar, you could not see the realistic way the population were living behind the beach and the gated communities that surrounded them. The comparison the husband did of Diarniadio to Saly, I understood as them both being rural areas—but might have to do with peoples view of the suburbs as not-so-good areas. Materially, the decline of certain enclaves can also be visible through old worn-out brick walls that are starting to fall apart, but also the lack of them. The material gating of most *citées* are not very visible or with big *marcours*. Distinguished then, as I will show below, from the sub-urban *citées*, are the *KOSEN* project and the two *KALIA* prospects, which resembles more the typical “fortress city” that has “an obsession with the policing of social boundaries through architecture” (Davis 2017: 2) through a fixation of security and walled architecture.

Or Urban enclaving futures?

Enclaving has been studied the last 25 years in various forms by anthropologists and other urban scholars (Waldman & Ghertner 2023). The last years, many scholars have studied the topic, particularly in sub-Saharan cities and are often viewed as a negative trend in terms with rapid urbanization and capitalism. Waldman and Ghertner (2023) suggests that developers control the urban trends through fears and events of the society. In their case of India, they argue that uncertainty and dangers for the society caused enclaving trends. They also specify the ongoing democratization in Brazil and post-apartheid integration in South Africa as external factors of the increase of the urban enclaving (2023). However, in the case of South Africa, after apartheid’s end, whites’ response to the mix of races led to a “fortification of individual houses”, before gathering in fortified communities (2023: 283). Similarly in wealthy areas such as Plateau, Point E and Almadies, many individual houses or apartment buildings are highly securitized with walls, wires, security cameras and security guards. Could this be a starting point of enclaving futures in Dakar?

Senegal has been a relatively stable democracy for many years and is a relatively calm country in terms of peace. At the beginning of my fieldwork Senegal was commonly referred to as a good country because of its peace, “here, we have peace” [*On a le paix ici*] is a quote that stuck to my brain. Thus, tendencies against this were shown in relation to the 2024 presidential election. On our way home from SD City, we noticed that demonstrations had broken out in the city center, particularly around the neighborhood I was living in, partly due to its approximate location to the University. While driving, our car was blocked in traffic

because of smoke and fire in the road. With an upset look and tone my friend said “ahh, Senegal used to be so calm, I am really scared for next year”. Here he was referring to the coming presidential election in 2024 which turned into violent scenes with clashes of the police forces and the protesters.

Despite a certain reduction of enclaved spaces, the KOSEN project shows a completely opposite example. In Dakar, this is ambiguous. The new housing provided by private companies, or the state such as the ones in the new city of Diamniadio are very expensive. These types of housing are unreachable to buy or even rent for middle classes and are often inhabited by and advertised for the wealthy and foreigners. An example of this can be understood through the advertisement of the KOSEN project, which is currently under construction in the middle of the city center:

< KOSEN_DAKAR
Innlegg

KOSEN kosen_dakar
Dakar, Senegal



Likt av khady.gy og andre
kosen_dakar KOSEN | La paroi berlinoise

Dans le souci de renforcer l'infrastructure de Kosen, nous avons opté pour la mise en œuvre d'un système de blindage de type « Paroi berlinoise » permettant de protéger les fondations et les voiles périphériques de Kosen des poussées de terre fréquentes rencontrées en milieu urbain.

Ce système a également pour avantages d'offrir aux voiles de l'immeuble des parements de haute qualité.

Avec Kosen et en collaboration avec ACC, notre entreprise de construction, nous avons l'ambition d'apporter des solutions techniques inédites et proposer des ouvrages aux standards internationaux les plus stricts.

Pour plus d'informations:
www.kosen-project.com
2. desember · Se oversettelse

Figure 5.

Screenshot from Instagram page @kosen_dakar (02.12.2023). Advertisement for the security of the KOSEN project.

An advertisement for the KOSEN project posted this prospect on Instagram with the title “The Berlin wall”. Further, they write that to strengthen the infrastructure of the condominium they will have a shielding of a “Berlin wall” type to protect the foundation from the frequently used urban space. I argue that this type of symbolic and comparison is critical in several ways. First, it presumes that it will be like a European city and thus idealizes Western models of housing (Ablo 2023). Second, it refers to an historical event that were meant to divide people and that would take the life of those who tried to cross the wall. I found the KOSEN project through advertisements that popped up on my phone, probably because I was regularly looking up different projects I spotted on the street on social media. When I showed up at the site at noon one day in March it was under rapid construction, and I was allowed to meet with one of the project managers that had his office on-site with a view over the ongoing construction work. It was run by a well-established private company from the Middle East—the manager— himself was Lebanese³³. How well-established they were and other ongoing projects, he insisted, was why they don’t make money of the KOSEN project:

This project has a social aspect too. We are getting help from the APGMV³⁴ organization, which is planting trees all over Africa. This is the first architecture in Senegal with an ecological focus, and there is no other exclusive green project like this in all of West-Africa [that he knew of]. To buy land in the city is very expensive, so people doesn’t prioritize greenness. But for us its okey because we can afford it.

There were two big trees inside the condominium that they were going to save and build around, but there were people living on the outside of the construction site that would later be put down to include in “West Berlin”. What makes it stand out as an ecological enclave is that they will have a big lawn in the middle and grow trees. The already bought apartments were bought by a mix of Senegalese, Europeans, and people from neighboring countries. Waldman & Ghertner (2023) looks beyond the traditionally studied material form of viewing enclaves, as for example studied by pioneer Teresa Caldeira (2000) and looks at embodied experiences of enclaving.

³³ The city center was claimed by my interlocutors to inhabit many Lebanese people.

³⁴ L’Agence panafricaine de la Grande Muraille Verte

They investigate which bodies are invited or denied access to the expanding enclaved zones. In the KOSEN project, “ecology”, is presented by the developer as something exclusive, unique, and luxurious. Waldman & Ghertner sees this use of advertisement for ecology as attempts of creating ‘hygienic bodies in purified zones’. Emphasizing the bourgeois’ anxieties of the environment, ‘green’ surroundings is a part of creating good natures as opposed to bad natures—where “good natures” such as the KOSEN project promotes with planting trees excludes the “bad natures” —which constitutes social mixing and “the polluting poor” (2023: 286). They also emphasize the complete enclosure of neighborhoods as making these areas more well-kept and cleaner. This complete enclosure was promoted in other enclaved projects I found when I came back from fieldwork:




Figure 6
Prospect of a “Closed and secured Cité” [*Cité clôturée et sécurisée*] in Sangalkam, near Diamniadio.




Figure 7

Advancement of project *Cité Jardin*, “dream residence” [*Résidence de rêve*] near Rufisque.

As shown in the introductory chapter, it has been a year of uncertainty in relation to the presidential election. Through following up on some of the construction companies after the end of my fieldwork, I noticed in April 2024 a growth of prospects of closed enclaves in the outskirts of Dakar. These prospects and others, promising a 24/7 security including a wall and gate proposes a shared housing community with pools, gyms and courtyards among equals shows a growing trend. If whiteness signifies safety and comfort in post-colonial city—as gated communities blossomed to maintain whiteness in the 1990s—(Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 285), Figure 6 further illustrates this point. The closed and well-secured *Cité* shows an illustration of a white woman jogging on the pavement inside off the walls. She is wearing a sports bra and tights, a rare sight for a woman in the streets of Dakar that would often cover skin and hair in line with Islamic tradition. This animation on the other hand, valorizes whiteness (Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 281) as it symbolizes global freedom (on dressing according to western expressions of freedom), health (promoting sport and activities) and safety (from the endangered other). It reflects how such new enclaved development conjure images of racialized, gendered, and classed difference, distinguishing them from the rest of the unsafe and polluted public city. Arguably, the use of the French term *cité*, could also be used to provide the same safety and comfort as it was used to describe homogenous neighborhoods in the former colonizers’ cities (Lepoutre 1997). *Cité Jardin* or Garden as the name of the *Cité* indicates are

according to Mercer also a reflection of urban desires that underpin colonial ideologies (2018: 530).

“They don’t need a wall, people don’t feel welcome”

The *Fayçal* resident’s note on people not entering the *cité* because they are believed to be high class, confirms with Bourdieu’s view of culture as a system of symbols (Gartman 1991). I suggest that as these class symbols and thus restrictions also extend to classed parts of the city that are not regulated by walls and security guards. As I were discussing enclaving with Modou, who did research on the new city of Diamniadio (Ndiaye 2020) that the SD City project takes part of, I asked why he thought closed condominiums were not so typical to Dakar. To this he answered the above quote. Despite places not always being materially closed, certain areas are exclusionary through high prices, difficultly accessed through lack of public transport and private arrangements such as hotels and restaurants. Waldman & Ghertner analyze the enclaved subject that lies behind the architectural and material enclave (2023). They distinguish between the securitized body in the fortress city, the performative body in the consumptive enclave and the hygienic body in the purified zone (2023: 281). Bodies are invited into or denied access to places through the understanding that “particular built environments are constructed and meta-discursively defined as valuable and habitable for particular types of classed, gendered, raced, and caste-marked subjects” (2023: 282). These also include environments that are ‘building up’ (2023), as in tall apartment buildings, which also function as organized group housing on the basis of community which is widespread in the new constructions taking place all around the coastal road. They call this a “bodily performance that sits between the local and global, intimate and public” that is the enclaved embodiment (2023: 288). Thus *citées* such as *Touba Renaissance* and *Fayçal* – and also the neighborhoods around *La Corniche*, are not entirely closed, their enclaved ‘bodies’ creates an exclusive zone beyond the material form that is uninviting to the unintended bodies.

The material and social exclusion of the enclave stand in stark contrast to the important Senegalese concept and expression of *Téranga*, a word that was continuously used during fieldwork. The concept translates to hospitality, but as Fedora Gasparetti states, it goes beyond the European understanding of the word (2011). The concept implies to open your door to and feed any guest and stretches to treating any “guest” as family in several social contexts (2011: 221), that being the case—keeping the doors open to neighbors. Without reciprocity extended

kin is expected to stay with family in other cities when needed and often give pride to those who open their home (Gasparetti 2011), such as Madicke, the landlord's cousin that frequently stayed in a room in the apartment building he rented out. The case of "Ngor Village", cited in the introduction, shows how having open doors to neighbors are valued traits of communities. During a walk on the beach of Ngor one afternoon, a man approached us and wanted to show us around (with expected payment) in a neighborhood which was right by. The 'village' as he called it, was right by the sea, and the beach was covered with the boats of fishermen, which is the main source of income in the neighborhood. Most of the houses did not have doors in their entrance, but open space to enter. This, he proudly stated twice by saying "all the homes in this village has open doors to their houses" pointing to the empty space of entrance "here, everyone is welcome".

This, I argue, was a way of showing distance to the way he sees that the development of Dakar is going—a place where everyone is not welcome. Seck thus stresses the freedom of human intervention of the concept which takes the pressure off "the war of prestige" that is the contemporary capitalist economy (2015: 28). May the contrast of this in certain areas be the cause of unwelcomeness? The well-known sociologist Durkheim meant that social cohesion was the social glue that kept societies together through solidarity amongst groups (Courpasson et al 2021). Can *Teranga* be seen as a part of this social glue in the Senegalese context? If so, are unwelcoming architecture and securitization the signal not to take place in certain areas? Also, does not the concepts of *Teranga* lose its sociability in areas such as the *citées* elaborated on above? Enclaved bodies inhabit spaces that are unwelcoming and, in some cases, completely closed-off because privacy from peers is desired (Lockwood 2023), sometimes enough to move neighborhoods to escape these obligations. Aligning with Aïcha, the kids from their prestigious neighborhood do not frequent the street they inhabit because they are at school, have activities set up indoors or drive somewhere else for leisure time.

Another factor of the seemingly spatial segregation despite a distinct material presence of prison walls are the narratives on and performance of security. The fact that crime rarely happened was quite clear from both private security personnel and residents of securitized areas' comments. Meanwhile, the growing security presence is striking and as O'Brien reports, there are security guards in front of every bookstore, café, and office (in particular areas) despite a low crime rate (O'Brien 2008: 656). He argues that some of the reasons for the growth of private security is the attraction of international and organizations, nevertheless that this is preferred by wealthy inhabitants because of the view of the police as corrupt (2008: 656). Though

common since the 1980s, the growth of privatized security started in line with economical (neo-liberal) reforms that increased the inequality (O'Brien 2008). However, my digging in peoples' motives for private security was by some frowned upon because of the fact that having a guardian was to employ a person that needed a job. That said, private security does create a work force in an otherwise big unemployed population, even if it means watching over a house to have a roof above the head³⁵.

Underlying xenophobia and wish for racial segregation in urban enclosures and gating are often justified with the fear of insecurity in predominantly white countries such as the US and Brazil (Low 2001, Caldeira 2000). While this is not necessarily the case in Dakar, whiteness is sometimes favorized in the urban setting, especially by foreigners. Fatou came to me one day seemingly upset, asking whether I found Senegal safe and if I felt safe in Dakar. The regional start-up company she worked at had offices in several countries, and some of her co-workers was staying in Dakar at the time being. Her white south-African colleagues had told her that they found Dakar dangerous and consequently, they would not leave their residence while being there. She proceeds: "but when I went to their office [in South Africa], I understood why; on TV, in media and everywhere they profile Black people as dangerous and here they see black people everywhere and therefore thinks it is dangerous". This favorizing of predominantly white neighborhoods was also emphasized by a female White acquaintance in her thirties. She had been living in Dakar the past five years and I met her on several occasions at typical expatriate parties in Almadies. She stressed that living in her neighborhood [Mamelles] was alright and that she felt safe because there were many other white people living there. This permitted her to share a taxi with other white people when going home in the evening. This ritual, including only going to similar areas such as the city center and Almadies was a part of her mapping of secure areas according to who was frequenting these areas.

Caldeira's concept "talk of crime" implies the importance of narratives and everyday commentaries of crime, violence, and the fear of violence. She argues that these narratives are constructed by various elements, and that generally, all classes stereotypically "associate criminals with the poor, with black people, with migrants [...], with sons of single mothers, with consumers of drugs [...] and favelas" (2019: 201). This criminalization of certain people and neighborhoods were manifested in everyday commentaries from residents' *mental maps* of the city (2019). Caldeira emphasizes the mapping of security as shaping the public character of the city in the ways that they create patterns in the urban landscape and feel restricted, afraid,

³⁵ Referring to the conversation with the sisters in Almadies.

and controlled in their movements (Waldman & Ghertner 2023: 283). Reflecting the prestigious and highly controlled coastline, it was almost always considered as a safe area. Each time I would walk home from any direction, I was always consulted to walk along the coastline particularly instead of through Medina. in accordance with the mapping of the enclaved body (Ibid) in the privatized secured area that Aminata distinguished through Medina³⁶.

Will the enclaving trends of regional neighbors maintain?

To study enclaving one must see them in the historical and social context which it exists (Waldman & Ghertner 2023). While some of my interlocutor's distinguish the growing enclaving trends in other African cities from Dakar—and I initially agreed—looking at the decaying enclaved ‘ghost-cities’, the prospects of the KOSEN project and KALIA resembles more the futuristic hyper-modern enclaves in some African cities (Ablo & Bertelsen 2022, Murray 2015). The latter projects are proposed in the wake of the protests which created a temporary instability in the country, however, as my interlocutors communicated after fieldwork, everything went back to normal, it is therefore uncertain whether this is a growing trend. Though directly closed-off areas are not very dominating in the cityscape—the policing and privatization of public space such as in Almadies and by the coastal road exclude citizens both through high prices and surveillance in embodied middle- and upper-class areas (Low 2014). As urbanization ensures compromising of space, the increased distance to the unwanted subject is visible through the excessive presence of patrolling executive powers and diminished public space in favor of costly activities such as restaurants and sport clubs. On the other hand, the property violation by property developers was up for critique and protest, which resulted in minor improvements. Despite these dynamics in the heart of the city, including in new city developments (SD City)—increasingly closes and segregates the city's poor—neighborliness and hospitality are important values. These values, manifested in *Téranga* that aligns with the theory of people as infrastructure are seemingly being challenged by the looks of these restrictions and prestigious adjectives such as “closed” and “secured”. As we shall see in the following chapter, the distinction of different areas are prominent marcours of the spatial segregation and exclusion but also, how people relate to these values in different areas.

³⁶ See Aminata's quotation in Chapter 4: Differentiation through the ‘other’.

Chapter 4. Mapping class and prestige in the shifting urban landscape

New modes of inhabitation and transformations of space is in constant flux in accordance with increased urbanization and imaginations of development by project developers, the state and its citizens. These new spaces and lifestyles are often expressed in the class differences that they increasingly create—by ‘improving’ the living of the rich and worsening it for the less fortunate. In this chapter I want to show how class and prestige is being used to map social differences in the urban landscape. Crucially, in this thesis I approach class and prestige as a manner in which to distinguishing self from others and how it is incorporated and crucial to the urban inequality of the city. In accordance with Bourdieu’s arguments, the distinction of class is used to legitimate and reproduce social differences (1998). In anthropological analysis, Don Kalb views class as a way of understanding “a much more encompassing set of global, uneven, social and geographic power balances, surrounded by an array of unevenly assembled myths, ideologies and practices of individualism, temporal salvation (“progress”), space making (“development”, “globalization”)” (2015: 14). He argues, then that class has gone further than Marx’ view of class as a “means of production”—that class status is determined by relations of production and ownership—but a changing concept in line with societal change such as neo-liberalism and urbanization. In this view, as I will show throughout the chapter, class is a complex set of relationships, negotiating amongst other elements; modernism, traditionalism, urbanization and development. I will also show how racial differentiation often derive from the colonial era and how this relates to prestige, a concept described by Bernd Wegener as “a variable representing a hierarchy of individual social positions” (Wegener: 1992: 273).

As new luxury apartments visibly are a big part of the urban future, these breaks with what is viewed as traditionally prestigious housing and strengthen the change in the urban and sub-urban landscape. This is reflected in the fact that it was forbidden to build more than two floors in many parts of the city because of the airport, until president Wade relocated it. Are these physical forms of homebuilding a part of changing collectivism and individualism? When visiting typical Dakarois families, they proudly show their several floored homes where each family member having their own part of the house. As opposed to traditional housing in Dakar, these apartments are suitable for the typical European family home. This may be the case because most of these projects are funded by foreign investors and tenants. There is a tension between these modes of living as they both show comfort and prestige in different ways. How

can one understand class and prestige in such a diverse city and how does it play out and is used to distinguish differences in Dakar?

Middle– and upper-class housing in Dakar

It is “more suitable”, as Lulu noted about their living-situation in Point E. Their apartment-building [*résidence*] was situated five minutes from her husband’s workplace where he was stationed temporarily. The organization of the apartment resembles a modern European apartment with three bedrooms. This quiet paved street was in-between to embassies and international organizations. The residency had a pool, cameras at every corner and a security personnel checking us as we entered. While this area earlier consisted of big houses typically for ambassadors and state governors, most of the houses has turned into luxury apartments. The area also has restaurants and international cafés that gives you the feeling of being in a western big city neighborhood. With different types of banks, hospitals and proximity to “everything you need”, it is made for an high standing ‘global’ lifestyle.

Even though she liked the calm and safety of the area, it was getting a bit boring as there “was not much to do” and they did not know any of the neighbors. These typical well-secured formal residencies is analyzed by amongst others Claudia Gastrow in an Angolan context, with transnational imaginations of housing and status, and—she argues—is rooted in colonial notions (2020: 510). Formal here, not necessarily in terms of legality, but also the aesthetics of what resembles formal housing—which she also argues is a part of the states wish for a modern cosmopolitan city that several cities, including Dakar has undergone in the attempt to become ‘world-cities’ (2020: 512). Formality thus occurs as sterile, neutral, and as if being anywhere in the world such as the plain apartment building with large windows and a small terrasse of the family in Point E³⁷.

Parcelles Assaines is a big district of Dakar that some of my interlocutors referred to as a suburb, divided into different units that have quite distinct characteristics. At midday a Saturday I visited Aïcha’s family home in a unit that she had heard people name the “VIP’s”³⁸. She states that this suburb is one of the best suburbs, because they go by economical class in most cases. All her family members had high-standing jobs such as doctors and biologists. Her family house was a huge one, newly renovated, consisting of four floors where each of her brothers’ new families had their own big apartment. The middle of the house has an open

³⁷ See also apartment prospects in chapter 3.

³⁸ Stands for: Very Important Person.

outdoor space, which makes all the apartments turn inwards to the center. Even though this is where she grew up, people would often think that she was from the city center based on her looks, clothes, and persona. She had learnt her perfect English accent when she was studying in the US. She was married and therefore she did not officially live there anymore. Reflecting Senegalese sociocultural ideals, she had moved into her husband's family home. In my conversation with her, she underlines that most people live with families here—a fact also represented by the many spacious houses. She went on:

Here, we like to build our houses so tall, it's like the more you earn, the bigger and taller your house is. The esthetics of the house is also very important here.

The houses in the neighborhood were colorful in shiny varnish with embroideries. Most of the residents own their houses, while others keep their house while they live in other countries. Including herself and her family, most of the neighbors were lawyers, doctors, and academics. As I walk in the sandy streets I can barely see or hear a person besides the security man in the security post.

On my first bus ride in Dakar, Serigne, the sociology student had agreed to show me around and asked me if I had ever been out of the city or in the suburbs before and gave me a worried look. As I would see after standing one hour in a warm crowded bus it was quite different from the European gaze in the city. He stresses his view of Europeans as only thinking about themselves and that it has transferred to Senegal. During the afternoon we visited the religious area Cambérène 1, which also takes part of Parcelles. Even though it is a part of Dakar, the residents of this part of the Cambérène refer to it as a religious village. Most of the houses have belonged to the same families for generations and the houses are purposely surrounding the mosque *Mausolée de Seydina Issa Rohou Laye*. The village itself is constructed in a U so that all the inhabitants can meet in the middle which correspond with the way they are constructed traditionally and in the villages, according to Issa. If Bourdieu's (1998) perception of the Kabyle house as a reflection of social relations, cultural values and societal structures, this organization of living in certain neighborhoods reflects on these in Senegal. In his analysis of the Kabyle house he argues that the physical and symbolic structure of the house says some of the social organizations in the society, such as for example the gendered dynamics in the use of rooms and their connection to discourses of public/private and the distribution of tasks (Bourdieu 1998: 14).

About a month after my first visit, I had set up a meeting with Issa, an influenced man in his neighborhood in Cambérène 1 who worked at the town hall. Currently his house was under construction to build another floor for his sons' family. He explains that the neighborhood is running out of space to build on and that it is why they are starting to build upwards. Issa continually makes a contrast to Cambérène 2 during the interview, where you can buy tobacco and alcohol, and most of the people rent and are “foreigners” [mostly people from other regions in Senegal]. He explains:

In Cambérène 2 people just come. Originally, they are not part of the area, but me for example, was born here [in Cambérène 1]. If you have money, you stay here. It's a deep connection between the people here, that is why they don't do certain things [as in Cambérène 2] and prefer to stay here. It's a well-established community, we have the calm and there is a lot of places you can't build because its holy land where we have religious events. Everyone here owns their homes and knows everyone.

As a religious community, I had heard others talk about the particularity of this area as a traditional place where they live as people lived before and in the villages. Even though the aesthetics of the houses were not as grandiose as in the former unit of Parcelles, it is situated by the beach, the holy land and the common spaces makes up for a lot of open public space between the houses, that most Dakarois does not have. Despite being a positively reputed area, the notion of highlighting this form of living suggests that it is no longer common in Dakar, something Issa also expressed in accordance with Serigne. Thinking in terms of Bourdieu's (1998) argument that the house mirrors the society, the importance of living together and sharing across neighbors might be undergoing profound change, particularly in Dakar.

Returning to the student's comment in the sandwich shop during Ramadan about a society that controls their neighbor, undoubtedly reflects on communal obligations he wished to be freed off. As Ousmane stressed that “nobody gives a shit” about their neighbors, and that if you have money, you buy an apartment and bring your wife and little family. Despite Simone's arguments that people in “the global south” finds improvised modes of cooperating and rely on social networks (2004, 2019: 119), these are often strategies of the informal worker. Perspectives such as the latter are used to distinguish from middle- and upper-class residents that does not share, because Ousmane was thus an “informal worker” in a middle-class neighborhood. In accordance with Gastrow's argument that class in sub-Saharan cities must be viewed through the ways in which the residents talk about class positions and differences (2020:

512). However, developed or not the Cambérène area was, Issa saw this development as a strength, because it showed that their neighborhood could improve in their own way while still keeping traditional values. He stressed that while *Téranga* was a strength in their society, individualism was increasing in Dakar as a result of “too many people” and hardship resulting in people preferring to live by themselves.

Public perception of class and prestige: *La calme*, cleanliness

The top-down structuring and planning of cities is often approached by anthropologists by highlighting the contrast between the latter and the appropriations and transformations of these new environments by the local population (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 119). In colonial cities, urban planning was an integral part of the ‘project’ (ibid 2016: 121). The sanitary reform took part of this urban planning and in the case of African colonies, the aim was to keep ‘African’ diseases from the colonizers. The reform was used to physically segregate the population, but also to reinforce social, racial and spatial hierarchies and power structures (2016: 123). Sandra Manuel (2023) argues that there is a connection between the historical context and their physical and socio-spatial separations which today defines the status of the Maputo residences. In her case of Maputo, the organization of the socio-spatial stratification in the city was historically racially defined (2023: 2). She outlines the history of the city which mainly developed from Portuguese settlers living by the harbor to trade commodities with South Africa across the sea. When the African population became the majority of the city, different spaces became defined for Europeans, Indians and Africans, where the Indians inhabited an area that functioned as a social border dividing European from and the areas inhabited by the Africans (2023: 2)—or racial segregation. After Mozambique’s independence from Portuguese colonialism in 1975, the racial segregation was put an end to, but the social differentiating remained as the area of the African elites during the colonial period took the place of the former colonial elite.

Stephanie Newell (2019) argues that the colonial and pre-colonial period in West-Africa was highly focused on imaginations of cleanliness and dirt. She argues that dirty was an adjective used to describe the foreign and unknown about Africans and their culture by Europeans. Advertisement for soap as civilization, health and purity was used as a way for British colonizers [in her case] to “protect” themselves from the natives (Newell 2019: 7). The racial segregation was built on protection for Europeans from tropical and “filth diseases” and proximity to “natives” (Newell 2019: 7). She analyses dirt as a form of othering, in which

“colonial public health policy, town-planning initiatives, and propaganda films are treated as contributing to African public opinion in public spaces that include people’s preexisting practices and values” (2019: 11). These initiatives contributed to the view of the local populations costumes and looks as dirty, while the Europeans as clean.

The general processes which Newell and Manuel describes - i.e. this type of racial segregation also took place in Dakar during the colonial period, where the city center was divided from the area called Medina. Sanitation was used in the same way to justify this segregation between Plateau and Medina by its colonizers (Jonssón 2024: 39). Locals were removed from the city center to Medina which separation was marked by a big boulevard that still consists today³⁹. Remaining till this day, a significant part of the city center is inhabited by Lebanese and other foreigners⁴⁰, meanwhile in Medina there is mostly Senegalese. Medina was often referred to by my interlocutors as dangerous (at least for me), noisy and not clean even despite its proximity to the city center and the standards which are in my opinion higher than in most suburbs. The city center on the other hand, was cast as chic, modern and globalized. Aïcha told me that she often heard from people she had just met that “you must be from the city center; you are too chic to live in the suburbs and stuff like that”. This might have something to do with her seemingly expensive clothing materials, natural makeup, perfect French and English accent, as well as having salaried position in a research lab.

A Spanish woman in her mid-twenties moved into the neighborhood in April after spending a few months living in Plateau, which was proximate to her internship in an organization. She had moved from there because there were too many people, cars, and contamination. This was not the first time I had heard from Europeans that certain places in the city were too contaminated. On the contrary, not all Senegalese have a relation to the term ecology. During the preparation of a meal at the collocation, it came up that one of the people in the house were a vegetarian. One of the Senegalese then asked what that meant and what the reasons for being one was. Another one said because of the ecology, and while Fatou tried to find the Wolof word, she could not think of one. Contamination and ecology were often spoken about, unlike pointing to the amount of trash, dirt or noise as Senegalese would more often refer to. In this sense, there is two different yet overlapping discourses about the same topic—different ways of thinking of dirt. However, it is not as if people do not care about the environment, many spend hours picking waste from the beaches or make “eco-decoration”.

³⁹ See mark of the division between Medina and Plateau in Figure 2

⁴⁰ Noticed also by participant observation and ‘the word of the mouth’



Figure 8

Our beaches in 20 years? [*Nos plages dans 20 ans?*] Poster of a beach full of waste, a promotion to act in waste management.

Who then is the *KOSEN* project trying to appeal by using the ‘Western’ term of ecology—deriving from Western environmental discourses? My reading would be that the project of *KOSEN* as an ecological enclave is an example of a perception of the “pure and clean” way of living in accordance with Waldman & Ghertner’s (2023) hygienic body in the purified zone. Ablo implies that the “generative rationality is that hygiene, sanitation and unpolluted elements are opposed to disease, filth, and pollution and all are linked to individuals’ and populations’ moral standing” (2023 447). In this view, the objective of the *KOSEN* project is to create hygienic bodies that distinguishes from the polluted and dirty environment on the outside of the enclave. *Cité Imbecile* on the other hand was associated with illnesses and dirt, likewise in Grand Medina, which was in conversation with interlocutors associated with the feces and urine that floated around because of the lack of running water. Grand Medina is an area where many live in “informal settlements”, some beneath ground-level densely without any drainage system. In these cases, dirt and cleanliness is used to talk about and distinguish class. The social, racial, and spatial hierarchies that was created during the colonial era (Newell 2019) holds some of

the same imaginations today. Illustrated by the *KOSEN* project, the pure and unpolluted enclave consumed by mostly foreigners hosts the upper class, while the cities' "slums" that are imagined as polluted, dirty, and diseased hosts the poor.

Papa admitted that the reputation of the area was the reason he sometimes did not tell people where he lived. He explains that it is difficult to change this perception and conditions, while the number of people in the neighborhood is growing.

If you get here at 23 at night, you will see that all the children are still out in the streets by themselves because the parents don't have time. It's difficult when the parents don't have the time to take care of all the children, they are many and they don't have control of what they are doing. The parents get up early to find food that they can eat the next day, when they come back, they must rest before they prepare the food. Therefore, the upbringing here is not great. I have a little girl and I am really worried for her future because of this.

This, he explains is one of the reasons of the high level of criminality in the area. He was aware that his position was privileged compared to his fellow neighbors, where on average three adults shared one bedroom. Yet he also knew that he could live like this [having a small apartment with one bedroom, a bathroom, and a living room] because rents were cheaper than in other areas. Similarly, Aïcha explains the same dynamic in her area. She tells a story about one of her relatives who lived in Cambérène but wanted to move because they did not like to be there and did not want their children to become "that way". It was very noisy and difficult to make the children focus on their schoolwork, so they chose to move somewhere quieter. She explains that the reason some places are quieter is because of the people that live there.

Their background, education and where they are from. It's also the mindset, here for example, most people are doctors or in administration so mostly they don't have time to be on the street. The children here are picked up by the bus at 7 and brought home at 5. After school they have lessons with their private teacher in the house. In the weekends parents bring their kids elsewhere by car, rather than to keep them alone in the street. We have come to a stage where people want their kids by their side.

Most people had a longing for this calm and would often make a comment when visiting such areas. Usually referring to the comfort of the silence or to say that the area is a privileged one. Being on the street is often considered as being uneducated or unemployed and being up to no good. Since Aïcha and her neighbors had the space and could afford to bring all the necessary assistance and activities for the children—they kept the streets calm, clean and quiet, and thus, prestigious. However, the notion of these indicators of prestige, I argue, challenge the sociability and interaction between neighbors, and therefore the relational dynamics of people as infrastructure.

Distinctions in ‘mixed space’



Figure 9.

[*C'est quoi le luxe?*] Advertisement for new luxury apartments in Almadies. Picture by author (23.04.2023).

Figure 9 illustrates an advertisement for a private construction and promotion company which was put up and dispersed throughout several places around the city, with the headline translating into “what is luxury?”. Advertisement for securitized luxury apartment complexes or residencies were seen everywhere, but most commonly in their future locale or in a magazine or flyer. This ‘in-your-face’ poster, found in various neighborhoods in the city felt misplaced and as a provocation. The KALIA company’s real estates are typically under the categorization *résidence* or *cité* (<https://residenceskalia.com>). The exclusivity promoted residency is an

apartment complex with a common area with a pool. Advertising is a form of creating status symbols, in the way that they are created to fit an imaginary of fantasies that resonates with desired lifestyle and values (Caldeira 2000: 263). Similarly, Waldman & Ghertner points to real-estate developers creation of new ways of consumerism and to “teach’ the aspiring middle classes about the ‘good life” (2023: 285). However, emphasizing Grant’s *paper architecture* and Cheikh’s note on the projects not being for the people—are people able to take use of these posters as dreams of the future⁴¹, or are they just a reminder of the growing urban inequalities?



Figure 10.

Screenshot from webpage (www.kosen-project.com) (15.04.2023). Description of apartment building and services included.

Figure 10 similarly shows the advertisement for one of the buildings in this future enclave. The third point of what is included in this building can be translated into “Entrance dedicated to personnel, service elevators and room for drivers”. This advertises for the separation of the service personnel working for the inhabitants of the enclave. As space increase from big houses

⁴¹ Grant also emphasized these posters as “opium for the masses” for people who find relief in “shining new horizons” (2014: 522).

to smaller apartments, Caldeira argues that separate spaces for personnel is a new form of distinguishing them from inhabitants' personal space (2000). The middle and upper classes create an dependent relation to domestic help, usually people from the city's peripheries, such as Mabo in my apartment building – yet with the reasoning to be separate from them. While Mabo and the other cleaning women were welcome to stay and included as a part of the household in Fann Hock, interlocutors stressed the annoyance of cleaning personnel staying in the house after finishing the daily duty. While the big house leaves room for physical space or distinction between employer and housekeeper, the standard apartment does not and conflicts this relation (Besançon 2020). The intimacy this relation created in a three-room apartment in Almadies, made my European single friend working in an NGO in her thirties fire her maid as he stressed that he did not like having another person staying in his home all day. On the other hand, he did express that he did not really have the need for one. Regardless, as Aïcha describes, the amount of help you have determined the prestige in an area:

That there is a lot of 'help' in certain cities defines the status of the area and shows what you can afford. In some areas it's getting more difficult, because prices are rising. We tried to get a new babysitter for our niece, but it was difficult.

Besançon notes that keeping servants firstly confirms middle-class status and attributes to prestige, cultural capital, and class domination and are deeply rooted in extreme inequality (2020: 145). This prestige is also connected to security and "house-sitters". Even though Aïcha states that most people in her area have a housekeeper, they don't have people to cut their lawn or watch over their particular house like in Almadies. As I observed, in areas like this one, there would only be a lot of service personnel in the streets and homes during daytime when the owners were working in their formal jobs. Regardless of these jobs being seen as exploitative and hierarchical in a certain vision, they do provide salaried work in a city of much unemployment, which, as discussed in the previous chapter with regards to security personnel, is often perceived as inherently beneficial to the working class in Dakar, regardless of the circumstances of the work environment.

Most of the domestic workers and constructors work in wealthy areas such as Almadies because it is where they are constructing, and where people can afford this. Simultaneously, they are the places that is the least accessible if you do not have a car or can afford a taxi. The busses do not even go in there according to Aïcha. At her former workplace in Mamelles [another residential area] she describes that she had to take two busses and then walk for thirty

minutes to get there. The few buses that passed tended to be full but as she could afford it, she would often take a taxi. This also highlights the inaccessibility of certain areas for certain people, despite it being the workplace for most of these people, even without surrounding walls.

Boy Sicap

My rented room in an international collective in Fann Hock is situated between the enclosed University on one side (also from behind) and the canal that divides it from Medina. Along the canal the differences on the two sides are quite distinct. On the Fann Hock side there is beautiful pavements, benches, trashcans, and palm trees. On the Medina side there are booths selling furniture, women selling food in the evening and many more by passers. You can only access Fann from the front by the main route that goes along the seaside and beaches. The area was inhabited by mostly whites during the colonial period according to interlocutors of mine. Right next to one of the few entrances to access the neighborhood, a young man owns a small shop, where people in the neighborhood and buy their daily necessities. This is also where the young man lives, explains Ousmane, who knows most people in the neighborhood. Ousmane has some opinions on why it was great business even though he states he could have bought a house in another neighborhood for the same price.

First of all, this is Sicap 1, you are seven minutes away from the city center and two minutes away from the beach. You also have Terrou-Bi⁴² right over there. He got the right clientele, richer clients.

I ask what Sicap means, to which he answers:

Sicap was firstly a way that they built houses for government workers back in the days. Those houses were therefore expensive and only for highly educated people. People that lived in Sicap houses had a more occidental lifestyle and lived like white people.

As I was walking in another Sicap neighborhood with Cheikh a few days later, I mention that I had heard the expression “Boy Sicap” and asked if he could explain:

⁴² A five-star hotel

When someone lives well, they are called *boy Sicap*. That means that they live like white people or as a boss boy. You can see that they have built to have space between the houses, they have streets of asphalt without a lot of sand. The houses are low, but they are big.

We visited his sister that lived in *Sicap Liberté*, that lived exactly as he explained. A big house with a garden, picked fence and far from the next house. She describes her new house [her husband's family home] as good, and "not as populated as the suburbs". She stated that "over there it is a lot of noise, so many people and criminality. Go there and you will see". There is a lot of dust and sand in Dakar and therefore hard to avoid sandy streets. For example, in my street in Fann Hock there is pavements and asphalted streets. Often, when they got dusty, the housekeepers or houseowner would weep the street, and likewise for our neighbors. *Sicap* was a part of a housing project in the 50s and 60s as a result of rapid urbanization, with the initiative of middle-class housing for state employees and civil servants (Jónsson 2024: 39). These were built outside Plateau and Medina which was at the time outskirts of the city. Those who inhabited these 'state-owned' lands was resettled to remote suburbs such as Pikine (2024: 40). As Ousmane described, *Sicap* neighborhoods were inhabited by Africans that lived "like white people" in formal homes with formal education and jobs inside the city as opposed to those who were expelled to the outskirts. In Dakar, a *boy Sicap* as the "*assimilados*" in Maputo, maintained the same status after independence and became the "*African petit-bourgeoisie*" which created stratification among the native population (Manuel 2023: 2).

Differentiation through the 'other'

What is particular about this neighborhood it that it is no noise. After 23, you can't hear a sound. But in Medina on the other hand, there is always a lot of people, we also say that it's an area with dangers. Here it's always calm, that's because there is better education⁴³. Sunday morning, I woke up at 7, took a coffee and looked over the neighborhood, not a pip. If it had been over at Medina on the other hand...Ahhh [refers to the noise]. There is no one in the street here, you have the calm.

⁴³ Education here referring to upbringing.

Ousmane mentions that the reason this calm is associated with prestige is that it was inhabited by the French and people like his grandparents that had high education and particular positions in the government. On the other hand, he mentions that having many family members in one house and Islamic education also contributes to a good upbringing. For example, he mentions that as a child there was a professor from a Koranic school in their neighborhood that would educate the children. His own uncle gave him homeschool in a Koran school. This is a great example of the ways in which notions of traditionalism and modernism often mix and overlap in the social life of Dakar. On one hand the European way of living, on the other living in family and getting an Islamic education. In this regard these are valued characteristics where he stays true to his Senegalese values and traditions while enjoying the characteristics of desired lifestyle and neighborhoods of a “boy Sicap”.

Mercer (2018: 524) uses the notion of *boundary work*, a concept built on work from Weber and Bourdieu to show how the middleclass in Tanzania distinguish themselves from the other classes. The concept is used to show how social distinctions are reproduced—through judgements of social status, values and worthiness—and used to compare self to others in terms of amidst socio-economic positions, aesthetics, and lifestyles. Mercer manifest how boundary work is played out through the description of other neighborhoods—places they wanted to distinguish themselves from—in response to how their own neighborhood is. Similarly, Ousmane shows through responding to what was wrong about the neighboring area to tell something about how his own area is. When I asked my friend Bamba that lived in his family home in Medina, he had another take on this lively crowded place. He appreciated how he knew everyone in the neighborhood and that all his friends were there. To him, the busy streets was a joy, and he would always happily stop to talk and exchange with people he knew on the street. Ousmane on the other hand, often expressed that most of the people he knew moved away because they were sold out by property investors. Most of the expats that live in the neighborhood stay for a while before they move again. (Jaffe & De Koning 2016: 154:

As residents try to make sense of a scary city by distinguishing between “good” and “bad” neighborhoods and people, urban geographies of fear take shape that are based on spatial and ethnic “othering” within the city. In some cases, new social categories of “threatening” and “threatened” urban spaces and people are constructed, while in others existing categorizations are reinforced.

This is very often the case and is in Dakar related to the amount of security personnel present. As Papa in Grand Yoff explains, security can sometimes be used as a way for the state to portray certain areas as safe and “good” neighborhoods, similar to the developers of residencies and *cités*. This is also done by rumors and the media, like in the case of “*Cité Imbecile*” where allegedly there was a big fire, burning houses down. As I returned later the next time and asked about it, I was told that it happened in another *cité* and that “it’s common with fake news here”. This contributes to the image of uncertainty and danger of these neighborhoods, and a certain dramatization of the situation in disadvantage areas. Security was also an important factor in the *boundary work* (Mercer 2018) of portraying and distinguishing areas in relation to their own.

You can see how we live [Esthetically good-looking and newly built], how quiet it is and how people behave. Here we have security, we have a security post⁴⁴ with a security guy and its safe here. If something happens that is not good, we know that there are intruders from other areas”.

Reflecting on The *effective layer* of security which refers to citizens or receivers of security’s experienced feeling of safety, danger or uncertainty (Diphorn & Grassiani 2019: 11), it is here the “intruders” that are considered unsafe subjects. During a conversation about Grand Medina, Aïcha speak of the safety in the area:

There is no security [in Grand Medina]. People have no space, its precarious and often they occupy houses illegally. The state often tries to remove people from their houses⁴⁵, but it ends in a lot of trouble. Most of them are from different villages looking for work and are tempted to make money quickly and do dishonest work. You cannot raise your children to be good citizens there. When we used to play football against them in school, they would start a fight just because they are bored and feel nothing. If I go there, they will know that I don’t live there and could therefore be a target, but if you live there, they will protect you because you are one of them”.

⁴⁴ The security post referred to here was a tiny house with room for a chair and a person.

⁴⁵ As a part of the “zero slum program” (*zerobidonville*).

Here, the effective layer of security is manifested in the boundary work (Mercer 2018), where the security of other places is used to say something about the safety in their area and residents of disadvantaged areas are criminalized. Cheikh fills out: “when you are someone like us you don’t wish to live in a place that is noisy, and you think about security, so you will pay more to have it”. Likewise, Aminata states that if you have money you will live in a well-secured *cit * or *r sidence* when we discussed money and how it effects the choice of residency:

But if you don’t have money, that is fine too. Us Senegalese can live in Medina, but if you [refers to author] live in areas such as Medina, Grand Yoff or the suburbs, it is not safe. The kids from the suburbs often does not take education, they become bandits, violators, thieves, and dealers. It is very common to move to other places if you begin to earn more if you are from the suburbs or poor areas.

In the case of Aminata and A cha, both living in middle-class neighborhoods points to neighborhoods that is not like their own, and thus of another class, which is used to indicate that are dangerous to them—including the distress of Bamba in “*Cit  Imbecile*” in the previous chapter. A cha that had already gotten the confirmation that she appeared as an upper-class woman and therefore thought she would be a target in working-class neighborhoods. During the conversation with Aminata she adds that many believe that all white people in Senegal, even though many Senegalese are richer than white people. She indicates that the stereotypes and how other people perceive you will determine the threat of security—or at least the experience of it.

Security as prestige

At noon in early March, I had lunch in an Italian restaurant in *Place du Souvenir Africain*, a memorial for the continent. The restaurant was almost empty, and as the person I was with spoke Italian, he started to speak with the owner. As I did not understand a word of the conversation, I started to talk to a French man that was seemingly visiting the owner. During the conversation with the bachelor in his thirties I found out that he had been living in my apartment building a few years earlier: “yeah, I used to live there, but now I live in Point E because it is better” he said with a laugh. “There I have an embassy at the one side of my house, and at the other I have a world organization, its genius!”. The reason he found it genius was because of the high security and esthetics these institutions created in the area. Living in areas with formal

institutions like embassies and international organizations are often considered as offering both prestige and security. How are imaginaries and perceptions of security used to create unequal ‘protection’ of citizens and skewed distribution of safety and prestige in different areas?

“Fences, bars, and walls are essential in the city today not only for security and segregation, but also for aesthetic and status reasons” (Caldeira 2000: 291). Caldeira calls these dynamics an *aesthetics of security*. She argues that despite having trouble buying security elements, these are modes of showing social status and distinction to poor areas (2000). The city of Dakar is not known for having a lot of crime, and as I have tried to show throughout the chapter, particularly in the coastal part of the city, it is rare – Though security was stressed by interlocutors, I never heard of any instances of violence or break-ins. Endangering other neighborhoods seems more common than worrying about the security in their own area. Distinguishing between quiet and noisy neighborhoods often underlies the symbolics and associations of safety and danger.

Diphorn & Kyed emphasizes that security in urban Africa often becomes “something you pay for, if you can”, as opposed to security provided by the state (2016: 711). The states inability to provide such public goods, they argue, can be a consequence of either lack of resources or capacity and/or conscious neo-liberal policies, encouraging privatization and self-governance (2016). Upper class citizens and businesses can afford to pay for security, while poor citizens living for example in “slum” settlements must figure out other ways of creating security. Diphorn & Kyed therefore argue that private security has become a way of reinforcing social inequality and class-spatial segregation (Diphorn & Kyed 2016: 711). On the other hand, private security can also be seen as an individualistic act, working against the communal, based on mistrust of neighbors in a context of social insecurities and social inequalities (2016: 731). Living in a securitized area is often associated with prestige as the vignette above illustrates. Aminata’s certainty that when people receive more money, they will move to a well-secured *cit * despite interlocutor’s stress that there is not really a safety issue illustrate that security is a way of showing economic capital and thus prestige (Bourdieu 1986), but also conspicuous consumption (Lockwood 2023). Issa’s concern of the growing tendency of peoples’ preference to stay and live alone because they cannot afford to be sociable in the way that is expected of them contradict to this point. Here, the individualism and protection from the urban poor is considered prestigious and synonym with middle- and upper classes’ strives.

According to Jeffe & de Koning, one person's placement in the social hierarchy ascertains whether they will be understood as a potential threat to a security group. This will further affect their movements within the city based on people's interpretations of their presence (2015: 155-156). Kan trekke inn dette igjen

Negotiating modernism and traditionalism

Ananya Roy (2009) emphasizes the fact that the study of metropolises in fact is the study of modernity. How then can one discuss traditionalism and nationalism? Traditionalism was thus often talked about, while interlocutors rarely emphasized the term modernity. Throughout the city, the national flag of Senegal is everywhere, both waving in the wind, tagged on walls and on clothes. In many conversations people stressed their beautiful country and hospitable people with a sense of pride. Taking pride in the country appeared to me as being proud of the ideology of *Téranga*, but as Issa stressed it is difficult to maintain these ties in "this economy", also for working-class residents. This nationalistic notion can be viewed through the dream of the new president that would strengthen the republic, African values and autonomy from other countries' influence and exploitation. Numerous Tik Tok and Instagram videos honoring the president having two wives in line with traditional Senegalese family values illustrates this point.

My aim here, is not to discuss whether Dakar is a modern or traditional city facing a crisis in the meeting with the West, or even what these concepts bears, which Fedora Gasparetti (2011) argues is done too often. She notes that many "traditional" African cultures are modernities because they exist alongside the many years of encounters with Europe, and therefore are nothing but timeless (Gasparetti 2011) if we were to consider Europe as the standard for "modernity". Abdourahmane Seck (2015: 14), however stresses the Senegalese being "neither ourselves, nor the other" and that "independence has doubled the chains", reflecting on the developmentalist and identity discourse after what appears to be not complete independence. Nevertheless, the notions I saw as nationalistic, do confirm with Anderson's (1998) imagined communities which thus is expressed through imaginations of a collective that unites in the symbol of the nation. Emphasizing the flux of foreign interests in the country, might these symbols be a response to these pushing forces? Modernity was thus sometimes talked about through values that contradicted with what is considered historical and typical Senegalese. During the lunchbreak with Serigne at the research center, I explained my project

and asked him for input. He was engaged in discussing the effects “European culture” had on Senegal:

Just look at me – [wearing a plaid shirt, jeans, and sneakers], I speak French in my daily life and even dress like a French man, instead of using traditional Senegalese clothes [Often a *grand boubou*, a big wide-sleeved cape/robe].

The next time I saw him we were walking past a vegetable market when he said

Do you see all these vegetables? Most of it will be thrown away because people don't want Senegalese products, it is the same as with the clothes, even I prefer buying them from China or Europe. People think that the products are bad because they are from here and buys vegetables that is labeled with Spain or Italy. It is the mentality from the colonial era.

There is an ambiguity to viewing prestige and class in relation to Western or French features. While they are often associated as having a strong link, there is sometimes, I argue, a sense of patriotism that look down upon following European models or being “too French”.

I was invited to a dinner party by a guy I had met during my exchange semester in Paris, where this point was illustrated. He had been working in Paris since he finished the degree he moved there for. At the time being, he was back in Dakar for Ramadan to see his family, but also to buy property in a nearby village. Arriving at my friend's house in Hann-Maristes, a neighborhood considered residential (Versluys 2008), I meet the security guard by the building's desk who ask who I was there to visit before following me up the elevator. At the door the house help greets me and take me into the living room. She had prepared a table full of food in time to break the fast. The apartment belonged to his brother, that had lent him the place for his stay since he was travelling for work. His guests were all people from his school, all working in prestigious equivalent jobs as himself, in Dakar. The conversations went mostly about their projects, from time to time making jokes about my friend being a “French man”. The next time I met with him, I accompanied him to another dinner party. In the car he told me that he was frustrated because two cars had been blocking him inside the parking lot at the time he was ready to leave the store. No one in the parking lot knew whose cars they were so he had to wait for them to come back from their shopping.

It is so chaotic here, the organization in Europe is so much better, but people refuse to adopt these organizations because they don't want to follow European things, even if they are better. People want to be proud Africans. I have great plans and goals for my life, but I cannot develop in my career here. I can criticize the organizations now because you are from Europe, but I cannot tell these things to people here.

The reason he felt that he could not complain about the organization to people might be intertwined with the jokes of him being a “French man”. This case shows that there are certain attitudes that are expected from a “modern Senegalese”, where one should not idealize the West. Negotiating traditionalism and modernism in the diverse urban landscape of Dakar is complex. Scholars on former colonies often points to the fact that modernism is often associated with western features and with wealth (Roy 2009; Mbembe & Nuttall 2004). Traditionalism is, according to my interlocutors, often viewed with respect, and of important values of their history and culture—and if I dear to add, not as frequently emphasized by scholars.

Understandings of traditionalism may also be navigated through informality and rural life. Versluys (2008) points to residents of the popular area Yoff, who consider their neighborhood as a village and closer to “traditionalism”. By comparing their neighborhood to the “modern city” which refers to areas closer to the city center, they separate themselves from these ways of living. By referring to elements as ‘living a village life’ and having a strong connection and community across houses, her interlocutors see themselves as living in a traditional atmosphere (Versluys 2008: 289). Places such as this neighborhood in Yoff is given the quality of being able to maintain the culture as it has historically been, and still is in the villages. Similarly, Issa referred to Cambéréne 1 as “the village”, even though it is a suburban part of the city as he felt that it aligned with their way of living. Stated by post-doctor in geography at the University of Dakar⁴⁶ Modou Ndiaye, the traditional way of organizing housing is by having a circle in the middle of houses pointing towards the center – which makes a common area. In Camberene 1, most of the houses are built in a U, which makes a small community and common space for those living around this free space in the middle.

Interlocutors of Versluys in Yoff saw those who contradicted with this lifestyle of being too assimilated and affected by the former colonizers’ culture, particularly residents of areas around the city center, and coastal areas as Fann Hock and Point E (Versulys 2013). Here, language makes a distinction in the way that French is associated with a symbol of socio-

⁴⁶ Université Cheikh Anta Diop

economic progress, because it is used in education, formal employment, and administration (Versulys 2013). For example, every person on the street in Fann Hock communicated in French, while I could not find French-speakers in “*Cité Imbecile*”, and I was warned before visiting that it would probably be the case. Language therefore also becomes a way of distinguishing areas from each other and symbolize its class and prestige. As Bourdieu (1986: 245) notes on language; the working classes cannot afford to keep their children’s education beyond the minimum necessity—which is marked by the cultural capital obtained by higher education—for the high-classed subject in the French speaking schools in Senegal. Returning to the quotation in the introduction illustrated that everyone was welcome in a neighborhood in Ngor. In accordance with the Yoff residents (Versluys 2008), the neighborhood was by its residents called ‘Ngor village’, despite it being situated in the city. As the young resident put pressure on the fact that everyone is welcome, he created a distance to his perception of the rest of the city. By ascertaining that they are a ‘open’ traditional village and living as they do in the villages, there is a underlying perspective of the other parts of the city as the opposite—modern and not welcoming.

How can class be navigated in Dakar?

Don Kalb provided a quite open and contemporary relevant understanding of class, but without a crucial element many identifies themselves with which is the collectivism that makes *Téranga*, a crucial element of social life. However, collectivism, as most other things, is a part of a system that constantly changed by ideas of progress, development and globalization in the capitalist economy he views class through. This chapter have showed how class is manifested in different neighborhoods through patterns of security, enclosed housing and urban inequality. In addition to this I have shown that these patterns are embedded in relation to identities of modernities and traditional values, as Mbembe & Nuttall (2024) argued. The housing developments taking place clarifies these imagined differences, on one hand Lulu’s small formal (or neutral) family-of-four high-rise in ‘global’ Point-E. On the other, Aïcha’s huge extended family building constructed with an open space in the middle in accordance with traditional Senegalese housing, beautifully ornamented in the ‘local’ suburb of Parcelles. Discourses of development (Seck 2015) and visions of the future (Grant 2014) illustrates imaginaries of a city that are promised for the wealthy, but as Cheikh noted is not for the people. While these new modes of building homes appeal to wealthy residents, often internationals these areas are distinguished through “clean bodies” (Waldman & Ghertner 2023) in enclaved

spaces to “dirty areas” associated with the poverty which constitutes them. Variables such as dirt and noise continue to stigmatize and criminalize the neighborhoods that they are associated with. The racial segregation during the colonial area contributed to this point of view (Newell 2019) in the case of Medina and the city center but is still present to distinguish class separations between different areas. Notions of security are also used to show superiority despite having a proper usage. If the exclusion and privacy the gating and security measures enables is considered prestigious and high-class, how can the meaning behind *Téranga* remain and continue to maintain people as infrastructure?

Chapter 5: Concluding reflections: Are people the infrastructure in Dakar?

Close to a year after the end of my fieldwork and the demolition of *Cité Imbecile*, I was talking with Bamba on the phone with who told me that Soda recently came to visit him in Dakar carrying gifts. She had returned to her family in Touba and brought Bamba vegetables she had cultivated in a village nearby. Despite having her home in Dakar torn down and demolished, she was, according to Bamba happy to be with family and to be able to cultivate food for herself, whilst earlier having trouble paying for it in the city. She did after all stress that she enjoyed the space and feeling of community in Touba, compared to the dangers she experienced in the narrow *cité*.

Despite her story turning out for the better, I do not know what happened to the other residents, but if I were to guess based on recent trends in Dakar, the land of these housing will likely be bought by private project developers. If these relational dynamics are bound to the villages⁴⁷ how can they remain in a city that continues to push them out of the city? Neo-liberal projects have created excessive physical infrastructure with fences and walls that does not confirm with the social ideal of “relating to others across class, gender, ethnicity and other differences” (Anderson 2006: 36). The urban exclusion through gating is also extended to the symbolically enclaved subject (Waldman & Ghertner 2023) and securitization of privileged areas and privatization of public space.

The introduction of this thesis presented some of the political and historical remarks that I found representative for contemporary urban Dakar. The political history as a consequence of colonization have been marked by developmentalist narratives (Seck 2015) and the mirroring of everywhere else (Simone 2019). By situating Dakar as a metropolis, I have tried to address that the city is overlapping the global and local, traditional, African modern and Western modern and thus a homogenous world city, while at the same time retaining its own particularities. The urbanization consists of people such as Aminata and my Mauritanian classmate who sees the city as possibilities, developed and modern, while others, such as Soda is driven to the city because of the lack of labor in the rural areas—amongst others a result of the deregulation of agriculture initiated by the World Bank. The introduction have also described the framework of the thesis which is to discuss whether people are the infrastructure

⁴⁷ Touba is a city, but because of its particularity as religious center, traditional values and organizations are very important according to Issa.

of Dakar, as Simone (2004) emphasized is the case for many African cities and seen this through the concept of *téranga* or hospitality.

In Chapter 2, I explored ethnographically the growing disparities of class divides in Dakar, in part a consequence of amongst others the neo-liberal shift (Jaffe & De Koning 2016), including the limited assistance received from the state (Grysole 2018). I argue that this has created a tendency of growing precarious housing and private cities for the wealthy to keep the residents of the former off sight (where elements such as gender and race also intersect). A growing literature on the African middle-classes (Mercer 2018) illustrate a response to the narrative of African citizens as either rich or poor. However, the private SD city project illustrate that the middle-class residents cannot afford to inhabit these new developments because of the ever-rising prices in investors search of profit. The state sponsored Zero Slum Program furthermore makes visible how poor resident are dealt with, which takes part of the spatial mapping of the city that becomes crucial for understanding structures of spatial segregation. Peripheral urbanization (Caldeira 2017), the process where the poorest citizens are pushed further out of the city, is a correlating response to the beautifying and modernization of the urban space, where developments of privatization and securitization in the city center and along the coast are increasingly forming.

Chapter 3 focused mainly on the *citées* of Dakar often constituting prestigious closed and secured neighborhoods and the privatization and securitization processes of the city center. The case of Almadies illustrates that the former public beaches have been replaced by luxury hotels and apartments amongst other paying activities such as restaurants and bars. Though most of the *citées* I focused on were not as distinct as urban enclaving trends in some cities of ‘the Global South’, there is an ‘enclaved body’ visible: a symbolic barrier that hinders certain (classed, raced and gendered) bodies from taking place in prestigious areas such as *Les Citées*, *Les Résidences*, *La Corniche*, and their surrounding neighborhoods. This is reflected through the new projects taking place in these areas, mostly luxury high-rises, which conforms to the middle and upper-class population inhabiting them.

Chapter 4 went further on the relational distinctions of class positions to explore elements of urban prestige in Dakar. In the ethnography, I show that calm and clean neighborhoods become synonym with quiet, private homogenous spaces, embedded in strategies of colonial racial segregation. The purified bodies (Waldman & Ghertner 2023) of the ecological enclave KOSEN shows that the physical separation is what renders the bodies clean from the polluted other. As my interlocutor Papa similarly stressed in the introductory Chapter, the state provides additional security from the police (in addition to excessive private

security of housing) in the favored areas of the city center and the coastal road areas, which I argue in chapter 4 is the *aesthetics of security* (Caldeira 2000), based on interlocutor's association of security as indicators of wealth, not necessarily as an actual threat in these prestigious areas.

What is seen by many as the democratic 'victory' of the new president illustrates in many ways a possible new era for the vision of future Dakar. Symbolically this meant in many ways a removal of the French influence in Dakar and perceived hope for change of the situation for the of the city's many unemployed poor. If the people felt excluded and unheard before, they experienced and expressed a victory by choosing their president that "tells the truth about our situation"—referring to the systematic colonial exploitations still taking place in contemporary Senegal. If we were to analyze through scholars' notes on the rise of enclaving through change and fear in the population, it is possible that the uncertainty before and during the election could create an increase of enclaving. The protestors consisted to a large extent off suburban youth, a large part of the unemployed population, while those who supported the Macky Sall administration were often more well-off and internationals, according to interlocutors of mine. However, it is possible, since the calm has settled in Dakar, and similar happenings also occurred during the former presidency (*Rfi* 2010), that it will not have much influence. The future is yet to be made in Dakar.

As Seck's critique of the ethnocentric philosophy of Senegal in the aftermath of independence indicate, the continuous assimilation to narratives of modernity, have been dealing with the needs of a redefinition of the cultural and political framework (2015: 17). Senghor's *négritude* movement, the figure Sonko and current president Faye are representations of this—as opposed to the more developmentalist discourses that has marked the candidatures in-between them (Seck 2015). While democratization processes have been associated with increased urban enclosure, the relative democracy since the beginning of this century have not showed evident consequences on the increase of enclaving—it have even showed the opposite in the well-established *cités*, such as *Cité Faycal*. However, privatization and securitization has blossomed. Citizens' (mostly young people) mobilization to affect the election, strengthens the democracy and may affect this trend in the future, which might already be in process viewing the projects of *KALIA*. However, the state's power to remain in control, sensor its citizens and effectively restrict democratic participation was manifested, as I experienced myself in June 2023 towards the end of my fieldwork, in the blocking of social media and shut down of the internet (*The New York times* 2023).

This thesis has discussed several yet intimately connecting topics concerning the urban environment in Dakar. The theories and ethnographies of urban anthropology are many, and it is therefore difficult to predict how the future of a globalizing and urbanizing metropole will look. This is particularly true when we consider the diversity of urban space in Dakar, with its many different neighborhoods. To compare its progress with other urbanities in “the Global South” or their former colony is complex because of the great variation of people and places. The hostile security dynamics and class distinctions are clear both within the city, but also as part of the peripheral urbanization. While at the beginning of my fieldwork, I got the impression that the urban and suburban enclaving in *cités* were decaying, both because of its status and public perceptions, this might be the end of certain types of *cités* of the past.

The projects of KALIA and KOSEN however shows new types of fortressing in both the city center and in the peripheries. Viewing the political unrest, it is possible that the new KALIA projects was a ‘response’ to this uncertainty. A strong nationalism and the values of *Teranga* is core values that honors hospitality and openness. Interlocutors distinguishing from “cold” countries such as Europe and continuously racially segregated dynamics in countries such as South Africa, presuming these are countries with enclaving patterns is used to distance Dakar from such tendencies. With a continuous stream of immigrants from both rural Senegal and other countries, the peripheries are ever growing, also displacing among others the so-called slum-residents that move to the city to support their livelihoods.

Téranga can be viewed as an ideal of shared hospitality and an imagined community with strangers that bind the people together. Though these values are important or maybe incorporated in the Senegalese and Dakarais⁴⁸ mind, my material indicates that it might be threatened in the urban environment and its changing configurations. Ousmane’s stress that if someone tap the shoulder of someone that does not have money they will explode, because people does not have anything to give and struggle to make ends meet. The ones with money however, as Lulu pointed out do not know their neighbors because of their separateness—and tendencies to stay inside their home amongst equals as Aïcha stress. The reduction of public space by the coastal road or Almadies reflects both on the spatial separation and prestige these areas carry, illustrated by the Congolese suburban resident who had *La Corniche* as his favorite place, but rarely had the opportunity to take use of this space. Similarly, the building of the

⁴⁸ Person from Dakar

«Berlin Wall» in the middle of the city reflects on the militarization of the city center where a security guard watches over every corner—despite interlocutors proudly speak of the peace in the country.

The imaginations, in for instance the prospects of the property developer *KALIA* writes about an enclave that seem to approach the Western dweller and not according to national imaginaries (Anderson 2006). As he argues that the print-capitalism—newspapers and texts—was the way of one to relate to another, these prospects do the opposite, where people cannot relate to this as Cheikh illustrated by saying that the building prospects are frustrating to view, because most people know it is not for them. This is also what Serigne referred to when he said that Macky Sall is doing good things for the development but leaving the rest to starve.

While Simone's (2004) notion of people as infrastructure mostly emphasizes working class people dealing with informal activities, Issa stress that even these prefer to live alone because of the pressure of the economy and change of mindset. However, Issa's neighborhood Cambéréne 1 is emphasized as a community where the connections between the people binds the people. Each time I mentioned the area Cambéréne interlocutors signified the traditional way of living there in a respected manner. While as Aminata stressed that “if you have money, you will live in a *cit*é or *résidence* well secured”, Issa put pression on the fact that people do not move, even if they get a lot of money because of the strong tie between the people in the neighborhood. Melly's ethnography from Dakar confirms to Simone's notion in another way. The cityscape is to a large extent characterized by unfinished houses, she therefore argues that these houses are turned inside out and spill into public space, and thus creates an experience of the city as a shared place (2010: 38). The sisters in Almadies illustrated that these places are inhabited and watched over without much salary—relating to class differences which corresponds to Bertelsen's (2021) ethnography from Maputo, where his interlocutors stress' of keeping lower-class residents around to work for wealthy residents.

Roy stress the possibility for a romanticization of the hardship and creative strategies of informal structures, and notes to not confuse it with mobilization and rebellion (2009: 85). If “infrastructures are matter that enable the movement of other matter” in the sense that they are “things and also the relation between things” (Buier 2022: 3), the built environment I have emphasized in the middle- and upper-class parts of the city that I frequented the most cannot support the assertion that people *are* the infrastructure. Namely in the sense that “things”; walls, gates, police officers and security guards (or lack of public transportation, parking lots or purchase obligation at restaurants) hinders certain classed, gendered and raced citizens'

movements, but also through embodied classed spaces, where “they don’t need a wall, because people does not feel welcome”.

The infrastructure is often symbolized by the prestigious pavements without “dust”—an epitomic symbol of wealth—in prestigious neighborhoods and by *La Corniche* as illustrated on the front page of this thesis—and are to a larger extent areas where the physical materials function as a Berlin Wall rendering spontaneous transactions and relations among people difficult. As the ethnography of this thesis shows, this manifest also by the formalized bureaucrats with weapons (Graeber 2012), and similarly with the criminalization of informal activities (Jónsson 2024) in these areas. If the objective of the infrastructure as we know it in Euro-America, works as an ideological tool for continuing to dominate and exploit labor the nature in this capitalist world (Buier 2022: 11): who gets to dominate it and how, is thus in Dakar to an extent controlled by project developers and investors, the state, and maintained by the purchasing elite. The state program to remove the city’s slums in brutal and open fashion shows how they also prey on residents housing through the demolition of their neighborhoods.

I have briefly given a contextualization of how these urban dynamics often weigh on women to a larger extent. Women are more likely to have both a role as a provider and to take care of the domestic ‘duties’ without changing the patriarchal structure of the household. They are more likely to experience more severe poverty with more implications than men. It would thus be interesting and very relevant to look further into women’s navigation of these urban landscapes, particularly in terms of upwards mobilization which have been briefly discussed in the section of Dakar’s middle classes. Unfortunately, I did not encounter (incautiously) sufficient working-class women to make a representation of their perspective. Further research in this area, I also suggest should involve sufficient knowledge of a Senegalese language. With an emerging middle-class, can working-class women’s mobility be changing in light of the promise of a new political and ideological system?

Figures:

Figure 1: Map of Dakar with suburbs.

Figure 2: Map of Dakar.

Figure 3: Advertisement for the construction by the coastal road.

Figure 4: Spontaneous settlements in front of apartment buildings in Almadies.

Figure 5: Advertisement for the security of the KOSEN project.

Figure 6: Prospect of a “Closed and secured Cité”.

Figure 7: Advancement of project *Cité Jardin*.

Figure 8: Poster of a beach full of waste.

Figure 9: Advertisement for luxury apartments in Almadies.

Figure 10: Description of a KOSEN apartment building.

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