

Peter Philipp and Richard Raatzsch

Essays on Wittgenstein



Skriftserie fra
Wittgensteinarkivet ved
Universitetet i Bergen
Nr. 6, 1993



Working Papers from the
Wittgenstein Archives at
the University of Bergen
No. 6, 1993

Wittgensteinarkivet ved Universitetet i Bergen

Wittgensteinarkivet er et forskningsprosjekt ved Filosofisk institutt ved Universitetet i Bergen. Prosjektet ble startet 1. Juni 1990. Dets hovedmålsetting er å gjøre Ludwig Wittgensteins etterlatte skrifter tilgjengelige for forskning. Wittgensteinarkivet arbeider med sikte på: (1) å produsere en komplett, maskinleselig versjon av Ludwig Wittgensteins etterlatte skrifter, (2) å utvikle programvare for presentasjon, gjenfinning og analyse av tekstene i vitenskapelig arbeid, (3) å stille de maskinleselige tekstene og analyseredskapene til disposisjon for vitenskapelig ansatte ved Universitetet i Bergen og gjestende forskere.

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Working papers from the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen

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Bergen 1993

ISBN 82-91071-05-5

ISSN 0803-3137

*Skriftserie fra
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Preface

The following essays are not systematically linked with one another. What they have in common is that they all deal with Wittgenstein's philosophy, and that they are throughout critical with regard to positions which are proposed in the literature on Wittgenstein. The first five essays try to give interpretations of particular sections of the *Philosophical Investigations*. The sixth is a critique of one writer's interpretation of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. In the last essay the author tries to make Wittgenstein's later philosophy fruitful for one field of modern non-classical logic.

Another point of contact is that all the essays in this volume are connected with the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen. The essays of Peter Philipp go back to two lectures which he delivered in Bergen in spring 1992, as a guest of the Archives and the Institute of Philosophy. The other essays were written in Bergen, during the author's stay at the Archives between October 1991 and December 1992. This stay was supported by the Alexander von Humboldt-Foundation (Germany) and the Norwegian Research Council. I wish to express my thanks for the opportunity to work at the Archives. But above all I must acknowledge my gratitude to the colleagues from the Archives, Claus Huitfeldt, Ole Letnes, Alois Pichler, and Astrid Castell, for their generous help. I should also thank Peter Cripps for his help with the English

proof-reading. Last but far from least I am indebted to Prof. Tore Nordenstam (Bergen) and Prof. Eike von Savigny (Bielefeld), who agreed to act as my advisers in this work.

Richard Raatzsch
Bergen, December 1992

Abbreviations for works by Wittgenstein

- TLP* *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, tr. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
- BlB and BrB* *The Blue and the Brown Book*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
- OC* *On Certainty*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, tr. D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1969.
- PI* *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd. edition, Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.
- RoF* *Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough'*, tr. A.C. Miles and R. Rhees, *The Human World* no. 3 (May 1971), pp. 28-41.
- Z* *Zettel*, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, tr. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell, 1967.
- CV* *Culture and Value*, ed. G.H. von Wright in collaboration with H. Nyman, tr. P. Winch, Oxford: Blackwell 1980.

References to unpublished material cited in the von Wright catalogue (G.H. von Wright, *Wittgenstein* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982) pp. 35ff.) are by *MS* or *TS* number followed by page number.

**Philosophical Investigations 2:
Wittgenstein's Remarks on a Complete Language**

In this paper I shall primarily try to give an extensive interpretation of some remarks from the beginning of the *PI* which gave rise to several objections. Some of them were pointed out several decades ago, others are more current.¹ In my eyes some of the objections express uncertainty about content and role of the remarks in question, whereas others express a philosophical position which is different from Wittgenstein's. Whereas the first group can be answered by giving a consistent interpretation, the second needs another kind of answer. I will try to give one in form of a critique of a critique, based on Wittgenstein's philosophy. My main subject will be two essays of Audun Øfsti.²

I will start with the interpretation (section I); hereafter the critique will be reconstructed (section II). In the last section (III) an answer, consisting mainly of a diagnosis concerning the reasons for the critique, will be given.

I

¹ Cf.: Rhees [1978], Manser [1973], Mosedale [1978] Øfsti [1985, 1990].

² Øfsti [1985, 1990]. In the following I will refer to both articles with name, date and page-number in the text.

Wittgenstein's remarks which are in question here belong to the first sections of the *PI*. The word "complete" occurs first in *PI* 2. I take it to be appropriate first to consider the context of this occurrence.

In *PI* 1 Wittgenstein quotes a passage from Augustine on his *learning* (and *use of*³) language. In these remarks we get, in Wittgenstein's view, "a particular picture of the essence of human language", according to which "the individual words in language name objects - sentences are combinations of such names." In this particular picture we find, according to Wittgenstein, "the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands." For the sake of exegetical clarity we have to register that Wittgenstein is concerned with three different things:

(i) Augustine's *description* of (his) learning etc.,

(ii) a *picture* of the essence of human language, and

(iii) an *idea* of the meaning of a word.

The phrase "these remarks, ..., give us" indicates that (i) presupposes (ii)⁴ and the phrase

³ Augustine's remarks on his use of language in the quotation are restricted to one - the last - sentence (see below).

⁴ The German text has: "*In diesen Worten erhalten wir ...*" (my italics - R.R.). This is different from: "*Mit diesen Worten erhalten wir ...*". In German one can say: "Er beschrieb den Berg *mit* den Worten..." ("He described the mountain with the words ..."). One cannot say: "Er beschrieb den Berg *in* den Worten...", but "*In der Beschreibung seiner Wanderung steckte auch eine Beschreibung des bestiegenen Berges.*". Similarly, someone who utters "Peter beats his wife." does not say (in one sense of saying), that Peter has a wife, or that his wife *exists*. But what he says *presupposes* - to

"in this picture ... we find the roots..." indicates that (iii) also presupposes (ii). (ii) is then, one could say, at the heart of the whole section. Nevertheless, the presupposition (ii) does not exhaust its respective antecedents (i) and (iii).

The next three steps taken by Wittgenstein are:
- to register that Augustine "does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word",
- to give a diagnosis according to which somebody describing the learning of language in Augustine's manner is "thinking primarily of nouns like 'table', 'chair', 'bread', and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself" (), and
- to describe a special use of language - the well-known shopkeeper-example.

The first two comments are given from the point of view of *our* language. In our language there are different kinds of words like nouns, proper names, names of actions, of properties, etc. The first two steps are furthermore, as I would put it, taken from an *internal* point of view with respect to Augustine's remarks, that is, in these points Wittgenstein restricts his own comments to Augustine's description. These comments are also restricted to the topics which

be true or false - these propositions. If this is accepted, then it is no problem to say, that someone who says (in the sense above) "Peter beats his wife.", also says (in another sense of saying, e.g. in the sense of "saying implicitly") that Peter has a wife, or that Peter's wife exists. Therefore I use the word "presupposition". With regard to the relation between (iii) and (ii) the case is similar. (Note the definite article in "die Wurzeln"!)

are circumscribed by (ii) and (iii). The functions of these comments are:

(a) to make explicit what - with regard to (ii) and (iii) - gives Augustine's description (i.e.

(i)) a *prima facie* plausibility, and

(b) to remind the reader that there are more kinds of words in our language than Augustine in writing and the reader in reading may have been thinking of.

With (a) Wittgenstein implicitly accepts that a description of the learning of language must be brought into accordance with, or must correspond to, a picture of the essence of human language - that is: with a picture of what it is that has been learned - and with an idea of the meaning of a word. To see why Wittgenstein says that somebody describing the learning of language in Augustine's manner is thinking primarily of nouns like "table" and of proper names one must register a characteristic of Augustine's description. He speaks not only about *objects* but furthermore about the elders moving towards something, the play of their eyes, their "seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something", about their meaning to point out, the expression of their faces, their state of mind, his "seeing what they tried to name by the sound they uttered". Augustine's description is full of mental predicates⁵, especially those which are connected with visual experience of things and with attitudes towards material objects. Tables, chairs, the Chinese Wall and Marilyn Monroe are - contrary to red and five - paradigmatic examples for entities one can move towards, see,

⁵ Cf.: Savigny [1988], comment on *PI* 1. In the following I will refer to the commentaries by Baker/Hacker, Hallett and Savigny with name(s) only, if the comment(s) of the section which is in the text in question is/are meant. Otherwise I will give the date and the number of the page. Translations from Savigny's commentary are mine, if not otherwise indicated.

reject, avoid, seek, etc.

The third step is taken from an *external* point of view, that is, Augustine's description of his *learning* (and *use of*) language is contrasted with a description of a simple example of language *in use* - the well-known shopkeeper-example. The connection between the first two steps on the one hand and the third step on the other is at least twofold:

- whatever the *learning* of language may consist of, it should enable the child to use the language, that is to "operate with words" [PI 1]⁶,
- our operation with words includes operating with words like "apple", "red", and "five" as described in the shopkeeper-example in PI 1. Whereas Augustine's description of the learning of language seems to fit to the use of, or operation with, the word "apple" the following questions arise with regard to the other two words: "'But how does he (i.e. the shopkeeper - R.R.) know where and how he is to look up the word 'red' and what he is to do with the word 'five'?" [PI 1] These questions arise because it is not *prima facie* plausible that the uses of the words "red" and especially "five" could be

⁶ This is also accepted, in some sense, by Augustine: "Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires." (PI 1, my italics -R.R.) One could imagine that the shopkeeper-example starts with the sentence "I have the desire to get five red apples.", and then continues with the written text. Notice also that in the German original the passage "... die (that is: "die Wörter", "the words" -R.R.) ich wieder und wieder, an ihren bestimmten Stellen in verschiedenen Sätzen, aussprechen hörte." has no grammatical subject. Correct would be e.g.: "... die ich sie (that is: "die Erwachsenen", "the adults" - R.R.) wieder und wieder, ..., aussprechen hörte."

learned in the way indicated by Augustine's description.⁷

Instead of giving an answer, Wittgenstein repudiates the question: "Well, I assume that he acts as I have described." [PI 1] What gives Wittgenstein the right to do this? He says: "Explanations come to an end somewhere." [PI 1] At first sight this doesn't seem to be a good reason for the repudiation, for this phrase, one could object, is true despite our understandable need for explanations in various situations. For this remark to be a reason for repudiating the question one should imagine what an answer - in the context of the discussion of PI 1 - could consist of. In the style of Augustine the answer could be a refined description of the learning of language. But this would nevertheless have been provoked by the description of the use of, or the operation with, the words given by Wittgenstein, for the question quoted above arises just because it is not *prima facie* plausible how Augustine's report could fit the use of the words "red" and especially "five". We see, the refined description of the learning of language would be *dependent* on the description of the use of language.⁸ But nevertheless, the repudiation of the question is something like a break in the argumentation. The effect and the point of this move is that it turns one's thoughts to the description of the use of, or the operation

⁷ With "not a priori plausible that" is not meant "impossible that". Cf. Wittgenstein's remarks in PI 28ff. which lead to the first summary of the discussion of Augustine's description in PI 32.

⁸ This observation supports my claim that (ii) lies at the heart of (i) and (iii). I suppose here that (ii) has primarily to do with the use of language, i.e. that the essence of language is the essence of the spoken or written language as it is used.

with, words as the most important subject of a search for the essence of human language in a Wittgensteinian manner. An effect of this redirecting of interest consists in the concentration on what people are *doing* when speaking, not on what they may *think, feel* or *wish*.⁹

We saw that Augustine's description of his learning of language runs into trouble if contrasted with even a simple example of an operation with words, at least it loses its *prima facie* plausibility and therefore part of its attractiveness. It seems that the general idea of meaning brings about similar problems. At least Wittgenstein's response to the question

⁹ Cf. also *PI* 689. Here Wittgenstein writes:

"'I am thinking of N.' 'I am speaking of N.'

How do I speak of him? I say, for instance, 'I must go and see N today'-but surely that is not enough! After all, when I say 'N' I might mean various people of this name.-'Then there must surely be a further, different connexion between my talk and N, for otherwise I should *still* not have meant HIM.

Certainly such a connexion exists. Only not as you imagine it: namely by means of a mental *mechanism*.

(One compares 'meaning him' with 'aiming at him'.)" The point in which this section resembles the repudiation of the question in *PI* 1 is that it seems that according to Augustine's description, the problem is how the shopkeeper could have got a mental picture of the objects named "five" and "red", the objects the "someone" spoke of. If this were obvious as it seems to be with the word "apple", then the question would not arise. The shopkeeper could know then what he is to aim at, for he has a mental image he can compare with what he sees. The mechanism between the mental image he acquired by learning and the visual experience he has could exist. Wittgenstein's answer in *PI* 689 resembles then the repudiation of the question in *PI* 1 in its implicit demand to *look and see* what the connection consists in, instead of supposing a mental mechanism, that is, in the demand to look at the *use*, or the language-game. Here one can see what the connection consists of. (Cf. also: Savigny.)

"But what is the meaning of the word 'five'?" [PI 1] seems to be similar to his response to the question above: "No such thing was in question here, only how the word 'five' is used." [PI 1] Notice that the question is only concerned with the meaning of the word "five" and not with the meaning of the word "red". Wittgenstein chooses the most obvious case to show that there is something unclear with the general idea of meaning due to Augustine - even in such a simple case like that of the shopkeeper-example. If the general idea of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze, then we should expect that the picture of the essence of language, in which the roots of this general notion lie, could also be criticized. "That philosophical concept of meaning has its place in a primitive idea of the way language functions." [PI 2] If, as we said above, (iii) presupposes (ii), and if (iii) runs into trouble when applied on an operation with words like "five", then one could expect first to have to change (ii) in order to solve the puzzles. This is surely true, and it is exactly what Wittgenstein tries to do with his invention of primitive language-games like that of the shopkeeper. But: "If we look at the example in §1, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words." [PI 5]¹⁰

¹⁰ In the German text Wittgenstein writes "der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte" and not "dieser (that is: Augustine's - R.R.) allgemeine Begriff ...". If Wittgenstein meant with "der allgemeine Begriff der Bedeutung der Worte" Augustine's general notion, then an alternative could be to propose another

Therefore, even if (iii), to be true or false, depends on the truth of (ii), in philosophizing (iii) plays a crucial role. It is a *prejudice* which gives rise to the assumption that the language *must* function in accordance with it. Where this seems not to be obvious, a search for explanations and hidden entities is produced. What produced the haze and the fog (that is: the false picture) in the case of Augustine's description and its respective idea was the fact that it is not clear how they could be brought into accord with the variety of different kinds of words and the variety of different kinds of use of words in our language. As long as we try to follow the *idea* we are not able to get a clear view and a correct picture.

The questions posed in *PI* 1 were, as we saw, concerned with the explanation of the use and meaning of *some* of the three words, *not all* of them. Augustine's description of the learning of language and the respective picture of the essence of language and the general idea about the meaning of words are not useless in all respects. Therefore Wittgenstein says that the philosophical notion of meaning due to Augustine stems from a *primitive* idea of the way in which language functions, from a primitive picture of the essence of human language. But, one could also say that this idea is an "idea of a language more primitive than ours." [*PI* 2] These two things are not the same. The *primitive* idea of the way in which language functions is primitive *with regard to the way our language functions*. The philosophical notion of meaning brings about problems - for instance it produces a need and a search for refined explanations - when it becomes applicated to fragments of our language which had not been part of what its

er, distinct general notion.

proponents have been thinking of. In the case of a language more primitive than ours there is no need for explanations, there are no puzzles. Insofar as one can characterize such a language as a language consisting *only* of the examples the proponents have been thinking of. Therefore Wittgenstein's remarks on a language more primitive than ours are not the expression of a new observation or something similar, but a methodological reformulation of the first remarks. Its methodological point is the following: if a general notion of the meaning of a word and its respective picture of the essence of human language produce - when they are compared with the whole or with particular fragments of our language - the need for explanations and further refinements like for instance the postulation of hidden entities etc., and if they have therefore to be taken to be inadequate, and if finally this need is not brought about if they are compared with (fictitious) primitive languages, then it seems possible to get an adequate conception, an appropriate picture by looking at our language as a system, a whole of such (real) primitive languages, which is itself - as a whole or a system - not primitive. If this is true, then this sheds light on the repudiation of the question in *PI 1* and the remark that explanations come to an end somewhere: everything that is necessary in philosophy is available without explanations, without theories, without postulates, etc.

Such a "language more primitive than ours" is the language described in *PI 2* - the language of the builders. Wittgenstein writes:

"Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right. The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks,

pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words 'block', 'pillar', 'slab', 'beam'. A calls them out; - B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. - Conceive this as a complete primitive language."

For *this* language the picture of the essence of human language which is implicit in Augustine's description is *right*. But it is not right for the whole of our language. Insofar as a correct response to Augustine's description is: "'Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe.'" [PI 3]¹¹

In PI 8 and PI 15 Wittgenstein describes expansions of the language of PI 2. In PI 8 the expansion consists of "a series of words used as the shopkeeper in (1) used the numerals (it can be the series of letters of the alphabet); further, let there be two words, which may as

¹¹ Wittgenstein writes that Augustine "does describe a system of communication". (PI 3) If we suppose that young Augustine was not able to speak aloud, that means: not able to communicate, then there is a difference between Augustine's description of the learning of the language and his description of a system of communication. I take the "system of communication" to belong to what I called above (ii). (Also the phrase "the description given by Augustine" in PI 2 has to be interpreted in this way.) If we make this distinction, then it is possible to say that his description of a system of communication is appropriate, whereas his description of the learning of the language might not be - like it is indicated by Wittgenstein in PI 6 (see below). (Remember that someone who says "Peter beats his wife." presupposes that Peter has a wife as does someone who says "Peter does not beat his wife.". But normally only one can be right.)

well be 'there' and 'this' (because this roughly indicates their purpose), that are used in connexion with a pointing gesture; and finally a number of colour samples." In *PI* 15 Wittgenstein assumes that A uses tools, and he introduces marks which are borne by the tools which A uses in building. "When A shews his assistant such a mark, he brings the tool that has the mark on it."

In *PI* 18 Wittgenstein responds to a possible objection to his comment in *PI* 2: that this language cannot be complete because it consists only of orders. Wittgenstein's argumentation goes as follows: if one wants to object that the language of *PI* 2 (and also, we could add, the expanded languages) is incomplete because it consists only of orders, then one should ask further whether our language is complete, whether it was complete before the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus were incorporated. The point of this response is, that, in making the objection above, one presupposes at least that a language could only be complete if it consists of more than just orders. But what could function here as a criterion of a language's completeness? Is the inclusion of the symbolism of chemistry such a criterion? And was our language then incomplete before this symbolism was incorporated? It is clear, I think, that the question serves as a *reductio ad absurdum*. The point of Wittgenstein's response is that the concept of a language's completeness is - at least - not related to the abstract degree of structural elements included in the language. Therefore, the use of "complete" in the objection is not a correct use.

But the remarks in *PI* 18 bring about a problem. What is meant by "language" in *PI* 2? If the

objection in *PI* 18 should be an objection at all, then one must accept that only orders belong to the language. But in *PI* 2, as well as in *PI* 8 and *PI* 15, Wittgenstein does not speak explicitly about the language's consisting of orders, but only about its consisting of words and how they are used. Is there not a category-mistake in Wittgenstein's remarks? Someone who says that a book consists of a cover, pages, cardboard and paper makes a category-mistake, for the proposition that a book consists of a cover and pages and the proposition that a book consists of cardboard and paper are not propositions on the same category-level. From one point of view - say a structural one - a book consists of a cover and of pages. From another point of view - say a material one - a book consists of cardboard and paper, namely the cover consists of cardboard and the pages consist of paper. Whereas it is questionable whether something is a book which does not consist at least of a cover and pages, something can surely be a book even if, rather than cardboard and paper, it consists of, say, plastic or leather. To consist of a cover and pages seems then to be a necessary condition for being a book¹², but to consist of cardboard and paper is not. If what is true for books, is also true for languages, then the question must be answered: What takes the place of the cover and the pages on the one hand, and the cardboard, paper, plastic, or leather on the other? What seems to support the analogy, and what seems to give the answer, is that we can imagine that instead of the words "block", "pillar", etc., A and B use other signs, for instance different pieces of paper,

¹² This is an idealization. But that "book" is in ordinary discourse not always used in accordance with this necessary condition is not important for the problem which is in question here.

or - as Wittgenstein himself introduces - marks which are used by A and B and which are borne by the tools A uses in building [PI 15], or colour samples [PI 8, see above]. And instead of ordering by uttering "Block!", A could also order by showing a piece of paper. So it seems as if the words, pieces of paper, marks, and colour samples play for language the role which cardboard, paper, plastic, and leather play for books.

But there is a difference between words, colour samples, etc. on the one hand and cardboard, paper, etc. on the other hand. Whether something is cardboard, or paper, etc. can be decided independently of the identification of its being a cover, a page or part of a book. The criteria of identity of cardboard, paper, etc. are independent from the criteria of identity of covers, pages, and books. But whether something is a word, or a colour sample, etc. cannot be decided independently of the identification of its being used in language.¹³ The criteria for the identity of a word are not independent of the criteria for the identity of a language¹⁴. The proposition that this or that is paper entails nothing about pages. But the proposition that that or that is a word entails that it is in some way used in language, for instance in the way of giving, obeying, etc. orders.¹⁵ But one problem

¹³ This remark is also a bit dogmatic, for there are cases like the well known beetle which crawls through the sand and produces a track identical to the inscription of "Churchill". But this is a borderline-case which bases on our paradigmatic examples for words and signs in general. (See also below.)

¹⁴ This problem is most explicit in PI 200 - here with the help of the game-analogy.

¹⁵ Instead of the way above ("entails") the point could also be expressed in a "behaviouristic" language. Someone who says, that this or that is paper and denies

remains then: does the process of building belong to the way the words are used, or not? And if it belongs to this, then we could ask whether Wittgenstein's "Conceive this as a complete primitive language." in fact means "Conceive this as a complete primitive activity."

This question seems to be answered in *PI* 7. Here Wittgenstein writes that "the whole process of using words in (2) (can be thought of - R.R.) as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language. I will call these games 'language-games' and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game." But in the last sentence of *PI* 7 Wittgenstein writes: "I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the 'language-game'." Here it is clear that "language" cannot mean "language-game", for if it did so, the whole sentence would become obscure. What one has to register here is that Wittgenstein does not use "language" and "language-game" as *termini technici* with a clearly defined meaning, that is according to explicitly given rules, but in the way the word "language" is used in ordinary discourse. But this does not mean that it is used without any rules. Normally the context makes clear how a word has to be understood. When Wittgenstein speaks in *PI* 2 about a language for which the description given by Augustine is right, he uses "language" in the sense of "the whole process of using words". When he speaks about a language consisting of the words ... (or consisting only of orders), he

that this is also a page need not be criticized. Whether he will be criticized depends - among other things - on the matters of fact. Someone who says that this or that is a word, but denies that it is/was used in language can be criticized, no matter what the facts may be.

uses "language" like he does in "language and the actions into which it is woven". But how are "this" and "language" used in "Conceive this as a complete primitive language."? I think both senses just mentioned are possible, but both give rise to special problems.¹⁶

If we take "language" and "this" in "Conceive this as a complete primitive language." in the sense of "the whole process of using words" (including the activities), then the "Conceive this ..." -demand has to be understood in the sense of "Conceive this as a complete primitive activity." What could "complete" mean in this case? To answer this it is fruitful to ask what it could mean to say a given language-game (in the sense discussed here) is *incomplete*. Remember Wittgenstein's answer on the incompleteness-objection in *PI* 18. The point there was that to call our language (in)complete presupposes a criterion according to which it could be (in)complete. The objection was rejected because there is no such thing that could function as a criterion.¹⁷ The only way I see to give this proposition a sense despite this rejection would be to understand it in the sense that the language does not function, work, or the like. That is: it has some aspects which make it resemble a

¹⁶ Wittgenstein's invention of primitive languages has two aspects he himself described in *PI* 492:

"To invent a language could mean to invent an instrument for a particular purpose on the basis of the laws of nature (or consistent with them); but it also has the other sense, analogous to that in which we speak of the invention of a game.

Here I am stating something about the grammar of the word 'language', by connecting it with the grammar of the word 'invent'."

For Wittgenstein's use of "purpose", "tool", "instrument", etc., cf.: Hunter ([1990], p. 1ff).

¹⁷ We can, of course, stipulate one. See below.

language-game, but it is not really one. It is *incomplete in itself*. The demand "Conceive this as a complete primitive language." would mean then: "Do not look at this as if it could not function, work, or the like. Look at this as if it does."¹⁸ For the whole second part of *PI 2* stands under a let-us-imagine clause, the demand would say: this is an imaginable, functioning language-game.

"Completeness of a language", if "language" is understood in the second sense above, means: a language consisting of this and that is complete if this and that are sufficient¹⁹ tools for the activities which this and that are used for. This means for the situation described in *PI 2*, that A is able to build with his calls of the words, that B is able to pass the stones A called for, and if they are sometimes not successful then not because there are not enough words or because there are no descriptions and

¹⁸ This is implicitly supported by the argumentation in *PI 18*, for there it is clear that whatever the proponent could propose as a criterion, it would not be of any importance with regard to the question whether our language works.

¹⁹ They need not be necessary tools! There may be functional equivalents, and some tools may even be superfluous. Therefore, the fact that Wittgenstein gives in *PI 8* and *PI 15* expansions of the language of *PI 2* is no argument against the completeness of the language of *PI 2*. Whether the expansions of *PI 8* for instance are not necessary, depends on the purpose. If the purpose changed, for instance into a purpose of building differently colored houses, then at least the colour samples - or a functional equivalent - would be necessary, if the way of using the signs were unchanged.

only orders.²⁰ That A is able to build with his calls, and that B is able to pass the stones A called for, means then - with regard to completeness - that there are enough words (and perhaps also that they are different enough from one another, not too long, etc.) and/or that orders are sufficient. The situation may change, and that may bring about a need for further words, or language-forms. But now the language is complete. We see that to say a language is complete means to say that it is complete relative to a *practice*, not in itself, or absolutely. The practice functions as the criterion of completeness.²¹

²⁰ In this spirit one could say - against Øfsti ([1985], p. 587) - that Wittgenstein accepts something like a minimal repertory, but one *related to the game in question*, not an *abstract* one.

²¹ In this essay I try to relate only to the PI. But a few remarks on other sources should be allowed at this place. In the "Blue Book" Wittgenstein writes: "A treatise on pomology may be called incomplete if there exist kinds of apples which it doesn't mention. Here we have a standard of completeness in nature. Supposing on the other hand that there was a game resembling that of chess but simpler, no pawns being used in it. Should we call this game incomplete? Or should we call a game more complete than chess if it in some way contained chess but added new elements?" [BlB, p. 19] And in the "Brown Book" he writes: "Suppose a man described a game of chess, without mentioning the existence and operations of the pawns. His description of the game as a natural phenomenon will be incomplete. On the other hand we may say that he has completely described a simpler game." [BrB, p. 77]; and: "We are not, however, regarding the language-games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves, as complete systems of human communication. To keep this point of view in mind, it very often is useful to imagine such a simple language to be the entire system of communication of a tribe in a primitive state of society." [BrB, p. 81] The quoted passages from the "Brown Book" are in accordance with the first of my interpretations. The remarks from the

On the basis of this interpretation we can say that somebody making the incompleteness-objection above, uses the predicate "incomplete relative to our language", without registering the hidden part "relative to our language" in this predicate. "Complete" is as well a predicate with one place more than obvious, as is "appropriate". Augustine's description is neither appropriate, nor inappropriate; it is appropriate relative to x , and not appropriate relative to y , where " x " and " y " stand for different entities. The language of *PI 2* is neither complete, nor incomplete; it is complete relative to the language-game of *PI 2*, and incomplete relative to our variety of language-games. So one cannot object to Wittgenstein's remark that the language is incomplete. It is incomplete relative to our language-games, but this is not the question of *PI 2*. It is complete relative to the game of *PI 2*. These are not surprising insights; the game of *PI 2* was designed for this purpose. Notice that the language of *PI 2* is complete relative to the language-game of *PI 2*, not relative to Augustine's description.²²

Wittgenstein compares Augustine's description of the essence of language with a description of the essence of games according to which a game consists in "moving objects on a surface accord-

"Blue Book" indicate, as well as the phrase "complete in themselves" in the "Brown Book", that it is in some sense confusing to call a (language-)game complete or incomplete, for "(in)complete" seems to need a criterion. "(In)complete in itself" seems to be a borderline-case. This supports in my view the search for a further interpretation.

²² Contrast this with: Mosedale [1978] and Savigny.

ing to certain rules". [PI 3] This definition is incorrect with regard to the *variety of games we play*; it can be made correct "by expressly restricting it to those games (i.e. board-games R.R.)." (] The point of introducing the game-analogy is in our context twofold²³: - it is much easier to see the relatedness of definitions, descriptions, or the like, of games to *specific* games than it is in the case of language,

- if, for example, one were to describe two players, A and B, playing a game with four kinds of card, one would hardly object that the set of kinds of card is *incomplete*. It is simply only another game of cards than bridge, poker, or skat. And this is obvious, not least because games of cards are in many respects played according to explicit rules, some of them often prescribing with which and how many different kinds of cards the game has to be played. A set of cards of the game skat would be incomplete if it consisted only of 31 kinds of cards, instead of 32. Similarly, the language of PI 2 would become incomplete if, for example, A and/or B forgot the word "pillar" (or, in the cases of the extended versions of PI 2, if they lost a colour sample or a mark) but still had to build with pillars which were still available. The language would be incomplete with regard to the purpose of the language of PI - to build with four kinds of stones.²⁴ An objection that a given set of cards of skat is incomplete, would be true or false. But an objection that the set of kinds of cards of an unspecified game is incomplete (that is *in the sense of the possible objection in PI 18*) is senseless. Nevertheless it shows that one, making this objection, is

²³ Cf. also the quoted passages from the "Blue Book" and the "Brown Book" above.

²⁴ Cf.: PI 57.

familiar with other cardgames, like Augustine was familiar with - *cum grano salis* - our variety of language-games.

With the help of the game-analogy Wittgenstein is able to illuminate his use of primitive languages/language-games. It serves to disperse "the haze" which "surrounds the working of language" [PI 5], and which arises when we look at it through the general notion of the meaning of a word as found in Augustine. Instead of primitive, fictitious kinds of word application one can also take the primitive forms of language which "a child uses ... when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training ("Abrichten" in German -R.R.)." [Ibid.]²⁵ So we must register another important distinction Wittgenstein makes, a distinction between:

- "the practice of the use of language", and
- the "instruction in the language" [PI 7].²⁶

That distinction has furthermore the aspect of bringing into account the fact that people have to be instructed in their language. Wittgenstein writes in PI 6 that an "important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word 'slab' as he points to

²⁵ The language in question here is *our* language.

²⁶ This distinction is not the same as the distinction from PI 5 between explanation and training. Explanation as well as training can be a component of learning. Whether explanation can in a special case, with regard to a special language-fragment, be a form of teaching depends on the faculties the child has so far learned. Explanation cannot be at the beginning of learning language at all, for the child cannot ask questions.

that shape." Wittgenstein calls this "ostensive teaching of words" and contrasts it with "ostensive definition" (]²⁷. Whatever ostensive teaching of words consists of, it can surely not be identified with giving orders. Wittgenstein himself emphasizes the contrast between the orders of *PI* 2 and the instruction in the language of *PI* 2: "In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner *names* the objects, that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone." [*PI* 7]²⁸

The importance of the distinction between the practice of the use of language and the instruction in the language - in our context - lies in its capacity to solve an implicit tension in the remarks above. For, if people have to be instructed in their language and the instruction entails ostensive teaching, then the language of *PI* 2 would *not* consist only of orders, *unless* we were to make a categorical distinction like the one above, but still - which would be in accordance with Wittgenstein's position and which is, Wittgenstein aside, true - accepted that people have to be instructed in their language. Therefore, the objection of *PI* 18 would be based on a false presupposition - that the language consists only of orders - and would have to be answered otherwise.

²⁷ Here I follow the English translation. The German original uses the words "hinweisende Erklärung" and "Definition".

²⁸ In the German original Wittgenstein writes: "... im Unterrichts der Sprache aber wird sich *dieser* Vorgang finden: ..." The "aber" stresses the difference. It is not translated in the English version. Cf.: Hallett, Savigny.

But what gives Wittgenstein the right to make such a categorical distinction? The first thing one should notice is that Wittgenstein speaks about "instruction in the language", not about "instruction in *the use of language*".²⁹ The point of this difference is that Wittgenstein agrees with his interlocutor that the effect of the ostensive teaching of the words can consist in establishing "an association between the word and the thing." [PI 6]³⁰ This can mean various things, for instance evoking images; but one thing is clear: "... in the language of §2 it is not the purpose of the words to evoke images. (It may, of course, be discovered that that helps to attain the actual purpose.)" [Ibid.] To be a learning of the use of that language ostensive teaching is not sufficient. What a child learns in this way, one could say, is naming an object. But, in parenthesis of PI 49, we can say: "... naming and calling in the game of PI 2 do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for calling the words in the game of PI 2. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game any more than putting a piece in its

²⁹ Cf.: Hallett. To say that something can be instruction in the language without being at the same time an instruction in the use of language reflects the analysis of "language" above. This is not the only possible interpretation. The German Text has. "...; *im Unterricht der Sprache ...*" (my italics). This and also the passage in PI 9 "When a child learns this language, it has to learn a series of 'numerals' a, b, c, ... by heart. And it has to learn their use. ..." indicate that with "instruction in the language" could also be meant "instruction in the use of language", if we understand "language" in the sense of "language-game". But still these things are different, as is indicated by the "And" in PI 9 and by the possibility that the same process of naming objects, etc. can be part of quite different instructions in the use of language.

³⁰ This is a partial agreement with Augustine.

place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: *nothing* has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even *got* a name except in the language-game." [PI 49]³¹ That naming and calling (in the game of PI 2) do not stand on the *same* level means that instruction in the language is not something specified enough to be an instruction in the use of that language. And if it is not connected in this or that way with this or that language-game, then it is perhaps no instruction at all. But given the context of, for instance, the game of PI 2 its components are "processes resembling language." [PI 7]

To become an instruction in the use of a language, the training must be specified. Associations, mental images, and the like are not sufficient. Necessary and sufficient for the training in the use of a language(-game) is that the child can "act upon it in such-and-such a way ... Doubtless the ostensive teaching helped to bring this about; but only together with a particular training. With different training the same ostensive teaching of the words would have effected a quite different understanding." [PI 6] For something, we see, to be an instruction, or a training, in the use of a language, the relatedness to the language(-game) in question is essential. So we can say that such a training is not self-sufficient, nor self-defining; it is defined by the language-game. Whatever the training in the use of a language may consist of, it does not change the essence of the language(-game) in question³²; moreover, "it may be

³¹ Cf. also: PI 26, 28, 30, et. al.

³² This does *not* mean that a change in the training could not bring about (causally) any change in our language-games. But the point - in our context - is that the games are then other games.

all one to us whether someone else has learned the language, or was perhaps *from birth constituted* to react ... like a normal person who has learned ..." [PI 495, my italics.] And even if the person has learned, it could be that he has learned only by watching [cf.: PI 31].

That the language of PI 2 has to be regarded as complete (in both of the senses above), does not mean that it has to be regarded as the *whole* language of A and B.³³ Otherwise the following passage from PI 6 would make no sense: "We could imagine that the language of § 2 was the *whole* language of A and B; even the *whole* language of a tribe."³⁴ If we could imagine this, then we

³³ This is also said in the quoted remark from p. 81 of the "Brown Book". In the following "language" is always taken to mean "language-game" or "the whole process of using words". But the remarks are also valid for the other sense, for without the whole process of using words there are no words.

³⁴ Wittgenstein's German phrases for "complete language" and "whole language" are "vollständige Sprache" and "ganze Sprache". In German "vollständig" and "ganz" are in some occurrences interchangeable, in some occurrences not. For the passage of PI 6 to make sense besides the demand of PI 2 Wittgenstein should use one of the word-uses of "ganze" which is not interchangeable with "vollständige". Here is one example where the occurrences are not interchangeable: (1) Dies ist meine ganze Briefmarkensammlung; sie ist aber nicht vollständig. Instead of "ganze" in the first part of (1) we could also say (1.1') Dies ist meine vollständige Briefmarkensammlung; but it would be bad German to continue with (1.2) sie ist aber nicht vollständig. To say (1.1) or (1.1') means that it is all I have; to say (1.2) means that these are not all the different items one can have. (1.1') and (1.2) together would be bad German because one would use the same word for different concepts in one sentence, which because of the "nicht" sounds like a contradiction. Instead of

should also be able to imagine that the language of *PI 2* is *not* the whole language of A and B, or of a tribe.³⁵ This point can also be illuminated with the help of the game-analogy. We can imagine both:

-two players, or even a tribe, playing only one

"ganze" in (1) one could also use "gesamte", but we cannot use "gesamte" instead of "vollständige" in (1) or (1.2). Wittgenstein uses "ganze" in the sense of (i.e. interchangeable with) "gesamte". That is also the case in *PI 7*, where he speaks about "the whole process of using words in (2)" ("der ganze Vorgang des Gebrauchs der Worte in (2)").

³⁵ To imagine that the language of *PI 2* is the whole language of A and B need not be the same as to imagine that the language of *PI 2* is the whole language of a tribe. The "even" in the quotation indicates that we should also be able to imagine that the language of *PI 2* is the whole language of A and B, but not the whole language of a tribe. But a problem would be whether we could imagine that the language of *PI 2* is not the whole language of A and B, but the whole language of a tribe, if the tribe is the tribe A and B belong to (which is *not* said by Wittgenstein).

All these differences give rise, it seems, to a problem: In virtue of what does somebody belong to a community (tribe)? (Cf.: Pothast [1991], p. 138f.) For, one could say, to a given community belong all and only those people who share (at least some of) the practices of that community. If we accept this as a definition we cannot continue saying that an individual is doing this or that if "the pattern of the individual's behavior is embedded in a particular way in patterns of social behavior within the relevant community (i.e. the community the individual belongs to -R.R.)" (v. Savigny [1988], p. 7; translation from Glock [1992], p. 119). That would be a circular definition. I think that the problem of individuating communities is similar to the problem of individuating persons (cf.: Teichman [1976]). There are different criteria; we have geographical, ethnographical, cultural, historical, religious and other ones. And which we use depends on our purposes and the wider context in which the question arises. So there need not be a circular set of explanations.

game, and
-two players, or even a tribe, playing the same
game, but also other games.
And in both cases we could as well say that this
and that are the complete elements of the game,
or of one of the games respectively, as we could
say that the game/each game is complete in
itself.³⁶

But there is still a problem here. The problem
is that Wittgenstein does not simply assert that
the language of *PI 2* is complete, but *demand*s of
the reader to conceive it as a complete lan-
guage. So one should expect that Wittgenstein
connects a certain purpose with this demand.
What purpose? The question is the same as: What
role does the demand of *PI 2* play in the course
of the argumentation in the *PI*? If we accept
that (2), that is the essence of human language,
lies at the bottom of the whole discussion at
the beginning of the *PI* - which doesn't imply
that other topics are not to be found among the
PI, for instance the nature of mind - then it is
not hard to see that the essential role of the
demand is to serve as a preparation for the
discussion connected with the concept of *family
resemblance*. For, if we conceive the language of
PI 2 as complete, then we immediately see that
this language is very different from our lan-
guage, that it is much more primitive. But we
also see that the language of *PI 2* is different
from the language of *PI 8*, and from many other

³⁶ So it is simply not true, as Øfsti writes, that
Wittgenstein neglects to emphasize "a difference
between (whole ('ganzen' in the German text - R.R.))
languages and (only as a 'part' of such possible) very
simple, or primitive, language-games." ([1985], p.587)
This is also not true, if we translate "ganzen" with
"complete", which is not very appropriate because of
the "'parts'" ("Teile" in the German Text -R.R.), but
perhaps not excluded because of the quotation-marks.

languages too, which Wittgenstein describes in the *PI*. What becomes a problem then is the assumption that there is (or must be) something common to all language-games. For, even if we call the words of both *PI* 2 and *PI* 8 "names", we see that the uses of the names are "absolutely unlike" [*PI* 10]. The same is true for language-forms such as orders, questions, and the like. [Cf.: *PI* 19ff.]³⁷ Therefore, if we accept that languages such as those of *PI* 2, 8, 15, etc. may be taken to be complete languages, then we are also prepared to see that there is nothing common to them all in virtue of which we call them all language.

Also this can be illuminated with the help of the game-analogy. "Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: 'There *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games'" --but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. "[*PI* 66] Wittgenstein calls these similarities "family-resemblances" [*PI* 67]. Therefore, the demand of *PI* 2 to conceive the language of A and B as complete, is the demand to put aside the prejudice that there must be something common to all (language-)games, and it is the demand not to theorize, but to look and see. To conceive the language of *PI* 2, and others too, as complete is a condition for seeing the family-resemblances, or - if seen - to give them their right weight.

Now we can see the importance of the point of *PI* 18 more clearly. To ask whether our whole lan-

³⁷ Cf.: Mosedale [1978] and the following essay.

guage is complete is either itself an incomplete question, or is the question whether it is complete relative to the language-games we play. In the first case it is an incomplete question because it is not clear *with regard to what* our whole language should be (in)complete. That means that we have to decide according to which criteria we want to know whether our whole language is complete or not. If we want on the one hand to know whether our whole language is complete with regard to the variety of language-games we play - that is: whether our terminology, syntax, etc. are complete - or with regard to their respective "purposes" - then we want at best to know something that can only be answered by an empirical investigation. Such an empirical investigation could for example provide us with the insight that there are some language-fragments in our whole language which are incomplete.³⁸ The practical result could be then a proposal of a reform. "Such a reform for practical purposes, an improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice, is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with (in philosophy - R.R.). The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work." [PI 132]

³⁸ It can make a difference for a special part of language with regard to completeness what happens around it. It can happen for instance that the vocabularies of two language-games are not different enough from one another, so that it is too often unclear for the users whether a special utterance belongs to this or that game. In this case the functioning of the language-fragments as tools for the respective games (see above) could be disturbed. (The variety of our language-games need not be based on atomistic language-games, its structure need not be simple addition.) But notice that in this case the games are disturbed themselves.

II

But, there is a point in Wittgenstein's remarks in *PI 2* that seems to bring about problems and to give reason for Rhees' and Øfsti's criticisms. To see this point better, we must go back to *PI 2* and look at it more closely.

Who is speaking here? It is *only* A, who is speaking. What is B doing? He only has to pass the stones A called for. There is no difference in principle here between what A and B are doing and what a hunter and his dog are doing. Indeed, many dogs, which are trained for hunting, are able to understand - "understand" just in the sense of *PI 6* - much more words than only four, and are able to do much more than only to pass things the master calls for. But nevertheless, dogs do not - for instance - philosophize, even if some dogs look very skeptic. Dogs, and animals in general, just do not *talk*. "... animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: 'they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.'" [*PI 25*]³⁹ To think, one could say, is to be reasonable (or rational), or - weaker - only thinking beings are reasonable (rational) beings. Therefore, whatever *PI 2* may show us, it is not sufficient with regard to thinking/reasonable (rational) beings, that is with respect to (most of) us. The game of *PI 2* lacks an essential aspect: that human beings think. Therefore, the language of *PI 2*

³⁹ Øfsti writes with regard to the game *PI 2*: "I would say it is still too early to ascribe thinking to our persons." ([1990], p. 145) Øfsti does not mention the question whether animals think or not, but we will see, I hope, that his problem can be compared with this one.

can be neither complete nor the whole language⁴⁰ - in a not trivial sense of these concepts - of (a tribe of) *human beings*. We couldn't even *imagine* this, if our imagination were in accord with our fundamental intuition about what it is to be a human being.

In this point Augustine was much nearer to the truth than Wittgenstein, for he uses *mental predicates* in his description of the learning of language. Whatever may be wrong with Augustine's conception in detail, it simply bases - contrary to Wittgenstein's - on a fundamental intuition we cannot miss. *This* is the point which Øfsti also wants to stress: "On a special level one can say, that the language-subjects are reasonable beings and that 'the extent' of their language (notwithstanding which 'suburbs' this language now entails or not) is unimportant." [1985, p. 589]⁴¹ A language can only be complete - in a not trivial sense - if it allows the users to be reasonable (rational). Similarly Apel writes: "Wittgenstein once said: 'If a lion could talk, we could not understand him.' This seems to me not very plausible since it is precisely linguistic competence and not ... the conditions of life (birth, death, sexuality) conceived of as independent of linguistic compe-

⁴⁰ Rhee clearly sees, contrary to Øfsti, that the stronger problem with regard to the question discussed now is that Wittgenstein says we could imagine that the language of *PI 2* is the *whole* language of A and B, or even a tribe. Cf.: Rhee [1978].

⁴¹ The remark on the extent of the language is not meant literally. On p. 588 Øfsti lists five theses, each - as it seems - standing for a necessary condition of a complete language in the sense of Øfsti. The first is: "The complete language must entail a *plurality* of language-games ..." (See also below.)

tence - that separate us from lions."⁴²

But not only are the "conditions of life (birth, death, sexuality)" not enough, neither are the *particular* activities which Wittgenstein considers with his language-games. As Aristotle wrote: "Just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have a function or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? is he naturally functionless? or as eye, hand, foot, and in general each of the parts evidently has a function, may one lay it down that man similarly has a function apart from all these? What can this be?" His answer is: "the activity of soul in accordance with, or not without, rational principle".⁴³ Therefore, it is not enough to presuppose a certain "transcendental language-game" or the like, but one has to make a clear distinction between *language-games* (in the sense of *PI* 2 and other sections) on the one hand, and *the language* on the other.⁴⁴ Even if Wittgenstein's concept of completeness is correct, it is valid only for language-games

⁴² Apel ([1973], II, 257, 167), quoted from Øfsti ([1990], p. 135). What seems not very plausible to Apel is not that we could not understand a talking lion, but that a lion could talk. A similar point is made by Baker/Hacker (1985) with respect to *PI* 206. See also my interpretation of *PI* 206 in this volume.

⁴³ Aristotle ([1984], 1097 b25 and 1098 a8), quoted from Øfsti ([1990], p. 167). "Linguistic competence" seems to be - for Apel at least - a modern expression for "soul".

⁴⁴ Cf. Øfsti ([1990], p. 129), where he marks this as a central difference between his approach and that of Apel.

like that of *PI 2*, not for *the language*. But the language-game of *PI 2*, as we saw, is a language-game which neglects the *differentia specifica* of human beings. It is not only comparable with a hunter's and his dog's interaction, but also with interaction among animals alone, for instance with a cocks calling his hens by crowing. Therefore it is by no means clear, "when ... the different language-game competences of a person (are) sufficient to constitute *linguistic competence* ..." [1990, p. 138]. This is the question of "formal completeness", which is "rather avoided by Wittgenstein." [1990, p. 139]

This question is not one of complexity, like Wittgenstein seems to suggest (e.g. in the Blue Book), but rather a question of different levels. However complex the plurality of language-games which a child has to learn may be, "sooner or later we will have to reach a level where the subject becomes a subject in the full sense, a level which must have to do with its recognition of itself and others as autonomous, 'equivalent' subjects." [1990, p. 144] Even if we conceded that the builders in *PI 2* think, it is "too meagre to capture the full sense of 'thinking'. And this would still be so however much we extended the repertoire of common language-games in the person's home country ..." [190, p. 145] For *the language* this means that it must be constructed in a way which allows us

- (i) to reflect on language,
- (ii) to move in and out of certain language-games,
- (iii) to imagine and describe language-games other than those we ourselves play,
- (iv) to give an "'overview'" on the games we play, and not only to play them,⁴⁵ and

⁴⁵ I have condensed here the remarks in ([1990], pp. 149-155). Cf. also: ([1985], p. 588f).

(v) to reach and express a "complete communicative competence" [1985, p. 589.]⁴⁶

This level cannot itself be a "special, more or less separable language-game (as for instance Apel means -R.R.), but rather part, or an aspect, of a structural trait which runs through the whole of a complete language, i.e. through each of its language-games." [1990, p. 146]⁴⁷
The reason for the necessity of a complementary structure of language is that "any intentional act (in the full 'human' sense) must reach two

⁴⁶ The German words are: "vollständigen kommunikativen Kompetenz".

⁴⁷ Øfsti calls this the "'description' level", which is complementary to the "performative level" [ibid.].

My question in this paper is not whether Øfsti's approach is consistent or not. Therefore only some remarks at this point to this question. If the "structural trait runs through ... each of ... (a whole language's - R.R.) language-games", then it runs also through the game of PI 2, or whichever one wants. But then there is no "sooner or later" at which we will "reach a level where the subject becomes a subject in the full sense" (see above). With learning *one* game, the child becomes "a subject in the full sense". Or, the child has already been "a subject in the full sense", and then the child does not *become* one. (This is, as we will see, Augustine's implicit position.) Furthermore, if the conditions (i)-(iv), mentioned above, are realized in *each* game, then *there* is something common to *all* games, and *not* only family-resemblance, and the language of PI 2 is not *really* complete, or not *complete in the full sense*. Perhaps family-resemblance and completeness are all we can see. What Øfsti could say at this point is that it is not enough, or perhaps trivial, only to *see*, one must also *think*. The alternative - to take, like Apel, the "level of description", characterized by conditions (i)-(iv), as a special language-game - brings about similar problems. For instance, it should then be possible, to learn *only* this game, without the other ones.

levels":

- (i) "the 'game' level"", and
- (ii) the level where "the agent masters the concept of what is done." (]

The second level is the one on which descriptions of the game played are possible.⁴⁸ This is the level, which guarantees that *responsible* actions are possible, the level where "the drama of human interaction takes place." [Ibid.]

These are Øfsti's remarks on what is trivial with Wittgenstein's concept of completeness, and on what a non-trivial concept must include. Now we can look at what Wittgenstein could answer.

III

Section 25 of the *PI* goes in its entirety as follows:

"It is sometimes said that animals do not talk because they lack the mental capacity. And this means: 'they do not think, and that is why they do not talk.' But - they simply do not talk. Or to put it better: they do not use language - if we except the most primitive forms of language.- Commanding, questioning, recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing."

Why does Wittgenstein writes "But - ..."? Isn't it accepted in the first two sentences that animals do not talk? The difference between "they do not think, and that is why they do not talk" and "they simply do not talk" consists in

⁴⁸ In some sense this is a point also demanded by Baker and Hacker.

the first phrase's being an explanation, and the second phrase's not being an explanation.⁴⁹ "Our mistake is to look for an explanation, where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: *this language-game is played.*" [PI 654] To say that animals do not talk means then to say that they do not play language-games. That is why it is better to say that animals do not use language, than to say that they do not talk. And the exception is that they play the most primitive language-games. Whether a creature's uttering of sounds is talking or, say, crowing depends on the circumstances of the utterances. Not even each verbal utterance of a human being is talking, just like a cockatoo's talking is only talking in a very special sense, which is secondary with regard to our normal use of "talking". "We say 'The cock calls the hens by crowing' - but doesn't a comparison with our language lie at the bottom of this?" [PI 493]

To say that animals do not play language-games, if we except the most primitive ones, means that they do not play the variety of language-games we play, if we except the most primitive ones. This is a difference of multiplicity, complexity, structure, richness, content, and purpose in the sense above. It is a *difference of social forms of life.*⁵⁰ Therefore, even if a lion could talk, we could not understand him because his form of life would be too different from ours. But this is not something special for lions. "We also say of some people that they are transparent to us. It is, however, important as regards this observation that one human being can be a complete enigma to another. We learn this when

⁴⁹ Cf.: Hallett.

⁵⁰ Cf.: Savigny.

we come into a strange country with entirely strange traditions; and, what is more, even given a mastery of the country's language. We do not understand the people. (And not because of not knowing what they are saying to themselves.) We cannot find our feet with them." [PI, p. 223]⁵¹

But to repeat: it is a difference, and one could add here, as in the case of the difference between living and not living beings: "this is a case of the transition 'from quantity to quality'." [PI 284] So, the first thing we must register, is that Wittgenstein very well accepts in his philosophy something like a fundamental (perhaps better: qualitative) difference between animals and human beings. However many "levels" there may be, in learning the multiplicity of our language-games a child becomes a being that is qualitatively distinct from animals. We see that the intuition of there being a fundamental difference between human beings and animals (and all other things in the universe we know about) is no argument against Wittgenstein's philosophy. On the contrary, in his PI Wittgenstein tries to give us a clear picture of that difference.

But, one could ask, what about thinking? Do the remarks above mean that Wittgenstein wants to deny that people think, and only accepts a difference in the complexity of verbal beha-

⁵¹ There is a problem in this passage: the use of "mastery of the country's language". It has, for the principle of charity, to be understood in the sense of "being able to understand the content of what the people say", or in the sense of "being able to understand when they give orders", or something similar. The point is, that we do not understand them in the sense that we cannot see the point in their (verbal) actions. Cf.: Schulte ([1990], pp. 159ff.).

viour? Here, I think, one should see that Øfsti's argument bases on the primitiveness of the game of PI 2. Otherwise he would have to say that also the games of

"Forming and testing a hypothesis-
Presenting the results of an experiment in
tables and diagrams-
Making up a story; and reading it-
Play-acting-
Singing catches-
..." [PI 23]

are played by beings which are not reasonable, or have no "linguistic competence". This would be, I think, obviously nonsense. On the contrary, to be able to do things like these above means to be able to think. To think (or to have "linguistic competence") is not something that lies *behind*, or *at the bottom*, of playing language-games, but is *expressed* in playing them. Understood in this sense the phrase "animals do not think, and that is why they do not talk" becomes at best a tautology.⁵² The exception, that animals use the most primitive forms of language - that is, that they play the most primitive language-games - means then that they think only in the most primitive sense of the word, are only primitive reasonable beings, or that they do not think in "the full sense of 'thinking'" (Øfsti). "We say a dog is afraid his master will beat him; but not, he is afraid his master will beat him to-morrow." [PI 650] Here both parts of the sentence are important:

- that we say a dog is afraid, that is: that we attribute mental capacities to animals, but
- that we do not say a dog is afraid he will be beaten tomorrow, that is: that we do not attribute to animals the mental capacities we attribute to people, but only primitive, simpler ones.

⁵² Cf.: Hallett, Savigny.

That people have to *learn* their language means then that they have to *become* reasonable beings. This point is Wittgenstein's main argument against Augustine: "And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think* (or were already reasonable - R.R.). And 'think' would here mean something like 'talk to itself'." [PI 32]⁵³

What Wittgenstein attacks is *neither* the idea that people think, *nor* the idea that the difference between human beings and animals may be seen to consist in the human being's having mental capacities and the animal's not having mental capacities (with the exception of the most primitive ones), but the idea that we have a clear picture of what it means to think, or to have mental capacities, according to which thinking or having mental capacities is something which is in principle independent from using language; and that this picture serves as an *explanation* for the human being's ability to talk and the animal's lack of such an ability.

But if Wittgenstein does not deny that there is a (fundamental) difference between human beings and animals, does this not indicate that there is something wrong with his demand in PI 2 and especially with his remark in PI 6? That there is a conceptual contradiction between the demand and the remark on the one hand and our concept of a human being on the other would only be true if to play the variety of language-games we play - and, accordingly, to have the mental capacities we have - were our only criterion for being

⁵³ Cf. also: Savigny.

humans. But since it is already indicated by the fact that people have to learn their language, and accordingly have to become thinking or reasonable beings it is clear that this is not the only criterion. If little children are human beings, then also A and B can be. That animals are also able to play a game like that of *PI 2* does not mean that A and B, or children, are not distinct from animals, for we have furthermore lots of criteria for being humans.⁵⁴ Therefore, neither the demand of *PI 2* nor the remark in *PI 6* stand in contradiction to our basic intuitions about what it means to be human.

But now one could ask: What is the difference on principle between Wittgenstein on the one hand, and Øfsti (Apel, and others) on the other, if Wittgenstein neither denies that there is a fundamental difference between human beings and animals, nor denies that this difference can be seen to consist - understood in the right way - in the human's thinking and the animal's not thinking? The deep difference, I think, is one connected with the conception of philosophy, that is, the philosopher's understanding of himself.

Remember the words of Aristotle. He asked whether there is anything essential to human beings that is not reducible to the various functions they have in social life, anything that is essential to them *qua human beings*. And whereas all questions about the "good and the 'well'" of this or that certain function or activity belong to the various sciences and arts of these functions and activities, and these sciences and arts get their importance from the importance of their subjects, the question of the essence of a

⁵⁴ Cf.: Teichman [1976].

human being *qua* human being belongs to philosophy. If we know what this essence consists of, it seems, then we can also say which real life human beings should live, and what is wrong with their actual life, how society should be constructed to fit to the real nature of human beings, what individuals should really do - and not only "this language-game is played". Philosophy gets its importance from these important questions and the possible results which answers to them might bring about.⁵⁵

But now it seems as if Wittgenstein denies that there is such an essence, and would only accept forms of life, or language-games. "What has to be accepted ("Das Hinzunehmende" in the German original - R.R.), the given, is - so one could say - *forms of life*." [PI, p. 226] But, to accept the existing forms of life, it seems, excludes the possibility of (rationally) criticizing them. The exclusion of the possibility of (rationally) criticizing them entails, it seems, the exclusion of the possibility of (rationally) changing them. Wittgenstein's philosophy expresses, one could say⁵⁶, a pure conservatism. In the end philosophy loses its importance. So the question is: "Where does our investigation get its importance from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, that is, all that is great and important." [PI 118]

To give an answer to this question, I want to point to a similar problem. Bertolt Brecht writes: "Me-ti taught: Master Ka-meh says that consciousness depends on the actual way in which people produce what is necessary for life. He

⁵⁵ Cf.: Nielsen [1992] for a similar view on philosophy.

⁵⁶ It is said, by Trigg [1991]; see also my essay "How not ..." in this volume.

denies that, in their minds, people can free themselves farther from the economical standpoint than in economy. This sounds at first oppressive. But the simple consideration that in fact all great works came about via this dependence, and that these would by no means be diminished by acknowledging the dependence, puts everything right again."⁵⁷

Two points interest me in these remarks. The first is: that what Ka-meh taught sounds down-hearted only for people who view the great works not as important in themselves, but rather as important because they are the expression of something else: the *reason* or *rationality*, for instance.

We can register something similar in the case of interpreting Wittgenstein. Singing catches, play-acting, building - all these and many other activities are not taken to be philosophically important. They are perhaps plebeian examples for something higher, but not in themselves worthy of consideration. "Language (or thought) is something unique" - as Wittgenstein lets his interlocutor say in *PI* 110. But he continues: "- this proves to be a superstition (*not* a mistake!), itself produced by grammatical illusions.

And now the impressiveness retreats to these illusions, to the problems." Surely, language and thought are something important, but they are not something unique! If the plebeian examples can be called thinking, then nothing is lost, except our delusion. "What we are destroying is nothing but houses of cards and we are clearing up the ground of language on which they stand." [*PI* 118]

The second point of Brecht's remark is this: to

⁵⁷ Brecht ([1967], p. 434f.), my translation - R.R.

take the great works for what they are in themselves presupposes seeing them as something following their own rules, or with their own underlying criteria. This does not exclude that they are causally, or otherwise, *effected* by something not based on these criteria, not following these rules, the *economy* for instance. But to identify the causes presupposes to get a clear picture of what it is that is causally effected.

Something similar, again, we can see in the case of Wittgenstein. What he is interested in are the conceptual confusions which are expressed in philosophy. Therefore he tries to show what it is to think, to feel, to order, and so on. It is the *essence* of thinking, feeling, ordering, and so on, he is interested in. And the "*Essence* is expressed by grammar." [PI 371] The grammar is one of a family of word-uses, which is connected by family-resemblances. To see the family-resemblances it is fruitful to conceive the (primitive) language(-games) as complete.

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Philosophical Investigations 65ff.:
On Family Resemblance

Wittgenstein's remarks on family resemblance belong to the best known parts of the PI. Nevertheless, there has so far been no general agreement on their detailed philosophical content and their role in the whole architecture of the PI.

The attention Wittgenstein's remarks have drawn is partly due to Renford Bambrough's famous article [1960/61] on them. Bambrough's query is still one of the most interesting in the literature. According to Bambrough in these remarks one can find a solution to the so-called problem of universals. Bambrough writes⁵⁸:

"The nominalist says that games have nothing in common except that they are called games.

The realist says that games must have something in common, and he means by this that they

⁵⁸ I quote here what Bambrough calls the "bare bones" of his reconstruction of Wittgenstein's solution (p. 199. All references with page-number only refer to Bambrough's essay.). There is a conceptual tension in the following quotation with regard to the realist's position. If it is possible that something *must* be the case, but *is* not the case, then what "the realist says" and "the realist's claim" cannot be identical. But in some occurrences "something must be the case" and "something is the case" are interchangeable. Therefore I understand in the following what the realist says in the sense of the realist's claim.

must have something in common other than that they are games.

Wittgenstein says that games have nothing in common except that they are games.

Wittgenstein thus denies at one and the same time the nominalist's claim that games have nothing in common except that they are called games and the realist's claim that games have something in common other than that they are games." [198f.]

Now we have two possibilities:

either

(i) to be a game is not the same as to be called a game,

or

(ii) to be a game is the same as to be called a game.

If (i) is true, then it is also true that Wittgenstein denies the nominalist's claim, so long as we take Bambrough's reformulations as appropriate. And if (i) is true, then it is also true that Wittgenstein denies the realist's claim. But in this case Wittgenstein would also deny what both the realist and the nominalist accept: that games are called games.

But if (ii) is true then it is only true that Wittgenstein denies the realist's claim, but it is *not* true that he denies the nominalist's claim. Therefore, Wittgenstein only denies at *one and the same time* the nominalist's claim and the realist's claim if (i) is true.

Now, (i) is true iff

(i.i) something can be a game without being called a game,

or

(i.ii) something can be called a game without being a game.

But if (i.i) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim could not be a solution to the so-called problem of universals at all, assuming, that is, that we take the so-called problem of universals to consist in the questions whether there can be an objective justification for the application of a general term to its instances, and - if there can be - in what it consists [cf.: p. 198]. For Wittgenstein's claim is about *games* and not about *what we call games*. Even if *games* have nothing in common except that they are games, *the things we call games* might in fact have something in common other than that they are called games, just as a specific subset of the set of games may have something in common.

If (i.ii) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim could only be a solution to the so-called problem of universals, provided there were at least two *games* among *the things which are called games*. Since Wittgenstein's claim does not entail this proposition it is also in that case no solution.

If (ii) is true, then Wittgenstein's claim is the same as

- "games have nothing in common except that they are called games",
- and
- "the things called games have nothing in common except that they are games",
- and
- "the things called games have nothing in common except that they are called games."

Therefore, if (ii) is true, then it is not only the case that Wittgenstein does not deny the

nominalist's claim, but his claim is the same.

Therefore, Wittgenstein's remarks on family-resemblance - as they are understood by Bambrough - are either no solution to the so-called problem of universals at all, or they are a nominalistic one.

Furthermore, for the nominalist's claim to *contradict* the realist's claim (i) cannot be true. For, if (i) is true, then the realist's claim is compatible with the claim that games have nothing in common except that they are called games. But this is exactly the nominalist's claim. On the other hand the nominalist's claim is compatible with the claim that games must - "must" understood in the sense Bambrough understands it in the last sentence quoted above - have something in common other than that they are games. But this is exactly the realist's claim.

Therefore, if the debate about the so-called problem of universals is characterized by two proponents - the nominalist and the realist - whose claims contradict one another in the way described by Bambrough, then Wittgenstein is a nominalist. But if the solution of such a problem consists in the formulation of a third position, which shows that the two proponents are both false in one respect and right in another one, then Wittgenstein's claim is no solution at all, if Bambrough's reconstruction is appropriate. At least it is not clear how something can be the solution of a problem, if it only repeats what one of the proponents has already claimed. This could only be the case, if the arguments were new. Therefore it would seem advisable to look at the flesh around the bare bones.

Bambrough illustrates his interpretation with a

simple diagramm:

e	d	c	b	a
A B C D	A B C E	A B D E	A C D E	B C D E

[p. 189].

He writes:

"Here we can already see how natural and how proper it might be to apply the same word to a number of objects between which there is no common feature." [Ibid.]

And if we take only the subset:

e	d	c	a
A B C D	A B C E	A B D E	B C D E ,

"then although they all *happen* to have B in common, it is clear that it is not in virtue of the presence of B that they are all rightly called by the same name." [Ibid.]

The first group of objects can only be an illustration of Wittgenstein's position with regard to games if we suppose that

- if (i) is true, then
 - either
 - to be a game is not a feature of each game,
 - or
 - to be a game is a feature of each game, but this feature is not represented in the list A, B, C, D, E;

and

- if (ii) is true, then
 - either
 - to be a game/to be called a game is not a feature of each game,
 - or
 - the illustration is not relevant for the

question whether the things which are called games have something in common.

Furthermore, *clear* is that *if* we (rightly) apply the same name to the number of objects of the first group, *then* it is not in virtue of B that we call the number of objects of the second group rightly by the very same name. But this is only analytically true. Now, let us take the following group instead of Bambrough's first one:

f	g	h	i	j
P Q R S	P Q R T	P Q S T	P R S T	P Q R U

If one can accept it as natural and proper to apply the same word to Bambrough's first group of objects, how natural and proper would it then be to apply the same word to my group? But here it would not be analytically true that *if* we (rightly) apply the same name to this group, *then* it is not in virtue of P that we call a subset of this set by the same name. This would only be the case, if it were clear that it is not in virtue of P that we call the objects of my group by the same name. But whether the objects of my group are called by the same name in virtue of P nothing one can see!

But now Bambrough writes that, even if the number of objects were infinite, and if all of them have a common feature or features, "it would not be in virtue of the presence of the common feature or features that they would all rightly be called by the same name, since the name also applies to *possible* instances that lack the features." [189f.]

But here it is clear that Bambrough's simple illustration is no longer one in favour of this

thesis. For if all elements of an infinite set of objects had one or more common features, then his set of the five objects {a,b,c,d,e} would not be an example of a subset of such an infinite set. Therefore we have to make a distinction between two independent arguments in Bambrugh's analysis:

- (a) it might be natural and proper to apply the same name to a number of objects, which have no common feature;
- and
- (b) all general names apply not only to actual instances, but furthermore to possible ones which have no common feature.

(a) is compatible with:

- (c) it might be natural and proper to apply the same name to a number of objects, which have one or more common features.

Now the "it might be"-propositions (a) and (c) will be - for the sake of argument - reformulated into "there are"-propositions:

- (a') there are applications of the same name to a number of objects, which have no common feature;
- and
- (c') there are applications of the same name to a number of objects, which have a common feature.

If we remember now the claims of the nominalist and the realist we see, that (a') would suffice to deny the realist's claim, and that (c') would suffice to deny the nominalist's claim, so long as we accept the things that the nominalist and the realist say with regard to games are instances of their respective general positions,

which could be expressed in the following way:

- (N) Objects, which are called by the same name, have nothing in common except that they are all called by that name.
- (R) Objects, which are called by the same name, (must) have something in common other than that they are all called by that name.

That is, if we were able to show that Wittgenstein hold both (a)/(a') and (c)/(c'), then we could say that Wittgenstein both denied the nominalist's and the realist's claims. First to (a)/(a'). Wittgenstein writes in *PI* 66:

"Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games'. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them all? - Don't say: 'There *must* be something common, or they would not be called 'games'' - but look and see whether there is anything common to them all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to them all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many common features drop out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. - Are they all 'amusing'? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has dis-

appeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring-a-ring-a-roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared! And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; we can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail."

And in *PI* 67 Wittgenstein writes:

"I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblance'; for the various resemblances between the members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. - And I shall say: 'games' form a family."

Here one can surely say that Bambrough's first group is a simple illustration of the former remarks, that is, that Wittgenstein accepts (a)/(a').⁵⁹ This acceptance is not restricted to

⁵⁹ A more extended illustration with the example of "game" can be found in: Suter [1989]. Bambrough elaborates this point with his example of the Churchill face. Bambrough writes: "The members of the family have no *feature* in common, and yet they will all unmistakably have the *Churchill face* in common." [p. 190] Here it seems as if the *Churchill face* cannot be a *feature*. (There is a problem with the understanding of the word "feature" which in English has a peculiarly specific meaning when referring to the separate parts of the

the word (or concept) "game". The description and comparison of games functions only as an example for concepts like "language" and "proposition" ("Satz") [PI 65], "number" [PI 67], and others.⁶⁰

But how are all these remarks related to our objection above that Bambrough's first group could only be an illustration of Wittgenstein's position if we suppose that

- if (i) is true, then
 - either
 - to be a game is not a feature of each game,
 - or
 - to be a game is a feature of each game, but this feature is not represented in the list A, B, C, D, E;

human face. Thanks to Peter Cripps for this point.) But I see no reason why this should be the case. I think it would be more correct, and less misleading, to say that the *faces* of the members of the Churchill family do not have a common feature, but that the *members* have at least one common feature, namely the Churchill face. But the Churchill faces do not have the feature "Churchill face" in common. See also: Wennerberg [1967] for an extended critique of Bambrough's account.

⁶⁰ There is a debate in the literature concerning which concepts are - according to Wittgenstein - family resemblance concepts and which are not. Some authors believe that all concepts are family resemblance concepts. Cf.: Kutschera [1973], p. 190 - for predicates with one place; Pompa [1968], p. 347; Pitcher [1964], p. 220. Others argue that not all concepts are family resemblance concepts. Cf.: Llewelyn [1968], p. 343; Simon [1969], p. 409; Wennerberg [1967], p. 125f.; Hunter [1985], p. 62; Manser [1967], p. 211; Suter [1989], p. 31. For Bambrough the question is irrelevant (p. 194). I will try to show that not all concepts need be family resemblance concepts, but won't try to say in detail which are and which are not.

and

- if (ii) is true, then
 - either
 - to be a game/to be called a game is not a feature of each game,
 - or
 - the illustration is not relevant for the question whether the things which are called games have something in common?

For Wittgenstein also says that games have *nothing* in common. For Bambrough's reconstruction of Wittgenstein's claim to be correct one has to make - as I want to call it - a "not literally meant"- objection. That is, Wittgenstein indeed thought that games have something in common, but does not mention it, because it is, for instance, too trivial. According to Bambrough Wittgenstein should rather have said that games have nothing in common except that they are games.⁶¹ The "not literally meant"-objection is enormously widespread in the literature.⁶² Other candidates for a common feature are:

- that games are activities (Wennerberg [1967], p. 110);
- that games have rules (Khatchadourian [1968], p.209; Suter [1989], p. 26; Hallett);
- that games have the capacity to serve specific human needs (Khatchadourian [1968], p. 211);
- that games play a specific role in human life (Manser [1967], p. 217);
- that games are (interwoven with) activities (Savigny; Campbell [1965], p. 241);
- that games are proceedings (Savigny);

⁶¹ A similar argument is to be found in: Kutschera [1973]. p.191.

⁶² I found only one exception: Pitcher [1964], p. 212.

- that games are located in space and time
(Campbell [1965], p. 241).⁶³

Let us start with the last candidate. To say that every *game* is located in space is similar to saying that every *body* is located in space. In *PI* 252 Wittgenstein comments on such propositions as follows:

"'This body has extension.' To this we might reply: 'Nonsense!' - but are inclined to reply 'Of course!' - Why is this?"

The answer to the question is given in the foregoing section:

"Example: 'Every rod has a length.' That means something like: we call something (or *this*) 'the length of a rod' - but nothing 'the length of a sphere.' Now can I imagine 'every rod having a length'? Well, I simply imagine a rod. Only this picture, in connexion with this proposition, has a quite different role from one used in connexion with the proposition 'This table has the same length as the one over there'."

When the "not literally meant"-objections are founded on the supposition that Wittgenstein does not mention such things as the location of every game in space and time because of their triviality and self-evidence, then we also find a counterpart for this argument in *PI* 251:

"What does it mean when we say: 'I can't imagine the opposite of this' or 'What would it be like, if it were otherwise?' ...

⁶³ For reference to Savigny and Hallett see footnote 5 in the first essay.

Of course, here 'I can't imagine the opposite' doesn't mean: my powers of imagination are unequal to the task. These words are a defence against something whose form makes it look like an empirical proposition, but which is really a grammatical one."

Now, can we imagine that a game is not located in space and time, is no activity, is no proceeding? I think we can't in the sense of Wittgenstein's remarks. Therefore these proposals for candidates of common features can be answered with: "Nonsense!"

That every game plays a specific role in human life resembles the following problem:

"When we say 'Every word in language signifies something' we have so far said *nothing whatever*; unless we have explained exactly *what* distinction we wish to make. (It might be, of course, that we wanted to distinguish the words of language (8) from words 'without meaning' such as occur in Lewis Carroll's poems, or words like 'Lilliburlero' in songs.)" [PI 13]

A situation which would make the proposition that every game plays a specific role in human life say *something* is for instance described in PI 200.

With regard to the candidate that every game has the capacity to serve specific human needs one could answer either that this capacity is nothing one can see or - better - with PI 14:

"Imagine someone's saying: 'All tools serve to modify something. Thus the hammer modifies the position of the nail, the saw the shape of the board, and so on.' - And what

is modified by the rule, the glue-pot, the nails? - Our knowledge of a thing's length, the temperature of the glue, and the solidity of the box.' - Would anything be gained by this assimilation of expressions?"

The situation is different in the case of one candidate for a common feature - that games are games. This supposed common feature resembles the features of location in space and time and the like insofar as it seems to be hard to imagine the contrary, whereas if (i) were true, we could imagine that something is called a game, but is not really one. But if (ii) is true or if we understand the proposition that every game is a game literally, then this proposition seems to reduce to "Every game is identical with itself."⁶⁴ In this case one can answer with *PI* 216:

⁶⁴ Bambrough himself proposes another line of argument. He writes: "In the sense in which, according to Wittgenstein, games have nothing in common except that they are games, and red things have nothing in common except that they are red, *brothers have nothing in common except that they are brothers*. It is true that brothers have in common that they are male siblings, but their having in common that they are male siblings is their having in common that they are *brothers*, and not their having in common something in addition to their being brothers." [p. 194] (This passage is directed against: Strawson [1959], p.11.) Here it seems as if every proposition which describes something that can be in common is also analytically true, or at least is different in its truth-conditions from paradigmatical empirical propositions. One could argue against Bambrough that brothers have in common their being male and have in common their being siblings. But neither their being male, nor their being siblings is their being brothers. Only their being male *and* siblings is - perhaps - their being brothers. On the other hand it is perhaps true that neither their being male nor their being siblings is something *in addition* to their being brothers.

"'A thing is identical with itself.' - There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted."

With regard to one candidate for a common feature - that games have rules - I am not sure whether this could also be answered in one of the ways above. But I have the feeling that also here there is something awry.⁶⁵

Now, Wittgenstein's remarks in *PI* 66 and elsewhere seem to give us reason to believe that Wittgenstein accepts (b). For Wittgenstein writes:

"And we extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres." [*PI* 67]

"For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No." [*PI* 68]

"One might say that the concept 'game' is a

⁶⁵ Perhaps one could argue along the following lines. According to Wittgenstein a game is *defined* by its rules. [Cf.: *PI* 205] That is: to follow this or that rules *means* to play this or that game. But it is not a part of the definition of chess that skill plays a specific role. Therefore the "common feature" of all games that they are played according to rules is something different from the features listed by Wittgenstein.

concept with blurred edges." [PI 71]

It is true that in cases where (a)/(a') is appropriate, often (b) is also. But if we look at the context of the quoted passages we see that there are no reasons to attribute (b) to Wittgenstein:

"...I can give the concept 'number' rigid limits..., that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is *not* closed by a frontier." [PI 67]

This remark suffices to show that Wittgenstein does not accept at least that part of (b) according to which every word applies to possible objects, and not only to actual ones. But (b) not only expresses a position with regard to *openness* of concepts, but furthermore one with regard to *vagueness*. Here we can look at PI 69:

"How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe *games* to him, and we might add: "This and *similar things* are called 'games'" (This expresses the vagueness of the concept "game" - R.R.) And do we know any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people whom we cannot tell exactly what a game is? - But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose. Does it take that to make the concept usable? Not at all! (Except for that special purpose.) No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm. to make the measure of length 'one pace' usable. And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't an exact measure", then I reply: very

well, it was an inexact (a vague - R.R.) one. - Though you still owe me a definition of exactness."

This remark suffices to show that Wittgenstein does not accept that part of (b) that is concerned with vagueness. On the contrary, both quotations give reasons to attribute (c)/(c') to him.

Whereas with the acceptance of (b) Wittgenstein would not only deny the realists claim (R), but furthermore support the nominalist's claim (N) - if we accept that "to be called by the name 'T'" is not among the features - with the non-acceptance of (b) Wittgenstein does not only not support the nominalist, but with the acceptance of (c)/(c') he denies the nominalist's claim.

There is a further line of argument in Bambrough's account which did not find a sufficient echo in the literature.⁶⁶ For him family resemblance is not only sufficient as an objective justification of our application of a general term to its instances - which is contrary to the realist's claim -, but is furthermore necessary as such a justification - which is contrary to the nominalist's claim. To show the necessity of family resemblances Bambrough describes a situation "where a set of objects literally (! R.R.) and undeniably have nothing in common except that they are called by the same name." [p. 199]⁶⁷ He writes:

"If I choose to give the name 'alpha' to each of

⁶⁶ An exception is Savigny.

⁶⁷ Notice that his remark and the following ones indicate that Bambrough does not accept (ii), but implicitly (i).

a number of miscellaneous objects (the star Sirius, my fountain-pain, the Parthenon, the colour red, the number five, the letter Z) then I may well succeed in choosing the objects so *arbitrarily* that shall succeed in preventing them from having any feature in common, other than that I call them by the name 'alpha'." [p. 199f.]

The points in which this imaginary case differs from real ones are:

- the *arbitrariness* of the selection of objects in the imaginary case,
- that the class of alphas is a *closed class*, that is, "no further application can be given to the word 'alpha' according to the use that I have prescribed." [p. 200], and
- that "I cannot teach the use of the word 'alpha' except by specifically attaching it to each of the objects in my *arbitrarily* chosen list. No observer can conclude anything from watching me attach the label to this, that, or the other object, or to any number of objects however large, about the nature of the objects, if any, to which I shall later attach it. The use of the word 'alpha' cannot be *learned* or *taught* as the use of a general word can be learned or taught." [p. 200f., *my italics* -R.R.]

We have already seen what Wittgenstein's position is with regard to the openness of concepts. Therefore it is only necessary to discuss the other elements of that reasoning. First, *which* use of the word 'alpha' can neither be learned nor taught? There was no use described in Bamrough's description of the imaginary case, but only a giving of a name to objects. Or as Wittgenstein writes:

"One thinks that learning the language con-

sists in giving names to objects. Viz., to human beings, to shapes, to colours, to pains, to moods, to numbers, etc. To repeat - naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But *what is it a preparation for?*" [PI 26]

"What is the relation between name and thing named? - Well, *what is it?* Look at language-game (2) or at another one: there you can see the sort of thing this relation consists in." [PI 37]

"For naming and describing do not stand on the same level: naming is a preparation for description. Naming is so far not a move in the language-game - any more than putting a piece in its place on the board is a move in chess. We may say: *nothing* has so far been done, when a thing has been named. It has not even *got* a name except in the language-game." [PI 49]

So we can conclude that Bambrough's description of the imaginary case is either no description of a name-giving procedure, or it lacks its essential part - the description of the use of the word 'alpha'. The second possibility is the interesting one, for it leads to the question whether we can imagine a use for a word which is applied to such arbitrarily chosen objects. One, not only imaginary, example is given *with* (not *in*) Bambrough's description itself. That is, the naming of the objects above can play the role of a (supposed) counter-example to a philosophical claim. For, it is of course the case that the reader of Bambrough's essay can learn, and can be taught, what Bambrough calls 'alpha', and how he uses this word. Another example seems to be relics in religious contexts. The objects

called "relics" need not have more in common than the alphas have, yet there is still a use of the word which can be taught and learned by the members of the religious community. But the important point is that the use of the word "relic" does not consist only of saying "Relic", when one sees (or thinks of) a relic. The use includes much more than this, and that makes it a use.

Therefore, I think, we can also conclude that family resemblance between objects which are called by the same name is not a necessary condition for an objectively justified application of that name. Whether or not objects called by the same name have something in common, stand in a family resemblance relation to one another, or are simply "arbitrarily" chosen will depend on the *language-games* in which that name is used. There are no abstract general sufficient and/or necessary conditions which must be fulfilled in order objectively to justify an application. Therefore, to ask whether family resemblance is necessary and/or sufficient as a justification is an incomplete question since it lacks the (hidden) part "relative to language-game 'L'". This situation is principally the same as in the case of exactness. This is expressed in the last two sentences of *PI* 69:

"And if you want to say "But still, before that it wasn't an exact measure", then I reply: very well, it was an inexact (a vague - R.R.) one. - Though you still owe me a definition of exactness."

The interlocutor's objection is correct *if* we take a specific form of exactness - for instance the exactness in some fields of the physical sciences - as our criterion. In this sense Wittgenstein can answer: "very well, it was an

inexact one." The objection is wrong *if* it is to mean that the measure were useless. In this sense Wittgenstein can answer: "you owe me a definition of exactness".

Now we can say, that Bambrough is right in his comment that Wittgenstein both denied the realist's and the nominalist's claim. But he is not right in what he takes to be Wittgenstein's argument. For the realist's claim bases on the universalisation of specific language-games or practices - namely those of the (physical) sciences. The nominalist's claim bases on the universalisation of (parts of) our ordinary discourse, which includes the application of word to objects between which there are only family resemblances or even only arbitrary relations. What Wittgenstein denies is the universalisation of both groups of language-games.

Finally we can have a look at the alternative (i)/(ii). So far we have only discussed what would be true *if* one of the two positions were true. But which *is* true? According to Hunter "the final arbiter of whether something is a game is whether the linguistic community routinely so describes it; in spite of there being nothing that all games share, we all soon learn to identify activities as games by their properties." ([1985], p. 62, cf. also p. 54)⁶⁸ This will also be true for possible cases. This statement entails the proposition that the community cannot err in identifying a game as a game, that is: to be called a game is (an essen-

⁶⁸ It is clear, I hope, that with "to be called" was always - that is, also in Bambrough's remarks - meant "to be routinely called by the linguistic community" and not "to be called at time t and place p by person P".

tial part of) being a game. I think for the actual instances that is true, but for the possible ones one also has to register that there may be differences in the community's linguistic practices. This doesn't mean that, with regard to possible future instances, one or all parts of a community may err, but only that it is at *that moment* not decided whether this or that activity will be called a game or not, *even if it resembles one or more known games very closely*. As far as features of the objects in question are concerned, this is true because there are only family resemblances between the actual instances and because these may vary in different directions. Therefore, at least with regard to games (the actual instances for "game") (ii) is true.

But (ii) cannot be generalized. For in the case of the use of words according to fixed criteria the community can err in identifying objects as falling under the concept. Whether an object is one which falls under the explicitly defined concept C depends on there being defining features. In identifying or finding *them* even the whole community can err.⁶⁹ But that an object falls under the concept C *if* it has the defining feature has *now* been decided.⁷⁰ In physical sciences as one paradigmatic area of such cases the specification of defining features is normally dependent on whole theories, which for instance also entail propositions about the relevant object's structure and behavior with regard to others, that is: what they - the structure and behavior - explain and by which they are explained. In these cases a version of

⁶⁹ That does not mean that there can be errors in every case at every time and place by everyone.

⁷⁰ This does not exclude that the community may later take another feature as the defining criterion.

(i) is true.

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Philosophical Investigations 206:
The Common Behaviour of Mankind

Imagine you came into a strange country. You did not understand the language of the people - if their verbal utterances were a language at all.

Now:

(Q) "In what circumstances would you say that the people gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on?" [PI 206]

This Wittgensteinian question (Q) is commented by Savigny with the thesis:

(i) "The answer to the question in [PI 206]b demands a theory."¹

(i) can be understood at least in two different ways:

(i') (Q) demands as an answer a theory, that is: only a theory could be accepted as an answer.

(i'') The answer to (Q) - whatever it will consist of - demands a theory.

(With regard to (i'') one could, and perhaps would, tacitly add : "... as a justification of the answer.")

What Savigny writes a bit later is not thesis - for the reason that it is, in my eyes, undebated:

(ii) "Wittgenstein does not tell us, what his theory is." In short: Wittgenstein does not give

¹ Cf. note 5 in the foregoing essay.

us his theory.²

From (i') and (ii) follows in my view:
(iii) Wittgenstein does not answer (Q).
(And with regard to (iii) one could, and perhaps would, tacitly add: "... as so often in the *PI*." (i'') and (ii) do not exclude that Wittgenstein did in fact answer (Q), but - again only tacitly - without a sufficient justification.)

Undebated is, as I said above, (ii): Wittgenstein really does not give us a theory. Not only is it lacking in the immediate context, it is not to be found in the entire *PI*. At least he does not give us a theory in that sense of the word, in which it is taken by him. With regard to (i) we can choose: we can take one of the two alternatives, both or neither of them. (i'') is in my view relatively uninteresting for an *interpretation*, whereas it could be very interesting for a *critique*, or a systematically oriented *elaboration*, of the sparse Wittgensteinian remarks - assuming, that is, that Wittgenstein gave an answer. But since the problem here is interpretation and neither critique nor further elaboration, (i'') shall not further be mentioned, without justifying why (i'') is probably false.

(i') becomes more plausible if we smuggle a word or two into (Q): (Q') "In what circumstances would you be *justified* in saying ...?"
For the sake of greater clarity and precision (Q') could be reformulated into:
(Q')' "What could you give as a justification for saying that the people ...?"; or complemen-

² My "short" is a bit too short for it does not mention a presupposition of v. Savigny's proposition: that Wittgenstein has a theory; only he does not tell us what it consists of.

tary:

(Q')' "How would the people's behaviour have to be, in order for you to say with justification that they gave orders ...?"

The more we reformulate (Q), the clearer, but also the more problematic, the results will be, when we compare them with Wittgenstein's text. I think (i) is simply inappropriate. And this impression becomes stronger if we pass from (Q) via (Q') and (Q')' to (Q')''.³

This impression is highly welcome, for especially (iii) seems to me to be too unplausible.⁴ Let us therefore forget everything with the exceptions of (Q) and (ii), and register as our first result that all the more or less extended commentaries on *PI* 206c - which without exception take *PI* 206c and other parts of the *PI* to be in some way Wittgenstein's answer to (Q) - are basically right. Now it is time to have a look at this answer:

(A) "Die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise ist das Bezugssystem mittels welches wir uns eine fremde Sprache deuten."⁵

³ If a theory is demanded, who should then be the addressee of (Q)?

⁴ If (iii) would be true, what are then the commentaries on *PI* 206c and 207 about? For instance v. Savigny's?

⁵ This is the German text and the English version has, as Savigny [1989] points out, the misleading translation:

"The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language."

Instead of "behaviour of mankind" I propose "human way of acting". But for the sake of simplicity I will use in the following the established translation.

The following questions are immediately connected with (A), if one is interested in interpretation:

- What does "interpret" mean?
- What does "system of reference" mean?
- What does "common behaviour of mankind" mean?

The last question has been central to the discussion in the literature. Therefore let us take it as our starting point. The interpretations which have been proposed in the literature can be ordered by grouping them according to the domain they take to be "common":

- (1) the common behaviour is a (regular) behaviour that is common to the members of the observed group - this is Savigny's interpretation;
- (2) the common behaviour is not only common to the members of the observed group, but furthermore common to the group the observer stems from - this more or less sums up Schulte [1990];
- (3) the behaviour is common to all human beings, to mankind - in this is the standpoint adopted by Baker/Hacker and Haller [1979;1984;1988]⁶.

(3) is the strongest interpretation in the sense that, with (3), it is presupposed that there is (at least) one (kind of) behaviour that is common to all human beings, whereas this domain can not be so wide in the case of (2) and must be even smaller in the case of (1). From an extensional point of view (3) entails (2) and (2) entails (1). Hence (1) is the extensionally weakest position. With regard to (1), (2) and (3) stand in need of justification. Anyone who

⁶ Haller means that *PI* 206c leads us to attribute a "praxeological fundamentalism" to Wittgenstein. His interpretation is probably not supported by the English translation, but by accentuating the "menschlich" ("human") in the German text.

tries to defend (only 1)⁷ shows that he is interested in exactly that behaviour in regard of which (1) is distinct from (2) and/or (3). Here the point is an intensional one. Anyone who tries to defend (only 1) would thereby defend the position that, whatever may be subsumed under (2) and/or (3), is not sufficient, perhaps even not necessary. In this sense (only 1) is the intensionally strongest position. In his interpretations of *PI* 206,207 Savigny tries to justify this position. In his essay [1989] this position is further elaborated. I will refer to both, but primarily to the commentary.

With regard to (Q) Baker and Hacker give an interpretation which is similar to Savigny's: "What justifies the judgement that alien people are giving orders, understand them, obey of flout them?" The difference with regard to Savigny is that Baker and Hacker (not only at this place) do not talk about (the need of) *theories*. But the more important difference for our topic is their interpretation of (A): "The common behaviour of mankind provides an essential leverage for interpreting an unknown language." This common behaviour of mankind is characterized as "not merely that behaviour which manifests our animal nature, our natural needs for food, drink, warmth, our sexual drives, our physical vulnerability. etc. It also includes the diverse species-specific forms which such behaviour may naturally take for human beings. It is part of the natural history of mankind that we are impressed by fundamental features of our lives (birth, death and procreation), by elemental features of our natural

⁷ Since (1) does not exclude that there is a behaviour common to all human beings, I introduce "(only 1)" for that position which is characterized by the exclusion of everything which goes farther than the necessary minimum.

world (the sun and moon, the cycle of seasons, the fecundity of nature, its fury and tranquillity), by the basic patterns of human relationship arising out of sexual differentiation, parenthood, the overlapping of generations."

Savigny is right in mentioning that Baker and Hacker do not found their interpretation on the text of the *PI*, especially *PI* 206 and its context. Instead of this they refer to two passages from the manuscripts. And also Haller does not refer to the context of the passage in question. Therefore (3) must be taken not to be justified by its proponents according to the principles of "textimmanent interpretation" as put forward by Savigny.⁸ But (3) is taken by Savigny not only to be not justified enough by the context of (A), it furthermore *obstructs* Baker and Hacker from giving an appropriate interpretation of *PI* 207a, 1,2.⁹ This means: even if (3) cannot be justified in terms of *PI* 206c - although it might be in terms of other passages of the *PI* - it is an obstruction for the interpretation of at least one passage from the *PI*. If one does not want to attribute inconsistency to Wittgenstein's text, one could be forced to say that (2), (1) or (only 1) are the only appropriate interpretations.

PI 207a, 1,2 go as follows:

"Let us imagine that the people in that country carried on the usual human activities and in the course of them employed, apparently, an articu-

⁸ See his "Introduction". This judgement does not say that (3) is false or uninteresting with regard to the whole *PI*.

⁹ With references of this kind is meant: *PI*, number section, part of the section, number of sentence of the part. This is the system of reference Savigny uses. Savigny's remark belongs to his comment on *PI* 206.

late language. If we watch their behaviour we find it intelligible, it seems 'logical'." Baker and Hacker comment the passage "carried on the usual human activities": "... puzzling, since if it turns out that the noises they emit are not speech, then can they carry on the usual human activities at all? Without a language they would just be hairless apes." In this comment Savigny views "an interpretation interesting for the feuilletton", namely the supposition Wittgenstein would have argued for an "anthropocentric language-imperialism".¹⁰

Wittgenstein continues:

"... But when we try to learn their language we find it impossible to do so. For there is no regular connexion between what they say, the sounds they make, and their actions; but still these sounds are not superfluous, for if we gag one of the people, it has the same consequences as with us; without the sounds their actions fall into confusion-as I feel like putting it.

Are we to say that these people have a language: orders, reports, and the rest?

There is not enough regularity for us to call it 'language'."

Savigny points out that "their language" in the first sentence is used attributively and not referentially. The people do not have a language. "Their language" is that, which seems to us to be their language. But then they are - if Baker and Hacker are right - hairless apes. Of course it is clear that they are people. Here, like at many places in the *PI*, Wittgenstein introduces a fictitious community of people to contrast particular sides of our psychological concepts and thereby to make them visible. But the question of Baker and Hacker can be given

¹⁰ Cf. also: Savigny ([1989], p. 232).

sense by considering that it is not a priori clear where we would like to give, or to accept, limits for the property "being a human being". If to carry on the usual human activities and to use in the course of this a language belongs to that property, then Baker's and Hacker's question is correct. Savigny does not see any problem here, for he writes: "... contrary: the behaviour is described as 'usual human activities', their behaviour as 'seems 'logical''... So we find a human way of acting ("Handlungsweise" in German, see above - R.R.)...". Here, I think, one has to look closer at the text.

Firstly, it is surely clear that with PI 207a not only orders are meant - which are the ostensible topic of (Q) - but *language* as discussed in PI 206c and 207b. It is also clear that it is a fictitious situation ("Let us imagine"). Now, Wittgenstein uses the phrases "wie es scheint" (in the English translation: "apparently") and "it seems" (in the German original: "erscheint uns"). What we are to imagine is, that it *seems* the people use an articulate language and that their behaviour *seems* 'logical'. So far there is no difference between this and Savigny. But now the question arises, whether "usual human activities" is also used attributively and not referentially, as it is, according to Savigny, in the case of "language". Exactly this problem is touched by Baker and Hacker with their question. Savigny seems to suppose that this is not the case.¹¹ At least his whole argumentation against

¹¹ Savigny's remarks are insofar unclear as he says on the one hand that the people's behaviour is signified ("bezeichnet") by Wittgenstein as usual human activities, but on the other and at the same time he puts "usual human activities" in quotation-marks. So it is not clear whether he means "signified as" ("bezeichnet als") or "signified with" ("bezeichnet mit"). Therefore my "seems". In ([1989], p. 234) the thing is

(3) bases on this assumption. But if this assumption should be true, then the situation would be strange. For what we are to imagine then are usual human activities, which - as we are to imagine at the same time - only *seem* to be connected with an articulated language. This double demand only makes sense if the things demanded are different. Usual human activities do not only *seem* to be connected with an articulated language. Normally they are. At least the games of ordering, of reporting, etc. - as we play them - are connected with an articulated language. And they are connected with it in such a way that, to say they *seem* connected with an articulated language has no clear sense. On the contrary, they are paradigmatic examples of what we call "activities connected with an articulated language", paradigmatic of - to say it with Austin - how to do things with words. Something can seem to be a usual human activity which is connected with an articulated language (can seem to be ordering, to be reporting, etc.) - which we are to imagine according to Wittgenstein - and here we can err. That is: it may be that what seemed to be such an activity connected with language is not really one. But it cannot happen that we imagined a usual human activity which seemed to be connected with an articulated language, but this only seemed so. What could happen - and what therefore could be demanded by Wittgenstein - is that something seemed to be a usual human activity which is connected with an articulated language, but that we register while trying to learn it, that it is not connected with an articulated language, but only something that appears to us as such. But then it is not the *imagined* usual human activity, if an articu-

clear - my "seems" would there be superfluous. But - according to the principles of immanent interpretation - only for this work.

lated language essentially belongs to it, as it is the case with ordering, reporting, etc. In our *imagination* the articulated language need not be *regularly* connected with the activity. This is one of the important point of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language.

Here one could refer to *PI* 207a, 4, where Wittgenstein says that the sounds the people utter are not superfluous. Savigny writes with regard to this remark: "If there is no regular connection between sounds and actions, then the gagging doesn't have *exactly* the same consequences as it does for us. (For us there is a regular connection.)" But, if there is no regular connection between sounds and actions, how can it be then a usual human activity?

If we interpret *PI* 207a, 1,2 in the way proposed above then also the "aber"¹² in the next sentence becomes clear. For there are two things we are to imagine:

- an explorer who *only watches*, and
- an explorer who furthermore *tries to learn* the language. Now it should be clear why at the beginning I made such a trouble about (Q). This question is *not* concerned with the problem in what circumstance we would be (*theoretically*) *justified* in saying that the people give orders, obey them, etc., but with the *circumstances*. The circumstances are also *different* with regard to the explorer. What he wants to say while watching may be different from what he wants to say while learning.

That for an observer it may only seem that the people are engaged in usual human activities

¹² It is not translated into English. The German text is: "Versuchen wir aber ihre Sprache zu erlernen, so finden wir, dass es unmöglich ist."

which are connected with an articulated language, bases on the fact that knowledge of the rules which characterize our use of language is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for following them.¹³ That the explorer registers that there is something wrong with the "language" of the people, must not be connected with his insight into the rules we follow. Here it is sufficient if he registers that he cannot - while trying to learn the language - take part in the games in the usual way. Then he can perhaps come to the result that the people do not have a language, that it only seemed so. That he cannot learn the language is neither the cause nor the reason for the unknown people's not having a language. On the contrary, for they have no language, there is nothing he can learn. But that he cannot learn it is the cause or the reason for his judging that they do not have a language. This point is similarly accentuated by Savigny: "Wittgenstein describes realistically in which way we find out that they do not have a language. (Before a philologist can get to grips with describing a living language he must first learn it.) But it has to be emphasized that the language fails as such because there is a lack of regularity, not because we cannot learn it."¹⁴

¹³ This is the point of Savigny's interpretation of the passages on rule-following in the *PI*. Cf. also: Savigny [1991].

¹⁴ The difference between Savigny's and my position in this point follows from our difference with regard to (Q). The difference is: for Savigny the "explorer" is the philologist, for me the "explorer" is the reader (Wittgenstein writes "you" in *PI* 206b). My point is that one should expect as little as possible from the explorer with regard to knowledge about the essence of language in Wittgenstein's sense. Cf. also: *TS* 213, p. 157.

Before I try to give an answer to the other two questions from the beginning, those concerning "interpret" and "system of reference", I want to draw attention to a section close to PI 206/207 that is in more than one respect similar to them. If the following emphasis of the resemblance is correct, then at least it is not true of (2) that "nowhere in the preceding text can even the vaguest hint" (Savigny) of (2) be found.

In PI 200 Wittgenstein writes:

"It is, of course, imaginable that two people belonging to a tribe unacquainted with games should sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess."

The "tribe" here corresponds to "the people" in the "unknown country" of PI 206. The games of the former correspond to the language of the latter; the game of chess corresponds to the giving, obeying, of orders etc. That games are unknown in the one corresponds to the fact that the people do not have a language in the other. "The common human way of acting"¹⁵ is then that the two people - *as we do* - sit - *as we do* - at a chessboard - *as we do* - go through the moves of a game of chess - *as we do* - and show the appropriate mental accompaniments - *as we do*. (That there is so much correspondence is, of course, not a surprising result, so that one could say: Look, here Wittgenstein created an example which resembles our life enormously. The correspondence is constructed.) In these circumstances, where there is for us as the observers ("if we were to see it" - my underlining) every-

¹⁵ Remember that this is the translation of "die gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise" which I prefer.

thing is as we are used to, we would of course say that the two people were playing chess.¹⁶ But what if we tried to play a game of chess with one of the two people?

Wittgenstein continues with *PI* 200:

"But now imagine a game of chess translated according to certain rules into a series of actions which we do not associate with a *game*—say into yells and stamping of feet. And now suppose those two people to yell and stamp instead of playing the form of chess that we are used to; and this in such a way that their procedure is translatable by suitable rules into a game of chess. Should we still be inclined to say they were playing a game? What right would one have to say so?"

There are at least two possibilities to interpret this passage. The first bases on the supposition that "those two people" are the "two people belonging to a tribe *unacquainted with games*" (my italics). Then, of course, they do not play in the second case.¹⁷ The second interpretation which seems possible, takes the "instead" literally: "those two people" play really, only not a form of chess we are used to. "Those two people" can then, of course, no longer belong to a "tribe unacquainted with games". The point of this interpretation is that we should not exclude that something really is a game even if it is far from resembling one. On the other hand something might not be a game

¹⁶ Perhaps the correspondences are so strong that one could not say that we *interpret* in such a case, if interpreting requires uncertainty.

¹⁷ This is Savigny's interpretation.

even if it looks exactly like one.¹⁸

Whichever interpretation one chooses influences the interpretation of the question at the end of the whole section. But independent of both is an interpretation of the answer Wittgenstein suggests to the preceding question: we would not be inclined to say they were playing a game. The visible differences, the superficial differences, are too strong. In this sense there is also no common human way of acting, no system of reference, no interpreting.¹⁹

But there are not only resemblances between *PI* 200 and *PI* 206/207. One important difference is that the examples given in *PI* 200 concern one token of behaviour, whereas it seems clear that in *PI* 206/207 types are meant. If Wittgenstein doesn't explicitly say at the beginning of *PI* 200 that in the tribe games are unknown, then the question whether what the two people are doing is playing or not would hardly be answerable at all. The cases would be "temporally

¹⁸ Baker/Hacker point out something in this direction, but without being very explicit. But the passage from *MS* 124, p. 206 which they quote shows the point very well.

¹⁹ With regard to the question at the end of *PI* 200: this question as distinct from the other only makes sense if the remark in the second sentence and the other question are not to be interpreted in the sense of "being justified to say that/whether they play chess". That is: only if "being justified to say" and "being inclined to say" are conceptually distinct. This is the difference I emphasized with regard to (Q). This difference is obscured by Savigny when he interprets the last question as: "Could one, and if so with what right, say ...".

under-determined".²⁰ In this view *PI* 206/207 are further elaborations of *PI* 200; here the answer is not impossible because there is not enough time for the "explorer". If observation is sufficient, then the observer has enough time to observe. The new element is: learning is emphasized, instead of observing.

But now to the questions: What does "system of reference" mean, and what does "interpret" mean? In which way could "system of reference" be used if (1) is correct? Here is a suggestion: We observe how the people carry on different activities and how, in the course of these activities, they utter different sounds. Or, we observe how they utter different sounds without carrying on any activities. We want to know whether at least some of the sounds they utter are orders, questions, etc. But we only observe tokens of activities and sound utterances. These are not enough for us. What we need are types, or schemata, namely types, or schemata, of sound utterances which are regularly connected with the people's other behaviour, that is with

²⁰ Baker and Hacker point in their exegesis to a passage from the "Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics", where Wittgenstein describes the case that God creates in a desert for two minutes a country resembling England in all details. Now the question whether what two people of this country are doing at one moment would be the same as what (at the same time, with the same behavior, etc.) two mathematicians in England are doing is, in principle, answered by Wittgenstein as follows: We could not say it, two minutes are too short; we would have to know what happened before and/or what will happen afterwards. This resembles the section before *PI* 200: "It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on which somebody obeyed a rule." (*PI* 199) Similar problems are the topic of *PI* 581-587. In *PI* 583 one finds a connection to the position of Baker/Hacker and Haller.

types, or schemata, of their behaviour. What we need is - a system of reference.

This interpretation is, of course, guided by the content of (1) and it does not show more than that one can give associations for "system of reference" which are in accordance with, or at least not contrary to, (1). Therefore the interpretation of "system of reference" is no *experimentum crucis* which could help us to justify a decision between (1), (2) and (3).²¹ But at least one difficulty connected with the given interpretation of "system of reference" should be seen. In this picture there seems to be no good place for the distinction between observing and learning, that is for the importance of this distinction with regard to the problem in question. This difference seems only to be one of the psychology of the explorer. What sounds more natural therefore is an interpretation of "system of reference" on the basis of (2). Our interaction with the people of an unknown country is that system, that is: that way of acting which is common both to them and to us.

To justify that (1) is correct and that (2) is not, that is to justify that (only 1) is correct, it is not enough to show that (1) is an appropriate interpretation, but furthermore that (2) is not. According to Savigny (2) is compatible with the text, because "interpret" in *PI* 206c has not to be interpreted as "translate".²² This position presupposes that "to interpret" is not the same as "to translate". But in the commentary on *PI* 207 one can read: "... trans-

²¹ "System of reference" does not seem to be an important problem of interpretation for the commentaries.

²² Savigny does not give reasons for this judgement.

lating is, according to (or after ? - R.R.) *PI* 201 nothing other than interpreting." So, we are saying that, according to *PI* 201, "to translate" is to be read as "to interpret", and if we ask now how "to interpret" is to be read, we hear that it is to be read as "to translate". That doesn't sound good.

In one sense of "translate" this cannot be taken to be the correct interpretation of "interpret" in *PI* 206c, even if it seems that this is exactly the point. In *PI* 23 one example of a language-game is: "translating from one language into another". But "a language quite strange to you" in *PI* 206b makes sufficiently clear that with "interpret" in *PI* 206c is not meant "translate" in the sense of *PI* 23. To play the game of translating from one language into another we have dictionaries, grammars, classical examples, specialists for special fragments, etc. But in this sense we simply cannot - *ex hypothesi* - (try to) translate the sounds of the people. But in this sense of "translate" "interpret" in *PI* 201 is also not to be interpreted as "translate". As far as "interpret" in *PI* 201 is to be interpreted as "translate", "interpret" in *PI* 206c is also to be interpreted as "translate". There is no conceptual change between these neighboring sections. According to *PI* 201 "interpret" is not that "which is exhibited in what we call 'obeying a rule' and 'going against it' in actual cases." In the situation described in *PI* 206b there is nothing we could call "obeying a rule" or "going against it", for the language is "quite strange to us". Here one can only interpret, based on the common human way of acting, as it is described in *PI* 200. A good translator, on the other hand, only chooses sometimes, but normally he follows the rule blindly. [Cf.: *PI* 219] That makes him a good translator. Before one becomes a good transla-

tor, one has to learn the language.

Let us summarize. (3) is too strong for interpreting *PI 206c*, for it is not made compatible with the whole section and its context. Whether (3) is fruitful for the interpretation of other passages was not discussed here.

Neither (1) nor (2) is excluded by the text. But the text itself is sufficiently unclear to make a decision between (1) and (2) difficult. But it was shown that (only 1) is too weak, and that the arguments against (2), which are given by Savigny, are not strong enough.

To come to a decision it seems appropriate to widen the context.²³ For instance *PI 54*, a section not mentioned in any of the commentaries, seems to bring (2) into trouble and to support (1) and (3).

Finally, no independent and *systematic* argument was given here. Both - the widening of the context and the systematic argumentation - go beyond my aim in this essay.²⁴

²³ Baker and Hacker see already in *PI 1*, a connection with *PI 206*. But the other passages they quote or point to are not useful for their position.

²⁴ An outline of a systematic argumentation along the lines of (2), which seems to me to be fruitful, is given in Meløe [1986].

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**Philosophical Investigations 293:
Private versus Public Beetles¹**

Some years ago when I read Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka's book *Investigating Wittgenstein* I found their "most surprising, and ... most controversial, thesis", the thesis of "Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism, that is to say, the claim that for Wittgenstein there really were private event-like experiences, including pains and other such sensations" [p. 265]. At first I simply considered this to be an original but absolutely wrong interpretation of the *Philosophical Investigations*. It seemed to be not just a *courageous but daredevil interpretation* - as E. v. Savigny said in his *Wittgensteins "Philosophische Untersuchungen"* [Vol. I, p. 344]. But meanwhile I have observed - perhaps my attentiveness for these things has grown - that this thesis meets with approval by quite some people. Among these people there are some philosophers I highly estimate. Hence the matter seems to me worth dealing with in a serious manner.

I'm not surprised by the fact that some people *accept this thesis* ascribed to Wittgenstein, but by the fact that this thesis is *ascribed to Wittgenstein*. Therefore in the following it is not my main goal to argue against anybody's conviction that there are - in a philosophical or psychological sense - private sensations but

¹ A shorter German version of this essay appears in the Proceedings of th Conference ANALYOMEN, Saarbrücken 1998.

to argue against the thesis that this is the opinion of Wittgenstein inasmuch as his *meta-physical* positions are involved. However, I will strengthen my argument in such a way that it also attacks the weaker thesis that Wittgenstein's texts and especially *PI* 293, are compatible with the opinion ascribed to Wittgenstein by the Hintikkas.

As we know, our problem is first and foremost connected with the *Private Language Argument*, and meanwhile it is a widespread opinion - and in this I am in accordance with the Hintikkas - that the *PLA* has no self-contained standing in Wittgenstein's philosophy but, primarily, is a consequence, an application, of the argument on *Rule-Following*, developed in sections 143-242. Therefore, the Hintikkas say, we have to answer the question: "what are the language-games that connect our talk of private experiences to their subject matter and hence lend this talk its meaning?" [p. 246] Well, this question asks for a special kind of language-games but, at the same time, it makes a nice presupposition: to assume that there are private experiences! Again I agree with the Hintikkas - and I think, we all do so - that, following Wittgenstein, private languages are impossible. The point of disagreement is: I am a disciple of the "received view" - as the Hintikkas call it [cf. p. 246] - according to which Wittgenstein has simultaneously shown that there are no *private* languages and no *private* experiences, whereas the Hintikkas think that there are private experiences, solely the language about them cannot be private, has to be public (and they think that this is Wittgenstein's opinion, too). Thus, their slogan is: Wittgenstein does not criticize the *Cartesian metaphysics* but the *Cartesian semantics* [cf. p.250].

We also agree that Wittgenstein does not deny that we are able to speak about our own sensations, e.g., our own pains - and we do it in our normal, common language. But Wittgenstein states no *ontological thesis* about the existence or non-existence of sensations but shares with all of us and outside of all philosophy the opinion that there are sensations. Then, we could reformulate the disputed point: I think that there are sensations but they are not private, whereas the Hintikkas believe that our sensations are private.

Now, it may appear as if our discrepancy solely consisted in my usage of the words 'my sensations' (or 'our sensations') and the Hintikkas' usage of 'private sensations' or 'my private sensations'. I will argue that these different ways of using 'private' generate an important discrepancy in the understanding of language-games, and I will start with Wittgenstein's introduction of the problem of private languages in *PI* 243: "But could we also imagine a language in which a person could write down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences - his feelings, moods, and the rest - for his private use? - Well, can't we do so in our ordinary language? - But that is not what I mean. The individual words of this language are to refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language." Here, Wittgenstein construes a certain situation connected with a lot of assumptions; since we already have read the whole *PI* we know that this situation is construed for the sake of argument and later on will be shown as impossible, but let us look more cautiously at these assumptions: (1) There are *inner* experiences, sensations; this may be regarded as an *ontological thesis* (however, the word *inner* is connected with our concept of a

man, an individual, a person and, therefore, at least in some philosophical conceptions the thesis is not purely ontological). (2) Everyone can know his own sensations, but (3) another person cannot know the sensations of this person - these are *psychological* or *epistemological* assumptions - in our traditional understanding. (4) Everyone can refer with words to his own sensations - this belongs to the *philosophy of language*. And also (5): another person cannot understand this language for she does not know the reference of these sensation words.

I have already accepted the first assumption - on inner sensations - , but now, in connection with the other assumptions these inner sensations are also *immediate, hidden, private* sensations. It seems to me that there is a big muddle around the words *inner, hidden, private*; in some arguments one of these words may be substituted by the others, in other arguments this cannot be done; sometimes one word is used to define the others, sometimes the reverse is the case, but without declaring the terms as synonymous.

Therefore, I regard it as useful to follow Anthony Kenny in distinguishing two ways of using 'privacy': one meaning is *inalienable, belonging to me solely* ("Another person can't have my pains.", PI 253), the other use is *not communicable* (not expressible), *verifiable by me solely* ("only I can know whether I am really in pain", PI 246).

"Another person can't have my toothache." - In this sense my toothache is private; but for everyday psychology it is also a hidden and inner state or event. Another person also cannot have my blood circulation or my foot though both are not psychological entities and my foot is not even internal and, at least sometimes, is

not hidden. Wittgenstein construes fictitious situations in order to imagine how, even so, it could be that another person has my pains, my blood circulation, my foot. But these constructions require another language-game; in this new language-game we could not characterize these events or states as *private*, neither, however could we characterize them as *my pains* etc. Now, when we realize that these are grammatical declarations we need not get more upset about the privacy of my toothache than about the privacy of my foot.

My blood circulation is hidden, especially: my blood circulation is hidden to *me*. But let us assume: "I discover that whenever I have a particular sensation a manometer shews that my blood-pressure rises. So I shall be able to say that my blood-pressure is rising without using any apparatus. This is a useful result." [PI 270] Neither the privacy (the concealment) of the blood circulation is a philosophical problem for us, nor is the assumed ability to perceive its increase by means of certain perceptions (at least not in this context).

Another person, however, needs the manometer to determine changes in my blood circulation for my blood-pressure as well as my sensations are hidden to him. But also my foot and other parts of my body are hidden to him. And: that I cannot reveal the blood circulation in the same way as the foot, again, is not the philosophical problem we are worried about. It is another thing with the sensations; now this hiddenness is not the same as the one of the inner organs and of their changes of state in contrast to the external ones. Here, *concealment* and *internality* means something else: while my blood circulation is also hidden to me, this is not the case with my toothache. If we really want to maintain this

divergent use of *concealment* and *internality* which has to guarantee that my toothache is not *hidden to me but to you*, then there exists - I think - only one possible solution: My sensations are not hidden to me because *I'm myself inside my body*.

I am sure that *this is not Wittgenstein's solution*. And, therefore, there cannot be a solution in the sense of Wittgenstein which resorts to language-games and at the same time asserts the privacy, internality, concealment of sensations. - With respect to the concept of *language-games* we can now give a more precise account of the divergence to the Hintikkas; as I can see, there are two possible lines of argument against the existence of a private language:

- (1) It is wrong that a person and only this person knows the sensations of this person and is able to refer to these sensations by means of language.

Therefore:

- (1.1) It is wrong that a person knows his/her own sensations and is able to refer to them by means of language.

or

- (1.2) It is wrong that one person cannot know the sensations of another person (or cannot refer to these sensations by means of language).

- (2) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to understand the language this person uses to speak about those sensations.

And following Wittgenstein's description of this language of sensations in PI 243, we can split this into:

(2.1) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person and, therefore, to understand this language.

or

(2.2) Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations and also that another person cannot establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person, another person can understand this language.

To put the position of the Hintikkas in its proper place we have to remember our agreement on the thesis of the impossibility of a private language. - By the way, the Hintikkas say: Wittgenstein "is not in reality arguing against the *possibility* of private languages in general, but against their *necessity* in the particular area of the language people use of their inner sensations and feelings". [p. 245, my italics] This would remarkably weaken their goal of argumentation. But at other places they speak clearly enough of the *impossibility* of a private language about sensations. [Cf. p. 242, 245] The main difference to the "received view" is the assumption that according to Wittgenstein "there really are private experiences, and there really are expressions naming them and referring to them" [p. 247]. But, to speak intersubjectively of these private experiences we need - as the Hintikkas say - a publicly available framework: the language about private experiences has to be a public language.

Thus, in our classification the position of the Hintikkas should be assigned to type (2): There are private experiences but another person can

understand the language a person uses to speak of them. - The further assignment to type (2.1) or (2.2) depends on the question of whether or not another person is able to relate the private experience of a person to the expressions used by that person to speak of his/her private experiences. For the Hintikkas again and again refer to *PI* 293, and since this passage is so beautiful let me quote it in its full length:

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means - must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the *one* case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that *he* knows what pain is only from his own case! - Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. - But suppose the word 'beetle' had a use in these people's language? - If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty. - No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is. That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." [*PI* 293]

In addition to this passage the Hintikkas declare that Wittgenstein criticizes the wrong semantical paradigm, the "model of >object and designation<", for this model "results in rele-

gating the putative representative relationships between sensation-language and sensations entirely to the realm of the private and thus in rendering these relationships otiose. It is the privacy of these semantical relations, not the privacy of what is represented by their means, that Wittgenstein is criticizing." (p. 250) Thus, since these relations between the sensations and the expressions of sensations are not private we can assign the position of the Hintikkas to type (2.2). (They argue that there is a special kind of public language-game which fulfills the task of correlating sensations and their expressions - the *physiognomic* language-games.²

The Hintikkas have a strategy of argumentation which makes attacks against them more difficult in two respects: on the one hand they state that Wittgenstein still holds the *Tractatus* thesis of the ineffability of semantics but is never willing to utter - a la *Tractatus* - nonsensical sentences about semantical matters. Thus - they say - we have to add Wittgenstein's "unspoken assumptions" [p. 252] in order to realize that Wittgenstein *if he were willing* to speak in a realistic mode on private experiences and their properties, could say, "there *is* an actual beetle in each person's box visible only to that person" (p. 248] "Of course we cannot say in language that sensations and their ilk are private, according to Wittgenstein. But this is not the problem. It is only one of the consequences of the ineffability of semantics. The real question is: Are those philosophers right who say that *there are no private experiences* according to Wittgenstein?" [p. 265] Here, to get involved in a dispute would mean to make

² Cf. Richard Raatzsch's essay on *PI* 244 in this volume.

ontological derivations from Wittgenstein's philosophy of language instead of rejecting the question: not because of the ineffability of semantics but because of the irrelevance of the question to this kind of philosophy of language. (And, by the way, if there were nothing else to criticize, then it would be enough to qualify this argument about the "unspoken assumptions" and the counterfactual speech about what Wittgenstein would do if he could do what he cannot do as highly un-Wittgensteinian - the Hintikkas may be right or wrong in their thesis on private experiences but this has nothing to do with the late Wittgenstein.)

The other difficulty - connected with this one - is that the Hintikkas criticize the "received view" because there "private experiences disappear from the picture" [p. 246], solely public behavior remains, whereas Wittgenstein's problem according to them is to say in what way it is possible to speak intersubjectively on private experiences within a public language-game. [Cf. p. 246, 247f.] Naturally, this would shift the topic of our discussion: the *privacy* of the experiences is assumed already, therefore, an attack on *private* psychological experiences challenges the existence of the psychological experiences. Thus, we have to be careful not to slip from the level of philosophy of language into making psychological, epistemological, ontological statements about the existence of experiences etc., and at the same time we have to be careful not to challenge the existence of psychological experiences together with the *privacy* of these experiences. (The reproach of behaviorism is not new: "The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the 'inner process'. What we deny is that the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of

the use of the word >to remember<. We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is." [PI 305] "'Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction? - If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a *grammatical* fiction." [PI 307])

Now, our argument against the Hintikka interpretation has to contain two things: on the one hand we have to attack the thesis that according to Wittgenstein there are private psychological experiences. And, when this is done and we are content with it, we cannot confine ourselves to it: We also have to challenge that our public language functions in the way the Hintikkas describe, for our result, after all, ought to be that the Wittgensteinian concept of a language-game is not neutral with respect to the question whether or not there are private psychological experiences.

Provided that we agree in the position that the question of the *privacy* of experiences is not to be put and to be answered as an epistemological or ontological question but as a question of philosophy of language - and this is what I will do in the following - we can start with PI 246: "In what sense are my sensations *private*? - Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. - In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain. - ... It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I am in Pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I *am* in pain?" [PI 246]

This could be the place, now, to show how Wittgenstein in the following passages argues against the privacy of sensations [cf., e.g., sections 247 - 252, 272 - 280] but I will concentrate on what the Hintikkas offer as evidence of the privacy of sensations. They quote *PI* 272: "The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else. The assumption would thus be possible - though unverifiable - that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another." [*PI* 2] I am sure this is *not* direct evidence for private sensations as the Hintikkas believe [cf. p. 265f.] but just the opposite: *if* there are private sensations of red and *if* they differ, then this does not play any role in our use of the word *red*. And this is not so because of our adherence to a certain conception in the philosophy of language but because in our language-game this distinction does not appear! And: if anyone believes that, e.g., red-green color-blindness plays a role in special language-games, he surely is right but should be reminded that this phenomenon can play a role just because it is not private.

And the Hintikkas also misinterpret *PI* 271, which is about the case suggested by Wittgenstein's fictitious opponent of someone who cannot keep in mind what the word *pain* means and therefore again and again calls different things *pain*. They believe that Wittgenstein wants to indicate "that comparisons between my own experiences at different times are also problematic" [p. 248]. But to take part in the language-game I neither need the ability to compare my recollections of private experiences nor methods to increase the accuracy of the comparison; Wittgenstein finishes 271 with: "a wheel that can

be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism" [PI 271].

I could present also other misunderstandings: assumed examples of private experiences or of the naming of private experiences [cf. PI 257, 261, 265, 270, 384] are misinterpreted by regarding the speech of the fictitious opponent as Wittgenstein's own position; often Wittgenstein uses words or phrases belonging to the opponent's usage for the sake of argument - and the Hintikkas regard this as acceptance of this usage; they regard Wittgenstein's willingness to speak of *inner* experiences as an admission of the existence of *private* experiences etc. [cf. pp. 249f., 259, 260f.].

And now, let us make - together with Wittgenstein - a concession to the opponent: there are private psychological experiences. What could be the public framework that gives the language community the possibility to speak of these experiences? The Hintikkas refer to PI 244: "How do words refer to sensations? - There doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word 'pain' for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions of the sensations and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour." [PI 244] The Hintikkas think that such language-games "can lend our talk of pains and other sensations its meaning" [p. 257] and say: "This is an apt example of one kind of public framework which ... enables

different persons to compare their respective sensations". [Ibid.] The last sentence which the Hintikkas quote from PI 244 - "They teach the child new pain-behaviour." - was strictly speaking too much; it goes together with the next sentence which they, for good reasons, did not quote: "'So you are saying that the word >pain< really means crying?' - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it." [PI 244] Inasmuch as the linguistic pain behavior solely is a substitute for the natural, spontaneous, pain behavior, it is not a report on pains, has not the state of a description. Wittgenstein gives us an example of drilling linguistic pain behavior, not of the comparison of private pains. If the original pain behavior of the child (and also that of the animal) can give us information about its pain then also the new one (which the animal cannot learn) can do it; but inasmuch as the new, linguistic pain behavior solely substitutes the old one, it cannot teach us *more* about the state of the child than the old. Therefore, if we liked to speak on the concealment of pains we should do this already with reference to the child's original pain behavior. And, if we here cannot find any philosophical problem we should not look for it in the case where the new behavior solely substitutes the old one.

We will not deny the existence of pains, nor do we in the case when the child has not yet mastered linguistic pain behavior. After all: If the child cannot say it, "but at least it could point to the place where it has the pains; if a child is able to cry so much then just as well it can point" - says Karl Valentin [p. 32 - my transl.]. Or is he wrong? He is wrong, if indisputably the child *has* pains but *does not know* them, and if the new pain behavior cannot teach us more about the state of the child but can

teach *the child* something, namely, to speak about its pains. ("William James, in order to shew that thought is possible without speech, quotes the recollection of a deaf-mute, Mr. Ballard, who wrote that in his early youth, even before he could speak, he had thoughts about God and the world. - What can he have meant? - Ballard writes: 'It was during those delightful rides, some two or three years before my initiation into the rudiments of written language, that I began to ask myself the question: how came the world into being?' - Are you sure - one would like to ask - that this is the correct translation of your wordless thought into words?" PI 342]

When the child has learned this linguistic pain behavior then the possibility arises of concealing or pretending pains by using forms of natural or linguistic pain behavior as signs, symptoms of pain. This is the child's socio-cultural learning (which the animal cannot acquire: for such behavior it lacks the proper surroundings). [Cf. PI 250] If privacy, concealment could play a role at all, then here. To learn to conceal or pretend sensations cannot change the *ontological* state of these pains but, perhaps, the grammar of the word *pain*. If someone thinks that this case could support the thesis of the privacy of sensations he is in disagreement with Wittgenstein, also in the case of pretence: "from a person's behaviour you can draw conclusions not only about his pain but also about his pretence." [LW, 1, 901]

We agree with the Hintikkas: the grammar of the word *pain* is "constituted by a language-game which essentially includes, over and above having certain sensations, also their normal spontaneous expressions" [p. 264] Nevertheless, here "having *certain* sensations" cannot indicate

a comparison whether or not the same (private) experience is given.

It is correct, also, that Wittgenstein in *PI* 270 (and elsewhere, too) rejects the question whether I have properly recognized my experience [cf. p. 264]. The Hintikkas go on with the following: "Before the correlation (between my sensations and the correlated public expression, Ph.) has been established, there is nothing to know or to make a mistake about. After it has been established, the connection between the public correlate and the sensation is not subject to epistemic mistakes, because it is a conceptual connection." [Ibid.] However, where error is impossible there truth and knowledge also are impossible! "It can't be said of me at all ... that I know I am in pain." [*PI* 246] I am in pain. - That I cannot be wrong in identifying my sensations, that is because I do not identify them! Therefore, from here you cannot clear the path to the comparison of sensations of different persons assumed as private and you cannot clear the way to the comparison of these sensations with public behavior.

Now, we can come back to the famous beetle example of *PI* 293. The Hintikkas argue: "Our opponents could try to defend their position by saying that by a rejected private object they mean something that is *logically* impossible for others to witness. But suppose it were logically impossible for others to see my beetle in my box, but that I could compare it with public beetles outside the box. Why could I not then speak of my beetle and also of yours? ... it is compatible with Wittgenstein's ideas to imagine ... a situation in which each person has access only to his or her own beetle, but that beetle-owners can nevertheless happily converse with each other about their pets by relating their

own beetle to suitable public objects of comparison." [p. 266] And as an answer to the objection that in this case it would be impossible for the other to verify my comparisons of my private beetle and the public beetles they declare: "There are public ways of checking my skill and veracity in making such comparisons, such as testing my eyesight, calling character witnesses, administering lie detector tests, etc." [Ibid.] Well, these public control procedures exist just there where I am comparing *public* beetles with each other, and not in the case of comparing them with my *private* beetle. And: with one exception the examples of control procedures are procedures of testing my *veracity*; I am sure, there are many everyday situations in which it is useful to know whether or not somebody is sincere, but this is not the way to solve *philosophical* problems. Isn't it a quite ridiculous proposal to test my eyesight? As if I, perhaps, could see the public beetles blurred solely and as if because of this all the philosophical trouble occurred - or do they really want to test my aptitude to see sharply my inner, private beetles?!

However, more important is another thing: *there are no public beetles!* The Hintikkas still have the aim of upholding the distinction between my private sensation of pain and my public pain behavior. No doubt, both are conceptually connected, but if there were no difference the private sensations of pain would get lost. This must be true for another person too, so that I can compare my *private* pain sensations with his *public* pain behavior, solely, and not with his *public* pain sensations. Let me remind you, Wittgenstein's construction is: "Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a 'beetle'. No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is

only by looking at *his* beetle." [PI 293] Let us not be seduced by the fact that we indeed know various public beetles, may-bugs, lady-birds, stag-beetles, etc.; and if someone comes back from the forest and tells us about a beetle never seen before, then there really is a framework which allows us to put the right questions. But in Wittgenstein's example it has to be no lie, naturally, when everybody says, he knows what a beetle is, only by looking at *his* beetle.

Therefore, the following interpretation is misleading at least: Eike von Savigny who gives an interpretation of PI 293, with which I agree on all other points, argues on the section 293-sentences "Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing." [PI 293] with the following words: "A continually changing thing cannot be distinguished from a series of different things, and the box - sometimes or always - could be empty, for what the argument can set forth for any series 'beetle - fly - bee - louse - ...' it can also set forth for the series 'contains a beetle - contains a fly - contains nothing - contains a louse - ...' etc." [Savigny, p. 342 - my transl.] It is correct that a changing thing, different things and nothing in the box may play the same role - and here, together with Wittgenstein and for the sake of argument, we speak in a realistic manner - but then if I were looking into my inside I could not distinguish the changing thing from different things and, therefore, if I have no reasons to exchange the names for the changing thing, I also have no reasons to name the different things by different names *beetle*, *fly*, *bee*, etc. These different names used by Savigny indicate the possibility of a comparison with outer things. Just this, howev-

er, cannot be done.

To avoid such misunderstandings let us call what we are talking about not *beetle* but *teeble*. Another person tells me: "My teeble is sharp." (Compare, at least in German: "Ein spitzer Schmerz" - "A sharp pain".) And I ask him: "*Sharp* like what? Like a needle? At one end or at both?" Here something goes wrong! The correct answer would be: "*Sharp* in the mode as *teebles* sometimes are." But in our example this answer is not permitted for I have to compare my private *teeble* with outer *beetles* or other outer things. Therefore, it is also not permitted to answer "*Sharp* like your *teeble* the other day." for I cannot compare my private *teeble* with your private *teeble*. - Nevertheless, I like these answers and, therefore, let us turn the whole matter upside down: these answers are permitted, for we know many *teebles*, especially, I know yours. The pains are not private, are not hidden, but, naturally, they exist! And often we know the pains of another person, though *he* sometimes hides them, for: what he cannot do is to hide his pains *systematically*! - This is a *grammatical* declaration.

Now, let me sum up my argument: I assigned the position of the Hintikkas to type (2.1) "Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations another person is able to establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person and, therefore, understands this language". I argue that this position is wrong; I will not argue against type (2.2) "Although it is true that every person knows just his/her own sensations and also another person cannot establish the referential relation between the expressions this person uses and the sensations of this person, another person can understand this

language". I had logical reasons, solely, to present this mysterious position. Thus, I plead for type (1), especially I sustain position (1.2) "It is wrong that another person cannot know the sensations of a person"; then - together with other premisses - it can be concluded that (1.1) "It is wrong that a person knows his/her own sensations and is able to refer to them by means of language" itself is wrong - I am able to refer to my sensations *because* other persons according to (1.2) can do it. But, this discussion needs another paper.

Finally, if my interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language is correct, then Wittgenstein's position in the following sense is not neutral with respect to the thesis that there are private psychological events or states: There is no argumentation about the formation and the functioning of language-games which uses this thesis and is compatible with Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. - Certainly, one could keep up the "thesis on Wittgenstein's metaphysical Cartesianism" if he were to add that this is one of Wittgenstein's private, hidden attitudes.

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**Philosophical Investigations, 244:
"Physiognomic language-games?"¹**

In chapter 10, "Wittgenstein on Private Experience" [pp. 241ff.], of their book *Investigating Wittgenstein* Merrill and Jaakko Hintikka try to elaborate a view according to which the late Wittgenstein adopts a Cartesian point of view with respect to metaphysics. The remarks on "physiognomic language-games", which are also in some respect a topic of chapter 11, "Differences and Interrelations among Language-games in Wittgenstein" [pp. 272f.], play an important *constructive* part in the argumentation in favour of this thesis. In this paper I shall discuss these remarks on "physiognomic language-games" and attempt both an internal (I) and an external critique (II).

I

In order to demonstrate the fallacies of the "received interpretation", the object of the Hintikkas' critique, it is useful to remind

¹ Earlier versions of this paper were discussed at colloquia in Bielefeld and Konstanz (both Germany). I must thank the participants for their helpful comments. Mr. Peter Philipp (Halle, Germany) helped not only with critique but especially with his essays *Schmerzen, physiognomische Sprachspiele und das Privatsprachenproblem* (Halle 1990) and *PU 293: Private vs. öffentliche Käfer* (Halle 1991, forthcoming in the Proceedings of the ANALYOMEN-Conference held in Saarbrücken 1991. See also his essay in this volume). In the text I will refer to Hintikka [1986] with number of pages only.

ourselves of section 293. It goes as follows:

"293. If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word "pain" means -- must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?

Now someone tells me that *he* knows what pain is only from his own case!-----Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle.---Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.---But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in the people's language?---If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all; not even as a *something*: for the box might even be empty.---No, one can 'divide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant."

The Hintikkas quote next the two last passages (b, c) of this section and write "that the private object (the beetle, the sensation) drops out of semantical consideration according to Wittgenstein *only when the semantics of sensation-talk is construed on an incorrect model. ...* It is the privacy of these semantical relations, not the privacy of what is represented by their means, that Wittgenstein is criticizing. (*Sensations are private; sensation-language cannot*

be.)" [p. 250.]²

With the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" the Hintikkas mean "the model of reference unmediated by any language-game." [p. 254] Now, the physiognomic language-games are - by definition - language-games and not an aspect of the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'". Therefore, the object belongs as relevant to the discussion. The beetle-game's need for some "foundation" other than that of the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" is at the same time a demand for the self-sufficiency of this "foundation", that is, a demand for the independence of the situation described in section 293. [Cf. also pp. 273ff and 278f..] If one could find such a "foundation", it seems, one could also compare private beetles in a public way.

The most important textual evidence upon which the Hintikkas base their argument for a constructive aspect, is section 244. Wittgenstein writes:

"244. How do words refer to sensations?---there doesn't seem to be any problem here; don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names? But how is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up? This question is the same as: how does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?--of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility: words

² A remark in passing: the Hintikkas interpret the functional relationship given by Wittgenstein by assuming that, if Wittgenstein accepts other models than that of "object and Bezeichnung" this would de facto be enough to ascribe to him the acceptance of the object as relevant and belonging to the discussion, which opens the way to an ascription of a Cartesian position.

are connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then the adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"---On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it."

Here the Hintikkas only quote the first passage (a), where they find "Wittgenstein's first and foremost example of 'how words refer to (more accurately: 'are related to', in German *beziehen sich auf*) sensations'" [p. 257]. It is decisive for the Hintikkas that here we deal with a conceptual or "grammatical" relation and not with a contingent one between the sensation and the spontaneous pain-behavior, such as the sensation's "natural physiognomic correlate" (p. 258). "Such a framework of spontaneous expressive behavior (including facial expressions, gestures, and other bodily movements), will be called physiognomic framework and a psychological language (or language fragment) based on it will be called a physiognomic language." [Ibid.]

Now we can look at the characterization of pain the Hintikkas find in section 244a. (I take it as a definition and call it "DEF-H".)

DEF-H

"..., a sensation is an instance of pain, if it is of the kind that typically goes together with what is normally taken to be, and is responded to, as pain-behavior." [p. 257]

To say that *x* typically goes together with *y*, which is normally taken to be, and is responded to, as *z*, presupposes - as the words "typically"

and "normally" typically and normally are used - that there can be *atypical* and *abnormal* cases. If we exclude that x cannot go together with y and/or with non-y, and/or if we exclude that y cannot be taken to be, ..., z and/or non-z, then we would typically and normally have no reason to use the words "typically" and "normally". But how does this fit with the so-called logical, conceptual, or "grammatical" relation between x and y/z that the Hintikkas are speaking about? Would it not be more prudent and advisable to speak only about something like a statistical relation?

Since we want to be a bit more exact here, let us transfer the parameters explicit in section 244 onto DEF-H (and call the result, as a variation of DEF-H, "VAR-1").

VAR-1:

"..., a *child's* sensation is an instance of pain, if it is of the kind that typically goes together with what *adults* normally take to be, and what *adults* normally respond to, as a *child's* pain-behavior."

But here it seems as if that which is taken by the adults to be a child's pain-behavior might not really be pain-behavior. Of course, we know such things from adults: for example the presence of pain. But it could also be that real pain occurs without there being any pain-behavior. Of course, we are also familiar with this: the concealment of pain. Finally it could happen that there are both pain and pain-behavior, yet the adults do not take them as such. And neither is this strange to us: sometimes we err in identifying the behavior of others. However, if only one of these things is possible we cannot say that the physiognomic language-games connect our psychological vocabulary with our private sensations, but only that they typically and

normally do so. With respect to certainty there is no longer any conceptual difference (only, perhaps, a statistical one) between the physiognomic language-games and those language-games for which the physiognomic ones should function as a foundation. One question arises here: What, then is the criterion according to which we can distinguish between the normal and typical cases on the one hand and the abnormal and atypical cases on the other? It is clear that the physiognomic language-games cannot function as such a criterion if we take DEF-H or VAR-1 as in any relevant sense defining or characterizing them. Shouldn't we, then, better take

VAR-2:

"... a child's sensation is an instance of pain, if it is of the kind that goes together with what adults take to be, and what adults respond to, as a child's pain-behavior."?

Here it seems that none of the above doubts can arise. Indeed, this characterization fits much better with the Hintikkas' thesis about "the incorrigibility of primary language-games" [p. 279f.]. Can we then generalize VAR-2 into

VAR-3:

"... a sensation is an instance of pain, if it is of the kind that goes together with what is taken to be, and responded to, as pain-behavior."?

But also this formula cannot be valid, because it seems now that *all* pain-behavior - including that of the adults, who we know to be capable of pretending pain - forces us to accept a pain-sensation. Whatever nice results VAR-3 may possibly bring us, the costs incurred should not be so high as to require that we forget nearly all we know and nearly all we are certain about, when it was just these things which forced us to

look for a "foundation" in the first place. Why do the remarks in section 293a,b seem to be so powerful? Simply because we do encounter things like the *adults'* simulation and concealment of pain-sensations, and because we know that *adults* can err while identifying the mental processes and events of other *adults*. We cannot check the adult's utterance "I am in pain!" as we can check his utterance "The cat is on the mat!". There is at least an epistemic difference between an adult's toothache and cats on mats. Of course, not everything that looks and sounds like a cat on a mat is really such. But there are at least some well-known and generally accepted procedures to find out whether something that looks and sounds like a cat on a mat is what it seems to be. Both cats and mats are visible things which we can take in our hands. Are pains visible entities? Of course not. We can have pain in our hands, but cannot take pain in our hands. And this is why it is so easy to simulate or to hide pain, if we want or are forced to do so. As candidates for simulation and concealment cats on mats are not very suitable. Much better are beetles in boxes. Both however, are more suited for these purposes than a child's pain!

The absence of the parameters explicit in section 244 in the Hintikkas' characterization of pain allows us to bring two different cases under one definition; but we have to pay the price of losing the differences which allowed us to take the one case as the "foundation" of the other.

If we cannot make the step from VAR-2 to VAR-3, does this mean that we have indeed two concepts of pain, one for children and another for adults? Don't we also talk about the child's milk teeth and the adult's (mature) teeth? Also

the Hintikkas say that Wittgenstein on the one hand favors physiognomic language-games but, on the other, does not exclude other public frameworks for our talk about private sensations. In particular he does not exclude the possibility of physiological correlates of different sensations as a public semantical system of coordinates [cf. pp. 273ff.]. If different sensations can have different physiological correlates - and for them to be useful as a public system of coordinates they must be different, otherwise different sensations could not be publicly identified as such - shouldn't we then also say that physiologically different teeth are correlated with different sensations, a milk tooth with a milk tooth-pain and a (mature) tooth with a (mature) tooth-pain? Suppose that such a state of affairs were possible. Which concept of pain would the adults teach the child, or at least try teach it? Isn't it just a happy chance that the child learns from the adults' teaching precisely the concept which is most fitting for both its private sensation and the physiological correlate thereof. And isn't this just such a happy chance as the one whereby we find openings in the cat's skin precisely where the cat has eyes and ears?

No, I believe the physiological correlates cannot help us out of the difficulties which the physiognomic correlates led us into. They only create new ones. It is not only that the whole story sounds strange - the question arises whether we have any good pictures available in the cases of pain in the head, in the foot, in the neck, etc. Of course, one could say now that no *such* physiological correlates were meant but instead something in the brain. That may be so, but one thing is clear: this is not very public, at least not in the situation described in section 244. And finally: before we can use

physiological correlates as a public system of coordinates we have to clarify whether sensation x belongs to the physiological state s (and/or process p) or not. This has to be done in a public way, otherwise we would have what the Hintikkas do not want: a private relation between the public sensation-vocabulary and the private sensation.

Let us then put the physiological correlates aside and try to find the place where our problem arose. This place has to be found between section 244, section 293, and the Hintikkas' characterization of pain.

II

Remember what made the situation described in section 244 so interesting for the Hintikkas that they gave it an own name. It was the search for something that could play the role which the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" played in their eyes in section 293. The problem with the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" was its character as a "model of reference unmediated by any language-game." Was it then Wittgenstein's mistake in section 293 to speak about the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'" instead of the "model of the private (making of the) relation between 'object and Bezeichnung'"? Of course, for the Hintikkas pain is still a (private) entity and "pain" a (public) Bezeichnung, a (public) name for these "private innards" (v. Savigny). Section 244 gives us a public language-game, which can, as it seems to the Hintikkas, function as a foundation for preventing the objects from dropping out of consideration as they do in section 293. In the words of the beetle-game the Hintikkas can say that we can talk about, describe, and compare the (private)

beetles in our boxes because we have learnt in another public game how to describe, how to talk about, how to compare public beetles. Also we can now behave as if there weren't really a beetle in the box and can, if there really were none in it, behave as if there were. And we can behave as if we behave as if there were not really a beetle in the box, etc..

Suppose now that Wittgenstein's expression in section 293c is correct, that is, he means what he says when he speaks about the "model of 'object and Bezeichnung'". The first consequence is that "the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant." Whatever "pain" means, it does not stand for a private object. That means that pain-behavior can no longer be a physiognomic correlate of a private object. Does that mean that there is only pain-behavior left? Do the differences we were certain about - the differences between honest and dishonest pain-behavior, between spontaneous and reflected pain-behavior, between the child's and the adult's pain-behavior - disappear, drop out of consideration?

We do not doubt whether a *child* is in pain when it has hurt himself and is crying. But do we doubt in *each* case in which an *adult* has hurt himself and is crying? If reflection is possible and/or necessary in such situations, then this is normally and typically¹ no reflection of whether the adult is really in pain, but it is reflection on our possibilities to help or to express our sympathy in an effective way.

¹ "Typically and normally" in the sense above, for there are circumstances in which we primarily reflect whether the adult is really in pain or not.

When do we doubt? We doubt, for example, when the adult is crying like someone who has hurt himself, without having visibly hurt himself. We doubt only in special situations, not in general. In these special situations we interpret the behavior that closely resembles pain-behavior; and in this interpretation we sometimes err. In other situations we do not doubt, we do not interpret, we simply react, help, or express our sympathy. Sometimes we don't even know what it would be to doubt whether the other is in pain or not. Whoever doubts in these situations must have other concepts of pain than the ones we have, or must be in confusion.

The child's spontaneous pain-behavior and our reaction to it play indeed a special role in the variety of our uses of our pain-vocabulary. It is just one of the situations in which children are learning these uses. It is not the only situation to have this character. There are others in which children learn what it means to simulate or hide pain. There are lots of such situations, changing from time to time and place to place. But it is in no, or only a few, cases primarily the description of pain which the children are learning here. Much more important is to learn how to behave in the case of one's own pain and, in the case of another's pain, how to help, how to express sympathy, etc. That is the way people are. That is the point of section 244. To repeat the quotation of that passage from section 244 which is not quoted by the Hintikkas:

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?'"---On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain *replaces* crying and *does not describe it.*" (My emphasis - R.R.)

As far as knowing that another is in pain and as

far as descriptions play a role, we often know whether the other is in pain or not and what pain it is. As far as knowledge plays a role at all in connection with being in pain it is the pain of the other we (can) have knowledge about. With respect to my being in pain it is false and senseless to say "it is only from my own case that I know what the word 'pain' means" [section 293]. In this sense - the sense in question here - pain is not private.

The Hintikkas are right, I believe, in criticizing a tendency in the literature according to which there is a wide gap between the Wittgenstein of the *TLP* and the Wittgenstein of the *PI*. I also agree with the Hintikkas when they write that what they call vertical relations between language and world do not drop out of Wittgenstein's interest. But in the Hintikkas' specific interpretation of the *Tractatus* and its relation to the later philosophy it seems to be necessary to find an analog for what allowed in the early philosophy the analysis of the proposition's real logical form. If we take the picture of the vertical relations between language and world seriously, we could say that, according to the Hintikkas, the pain, the private sensation, is at the bottom. Superimposed upon it comes the physiognomic language-game, while at the top are the secondary language-games. Following this picture, the physiognomic language-game has to play the role of the *Tractatus*' *Elementarsatz*.

But if we take pain to be not a private, that is an inner and for the others hidden, entity, the physiological language-game can no longer play the role of a mediating language-game. It was my aim to show that they cannot play this role even if we let the question about the nature, or the

essence, of pain remain open. At least they cannot play this role in the way the Hintikkas handle the problem. But if we take pain to be not a private entity then there is also no longer any reason, nor any attractiveness in my view, to take the situation described in section 244 to be a (self-sufficient) *language-game*. Then the view is open to see that this situation is no language-game at all, but belongs to the one game with the word "pain".

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How not to speak on Wittgenstein and Social Science

I

In an article entitled "Wittgenstein and Social Science", Roger Trigg writes: "Our ability to reason about reality lies at the root of our intellectual endeavor. Yet it is an ability put in grave doubt by the later Wittgenstein. In rooting our reason in society, he made it impossible to reason about society" (Trigg [1991], p. 222, in the following quoted with number of page only.). Despite the "vast influence in the field of social science" [p. 209], of the work of the later Wittgenstein, it "adds up to a direct onslaught on the very possibility of rationality" [p. 219]. This is strong criticism. If it is correct, it should at least help social scientists to get rid of that philosophy they have mistakenly taken to be important for their field. But is this criticism correct?

Trigg's argument, as I take it, runs as follows: Wittgenstein's later philosophy is incompatible with the possibility of a proper social science; there is or at least should and could be a proper social science; therefore this philosophy must be abandoned. (Notice that the "proper" is important insofar as *there is* a social science vastly influenced by the late Wittgenstein. This science is, of course, not made impossible by Wittgenstein's philosophy).

The argument rests on a view of a proper social

science on the one hand and on a view of Wittgenstein's so-called later philosophy on the other hand. The latter must be abandoned because it does not fit the former, not because it is false in itself. In this article I will first take a closer look at Trigg's views of a proper social science (section II). Secondly, I will look at how he views the later Wittgenstein (section III), in order finally to discuss whether Trigg's criticism meets Wittgenstein (section V). However, before I do that I will briefly examine Trigg's own views, asking whether he presents an attractive alternative at all (section IV). The final section of the article will investigate whether there are any points in Trigg's critique of Wittgenstein which may help to elucidate the importance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy for the social sciences, even if Trigg's criticism is not acceptable. In sections II and III I will quote Trigg extensively, because his remarks are themselves good examples of propositions which Wittgenstein criticized.

II

For a clearer presentation of Trigg's account, I shall group his remarks into three sections. In his article they are not divided in this way.

(i) The first condition for the possibility of knowledge and science in general is, according to Trigg, that there is a difference between subject and object. "There is a difference between knowledge and reality. The latter is the proper object of knowledge, but the subject of knowledge, the person who knows, must remain distinct" [p. 220]. Without this difference there is no possibility of an objective truth.

Trigg speaks about "the natural picture of the situation ... according to which we can each think clearly and have determinate experiences apart from our ability to use language" [p. 209]. Our concepts are "based on individual private experience" [p. 210]. Our thoughts and feelings are then independent of language, which may be a social institution. Reality is self-subsistent and "in no sense dependent for its existence on our interaction with it. We can discover it, but do not create it. ...If I see a lion, I can assume that it has an independent existence, and is not the product in some peculiar way of my conceptual scheme" [p. 209f.]. On the other hand the subject is itself independent. "Similarly I myself have a real existence, and do not need to have been inducted into the practices of a society to see the lion for what it is and react accordingly" [p. 210].

(ii) Also for "knowledge to be possible in the field of social science, the nature of a society, or social reality, has to be regarded as distinct from the investigator." [p. 220] In a similar way this is also valid for the physical sciences, as the case of quantum mechanics shows. The general problem is that "an observer who is continually interacting with a system cannot observe it in the detached way necessary for the acquisition of knowledge" [Trigg, p 220]. So, for the sake of human rationality and knowledge there must be "the possibility of unprejudiced reason" [p. 218]. But now we must accept that all investigators are themselves members of a society. The problem of the necessary distinction between object and subject thus becomes a "perpetual problem in social science" [p. 220]. "No one, even in the name of science, can step outside every society and abandon every presupposition" [p. 220]. Yet, for the sake of human rationality in the field of social sci-

ence, "we will no longer take its (i.e. society's - R.R.) assumptions for granted, or uncritically apply its concepts" [p. 220]. We have "to grasp the concepts of a society and simultaneously to distance ourselves from them" [p. 220].

According to Trigg, the "unprejudiced reason" which is not constrained by any language-game allows us to understand both our own society and other ones, and so to avoid ethnocentricity. In the first case the possibility of "unprejudiced reason" is necessary because there is, for instance, the possibility that "the real workings of a society may not be properly perceived by its members" [p. 221]. There may be 'false consciousness' and unforeseen consequences of people's actions. Social reality is more than just the individuals' thoughts and feelings. "Otherwise everything would be apparent at the surface of society and there would be little need for social science" (Trigg, p. 222). Whereas this is also valid for other societies, in whose case the "unprejudiced reason" is furthermore necessary simply because we cannot assume that the members of another society under investigation share concepts which are identical to ours. They often do not, as we know. Investigating our own and other societies with an "unprejudiced reason" enables the social scientist to criticize rationally the investigated societies, to direct the attention of their members to the discovered unintended consequences of their actions, and perhaps "to strengthen the institutions of a community, assuming there are good grounds for their existence" [p. 220].

(iii) Where could social scientists find foundations for such an important "unconstrained and unprejudiced reason"? It is metaphysics which provides them with it. It seems that Trigg takes empiricist philosophy to be the appropriate

metaphysics.

III

These are the basic insights we must accept, according to Trigg, to explain how a proper social science is possible. And all these insights are denied or questioned by the later Wittgenstein.

[i] The "natural picture" did not find favour with Wittgenstein. As Trigg says, instead "of the private he emphasizes the public, and instead of the individual he stresses the social. Concepts are not based on individual private experience, but are rooted in our social life which of its nature is shared publicly" [p.210]. "Both the nature of private experience, and of an objective world, was deemed to depend on concepts all could share" [p. 209]. The source of our concepts is society. "Nothing I think or say about myself and the world is determinate until it has been mediated by the rule-governed practice of our shared life" [p. 210]. "There is no possibility of conceding that one person may be right and everyone else wrong" [p. 216]. Therefore, Trigg concludes, there is no place in Wittgenstein's later philosophy for a distinction between subject and object, for the notion of an objective truth, or for the necessary distinction between the observer and the object under observation.

[ii] There is also no place for an "unconstrained and unprejudiced reason" in Wittgenstein's later philosophy, because "we can never get outside all language-games and talk rationally, just as it is never possible to reason properly beyond the limits of language" [p.

218]. We can reason whether a player is playing a game, following its rules correctly or not, but we can never reason about the game and the rules themselves, because that would mean to leave the game itself. This "attack on reason is devastating, We cannot abstract ourselves from (society) in order to reason about it" [p. 212].

Since we are bound to the language-games, Wittgenstein cannot distinguish between the intended and the unintended consequences of our actions - in fact, he cannot even pose that question. Furthermore, Wittgenstein's philosophy does not allow us to understand a society with other games than ours, except through a process where the investigator becomes himself a member of that society, thus losing his status as an investigator. This philosophy, says Trigg, "implies that the only way to understand a cannibal society is to be a cannibal" [p. 220]. Furthermore, "whether or not forms of life are derived from anything beyond themselves, they cannot be explained or justified. They are just there even if they are an expression of human nature. One cannot reason about them, because reasoning can only take place within a particular context" [p. 212]. "Wittgenstein's stress on the fact that we must accept language-games as given involves a repudiation of any idea ... of providing a rational foundation for activities and practices. Philosophy has to leave everything as it is" [p. 215].

"On this view genuine social science cannot get behind people's understanding of what they are doing, but can only lay bare the conceptual rules they follow" [p. 215].

[iii] "The view of philosophy as the mere classification of concepts not only emasculates it as a discipline. It also removes the possibility of giving proper (sic!, see above under I -

R.R.) foundations to other parts of human intellectual endeavor. The role of human reason itself is downgraded when metaphysics is dismissed" [p. 216]. Sociology and philosophy "seem to merge". "The search for meaning forces sociology away from the scientific ground" [p. 215].

IV

Before looking into whether Trigg's critique meets Wittgenstein, it seems appropriate to examine Trigg's own philosophy of science, or metaphysics. This examination will be restricted to the first two points of section II. Paragraphs (iii) and [iii] will be discussed in section V.

(i') In which sense is reality "in no sense dependent for its existence on our interaction with it"? Let's take some plebeian examples. A book about Wittgenstein is surely in many ways dependent for its existence on our interaction with some parts of reality. And so are ships, houses, music-boxes, and many other things. We can discover them, but we also create them. In *this* sense many things are dependent as well as created by us.

But that is not the sense which Trigg has in mind. He is perhaps speaking about reality in itself, or reality in general, or reality as a whole. Whatever that may be, and in whatever way it is not dependent and not created by us, social scientists simply do not investigate reality in itself, or reality in general, or reality as a whole. Social scientist investigate the ways people build and observe houses, build ships, and use music-boxes. What should be explained, then, is at least how these plebeian parts of ordinary reality are linked to reality

in itself. Because in most cases scientists are not in doubt in which sense something is (in)dependent, and (not) created. And where they are in doubt, they normally try to develop scientific methods and criteria for deciding the question.

What about the lion: it is of course not reality in itself, but perhaps, as a member of a natural kind, it is somewhat closer to reality than our examples of artificial products? What I can assume when I see a lion (as well as when I see a house) may be debatable. But what is it to "react accordingly without being inducted into the practices of a society"? If somebody sees a lion in the zoo and runs away, crying for help - is that person then seeing the lion for what it is and reacting accordingly?

If the example of the lion is supposed to be an example of the philosophy favored by Trigg, it is a bad one. If it is a good example at all, then it is an example in favour of Wittgenstein. This becomes more obvious, even for the case of seeing, when one substitutes "a solemn ceremony in Westminster Abbey" for "a lion" in Trigg's proposition.

(ii') Is the proposition "x is in no sense dependent for its existence on y" (necessarily) the same as "x is distinct from y"? I am in at least one sense dependent for my existence on my father, but I am distinct from him. Yet my father and I belong still, so to say, to the same ontological realm. One can compare my father and me, whether there is, for instance, any resemblance in our appearances. One can also ask whether the fact that I am a mechanic is dependent on the fact that my father is a watchmaker. Maybe, and maybe not. And again, my father as a watchmaker and I as a mechanic

belong to the same ontological realm. But what if one would say: Music is in its existence both independent of and distinct from sugar beets? Here one could answer that music and sugar beets do not belong to the same ontological realm. And that would mean: one cannot compare it like one can compare fathers and sons, mechanics and watchmakers. There is no possibility for a relevant and meaningful comparison between music and sugar beets. (Here one could perhaps say that music is *in no sense* dependent for its existence on sugar beets. But then "in no sense dependent" is the same as "in no sense not dependent", and not the same as "independent", as this concept is normally used.) The moral: In order to be able to say that x is (not) dependent on/ (not) distinct from y we must relate entities that belong to the same ontological realm, that is, there must be a possibility for meaningful and relevant comparison between x and y. Otherwise the result is nonsense, or something like a grammatical proposition.

Now, do societies (the nature of societies, social realities) and investigators belong to the same ontological realm? If "society" is taken in the sense of "community" one can try to become a member of a society, but one cannot try to become a member of an investigator. That is not impossible, because it would be very hard for people to become members of an investigator. Hence, in "x is a member of y" there is no meaningful and relevant substitution for "x" with "y" representing "investigator" - as opposed to "society". Similar considerations can be made for "x is born in y", "x is happy in y", and others. (If we take "society" in the sense of "complex of social relations", instead of "community", the problem is much easier to solve.) The moral: a society (or the nature of a society, or social reality) does not belong to the same ontological realm as an investigator.

Therefore, to say that for knowledge to be possible in the field of social science, the nature of a society has to be regarded as distinct from the investigator is like comparing music and sugar beets.

Trigg speaks about observing a system in a detached way, because continually interacting with it would make the acquisition of knowledge impossible. But is this true? Is a watchmaker interacting with a clock when he turns it around, trying to see how it works? Or is this no interaction? Is he then interacting with the clock when he takes it apart? If this is interaction, it is by no means clear why he should not be able to observe the mechanism of the clock. On the contrary, to turn the clock around in your hands, or taking it apart, may well be necessary conditions for observing the clock with the aim of finding out how its mechanism works. Those who now feel like saying that a clock is not a system, should remember that biologists and chemists are interacting in many more ways with things that are paradigms for systems. And surely they acquire knowledge, even if it may be difficult to separate the influence of the scientist. But there are many different ways of interacting, some leaving this aspect of the system as it naturally is, some other aspects. In this sense, Trigg's remarks are simply false, and one does not have to be a philosopher of science to see that.

But things like these are surely not what Trigg has in mind. What he wants to stress are concepts of interaction and system, according to which a system would behave differently if we interact with it. And the interaction would render the system's normal behavior inexplicable. But taken in this way Trigg's proposition is like a part of an explaining theory with

concepts defined within the context of the theory. But then it is not clear how the theory could explain e.g. the example with the watchmaker given above. Alternatively, the proposition is a definition of a word. Such definitions cannot be judged as true or false, but as fruitful or not fruitful. For some cases at least, Trigg's definition is not fruitful, as we have seen.

What does it mean to say that we no longer take society's assumptions for granted? Which assumptions? All, or only some of them? If only some of them, one wants to know which of them, and why not the others. What could be the criterion? If all of them, we arrive at the Cartesian doubt. But what then about the "natural picture"? Can *each* individual think clearly, or only I? Do I have *different* determinate experiences, or only the experience that I know clearly that I am in doubt?

But again, that is surely not what Trigg means. Yet, instead of using ordinary words in a meta-physical manner, he now uses ordinary words in an ordinary manner, coupled with the "dialectical" phrase of "simultaneously grasping and distancing".

. v

Even if Trigg's metaphysics can be criticized as in the above section, he could well be right in his critique of Wittgenstein. So, let us take a closer look at it.

[i'] Trigg's remark that, according to Wittgenstein, concepts are *not* based on individual private experience, but *rather* on our social life, suggests that two different positions are

possible. It sounds as if there are two theses, and the social scientist, looking for proper foundations for his actions, could choose. But this picture is wrong. Neither are the two claims "on the same level", nor are both claims theses. Wittgenstein writes: "In what sense are my sensations private? - Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. - In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense" [PI 246]. In which sense is this false, and in which sense is this nonsense? The second part of the proposition beginning with "Well" is false. "If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain" [PI, 246]. The first part of the same proposition is nonsense: "It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain" [PI 246].

So one must make a distinction within Trigg's phrase of the "individual private experience": experiences are something that individuals have, but they are not private in the sense of the first part of Wittgenstein's proposition above. And this sense is the philosophically important sense for the "natural picture". One could well say that individual experiences are the basis for our concepts -- if that means that without individuals having experiences there would be no concepts. "..., of what object does one say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer" [PI 573]. But being able to have experiences and opinions means that an individual is able to master a social practice. Therefore I have just not thought or said even something indeterminate about myself and the world "until it has been mediated by the rule governed practice of our

shared life", as Trigg says. In this sense there is no stress on the social *instead* of the individual. But there is also no stress on the public *instead* of the private, when taken in the way we normally use "instead of". The concept of the mind as something private is nonsensical, not false. And therefore the remarks on the public character of mental states and processes are not a thesis which one could choose instead of the thesis that mental states and processes are private.

Is there a possibility in Wittgenstein's later philosophy to concede that "one may be right and everyone else wrong"? Notice first that this remark is imprecise. Who is "everyone else"? Is the question whether of three, four, or one hundred people with an opinion on question Q, one is or may be right and the other two, three, or ninety-nine are or may be wrong? Or is the question whether in a community one may be right and everyone else in that community may be wrong, whatever may be the question? Trigg himself points to PI 241 where Wittgenstein says: "So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?' - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the *language* they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life." In this sense there is no ground to surmise that it could not be the case that one is right in what he says and the other two, three, or ninety-nine are wrong. Rather more important for Trigg's position is the next section: "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments" [PI 242]. If some people were to measure the length of a table, and one said that it is 2 meters long, whereas the others said it is 3 meters long, it could well be the case that only the

one is right. But if there were no agreement at all whenever anybody would measure the length of the table, the procedure of measuring would lose its point. "...what we call 'measuring' is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement" [PI p. 242]. There is, then, surely the possibility in Wittgenstein's later philosophy that one may be right and everyone else may be wrong; but not in each case at every time in each question.

[ii'] Trigg's remark that we can never, according to the late Wittgenstein, get outside of all language-games and talk rationally, raises some questions. First, it seems to presuppose that we can never stay *inside* all language-games and talk rationally. That may well be. In other words, it could be the case that the predicate "rational" is not meaningfully applicable to all language-games and activities. For instance the language-games of singing catches, cursing, and praying, listed by Wittgenstein in PI 23, may belong to the group of such language-games. However a person prays, we will hardly say that he prays rationally or not rationally, but rather e.g. that he prays (not) intensely. But Trigg's remark, to make a point at all, must presuppose the stronger claim that we cannot stay in *any* language-game and talk rationally. For, if we could at the same time be in a language-game and talk rationally, the metaphysical foundation of an "unconstrained and unprejudiced reason" would lose half of its attraction. So, does Trigg's argument mean, for instance, that we cannot talk rationally while playing the games of describing the appearances of an object, or that of reporting an event, or speculating about an event, listed by Wittgenstein PI 23? Is Trigg saying that whatever a social scientist is doing when he describes the appearance of an object, reports an event, or specu-

lates about an event, he is *not* engaged in the language-games of describing, reporting, or speculating, because what he is doing may be rational? Do we then have two concepts of describing, reporting, and speculating? Or are the things done by the social scientist not real (or proper) describing, reporting, and speculating? Or, was it Wittgenstein's mistake to list reporting, describing, and speculating among the examples of language-games?

Is there a possibility for a distinction between an observer and the object observed in Wittgenstein's later philosophy? There is surely a distinction between a person describing an object's appearance and the object's appearance itself. And there are surely similar distinctions between a person giving a report of an event and the event itself; between a person speculating about an event and the event itself. If observing the appearance of an object, or of an event, is at least in some cases a condition for, or a part of, describing the appearance of an object, or of reporting an event, or of speculating about an event, then there is surely the possibility for a distinction between an observer and the object observed.

Trigg's criticism that, according to Wittgenstein, we can only reason about whether a person is playing a game (correctly) or not, but not reason about the game itself, rests on the distinction between, to put it this way, reasoning-in-games and reasoning-about-games. This distinction is important and it is correct to make it. But it is not a distinction that Wittgenstein could not accept. On the contrary, his philosophy is based on that distinction. He describes language-games, and their rules, he describes fictitious communities and their games (How could only this be possible in Trigg's

eyes?), he compares the language-games to games like chess, etc.

All these things are possible just because there is a difference between playing chess and describing chess or comparing it with giving orders, and they are necessary because "we do not *command* a clear view of the use of our words. - Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity" [PI 122].

In this sense there is without question the possibility of reasoning-about-games. But perhaps Trigg has another sense in mind. First, he might mean reasoning-about-causes-of-games. But even this is not excluded by Wittgenstein: "The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point if it frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no obvious reason" [PI 142]. And even a reasoning-about-the-rationality-of-games is not excluded by Wittgenstein: "But, after all, the game is supposed to be defined by the rules! So, if a rule of the game prescribes that the kings are to be used for drawing lots before a game of chess, than that is an essential part of the game. What objection might one make to this? That one does not see the point of this prescription" [PI 567]. "The game, one would like to say, has not only rules but also a point" [PI 564].

The next thing one should accept is that Wittgenstein, as seen by Trigg, is at least self-contradictory. However one interprets the remarks in *Culture and Value* (CV) - as conservative or not - one thing should be clear: at least some of them are by no means uncritical, or apologetic. One can distinguish between two forms of conservatism. One form is that everything should stay as it is: no changes, no experiments!, could be the motto of this form.

The other form of conservatism consists precisely of a demand for changes, not experiments of course, but a return to the way things used to be. The latter is *critical* with regard to the actual social reality, whereas the former is not necessarily critical. (It may be critical in the same sense as Churchill's slogan about democracy being the worst of all political forms, except for all the known ones.) If the remarks in *Culture and Value* (CV) express in any way a conservatism, then it is the latter kind, not the former. But this form of conservatism would not be compatible with the conservatism Trigg speaks about with reference to the concepts of language-game, form of life, etc.

In a similar way one could argue with respect to the compatibility between the later Wittgenstein and Marxism. It is by no means made clear by Trigg how that compatibility could be brought in accordance with the assumption of late Wittgenstein's apologetic for the language-games actually played, of the impossibility of criticizing these language-games.

Is Wittgenstein able to distinguish between intended and unintended consequences of our actions? Consider what he says: "The fundamental fact here is that we lay down rules, a technique, for a game, and that then when we follow the rules, things do not turn out as we had assumed. That we are therefore as it were entangled in our own rules.

This entanglement in our rules is what we want to understand (i.e. get a clear view of)." In these cases "things turn out otherwise than we had meant, foreseen." [PI 125] In this sense Wittgenstein is not only able to make the distinction, it is in his eyes in some respect a "fundamental fact".

But one could answer that Wittgenstein is con-

cerned here with cases where the players themselves feel that "things do not turn out as we/they had assumed." Does that mean that we can only register that there is something wrong with our rules in retrospect? That depends. In many cases, especially those of explicitly making explicit rules, we surely look whether things will turn out as planned when we follow them. Our ability to look forward may be restricted in this or that way, but nothing in Wittgenstein's later philosophy gives rise to a general skepticism in this respect. The point of interest to Wittgenstein is only whether we had played a game, when it turns out, for instance, that a game is no longer a game with a winner and a loser, because we found, after playing it over a long time, or after some deep investigations, that there is a way for the beginner to win each game.

Now, what about Trigg's statement that *understanding* a cannibal is, according to Wittgenstein, only possible by *being* a cannibal? Trigg's phrase is as nice as it is imprecise. "Understanding a cannibal society" may mean a number of things. The social scientist may try to find out where a cannibal society came from, what history it had, where it settled, what its members eat when they are not eating people, whether they eat people every day or only on special occasions, which family relations they have, how they build houses, whether they sing songs, pray, and curse, etc. None of these questions can be meant by Trigg, for otherwise his statement would lose its point as a critique of Wittgenstein. One must read "to understand a cannibal society" in the sense of "to understand how it feels to be a cannibal", "to understand how freshly cooked people taste", "to understand how it is to slaughter a fat old man", and the like. It is correct that it is hard to see how

one could understand such things just with the help of Wittgenstein's philosophy. But it is also hard to see why just these questions and not the former ones should be of the highest interest to social scientists. Perhaps poets are in a better position here. However, nothing in Wittgenstein's later philosophy forces us to doubt that the first questions could be answered seriously. Some statements in Wittgenstein's later philosophy do lead us to doubt that we can understand everything in the same manner as we understand the games we are engaged in. But again, the fact that we are unable to understand games in which we are uninitiated in the same way as we can understand games in which we are initiated, is not a philosophical thesis, but simply an observation which can be made by anybody who goes to an alien society. The point cannot be to accept this fact or not, but to give it the right weight.

But there is another aspect too. Read in Trigg's way, Wittgenstein's philosophy not only implies a strong *intercultural* relativism, but also a strong *intracultural* relativism. For describing a game of chess is not the same as playing chess. But if we are "bound to the language-game we actually play", then it is not clear how *describing* (a game of) chess could be describing (a game of) *chess*. To be consistent, Trigg should not only look at Wittgenstein as a cultural relativist, but as a cultural *solipsist*. But looking at Wittgenstein as a cultural solipsist excludes the possibility of looking at him as a cultural relativist, for even relativism is not expressible then.

[iii'] To say that the view of philosophy as the mere classification of concepts removes the possibility of giving proper foundations to other parts of human intellectual endeavor, presupposes, to be a critique at all, that the

other parts of human intellectual endeavor stand in need of foundations given by philosophy. For, one could answer Trigg by saying that Wittgenstein's philosophy surely removes this possibility - and helps in this way to lay bare the real (or "proper") foundations, if there are foundations at all. Trigg himself quotes *PI* 124: "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give any foundation either." *Philosophy* cannot give any foundation for the *actual use of language*, especially no rational one. Whether philosophy can give any (rational) foundations of social institutions like war, trade, stock-exchanges, etc. is not said here. But these are some of the main objects of social sciences. Even if philosophy could not give (rational) foundations for them, or criticize them, *people can!* Why should criticizing usual practices and social institutions as irrational be a domain of philosophy alone, and not of political parties, poets, journalists, scientists, in short: citizens? They simply do it, even if they do not have the slightest idea about philosophy! Why should they need metaphysics in order to criticize the rule "that the kings are to be used for drawing before a game of chess"? What people do when they criticize such phenomena are examples of what we call "giving foundations for a social institution or practice". But again, this is surely not what Trigg has in mind when he speaks about "foundations". He means something like "ultimate (or proper) foundations", and not foundations for wars, trades, and stock-exchanges, but for social reality in itself, ..., - see above. This is what philosophers call "giving foundations".

But is it not true then that, "according to Wittgenstein, ... a prophet calling society to

a proper vision of things ... is like someone wrecking a cricket match by refusing to play by the rules" [Trigg, p. 216]? Clearly, cricket would disappear if everyone refused to play by the rules. And if the effect of what the prophet says is that all people refuse to play by the rules, then he has been successful. But that is not Trigg's question. The question is, whether a prophet is able to give good reasons for refusing to play by the rules, whether he can convince people to refuse to play by the rules. Notice first that it may not just be good reasons that make people refuse to play by the rules. It may well be the authority of prophets, politicians or others. But the question still remains. Here one must make a distinction between two things: it is one thing to ask what it means to play cricket, what cricket consists of; and it is another thing to ask why people play cricket. Insofar as people have reasons to play cricket, there may be the possibility of convincing them not to play. This is of course not excluded by Wittgenstein, who is mainly interested in the first question. His philosophical interest in chess is not an interest in people's reasons for playing chess, but in what it means to play chess. His aim is not to understand why people play chess, but to understand what it is they do when they are playing chess. It is the essence of a thing he wants to understand. And the "Essence is expressed in grammar" [PI 371].

VI

We saw that

- Trigg's view of a proper social science rests on conceptual confusions and false assertions, and therefore cannot be a view of a proper social science at all;

- Trigg's view of the later Wittgenstein's philosophy is at least a misinterpretation, and that nothing of what Wittgenstein's philosophy was supposed to exclude is really excluded by it;

- therefore Trigg's argument is not acceptable. It is not the case that Wittgenstein puts our ability to reason in grave doubt. Wittgenstein clarified what our ability to reason consists of, insofar as this ability is connected with our abilities to think, feel, measure, understand, calculate, observe, speculate, report, describe, speak, etc. And what else could our ability to reason consist of?

But if Trigg's critique fails to meet Wittgenstein, could there nevertheless be this or that point which can help us to get a better picture of the relevance of Wittgenstein's later philosophy for the social sciences?

The first thing one should see is that there are many different approaches in the social sciences, approaches which sometimes exclude one another. Hence, one cannot expect that any philosophy could be brought to accord with all of them, without contradictions. The question then is not only whether a philosophy could give foundations to the social sciences, whatever that may be, but also whether it might help to evaluate the different approaches. In this sense Winch is right when he stresses the philosophical side of sociology, for also sociology makes use of concepts. Wittgenstein's later philosophy *cannot* be compatible with all sociological concepts, and it is especially *not* compatible with those that take the private self as its basic concept. It is not compatible with methodological individualism and interactionism, showing that these concepts rest on a misuse of language, based on conceptual confusions. But

Wittgenstein not only shows that there are confusions, he also shows that the answer to the question: "Is this an appropriate description or not?" often is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe." [Cf.: *PI* 3] The reason for conceptual confusions is a misunderstanding of the use of our language, not stupidity. And the other way around: the "problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of *depth*. They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as great as the importance of our language" [*PI* 111].

If one takes a social science only for science if it is close to physics and its methods, then a social science searching for meaning in a Wittgensteinian manner is no science. But why should social science be close to physics? Philosophers often give the answer "because all sciences search for *truth*". But is the search for truth really the only important aim for physics? Does physics not also play an important role for the technical sciences? And do the technical sciences - in the same sense - search primarily for truth? And must "search for truth" always mean the same, whether we speak about physics, technology, psychology, or anything else? But even if we were to accept that the social sciences search for truth in the sense that physics does, one of Wittgenstein's insights would still be valid: that there is a "misleading parallel: psychology treats of processes in the psychical sphere, as does physics in the physical" [*PI* 571]. Following Trigg's view, "perhaps one thinks that it can make no *great* difference *which* concepts we employ. As, after all, it is possible to do physics in feet and inches as well as in meters

and centimeters; the difference is merely one of convenience" [PI 569]. Whereas even this is false. It is much more misleading if we compare physical and psychological concepts. "Seeing, hearing, thinking, feeling, willing, are not the subject of psychology in the same sense as that in which the movements of bodies, the phenomena of electricity etc., are the subject of physics. You can see this from the fact that the physicist sees, hears, thinks about, and informs us of these phenomena, and the psychologist observes the external reactions (German: "die Äusserungen" - R.R.) (the behaviour) of the subject" [PI 571]. To repeat: seeing, hearing, ..., are the *objects* of psychology, which is as different from them as physics is from the movements of bodies. The point is not that there is a difference between subject and object, but that there are important differences between the social and physical sciences which are not based on a difference between subject and object, but on differences within objects and subjects.

Wittgenstein is not interested in searching for causes of our language-games. This is connected to his concept of philosophy according to which there should be no explanations, no hypotheses, no theories [PI 109], and the like. Everything one wants to say in philosophy must be said without looking for new discoveries. Wittgenstein only wants to give descriptions. His only interest is in arguments that show that what philosophers utter is nonsense, not in the possible causes of these utterances, neither psychological nor social ones. The insistence on description, instead of explanation, may in some respects be fruitful even for a social scientist. As Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Frazer (RoF)* show, it is sometimes the search for an explanation that gives rise to a "constrained and prejudiced reason". In order to reason in an

unconstrained and unprejudiced manner it is necessary to get a clear view of our own language-games. But, "the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something - because it is always before ones eyes). The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all" [PI 129]. The absence of any interest in explanations is visible especially in Wittgenstein's remarks on our entanglement in our own rules. "The civil status of a contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem." [PI 125] In the *PI* there is not much more to be found on this point than this basically cryptic remark. But there is also nothing to be found that excludes a scientific explanation of "the civil status of a contradiction". Nevertheless, grammatical confusions must be described, before they can be explained. "Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomenon'. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is played" [PI 654]. To repeat: "where we ought to have said", not everywhere! It is *philosophy*, or the search for meaning, where we ought to have said: *this language-game is played*; for philosophy must be "possible before all new discoveries and inventions" [PI 126]. Philosophy becomes then a form of skilled remembering, because in order to follow a rule in general it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to be able to express explicitly the rules we follow. Even if "nothing is hidden" [PI 435], and everything necessary lies open to view [PI 92], we do not see it.

As far as a social scientist is interested in aspects which are "hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity", Wittgenstein's later philosophy may be of high interest for him, providing him with lots of insights. If he

disregards these aspects he is in danger of overlooking "the real foundations of his enquiry".

To give at least one example: in *PI* 200 Wittgenstein describes a situation in which in an alien tribe two people "sit at a chess-board and go through the moves of a game of chess; and even with all the appropriate mental accompaniments. And if we were to see it we should say they were playing chess." Now a scientist could continue and ask for the causes, or reasons, the two people have to play a game of chess, in that way trying to explain the observed behaviour. But what if we were to find that the two people belong "to a tribe unacquainted with games" [*PI* 200]? Would we, and also the scientist, still continue to say that the two people were playing a game of chess? And if not, would that not mean that the assumed causes and reasons should not only be abandoned, but that the primary question should now be, what are these two people doing?

Sociology and philosophy do not seem to merge, as Trigg (and also Winch) think, but rather they stand in a close relation to such a degree that Wittgenstein's philosophy can help to clarify the conceptual foundations of sociology. "Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expression of our interest, and direct our interest" [*PI* 570]. To get a clear overview of our concepts means then also to get a clearer overview of our interests. Trigg speaks about ethnocentricity as if it were precisely the outcome of a Wittgensteinian philosophy. But ethnocentricity in anthropological research is an historical, scientific fact. With Wittgenstein's philosophy one becomes better able to see how it arises, on what confusions it is based, and thereby to avoid it.

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The philosophical background of some tendencies in epistemic logic

To treat logic not only as syntax and formal semantics but with the aim of investigating some properties and some portions of natural languages, of reconstructing logical structures of these languages, requires - as a means of these investigations - some abstractions and idealizations which are, at least partially, philosophically and methodologically motivated. This is a feature of logical work which is nearly invisible as long as we do not leave the frame of classical logic: We have all learned our lesson of the last 100 years and we have no trouble with the philosophical presuppositions of classical logic because, normally, we do not recognize them. But this feature becomes more important when we are working in field of non-classical logic.

Thus, if we are looking at classical logic as competing with other logics, especially with intuitionistic and many-valued logics, and if we are ready to look at it from a liberal point of view, we realize that the truth predicate of classical logic is only one of various different truth predicates. And looking at alethic (classical) modal logic, we note the same about the concept 'necessarily true'. Now, it is easier to recognize the different philosophical presuppositions and consequences of different non-classical logics (and, therefore, also of classical logic), but we could say that we do not leave the field of *philosophy of logic* since the

philosophically relevant concepts are those of logical syntax and semantics.

My *first thesis* is: We cannot preserve this view if we change over to those logics which are usually called 'non-classical modal logics': epistemic logic, deontic logic, logic of action, causal logic and so on. - But the origin and the development of these logics in the middle of our century disguised this new feature because this development had a peculiarity. It seemed to be very natural to construe systems of non-classical modal logic in the following way: Let us take an appropriate system of alethic modal logic and re-interpret its modal concepts, e.g., substitute the concept 'necessary' by 'is known' or 'is obliged' and the symbol \Box by K or O . As long as, in the new system, we do not want to use a concept of necessity besides 'is known' or 'is obliged', at a syntactical level there is no need to exchange the symbols. The formal semantics, e.g. of the system D , also do not alter when we speak of 'is obliged' instead of 'is necessary'.

I do not deny the correctness of this approach so far our aim is only to do *logic*, but I maintain that our task is, at least in some cases, to do *applied* logic - and this task is covered by this approach.

The concepts we are investigating - 'believe', 'know', 'doubt' or 'allowed', 'obliged', 'forbidden', etc. - are *not logical* concepts. It is possible to give a logical analysis of these concepts since they have *formal* properties but they are descriptive concepts, they have a descriptive content in the sense of logic. (In this context it is not my problem whether these concepts have formal properties - so to speak - "a priori" or as a result of our logical analy-

sis.) At least some of these descriptive concepts we are investigating by formal means are philosophically relevant and, therefore, in construing logical theories of norms, of propositional attitudes, of actions, etc. we import into these theories (or: infiltrate these theories by) philosophical assumptions and presuppositions which do not belong to the field I called 'philosophy of logic'.

Then we are in a situation where disputes may arise, e.g., whether we have to construe a logic of *rational* epistemic concepts or of *descriptive* epistemic concepts; whether or not some or all rational epistemic concepts are *empirically empty* - and what consequences this has; whether or not a logic of descriptive epistemic concepts is *possible* at all, etc.

Now, my *second thesis* is: We can eliminate many of the problems which are related to these philosophical assumptions we - mainly unintentionally - imported into our logical theories. To do this we have to find a neutralization of our theory relative to certain, perhaps not all, philosophical positions.

I think, not everybody would regard it as desirable to acquire philosophical neutrality, for one I do not want it; therefore, let me add my *third thesis*, straight away: When this philosophical neutralization of our formal theory is done we can again import philosophical assumptions into our theory, but now we are able to do this explicitly and with the methodological consciousness of accepting postulates which have a non-logical, descriptive state in the sense of logic.

In the following I want to illustrate (1) the philosophical burden of some systems of epistemic logic and (2) the way to reduce this burden,

at least partially. In the main, I will consider the epistemic logic of Werner Stelzner [1984]; but the philosophical problems arising there are not typical for Stelzner's position only. Therefore, I will contrast his views to those of Kutschera [1976] and Lenzen [1980] - both standing in the tradition of Hintikka's epistemic logic whereas some of Stelzner's ideas belong to the tradition of Alexander Sinoviev's work. Then I discuss some philosophical positions behind this formal analysis of epistemic concepts, and I contrast them to the views of the late Wittgenstein. Finally, since I sympathize with most of Stelzner's ideas on the methods of the logical analysis of epistemic concepts, I will try to find a suitable reconstruction of his epistemic logic to reach my second goal.

Kutschera [1976] starts his construction of an epistemic logic with the distinction between a *descriptive* and a *rational* concept of belief and with the decision for the logical analysis of the rational concept of belief. He finds the motivations for this decision in the fact that for the totality of everything people really believe we cannot hold principles like

$$(1_x) \quad B(a, p \supset q) \wedge B(a, p) \supset B(a, q)$$

and

$$(2_x) \quad B(a, p) \supset \sim B(a, \sim p).$$

He says that it is hardly possible to state principles about the inner logical structure of people's systems of contents of real beliefs since there are no limits to the lack of logical intelligence. (Cf. Kutschera [1976], p. 80)

In the following way Kutschera introduces a rational concept of belief: Let B_0 be a suitable descriptive concept of belief; then, with

$$D_1 \quad A_a := \{p: B_0(a,p)\}$$

A_a is the set of belief contents of the person a , in the sense of this descriptive concept. Now, with restriction to consistent sets of sentences A_a , we can define:

$$D_2 \quad B(a,p) := A_a \vdash p.$$

Now, B satisfies not only (1) and (2), but also

$$(3_r) \quad B(a,T), \text{ for all logically true sentences } T.$$

It would be absurd to accept (3) for B_0 instead of B , but in the case of B it is highly trivial. (However, we should demand that the set A_a is not empty to avoid that tables and chairs are outstanding instances of rational epistemic subjects!)

I think we cannot find any formal objections against this rational concept of belief, and we also cannot do it against Kutschera's further construction. However, it is interesting to look at what Kutschera says about the basic idea of epistemic logic: There is a normal language usage of 'believe' which for many purposes is sufficiently unambiguous. Epistemic logic deals with this predicate by formulating precise and systematically fruitful criteria of its usage for certain philosophical aims. (Cf. Kutschera [1976], p.79) - Let us assume now that there is someone who also deals with a logic of rational belief and who wants to attack Kutschera's system or, at least, wants to defend an alternative system. What could he bring forward as an argument against Kutschera's system? He could

attack the theses of the system, e.g., thesis (1_x): Thus, he could state that with $B(a, p \supset q)$ and $B(a, p)$ as premisses the sentence $\sim B(a, q)$ is satisfiable. In which way could he support his thesis? He cannot formulate arguments referring to real belief contents because these do not belong to what we are concerned with. The question is what someone believes rationally or does not believe rationally (or: ought to believe rationally or ought not to believe rationally). This means: he has to speak about his understanding of 'rationality', and now we realize: Kutschera's meaning postulates do not regulate the usage of the concept of *belief* but of the concept of *rationality*. - Instead of saying: "If someone rationally believes this, then he also rationally believes that" we could say: "If someone is rational, then, if he believes this, he also believes that." And in this case we use a concept of belief which is not already fixed as a rational concept (but, perhaps, our concept of rationality is restricted to belief contexts):

$$(4'_x) \quad R(a) \supset (B(a, p \supset q) \wedge B(a, p) \supset B(a, q)).$$

This separation of the demand for rationality $R(a)$ has two advantages: (1) Since we now have exposed the concept of rationality we may go on with distinctions between different demands for rationality - this is an idea developed in Stelzner's system. (2) Thesis (4'_x) shows that until now we have not performed the main part of our task: Since thesis (4'_x) belongs to the meaning postulates about R , of course it cannot belong to the meaning postulates about our concept of belief G ! We have said nothing about our concept of belief!

Before turning to the positions of Stelzner, who also fulfills this second task, I will make some

remarks on Lenzen [1980]: Like Kutschera, Lenzen starts with a rational belief concept but without reducing it to the descriptive belief concept in the mode of $D_{\kappa 1}$ and $D_{\kappa 2}$. It seems to be as if this would pressure him to motivate the adequacy of his usage of epistemic concepts - although he states meaning postulates and gives axiomatic characterizations, and this, surely, is a correct practice. Lenzen says: It is the nature of epistemic attitudes that they are subjective. This does not mean that there are no objective or intersubjective criteria for them. This is not even meant as a thesis of "privileged access" in the sense that in knowing the belief contents of a person, nobody is as certain as this person herself. It merely means that everybody always has an immediate access - privileged or not - to his own epistemic attitudes. If he assumes or believes something he is always indubitably conscious of this fact by means of introspection. (Cf. Lenzen [1980], p. 27)

Kutschera could not accept such a thesis because in the case of his rational concept of belief B , we could at best state that the elements of the set A are known indubitably but not the logical consequences of this set. Lenzen, however, needs this thesis because giving up intersubjective controllability is not so painful if we proclaim: "We are all immediately conscious of our own epistemic attitudes, aren't we?" - I will return to this problem after I have sketched Stelzner's positions.

The basic epistemic concept of Stelzner [1984] is that of *explicit internal acceptance*:

$A^1(x, p, t)$ - During the interval t the subject x explicitly accepts p internally.

Stelzner says that the introduction of this concept would immediately guarantee that the subject may decide indubitably whether or not it explicitly accepts a certain sentence p internally. This concept has to mean that before t , the subject x performs the act of explicitly accepting p internally and that during t , x maintains up this acceptance. (Cf. Stelzner [1984], p. 41)

In the case of expressions like $A^1(x,p,t)$, we have to decide what the reference of p is: If p were a variable for truth values, we would get an extensional epistemic logic, with the consequence that the epistemic subject has to be an ideal knower of the world (or ideal "mis-knower" of the world) because sentences with the same truth value could substitute for one another. - We can avoid this embarrassing consequence if we use p as a variable for propositions (intensions of sentences), but then logically equivalent sentences are still substitutable; therefore, epistemic subjects have to be ideal logicians. Usually, this way is chosen in the construction of epistemic logics (examples are Kutschera [1976] and Lenzen [1980]) with the result that the correlated epistemic concepts have a theoretical state (mood) and are not directly applicable to epistemic attitudes. - Thus, Stelzner decides to take p as a variable for sentences (as elements of language), and now the transitions the subject performs from certain sentences to others depend on its usage of language and its logical abilities. (Therefore, the predicate A^1 is never intensional but hyper-intensional.)

Consequently, Stelzner has to introduce another basic predicate, the concept of *understanding*, to refer in the language of analysis to what epistemic subjects accept in their language:

$U(x, a, t, b)$ - the subject x understands in the interval t the expression a in the sense that x identifies by a the same as is identified by b in the language of analysis.

With the definition

$$D_01 \quad U^*(x, a, t) := U(x, a, t, a)$$

he introduces the concept of *adequate understanding* and with

$$P_02 \quad A^1(x, p, t) \supset (\exists q)U(x, p, t, q)$$

he postulates that the subject understands the sentences it accepts - it understands the sentences in some sense, not necessarily in the sense of our language of analysis. And: the subject understands the sentences in a way we can express in our language.

By definitions we get concepts of implicit internal acceptance: *Propositional hermeneutic implicit internal acceptance* with

$$D_03 \quad A^{ip}(x, p, t) := (\exists q)(U(x, q, t, p) \wedge A^1(x, q, t))$$

and *derived implicit internal acceptance* with

$$D_04 \quad A^{ip}(x, p, t) := (\exists q_1 \dots q_n r_1 \dots r_n)(U(x, q_1, t, r_1) \wedge \dots \wedge U(x, q_n, t, r_n) \wedge A^1(x, q_1, t) \wedge \dots \wedge A^1(x, q_n, t)), \quad \text{where } r_1, \dots, r_n \vdash p.$$

In D_03 we ascribe to the epistemic subject the acceptance of p , whereas the subject really accepts a sentence of which p is a translation, and in D_04 we ascribe to the subject the acceptance of a sentence p that is a consequence of sentences which are translations of sentences the subject really accepts.

But also both these concepts are not yet the same as those of Kutschera [1976] and Lenzen [1980] since we are still bound to the subject's usage of language. We get these concepts in the next step: We define *propositional formal implicit internal acceptance* with

$D_{s5} \quad A_p^i(x, p, t) := (\exists q) A^i(x, q, t), \text{ where } \vdash p \equiv q$

and *derived formal implicit internal acceptance* with

$D_{s6} \quad A_p^i(x, p, t) := (\exists q_1 \dots q_n) (A^i(x, q_1, t) \wedge \dots \wedge A^i(x, q_n, t)), \text{ where } q_1, \dots, q_n \vdash p.$

Now we ascribe to the subject implicit attitudes without looking at its usage of language. Kutschera's concept of belief is that of D_{s5} , Lenzen's comprises D_{s5} and D_{s6} .

Stelzner says that his basic predicate of *explicit internal acceptance* is *effective* relative to the subject itself, because the subject could always decide whether or not it explicitly accepts a certain sentence internally (cf. Stelzner [1984], p. 41), but he knows that this is not valid for the concepts we introduced with $D_{s3} - D_{s6}$ and, hence, it is not valid for the concepts of Kutschera and Lenzen, as well. Moreover, he knows that all the concepts he has introduced exclude the possibility of an intersubjective verification. He obtains such concepts which are intersubjectively verifiable by altering the basic approach and defining a predicate of *explicit external acceptance*:

$A^*(x, p, t, y)$ - in the interval t , the subject x performs the act of explicit external acceptance (act of assertion) of the sentence p vis-à-vis the audience y .

The explicit external acceptance is performed by acts (in most cases: speech acts) observable by other persons.

In the following I will leave aside Stelzner's very interesting analysis of this concept of external acceptance, and in particular the differentiated demands for rationality I mentioned above. I will sketch only one point I need for my further criticism.

In combining his concepts of internal and external acceptance, Stelzner is now in a position to present very beautiful analyses of sincere assertions and of lies. With

$$D_7 \quad A''(x,p,t,y) := A^*(x,p,t,y) \wedge A^i(x,p,t)$$

he defines sincere assertion. (Please note that to make a sincere assertion the speaker has to accept internally the asserted sentence but he may understand this sentence in another way than we do in our language of analysis.) We get the general form of lies with

$$D_8 \quad L(x,p,t,y) := A^*(x,p,t,y) \wedge \neg A^i(x,p,t),$$

a special case is, e.g.,

$$D_9 \quad L'(x,p,t,y) := A^*(x,p,t,y) \wedge A^i(x,-p,t) \wedge U^*(x,-,t).$$

Now I can start my criticism: Stelzner fights intensely against all attempts to find action-theoretical foundations for the concepts of internal acceptance: since there would be no compelling way from external acts of acceptance

to internal acceptance, we could only get behavioristic reductions of internal attitudes. He, too, rejects Searle's speech act-theoretical foundations of the concept of assertion because, as he says, referring to internal attitudes (especially in the rule of sincerity) makes the concept of assertion *ineffective*. Stelzner thinks that only the independent introduction of predicates of internal and external acceptance could guarantee a correct explication of the predicates of sincere and insincere assertions.

Thus, we get the deep, *unbridgeable gap* between the concepts of internal and of external attitudes with which we are highly familiar from our traditional philosophical thinking. I think that this gap is the result of the following: first we construed concepts of internal acceptance, belief, understanding, etc. as concepts of private mental events or states because we wanted to secure the indubitable application of these concepts to ourselves. But now we want to apply these concepts to the - as we assumed - *hidden* attitudes of other people - and we do not know how to do this. Therefore, we introduce new concepts: concepts for external acts of acceptance, belief, etc. Since these acts are performed publicly we may be sure about whether or not such an act is performed, but the propositional and intentional attitudes are still hidden. Thus these external acts may give us a hint that there are some internal acts, states or events, but we cannot know which. And, consequently, we can neither define concepts of inner states or acts by means of concepts of outer states or acts nor can we do the reverse.

Stelzner is right when he says that his concept of internal acceptance in application to other people is *not effective*, but this is a *very weak* formulation: we call a concept 'effective' if

and only if there exists a procedure to decide definitely, in a finite number of steps, for every n -tupel of individuals whether or not it falls under that concept. This concept of internal acceptance is then not only *non-effective* but in *no case* (always leaving aside the case of our own attitudes) are we able to decide whether or not a subject internally accepts a particular sentence. And the cause of this is not that we could not decide *definitely* because there is an empirical uncertainty in the applied methods, but we are *not* able to decide at all for conceptual reasons: the external behavior of the subject does not provide us with any criteria for the internal attitudes. (This was the reason for the criticism of concepts of internal attitudes grounded act-theoretically.)

Thus we are concerned with a rather strange concept: Whereas everyone in his own case *knows* whether he accepts a certain sentence, we not even know how to *apply* the concept in the case of other people. On the other hand in *everyday usage* we obviously have no difficulties applying concepts of internal attitudes to other people. Is the usage of these concepts in the application to other people then just the same as in one's own case? - It is a question we are familiar with from the writings of the later Wittgenstein; therefore, let us try to find an answer with Wittgenstein's help.

Stelzner declares that the concept of internal acceptance intends a *definite state of consciousness* of the epistemic subject (cf. Stelzner [1988]), and now it seems to be as if our problem results from the factual difficulties determining this state. But what is the state of consciousness of internal acceptance? "The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own

exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have *this* or something else." (PI 272) I have a clear picture of what it means that I accept a definite sentence, namely: I have a definite attitude to this sentence. Well, and he has the *same* attitude if he accepts the sentence. "That gets us no further. It is as if I were to say: 'You surely know what >It's 5 o'clock here< means; so you also know what >It's 5 o'clock on the sun< means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock.' - The explanation by means of *identity* does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there 'the same time', but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there... For *that* part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, *if* one says: it is in pain and I am in pain." (PI 350) "Perhaps a logician will think: The same is the same - how identity is established is a psychological question. (High is high - it is a matter of psychology that one sometimes sees, and sometimes hears it.)" (PI 377) But, of course, our talk about internal attitudes is not one which is based, e. g., on the newest results of psychology or neurophysiology, and our uncertainty in applying these concepts is not an empirical one. "When I say the ABC to myself, what is the criterion of my doing the same as someone else who silently repeats it to himself? It might be found that the same thing took place in my larynx and in his. (And similarly when we both think of the same thing, wish the same, and so on.) But then did we learn the use of the words: 'to say such-and-such to oneself' by some-one's pointing to a process in the larynx or the brain?" (PI 376)

Starting with concepts of our own internal

attitudes, we cannot find a path to the internal attitudes of other people; and as long as we do not leave this starting point, but nevertheless declare that we can know the experiences, attitudes, etc. of other people, we are subject to the reproach of behavioristic reductions of our concepts of internal attitudes and experiences. "Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren't you at bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?" [PI 307] In fact, if the mind-body-dualism is established, Wittgenstein's position is to be understood as a variation of psychological behaviorism. In this case Wittgenstein's reply to the reproach of denying mental processes may appear merely as a rearguard action: "Why should I deny that there is a mental process? But 'There has just taken place in me the mental process of remembering' means nothing more than: 'I have just remembered'. To deny the mental process would mean to deny the remembering; to deny that anyone ever remembers anything." [PI 306]

But Wittgenstein says in *PI* 305 which positions he is arguing against: "The impression that we wanted to deny something arises from our setting our faces against the picture of the inner process gives us the correct idea of the use of the word 'to remember'. We say that this picture with its ramifications stands in the way of our seeing the use of the word as it is." Behaviorism is no way out of the mind-body-dualism but only the other pole of Cartesianism. "How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? - The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about them - we think. But that is just what commits us to a

particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent.)" [PI 308] But an argument directed against our philosophical tradition is subject to misinterpretations, especially when we ask our questions where everything seems to be clear. "So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don't want to deny them." [PI 308]

We have to destroy the picture of the 'ghost in the machine', without however denying the existence of mental processes and states. And, of course, it can happen that such mental processes of other people remain hidden. The usual philosophical usages makes it difficult for us to be serious about the materialistic thesis that mental processes and states are specific material processes and states. "Thinking is not an incorporeal process which lends life and sense to speaking, and which it would be possible to detach from speaking, rather as the Devil took the shadow of Schlemiehl from the ground. - But how 'not an incorporeal process'? Am I acquainted with incorporeal processes, then, only thinking is not one of them? No; I called the expression 'an incorporeal process' to my aid in my embarrassment when I was trying to explain the meaning of the word 'thinking' in a primitive way." [PI 339; cf. also Z 605, 606] If we use the phrase 'the mental process is *hidden*' in its ordinary sense then to be hidden is no peculiarity of mental processes: "'What is *internal* is hidden from us.' - The future is hidden from us. But does the astronomer think like this when he calculates an eclipse of the sun?" [PI II, ch.

It is interesting to observe that Stelzner, who is much more cautious than others in introducing and distinguishing his concepts of inner and outer assertions and much more conscious than others of the formal consequences of this introduction of epistemic concepts, nevertheless did not pay attention to some consequences in using these concepts - if we assume that these concepts, at least in some features, correspond to ordinary language usage. As an example: Stelzner analyzes sincere and insincere assertions by means of concepts of internal and external acceptance. We then have a nice analysis - but why do we still say that someone is sincere (or insincere) instead of saying: "Presumably he is sincere." This, after all, should be the consequence of our analysis since we do not know his internal attitudes! That we are not inclined to alter our usage as a result of this analysis may serve as a hint that there something has gone wrong. Is it our ordinary language usage which is wrong? In ordinary language our speech about epistemic attitudes of others in normal cases makes no use of the thesis of the essential privacy of these attitudes!

However: if there are no criteria for the correct use of 'sincere' then there are also no criteria for the correct use of 'presumably sincere'. "Imagine that a child was quite specially clever, so clever that he could at once be taught the doubtfulness of the existence of all things. So he learns from the beginning: 'That is probably a chair.' And now how does he learn the question: 'Is it also really a chair?'" [Z 411; cf. also OC 476] The language-game in which we have learned to say "That is a chair" is fundamental to the language-game in which we say "That is probably

a chair", "Is it also really a chair?". This has to be learned first, and then the other. At the bottom of our language-game is not doubt but certainty; and the kind of language-game determines the kind of certainty as well as the kinds of possible doubts.

If we now say of someone that his assertion is insincere, and later on correct our opinion - is the cause of this that at first we have been deceived by his body and then his mind has been revealed to us? His attitude has been hidden from us, and now we know it, but it has been his attitude and not that of his mind. "To have an opinion is a state. - A state of what? Of the soul? Of the mind? Well, of what object does one say that it has an opinion? Of Mr. N.N. for example. And that is the correct answer." [PI 573] Our concept of a human being, of a person, as we use it in everyday life, is not that of a body *plus* a mind which is concealed in it and of which we have no knowledge. Rather we ascribe to the practical actions of a person, in particular her linguistic utterances, that they are deliberate or not, intentional or not, sincere or not, etc. (Cf. Cook [1969].) Wittgenstein continues with: "One should not expect to be enlightened by the answer to *that* question. Others go deeper: What, in particular cases, do we regard as criteria for someone's being of such-and-such an opinion? When do we say: he reached this opinion at that time? When: he has altered his opinion? And so on. The picture which the answers to these questions give us shews *what* gets treated grammatically as a *state* here." [PI 573] None of the answers we could give to these questions refers to a hidden mind; by this, however, we do not deny that we are speaking about mental states or processes but about their *hiddenness*.

Our mistake was: we were not satisfied with the *practical* certainty, determined by our language-game, in applying the concepts 'sincere statement' and 'insincere statement'. We looked for something like *logical* certainty and hoped to find there at least a kind of neurophysiological certainty - but, of course, in application to mental states this kind of certainty too would not be the right one. The solution to the problem is not to restrict ourselves to bodily processes and to guess which mental processes are behind them; and the solution is not to reconstrue concepts of mental states and processes by means of concepts of bodily states and processes. We refer to *human actions* which are embedded in a social practice. In our language-game we comprehend these processes as human actions, and it is the same social practice which is at the bottom of our language-game. [Cf. OC 204.]

Let us return now to epistemic logic and to our final task, the reconstruction of Stelzner's main ideas in epistemic logic but without those philosophical assumptions we criticized. - What consequences do our philosophical considerations have for the logical analysis of epistemic attitudes? There is at least one: We have to give up the distinction between *internal* and *external* acceptance; it is enough to speak about *acceptance*. But, were there any results of our philosophical analysis which could be used as new, better means to *determine* the state of acceptance? No - and this is alright! We did not aim at providing new scientific discoveries or theories about the mind. "Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor

deduces anything... One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." [PI 126] Philosophy leaves everything as it is. This should be a reason for stopping all our attempts at logical analysis, logical explanation of mental states, but it is *no* reason for stopping logical work altogether: Our task is not to explicate by logical means what belief, internal acceptance, etc. are, but to explicate how we *speak* about belief, acceptance, etc. (And this is *no* new philosophical or methodological view about the tasks of logical analysis but perhaps we have forgotten this in doing non-classical modal logic).

Let us now consider which means we need to speak (in the third person) about epistemic attitudes. First of all, we have to be able to describe actions someone performs toward others to assert or reject the truth or falsehood of sentences:

$H^a(x, v(p)=n, t_1, t_2)$ - In the interval limited by t_1 and t_2 , x performs an act of assertion with regard to the truth value n of the sentence p .

$H^r(x, v(p)=n, t_1, t_2)$ - In the interval limited by t_1 and t_2 , x performs an act of rejection with regard to the truth value n of the sentence p .

(The subject x may refer to the sentence p by an explicit performative speech act, but could also perform other acts we can identify in an appropriate way. x may also make an explicit assignment of the truth value to the sentence but we would also accept other forms of assignment. Furthermore, for my purposes it is enough to restrict the truth value n to *True* and *False*; finally, although in the following I will not

work with the predicate H^a , I do not think it is a trivial task to reduce H^a to H^1 , especially when we permit non-verbal acts as acts of assertion and rejection.)

Let us assume that $H^1(x, v(p)=1, t_1, t_2)$ is true; then - in normal cases - we are inclined to say: 'x believes that p' is true:

$A(x, v(p)=n, t_1, t_2)$ - In the interval limited by t_1 and t_2 , x believes that the sentence p has the truth value n.

However, there are not always normal cases. Sometimes, in some circumstances, we distrust the sincerity of these acts of assertion or rejection. So, to conclude *acceptance* from the performance of the *act of acceptance* we need something more. What is it we need? Is it the knowledge of the hidden mental state of sincerity? Then we would be at the same point where Stelzner did not find a solution! Let me remind you: I have proposed that we should not try to analyze the mental states of assertion, sincerity, etc. but to analyze our usage of the related expressions. Therefore, the question is not, in which cases of acts of acceptance the mental state of acceptance really exists. The question is rather: If we say 'He performs the act of acceptance of p', in which circumstances do we also say 'He accepts p'? I think: What we need is a certain attitude towards this person, that is, we regard him as sincere:

$S(x, t_1, t_2)$ - In the interval limited by t_1 and t_2 , x is sincere in its acts of assertion and rejection.

A remark on the formal structure of this predicate: for the purposes of this paper I have chosen a very simple, perhaps too simple predi-

cate. Perhaps we should have an argument for the audience in S , and perhaps it would be better to have an argument for the act of assertion or rejection in S . In this case perhaps in this place there should be an event term, and we would need some enlargement of our logical means. But I think we can go on with this simple predicate.

And a more important remark: Please do not forget that we do not ascribe S to x because of x 's mental state of sincerity but because of our attitude toward x . Perhaps we have this attitude to x solely because of x 's state of sincerity, however, this is not our concern here.

Thus, we accept

$$P,1 \quad H^A(x, \nu(p)=n, t_1, t_2) \wedge S(x, t_1, t_2) \supset \\ \supset A(x, \nu(p)=n, t_1, t_2).$$

We can adopt Stelzner's concept of understanding in its formal structure:

$U(x, a, t_1, t_2, b)$ - In the interval limited by t_1 and t_2 , the subject x understands the expression a in the sense that x identifies by a the same thing identified by b in the language of analysis.

But now we have to note that this concept is applied on the basis of the subject's externally controllable usage and of the construction of translation rules.

Further, we define a concept of *acts of propositional acceptance*:

$$D,1 \quad H^{Ap}(x, p, t_1, t_2) := (\exists q) (H^A(x, \nu(q)=1, t_1, t_2) \wedge \\ \wedge U(x, q, t_1, t_2, p))$$

and a concept of *propositional acceptance*:

$$D_2 \quad A^p(x, p, t_1, t_2) := (\exists q) (A(x, v(q)=1, t_1, t_2) \wedge U(x, q, t_1, t_2, p))$$

Thus, as basic concepts we have: **H**, **A**, **S** and **U**. With the exception of **A** all these concepts refer to externally observable conduct of the subject, but not in a behavioristic sense: my goal is not to reduce internal states to external conduct but to formalize concepts with which we speak about other persons.

An interesting question is whether we can strengthen (P₁) to get an equivalence; then we could eliminate **A** from the set of basic concepts and define:

$$D_3' \quad A(x, v(p)=n, t_1, t_2) \equiv H^A(x, v(p)=n, t_1, t_2) \wedge S(x, t_1, t_2).$$

I would not like this definition because then we would ascribe to **x** the related belief of **p** only for the duration of performing the act of assertion. Therefore, I propose as concept of *active-dispositional-propositional belief*:

$$D_3 \quad A^p(x, p, t_1, t_2) := (\exists t_3, t_4) (H^{A^p}(x, p, t_3, t_4) \wedge S(x, t_3, t_4) \wedge (t_3 < t_1) \wedge (t_4 < t_2) \wedge (t_3 < t_2) \wedge (t_4 < t_1) \wedge (\forall q, t_5, t_6) (H^A(x, v(q)=0, t_5, t_6) \wedge S(x, t_5, t_6) \wedge U(x, q, t_5, t_6, p)) \supset ((t_3 < t_3) \wedge (t_4 < t_3)) \vee ((t_3 < t_4) \wedge (t_4 < t_4)) \vee ((t_3 > t_3) \wedge (t_3 > t_2)) \vee ((t_3 > t_1) \wedge (t_4 > t_2))).$$

The definition is a little bit complicated. It says: **x** believes **p** in an interval if before that interval he performed a sincere assertion-act concerning **p** and, if he performed a sincere

rejection-act concerning p , the rejection-act ends either before or after this interval. (We may strengthen the concept by substitution of \wedge for the last \vee : then, any rejection-acts concerning p either end before the interval or begin after that interval.)

The concept $A^?$ is the counterpart to Stelzner's concept A^{ip} , but without reference to hidden mental states. Thus, using our own concepts we can continue Stelzner's analysis, and we will also get all the nice results Stelzner achieved.

Finally, let me ask for the ontological correlate to the belief concept we introduced with D_{p3} . There are at least three different answers:

(1) There exist internal mental states to which the concept $A^?$ is applicable.

(2) Such a behavioristic reduction is not possible; in some cases it may be that $A^?(x, p, t_1, t_2)$ and $A^{ip}(x, p, t)$, where $t = \langle t_1, t_2 \rangle$, are true simultaneously, but this would be by chance. (We may say the same about the concepts of Lenzen and Kutschera.)

(3) $A^?$ is a *terminus technicus*, a mode of speech only; the concept means nothing more than what it says on the basis of the definition. If it has an ontological correlate than it has it solely because the concepts in the *definiens* do have an ontological correlate.

My answer is the third; I think the first is wrong; the second and the third, indeed, do not exclude one another, but with the third answer I give up ontological assumptions I do not need.

You may say that my position is merely cautious - but that is exactly what it is supposed to be!

Whoever is courageous enough to construe an ontology may do it as a supplement to this analysis. However, I expect - and this expresses my own philosophical opinion - that there is no situation interesting for epistemology or philosophy of language where a use of the concept A^{sp} - independent of A^{p} - could have any advantage for describing persons. And if I am wrong in this point I will only have to withdraw my basic idea if there are no useful applications of my concept A^{p} .

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ISBN 82-91071-05-5
ISSN 0803-3137