

Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization
A comparative analysis of two cases in a Norwegian context

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Abstract

In 2006, Roger Eatwell introduced the concept of “Cumulative Extremism”, after he observed violent clashes between radical right- and radical Islamist groups in Britain. In 2012, their sister groups, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League, established themselves in Norway. However, in contrast to the British case, they never displayed any signs of inter-group radicalization. This dissertation has two main contributions. First, it introduces a new concept: Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Second, it analyzes two cases of inter-group radicalization through three independent variables, which dependent on their temporal state, act either as limiting or facilitating political opportunity structures for “HRR”. The comparative analysis indicates that ideologies, counter-radicalization measures and inter-group competition functioned as limiting political opportunity structures for inter-group radicalization between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League in the period 2012-2014. The thesis finds the same variables to be facilitating opportunity structures for similar processes between neo-Nazi and anti-racist factions in the 1990s/2000s.

1. Introduction

During the past decade, a number of scholars have narrowed their attention to the relationship between the radical-right and radical Islamic movements. In 2005, Roger Eatwell developed a new concept of inter-group radicalization when he observed clashes between far-right members and radical Islamists in Britain. He noted that it had occurred a process of “*Cumulative Extremism*” among oppositional extremist groups. “[...] *extremist animosities fueling each other*” (Eatwell, 2006: 213).

“Eatwell’s argument is that extremists of both groups effectively enter a ‘cumulative’ process whereby the activity of one group leads the activity of another to become more extreme or provocative, which in turn may further radicalize the other group and so on.” (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 3-4).

Not only is this phenomenon observable in western Europe in modern times, but there also exists empirical evidence of similar occurrences all the way back to the 1960s (Bosi et al, 2014). Post-war Britain experienced four waves of movement-counter movement contests, including two periods with spirals and escalations of violence between the extreme-right and anti-fascists between the 1970s and early 1990s (Maklin and Busher, 2014: 56-57). In Italy, spirals of revenge emerged between the left-wing group and neo-fascists in the 1970s (Della Porta, 2013: 70-71). Finally, in Basque country, growing nationalism produced conflicts between the separatist group *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) and traditionalist factions between the mid-70s and the early 80s (Della Porta, 2013: 90-97).

This thesis seeks to investigate the dynamics of inter-group radicalization in a Norwegian context. Between 2012 and 2014, the country experienced the co-existence of two radical groups on national soil: *Profetens Ummah* and the *Norwegian Defence League*. The NDL was intended to work as a Norwegian affiliation of the English Defence League, operating with the same “counter-jihadi” ideology (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). Profetens Ummah had close contact with the British group *Al-Mujahiroun*, illustrated by the cooperation between PU’s leader Ubaydullah Hussain and Anjem Choudary. The latter stated in 2013 that he was the mentor and counselor of the Norwegian affiliation (NTB, 2013: c)

Could the interaction between far-right- and radical Islamic groups result in mechanisms of reciprocal radicalization? If groups with similar ideologies had engaged in violent conflicts in Britain, it could very well have the same consequences in Norway. Four years after his initial report, Eatwell stated that “processes of *Cumulative Extremism* (CE) could be “*more*

threatening to the liberal democratic order than attacks from lone wolf extreme Right-Wingers or even Al-Qaida-inspired spectacular bombings” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 884).

While Eatwell’s statement from 2010 might be a bit farfetched, empirical findings demonstrate that interactions between radical groups can produce escalations of violence in western-European countries (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014). This is not just the case for Italy, Britain, and the Basque country, but even Norway experienced the escalations of political violence and radicalization of far right and radical-left groups in the 1990s and early 2000s (Bjørngo et al, 2001; Bjørngo 2005; Fangen, 2001; Fangen, 2001 b; Kallevik, 2013).

Few can deny the destructive consequences of radicalization and especially terrorism on the global scale. To minimize their impact, a detailed mapping of mechanisms in play will certainly become important to tackle the problem in more efficient matters. Although much research exists in the field of radicalization, the interrelationship between radical Islamism and the “counter-Jihadi” aspect of the radical right seems to be rather undiscovered in many national contexts. For instance, the interrelationship between Profetens Ummah – and subgroups within the Norwegian far right movement remains mostly absent from the wide range of national research (Bjørngo & Gjeldsvik: 2015).

This thesis has two main goals. First, various academics have highlighted the need for conceptual changes regarding inter-group relationships, which is something that this thesis seeks to correct. Here, the thesis applies Alex Schmid’s definition of radicalization (Schmid, 2013). Deeper understanding of the phenomenon in a *context-independent* setting is valuable because reciprocal inter-group radicalization has occurred in multiple countries in the past, and it might very well become a challenge for democracies in the future. Second, the thesis seeks to explain the phenomenon in a specific national context. The dynamics between Norwegian counter-jihadism and radical Islamism has not undergone much analysis. Learning history strengthens our abilities to tackle the future.

This study is a comparative analysis of two cases of inter-group interactions, a process that the thesis labels as “*Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization*”. The first case regards the conflicts between the anti-racist and neo-Nazi movements in Norway in the 1990s/early 2000s. The dissertation defines this as a positive case of *HRR*, which is because interactions between them resulted in escalations of violence over longer periods in time. The second case is the least illuminated, and is subject to the most attention in the thesis. The two groups in question are the radical Islamist group *Profetens Ummah*, and the radical right group *Norwegian Defence*

League, which co-existed and interacted in the period between 2012 and 2014. Here, we find no evidence of escalations of radicalism, and the case is thus perceived as a deviant or negative instance of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.

To understand the different outcomes between the two cases, the thesis analyzes what Social Movement Theory calls *political opportunity structures*. David Meyer explains these as exogenous factors that facilitate or limit mobilization, and ultimately define a group's strategies (Meyer, 2004: 1457-1458). The analysis uses three independent variables to explain why the change in political opportunity structures limited Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case, but facilitated the same process in the 1990s/2000s. The central research question in this thesis is the following:

Why did Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occur between anti-racist and neo-Nazi groups, but not between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League?

To discover how certain opportunity structures limited or facilitated the phenomenon, the thesis analyses *ideologies*, *counter-radicalization measures* and *inter-group competition*. The thesis finds that the collective effects of the independent variables were indeed limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization for Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League, while the same variables functioned as facilitating structures for HRR in the first case. The effects of the variables are perceived as interconnected; social movements and their sub-groups operate within societies where there are different actors and highly complex structures, acting in constant interaction.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Radicalization: literature and definitions

“The Trouble with Radicalization”

(Neumann, 2013)

Extreme ideologies, political violence and terrorism became well-known subjects of research during the course of the 20th century. Today, there are abundant amounts of academic contributions tied to the phenomena of radicalization. As illustrated by the title of an article written by Peter Neumann from 2013, there are certain difficulties tied to the concept itself. Should one review the existing literature on the matter, it would not be hard to find definitional disagreement between scholars. Consequently, what is radicalization? Essentially, the notion is divided between an emphasis on extremist *beliefs* and extremist *behavior* (Neumann, 2013: 873).

Neumann labels the two approaches for “*Anglo-Saxon*” and “*European*” (Neumann, 2013). As freedom of speech is absolute in the former, the peaceful practice of personal political ideas remains permissible. On the other hand, an actor’s intention to break the law through violent means is considered to be a great danger for democratic nations. Some policies are therefore developed with the intention of functioning as short-term counter-terrorism (Neumann, 2013: 885-86). On the contrary, the European definition places larger emphasis on the behavioral aspect, but keeps violent extremism incorporated as one of two end-states of the radicalization process. Ideas and thoughts are perceived as potentially problematic and dangerous for the constitutional order. The radicalization process is then ultimately understood as a long-term, gradual development (Neumann, 2013: 886-887).

Which approach is the more appropriate? Neumann argues for the merge of the two, thereby incorporating both long- and short-term policies. To understand the complexity between ideas and behavior, one should not overlook neither component (Neumann, 2013: 889). The argument reemerges in Alex Schmid’s definition of radicalization from 2013, which he developed after reviewing a great number of empirical findings on the matter:

“An individual or collective (group) process whereby, usually in a situation of political polarization, normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. These can include either (i) the use of (non-violent) pressure and coercion, (ii) various

forms of political violence other than terrorism or (iii) acts of violent extremism in the form of terrorism and war crimes” (Schmid, 2013: 18).

Schmid’s definition is the most appropriate in many aspects. First, research on radicalization and terrorism has been making enormous progress since the 1980s, although especially post-September 11, 2001 (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013). Certain old notions have been abandoned, like the perception of radicalized individuals or groups as non-rational actors. Now, most scholars acknowledge that interests and goals drive actions, radicalized actors are therefore considered as rational (Borum, 2011a: 14).

Second, Schmid remains careful when he incorporates actions and beliefs into his definition. It is both understandable and practical that some governments chose to focus on actions when they mobilize for counter-terrorism: attacks can have a significant psychological effect on societies. However, we should not overlook the power of ideas. One can neutralize various actors from ever acting in a radical fashion, but that will not stop an ideological narrative, which will continue to feed future radicalization. Some have later highlighted the need for more counter-narratives, like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 2015: 16-17).

We should also merge beliefs with actions; Alex Schmid understands radicalization as a *gradual* process. When does one become a radical? According to Bailey and Edwards, there cannot be drawn any specific end-point, but it rather envelops the entire journey from thoughts to (possible) actions. Their argument is drawn from McCauley and Moskaleiko (2010) which suggest that radicalization is changes of ideas and actions “in the direction” of conflict. As they elegantly describe it: *radicalization is to radical, as aging is to aged* (Bailey & Edwards, 2017: 261-262)

Third, the word “*Radical*” loses its meaning when it is isolated from a societal context. We need to establish a specific understanding of “legal” political behavior to locate radical ideas and actions thereafter. National jurisdiction tend to vary on numerous matters, as seen through substantial differences in Canadian and Australian anti-terrorism laws (Roach, 2007: 53). Put differently, the term is relative (Sedgwick, 2010; Neumann, 2013: 876-78). Schmid sees this as dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors: the democratic ideal. He furtherly defines the concept:

“The process is, on the side of rebel factions, generally accompanied by an ideological socialization away from mainstream or status quo-oriented positions towards more radical or extremist positions involving a dichotomous

world view and the acceptance of an alternative focal point of political mobilization outside the dominant political order as the existing system is no longer recognized as appropriate or legitimate” (Schmid, 2013: 18).

Finally, Schmid’s extensive definition removes particular shortcomings that other definitions may suffer from. While a portion of the established interpretations choose to focus on actions (Olesen 2009; Githens-Mazer, 2009), others prefer to use ideas and narrative as their primary variable (Horgan & Bradock, 2010; Sinai, 2012). As previously noted, Schmid defines radicalism in a political context. As a second component, he defines radical political actions (or radicalism) with three indicators: “*non-violence*”, “*political violence*” and “*terrorism*” (Schmid, 2013: 18).

A process of radicalization is therefore a gradual progression towards three concrete forms of radical activity. This increases definitional clarity and measurement potential through multiple distinguishable end-states. The latter would certainly help if one seeks to explore possible contextual interrelations between the three indicators (Bartlett & Miller, 2011: 4-5).

2.1.1. Clarifying non-violent actions

Pressure and coercion are incorporated in the non-violent part of the radicalization definition. However, what these notions actually represent is not clarified any further, which makes any operationalization quite difficult. Which forms of non-violence can be both defined as “radical” and be observable by scholars? The spread of propaganda through the internet has become a strong source of influence. Various texts and multimedia online reinforce collective identities based on ideological grounds (Archetti, 2015). Alex Schmid specifies that:

“[...] Compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging” (Schmid, 2013: 18).

A non-violent radicalization is measurable by observing *changes* in narrative. Here, discourse comes both in physical- and non-physical form. The physical form of narrative and a shift of outgroup perceptions translates through the increased appeal for confrontational tactics, which might be facilitated by alienating opponents. A great number of radical groups have websites, journals and other forms of literature online. As one of many, the Islamic State (IS) has given out several editions of its journal, the *Dabiq* (Ingram, 2015: 732).

Linked to the process of *Cumulative Extremism*, Busher and Maklin also state that abusive and threatening language can have damaging effects. This is a phenomenon which is observable both off-and on-line, especially with the help of frequent reports by victims. A measurable increase in these kinds of *confrontational* activities could provoke responsive behavior and contribute to an intensification of the inter-group dynamics (Busher and Maklin, 2015: 888).

The former non-violent forms could be said to be *indirect* because there are no clear direct interactions with outgroup members. *Coercion* is defined as varieties of intimidation and threats or some form of pressure or force. It is possible that group members could contact outgroup individuals with the goal of stopping their radical activity. Intimidations and threats towards individuals, families or social networks are non-violent methods that have been efficient.

2.1.2. A sidenote on political violence

Measuring the radicalization of any individual, group or movement is a difficult task. If a possible end-state of a radicalization process is violence by either terrorism or political violence, we need to establish what really defines them. Alex Schmid claims that political violence is indeed very different from terrorism (Schmid, 2013).

First, political violence can come as a response to a repressive state. Since this is not the case for the Norwegian state apparatus, we need to base the analysis on a situation where the rule of law is established. Schmid explains that when a country applies the rule of law, confrontation is understood as form of *oppositional politics*. It is also free and persuasive politics, until escalations result in actions that are not necessarily legal. Concrete examples are hate crimes, public property damage, violent demonstrations or riots (Schmid, 2013: 13-15).

Terrorism then, belongs to a special category of violence. Political terrorism is a strategy of provocation; in most cases, the target is chosen more or less arbitrarily. Its strategy is one of fear-generating actions, but without legal and moral restraints. Civilians are in general the more strategically efficient targets, the propagandist and psychological effects leads to polarization as well as increased bottom-up political pressure (Schmid, 2013: 16-17). This can in some cases lead to irrational decisions from governments. The US military interventions in the Middle East at the turn of the 21th century might very well be one example of such politically “pressured” irrationality from a state actor in modern times.

2.2. Ideology

2.2.1. Radicals

In 2016, the Norwegian police security service (PST) viewed radical Islamism and the radical right as two potentially dangerous movements that could become serious threats to the Norwegian society (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2016: a). Whom do we locate into these movements? The world is not as simple as claimed by many radicals. A dualistic perception of antagonists and protagonists generalizes different masses in society, and denotes the counterpart as “evil” or “incompatible” with their own goals. Security agencies have directed their attention on *radicalized* individuals, which are quite different compared to the majority of the population. How they are discerned becomes facilitated by definitions of “*radicalism*”, like Alex Schmid presents in his summarizing paper on radicalization and extremism (Schmid, 2013).

Schmid argues that *radicalism* has to be located relative to mainstream, status quo political activities. “Moderate” political activity would therefore incorporate populism, which is in many states viewed as a political movement with relatively unusual policies compared to their opponents. Regardless of which political beliefs a populist political party may hold, most still accept the political- and legal path as legitimate (Schmid, 2013: 7). However, radicalism is neither legal, nor typical political. Other scholars have also used similar arguments to make the same distinction. Social movement theorists McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly label political violence as “*contentious politics*”, under which they bridge revolutions, civil wars and others (Della Porta, 2012: 244).

McCauley and Moskalenko also discuss the distinction between “activists” and “radicals”. Activists do not accept the usage of violent and illegal means, but radicals might and can (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2010). Schmid supplements this by arguing that radicals can also be non-violent. Two specific traits stand out: First, they do not accept the current state of society. Second, they want to transform the system through non-violent and democratic means; or by using violent and illegal methods (Schmid, 2013: 7-8).

2.2.2. The radical right:

Schmid’s discussion of the terms “radicalism” and “extremism” concludes that the use of “extremist” in a context of non-violence would not be empirically justified. On major source of

confusion arises because many chose to tie “radical” and “extreme” to general political populism. “*When there is overlap on the far right between extreme rightism, electoral-focused organizations and violent, non-parliamentary movements, again there is scope for confusion and interpretation*” (Hainsworth 2008: 8).

The Norwegian historian Øystein Sørensen argues for 3 degrees of extremes: *populism* is the most moderate variant; *radicalism* is in the middle, and *extremism* the most “undemocratic” (Sørensen et al, 2012: 10-11). In this thesis, *radicalism* is defined by the acceptance of violent and illegal means to achieve an ideological goal. Logically, *Populism* is ruled out because the term characterizes political activity within the legal framework of society. The next step is to merge extremism and radicalism into a slightly more including term, as argued by Alex P. Schmid: *Radicalism*. The term retains a non-violent acceptance of violence as well as the willingness to use violent measures as defined by “violent extremism”. What then defines the *Radical Right*?

Although the movement consists of a multitude of ideologically heterogeneous groups, some key traits stand out across various groups and national borders. First, parts of the ideology has a clear *anti-systemic* value, hence the abolishment of the liberal democratic state is necessary. Second, the radical right ideology is somewhat extensive, and needs to encompass all spheres of life. Third, radicals use historical revisionism to challenge historical facts and delegitimize official historiography (Wolf, 2016: 147-149).

The non-acceptance of multiculturalism (and especially anti-Islam) has become *the* central ideological component of certain fractions within the radical right movement, as well as for a majority of populist political parties in the course of the last decades. Nevertheless, this trait isn’t necessarily fundamental for subgroups within the general movement. Carter as well as Strømme highlight five recurrent ideological features: nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democratic sentiments and the call for a strong state (Carter, 2005: 14-15; Strømme, 2013: 27). As we can see, anti-jihadism is just one of many defining features within the radical-right. For instance, neo-Nazism and fascism remain pillars of the movement. However, anti-jihadism is the central (radical-right) ideological component in this thesis.

Historically, the radical right has generally formed and flourished after disintegrations of the social order. The primary force for these types of mass developments has been forms of modernization (Della Porta, 2013: 72). The influx of immigrants into European nations due to globalization, terrorism caused by Islamic terrorist groups and waves of economic recessions

are some the main drivers behind this ideological success. Immigrants are perceived as a danger for the indigenous culture and identity, often explained through *nativism* in the populist/radical right ideology (Mudde, 2007: 69-87; Ivarsflaten, 2008: 14-17). A belief of racial/cultural superiority drives the identity crisis, coupled with a strong xenophobia (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 7).

The “Islamization” of the western world through influxes of immigration has become a great concern for a great number of radical rightists. As Kundnani observes, the English Defense League differs from the traditional far right because of its “*anti-jihadist*” doctrine. Its main protagonist is Islam and Muslims, which they believe act as a repressor of their native culture. Multiculturalism becomes somewhat of a secondary concern, mainly because it enables the *Islamization* of the society (Kundnani, 2012: 3). The closer absence of a traditional distributional debate differentiates such radical-right groups from populist ideology; the non-acceptance of Islam is certainly a rising thematic. Although scholarly literature mixed the notions, here we find an emerging ideological emphasis of several groups: *counter-jihadism* (Kundnani, 2012: 1).

Some ideologues who belong to this growing movement have been great sources of inspiration for prominent radical right militants. For instance, Anders Behring Breivik’s perception of reality was inspired significantly by the work of Serge Trifkovic as well as Peder Nøstvold Jensen, known by the pseudonym “Fjordman” (Strømmen, 2011: 65-57; 70-71). Toby Archer argues that fundamentally, the “anti-jihadi” movement has been a product of the US terrorist attacks of 9/11 coupled with the interconnectivity that followed the growth of the internet (Taylor et al, 2013: 173-174). In any case, counter-jihadism has the power to mobilize individuals or groups with violent intentions.

2.2.3. *Radical Islamism:*

The significant number of terrorist attacks in Europe the past years has created an aggrandizing psychological pressure on residing Muslim communities. Ever since 9/11, specific minority groups have suffered from responsabilization of terrorism, presumably stemming from labelling from the media, the general population and security agencies (Mythen et al, 2009). A significant problem is that the phenomenon acts as a vicious circle; we experience a polarizing effect on society as long as there is a lack of a clear differentiation. “What kind” of ideology defines

radical Islamism, compared to a moderate, peaceful and modern version of Islam practiced by nearly all Muslims in European societies?

“*Islamism*’ is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final aim is the conquest of the world by all means” (Mozaffari, 2007: 21).

Mehdi Mozaffari developed this definition of Islamism with the goal of a clear differentiation between moderate and radical Islam. Interchangeable terms like “radical Islam” and “Islamic fundamentalism” reflect the desire to define the new form of faith that emerged and developed from colonial times until 9.11.2001 (Mozaffari, 2007: 17-19). “Islamism” reflects a new configuration of Islamic activism: it has become less political, more religious, increasingly violent, critical towards the West and hostile towards established regimes in the Arab world (Mozaffari, 2007: 18).

Mozaffari’s definition has four important components. First, the ideology is *religious*. Second, the *holistic* interpretation of Islam means that religion embraces every aspect of social life: the Sharia laws must characterize the societal structure. Ideologues like Said Qutb, Khomeini and al-Banna have contributed to the totalitarian aspect of Islamism through diverse writings that would later become ideological ground pillars (Mozaffari, 2007: 23). This extensiveness is quite similar to the one found in the radical right narrative.

Third, radical Islamism wants the proliferation of its religious doctrines. Repressive states pressured by “anti-Islamic” governments have to be replaced with societies that correspond to an ideal reference point. In essence, there lies a wish for religious universalism which corrects repression in the existing world (Mozaffari, 2007: 21-23), an anti-systemic notion that is also shared by some within the radical right movement. In both Salafism and Wahhabism, there has occurred major ideological changes: a transformation from a national/regional ideology towards transnationalism, inspired primarily by al-Qaeda post-9/11. Lorenzo characterizes this phenomenon as “*global Jihad*”: the ideological goal of terrorist groups to obtain a transnational agenda (Bosi et al, 2014: 277).

The last part states that a world conquest should require all means, although this is a vague point that needs clarification. Radical Islamist groups do not chose violent strategies the majority of the time; it has been used few times relative to other means. This depends on affiliated groups, the specific time in history, and structural opportunities (Mozaffari, 2007: 24). In many ways, radical Islamism shares common traits with counter-jihadism or Nazism/neo-Nazism. For instance, both factions have dualistic and exclusive views of the world where one

or many groups are alienated and perceived as dangerous for their protected collective. This ideological relationship one of several components that will be furtherly analyzed in this thesis.

2.3. The process of radicalization

As scholars moved away from understanding terrorism as irrational behavior, the field of radicalization has favored radical activities as part of a larger dynamic process. There are multiple levels of analysis, from the individual level to groups, networks, organizations, movements, socio-cultural contexts and international-interstate contexts. Actors enter processes of radicalization through different forms of “*pathways*”. This notion interplays with a variety of factors, like national economies and politics as well as the individual and collective psychology (Borum, 2011: 14-15). Radicalization is thus a process driven by a certain complexity. The lack of a general theoretical framework for entangled systemic dynamics is problematic, but we do find appropriate interpretive frameworks for inter-group dynamics between radical right- and radical Islamic groups.

Different theories reflect distinctive ways of looking at the dynamic process of radicalization. As Walter Laqueur states: “*one should not try to develop a general theory of terrorism, it is a dynamic process dependent on its time and national context*” - the same applies for radicalization (Borum, 2011: 15). Say we compare both Paris terrorist attacks (2015) to Anders Behring Breivik’s actions in Norway (2011). It would certainly be difficult to believe that the “lone wolf” profile of Breivik has emerged from similar processes of radicalization as the two Kouachi brothers, or Salah Abdeslam’s network. The same applies for the complex interactions between individuals, groups and state actors: it is quite difficult to generalize distinct processes.

A structured overview of applicable theories figures in Crossett and Spitaletta’s literature review from 2010. Here, the scholars discuss strengths and weaknesses of 16 theories from different disciplines. First, most *psychological, psychoanalytic and cognitive theories* seem to have a strong applicability for mechanisms of individual/group radicalization. This is in relationship to both in-group and out-group ties, meaning members within their group as well as actors towards whom they have a competitive or hostile perception. Hence, studies target micro- level human behavior and mental functions (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010). Since this thesis focuses primarily on inter-group dynamics, these theories seem to have limited relevance.

This problem of applicability is also the case for some social science theories. For example, *Relative Deprivation Theory* focuses on economic disparities as a source of radicalization, but lacks a more substantial analysis of inter-group relations (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 14-15). The same problem is recurrent in *Social Network Theory*, where person-to-person associations is studied more closely than group dynamics (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 16-17).

2.3.1. Social psychology

Two sets of theories strikes as relevant for the study of inter-group dynamics. First, there is *Group Dynamic Theory* from the socio-psychological subfield. Group dynamic theory focuses mostly on small groups but is in practice applicable to the study of larger groups and mass-movements. (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 22-24). Social psychological models like Moskalkenko and McCauley's model of mechanisms of radicalization have taken inspiration from psychological analyses (Borum, 2011: 21). An important aspect of the latter research is the notion of "*grievances*", which denotes psychological mechanisms that drives the radicalization process. Individuals and groups develop different types of grievances (McCauley & Moskalkenko, 2008).

Interesting mechanisms to investigate in this particular thesis are primarily those between groups/counter-groups and movements/counter-movements. First, the most relevant types of grievances are tied to inter-group dynamics. McCauley & Moskalkenko argue that conflict between groups often lead to *hate*, which in turn can develop into a dehumanization of the antagonist party. Hate is a dangerous grievance because it can result in impulsive attacks against a counterpart (McCauley & Moskalkenko, 2008: 427-428). Smaller (competitive) group-interactions can also lead to a further intra-group radicalization. Outgroup threats strengthen in-group cohesion, identification, nationalism or norms (McCauley & Moskalkenko, 2008: 426). An interesting point is that by analyzing inter-group interactions, we can also observe how it interplays with in-group/individual grievances.

2.3.2. Social Movement Theory

Among social sciences, the study of inter-group radicalization has been especially significant in *Social Movement Theory*. SMT treats the relation between individuals, groups and state actors. The transmission of grievances takes place in social networks, which are functions of

specific political or social conditions (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 17-19). In essence, three features define social movements. First, they are engaged in conflictual collective actions with opposed actors. Second, interactions happen in dense informal networks: hence, a mix of individual and organized actors. Third, social movements thrive when collective identities develop. Connectedness facilitates the potential for a stronger mobilization (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 19-22).

Some conceptual clarifications are necessary. A *movement* is different from a *group* because movements diffuse the ideological ground pillar that generally resides within most subgroups affiliated to it. They are constituted of informal interactions, but behavior is collective (Diani, 1992: 7). Groups do not need to be defined with social traits, but identities form based on shared orientations, values, worldviews and lifestyles (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 91-92). Different forms of beliefs can occur and develop within nations, but the diffusion of radical ideas is also as a transnational phenomenon. Groups differ because intra-group processes and specific environmental conditions are mixed with a core ideological component that stems from the movement, creating varying interpretations of ideological narrative.

Within Social Movement Theory, we find empirical evidence of inter-group conflicts and dynamics. “[...] *Social movement theories in particular can contribute a great deal to strengthening any theoretical and conceptual apparatus used to analyze terrorism and political violence*” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 886-887). McCauley and Moskalenko’s mapping of mechanisms of radicalization through group interactions is largely due to the work of scholars like Donatella Della Porta, who connects SMT concepts to violent radicalism in her study of numerous European militant groups (Borum, 2011: 18).

Additionally, Social Movement Theory gives the narrative an influential role in the indoctrination process; specific arguments made by radical movements reflect the dominating grievances that trigger their affiliated groups (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 18). Still, violence remains a core element of SMT, interactions between individuals, groups and states have previously resulted in mutual escalations of violence (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 17-19). Sageman also emphasizes the importance of horizontal networks and social bonds for the radicalization process (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010: 804). Stemming from the escalating progress, tiny factions of the original protest group go underground as terrorist cells (Crossett & Spitaletta, 2010: 19).

2.4. The concept: Cumulative Extremism

The concept known as “*Cumulative Extremism*” (CE) appeared with Roger Eatwell in 2006. His pessimism about the future of peaceful multiculturalism in Britain stemmed from the growth of several radical political groups. On one side, the English Defense League represented a rather anti-Islamic and nationalist ideology. On the other, British Islamic fundamentalist groups rose in strength and numbers. Eatwell observed an increase of violent attacks since 2001, which might be partly explained by a stronger “community tension” (Eatwell, 2006: 204-205).

To explain the rise of ethnic extremism, Eatwell points to ten changing societal factors and their influence on a weakening British community cohesion. The analysis suggests a mix between internal and external influences. Internal influence may come from increased immigration on British soil, relative deprivation of alienated groups or social separation through a visible segregation of certain social groups. Among several external factors, he mentions the diffusion of information through the Internet and the power of symbolic events. These factors increase the risk of violence between radical groups by diminishing community cohesion, also understood as *polarization* (Eatwell, 2006: 205-214).

After witnessing violent protests in 2006 of Muslim protesters against the Danish-made Muhammed cartoons, parts of the media evoked Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” as a new upcoming reality (Eatwell, 2006: 213). Eatwell’s analysis highlights a societal problem, but ultimately views it as far less (potentially) destructive than parts of the western media. However, the scholar appealed to the need to study the interaction between different forms of radicalism:

“A more general pattern is one of extremist animosities fueling each other rather than fraternization and understanding” (Eatwell, 2006: 213).

Some radical groups can provoke antagonist group into adopting violent means. The author argues that especially radical-right actors try to shape their “eurabian” thesis through physical clashes with ethnic minorities (Eatwell, 2006: 213-215). Observations indicate that political representatives of bigger moderate Muslim masses, as the *Islamic council of Europe*, somewhat discourage integration in western nations. They have also expressed their wish for formations of Muslim gatherings in some geographic areas, in attempt to conserve a “Muslim culture” (Eatwell, 2006: 214).

In essence, Roger Eatwell's argument has two components. First, radical groups in society have dualistic views of the world. They are themselves part of a "good side" and their opponents are generally another culturally distinguishable part of society, often homogeneously generalized into a bigger movement of cultures and beliefs. The radical right and European Islamist movements have reached a symbiotic state: the actions of one side towards a specific ideological goal will automatically reinforce the worldview of its counter-movement. Therefore, the potential for a phenomenon of ideological symbiosis is increasing (Eatwell, 2006).

The second component states that a cultural polarization of society could eventually increase the level of violence between radical groups, at the cost of normal political pathways (Eatwell, 2006: 215). Eatwell states that community tension could lead to spirals of violence, thus escalating hostilities between opposing radical groups. In fact, this potential security threat got quickly incorporated into British national policy based off available empirical evidence and events post-2006 (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 885).

Eatwell's concept plays out in two different timeframes. First, the development of narrative and other deeper ideological processes are latent and gradual. Busher and Maklin characterizes this as a long-wavelength process. Movement and counter-movements interact, producing interpretive frames and grievances towards each other. However, regarding structural explanations, Eatwell believes that any escalation of violence happens in a spiraling process, without specifying when, how long, or from whom escalation or de-escalation occurs (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 891-892).

TELL MAMA's annual report from 2015 mentions an increase in violence, but in forms of *spikes* that lasted shortly following the attack. In many cases, they were directed towards civilians or infrastructure with religious/political significance. The phenomenon of short-lasting spikes of violence has been observed in several countries, often after terrorist attacks that have gotten significant international resonance (Littler & Feldman, 2015; Fry, 2016: 122).

2.5. Understanding Cumulative Extremism through Social Movement Theory

Social Movement Theory (SMT) brings a supplementary framework of analysis that should be included to the concept of Cumulative Extremism for a broader understanding of the phenomenon through important structures of political opportunity. While the (contextually

isolated) concept of CE (acronym for Cumulative Extremism) pinpoints to how we can observe manifestations of the phenomenon, SMT supplements the theory with a structural explanation of *why* or *why not* inter-group dynamics actually occur in a more general context. A *social movement* is a set of ideas that spread through society via loose networks (Nawaz, 2011: 4). Busher and Maklin argue that Cumulative Extremism is a form of what social movement theorists call “*Competitive Escalation*” (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 887).

The process of *Competitive Escalations* stems from the research of Donatella Della Porta. First, her academic contributions have given the subfield of radicalization valuable empirical data. Significant amounts of observations regarding Italian and German group dynamics sheds light on the inter-group competition on a larger European scale (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014). Second, empirical data enabled Della Porta to map multi-level causes for the various forms of competitive escalations. In “*Clandestine Political Activism*” (2013), she presents three sets of environmental conditions: *Structural* (root) causes, *facilitator* (dynamic) causes, and *precipitating* (contingent) events (Della Porta, 2013: 71).

Preconditions is another expression for “root causes”, or contextual opportunities that could facilitate or harden certain forms of behavior. In “*The Trouble with Radicalization*” (2010), Sedgwick notes that the discussion about root causes of radicalization has been significantly de-emphasized after 9/11 (Sedgwick, 2010: 480-481). Some highlight the role of economic factors, although the statement lacks consistent evidence. Others point to rapid modernization and urbanization as a cause for violence (Della Porta, 2013: 72), something which applies especially to the radical-right. Modernization can have direct effects on social preconditions like the search for identity, which is also a cultural factor (IBID).

If actors are to accept extreme forms of discourse and violence, Della Porta suggests that an additional explanation comes from *facilitator causes*, such as grievances (Della Porta, 2013: 71-72). McCauley and Moskaleiko incorporate grievances in their models of radicalization, at the individual level as well as the group-level. Collective responses to outgroup threats can in a group-context lead to hardened collective identification, patriotism or nationalism. In essence, a clear ideological hostility is a central factor for the occurrence of any inter-group conflict. This point is quite interesting for the notion of mutual “fueling” which follows the concept of Cumulative Extremism (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 426-427).

In small groups, grievances over isolation and threat of perceived enemies can create extreme group cohesions and interdependence (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 423-424). In-group

leaders get increased respect, increasing sanctions against group deviates occurs, and in-group norms are strengthened (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 426). Prolonged conflicts between groups can also result in dehumanization or hate towards a perceived opponent, which augments the risk of impulsive attacks (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 426-428). These emotive intensifications after outgroup interactions are important in a process of Cumulative Extremism.

Lastly, Della Porta mentions the importance of *precipitating events*, which could act as triggers for violent reactions from radical groups (Della porta, 2013: 71). Bartlett and Birdwell came to similar conclusions in their analysis; the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013 was crucial in the escalation of conflicts between radical Islamists and the EDL in Britain (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). National events can also become international injustice symbols, like the Muhammad caricatures that the Danish journal *Jyllandsposten* published in 2005. The events of 9/11, the conflict in Palestine and the 03' Iraq war did certainly have similar effects. While many moderate Muslims in different countries did react to this phenomenon, only a few individuals actually mobilized with violent goals (Bosi et al, 2016: 217-232). This shows how particular episodes can have problematic consequences as they gain international resonance.

These three categories of variables are all important when explaining the larger dynamics of radicalization. Unfortunately, analyzing them all would be too extensive for this thesis. However, looking at one of the three could give significant explanatory power to the process of Cumulative Extremism in specific national contexts. In this dissertation, the focus lies on structural causes, which can act as facilitating or limiting conditions for processes of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. These indicate the radical groups' scope of opportunity and their strategies, in many ways societal limits or freedoms in political contexts.

Different categories of factors highlight general tendencies of group interactions, but their individual strength could be context-dependent. For example, community polarization could be the main driver for CE in Britain, but other countries may observe other structural conditions to be more important (Brockett, 1991: 253). The body of theory and recent findings makes it possible to isolate key conditions of great importance for inter-group radicalization. These will figure after the presentation of the new conceptual changes of CE.

2.6. Cumulative Extremism: conceptual disagreement

Since 2006, the concept of “Cumulative Extremism” has been subject to increased amounts of academic attention. In the British context, we find a number of analysis related to mechanisms of inter-group radicalization (Eatwell, 2006; Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013), this is also the case for Italy, Germany, Northern Ireland (Della Porta, 2013; Bosi et al, 2014) and Norway (Bjørngo et al 2001; Bjørngo 2005). Although some have analyzed radicalization in an inter-group context, the subject is in itself still quite recent. Naturally, there is still a lack of consensus at the conceptual level. Academics have criticized Cumulative Extremism in recent years, and for several reasons.

2.6.1. *How wording may affect the concept*

Existing research establishes that radical inter-group interactions can occur indirectly, directly, at the narrative level, and through violence of different forms and degrees. There has been a growing interest in the subject; but some scholars warn that the need for caution is increasing (Maklin & Busher, 2015: 53-54). A few discuss that the concept of CE could itself need changes (Busher & Maklin, 2014), which will figure later in this thesis. A first step is to illustrate one smaller problem that remains unsolved: scholars’ choice of actual words to describe the dyadic dynamic.

Cumulative Extremism (Eatwell, 2006), “*Tit for tat*” *Extremism* (Mughal. 2014; Kundnani, 2012), *Reciprocal Radicalization* (Cole & Pantucci, 2014), *Reactive Group-Radicalization* (Fry, 2016). These are some of the description used by different scholars for the study of a similar phenomenon (Maklin and Busher, 2015). There is no doubt that the subfield of inter-group radicalization could certainly benefit from homogenous characterizations. As Maklin and Busher argue, it is quite problematic that the concept has multiple depictions (Busher & Maklin, 2014: 885).

First, *Extremism* and *Radicalization* is certainly not the same thing, there has been a wrongful equating of the two notions. Alex P. Schmid argues this point by showing that the concept of *Extremism* is, in itself, flawed. The contradiction arrives when one tries to differentiate “non-violent” and “violent extremism” from one another. What is non-violent extremism? According to Schmid, this notion is non-existent. *Radicals*, on the other hand, have empirically been known to be both. Extremists do not accept democratic solutions, based on their inflexible mono-causal interpretations of the world; you are either with them or against them. Radicals do

not reject most democratic values, and could be potential allies in counter-terrorism (Schmid, 2014: 7-11).

“Radicals then are not per se violent and while they might share certain characteristics (e.g. alienation from the state, anger over a country’s foreign policy, feelings of discrimination) with (violent) extremists, there are also important differences (such as regarding the willingness to engage in critical thinking). It does not follow that a radical attitude must result in violent behavior – a finding well established by decades of research” (Schmid, 2014: 8).

What Schmid demonstrates is that scholars who want to measure the same thing, actually renders their task extremely complicated. Comparing results would ultimately be unproductive. Are we measuring violent actions, a wider non-violent community polarization, or maybe both? (Maklin & Busher, 2014: 54). The choice of the word “*Extremism*” could force academics to analyze violent actions, which is unproblematic if that is the ultimate goal but dubious if non-violence and the narrative do have a certain importance in the research.

The second point is that the supporting component of the concept comes in many different varieties. For instance, the words “*cumulative*” and “*reciprocal*” have quite different meanings. While *cumulative* could very well be associated with escalating violence, it says nothing on the mutuality of the phenomenon. Establishing *reciprocity* will on the other hand tell us nothing about an eventual shift from non-violent strategies towards violent tactics (Maklin & Busher, 2014: 54). This also applies to labels like “*Tit for tat*” or “*Reactive*”. To increase measurement efficiency, we need to inject more (and identical) descriptive words into the concept. For example, if we chose to measure inter-group dynamics through the concept of “*Reciprocal Radicalization*”, we find that it is also the description of a concept of *intra*-group radicalization in WW2 Germany (Mommsen, 1997: 2). Establishing the dynamics in play as vertical or horizontal then becomes necessary.

2.7. Cumulative Extremism - Pathways of influence:

2.7.1. Non-violent interactions

[...] Normal practices of dialogue, compromise and tolerance between political actors and groups with diverging interests are abandoned by one or both sides in a conflict dyad in favor of a growing commitment to engage in confrontational tactics of conflict-waging. (Schmid, 2013)

Although behavior is non-violent, the classification also contains radical actions. The definition above is quite important; the condition of “growing confrontational tactics” implies a *move* towards illegal methods of interaction. As we have seen, the classification of non-violent interactions between radical groups can happen on-line and off-line. Much like violent means, non-violence can be targeted both at radicals (*direct* contact) affiliated to groups or movements as well as civilians (*indirect* contact) (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 892).

Indirect interactions between radical groups can happen online. For example, after Woolwich, the EDL saw a significant increase of its online support (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4-5). This is manifested by changes of narratives, towards a more radical discourse of the counter-movement. A general trend already shows this with the new central ideological components of the two movements: *counter-Jihadism* and the strategy of *global Jihad*.

Especially within the radical right, the ideological radicalization process in the last decades has alienated several European Muslim communities. This ideological development is not necessarily bound to any precipitating event. By investigating websites, we might observe the increased commitment of confrontational tactics against “Muslims” but also “Western” citizens, dependent on the radical groups in question. Incidents online of an indirect nature could manifest in verbal abuse against common citizens on the “enemy side”. Social media such as Facebook and other interactive websites should have a central role in this process (Sabha et al, 2015: 5).

Off-line non-violence is quite similar to online-actions, but differs because confrontations are between individuals in person. These incidents are illegal because dialog takes the form of religious/racial hatred or threats (Tell MAMA, 2015: 13). As defined by Schmid, direct non-violent confrontation between group members is mostly about *pressure and coercion*. Increased inter-group intimidation, threats or abusive language should be indications of a non-violent radicalization process. In contrast to the everyday citizen, it is improbable that radicals would contact the police to report incidents against them. Interviews with these individuals could be more fruitful than to rely on police reports. Not all incidents against victims of hate crimes are reported as well; some argue that this is because some social groups display a higher level of mistrust against institutions of law enforcement (Pezella, 2017: 10-11).

Reports point to a general increase in *off-line* incidents after 9/11. Vandalism against mosques has apparently become a transnational trend (Stormark & Strømme, 2015: 13-14). These are in most cases initiated by radical-right individuals or groups, and emphasize the *counter-jihadi*

ideological component that has been developing the last decade or so. “*Pork attacks*” have occurred in Norway, where bacon and other forms of pig meat have been placed right outside a mosque in Kristiansand. The perpetrators were active members of the radical-right group SIAN (*Stop Islamiseringen av Norge*). Since then, Norwegian mosques experienced four episodes (2008, 2011, 2012, and 2013) of similar nature. This phenomenon has also occurred in other countries in Europe like France, Sweden or Germany (Stormark & Strømme, 2015: 27-29).

2.7.2. *Violent interactions*

Following Roger Eatwell’s initial analysis of the phenomenon of CE in the British context, several incidents have occurred that made facilitated scholars’ research of inter-group mechanisms and radicalization. Bartlett and Birdwell suggest that there is a “*clear intuitive case for this phenomenon*”. They perceive the creation of the English Defense League as a response to the activities of al-Mujahiroun in Royal Wootton Bassett (UK). Since then, both groups’ intentions of provoking their antagonist became apparent, sometimes in forms of *direct* violent behavior (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4). Violent interactions can occur both in direct and indirect nature. In contrast to direct confrontation, an indirect form of violence does not focus on interactions between two radical groups, but on radicalism against civilians.

A small fraction of British citizens with radical Islamic beliefs admitted multiple attempts to plot attacks on EDL members in May 2013. Later the same month, a former leader of an EDL counter-rally murdered British army soldier Lee Rigby in the famous “Woolwich attack”. Anjem Choudhry then announced the creation of an EDL-type group, the Islamic Defense League, a month later. This continuation of violent and sporadic reprisals eventually forced the British Prime minister to establish a new taskforce on radicalization (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4-5). These events show that inter-group interactions can manifest in *direct confrontations* between the involved parties. However, the radical groups are not always the ones targeted.

For Mughal, the threat of the radical-right movement and its subgroups should be taken as seriously as ISIS or Al-Qaeda. The EDL facilitates the “simple man’s” negative perception of a Muslim citizen. If this hostility becomes a mainstream notion, it can result in increased abuse from EDL recruits and sympathizers. In fact, Mughal’s national Islamophobia-project “TELL MAMA” found evidence of increased violence and abuse against common Muslim in 2012/13 (Copsey et al, 2013) and 2013/2014 (Littler & Feldman, 2014). Post-Woolwich, the EDL saw

a significant increase of hate crimes directed towards civilians and mosques (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 4-5). These sorts of actions unite under the classification of political violence (Schmid, 2013: 13-15), but are strategically *indirectly* aimed at another radical group.

Events in different countries have demonstrated that Eatwell's prediction of conflict escalations through *spirals* remains unclear, despite Woolwich and its connected episodes. Regarding violent confrontational tactics, it is far from obvious that we should expect an escalation of this kind of behavior. Instead, the emerging tendency shows a clustering of interactions around a key event (Busher & Maklin, 2015: 891; Maklin and Busher, 2015: 57-59). Structural opportunities are important; targeting civilians is the easiest strategy if inter-group interaction is difficult. However, the thesis argues that consistent inter-group contact beyond spikes would, in most cases, remain unreported and "under the radar".

2.8. Cumulative Extremism revised

With the help of proposals from several scholars and CE literature, this thesis seeks to develop a revised concept of *Cumulative Extremism* can be operationalized in different inter-group contexts. Hopefully, mapping the scope of interactive arenas contributes to further transnational research and coordination in the subfield. If we are to explore more cases of this specific phenomenon, it is important that we propose a proper general conceptualization.

2.8.1. What should we call the phenomenon?

As argue earlier in the thesis, describing the inter-group radicalization process as "*Cumulative Extremism*" is problematic. *Extremism* overlooks the radicalization power of ideas, narrative and ideology. However, *radicalization* extends our interpretation of the process and incorporates non-violence as an important component. Radicalization also has a second function: it describes a cumulative or gradual process. In Schmid's definition, he describes it as a "*growing commitment*" (Schmid, 2013: 18).

The problem with a cumulative process is that it implies spiraling notion or successive additions. What about asymmetrical spikes of violence? A growing commitment could latently form in ideology and later burst out in a single spike. No acts of reprisal are necessary; the process could stop at this point. During clashes between the British National Party and AFA in the 1990s, BNP innovated tactically away from violence: something that can be defined as

“*cumulative de-radicalization*” (Maklin & Busher, 2014: 59). How could we then measure an ideological accumulation? Based on the previous argument, we need to replace “cumulative”. Describing CE simply as a dynamic of radicalization seems logical. It leaves open the possibility of either spikes or spirals of reciprocal violence.

Stating that the process is one of radicalization says nothing about the direction of it. As demonstrated, vertical radicalization is an intra-group process. Any inter-group process is one of *horizontal* nature, and this should figure in the description for conceptual distinctiveness. A horizontal process implies the specific direction of the process, but remains inclusive so that both spikes and spirals is possible. This inclusiveness is important because varying contexts will determine how the dynamic manifests itself. Inter-group dynamics *can* lead to a radicalization of narrative, but it may as well stop right there. In other words, no increase in visible violence or even certain forms of non-violence are central for this specific process to occur.

Another important aspect is to establish *reciprocity*. A problem that the thesis discussed earlier regards the asymmetrical relationship and the ideological perception of the enemy. An asymmetrical ideological relationship between two radical factions would probably not cause sustained inter-group conflicts. A mutual link is necessary to establish *reciprocity*: the fueling goes in both directions. Hence, we end up with a new description: ***Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization***. This concept includes radical non-violent acts as an important indicator, as well political violence and terrorism as outcomes of HRR. In the long run, we end up with the intensification of one end-state as well as a move towards other forms as tactical innovations.

2.8.2. *Description*

Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization process is defined by a gradual increase of radicalism towards an ideological goal, as groups are in conflict with one another. It is a two-way process, defined by a dynamic of reciprocal tactical innovation to surpass the enemy (Della Porta, 2012: 246). When we arrive at this stage, the most current form of radicalism used by groups is political violence. In her research on political violence and radicalization, Della Porta finds that political violence depend on two things: political opportunities that trigger violence, and the presence of an ideology that justifies violence (Della Porta, 2012: 248). Political opportunity structures enable the legitimation of the violent ideological component.

Although this thesis focuses on the causal effects of three specific independent variables, alternative explanations can also be quite interesting for a further conceptual development. Reports from TELL MAMA or Hate Speech International show that sporadic increases of hate crimes against Muslims are often triggered by terrorist attacks, demonstrations and others forms of symbolic events that might trigger responsive behavior from an outgroup (Stormark & Strømmen, 2015: 13). This applies primarily to indirect strategies of interaction. The scale of violent and non-violent radicalization intensifies with *facilitator causes*: the psychological effects of the contact. Direct or indirect interactions with an outgroup cause intra-group radicalization, which then again drives outgroup radicalization if further direct/indirect confrontations of radical nature take place.

2.8.3. *Observing Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization: three possible outcomes*

There are three specific manifestations of the process of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Alex Schmid defines radicalization as a shift from peaceful political strategies towards (radical) **non-violence, violence or terrorism** (Schmid, 2013). The three indicators function by the family resemblance, where one of the alternatives is sufficient to enlighten the process (Goertz, 2006: 36-37). Indicators of radicalization are recognized as individual end-states, but it is evident that displays of radicalization through exclusively non-violence would not be considered as a major problem in the same extent as situations where factions employ tactics of political violence or terrorism.

Radicalization feeds on an ideological basis. First, we often find ideology to be a cover for pathological backgrounds in cases of “loners”. There are rare cases of non-ideological mass-murders like the German Wings pilot Andreas Lubitz (Merelli, 2015); however, they do represent only a minority of the cases of perpetrator. We can thus assume that in most cases, ideology drives different forms of actions (Pantucci, 2011:14-19). Secondly, ideological camouflage is also problematic when we consider that some radical Islamists may profess “*taqiyya*”, which is the notion hiding religious intentions under certain circumstances. Therefore, if radical groups interact by using violent means, we could most likely observe a preexisting narrative or tendencies of radical non-violence that advocates an amplified use of violence.

Alex Schmid presents **non-violent radicalism** as the first end-state of radicalization (Schmid, 2013: 18), which manifests through *direct* or *indirect* contact. Direct interactions take place

between group members, while indirect interactions are asymmetrical: between radical group members and civilians. The strategy behind indirect interactions is to provoke the counterpart, or aiming at producing reactionary behavior from outgroups. Arenas for radical non-violence are both *on-line and off-line*; pressure and coercion is not bound to any physical contact but might as well happen on social network, by telephone or email. A move from indirect tactics towards direct physical confrontations indicates increased competitiveness and hostility of group-strategies. Social Movement Theory states that this is facilitating for “*competitive escalation*”, hence there is a bigger chance that we might see a move from one indicator of Schmid’s definition to another (Della Porta, 2013: 71-72).’

It is important to clarify that a cumulative innovation towards political violence is not necessary, and in some cases improbable. The amount of non-violence through pressure and coercion can increase, but the use of violent ends such as political violence or terrorism in an inter-group conflict might be strategically and practically impossible for radicals due to certain structural constraints. Nevertheless, if inter-group conflict sustains over longer periods, it would be unlikely that escalation remained within the non-violent spectrum of radicalism.

Alex Schmid states that we measure non-violent radicalism through increased pressure and coercion. Increased appeals towards violent means in narrative indicates a growing ideological confrontational tactic. Ideological narrative moves towards the opposite of what Schmid denotes as “democratic”: tolerance and compromise (Schmid, 2013: 18). Different forms of hate speeches correspond to this description, like threats, defamations and discriminations based on group-belongings (Sunde, 2013: 35). In non-verbal forms, vandalism against symbolic infrastructures is also an indicator of the horizontal process of radicalization, as long as these actions have their basis in ideology. As we shall see in the next section, this turns out to be quite problematic in practice.

The second observable outcome is **political violence**. Like non-violence, it can occur either indirectly (radical-civilian) or directly (radical-radical). An increase in indirect interactions should be observable through increases in hate crimes, ideologically responsive to the activity of counter-groups. Increased physical confrontations between radicals themselves do also indicate the process, as long as these are ideologically motivated confrontations.

Scholars have observed *indirect* non-violence and political violence in forms of spikes after precipitating events. For instance, the French political expert Jean-Yves Camus warned about radical-right violence against the French Muslims population, primarily in response to the

various terrorist attacks in the country (Albertini, 2016). *Direct* confrontational tactics are sometimes harder to detect, under the radar or not necessarily reported. Nevertheless, as long as groups do not directly take credit for accidents, indirect tactics distort indications of their general behavior. We do not always know if aggressors have particular affiliations to groups with radical ideologies in reported hate crimes. The aftermath of the murder of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands (2004) illustrates this point, where only 10% of many hundreds incidents of political violence were linked to known groups (Taylor et al, 2013: 116-117).

The last observable outcome is **terrorism**. A terrorist attack is a possible end-state of the Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization-process. This thesis treats terrorism as an end-state that might have its basis in the diffusion of narrative as much as by prolonged violent inter-group actions. Terrorism in dyadic contexts is ultimately unlikely as a tactical tool in conflicts unless we observe a growing commitment for the reciprocal use of at least one of the two other forms of radicalism before it.

2.8.4. *Indirect strategies and Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization*

When it comes to measurability, indirect tactics of interaction is a challenge. The main actors in the relevant dynamic are radical groups. Let us say that an annual anti-Muslim racism report shows that an X number of civilians have been victims of hate crimes or racist slurs right after precipitating events. Are all the assailants radicals, or just some of them? Is an individual *per definition* radical after one perpetration, or can it be a case of an “emotive outburst”? These questions are impossible to quantify in precise estimates, because ideologically moderate individuals can also have powerful emotional responses to symbolic events as well as normal circumstances.

Nonetheless, indirect strategies are incorporated in the overall concept of reciprocal inter-group radicalization. As scholars have discussed (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013), in many cases radical groups uses them to fuel grievances in a counter-group/movement as well as reactive behavior. In some instances, the ideological goal is an escalation of inter-group conflicts, which legitimates and reinforces their worldview. However, the problem is that we cannot be certain of: a) an aggressor’s possible group belonging and b) the tactical/ideological goal behind the crime. Thus, maintaining direct strategies amongst radical groups reflects not just a state of mutual tension between two vague oppositions, but enables us to observe interactions between specific ideological opponents. It removes the risk of creating too many *false positives* (Busher

& Maklin, 2015: 886), which is probable if we chose to analyze indirect actions without any further conceptual changes.

This thesis chooses to incorporate radicalism against non-radical targets in the concept because observations show that this is a specific tactical tool practiced by radical groups, which eventually leads to provocation of enemy groups and in some cases reprisals. A possible explanation to similarities between radical and “non-radical” responses is that the ideological component presented by radicals, especially the radical right, has been popularized by populist parties and vice versa (Betz, 1993: 415; Strømme, 2011: 149).

Radicals and common citizens share similar opinions, grievances and emotive responses. This creates a measurement blur of the indirect aspect of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Muslims in the UK now face a dual threat: political violence committed by a small number of radical nationalists as well as unaffiliated individuals and gangs (Taylor et al, 2013: 55). Further analysis will have its basis in direct radicalism between radical groups, either in non-violent or violent forms.

Third party actors and structural conditions explain how the context determines inter-group interactions. The discussion so far has tried to establish the end-states of the phenomenon, because there has been a need for conceptual clarification. However, this answers the “if”. Presenting and analyzing political opportunity structures lets us answer the “why”. In Norway, this question becomes especially interesting. In the 1990s, clashes between neo-Nazi- and anti-racist groups indicate processes of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (Bjørge et al, 2001; Bjørge, 2005). Similar dynamics have been observed between radical Islamists and counter-jihadists in Britain. Nevertheless, no (direct) interactions in either end-state of Schmid’s radicalization were observed between their “sister groups” in Norway. What can explain this? The next sections presents three independent variables that theory pinpoints as drivers for processes of inter-group radicalization.

2.9. Independent variables

Social Movement Theory does not present any specific framework of variables to explain any occurrence of competitive (inter-group) escalation. In SMT, several theorists have used the term “political opportunity structures”, where the basic idea is that external factors facilitate mobilization when they come in certain manifestations: “*Analysts therefore appropriately*

direct much of their attention to the world outside a social movement, on the premise that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit a social movement's prospects" (Meyer, 2004: 126).

However, Donatella Della Porta discovers a crucial aspect of radicalization, political violence and competitive escalation. She highlights the importance of interactions between mechanisms of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization:

"A lack of narrowing of opportunities alone is a necessary but not sufficient precondition for sustained waves of political violence". Mechanisms that cause radicalization are activated by interactions between movement activists and their opponents [...]" (Della Porta, 2012: 246).

What Della Porta argues is that cases of HRR require a mix of structural facilitators and systematic contact between different fractions to spark conflict and sustain it over longer periods in time. Sporadic contact then logically limits the possibility for reciprocal tactical innovations; processes of reciprocal radicalization cease in cases where limiting factors hinder group interaction. We should then expect variables to have very different manifestations across inter-group cases with dissimilar outcomes.

Networks in which social movements and their subgroups operate within are quite complex. For instance, there are different levels of analysis in the studies of political violence and terrorism. While terrorism studies focus on micro-level psychological explanations, social movement studies have often examined macro-level variables such as the effects of economic development and modernization. Della Porta argues that these interpretations lack meso-level variables, an analytical level that captures both dynamics and interactions in the organizational field (Della Porta, 2012: 246).

Three explanatory variables have been selected from a mix of findings in Social Movement Theory, the sub-field of Competitive Escalation and in the concept of Cumulative Extremism. The independent variables are *ideology*, *counter-radicalization* and *competition*. These variables create conditions for inter-group radicalization, and are located within the meso-level of analysis due to the group-perspective of the analysis. Nevertheless, the thesis encourages supplementary variables in if they can contribute to a better theorization of HRR and the understanding of similar cases in other contexts. A complex qualitative mapping of intra-group structures and dynamics through micro-level analysis (individuals) could be an example of this kind of research.

2.9.1. Ideology

After the initial discussion of the concept of “Cumulative Extremism” by Roger Eatwell, Bartlett and Birdwell decided to test four assumptions made by the originator. One of Eatwell’s assumptions argues for a *symbiotic relationship* between the radical right and the radical Islamic movement in Britain, which eventually has a magnifying effect on the general processes of radicalization (Eatwell, 2006: 213-214). They found the activities of radical Islamic groups to have significant effects on the radical right, but the strength of the opposite effect is assumed *unclear* (Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013: 9-10).

Some argue for the idea of an ideological interdependence. Majid Nawaz illustrates that general recruitment is (mutually) facilitated by propaganda (Nawaz, 2012: 1-2). Stormark and Strømme arrive at similar conclusions; the activities of the radical right can fuel jihadi recruitment (Stormark & Strømme, 2015: 5). Certain inter-group perceptions have great importance in HRR dynamics. What these findings highlight is a certain reciprocal influence, but establishing firm conclusions of an ideological symbiosis requires us to look deeper into the most central “drivers”.

On the subject of political violence, which is one of the three end-states in the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, Della Porta introduces the notion of “*discursive opportunity*”. After examining student movements in Italy and Germany in the 1960s, the scholar found that violence and repression was justified by the specific ideology of the state. Hence, certain components of narrative can accept or advocate radicalism. This can also apply to Schmid’s definition of radicalization, which contains radical non-violence and terrorism. **Ideology** thus becomes the first independent variable to examine. However, Della Porta argues that the mere presence of discursive opportunities does not trigger radicalization (Della Porta, 2012: 247-248). The variable is thus not a sufficient condition, but as we see empirical findings highlights it as necessary for a HRR-process.

2.9.2. Counter-radicalization:

Coercive policies have minimizing effects on radicalization, especially on radical activities and inter-group contact (Maklin & Busher, 2015: 63-64). In his initial theory of *Cumulative Extremism*, Roger Eatwell argues that competitive confrontations between radical groups is facilitated by certain conditions in society (Eatwell, 2006). On the other hand, structural factors

can also work as limiting for mechanisms of radicalization. In the radicalization field, such disengaging factors are labeled “push-factors” and “pull-factors” (Barrelle, 2010: 11).

The author has chosen to use *counter-radicalization* as an extensive independent variable. Scholars argue that counter-radicalization is a “catch-all” denomination that incorporates three types of measures, each influencing distinct moments in the radicalization process (Clutterbuck, undated); ISCR: 2012, 9). The three types of initiatives that constitute counter-radicalization measures are prevention, disengagement and de-radicalization. Prevention blocks radicalization from taking hold in the first place, disengagement initiatives aim to take the individual out from their radical environment without necessarily focusing on eliminating the ideological basis, and de-radicalization seeks to eliminate the radical ideas an individual might hold (ISCR, 2012: 8-10).

Given Schmid’s definition of radicalization, counter-radicalization is understood as the prevention of either manifestation of radicalism: non-violence, political violence or terrorism (Schmid, 2013). The conceptual inclusiveness of the variable signifies that we have to narrow down measures that might have had a significant impact on the group’s activities and structure. The second case in this analysis is a deviant case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, which means that the groups never reached a point of reciprocal tactical innovation where they used increasing forms for radicalism. Therefore, the thesis analyzes this variable by the unilateral effect of initiatives, to find out why Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence league did not achieve HRR by reciprocal tactical innovations of radicalism.

Scholars like Della Porta (Della Porta, 2012), Tore Bjørgo (Bjørgo & Horgan, 2009) and Wictorowiz have attempted to shed light on opportunity structures that facilitate radicalization. Instead of aggrandizing the space of opportunity (facilitator), the variable of counter-radicalization is most certainly *limiting* in its effect on the radicalization process, in other words a “push-factor”. The more counter-radicalization in society, the more difficult it is for ongoing radicalization and reciprocal tactical innovations.

2.9.3. *Competition*

In some cases, radical groups compete against each other. This is the third independent variable that this thesis seeks to analyze. **Competition** might revolve around supporters, recruitment, resources, publicity, legitimacy, prestige or power. Bjørgo states that competition over scarce

resources may be imagined as well as real (Bjørge, 2011: 283), which means that competitively can have an ideational aspect. Inter-group competition might lead to a strengthening of the in-group cohesion (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425), thereby augmenting the possibility for strong polarization in inter-group conflicts. This can ultimately lead groups to use the three end-states of radicalism in the concept of HRR presented in the thesis.

It is important to highlight that this independent variable isn't necessarily connected to ideology. Even though there might exist competitive components in narrative, competition can also exist outside of subjective perceptions. Two groups might develop a state of mutual tension if they are in conflict over shared goods, which are ultimately scarce and interesting for both parts in order to advance their ideological goal. Historically, different radical groups have entered dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. For instance, radical right- and left wings have had a long and conflict-filled history (Della Porta, 2012: 243-256).

More recently, some view parts of the radical right and radical Islamism as two groups with conflicting interests. Donatella Della Porta argues that contact is important for mechanisms of inter-group radicalization (Della Porta, 2012: 246), the thesis argues that inter-group competition facilitates mechanisms of HRR because it sustains interactions over longer periods.

3. Method

3.1. *Quantitative vs qualitative*

The choice of method in a master thesis is essential because difference types of methodologies reflects very distinct approaches to research. We find two dominant approaches: quantitative and qualitative studies (Creswell, 2003: 13-14). A quantitative analysis is defined as an inference based on large numbers of observations, often translated into statistical datasets. On the other hand, the qualitative analysis has basis in few observations, and is especially appropriate when we want to analyze causality (Gerring, 2012: 362).

The qualitative approach relies on limited knowledge about central cases, while a quantitative analysis thrives on detailed information (Collier et al, 2003: 5-6). Due to the general lack of data on the subject of radicalization, it is appropriate to use a qualitative approach in this thesis. This argument is even more relevant for our two specific cases and the HRR concept, there are no existent databases available for analysis. Among many methodologies within a qualitative analysis, we find the statistical method, the historical method, the case study and the comparative method (Moses & Knutsen, 2007).

This thesis has chosen to conduct a *comparative analysis* of a positive case of *Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization* and a deviant case of the same phenomenon in Norway. A comparative inquiry involves variables analyses and tries to establish causality. The weight of focus is thus slightly more on the latter case than the former, for which there an empirical relationship between three variables by means of control. In contrast to an experimental design, a comparative analysis controls causals mechanisms in natural contexts. It also selects variables by the function of the independent variable, not randomly (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 96). The inquiry establishes the causal effect of the independent variables, and shows how their specific constitution created different outcomes HRR in the two cases.

3.2. *Inductive vs deductive reasoning*

There are two methods of reasoning: deduction and induction. Based off existing theory, the deductive approach moves towards specific conclusion based off established definitions and assumptions (Zalaghi & Khazaei, 2016: 24). On the other hand, the inductive approach derives general conclusions, theories and assumptions from empirical findings. With induction, we move from the specific to the general. The thesis finds the deductive approach of inquiry to be

the most appropriate because the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization has basis in Schmid's definition of radicalization, (Schmid, 2013) Della Porta's *Competitive Escalation (SMT)* and Eatwell's concept of *Cumulative Extremism* (Della Porta, 2012; Della Porta, 2013; Eatwell, 2006).

As we have seen in the theoretical part, we predict the causal effect of certain factors for mechanisms of inter-group radicalization. This enables the thesis to select a set of independent variables, which are analyzed in the context of the two cases. The thesis chooses a method of deductive reasoning, and generates an analytical framework through the convergence of findings from different academic contributions. The selection of the independent variables has its base in theory as well as empirical data. The comparative analysis then enables us to generate context-specific conclusions through the analysis of the independent variables in the two cases in the Norwegian context.

The independent variables have been empirically discovered to have a certain causal effect on the process of inter-group radicalization in other contexts. The first step is to test theory and causal assumptions tied to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization and the explanatory variables selected. This will ultimately lead to the confirmation or rejection of three hypotheses. By contrasting two cases through a comparative analysis, we strengthen the conclusions we get from our hypotheses (Zalaghi & Khazaei, 2016: 25).

An important clarification is that the thesis' goal is not to generate conclusions that holds a general explanation for necessary factors for positive cases of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. The selection of independent variables is through empirical findings, but any conclusion deduced from analysis are specific and may not be found to be applicable to contexts other than Norway. For example, one special trait of the Norwegian case in the 90s/2000s is that the process of radicalization was unfolding primarily between youth-groups (Bjørge et al, 2001). Other countries may experience clashes between radical-right and radical left factions with different social backgrounds. However, contrasting a positive case and a deviant case through a comparative analysis contributes to develop the *content* of theory (Emigh, 1997: 657), which might extend the context-independent understanding of the phenomenon.

3.3. Case Analysis

The theoretical part presents three independent variables. Dependent of their nature, they function as either facilitating or limiting structures of political opportunity for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. The thesis seeks explanatory information (*why*) dependent on the difference of outcome of the cases selected through political opportunity structures. This analytical goal fits a standard of qualitative research. The chosen independent variables remain constant in the inquiry of both cases; the thesis argues for the comparative case analysis as the most suited methodology.

Choosing a case study relates to the nature of the central research question. As Yin explains, exploratory question like “what” or “how” are often better answered with experimental or survey studies (Yin, 2003: 6). On the other hand, this thesis asks *why* certain opportunity structures facilitate or limit Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization across two cases. Here, Yin argues that case studies and historical methods are the more suited. The historical method is generally appropriate when past records are undiscovered, documents missing and general sources of evidence non-existent. Scholars have uncovered and analyzed the first case in detail. However, there exists less information about the groups in the contemporary case, especially at the inter-group level. Case studies are appropriate when we want to discover new evidence about certain circumstances (Yin, 2003: 8), here HRR connected to Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League.

Two important clarifications are necessary. First, the thesis performs the analysis on two levels. The constant in the analysis is the “cases”, which in this thesis figures as a bilateral relation between factions with radical ideologies. However, the two cases are constituted of different units. In the first period, the conflicts occurred between multiple groups with heterogeneous traits. Why is a generalization of multiple identities practical? The thesis analyzes the second case as a conflict between two specific group, the NDL and PU. While Profetens Ummah was the only active radical Islamist group, there thesis could have chosen to observe the counter-jihadi side as both the actions of the NDL and SIAN. This leads to the second clarification needed, which is why the thesis selects the Norwegian Defence League. Other radical-right groups were also simultaneously active in Norway in the same period (2012-2014).

3.3.1. Case 1: Generalization across two factions with heterogeneous sub-groups

In the 1990s and 2000s, the racist and anti-racist movements were composed of multiple subgroups with heterogeneous beliefs on subjects like violence and racism. The thesis has

chosen conduct the analysis through a generalization of the two sides, were one faction is labeled as neo-Nazi and the other as anti-Racist. Several examples will address some specific groups within the movements, but overall, the latter point remains dominating. This is practical in two ways:

First, research on the movements in the first case exists through qualitative methodology. The most important academic contributions highlight general tendencies within the movements, and do not go further into the relationship between specific subgroups. As Bjørge states, collective characterizations were methodologically suited because of strong binary formations. The social groups were dependent of mutual antagonism, and they seemed to constitute on another. There was a very clear *pattern* of conflict (Bjørge et al, 2001: 25-26).

Since further observations are impossible due to temporal constraints, the thesis has to use the available data to perform the analysis. For example, the thesis cannot discuss the nuances between the distinct effects of legislation on the Valla-gang compared to AFA because it would require relevant and detailed information about the sub-groups. Ultimately, this has no negative impact on the validity of the comparative analysis because it is the effect of the political opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization that is necessary to answer the research question. Extensive research done by Bjørge, Carlsson, Fangen and others captures these effects with high validity.

Second, it is very difficult to operationalize the concept of HRR without looking at the relationship between two specific factions. For instance, investigation inter-group dynamics between three or four actors would require new data and possibly new theories. The thesis has therefore chosen to conduct such an analysis because the primary analytical goal is to answer why HRR did not occur in the second case. Conclusions on the three generated hypotheses about ideology, counter-radicalization measures and competition also increase in validity when we render the cases comparable and identifiable.

3.3.2. *Why the Norwegian Defence League?*

Profetens Ummah was the first active radical Islamist group in Norway. Therefore, selecting PU for the second case is very intuitive. However, the Norwegian Defence League just was one of several radical-right groups that were active in the country between 2012 and 2014. For instance, *Stop Islamiseringen av Norge* (SIAN), *Den Nordiske Motstandsbevegelsen* and *Vigrid*

were also active within the national borders. What makes the NDL more relevant than the other radical-right groups?

First, *Nordfront* and *Vigrid* have been labeled as neo-Nazi groups (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 11-13). The dominating grievance in these groups is primarily anti-Semitism, however *Vigrid* had shown some interest in Muslims (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 11-13). However, the counter-jihadi beliefs of the Norwegian Defence League indicates that the group would have a bigger incentive to make radical Islamist movements central antagonists in their dualistic view of the world. Therefore, the lack of discursive opportunities within the neo-Nazi ideology decreases the potential for reciprocal mechanisms of radicalization.

First, the Norwegian Defence League was formed as a direct affiliation of the British counter-jihadi group *English Defence League*, which came in violent conflicts on multiple occasions with the radical Islamists group called *Al-Mujahiroun* (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17; NTB, 2013: c; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). Their Norwegian partner could turn out to be a security threat in Norway on two levels. The first point is that as an affiliation of the EDL, the NDL could have adopted the former's violent aspect. The second point is that the NDL could have hosted the most radicalized members of the British group when they themselves wanted to mobilize in demonstrations. The potential for escalations of conflicts and manifestations of radicalism was significant.

The third point is that this thesis seeks to highlight is why the NDL was chosen over SIAN. Focusing on the *Norwegian Defence League* in favor of *Stop Islamiseringen av Norge* has also been a function of which group had the most potential to grow violence. The SIAN leader Arne Tumyr estimated a number of 3000 online-members in 2011 (Michelsen, 2012: 11). Even though SIAN had more members than the NDL at the time, the latter group saw two former members display direct intentions of political violence/terrorism (Breivik 2011 & member from 2013). This indicates that the risk of outbursts of radicalism was higher within the NDL than SIAN, thus a larger potential for escalations of violent conflicts with Profetens Ummah if they entered dynamics of HRR. The thesis's goal is to analyze political opportunity structures with pre-existing knowledge of HRR-outcomes; this information is therefore important.

3.4. Comparative case analysis and the method of difference

A comparative analysis is often structured by a small number of cases and a large amount of variables. This method discovers empirical relationships among variables, and is not a methodology of measurement (Lijphart, 1971: 684-685). Arend Lijphart identifies two problems: too many variables and few cases. First, the statistical/experimental method can generally cope with a larger number of variables than a comparative method and produce coherent results. A comparative method is weaker than the other methods in evaluating hypotheses. One cannot perform an experimental control through this methodology (Collier, 1997: 106). The second problem with the comparative method is that some may attach greater importance to deviant cases than necessary. This can lead to premature rejections of hypotheses and generalizations (Lijphart, 1971: 685-687).

To eliminate these problems, Lijphart proposes to focus on a small number of *comparable* cases. If we select particular explanatory variables by using theory (Collier, 1997: 106-107), we then study these variables and their relationships under controlled conditions. In essence, the comparative method mirrors experimental and statistical methods by analyzing variables and establishing general empirical relationships among them (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 96). The selected cases consist of one positive case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization and one deviant case. The thesis abstains from qualifying “PU vs NDL” as negative case, because we have no way of firmly establishing if all the necessary conditions of HRR were present in this context before the analysis.

Lijphart argues that in the situation of two cases with opposed outcomes, the most appropriate method is John Stuart Mill’s “*method of difference*” (Lijphart, 1971: 687-688). Mill introduced several methods of inquiry, like *the method of agreement*, *the indirect method of difference*, and *the method of concomitant variation* (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 102-111). The method of difference is considered reliable due to its dependence of the logical experimental design (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99). In a MoD, the focus rests on the dependent variable across cases: the goal is to find the set of relevant independent variables (Anckar, 2008: 392-393). Here, the theoretical framework behind the concept of HRR determines which independent variables constitute the political opportunity structures.

Mills *most different system design* compares sub-system that share a common number of features. This method ensures that we can highlight some differences, while neutralizing others. The cases share common characteristics, but are deviant on some explanatory factors (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99). Thus, the fact that the method of difference aims at uncovering simple sufficient causes makes it more suited than Mills alternative *method of agreement* in which the

approach reveals necessary causes for a phenomenon (Rohlfing & Schneider, 2014: 20). In this thesis, we have two cases where the HRR-outcomes after inter-group co-existence are different. We then identify explanatory variables and compare them in the cases to uncover why Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occurred or not. This would logically be due to the temporal state of one or more independent variables (Anckar, 2008: 393-394).

By conducting such a method of inquiry, Mill expects to deduce conclusions about the phenomenon and its necessary conditions. Assumptions can be made about causal effects by using a method of difference: “[...] *the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon*” (Heuveln, 2000: 24; Mill, Book III, Chapter VIII, §4). The collective and independent effects of the independent variables on Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization is discussed in the analytical part as well as in the conclusion.

The thesis uses Mill’s method of inquiry to extract the causal effects of the selected independent variables. Firstly, the thesis establishes whether variables were contributory or partial for the difference in outcomes, in other words causal power. As discussed by Donatella Della Porta (Della Porta, 2013: 246), a factor can be either *limiting* or *facilitating* for a process of radicalization. This determination of causality is explained through a detailed presentation of contextual differences, which ultimately defines a qualitative analysis. The analysis is in reality on two levels: bilateral relationships in single cases build further cross-case analysis about the effect of political opportunity structures for the central concept.

3.5. Reliability and Validity

Achieving good research requires a certain degree of validity and reliability. The term *reliability* means that the results we find through conducting research should be replicable by other researchers using a similar method. In other words, testing an identical method of inquiry should produce consistent findings. Reliability also means the accurate collection and recording of information. These components define *internal reliability* (Brink, 1993: 35). This thesis performs a review of different forms of documents about the groups in the two cases. The author prioritizes academic/official documents to answer the hypotheses, and uses articles only when the information about groups or cases are insufficient in the former. This is reflected in the fact that there are more articles used in the analysis of the Norwegian Defence League than the three other units.

As the thesis argues, *the method of difference* produces more reliable results than the method of agreement due to its experimental nature. One can increase the research's *transparency*, thus describing the research strategy and the method of analysis in detail (Moravcsik, 2014: 48-49). This can eventually ensure equal measures from one analysis to another, thus increasing *external reliability*. The thesis presents a framework of variables selected for analysis, thus removing interpretive biases. The method of difference is quite simple to perform, thus also easily replicable by other scholars (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99).

Like reliability, we make the distinction between *internal* and *external validity*. Briefly described, it defines accuracy and truthfulness of research and measurement. *Internal validity* means that findings should be true representation of reality; conclusions are supported by theoretical/empirical structures. For one, the concept gains inclusiveness due the specific definition of radicalization used in this thesis (Schmid, 2013). For example, the thesis incorporates non-violent radicals as potential actors within the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Attaching importance to non-violence in a group-context of radicalization is important because some may advocate violence without necessarily using it.

Ideal *external validity* means that the reflection of reality is applicable across all relevant groups (Brink, 1993: 35). The variables selected in this thesis are interpreted as context-dependent. For example, similar ideological groups in different nations could have opposing views on violence. Profetens Ummah's version of radical Islamism does not necessarily represent groups in other countries with the same beliefs, as many of their grievances can be dependent of national characteristics. Nevertheless, if we study similar types of radical groups/movements in different national contexts, generalizable conclusions can be inferred as long as the independent variables have comparable structures. In this thesis, this refers to structures of political opportunity for inter-group radicalization.

Mill discusses one weakness with the method of difference: finding "similarity" as in an experimental design is not easily achievable. When we compare two systems, institutions or cases with similarities, they are probably not alike on every condition except one. Despite these weaknesses, social scientists have continued to employ the method of difference (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: 99-101). In this analysis, we do find comparability across the two cases. First, despite ideological difference between the pair of radical units in the cases, they both consist of radical factions in interaction. Second, the analysis focuses on the same opportunity structures within Norway. Moses and Knutsen describe four ways to conduct a method of difference:

comparison over time, within nations, over areas or counter-factualization (Moses & Knutsen, 2007: IBID).

3.6. Data Collection and treatment

In a comparative case analysis such as the one used in this thesis, we use a *purposeful sampling strategy*. As Creswell discusses, a collective case study benefits from “maximum variation sampling” of case outcomes to describe multiple perspectives about it. The choice of cases is determined in advance by specific criteria, or in this thesis the outcome of a phenomenon under investigation (Creswell, 2013: 157): *Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization*. Choosing a comparative analysis of a positive and a deviant case of HRR reveals opportunity structures that facilitated and limited inter-group radicalization (Creswell, 2013: 156).

Specific sample sizes has been discussed in previous parts. The role of a qualitative study is not necessarily to generate generalization itself, but rather to elucidate particular facts about specific circumstances (Creswell, 2013: 157). In this case, the causal effect is determined by temporal differences of political opportunity structures in Norway. According to Skocpol and Somers, the comparison of contexts across different periods is frequently used in comparative research (Finifter, 1993: 108).

3.6.1. Temporal triangulation

The next step is to obtain data on the two cases selected for analysis. Creswell identifies four types of information: Observations, interviews, documents and audiovisual material (Creswell, 2013: 160). A scholar can choose to collect information from one or multiple sources at the same time. This practice is defined as *triangulation*: the combination of two or more types of sources. One can also use triangulation of theories, methods or investigators. Performing a temporal triangulation signifies that information is gathered from different periods of time, places or settings (Thurmond, 2001: 253-254). The time gap between the chosen cases makes the method of this kind of method appropriate for research.

Why use temporal triangulation? First, Thurmond highlights that this type of investigation determines if similar outcomes can occur at different temporary intervals (Thurmond, 2001: 254). The primary goal in this thesis is to explain differences of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization through changing structures of political opportunity. Second, internal validity or

credibility augments when we use triangulation (Shenton, 2004: 65-66). Put simply, the conclusions we make about a circumstance are legitimized through multiple sources of information. This also points to an easier replicability of the results we get by performing the analysis.

Conducting a method of data triangulation means that we get a substantial volume of information; therefore, the time and effort required to sort and analyze the information increases (Thurmond, 2001: 256-257). The thesis chooses not to perform a methodological triangulation because it would have generate an overly ambitious amount for a master's thesis. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that future research on the matter could greatly benefit from interviews, or even quantitative methods like in Jacob Ravndal's doctorate on right wing terrorism and violence in Western Europe (Ravndal, 2017)

3.6.2. Documents

The work of Della Porta on competitive escalations shows that the concept of inter-group radicalization has already been subject to scholarly research. Substantial amounts of information exists on the preceding case in our comparative analysis, a case that took place in the 1990s and in the beginning of the 2000s. One potential source of information lies in different types of academic documents: PHDs and master's thesis. Among a large quantity of academic literature, the studies of Katrine Fangen (Fangen, 2001) and Tore Bjørgo (Bjørgo et al, 2001) on the activities in the period have been noteworthy contributions to the development of general knowledge on inter-group radicalization in a Norwegian context.

Finding direct analyses of relevant inter-group dynamics is quite difficult in the available documents. Detailed unilateral group-analysis of events, processes and dynamics are then valuable sources of information that facilitate a comparative analysis. Furtherly, the effects of counter-radicalization measures can hardly be directly analyzed in an inter-group perspective; the thesis discusses bilateral relationships on the basis of unilateral effects of the independent variables. Another point is that there exists less general information available about the second case than on the social movements and sub-groups in the 1990s and 2000s. This concerns primarily the Norwegian Defence League.

During their most active period, Profetens Ummah got a lot of attention from scholars and the media. The analysis of the second case benefits greatly from a relatively important amount of

literature on the radical Islamic group. For example, at least four Norwegian dissertations written after 2014 have analyzed Profetens Ummah: directly through statements by leaders/members of the group themselves, and indirectly through secondary sources like newspapers and academic research (Michalsen, 2015; Johansen, 2016; Skoglund, 2014; Skar, 2015). Researches like Lars Akerhaug, Brynjar Lia, and Sveen & Wigen have also focused their attention on the radical Islamists group (Akerhaug, 2014; Lia, 2013; Sveen & Wigen, 2013).

Contrarily to PU, there are no available dissertations or sizeable analyses on the Norwegian Defence league. A few organizations have done short analyses on the group, but there is no adequate information in academic literature for the thesis to be able to answer the research question. However, ever since 2011, there have been written articles about the radical-right group. These documents contain direct interviews with group leaders and administrators, and recollect the group's general activity in the period where they co-existed with Profetens Ummah. The organization Antirasistisk Senter has also written about the NDL (Sultan & Steen, 2014). Lastly, the group's webpage is still active. The thesis uses this site to discuss ideological components in the comparative analysis.

3.6.3. Other methods of analysis – Some considerations

The theoretical part identifies three independent variables that are analyzed in connection to Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. These are *ideology*, and *counter-radicalization* and *competition*. Methods of data collection are exploited to extract out information about the independent variables. There are two cases under investigation, and they occur at different periods in times. First, the reason for which direct observations is not a suited method of data collection is simple: both cases have already unfolded, the first in the 1990s/2000s and the second between 2012 and 2014. Such a method is preferable if one conducts an ethnographic study, a comparative analysis focuses on past cases (Creswell, 2007: 90-91).

Second, analyzing audiovisual material is time consuming, and ambitious if we are to couple this a large amount of documents. This generates more work than manageable for the time and length of a master's thesis. Analyzing audiovisual material is a possible task; however, some have raised their concern about the material available on the internet (Michalsen, 2015: 20-21). As Neumann and Kleinmann observe, the field of radicalization is suffering from a lack of primary data (Neumann & Kleinmann, 2013: 361). Encountering general issues of data-availability naturally makes this thesis rely on secondary sources.

The author estimates that the different sources used in this thesis are more than enough to answer the research question. Nevertheless, future research on the subject could benefit from primary sources, especially in the case with the Norwegian Defence League. A third source of information that could have been valuable is interviews. However, this is only a minor weakness. In the first case, scholars have used large amount of primary data in their analyses, like Tore Bjørge (Bjørge et al, 2001) in Kristiansand or Katrine Fangen (Fangen, 2001) for the neo-Nazi movement. Their extensive research on the matter display findings that are highly valid as well as reliable.

In the second case, the validity of information is quite high because Profetens Ummah's did interviews and press conferences with media, direct statements by its members have been analyzed in contributions such as Stian Michalsen's master thesis on PU's ideology (Michalsen, 2015). Furthermore, even though there does not exist as much information about the NDL as the three other groups, the thesis has found large amounts of information from articles. Different leaders have given official interviews with newspapers, like Lena Andreassen and Ronny Alte (Ravndal et al, 2012; Jørstad, 2012). One source that the thesis also considers as extremely valid is statements from the former PST-infiltrator Christian Høibø, who in 2013 gave several interviews about his past in the counter-jihadi group (Mon, 2013; NTB, 2013: a).

3.7. Operationalization

3.7.1. Ideology

The first independent variable identified in theory is *ideology*, or put simply a set of basic *values*. These are combined with political information to create a specific set of stands on particular issues (Martin, 2015: 12). Traits that define an ideology may vary greatly. For example, there are different views on how the state apparatus should be ran. Radical right groups may prefer authoritarian regimes, socialists other types of governments. Since this subject ultimately remains irrelevant for the inquiry, ideological attributes should incorporate inter-group perceptions.

Simply put, we look at the ideological nuances in comparison to the antagonist. We want to discover if one group sees the other as their ideological enemy, if the group's goals are in conflict with its enemy and if they are willing to use radical actions to obtain them. In general, ideology is a quite flexible concept with a cumulative number of attributes. It leaves us the

freedom of linking it up to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (Guerring, 1997: 957). The main goal is to find whether ideology makes it strategically rational to enter dynamics of HRR.

Since this is a study of inter-group dynamics, the analytical emphasis should lie on ideological features that enables reciprocity and radicalism. We can narrow components down to two important characteristics. First, a hostile perception of the counterpart should be an essential feature of the ideology on both sides. There is a simple logic: without an ideological enemy, the chance of any mutual conflict would be improbable. If an out-group affiliated to a different social movement is perceived as a threat to the group's ideological goal, long-term inter-group conflicts are facilitated.

Second, the thesis views another important discursive opportunity as an ideology that justifies the use of either one or more of the three attributes of radicalization, in other words general radicalism. Schmid's definition of radicalization is composed of non-violence, political violence and terrorism (Schmid, 2013). Ideology has a facilitating effect on mechanisms of radicalization if the narrative accepts or advocates radical measures; vice versa in a more moderate ideological narrative. The first hypothesis is the following:

H1: In Case 1, ideologies constituted discursive opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. In Case 2, ideologies did not constitute discursive opportunities for HRR

3.7.2. Counter-radicalization

Counter-radicalization policies have minimizing effects on radicalization and radical activities (Maklin & Busher, 2015: 63-64). Research of escalating political violence in the 1960s and 1970s in Germany, Italy and Northern Ireland shows that that police strategies contributed to radicalization. Clashes with political movements radicalized sub-groups at the margins with initial moderate and peaceful aims (Della Porta, 2012: 247).

A UN/CTITF report from 2008 highlights nine types of measures from 34 countries that have implemented counter-radicalization policies. The report clarifies that “[...] *the term counter-radicalization refers to policies and programs aimed at addressing some of the conditions that may propel some individuals down the path of terrorism. It is used broadly to refer to a package of social, political, legal, educational and economic programs specifically designed to deter*

disaffected (and possibly already radicalized) individuals from crossing the line and becoming terrorists” (CTITF, 2008: 5).

The definition above is quite inclusive, and denotes the complex interactions between different instances of the radicalization process and different parties working on counter-measures in society. The thesis has selected three indicators for this independent variable, three types of general policies out of nine key strategies (CTITF, 2008: IBID). The thesis aims to identify initiatives that could have had direct effect on the activities of Norwegian Defence League and Profetens Ummah. Some programs seem to have smaller effects on the group’s activities than others. For instance, the thesis does not select “prison programs” (CTITF, 2008: 8) because both PU and NDL were active outside of prison walls. The reeducation of convicts is intuitively not very “limiting” for the reciprocal radicalization processes in this thesis.

The first type of counter-radicalization initiative chosen for analysis is *legislation*, which punishes illegal narrative/actions and has a preventative effect on the general level of unauthorized activity. A change in structural opportunities is therefore when legislation becomes increasingly obstructing for radical engagement (UN/CTITF, 2008: 16-18) because it can punish committed crimes and prevent the spread of ideologies. For example, incarcerations can have consequences for a group’s general lifespan and activity. If Norwegian laws on radicalism have changed from the first case to the second, it might indicate limited opportunity structures in context of HRR mechanisms for Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League while active.

In the conceptual discussion, the thesis finds two arenas in which inter-group interactions unfold: physical contact and non-physical contact. Legislation does not solely apply to off-line activities; governments have also developed laws for on-line behavior. The internet has become a highly relevant arena for the spread of propaganda and general radicalization processes (IPI, 2010: 2). Both jihadists and right-wing radicals use websites, Facebook groups, YouTube and Twitter to a variety of political purposes like recruitment and propaganda (Sunde, 2013: 7).

How effective laws are often depend on their implementation by government organs. The UN/CTITF report refers to the *training and qualifying of government agencies* as one program of counter-radicalization. This component of counter-radicalization is the second indicator the thesis has chosen to investigate. Examples of such agencies are police forces and community workers. The training consists of accumulating greater knowledge in areas like cultural traits and religion, but also of the radicalization process in general (UN/CTITF, 2008: 20). Given that

this attribute is limiting for HRR, the thesis expects the general training and qualifications of Norwegian agencies to be more developed in the contemporary case than in the 1990s.

In many cases, the state alone does not have the necessary resources to pursue all counter-radicalization initiatives. The second indicator that the thesis will examine is the *engagement of civil society*. The government can engage local communities with programs to prevent radicalization processes and support individuals that want to disengage from their radical past (UN/CTITF, 2008: 6-7). The goal with these types of policies are to offer an alternative solution for vulnerable individuals, but also to challenge radical ideologies. The thesis expects civic engagement to be more limiting for inter-group radicalization in the second case compared to the first, given the different outcomes of the different cases. The second hypothesis is the following:

H2: Counter-radicalization initiatives were limiting structural opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in Case 2, but facilitating in Case 1.

3.7.3. Competition

As McCauley and Moskalenko theorize in their model of mechanisms of radicalization, inter-group processes can be driven and magnified by several factors. For example, in a radicalization process between groups, ideologically similarities can lead to competition for the same base of support (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425). In their research, they also mention other types of radicalization dynamics: competition amongst groups, or competition amongst radicals and the state. If government forces wishes to terminate a radical group's activities, the group can respond to repression by reciprocally intensifying their actions (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 425-426).

Repression and conflict inflicted by a party onto another can be translated into inter-group dynamics, as it is not unlikely that groups may interact with each other. In any case, competition intensifies radicalization in McCauley and Moskalenko's radicalization model (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). Literature points to factors like supporters, recruitment, resources, publicity, legitimacy, prestige or power (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-425). For instance, Della Porta discusses competition over specific spaces and political violence. An Italian activist explained how violence escalated when police forces tried to empty squatted houses (Della Porta, 2013: 71).

This factor is perceived as facilitating for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, because research finds that inter-group competition augments in-group cohesion, legitimizes the out-group threat and augments the possibility for escalations of reciprocal radicalization. The absence of competition is thus, in the same logic, limiting for the phenomenon. This leads us to the third hypothesis:

H3: Inter-group competition facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in case 1, but limited HRR in Case 2.

4. Analysis

In the 1990s/2000s, interactions between two radical movements lead to Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in Norway. Between 2012 and 2014, co-existing counter-jihadi and radical Islamist groups did not engage in similar dynamics, even though their sister-groups in Britain displayed escalations of violent conflicts some years earlier. What political opportunity structures can explain these differences of outcome? To answer this question, the analytical part analyzes three independent variables: *ideologies*, *counter-radicalization initiatives* and *inter-group competition*. The comparative analysis puts emphasis on the PU/NDL case; the independent variables chosen clarify if the structures of political opportunity for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization were different across the two cases. However, before we investigate the effect of the independent variables, let us explore the historical background.

4.1 *Historical Background*

4.1.1 *The positive case: neo-Nazis versus anti-racists in Norwegian cities*

The theoretical part presents a conceptual framework clarifying the phenomenon of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. The three end-states, which might occur when two radical groups have a competitive or hostile relationship, are *non-violence*, *violence* and *terrorism*. Scholars have analyzed dynamics between the two movements and their subgroups during the 1990s and early 2000s (Bjørger, Fangen). Empirical material shows observations that corresponds mutual escalations of tactical innovations as well as multiple of the conceptual end-states of HRR.

Approximately 30 year ago, Norway experienced the polarization of two radical political movements. A few cities saw increasing hostilities and clashes between neo-Nazi and anti-racist groups, including Oslo, Kristiansand, Drammen and Stavanger (Bjørger et al, 2001: 10). The neo-Nazi movement appeared at the end of the 1960s, but the “skinhead” period started in the early 1990s. This ideological inspiration sourced from the struggles of the British working class as well as hooliganism (Fangen, 2001(b): 76-88). A significant number of groups were formed, operative but also abolished in the course of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s. Zorn 88, HAT, Vigrd, Vikings and Boot Boys were among neo-Nazi groups active in this period (Fangen, 2001(b): 98-104; Bjørger, 2005: 50).

Opposed to the neo-Nazi radical-right at the time, certain militant groups within the radical left-wing movement mobilized around an anti-racist ideology. For example, Kristiansand experienced the presence of active gangs such as “Valla” or the “Chilean Gang” (Bjørgero, 2005: 51), as well as “AFA”, “SHARP” and “Blitz” in Oslo (Akerhaug, 2014). Many of these groups were quite different in ethnic backgrounds and subcultural preferences. For instance, the Valla gang consisted primarily of individuals with a Muslim background (Bjørgero, 2005: 52). Despite the differences among the various left-wing groups, they mobilized for a common cause: against the racist ideology and actions of the neo-Nazis (Bjørgero, 2005: 51-52).

4.1.2. Indications of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization

The 1990s and the early 2000s reflects a positive case of the HRR-concept. The two end states, non-violence and political violence, occurred multiple times between groups in different cities. In some instances, certain acts were so severe that they would have been defined as terrorism by modern definitions. Observations did point to a reciprocal innovation of tactical tools in conflicts. Provocations and threats, which belongs to the category of non-violent radical actions, were quite common tools used by one side towards its enemy (Bjørgero, 2005: 65).

In some cases, the violence resulted in severely dangerous episodes, grave injuries or even murder. Bombs, arms and knives became legitimized tools in conflicts between the neo-Nazis and Blitz in Oslo after 1995. Before 1993-1994, a street fight with bare knuckles was more “respected” and legitimate (Fangen, 2001: 223). In Kristiansand, one of the most dangerous incidents involved the capturing of a member from the Chilean gang. The neo-Nazis handcuffed a man to a lamppost, physically assaulted- and stoned him. This incident performed as a retaliation of a previous event involving the opposite sides. The following weekend, around 100 members of the anti-racist group set a house on fire where neo-Nazis were having a party. This incident resulted in no deaths but remained quite grave, and most importantly highlights a reciprocal tactical innovation of revengeful acts (Bjørgero, 2005: 65).

Bombs and other dangerous methods of violence were aimed at specific ideological targets (Bjørgero, 2005: 69), as in 1994 when two affiliates of the Neo-Nazi movement invaded the Blitz-headquarters with dynamite and pistols (Kallevik, 2014: 151-152). Nevertheless, arbitrary violence against non-affiliated civilians was common due to physical appearances. The haircut or clothes of an individual could give the perception of them belonging to an enemy group, and many were beaten up even without belonging to a radical faction. The indirect confrontations

did eventually reach a high point of escalation in 2001, when two neo-Nazis murdered the Norwegian-Ghanaian minor Benjamin Hermansen; a murder that was primarily motivated by racist prejudices (Borgarting Lagmannsrett, 2002: 2). This specific episode led to a plundering of recruitment and levels of violence in most parts of the country (Bjørge & Gjelsvik, 2015: 53).

4.1.3. *The deviant case: Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League*

As many western nations post 9-11, Norway experienced the activity of two specific ideological movements: the radical right and radical Islamism. The 12th of February 2010, “De Frivillige” organized a public appeal at *Universitetsplassen* in Oslo against the Danish Mohammed caricatures (Arefjord, 2014: 104; Vinding et al, 2010). In September 2012, some of the participants from 2010 formed *Profetens Ummah*, the first active radical Islamist group in Norway (Svendsen & Døvik, 2016). Simultaneously, multiple groups within a fragmented radical right movement were also keeping an ongoing activity. For instance, *Vigrid*, *Den Nordiske Motstandsbevegelsen*, the *Norwegian Defence League* and *Stop Islamiseringen av Norge* were some of the most active groups in the country at the time (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 11-18).

Among several radical right groups in the country, one group became an advocator of *anti-jihadism*: the Norwegian Defense League (NDL). This radical-right group was established by Rune Hauge in 2010 (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). PU and NDL shared an interesting similarity: both were created as affiliations of radical groups in Britain. The main sources of influence were the *English Defence League* in the case of the Norwegian Defence League (Sultan & Steen, 2014: IBID) and *Islam4UK* for Profetens Ummah (Bakke-Foss, 2014; Michalsen, 2015: 82). In any case, the two groups shared approximately two parallel years of activity on Norwegian soil: 2012-2014.

Intra-group tension resided within the Norwegian Defence League. Certain individuals showed their increasing commitment for violent measures, and threats were made against the Norwegian parliament (Stortinget). In 2013, a small group of individuals was arrested due to former threats against official institutions. “Antirasistisk Senter” judged the risk of violence stemming from the NDL to be unclear. Until 2016, the NDL’s primary activity online was primarily on Facebook and Twitter (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17).

Profetens Ummah was an active radical group in the Norway from January 2012 to 2016. The group arranged multiple demonstrations in the period, mostly in connection to the Norwegian government's role in international politics and other symbolic events. The group activity got highlighted in the media when it became known that some members of PU tried to get in possession of firearms, made threats against journalists and witnesses in trials. Some of the members travelled to Syria to take part in the activities of the Islamic State. It is estimated that the group had a core of 15-20 members, but its influence and mobilization potential expanded to approximately 70-100 individuals (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 22-24; Vepsen, 2012: 10).

4.1.4. No observations of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization

Norway has experienced Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between radical groups, defined by reciprocal tactical innovations towards three manifestations of radicalism: non-violence, political violence and terrorism. Despite some theorizing about an ideological symbiosis between radical Islamists and radical right groups like in Great Britain, the period of 2012-2014 did not contain forms of inter-group activity that fit the concept of HRR. Instead, the historical period in the Norwegian context which contains a positive case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization was between neo-Nazi groups and anti-fascists/racists in the 1990s (Bjørgero, 2005; Bjørgero et al, 2001).

There were minor instances where interactions did occur, but without any real significance for confirming Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. As argued earlier, the indirect strategies of contact are very difficult to tie to the groups themselves, so for clarity and optimal measurement we have to focus on direct contact. In forms of (non-radical) non-violence, a few episodes are noteworthy. One case of interaction occurred when Profetens Ummah mobilized against a demonstration from the NDL in December 2012. Ubaydullah Hussain and a few other members "assisted" an anti-racism counter-protest against the NDL, very close to the geographical location of the initial radical right manifestation. No forms of non-violent radicalism (pressure and coercion), neither political violence or terrorism were observed (Gunnensen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012).

Reciprocal group criticism was also an occasional phenomenon, particularly online. Twitter Facebook and other social media used by the radical groups illustrates reactionary behavior. This was especially the case for NDL, which publicly condemned Profetens Ummah on some occasions (Norwegian Defence League, 2014). Many of the public statements and comments

of radicals came right after certain incidents. When Ubaydullah Hussain praised Michael Adebolajo for the murder of Lee Rigby, strong reactions came from the NDL Facebook page (Gunnarsen, 2012).

PU did also react to the activities of Norwegian Defence League. Against the radical-right demonstrations in December 2012, they warned the police on social media to monitor members of the NDL (Gunnarsen, 2012). In January 2012, a prominent figure of Profetens Ummah Arfan Bhatti sent a mail to the current leader of NDL Ronny Alte. In his e-mail, Bhatti called Alte infidel (*kafir*), challenged him to meet him alone and warned him about Islam and sharia's arrival in Norway. According to Bhatti, the email was a response to an earlier review Alte made of him. Alte reported this incident to the police, but the case was ruled in Bhatti's favor (Brunmark, 2015, Karlsen, 2012).

Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence league did rarely meet under physical circumstances; apart from December 2012, contact did generally unfold on the web. However, in October 2015 the former leader of the NDL Ronny Alte formed a group called "*Odins Soldater (Soldiers)*". It had the purpose of patrolling the streets for safety, as a reaction to the new wave of refugees. While it was meant mostly as a joke (Vedler et al, 2016), the reaction from members of Profetens Ummah was real. In response to Odins Soldiers, the group "*Allah's Soldater*" was created with the same patrolling agenda (Brenna et al, 2016). While this latter episode occurred after 2014, it still demonstrates some reciprocal dynamics between the radical-right and radical Islamist movements.

Ultimately, there are no evidence of reciprocal non-violent- or violent radicalism. Radical right subgroups patrolled cities like Drammen; in contrast, the Islamist subgroup was active in Oslo. These latter episodes do show moments of reciprocal tactical innovations, but in no forms of radicalism. Thus, we cannot conclude that there were any observable signs of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. All events between 2012 and 2014 came as non-violent, asymmetrical interactions. When Bhatti sent threats to the current leader of Norwegian Defence League, Alte contacted the police instead of initiating exchanges of non-violent radicalism (Karlsen, 2012). This latter case was probably the closest indicator of any HRR-dynamic, but as a feud between two individuals.

In sum, when we look back at the historical background, we can observe the presence of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the first case. In contrast, the second case displayed no signs of HRR; there were no developments of tactical innovations or sustained inter-group

radicalism between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League. Nevertheless, the groups had some interesting interactions that reinforce the legitimacy of the research question. Why did Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization occur between anti-racist and neo-Nazi groups, but not between Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League? The next parts will seek to answer this question. Let us begin with a discussion about ideology.

4.2 Ideology:

4.2.1. Unclear ideological antagonism

In her research on political violence, Donatella Della Porta finds that one type of discursive opportunity for political violence are narratives that accepts and advocates it (Della Porta, 2013: 248). An important mechanism of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization is reciprocal alienation of an enemy group. Thus, the thesis argues that inter-group mechanisms are facilitated by levels of hostility towards outgroups located within the ideology. Given the differences of outcomes of HRR, the thesis hypothesizes that the first case must have contained higher levels of mutual hostility than the contemporary one.

In the 1990s, Norway experienced the activity of groups in cities like Oslo and Kristiansand. They were confined to two movements: the *neo-Nazis* and the *anti-racists*. However, in reality, this depiction is a generalization. Within the two movements, there were different sub-groups, each with distinct ideas and beliefs. For example, some factions within the “neo-Nazi” movement were more inspired by American racism than German National Socialism (Bjørge et al, 2001: 42). Still, the general tendency was that groups on both sides gradually polarized into two identifiable movements: racism and neo-Nazism. In many ways, units within the factions organized around these grievances (Bjørge, 2005: 46, 68).

Scholars have found that mutual hate/stigmatization was a central driver of the inter-group dynamics in the 1990s/2000s. This was also visible in the second half of the century, when the movements had been interacting with each other quite some time, strengthening the mechanisms of polarization and radicalization (Bjørge et al, 2001: 43; Kallevik, 2014: 151-155). In 1993-1994, Katrine Fangen observed that members of the “Blitz” community defined their struggles against the Neo-Nazis as primarily an ideological battle where the ultimate goal is to destroy fascism (Fangen, 2001: 78). Bjørge et al describe the ideological relations as

“binary moral positions”; the organization of groups within the different movements revolved around two distinct ideological poles (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 67-68).

How strong was the levels of hate? In “XTRM”, Jan Kallevik observes the levels of hostility from an anti-racist perspective: “*Isn't it wonderful to have someone to hate. I wonder if I will ever feel a feeling of emptiness when we have finally destroyed them*” (Kallevik, 2014: 162). This statement demonstrates how many individuals of the anti-racist group “Sharp Skins” felt about their enemy and personal duties. The subgroup “Antifascistisk Aksjon” or *AFA* even gave out their independent magazine six times a year where they kept updated information about neo-Nazi activity (Kallevik, 2014: 163). On the neo-Nazi side, Fangen observes that the anti-racist confrontational strategies lead to a gradual molding of their ideology. She states that their attacks eventually gave the neo-Nazis a concrete enemy (Fangen, 2001: 234).

The polarization and alienation of the two sides were able to continue along the course of the 1990s, but they also amplified with time. One important reason for sustained ideological alienation between the movements was fashion. To publicly appear as either Neo-Nazi or anti-racist reinforced in-group identities, but did also provoke the opposition. The use of “saggy” pants was perceived as a sign of an affiliation to an anti-racist group. On the other side, Neo-Nazi uniforms, skinned heads or Nazi symbols indicated the individuals’ neo-Nazi/racist moral position (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 83-85).

Ultimately, the first case displays a *symmetrical* relationship of ideological alienation between the movement/counter-movement. In light of the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, this component was certainly facilitating for further inter-group radicalization. Not only did it sustain all the way through the 90s, but it also intensified in the middle of the decade. How then, about Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League?

The British context has shown that it is possible for non-violent contact and violent interactions to occur between Islamist and counter-jihadi movements. Roger Eatwell discussed the possible ideological *symbiosis* between the factions, the activities of one reinforces the others’ grievances and so on (Kundnani, 2012; Eatwell, 2006; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). A general observation from scholars is there is no data to establish a firm ideological interdependence between them, most signs point to an asymmetrical link where the radical-right is influenced by the radical Islamists, not vice versa (Stormark & Strømme, 2015; Nawaz, 2012).

Profetens Ummah was the first active radical Islamist group in Norway. The group arranged demonstrations, press conferences, gave interviews to newspapers and had an important level

of activity online. Many in the Norwegian academic circles gained interest in this group as soon as it established itself as an important actor in the country. After reviewing a substantial number of texts and public statements made by members of the group, Sveen and Wigen concluded that Profetens Ummah lands under the category of Islamism characterized as *Salafism* (Sveen & Wigen, 2013: 276).

The Salafi doctrine is a fundamentalist version of Islamism. In Salafism, the ideal way of life is identical to the first generations of Muslims, the *Salafs*. Salafists want all societies to be ruled by the Islamic laws *sharia*, and views western government interventions on Arabic soil to be illegitimate. The important point is that Profetens Ummah believes that Muslim repression is a *global* phenomenon, often by western cultures imposed on them. These are incompatible with the “true” Islamic faith, and indoctrinate Muslims away from the real belief. For PU, all Muslims are at war with the west (Sveen og Wigen, 2013: 281).

Profetens Ummah has two perspectives on repression: international and domestic politics. In international politics, PU considers the Norwegian government as an important contributor to a global problem of Muslim repression. American, British and Norwegian modern warfare in Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq and others was an important grievance for the group (Michalsen, 2015: 51-52), especially before the arrival of the Islamic state in 2014. This is illustrated by a video that Profetens Ummah released in 2012 on Youtube, in which there figures threats against the Norwegian royal family and politicians like the foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre and the Prime minister Jens Stoltenberg. The primary message in the video was the following: “*Norwegian Soldiers out of Afghanistan*” (Ihlebak et al, 2012)

In domestic politics, they mention three important actors. These are the Norwegian government, the general populace and the media (Michalsen, 2015: 53). They also argue that the cooperation between imams and the government helps spread “twisted” ideas to Muslims in the country (Michalsen, 2015: 57). As we see, the Norwegian Defence League is not held responsible for the repression of the Muslim population, in Norway, nor the general counter-jihadism movement in the international context. A recurrent observation is that the Norwegian Defence League, as well as any other counter-jihadist group do not figure in the PU-narrative as a primary enemy. Given that the English Defence League has gotten in numerous conflicts with groups from the radical Islamists movements, it is interesting that its Norwegian affiliation does not get perceived as a potential hinder to the Salafist group’s political goals. What about the Norwegian Defence League?

The Norwegian Defence League has been defined as a radical group with counter-jihadi beliefs (Vepsen, 2012; Sultan & Steen, 2014). On their webpage, NDL states that:

“The NDL wishes to limit Islam’s influence in Norway. [...] The only demand we have for you is that you also think that the ongoing Islamization damages our country and the rest of Europe. [...] If you wish to participate in our work to stop and reverse Islamization in Norway, you are welcome to NDL.” (Norwegian Defence League, 2017)

For NDL, the problem for Norway and the rest of the world is thus an *Islamization* of societies. The radical-right group believed in an Islamic suppression of European culture. It resembles the Salafist ideology of PU because it has two agendas, a European cultural concern for Islamic imperialism and a local agenda in Norway. As we see, the Norwegian Defence league wants to prevent Islamization primarily in Norway. NDL’s argument suffers from certain obscurities, especially in relation to their understanding of Islam and Muslims. Which version of Islam is dangerous? Who performs the Islamization of western societies? Are all Muslims threats, or does the real threat come from radical Islamists with totalitarian and violent intentions? NDL states that:

“We do not accept racism and personal attacks. Such attitudes can lead to an eviction. Islam is no race, and Muslims exist in every denominations”. [...] Islamization is to adapt to Islam, which is a demanding and suppressing cult. One example is England, where sharia-courts now operate parallel with the English justice system. (Norwegian Defence League, 2017).

Norwegian Defence League’s definition of Islamization is quite vague and essentially contradictory. For one, they firmly discard any forms of racism against Muslims. The vagueness comes from the fact that NDL does not specify which parts of the Muslim community that is conducting the Islamization. This means that NDL has the potential to mold their grievances in flexible ways; every individual who they perceive to have intentions of suppression by introducing sharia can be a danger. Nevertheless, this definitional vagueness signifies that Profetens Ummah could have had a great potential influence on the radical-right group.

In an objective perspective, PU was an important actor: the largest radical Islamist group on Norwegian soil. Salafism in general, but also the specific doctrine of Profetens Ummah, advocates the incompatibility between Islam and western culture (Sveen & Wigen, 2013; Michalsen, 2015). This is something that the Norwegian Defence League could perceive as “*Islamization*”, but PU’s doctrine also simultaneously legitimizes NDL’s worldview. The organization Vepsen observed some NDL members’ satisfaction over Ubaydullah Hussain’s

supporting statements after the murder of Lee Rigby in 2013. On their webpage, comments were expressing how PU's actions gave people "the right view of Muslims" (Vepsen, 2013).

Most signs point to an asymmetrical or (even non-existent) relationship in ideology. Nevertheless, given the central role of Islamization of Norway in the ideology of Norwegian Defence League, the activities of Profetens Ummah would not have gone under NDL's radar in practice. This first independent variable demonstrates a major ideological (inter-group) difference between the two cases, but does not disallow a potential Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the contemporary case. In his research, Tore Bjørgo observed that the perception the anti-racists had of neo-Nazi fractions radicalized with the accumulation of clashes between the groups (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 42). These dynamics need therefore to develop over time.

In theory, the Norwegian Defence League might have become an important factor of Muslim oppression in the ideology of Profetens Ummah if the contact between the groups had continued over longer periods. However, the influence of one element stole much of NDL's spotlight: the Islamic State. One of the main goals of PU was to establish an Islamic State. When the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) was formed in 2014, and the group celebrated; it was a legitimate Caliphate in accordance with the Salafi ideology of Profetens Ummah (Michalsen, 2015: 64-66). After the rise of Daesh, most of PUs attention moved towards this new ideal state. Despite the fact that the Islamic State arrived on the international scene as late as 2014, it reduced the chance that counter-jihadi movements and subgroups could ever become grievances in the Norwegian radical Islamist group. External circumstances functioned as a de-escalating factor for mechanisms of inter-group radicalization.

Ultimately, Profetens Ummah's political goals illustrate that the modern case did not contain a symmetrical ideological relationship like the one that influenced within the positive case of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization from the 1990s. This section argues that the groups' narratives were more limiting structures of political opportunities for Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League than the ideological relations in the first case. This was true for the first steps of the molding of inter-group perception of hostility, in other words the very beginning of HRR-mechanisms. The primary causes for this were static components of ideology, but developments in the global scene did also have a dynamic significance for especially Profetens Ummah's grievances. The next section discusses the aspect of violence across the two cases.

4.2.2 Political violence and terrorism

In the last sequence, the thesis shows that the second case lacked mutual perceptions of hostility. Most signs indicate an *asymmetrical* relationship, where the Norwegian Defence League would (ideologically) be prone to perceive Profetens Ummah as a relatively important grievance, but with no visible effect in the opposite direction. Tore Bjørgo observed that groups within the anti-racist movement of the 1990s did develop a hostile perception of neo-Nazi groups after the latter had initiated violent acts on immigrants, radicalism against non-affiliated targets lead to processes of radicalization (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 43).

Accumulated acts of radicalism can activate opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in narrative. In the 1990s, violence was widely accepted amongst several subgroups within the two movements. Bjørgo observed that groups in Kristiansand developed violent subcultures where the dominating ideology was to retaliate violence with violence. Nevertheless, violent confrontations did not arise overnight. Both sides were separately active in the Norwegian society before they turned on each other. They had already used forms of violence before they engaged in confrontations with each other (Bjørgo et al, 2001: 89); they were in many ways *pre-radicalized*.

The neo-Nazi movement rose in the end of the 1960s, and mobilized through *anti-communism* and *anti-immigration*. Bombs detonated in a 1st of May workers demonstration (1979), and against a Muslim Nor-mosque in Oslo (1985). Two neo-Nazis did also murder their two comrades in Hadeland (1981) in fear of snitching (Fangen, 2001: 76-78). On the other side, the anti-racists factions attained an important level of radicalization before the 1990s; their gradual radicalization was due to accumulated (violent) conflicts with police forces (Kallevik, 2015: 58-66). Thus, the most militant anti-racist factions were already accustomed to violence as a tactical tool in conflicts. Clashes with third parties gradually legitimized violent means when the neo-Nazi movement entered the scene in growing numbers.

The counter-movements did also share one common source of influence that contributed to pre-radicalization: the skinhead culture. This style came from British hooliganism, and was a macho-characterized, hooligan environment, where collective identities were somewhat defined by violence (Fangen, 81). The skinhead culture became a larger part of the culture in most neo-Nazi sub-groups, but did also influence parts of the anti-racist community, like the *Skinhead against Racial Prejudice* or *SHARP* (Fangen, 2001: 87-90). Therefore, violence became legitimized through an importation of a cultural movement.

Unilateral activity and interactions with third party actors produced high levels of radicalization before the 90s, which made it very easy for violence to be accepted a legitimate tool in the resolution of inter-group conflicts. Fangen explains that there were established norms of violence that changed after specific periods in time. For example, before 1993/1994, conflicts between groups were legitimate when both sides had an equal number of participants. If both parts used fists in fights, the method was considered legitimate. After 1994, the violence escalated in nature. Bombs, knives, firearms and “raw” street violence became more frequently accepted tools by both sides (Fangen, 2001: 222-225; Kallevik, 2015: 151-159).

The first case showed that violence was not just important for resolving conflicts. It was also essential to create identities. Violent conflicts solidified in-group cohesions because it gave both sides a concrete enemy to fight. This legitimization of violence was therefore a very important structural opportunity for sustained Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization because it amplified in-group radicalization, which then again sparked long-lasting tactical innovations of radicalism (Fangen, 2001: 234). Violence and ideology had mechanisms of mutual reinforcement.

The groups in the contemporary case were much more resilient to use political violence than the neo-Nazis and anti-racists. This was primarily the case for the Norwegian Defence League, which struggled with internal disagreements on violence and terrorism. On their webpage, NDL writes that: “[...] *it is not violence we stand for*” (Norwegian Defence League, 2017). There were no observations of pressure, coercion or violent actions stemming from NDL members, neither in their multiple demonstrations between 2011 and 2014, or in any other context. The available information shows that the NDL leadership rejected members with violent intentions. The Norwegian radical-right group did not resemble the English Defence League in every strategical aspect: “*It was pretty clear that [the EDL’s] tactics were designed to provoke, and hopefully create violence*” (Communities Minister John Denham (2009) in - Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013: 4).

There are also additional instances that highlight the non-tolerance of violence in the Norwegian Defence League. Anders Behring Breivik, with the pseudonym “*Sigurd Jorsalfar*”, was banned by the group’s administrators from taking part in the discussion on the web in 2010 due to his radical beliefs (NTB, 2013: a). In 2012, the leader Ronny Alte left the group because there was internal disagreements about if the group should support the terrorist acts of Breivik (Ravndal et al, 2012). Later the same year, the deputy leader Lars Aardal denied all claims of violent intentions: “*NDL has always taken distance from violence or terrorism*” (Jørstad, 2012)

Why was violence so illegitimate for NDL? One reason is that the leaders of the group simply were not collectively supporting violence. Another is that there was significant problems of legitimacy for the radical-right ideology. The social movement tried to grow in a country that had been deeply shocked by two symbolic events: the murder of Benjamin Hermansen (2001) and more importantly the terrorist attacks of Anders B. Breivik (2011). These incidents lead to a zero-tolerance and a massive de-legitimization of the use of violence by radical-right actors. The 2001 murder plundered recruitment within the neo-Nazi movement and sparked massive counter-reactions from large parts of the Norwegian society (Bjørgero & Gjelsvik, 2015: 132).

The deep de-legitimization of radical-right intolerance was furtherly highlighted when the NDL-leader Ronny Alte left the group because of it got numerous associations with Breivik and his ideology (Ravndal et al, 2012). In the post-22/7 period, nearly all popular figures in Norway tried to distance themselves from Breivik's ideology and actions. For example, the Norwegian prime minister Jens Stoltenberg asked the media to reduce the anti-immigrant rhetoric, while the Progress Party (FRP) even apologized for their inflammatory discourse (Wiggen, 2012: 603). A third important factor to take into account is the political success of right-wing populism in the 21th century. Jacob Ravndal finds lower levels of violence and terrorism in Western European countries that have had populist parties who have reached over 10% support over longer periods, like *Fremskrittspartiet's* political success and the open debate on immigration in Norway. Political representations functions as a swamp for the mobilization to the radical extremities (Ravndal, 2017: 108; Vestheim, 2017).

In their summary of radical groups in Norway in 2012, Antirasistisk Senter stated, "*the primary risk from groups like NDL lies in the (violent) potential of individuals connected to such environments*" (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). The organization anticipated that violence would only come from outskirts of the group, most likely by a lone wolf. NDL harbored ideas that were common for radicalized individuals with violent intentions. Øyvind Strømme expressed similar concerns in the media (Rognsvåg, 2012: a).

The Norwegian Defence League could have functioned as an inspirational source, but not by its own intention. In fact, NDL reduced the risk of violence, by throwing out potentially dangerous members out of the group as soon the administrators noticed high levels of radicalization. Nevertheless, Antirasistisk Senter's prediction was somewhat confirmed through the cases of Breivik in 2011 (as a former NDL member on Facebook) and the threats

against Stortinget made by an NDL-affiliated in February 2013 (Sultan & Steen, 2014: IBID; Vestrum et al, 2013).

Unlike the Norwegian Defence League, Profetens Ummah accepted and promoted violence. The thesis defines Profetens Ummah as *Salafi*, and scholars who have analyzed their narrative conclude that the group goes under the category of *jihadi-Salafism* (Sveen & Wigen, 2013: 276, Holmer, 2016: 5). In order to rule the world by sharia, they accept the use of violent *jihad*. When questioned by a journalist, Ubaydullah Hussain legitimized jihad by portraying it as “defensive revenge” of repression by the west (Michalsen, 2015: 50-51). This legitimization of violence by PU is quite similar to the methods used by the groups in the 1990s; interviewed neo-Nazis characterized the reciprocal violent conflicts as vengeance of former attacks done by enemy groups (Fangen, 2001: 229).

In reality, Profetens Ummah did not use political violence against neither Norwegian Defence league nor other parties in the Norwegian society. In some occasions, prominent members made threats against the Norwegian government and the royal family (Linge, 2013: 50), but ultimately, their perception of global Jihad was primarily towards external sources like Afghanistan, Iraq or Syria (Michalsen, 2015: 73-74). This explains why the group’s primary strategy was the recruitment of a significant number of Norwegian foreign fighters to Syria (Jørstad et al, 2014).

Profetens Ummah appeared quite moderate in term of violence on Norwegian territory. Brynjar Lia argues that the radical Islamist group differed from international Jihadists because the latter see every activity except from violence as a waste of time. In contrast, Profetens Ummah chose non-violent forms of mobilization, through demonstrations and press conferences. Lia concludes: “*we have gotten a more moderate variant*” (Brynjar Lia in; Sveen & Wigen, 2013: 276). The group imported non-violent methods of political contention, while it exported violence to other geographical locations.

Why where the groups in the first case prone to violence? The thesis observes clear signs of facilitated opportunity structures within the narrative. For instance, radicalization mechanisms in the first case were molded by former conflicts with third parties, like the “pre-radicalization” of the radical-left movement in ongoing clashes with police forces (Kallevik, 2015: 58-66). However, another in-group characteristic that could have facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case is the number of members each group were able to mobilize.

In the first case, both the neo-Nazi- and anti-racist movements had large amounts of active participants, especially after the incidents of Brumunddal in 1991 (Fangen, 2001: 91). In the contemporary case, Profetens Ummah had 15 core-members. However, it was estimated that their mobilization potential could have reached 70-100 individuals. On the other hand, the different protests of Norwegian Defence League indicated that their off-line mobilization was of approximately 30-40 individuals (Volden, 2012; Sandmo et al, 2013), despite a larger number of memberships on their website. In reality, the NDL struggled to gather more than 40 to their different demonstrations, often significantly less (Gunnarsen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012; Sandmo et al, 2013).

The thesis mentions strengthening of in-group cohesions in the first cases through clothing “styles”, but the levels of radicalization could also be a function of the number of members. As more individuals joins the factions, they legitimize an opposite threat and thus radicalize the enemy group. McCauley and Moskaleiko argue that interactions between governments and radicalized groups leads to amplified radicalization mechanisms, as terrorist cells emerge and go underground to follow their political objectives (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2008: 425). Therefore, a larger number of affiliates could have increased the recruitment of more individuals with violent militant intentions, which could have formed ultra-radical sub-fractions in comparison to the consensus (on violence) within the social movement.

4.2.3. Hypothesis 1 – Ideology as a discursive opportunity

In conclusion, the available data points to limited discursive opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case compared to the first: *the thesis confirms the first hypothesis (H1)*. In the first case, the ideological components had strong mutual alienation of the counterpart as well as a perception of violence as a legitimate tool of conflict resolution. These components mutually reinforced one another and were important factors for the gradual radicalization of the groups, which eventually resulted in an escalation of violence.

In contrast to the first case, Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League had limited structural opportunities for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in their narrative. The first reason is that the ideological relationship between the two groups is far from an “interdependence”, a notion that has been hypothesized between similar groups in Britain. At most, we find an asymmetrical perception of an enemy. The Norwegian Defence League is prone to care more about Profetens Ummah’s activities than the opposite; NDL’s primary goal

is to limit the power of radical Islamism in Norway. On the contrary, PU's global agenda of Jihad gives limited attention to the Norwegian anti-jihadi group; governments, media and police forces cause the international Muslim oppression (Michalsen, 2015: 53)

The latter section highlights the second reason, which is that the first case displayed high potentials of violence due to the legitimization of it by both sides. However, the thesis finds no direct appeal to violence on Norwegian soil by Profetens Ummah. They lost an important mobilization potential after 2014 because they exported highly radicalized Norwegian jihadists to the Syrian regional conflict instead of fighting the war at home. The legitimization of violence was also asymmetrical in the second case because the Norwegian Defence League did not accept violence by any of its members. Two affiliated individuals displayed high enthusiasm for violence; however, they were thrown out of the group by its moderators/leaders (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17). The NDL narrative was ultimately problematic because it could have influenced lone wolves, but by no direct intention of the group itself.

4.3. Counter-radicalization:

The analysis of ideological components concludes that the opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the narrative were more limiting in the PU/NDL case than in the 1990s/2000s. Della Porta argues that mechanisms of radicalization are activated by interactions between groups, which means that the thesis supplements the ideological analysis with factors that could facilitate or limit inter-group contact. Preventive policies have a limiting effect on the groups' activities, both in unilateral and bilateral perspectives. Counter-radicalization is thus the next variable to analyze. In the next section, the thesis investigates the effects of legislation, the training of agencies and the engagement of civil society on Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization across the two cases.

4.3.1. Legislation

In the analysis of legislative changes, we have to target laws that affect the different forms of activities of the radical groups. Legislation sets limits to certain freedoms of action, and there have been two important changes that have considerably affected the activities of the radical groups in the second case compared to the first: laws on discrimination and laws on terrorism.

First, the thesis discusses the effects of the reforms of the Norwegian paragraph on discrimination, or §135a. This had major implications for the liberty of radical narrative in public spaces. Second, numerous terrorist attacks since 2001 have made counter-terrorism a central focus in the battle against radicalization. Expert on terrorism Jan Oskar Engene argues that the Norwegian laws on terror changed from *reactive* to *preactive* forms of legal intervention since 9.11.2001 (Engene, 2013: 234). This evolution is the second component discussed in this part. The thesis argues that the extensiveness of the new legislation on terrorism was an important obstruction in the second case, especially for Profetens Ummah.

Limitations of radical narrative - Paragraph §135a:

The paragraph on racism, or law §135a, was introduced in Norway in 1970. From 1977 to 2001, seven individuals were convicted for racial discrimination (Larsen, 2001). At first glance, this seems like a small number compared to the numerous incidents that unfolded in the years of the highest neo-Nazi activity. In 2000, the leader of the neo-Nazi group “Boot Boys” spoke at a demonstration where he discussed how Jews and immigrants were damaging the country. The Norwegian Supreme Court ruled Terje Sørli innocent because he did not appeal to violence, and he was protected by the constitutional law of free speech (§100) (Regjeringen, 2005). Organization like Antirasistisk Senter and the Mosaic societies of Oslo and Trondheim later sent a formal complaint to the UN’s racial discriminatory committee, as they argued that §135a did not fully protect against racist discriminations (Back, 2002).

The paragraph 135a of racial discriminations did eventually go through three major waves reforms. In January 2003, the law incorporated the use of certain symbols as a racist offence. In 2005, the punishment for racial profanities increase from two to three years, the definition of what constitutes a public statement was changed, and the cause of punishment changed from solely ethnical backgrounds to incorporate discriminations against religions and sexual orientations (NOU, 2005). Lastly, in 2013 the law changed so that statements on the internet were considered declarations in public space. It now specifies a reach of 20-30 individuals (Sunde, 2013: 35-36; 66-67).

How are the changes to §135a important? The Sørli-episode highlights an important contrast in the freedom of speech across the two periods. Before 2000, discriminatory rhetoric was legal as long as the narrative did not advocate violence or discrimination against ethnical backgrounds. The first consequence of the reforms was that Profetens Ummah and the

Norwegian Defence League had far less *off-line* freedom of speech than the groups in the 1990s. One example is that the neo-Nazis could use provoking symbols like the swastika (Fangen, 2001: 192-193), but this was no longer legal after 2005. The increased penalties for discrimination were probably an incentive for the groups to keep their narrative within the accepted frames of speech, illustrated by the official refute to advocate violence by the Norwegian Defence League (Norwegian Defence League, 2017).

In 2012, Ronny Alte described a struggle to reach an ideological consensus in the NDL on racism and violence (Ravndal et al, 2012). One important change was that violent and racist ideas went through a substantial de-legitimization process after the episodes of Benjamin Hermansen and Anders Behring Breivik. If radicalized individuals are understood as rational actors (Borum, 2011a: 14), then the preventive effects of legislative punishments would also have been influential in the strategical considerations of members of the Norwegian Defence League. Ideological consensus in the neo-Nazi group was quite important for the development of a stronger in-group cohesion (Fangen, 2001: 146); a driver of radicalization mechanisms according to McCauley and Moskalenko (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 423-424)

The second important consequence of the §135a reforms was the reduction of freedom of speech *online*. Discriminatory statements were much harder to make after the 2005 and 2013 reforms, and Profetens Ummah was punished by this through the shutdown of their Facebook page (Stenvågnes, 2014). Inger Marie Sunde observes that social media was the most important platform for Profetens Ummah in terms of mobilization, distribution of propaganda, discussion and internal coordination (Sunde, 2013: 106-107). These online-reforms crippled one of the groups most important recruitment channels (Stenvaagnes, 2014). Even though the Norwegian Defence League did not experience a shutdown of its webpage due to its more moderate narrative, the definitional vagueness of “Islamization” (which specific actors responsible, etc.) was strategically rational due to the online extension of law §135a.

Counter-terror legislation:

There have been numerous terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the United States since 2001. New York (2001), Madrid (2004), London (2005), Paris (2015), Copenhagen (2015) and a significant number of other attacks had important consequences on legislative reforms on terrorism. Jan Oskar Engene argues that the changes of counter-terror legislation moved from *reactive* measures towards *preactive* policies (Engene, 2013: 234). As we shall see, these new

laws were principally limiting opportunity structures for the radicalization of Profetens Ummah.

The post-9/11 period resulted in an explosion of new anti-terror laws in Norwegian legislation. Before 2001, none of the Nordic countries counted terrorism as a special category in their legislation. After 2001, terrorism became criminalized, the penalties against terrorist activities were increased and the anti-terror laws were developed to incorporate a broader spectrum of actions (Universitetet i Bergen, 2009). The ratification of these laws were primarily because the Norwegian state was bound to international conventions, coordinative initiatives came from the United Nations and the European Union (Engene, 2013: 234; Husabø, 2004: 182-183).

The first wave of new anti-terror laws resulted in the implementation of a Norwegian terror paragraph in 2002. This paragraph contained increased penal sanctions for killings with intentions of terrorism, forbade financing and illegalized to plan terrorist attacks. The second package of reforms arrived in 2005. The new laws gave secret services more freedom of supervision, illustrated by the repeal of the prohibition of surveillance. The last package pre-2012 came in 2008. These latter reforms prohibited recruitment to terrorist organizations, as well as training and encouragement of terrorist acts (Færaas, 2013: a).

To illustrate how the former laws lacked these various implementations, we can observe the definition of law nr.10 of 20.03.1998 on “preventive national security” §3,5:

“Illegal use of, or threats of the use of, coercion or violence against persons or property, in the attempt to pressure the national authorities or population or the society otherwise to achieve political, religious or ideological goals” (Bergesen, 2012: 53)

In reality, Norway implemented the new legislation because there was a demand from the international community to increase anti-terror cooperation through legislative homogeneity. The national assertions of terrorist threats at the time did not expect any imminent attack on national soil (Engene, 2013: 253). This is reflected by the foreign policy strategies against international terrorism developed by the Norwegian foreign ministry in 2006:

“So far, we have been spared acts of terrorism on Norwegian soil. Nevertheless, Norway and Norwegian interests are threatened by international terrorism. A fundamental principle of Norwegian foreign policy is to strengthen the role of the UN” (Utenriksdepartementet, 2006: 7)

How are the reforms of counter-terror laws limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between PU and NDJ compared to the 1990s/early 2000s? One

explanation is the activities of the neo-Nazis and anti-racists never were perceived as terrorist, which allowed the groups to keep more of its mobilization potential but also facilitated tactical innovations and escalations of violence in group-conflicts. The first Norwegian verdict of terrorism occurred as late as 2012, when two males were convicted for planning a terrorist attack against the newspaper that printed the caricatures of Muhammed (NTB & Løvstad, 2012; Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 59).

However, there has been more convictions of terrorism after 2012. A substantial number of these cases contain individuals who were profiled members of the Norwegian radical Islamist movement (Christoffersen & Zaman, 2016) like Ubaydullah Hussain's conviction in April 2017 for recruitment to the Islamic State (Arntsen & Hopperstad, 2017); or being active in the Syrian conflict, like Ishaq Ahmed, who was sentenced to 8 years in prison (Holm-Nilsen & Sagmoen, 2015). Certain incidents in the 90s would have been qualified as terrorism with the specifications of types of actions in the new juridical reforms. This is especially the case with the escalation of violence after 1994/1995. Neo-Nazi-made bombs detonated in 1995 and 1996 at the Blitz house in Oslo (Fangen, 2001: 236). The racist murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001 could also have been interpreted as an act with "*intention of causing serious fear in the population*" according to the current legislation on terrorism (Straffeloven, Kap.18 §131 b).

Ultimately, the juridical perception of terrorism has been a political question. Before 2001, the state would rather define radical action as ordinary legal breaches over terrorism. *Vandalism, explosion, or criminality* were common designations used by officials (Jore, 2011). The latter became the verdict of the 19-year-old Norwegian Ole Kristian Brastad, who tried to place a bomb in the *Nordmoské* in Oslo in 1985. He was sentenced to 5 years in prison (Strømmen, 2011), while his four accomplices were not charged; collaboration for terrorism became criminalized in 2002 (Færaas, 2013: a). This act was clearly politically motivated and targeted against civilian targets with a specific religious background. According to the new laws on terrorism, financing, preparation, training and collaboration are terrorist offences.

If the today's reforms on terrorism had been implemented in the 1990s, it could have had important consequences for the total number active of members within the radical fractions, and ultimately for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the groups within the two social movements. Strict legislation discourages the use of radicalism, which was essential for in-group cohesion as well as the identification of an enemy out-group in neo-Nazis and anti-racists conflicts. Thus, before 2001, groups had more freedom to use violence in conflicts with out-groups than after 2012-2014; legislation was limiting for HRR in the second case,

facilitating in the first case. The Norwegian Defence League's narrative was most likely moderated by a stricter regulation of racial discriminatory rhetoric, and Profetens Ummah lost a significant part of its mobilization and leadership due reforms of legislation of terrorism.

4.3.2 Training of agencies

In the last section, the thesis argues that post-2001 reforms of legislation was limiting for Horizontal Reciprocal in the second case due to two factors: reforms of laws on racial discrimination and terrorism. However, international security statuses post-2001 changed drastically: nations in the West observed that radicalization and terrorism did not stem exclusively from individuals from nations outside of the region, but there was also a growing domestic problem of "homegrown terrorism". Attacks in Madrid (2004), London (2005), Norway (2011), Paris (2015) and Orlando (2016) are examples of the numerous orchestrated attacks by individuals with the same nationalities that the country they attacked. Eventually, National governments were forced to train agencies to prevent homegrown radicalization and terrorism, and especially to tackle the new threat of radical Islamism.

EXIT, the Action Plan and empowerment conversations

The first project against radicalization was implemented in Norway in 1997, and was named "*Project EXIT*". As shown in previous parts, the preventive effects of legislation gave the groups the freedom to pursue a high level of inter-group activity over longer periods in time. In 1995, 80 radical-right individuals were arrested in Torshov (Oslo). The accumulation of past incidents (Brumunddal 1991, Vennesla 1992-1993, etc) started a process of cooperation between the police and researchers to develop a preventive strategy against radicalization in Norwegian cities like Oslo, Drammen, and Kristiansand. The project was first initiated in 1997 by the organization "*Voksne for Unge i Norge*" and focused primarily on reducing neo-Nazi activity and recruitment as well as encouraging disengagement (EXIT-Sluttrapport: 2-5; Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 60-61).

In 2014, the Norwegian government initiated a second large-scale project against "radicalization and violent extremism", called *Handlingplanen* (Action Plan). This was a revisited version of the first issue that was initially developed in 2010. The international threat of radicalization and terrorism security had gradually become a domestic problem after 2010,

with terrorist attacks and multiple active radical groups from both radical Islamic- and radical-right movements. New actors and changing security statuses required alternative measures to counter the growing national and global danger. The Action Plan was primarily designed to counter the relatively unknown threat of radical Islamism (NOU, 2014; Vidino & Brandon, 2012: IBID).

In retrospect, the EXIT-strategy was quite successful. The first reason for this was that the conflicts in the 1990s were mainly between youth under 18 years of age, therefore more manageable than groups consisting primarily of adults. It became particularly efficient with *empowerment conversations* (bekymringsamtale), which identifies (intentions of) criminal behavior and directs the concerned individual onto a path of legal and permissible conduct (Politidirektoratet, 2011: 13). Teachers, police officers, council workers or religious leaders are usually leading these conversations (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 63).

The cooperation between radicalized youth, their parents, and public employees was one of the main strategies of prevention, disengagement, guidance and rehabilitation. The second reason for EXIT's success was due to the transparency of the Norwegian society. The neo-Nazis' numbers of participants peaked at 300 at the national scale, but they regionally fragmented and easily detectable due to small populations in Norwegian cities with the highest levels of group-activity (Rieker et al, 2006: 16-17).

Despite EXIT's positive results, the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s still experienced severe instances of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. One explanation is simply that there was *no efficient system of prevention before 1997*. This is per definition a facilitating political opportunity structure for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization because it enables contact, which Della Porta argues, is necessary to activate mechanisms of radicalization (Della Porta, 2012: 246). Yngve Carlsson argued that the escalation of conflicts was in early stages a result of the inability of municipalities to face the new challenges of radicalization. He mentioned lacks of competence, misjudged or exaggerated reactions due to incorrect diagnosis of the source of the problem and refusing to hold entire communities responsible for the actions of the radical groups that reside within them (Rieker et al, 2006: 17-19).

Prevention of radicalization after 2001 built on the EXIT-project in two ways. First, the *Action Plan* and other post-2011 measures against radicalization were inspired by highly successful strategies of counter-radicalization. Tore Bjørgo saw that many of the successful factors from the 90s were transmittable in the modern era, with certain modifications (Letvik et al, 2012).

Much like the EXIT-project, the Action Plan also acknowledges the importance of police cooperation with communal authorities on subject like criminality and drug abuse (Justis- & Beredskapsdepartementet, 2014: 13). After 2006, empowerment conversations were used to tackle radical Islamism (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 62). New communal initiatives were also initiated, like *Samordning av lokale rus og kriminalitetsforebyggende tiltak*. The SLT-model works on the prevention of criminality and drug abuse with minors, and consists of a cooperation between the police, communes and organizations/businesses (Kompetansesenteret for Kriminalitetsforebygging, undated)

Second, the preventative work against radicalization of the 90s continued after the turn of the millennia, and it neutralized major parts of the radical-right movement in the country. Vidino and Brandon regard it as “highly successful” (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 61). For example, an important point is that the Action Plan was initiated in 2014, which is at the late stages of NDL’s and PU’s existence. Still, before 2014, there were multiple functioning and efficient measures against radicalization. Inter-communal cooperation (SLT) and empowerment conversations has been primarily developed for individuals under 18 years old, making it very difficult for a minor to display signs of radicalization without early interventions. This lowered the number of radicalized individuals and thus reduced *general recruitment of minors* to radical groups. Therefore, the EXIT-project continued to have an effect well after the last active radical youth-groups.

The latter explains why Profetens Ummah and (especially) the NDL struggled to mobilize the specific demographic cohort; early counter-radicalization intervention of younger individuals prevents recruitment and is ultimately a limiting factor for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. Fewer members in radical groups means that authorities can control the activities of nearly all individuals, reducing the possibility for an unknown sub-group or lone-wolf like A.B.B acting from ideological outskirts. According to Aftenposten (2014), the majority of the members of Profetens Ummah were over 20 years old (Stokke et al, 2014). PST’s mapping of demographic traits of people that frequent radical Islamic group reveals an average age of 27, 5 years (PST, 2016 b: 6).

A general tendency is that older members have fewer incentives to live a radical life than youngsters do. The first reason is *push factors*, or negative social forces like stricter punishments by legislation for adults than for minors; for example, the risk of longer incarceration is greater after the age of 18 (Prosjekt EXIT – undated: 12-13). The post-2001 reforms of legislation have ultimately been increasing push-factors themselves. The second

reason is *pull-factors*, which are positive alternative lifestyles that could lead an individual out of the environment. An older individual does not have the same need for excitement and will eventually want to live a normal life with commitments to family and professional life (Project EXIT – Undated: 13-14).

Despite the incorporation of successful measures of EXIT into the Action Plan, the new counter-radicalization policies suffered from challenges in the new context. First, the cooperation between different instances like NAV, SLT communes and local actors have proven to be difficult. Second, empowerment conversations are not as efficient with adults as with minors. This is because of parents' involvement in the process of rehabilitation with the latter, which has had a very positive effect. On the contrary, prevention of the radicalization of radical Islamists proved to be much more difficult due to a general lack of knowledge on how to tackle the theological aspects. For example, a "normal" police officer in the EXIT project discussed prospects on the mere quality of life, but had no relevant insight in religious "rights" or "wrongs" (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 64-65; Kvittingen, 2016; Lid et al, 2016).

In retrospect, the EXIT project was probably more successful than the Action Plan. This is why the most significant difference of opportunity structures for radicalization between the cases is that the first case had no established preventative measures (against specifically radicalization) before 1997. The Action Plan might be less successful than EXIT, but the measures from the 1990s/2000s like empowerment conversations and police-communal cooperation still became common tools of prevention against radicalization in the following years. The results were the collapse of the radical right scene in Norway and higher transparency; thus lower levels of detectable radicalization.

Aggressive security services

In the legislative discussion, the thesis discussed reforms of laws against terrorism. One change that was not evoked was the increased freedom of surveillance and wiretapping from the reforms of 2005 (Færaas, 2013: a). This liberty to acquire information had major consequences for security agencies and general police work in Norway. The 01.01.2002, the Police Surveillance Service (*Politiets Overvåkningstjeneste*) was re-organized and changed name to the Police Security Service (*Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste*). This change came parallel to a ratification of a reform of the police law from 1995 (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2007: 32). After the arrival of radical Islamist groups in Norway, scholars observed that the security

services had initiated quite aggressive strategies against the milieu to reduce its activities and further recruitment (Svendsen & Døvik, 2016; Akerhaug, 2013: 60-61). This section discusses the implications of the new characteristics of the police security agency across the two cases.

As the thesis has shown, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had political and juridical consequences in Norway. The global threat of radical Islamism did also influence the structure and strategies of security service, which underwent two important changes. After 2002, PST devoted much of its attention towards ideologically motivated violence inspired by radical Islamism (Døvik & Wernesén, 2014); combatting international terrorism was given the highest priority (NOU, 2002). There was a real shift of focus from POT, which had similar tasks as PST but was active in a “pre-9/11” context.

As shown in the part on legislation, a second big change came when the counter-terrorism reforms allowed security services extensive freedom of surveillance by removing covert audio surveillance and extending wiretapping to a wider range of crimes (Færaas, 2013: a). In 1996, POT got accused by the *Lund-Commission* of illegal surveillance and information gathering of Norwegian communists. The first signs of the increased freedom of monitoring came with a new proposition from the *Danielsen-commission* in 1998, which suggested that the institution should be an independent organ of the police and questioned the current conditions of the legal framework on surveillance (Ot.prp. nr. 29, 2000-2001: 1; NOU, 2012: 11). In 2002, POT finally became PST.

The new laws against terrorism and increased liberty of surveillance gave PST the possibility to lead *proactive* policies against individuals who they believe threaten national security and interests. Members of the groups in the 1990 were mainly in contact with normal police officers, mostly because no sub-group within the movements were perceived as threats against national interests. In the contemporary case, both Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League suffered from the security agency’s activities.

The Norwegian Defence League was primarily an internet phenomenon. The group struggled to establish itself in Norway due to ideological illegitimacy, long term-prevention of radicalization and legislation against discrimination and terrorism. The group probably never passed its infant stage, and another reason for this is PST’s total control of NDLE. The method the agency used to monitor the group’s every move was through *infiltration*.

In 2013, Christian Høibø came out as a long-term infiltrator in different radical milieus in Norway, with one of them being the Norwegian Defence League. Høibø was part of a group of

administrators who managed the group from 2010-2012, and reported to PST and SOS-rasisme. Høibø did later reveal his past as a spy in a documentary (NRK-Brennpunkt, 2013), and stated that he was partly responsible for the groups' establishment (Flydal, 2013). Over longer periods, the spy reported in information about members of NDL, and personally states he banned Anders Behring Breivik from the group due to his violent, anti-Muslim intentions (Mon, 2013).

Ultimately, it seems like *Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste* had large control over the small and fragmented radical-right group in Norway in 2010 and 2011. The agency's estimations in security assessments from these years indicate a weak radical right movement in Norway (Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2010; Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste, 2011). The infiltration of the NDL gave security agencies the liberty to monitor an important actor of the radical right environment in the country, and since the NDL had close relations to the "English Defence League" and SIAN (Stop Islamiseringen av Norge) it would facilitate the mapping of a large radical-right network, both within the nation frontiers and internationally. In reality, it would be very hard for the NDL to act collectively without reactions from PST or SOS-Rasisme. One example of this is the NDL-manifestation of 2011, where infiltrators from SOS-Rasisme suggested the specific place where it eventually would unfold. It was then easy to assemble a counter-demonstration, which further reduced the legitimacy of NDL's message (Sandli et al, 2012).

Ultimately, security agencies had almost full control over every move within the NDL, except for an unexpected lone-wolf actor. Despite the 22.7.2011 terrorism, it was rational of PST to keep NDL active along with informants within the group. An active NDL means that security agencies had a way to unite individuals considered as ideologically problematic through very transparent radical groups. The almost total control of the Norwegian Defence League made it even harder for the group to be active, recruit and grow. This factor is most certainly limiting for mechanisms of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the NDL and Profetens Ummah.

In *Norsk Jihad* (2013), Lars Akerhaug gives valuable insight in how PST was interacting with the radical Islamists movement in Norway. Much like with the NDL, the security service had informants in the milieu to extract a maximum amount of information about certain individuals, like Mohyeldeen Mohammad (Akerhaug, 2013: 52). Already in 2009, PST performed empowerment conversations against several persons considered radicalized and maintained regular contact with them. After a two-year long investigation started in 2011, an appointed committee from Stortinget revealed that the agency had illegally monitored and registered

information about approximately 300 individuals from radical Islamist milieus in the 1990s and 2000s (Færaas, 2013: b). Lastly, Akerhaug also describes how PST intercepted people who wanted to join the Syrian conflict at the airport, before they got a chance to leave to national frontiers (Akerhaug, 2013: 56-58).

What this highlights is the pro-active policy of *Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste*. The intelligence services were already leading extensive measures in the early 2000s, but Akerhaug states that PST started intensely working against radical Islamism after 2012. In 2010, the agency had an overview of practically every single person within the movement, due to a demonstration in front of the American embassy against the Mohammed caricatures where 3000 participated (Akerhaug, 2013: 62). PST maintained close contact with the local police, and local agents were often in charge of leading the communication between the parties (Akerhaug, 2013: 60). Given that the group had threatened Norwegian officials and supported groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, it was considered to have terrorist intentions and was taken extremely seriously.

Most of PST's contact with individuals they considered potentially dangerous consisted of preventive work, much like the EXIT project. They continued using empowerment conversations, and experienced that they were more efficient with younger individuals who recently got into the environment, for the more radicalized these actions could reinforce their view of an oppressive Norwegian state (Akerhaug, 2013: 60-62).

Even though older and more radicalized individuals do not necessarily respond positively to empowerment conversations, they have been gradually neutralized during the years after 2009. Ever since 2001, the Norwegian security agency viewed radical Islamism as the most important threat against Norway's security. One primary goal was to crush the radical networks in the country, an objective that former PU-member Yousef Assidiq saw as quite successful (Svensen & Døvik, 2016).

In 2016, there had been nine indictments for breaking the laws against terrorism and other forms of criminality. One important objective of PST was to neutralize the leadership of the group, which they did through e.g. incarcerations (Ubaydullah Hussain – 2017; Arfan Bhatti – 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017; Mohyeldeen Mohammad - 2013) and expulsions (Omar Cheblal - 2014, Adnan Shaluli – 2016) (Christoffersen & Zaman, 2016; Zaman & Christoffersen, 2016; Arntsen et al, 2015; Holm-Nilsen & Falch-Olsen, 2013).

As mentioned previously in the thesis, police forces experienced that preventive conversations were quite inefficient against older radicalized Islamists. This was especially the case for those

who had already decided to join the Syrian conflict. However, their departure weakened Profetens Ummah's strength at home, as many as 18 had were estimated dead in 2016 (Svendsen & Døvik, 2016). During 2012-2016, PST was actively trying to prevent recruitment and activity from the Islamists fractions in Norway, but departures to Syria were also quite limiting for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization with the Norwegian Defence League. The NDL would have less of an incentive to consider PU as a main contributor to the "Islamization" of Norway and Europe if the primary objective of many of PU's members was to join the conflict in the Middle East.

In sum, the counter-measures of PST were quite limiting for the unilateral activities and recruitment of Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League. Weakening the groups impedes their radicalization and renders inter-group interactions very unlikely. Infiltration was important to gain control over the radical-right- and radical Islamic movements, but PST did also use other methods. In 2011, a meeting took place with NDL leaders in a hotel in Oslo, where Høibø recorded the conversation and reported it back to PST (NRK-Brennpunkt, 2013). The new reforms of the laws against terrorism gave the security service the chance to monitor activity in new ways. The large control over the Norwegian Defence League leadership, and the monitoring, incarcerations and regular contact with individuals within the radical Islamists movement significantly weakened both sides, limiting Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.

4.3.3 Engagement of Civil Society

So far, the analysis indicates a general shift from facilitating towards limiting opportunity structures of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization from the first to the second case. One hypothesis is that the engagement of civil society did also limit HRR more in the second case than in the 1990s/2000s.

What does a more active civil society signify for opportunity structures? If local communities have efficient ways of combatting radicalization, it is then limiting. Multiplying measures does not necessarily mean better results. The thesis has discussed the role of the *EXIT-project* and *Action Plan* from a police-perspective through empowerment conversations, but these initiatives are first and foremost cooperative measures where local communities have an important role in the prevention of radicalization. This section analyzes counter-radicalization at the grassroot-level across the two cases.

Vidino and Brandon view the EXIT-project as highly successful (Vidino & Brandon, 2012: 61). Others question the effects of the Action Plan, partly because Norwegian communities have displayed lower levels of competence in tackling radicalization and Islamism. Norwegian prevention of radicalization has been primarily directed towards rehabilitation and social cooperation. For example, one successful local initiative in the 90s and 2000s was the offering of jobs to youth who wished to disengage from the radical environment. As Katrine Fangen argued, the system focused on integration as an alternative strategy (Fangen, 2001 b: 34-35).

There is major ideological different between the cases that makes the rehabilitation in the first period a much smoother process than for radicalized individuals in 2012-2014. When Bjørge, Fangen and others analyzed why some of the youths were drawn into the radical milieus, the ideological component was but one of many reasons. “*There are few that seek the environment out of pure ideological reasons*” (Fangen, 2001: 134). In many instances, the individuals were not ideologically motivated, and did not identify with the neo-Nazi ideas that defined the movement. For example, while *Boot Boys* was rather violent, the group did not figure as an ideologically driven organization. On the contrary, *Vigrid* promoted anti-Semitism but distanced itself from violence (Bjørge, 2005: 50).

Most individuals within the movements in the 90s/2000s did not reach high levels of ideological radicalization, and were therefore more prone to an easier rehabilitation into society. This was a significant problem for many radicalized individuals in the second case, especially for Profetens Ummah. Many members displayed high levels of ideological conviction, and were thus very hard to de-radicalize. The 30th October 2014, Erna Solberg ordered 23 municipalities to take actions against radicalization due to the increasing number of Norwegian foreign fighters, but no one really had any specific competence to tackle the problem of Islamism and radicalization (Thjømmøe, 2015).

Radicalization is a dynamic process that the scientific community still struggles to fully understand. In the first case, the measures were more about tackling unwanted criminal behavior than to reverse ideological indoctrination, and it isn't shocking that local mobilization had such great counter-effects. In some communities, the initiatives of normal, unqualified people were more efficient than direct engagement by police employees. In Bøler (Oslo), the social initiative called “Trygg Bydel” was carried out by locals and stopped recruitment to the neo-Nazi group that resided in the area through offers of alternative social activities from the trouble members (NTB, 2001; Lie, 2002).

The EXIT-strategy was launched in 1997, a significant amount of time after the first instances of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization between the two movements. It is now three years since the Action Plan was initiated (NOU: 2014), and there is still much to learn on how to tackle the new forms of radicalization. Regarding Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League, new legislation on terrorism and more aggressive security agencies were probably more preventive than a little developed plan of prevention, which also came as late as 2014.

Ultimately, the local initiatives in the second case were “more” facilitating opportunity structures for unilateral radicalization than the EXIT-strategy. The two cases display two very different contexts that need different forms of measures. In the first case, the more efficient initiatives were social programs. In the second case, the more efficient policies against radicalization requires deeper ideological knowledge but also more time. The rehabilitation of radical Islamists and generally older individuals located within the two extremities is increasingly harder than with minors, but we also need to give the measures more time before they can become efficient. An example of the negative professional consequences for adults who belong in these types of groups is the leader of Norwegian Pegida group, Marx Hermansen, who was let go as a teacher at a high school after an interview with the media channel TV2 in 2016 (Jensen & Husebø-Evensen, 2016)

Nevertheless, the comparative failure or success of local initiatives across the cases is unimportant. The collective effect of legislation and preventive/active strategies of Norwegian security agencies were so significant that the thesis can conclude that counter-radicalization measures were more limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case. Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League had no chance to grow, mobilize or recruit in early stages of their mobilization. The groups weakened so quickly that they were unable to form radical fractions, interact with each other or develop inter-group dynamics if the ideological component would have been a facilitating structure. Without unilateral growth, different counter-measures will incapacitate radical groups and mechanisms of inter-group radicalization.

4.3.4. Hypothesis 2 - Counter-Radicalization as a structural opportunity

How did counter-radicalization measures function as opportunity structures from the first case to the second? The three chosen indicators of this independent variable clearly demonstrate that counter-radicalization measure was a limiting opportunity structure for Horizontal Reciprocal

Radicalization in the second case, while facilitating in the first. *Therefore, the thesis confirms the second hypothesis (H2).* First, the reforms law §135a against discrimination and racial prejudices was a significant obstacle against free speech. Pre-reforms, the groups in the 1990s could express themselves more freely without juridical consequences, like Sørlie's public appeal in 2000.

Second, the 9/11 terrorist attacks had a crucial impact on anti-terror laws, which post-2001 gradually incorporated a wider spectrum of acts related to terrorism, like financing or compliance. Different actions of radicalism in the 1980s and 1990s were not labeled as terrorism. Had modern laws on terrorism been active in the 1990s, it would have had significant consequences on general prevention as well as incarcerations. This could have been detrimental for the degree of radicalism and recruitment between neo-Nazis and anti-racists; the new case shows that Profetens Ummah was quite weakened from the new reforms, ultimately reducing the risk of HRR.

Third, the thesis finds that there was no efficient plan against radicalization before 1997. This naturally gives the groups the liberty to grow, facilitating unilateral radicalization, inter-group contact and then bilateral dynamics of radicalization. The Action Plan is still young, but so far, it has been unable to tackle the new problem of ideological radicalization in the degree of the preventive measures of the EXIT-plan. Still, the latter benefits from successful tools of the former counter-radicalization strategy, like empowerment conversations and the general effects of prevention. The aggressive strategies and liberties of security agencies post-2002 did also act as limiting opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, because PU and NDJ were controlled/weakened by infiltration, systematic contact with PST and incarcerations/expulsions of central leaders/members. The unilateral effects have direct consequences on bilateral mechanisms of radicalization.

Fourth, the thesis concludes that the engagement of civil society was more efficient in the first case than the second, but it is important to understand that there was a higher need for specific ideological knowledge in the second case, thus local communities were in reality unqualified to be of help. Ultimately, this finding has no significant consequence on competition across the two cases. The collective effect of the three indicators of the independent variable strongly support the conclusion that the political opportunity structures in the second case limited unilateral radicalization and thus bilateral mechanisms of radicalization.

4.4. Competition

So far, the analysis has demonstrated how ideologies and counter-radicalization measures can work as limiting or facilitating opportunity structures for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization. The next section turns to competition, a factor that McCauley and Moskalenko argue is important for in-group cohesion, and ultimately radicalization at the group-level (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008: 424-426). The thesis expects a positive effect of competition on HRR-mechanisms, and given the different outcomes, higher levels of competition in the 1990s between the movements/groups than between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League.

4.4.1. Geographical interactions

One of the main reasons for the long duration and escalation of conflicts in the 90s/2000s was the contestation of local geographical areas. In the first period, the groups lived quite close to each other, often in the same town. This forced the poles to compete for the same social resources, as many of the members were living alongside one another. For once, there was competition over social goods, like girls, status, reputation and power. In Kristiansand, the center of town became the spot of assembly, contested between youth with minority-backgrounds and neo-Nazis. The areas in question were often pubs or youth-clubs (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 122).

One reason that people wanted to join the different sides was that they sought security. Vulnerable youth who had been harassed by “immigrants” were often prone to join the neo-Nazi movement (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 70). On the other end, neo-Nazis did sometimes attack or provoke people with a different skin color, which gave the victims a grievance to join the anti-racist fraction (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 73). When groups guarantee security and solidarity, they automatically put themselves in a position where they have to use strategies of active response. If one part uses violence, then the reply is first and foremost by the same nature. The primary reason for this is that these groups had low levels of trust with the police (Bjørgero et al, 2001: 103-107); instead of seeking help from law enforcement, they took the matter into their own hands.

The co-existence of polarized groups in small geographic areas facilitated acts of revenge against former assailants. Not only did this mobilize members of both parties, but it also limited

disengagement. Since members of both sides knew each other, they did not forget assaults done by people who had left the environment. Many had personal enemies, who they regularly threatened. Once they left the milieu, defector could be targets of personal revenge (Bjørgero. 2001: 74-79). The co-existence in small spaces therefore gave some individuals less incentives to disengage, and former experiences pre-developed hostilities for the counter-group. This naturally reinforced polarization and radicalization processes because members were active in the inter-group conflicts over long periods, ultimately facilitated Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.

Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League did not co-exist in small areas like several groups in Kristiansand and Oslo in the first case. Most members who joined these groups lived in different places and had negative experiences that were unconnected to members of the out-group. The lower level of co-existence reduced the risk of general contact, as the members did not know each other personally as in many cities in the 90s/2000s. Still, individuals or groups from different cities/nations can end up in physical confrontations. In Britain, clashes between the EDL and Islamists did sometimes escalate when they found themselves against each other in demonstrations. It was the primary setting from which inter-group violence could develop (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013).

The latter was the form of political mobilization that produced the most inter-group radicalism, often by escalations of clandestine political violence. In Norway, a few manifestations were initiated by each side, but without the direct counter-mobilization of the counterpart. For example, in the demonstration of December 2012, the police forced Profetens Ummah (and a counter-demonstration from moderate third-party actors) to keep a significant distance from the Norwegian Defence League (Gunnensen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012). This blocked any possible physical interactions between them.

In reality, the Norwegian Defence League had trouble mobilizing for its own events, and they often ended with low numbers of participants. It is improbable that they could have ever significantly mobilized against the activities of Profetens Ummah. Any physical interaction between PU and NDL was prevented by police forces, who kept the groups under control in different locations (Gunnensen, 2012; Olsson et al, 2012). Both groups, but especially NDL, were so small in number of members and so little prone to street-violence that counter-manifestations would have had little impact on the HRR-process.

An important change of the political opportunity structures between the two periods is that the groups in the second case could benefit from the internet and social media. In contrast to the first period, early stages of HRR (molding of in-group identification and out-group alienation) could have started in this arena. Brynjar Lia observed that Facebook was important for Profetens Ummah self-identification (Lia, 2013: 106-108). Contact triggers mechanisms of radicalization (Della Porta, 2012), but a necessary discussion is whether the online arena has become a point of contention with similar radicalizing effects than local co-existence.

Ultimately, the laws against online-discrimination and terrorism did limit the escalation of inter-group conflict online, as unilateral freedom of activism was blocked by legislation. If state agencies set strict restrictions on physical interactions, then a general freedom on the internet could replace the effect of social/strategic competition. However, if the internet has indeed become the arena for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, then the groups have to be able to operate with a large degree of freedom; restrictions on hate/discriminatory speeches blocks direct contact or indirect use of one's statements for propaganda.

4.4.2. Recruitment

A recurrent phenomenon in the 90s/2000s was that members could switch from one pole to the other, and sometimes even back again (Bjørger, 2005: 64). In Xtrm, Jan Kallevik speaks about how a leader of a neo-Nazi subgroup, Jonny Olsen, tried to recruit him to his side despite the fact that the former was part of an enemy group. He was also highly profiled in the anti-racist movement (Kallevik, 2013: 198-199). The two-way exchange of supporters increased polarization and feelings of hostility. The deserters were regarded as traitors and lead to personal feuds with former friends/affiliates from the other side. Not only was revenge personal, but if other members of the group attacked these individuals it had consequences for collective feelings of hostility towards the assailant group. It also worked as a self-legitimization of violence (Bjørger et al, 2001: 90). Solidarity turned individual conflicts into collective disputes, reinforcing mechanisms of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization.

The second case is quite different from the first in two ways. First, recruitment wasn't primarily local, people from different places in the country gathered to rally for the same cause which lowered in-group cohesion in comparison to the first case. In 2015, the journalist Erlend Arntsen mapped the profile of the individuals who had departed from Norway to the Islamic State. Affiliates of the radical Islamist movement mobilized for the same ideological cause despite

the fact that they came from different places in the country, thus there was no pre-existing solidarity between them other than the (required) radical Islamic belief. There was also significant age differences between them. A 28-year-old converted woman from Trøndelag would hardly have had the same life experiences than a 23-year-old Muslim man from Fredrikstad (Arntsen, 2015).

Second, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League focused on quite different demographic groups for recruitment. This naturally lowered the levels of inter-group competition. The NDL regarded the Christian community as a potential ally, as they believed that they could mobilize and cooperate with *Kristent Samlingsparti* and the Christian factions within *Stop Islamiseringen av Norge* (SIAN) (Rognsvåg, 2012: b). In contrast to the NDL, one of the main goals of Profetens Ummah was to recruit young Muslims, especially in the Oslo-area. They were notably quite active in Grønland and Oslo S, two geographical zones in the capital where there are a higher number of foreigners and Muslims than the rest of the city/country (NTB, 2013: b).

The radical-right group did also dedicate some of its attention on recruitment within the hooligan environment. A former chief of security from the Norwegian football team *Vålerenga* stated that NDL tried to recruit young and inexperienced males from the supporter club “Klanen”, much like Boot Boys did in the 1990s (Schjønberg et al, 2013). NDL’s intentions of recruiting from the hooligan environment also became apparent when members of the supporter-group “Brannguttene” were added in the NDL Facebook-group without their personal consent (Opheim, 2012).

In many ways, the NDL and PU recruitment strategies were quite similar. The easiest targets to radicalize were vulnerable youngsters, looking for excitement and social approval. In contrast to the NDL, Profetens Ummah understood that the individuals who wanted their ideological ideals were Muslims. This is why another specific strategy of PU was to recruit inside of mosques. Individuals from this environment were inclined to be attracted by the various forms of excitement connected Islamic state. They would also be more grieved by Muslim oppression by state actors than the small radical-right in Norway. PU and NDL were not in competition for the same base of support, something that in itself gave the counterpart less incentive to care about the other, but did also reinforce the unilateral grievances behind the recruitment in the first place. The analysis of the ideological nuances shows that these were never symmetrical like between the groups in the first case.

4.4.3 Ideological competition

Roger Eatwell, Majid Nawaz, and Bartlett & Birdwell are amongst those who have discussed the relationship between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism in Britain (Eatwell, 2006; Nawaz, 2011; Bartlett & Birdwell, 2013). However, what is an ideological symbiosis? In the British case, Bartlett and Birdwell argue that EDL demonstrations act as a “recruiting sergeant” for radical Islamist fractions. In reality, the group started up as a reaction to planned protests by *Al Mujahiroun* (2009). Are radical groups with these specific ideologies (context-independently) prone to engage in reactionary interactions? The authors refrain from giving a positive answer. One possible explanation was specific circumstances in Luton, or even factors caused by the national context. They mention an observable increased radical-right online activism in the period, and a significant number of British radical Islamist demonstrations against symbolic events. In any case, radical Islamist networks were perceived as a direct threat to people in the British community (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2013).

The inter-group relationship in the Norwegian “sister-case” is quite difficult to identify. However, one conclusion is that Profentens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League lacked the specific circumstances that triggered HRR in Britain as well as between neo-Nazis and anti-racists in Norway. In the 1990s/2000s, the radical fractions display strong signs of ideological interdependence. As the thesis shows in the ideological discussion, the group-identities were almost entirely sustained by the counterpart at a certain point in time. Their primary driver was the elimination of a specific enemy, a strategy that molded mechanisms of polarization, conflicts and reciprocal tactical innovations. In reality, there was a real ideological competition for survival, but eliminating the enemies would render unilateral collective identities obsolete.

Ultimately, this is a contradictory logic if the groups were entirely ideologically driven. What it was really about in the first case was social competition over success in common life within the same remote areas, which gradually shaped encompassing ideological structures. When the threat becomes real and it negatively influences personal welfare in one’s closest social circles, dualism rationalizes a combat against the enemy by any means necessary. One possible strategy is through collective mobilization. At a certain point, existential competition becomes a reality.

In the second case, the number of actors involved in the group-perceptions of oppression were much more than just Profentens Ummah or the Norwegian Defence League. The reality that formed their ideological grievances was far more complex/global than the local/regional lens which dominated in the first case. In an NDL-perspective, Profentens Ummah was far from being

the only “force of Islamization” of Norway. In reality, they never really specify which actors are behind the process. One major strategical obstacle are the reforms on the law against discrimination, or §135a. In a PU-perspective, the NDL was but one minor problem in a sea of actors against Muslim oppression. Laws against discrimination were also equally relevant from them as they were for the NDL. In sum, was it ever rational to engage in direct competition for survival with the counter-group? The thesis views radicals as rational actors with political strategies, dependent on the opportunity structures in societies in which they exist. We can then hardly conclude anything other than no.

There were other dominating grievances at play, and without a clear reciprocal dynamics. The very first dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization (polarization, interactions) were improbable in the second case from the very beginning. The most dominant driver of each fraction, their ideologies, were ultimately the only possible arena where inter-group radicalization could have emerged. As we analyze the beliefs of Profetens Ummah and Norwegian Defence League, other priorities were clearly dominating their political agendas.

4.4.4. Hypothesis 3 – Inter-group competition as a structural opportunity

The last section has investigated inter-group competition as an opportunity structure for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization across the two selected cases. The three chosen indicators of the independent variable show that competition facilitated HRR in the first case, while a lack of competition in the second case had a limiting effect on the same phenomenon. *Therefore, the thesis confirms hypothesis 3, H3.*

First, neo-Nazi and anti-racist factions often competed over social resources in remote geographical areas. Competition over girls, status and city centers increased in-group cohesion and out-group hostility. Since the members of the groups often knew each other personally, there were often retaliation and vengeance. In the end, people were drawn to different sides because they could give them security from further harassment of members from the other side. Deserters were sometimes pursued after their disengagement, which prolonged memberships and ultimately the conflicts. Dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization were prolonged.

In the second case, we find no competition over geographical areas. The groups’ mobilization was first and foremost on the ideological level, and recruits of the groups did not know each

other, or members from the out-group. This naturally lowers in-group cohesion and out-group hostility. The only possible physical arena where PU and NDL could have interacted was through demonstrations, but the law enforcement did always control these events. Even though the internet and social media has become interesting channels of interactions, the thesis judges that the unilateral activities were so limited by legislation that it would have been very improbable to ever experience severe dynamics of HRR online.

Second, the first case did also show a certain inter-group competition over supporters. Members could switch sides because the essential grievances were social issues, not ideological beliefs. Supporters from group side did sometimes develop resentment against former friends who joined the enemy side, aggravating the levels of conflicts and polarization. In the second case, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League never fought for the same demographic cohort. While the NDL focused on the Christian community and the hooligan scene, PU tried to recruit vulnerable youngster from mosques and areas of the capital with a larger number of Muslims.

Third, while the groups do show a certain degree of ideological interdependence, Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League were never in competition over existence. This (contextually) confirms the skepticism of certain scholars who have challenged the notion of symbiosis between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism. At the most, the Norwegian case shows a strong asymmetrical relationship. It is very uncertain that PU did benefit from the actions of the counter-jihadi movement in Norway between 2012 and 2014. When we additionally take into account that the NDL was also preoccupied by other actors than PU, the argument could even go in favor of a non-existent symbiosis in the Norwegian instance.

5. Conclusion

5.1. *General approaches*

After reviewing Bjørge and Gjelsvik's summarizing paper about Norwegian research on radicalization, the author noticed that few had investigated the relationship between the counter-Jihadi and radical Islamist movements, who, at a certain period, co-existed in the Norwegian society. Experiences between the EDL and al-Mujahiroun in Britain and Eatwell's concept of *Cumulative Extremism* opened the question of whether their sister groups could ever have entered in similar dynamics in Norway. A short historical analysis showed that no dynamics of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization had occurred between PU and NDL, but there had been a positive case of the phenomenon in the 1990s/2000s in Norway between neo-Nazis and anti-racists.

The author did therefore estimate that it would not be fruitful to focus on the mere outcome in the second case. Rather, the more interesting inquiry would be to uncover *why* HRR developed in the first case and not the second. Using Alex Schmid's definition of radicalization (Schmid, 2013), this thesis introduced conceptual changes to Cumulative Extremism to render the phenomenon more easily measurable. For instance, the new concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization incorporates indirect actions (group vs civilians), and inter-group dynamics online.

The second step was to perform a comparative analysis, using Mill's most different system design and temporal triangulation. Findings in Social Movement Theory and especially Donatella Della Porta's "competitive escalation" pinpoint to factors who limit and facilitate inter-group radicalization. Three variables seem to have important effects for the process of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization: *Ideology*, *counter-radicalization measures* and *inter-group competition*. The thesis argues that these constitute political opportunity structures that either limit or facilitate HRR in the two cases, and generates three hypotheses before the analysis.

Since there does not exist any significant quantitative data on the subject, a qualitative analysis was the most appropriate methodology. The radicalization process is also quite dynamic, complex, and human psychology in general is very hard to explain through datasets. The information collected for the analysis has been through different forms of documents, like academic findings, public documents, reports and articles and online sources.

5.2. Conclusions

Hypothesis 1 – ideology

The first independent variable that was subject for analysis was ideology. Donatella Della Porta's states that this factor could create *discursive opportunities* for political violence and radicalization (Della Porta, 2013). In relation to the concept of Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization, theory highlighted two important components: perceptions of hostility and the acceptance of violence.

In the first case, the first indicator supports H1. Mutual hate and stigmatization was a central driver in the 1990s/2000s. The neo-Nazis and anti-Racists organized around binary moral positions, and they eventually developed distinct styles of clothing and newspapers that tracked the activities of the counter-groups. The thesis argues for a *symmetrical ideological relationship between the two factions*, something that had been discovered by Bjørge et al (2001), Fangen (2001) and others.

Analyzing the first indicator in the second case furtherly supports the hypothesis. It seems like Profetens Ummah was unconcerned with the activities Norwegian radical right. The global repression of Muslims was caused by governmental interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Syria (Michalsen, 2015). The Norwegian Defence League did not figure amongst the central factors of domestic repression; PU focused on the activities of the media, the police and politicians. In contrast, the primary concern of the NDL is the *Islamization* of Norway. However, the group did not specify what actors drive this process. This is simply not enough to create strong feelings of hate/alienation towards PU. *The thesis concludes that the groups in the second case did not display a facilitating ideological relationship for dynamics of HRR.*

The second indicator analyzed was violence in the narrative. In the first case, the legitimization of “controlled” violence in street fights before 1994 and the escalations of it after was likely due to two things. First, the ideological component helped sustain and escalate conflicts until the murder of Benjamin Hermansen in 2001. Imported skinhead culture and hooliganism increased the acceptance of violence, and it became a legitimate tool of conflict resolution of both sides. The second mechanism of legitimization was the pre-radicalization of the radical left (with police forces) before the 1990s.

In the second case, violent clashes between PU and NDL was an unlikely scenario. The Norwegian Defence League's narrative rejected violence, most likely because of the de-

legitimization of hateful acts/ideologies after Hermansen (2001) and Breivik (2011). Official figure in Norway distanced themselves from these types of actions, and so did several leaders of the NDL, who eventually had to leave the group. Ultimately, internal division does not solidify collective mobilization. Contrary to the NDL, Profetens Ummah promoted violence. However, they never acted violently on Norwegian soil despite warning about potential terrorism because of the country's military interventions abroad. Instead, they exported violence to conflicts in the Middle East by facilitating transport for affiliates to the Islamic State. Thus, PU might have lost much of its potential for mobilization in a hypothetical HRR-dynamic with the *NDL*, if it was ever possible.

In sum, the second indicator furtherly confirms the first hypothesis. When there is no potential for violence between two groups, an escalation of conflicts is improbable. Nevertheless, one important consideration is that the thesis might have investigated two groups in their infant stages of HRR-dynamics. However, if manifestations of non-violent pressure and coercion indicate early stages of radicalization (Schmid, 2013), then the findings linked to the first indicator makes it very difficult to foresee that HRR could ever develop between PU and NDL. They never had any strategical incentive to engage in reciprocal, non-violent radicalism.

Hypothesis 2 – Counter-radicalization

The thesis expected the second hypothesis, measure of counter-radicalization, to be limiting for Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the second case and facilitating for HRR in the first case. The analysis therefore focused three indicators: *legislation, training of agencies* and the *engagement of civil society*.

First, there was two important reforms of legislation that had an impact on both general radicalization as well as the group's specific freedom of speech and action across the two cases. The first reforms came on the law on discrimination, or §135a. The new legislation protected discrimination again sexual orientation, religious beliefs and public statements offline. One example is Terje Sørli's appeal in 2000. This type of rhetoric would have had severe juridical consequences in today's society. The 135a reforms had also important consequences to the freedom of speech of PU and NDL online, an arena that they regularly used for propaganda, recruitment and mobilization. In sum, *PU and NDL had reduced freedom of speech compared to the groups in the 1990s/early 2000s.*

The second indicator of legislation investigated is counter-terror legislation. Here, the 9/11 attacks mark a turning point for several waves of legislative reforms against terrorism. Norway incorporated new pre-active laws against these types of actions, due to international expectations of cooperation and coordination. Before 2001, domestic legislation on terrorism did not specify types of actions, only motivation. Between 2002 and 2008, new laws increased sanctions against terrorism, like financing, planning, recruitment, training and encouragement of terrorism became criminal offenses. *These new reforms had consequences for the freedom of action of PU and NDL, and would probably also have reduced the levels of violence and escalations in the 1990s/early 2000s.*

The counter-terror laws very especially detrimental for Profetens Ummah. Many of PU's leaders and prominent members were arrested/expatriated due to criminal activities. Post-reforms, they were ruled as acts of terrorism. The criminalization of departures did also certainly have a preventive effect for some who wanted to join the Syrian conflict. The radical Islamists group weakened through the reforms of anti-terror legislation. Ultimately, unilateral incapacity hinders mobilization and bilateral radicalization.

Second, the training of agencies did also impede the groups in the second case. In 1997, the *EXIT project* was initiated in Norway. It proved to be very efficient against the radicalization and activities of neo-Nazis. The thesis concludes that one reason that Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization could have developed so long in case one was because there was no existing system of prevention before EXIT. However, until 2012, preventative measures from the first initiatives like empowerment conversations were commonly used. *The findings indicates that these probably had a long-term effect on the radicalization of minors, making it more difficult for the groups in the second case to recruit vulnerable youth without them being intercepted at early stages and rehabilitated.*

In 2014, the Norwegian government implemented a final version of the *Action Plan (Handlingsplanen)* to counter the new threats of radicalization on a national scale. The new measures suffered from the contemporary context. Both the radical-rights and radical Islamists were older, more ideologically driven, and there was in reality a need for more specific ideological knowledge to disengage them. However, the plan from 2014 did benefit from the measures created in the first case. There was also natural causes for disengagement and generally lower levels of mobilization in the second instance: legislation punished radicalism much more than before (push-factor), and the older age acted as natural disengagement due to societal expectations (pull-factor).

In 2005, agencies like PST got increased freedom of surveillance and monitoring, the prohibition of these became repealed. This gave *Politiets Sikkerhetstjeneste* the liberty to infiltrate and monitor PU and ND. For instance, the intelligence services led highly aggressive policies against radical Islamism ever since 2002. Empowerment conversations, a very efficient preventive tool from the 1990s, was used in radical milieus years before 2012. Through infiltration within both the Norwegian Defence League and Profetens Ummah, the secret services did also have the possibility to map and control the entirety of the individuals who they perceived as potentially dangerous. *By crushing leaderships and controlling nearly all members, they weakened unilateral group radicalization and thus probably limited possible HRR dynamics.*

Hypothesis 3 - Competition

In their model on radicalization, McCauley and Moskaleiko find that inter-group competition could have a facilitating effect on inter-group mechanisms (McCauley and Moskaleiko, 2008: 424-425). Due to theory and the known outcomes across the two cases, that the thesis developed a third hypothesis before the analytical part that expected more inter-group competition in the first case than the second, something that would facilitate Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization in the 1990s/2000s and limiting the process in 2012-2014.

The thesis finds the geographical closeness in the first case was an important facilitator for reciprocal dynamics of radicalization and sustained conflicts. In contrast, the groups were not in constant interaction in the second case. The only arena in which they could have met physically was demonstrations: violent clashes occurred in Britain between the EDL and al-Mujahiroun in these events. The internet might have become a new arena for bilateral exchanges, but the preventive effects of legislation limited the groups' freedom of speech online.

Strategies of recruitment were different across the two cases. In the 1990s/2000s, the factions did sometimes exchange supporters, and they knew each other personally in many cases. This created feeling of treason, and revenge, increasing polarization and hostility between the sides. *In the second case, the groups did not recruit from the same areas. In-group cohesion is then not as strong as social ties that we see in the first case due to local co-existence.* The ND and PU recruited from different demographic cohorts. The competition over supporters in the

second case was never as clear as in the first; it seems like the common strategy for recruitment was vulnerability.

Lastly, some sub-groups within the neo-Nazi and anti-Racist movements really did hate each other. Their existence and identities had their base in the counter group, but this “positive relationship” was also driven by the fact that they wanted to eliminate the other side. *There was a competition for existence, in many ways an ideological and socially incompatibility. One of the main reasons for this was personal ties, also created by geographical closeness.* The thesis does not find this type of relationship between Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League.

In sum, the collective effect of the independent variables was limiting for HRR, indicating that Profetens Ummah and the Norwegian Defence League were very unlikely to develop dynamics of inter-group radicalization like the factions in the 1990s/early 2000s. This conclusion is supported by the confirmation of H1, H2 and H3.

Not only does the thesis find that radicalism had very little chance of manifesting in the second case of inter-group dynamics, but the political opportunity structures analyzed did also have an impact on unilateral group structures. For once, the ideological analysis shows that the NDL had no violent intentions. Second, even though Profetens Ummah did warn of terrorism, the thesis argues that specific legislation and the strategies of intelligence agencies suffocated the radical Islamic group. Ultimately, PST had mapped both radical groups and did have a significant control over them through constant monitoring, surveillance and infiltration.

Nevertheless, the groups were still sources of danger. Not primarily as collectives, rather as sources of influence for lone-wolf actors. The thesis argues that given the political opportunity structures in the Norwegian context, the only possible manifestation of violent radicalism in this period in time was unexpected solitary/small group terrorism. This is reflected through Breivik’s actions from 2011, but also the charges against a radical right individual in 2013 who displayed violent intentions against the parliament (*Stortinget*) (Sultan & Steen, 2014: 17; Vestrum et al, 2013).

5.3. Looking ahead

This thesis has tried to explain why two cases of inter-group interactions ended had very different outcomes of radicalization. The conclusion is that Profetens Ummah and the

Norwegian Defence League did not have the political opportunity structures necessary for entering dynamics of reciprocal radicalization. The positive case from the 1990s/early 2000s occurred between the radical left and the radical right. While dynamics of HRR has only been observed between the EDL and al-Mujahiroun, the radical-left and radical right have entered similar processes several times before, and in different countries. What can we expect in the years to come?

When it comes to the relationship between counter-jihadism and radical Islamism, there are some countries that could experience different forms of radicalism. If the ideology has the necessary facilitating traits, and counter-radicalization does not totally limit their freedom, then it might be possible to develop HRR. One obvious necessary condition is that we need two active factions in co-existence. A second factor is transparency. Countries with massively populated cities render efficient counter-radicalization very difficult. Finally, a third facilitator could be the number of immigrants in metropolises. Roger Eatwell states that “[...] *issues related to immigration are undoubtedly an important starting point for understand the appeal of the BNP and UKIP*” (Eatwell, 2006: 206).

There are some countries in Western Europe that display high levels of polarization, significant populations and active forces on both ideological sides. In Belgium, we have seen the presence of Sharia4Belgium (Bouchaud, 2015) and strong right-wing populism in Wlaams Blok (Blommaert, 2016). In France, there has been numerous radical Islamist terrorist attacks by domestic cells and lone wolves since January 2015. As late as 17 October this year, 10 radical-right individuals were arrested for planning multiple terrorist attacks against immigrants, politicians and mosques (Joffrin, 2017).

Excluding the recent terrorist attack that killed 12 people, officials in Germany also argue that they expect more attacks from radical Islamist individuals or groups. Recent reports find that there are 10,000 Salafists in the country (Crosse & Birsal, 2017). In June 2017, the national police uncovered far-right paramilitary training camps with guns, ammunition and drugs (Dearden, 2017). England, France, Germany and Belgium have another thing in common: they all have a great number of foreign fighters (Loveluck, 2015). If their return does lead to a significant increase in terrorist attacks, then it could spark strong reactions in radical-right factions, and maybe activate HRR processes.

Lastly, we also see strong reactions against the wave of refugees in Eastern Europe. The 12th of November 2017, 60 000 nationalists marched in the streets of Warsaw with slogans like

“Refugees get out” and “White Europe of brotherly nations” (Taylor, 2017). If we observe increased radicalism towards refugees and camps, it could very well lead to radicalization, polarization, acts of revenge and escalations of violent conflicts in the future. This trend has slowly become a reality; the German interior ministry registered 3533 attacks against migrants and asylum hostels in 2016 (BBC, 2017).

Inter-group radicalization is still, at a young stage of its conceptual development. As we see in Europe, Horizontal Reciprocal Radicalization will remain relevant as a sub-field of radicalization. However, measuring and understanding these dynamics in different contexts will require academic interest, and conceptual changes. Here are some proposed measures that could gain an academic importance in the time to come.

First, the concept of HRR in this thesis focuses mainly on direct inter-group radicalization. In reality, the processes are far more complex. For instance, strategies of provocation aim non-radical targets, through hate crimes, political violence and terrorism. The resulting escalations of sustained HRR dynamics could be hindered at early stages if we can observe early indicators of inter-group radicalization. The internet has also become an important arena for radical groups, thus more knowledge about online inter-group interactions is necessary to tackle HRR.

HRR dynamics can unfold between multiple factions in complex dynamics. Third parties can facilitate pre-radicalization, and possibly sparking legitimizations of violence in militant factions. This happened between the police and the radical left in Norway in the 1980s. How we obtain moderation instead of radicalization could be a function of specific preventive policies of counter-radicalization. Finally, individuals in group-conflicts aren't necessarily radicalized; there are also chances that many are simply criminal, without any ideological convictions. Conflicts then resemble gang-disputes. We therefore need increased clarity in the concept of HRR to avoid systematically creating false positives.

Second, we can use the empirical findings related to HRR in different national contexts, to find tendencies and necessary conditions that do possess general explanatory power. In this way, it will be easier to foresee different scenarios. What groups are prone to engage in reciprocal radicalization? Will it be counter-jihadism and radical Islamists, or will anti-racists and neo-Nazi- clashes become a general trend in Europe? The recent mobilization of “Den Nordiske Mostandsbevegelsen” has to be taken seriously in itself, but also in connection to potential violent reactions by counter-parts. As many as 600 participated in a demonstration in Sweden (Falun) in April 2017 (Johansen & Thjømmøe, 2017). 10 000 counter-protesters (many radical-

left affiliated) were expect to mobilize against a NMB-march in Gøteborg in September 2017 (Eisenträger, 2017).

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