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Pakistan's national identity conundrum

Making sense of the composition, evolution and conflict
of Pakistan's national identity

MUHAMMAD AHSAN JAHANGIR

Abstract:

Pakistan has been struggling with its national identity since its inception in 1947. This crisis of identity has been persistent throughout the years. The basis and rationale for Pakistan, which is marred with confusion and ambiguity, is still discussed and talked about amongst the intelligentsia as well as the common people of the country. After independence from the British, there were two paths towards the future of the country. The first one was to work on the nation building in the country, creating democratic institutions for inclusive and participatory democracy, recognize and accommodate the ethnically, socially and culturally diverse groups and build a new country accommodating everyone. This path would have been taken if the country's leadership had realized that the 'two nation theory' was important for the creation of Pakistan but that it had outlived itself once the country was created. The second path was the continued use of the two nation theory as the basis of a homogenous Pakistani national identity. Ignoring the ethnic and cultural diversity in the country and using the symbols of one language and one faith to create a new national identity that everyone could not relate to. The state of Pakistan chose to follow the later. The result was a continued confusion regarding the national identity and a persistent conflict of the local ethnic identities with the national identity. Even after the separation of the country's Eastern Wing, the state has not changed its stance regarding the two nation theory as a basis of Pakistani nationalism. Today's Pakistan on one hand still uses the Urdu language and the Muslim faith in a bid to create a homogenous Pakistani identity and on the other hand continues to struggle to contain the national identity crisis and the ethnic identity conflict in Pakistan. My research is a bid to use the theoretical knowledge and available data to build an understanding of the Muslim nationalism in the sub-continent, circumstances of the partition and the birth of the Pakistani nationalism. In this context, I will take a detailed look at the composition, evolution and crisis of the Pakistan's national identity and the ethnic conflict as a result.

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Contents

| | |
|--|----|
| Abstract: | 2 |
| Acknowledgements | 3 |
| Abbreviations | 7 |
| Chapter 1: Introduction | 8 |
| 1.1 Background to the Study:..... | 8 |
| 1.2 Statement to the Problem | 10 |
| 1.3 Objectives of the Study..... | 11 |
| 1.4 Research Questions | 12 |
| 1.4.1 Main Research Question | 12 |
| 1.4.2 Specific Research Question | 13 |
| 1.5 Why is this research important?..... | 13 |
| Chapter 2: Historical Context | 14 |
| 2.1 Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent:..... | 14 |
| 2.2 Colonialism and Ethnic Identities | 14 |
| 2.3 All India Muslim League (AIML) | 16 |
| 2.4 Partition of British India, 1947: | 17 |
| 2.5 Objectives Resolution | 21 |
| 2.6 The Aftermath of Bangladesh..... | 22 |
| 2.7 Islamization of Pakistan | 23 |
| Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework | 24 |
| 3.1 Defining Concepts: | 24 |
| 3.1.1 Nation..... | 24 |
| 3.1.2 Nationalism | 24 |
| 3.1.3 Nation-state | 25 |
| 3.1.4 Ethnic nationalism | 25 |
| 3.1.5 National identity..... | 25 |
| 3.2 Study Theories..... | 25 |
| 3.2.1 Nation-state vs. State-nation | 25 |
| 3.2.2 Postcolonial Nationalism | 27 |

| | | |
|------------|---|----|
| 3.2.3 | Primordial Theories of nationalism | 28 |
| 3.2.4 | Constructivist Theories | 28 |
| Chapter 4: | Research Methodology..... | 29 |
| 4.1 | Research Design: | 29 |
| 4.2 | Data..... | 30 |
| 4.3 | Validity and Reliability..... | 30 |
| Chapter 6: | Analysis..... | 31 |
| 6.1 | Composition of the Pakistani National Identity..... | 31 |
| 6.1.1 | Contested Views about Pakistan..... | 31 |
| 6.1.2 | The Myths and Muslim Nationalism | 32 |
| 6.1.3 | Explaining the Muslim Nationalism in India:..... | 34 |
| 6.1.4 | The Two Nation Theory..... | 34 |
| 6.1.5 | The Ethnic Divide of Muslims in India: | 35 |
| 6.1.6 | Stages of nationalism | 38 |
| 6.1.7 | In light of the theories of nationalism | 39 |
| 6.2 | NATION BUILDING PROCESS IN PAKISTAN..... | 40 |
| 6.2.1 | The Mohajir Dominance and Urdu Language | 41 |
| 6.2.2 | Pakistan Ideology..... | 42 |
| 6.2.3 | Separation of East Pakistan..... | 42 |
| 6.2.4 | Role of the Military:..... | 44 |
| 6.2.5 | The Aftermath of 1971 War..... | 46 |
| 6.2.6 | Islamization of Pakistan..... | 46 |
| 6.3 | The Identity Conflict in Different Provinces | 47 |
| 6.3.1 | East Pakistan: | 48 |
| 6.3.2 | FATA | 50 |
| 6.3.3 | The Pashtuns | 51 |
| 6.3.4 | The Balochs | 52 |
| 6.3.5 | The Sindhis | 53 |
| 6.3.6 | The Mohajirs/Urdu Speaking People..... | 53 |
| 6.3.7 | Punjab | 54 |
| 6.3.8 | Conclusion | 55 |

| | | |
|----------------------------|---|----|
| 6.3.9 | In the light of Barrington’s Post Colonialism nationalism | 55 |
| 6.3.10 | State-Nation vs. Nation-State Approach..... | 58 |
| Chapter 7: Conclusion..... | | 61 |
| Bibliography | | 62 |

Abbreviations

AIML: All India Muslim League

ANP: Awami National Party

FATA: Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FCR: Frontier Crimes Regulation

INC: Indian National Congress

ISI: Inter-Services Intelligence

JUIH: Jamiat Ulma e Islam Hind

MQM: Mohajir Quomi Movement

NWFP: North West Frontier Province

KPK: Khyber Pakhtun Khwah

PPP: Pakistan People's Party

PTM: Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement

TTP: Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan

Chapter 1: Introduction

Today's Pakistan remains an enigma, seven decades after being formed as an independent country out of the British India. The newly formed country was at times vulnerable to the appeal of political Islam and the other times it followed the Western form of constitutionalism. The country has been through a number of military dictatorships and has been also struggling to form democratic governments over time. The one less talked about factor in Pakistan is its continuous struggle and search for identity. Ambiguity and uncertainty has been central to the country's national identity. The artificiality of the nation-state of Pakistan not only had consequences for the society, politics and economy of the country but has also created acute challenges for the country in forming a coherent national identity. Today's Pakistan has lost its Eastern Wing in the form of Bangladesh, it faces nationalist and militant movements in Baluchistan and there is an ongoing Movement to protect Pashtuns in Khyber Pakhtun Khwah province that is highly critical of the state and the military. The province of Sindh has experienced severe ethnic violence in the last decade which is the highest since 1947 (Paracha N. F., 2017). National identity of Pakistan is a central point when we explore the ethnic conflicts in the country. In this exploratory research, I will explore the origin, composition and evolution of Pakistan's national identity and its conflict with the local ethnic identities in the country. I will also explain Pakistan's nation building process and why it's problematic through different theories.

1.1 Background to the Study:

The aim of this study is to build an understanding and explanation to what Pakistan's national identity stands for? The country was born after a bloody partition from India in 1947. Since then it has faced various martial laws, wars with India and against the Taliban. It is hard to reconcile the official versions of Pakistan's nationalism with the facts on ground. The state of Pakistan encourages a slogan of one religion, one language and one nation but the actual situation in Pakistan is that the country has continuously struggled with maintaining its national identity. When you see the federally disparate and inequitable nation state of Pakistan using an iron fist but only against the weakest and poorest of the provinces of Pakistan, you began to question the very narrative that existed since the country was created and is still up and running without much of a debate. The role of religion has always been part of the official narrative in Pakistan but the

swift transformation of Pakistan under the military rule of General Zia under the name of Islamic Ideology had serious consequences for the country and its people for the years to come. This not only change the trajectory of the country's future but also damaged the fabric of the society as the country was dragged into the Afghan war and later the US 'War on Terror'. Although the country has recovered from the military rule and for the first time in country's history, two consecutive democratic governments have completed their tenure, the public debate in terms of the official narrative of the country's history and national identity been limited and even when possible is still under the shadow of fear. A number of voices that called out for a national debate regarding the ambiguities of the basis of Pakistan's identity have been labeled 'anti-national' and 'anti-state'. (Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Economy of Defense*, 1991)

Pakistan has had a turbulent history that is full of contradictions and conflicts, especially when it comes to the official narrative regarding the Pakistan's national identity and history. The series of contradictions started right from the partition onwards with the British leaving the sub-continent. The claims of the Muslim nationalism and the actual achievement of nationhood had a lot of contradictions in itself. Religion and Urdu Language were used as the only basis of national unity which were inadequate and it was demonstrated when Pakistan lost its Eastern wing (present Bangladesh) that had the majority of its population after a tragic civil war. Factors like historic interchange of people, culture, and geography have a very deep bearing on the regions of the remaining Pakistan which is far greater than the supposed unifying factor of Islam or the imposed Urdu language as a point of commonality. These factors combined with the state's official version of the history which is according to many researchers lies somewhere in between facts and myths, make the question of the national identity surrounded by confusion. Instead of the history of British India or the sub-continent, the local textbooks teach only the Muslim history in India which is molded in the favor of the state's official version. (Jalal, 2014) Pakistan lacks serious political or academic debate inside the country which is a matter of utmost importance, keeping in view the sophistication of the South Asian history. The void left by the tempered versions of history and ill-defined Islamic ideology which is considered the basis of the creation of Pakistan, is one of the biggest hurdles in any kind of public debate regarding the country's identity and nationalism. It's been more than seventy years since the formation of the

country and the country is yet to reconcile with the imperatives of a modern nation-state and its self-proclaimed Islamic identity.

This research will explore deep into creation, evolution and possible crisis of the Pakistani national identity. How much the facts differ from the state narrative as far as the Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent is concerned. I will also explore the role of religion and Urdu language in the identity of the populace in pre-partition India and in Pakistan after independence. The first chapter will provide an introduction and background needed to understand the Pakistani identity, construct the statement of the problem, objectives of the study, research questions and also why this study is important.

1.2 Statement to the Problem

The identity problem of Pakistan has haunted it for seventy years now and still the state of Pakistan does not have a clear answer to the questions regarding the Pakistani Identity. As Aysha Jalal argues that the founder of Pakistan along with the Muslim League combined the supraterritorial claims of the Islamic universalism, which thought of Muslims as a worldwide community, with the idea of a territorial nation-state (Jalal, 2014). One of the basic problems with the idea of the 'Muslim Homeland' i.e. Pakistan was that a large population of Muslims were supposed to stay behind after the partition in the Hindu-dominated India. This was the argument of the Muslim Leaders who were part of Indian National Congress (INC) that if the nationalism is about the Muslims in India, it will never be possible for all Muslims of India to migrate to the areas included in Pakistan. This made the newly born country's quest for an Islamic as well as national identity ambiguous right from the start.

As mentioned earlier, the religious rhetoric on one side was an important part of the Pakistan movement as this was an effective tool to gather diverse range of people on one platform. The Muslims of the subcontinent otherwise had little in common except the Muslim faith. But after independence, in all of the addresses Jinnah made, there has been little mention of building an Islamic state or the lack of. (Jinnah, 1947) The only common denominator for majority of people living in Pakistan is the Muslim faith but the question arises if this one characteristic was enough or will ever be enough for an ethnically and culturally diverse nation of 200 million people to find their identity? The decision by the leaders of the newly formed country chose the future path

for the country and its people. Jinnah in his first ever speech to the constituent assembly after the creation of Pakistan made it clear that, ‘the state of Pakistan will not have to do any business with the beliefs of the people’ which shows his vision for a secular Pakistan. (Paracha N. F., 2017)

The statement of the problem is that throughout history right before the inception of the new country and onwards, the state of Pakistan has been trying to rely on the ambiguous and vague idea of Pakistan as a homeland for the ‘Muslims of the British India’. This idea worked well to get a separate territory for some of the Muslims of the subcontinent but it couldn’t keep the country together for long. The movement for Pakistan as well the idea of the Pakistani identity has been oversimplified by the state of Pakistan. The immense plurality, complex cultures and diverse population and ethnicities were completely ignored and suppressed to sell the singular idea of the Muslim national identity of Pakistan.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The study focuses on the composition, evolution and the conflict of national identity in Pakistan. During the research I will focus on the circumstances and the reasons of the Pakistan movement and how the country was created. I will also explore how different actors played their part in building up the state narrative regarding the national identity. What factors were at play in the movement for Pakistan and after the creation of Pakistan that composed the national identity? The state supports the narrative that the movement for Pakistan was a religious movement rooted in the Muslim nationalism that dates back to the 8th century. The official views are highly contested and contradicted by a number of historians and political scientists. (Paracha N. F., 2017)

Understanding the Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent is important to understand the Pakistani nationalism and identity. I will also explore in detail the circumstances in which the new country came into being and the decisions about the direction the Pakistani nationalism and identity would take. I will focus on the following arguments in my thesis

- The Muslim nationalism was the product of the late 19th century and early 20th century where culturally and ethnically diverse Muslims united for entirely political reasons.

- The nation building process is a slow and complicated process which specially needs democratic values, inclusion and participation by all ethnic, social and cultural groups. The state of Pakistan failed to do so and instead relied on an ambiguous ‘two nation theory’
- The Pakistani national identity based on Urdu language and Muslim faith as propagated by the state is not relatable by the masses. It is not able to hold the highly diverse, plural and complex ethnic populations together.
- The identity propagated by the state is in conflict with the ethnic identities.

I will use different theories of nationalism and nation building to construct a better understanding of

- The Pakistani nationalism and the national identity
- The conflict the national identity causes with the ethnic identities

Since the factors like religion and ethnicity play a vital role in the south Asian societies and Pakistan is no different, I will also focus on these factors and how did they affect the nation building process or the identity crisis later on.

1.4 Research Questions

Yin (2014) describes a research question as the primary basis of a research study that directs the study and guides all the steps of the research. When we identify a specific research question, we are recognizing the main purpose of a research. The focus of the study is set as the researcher forms questions about the problem to be studied and determining a plan for the study. (Yin, 2014) Creswell also refers to the research questions as the most critical stage in the research design after the selection of the research topic. According to Creswell, research questions must be clear, specific, easy to understand and unambiguous to be able to lead the study to the anticipated data. (Creswell J. W., 2007)

1.4.1 Main Research Question

What composes Pakistan’s national identity and what factors have contributed to the conflict of the Pakistan’s national identity with ethnic identities?

1.4.2 Specific Research Question

- What composes Pakistan's national identity? Does the notion of 'religion as a source of national identity' have any roots in the society historically and politically?
- What went wrong with the nation building process in Pakistan? Why is the country facing problems holding the ethnically and culturally diverse and plural population together?
- How did the national identity in Pakistan come in conflict with other local identities and what explains the separation of East Pakistan and the other separatist movements inside Pakistan?

1.5 Why is this research important?

This research is important because of a number of reasons. First, there has been an ongoing confusion regarding the national identity in Pakistan since its inception but very less academic and research work in this regard is available. I feel this area despite its importance and relevance hasn't received all the attention it should have received. Moreover, the gap in the literature is where none of the literature explains the composition and conflict of the Pakistani identity based on the different theories of nationalism and ethnic conflicts.

According to the state narrative, Pakistani nationalism is based on the Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent and as a result of the 'two nation theory'. A number of researchers have talked about how religious rhetoric was used to gather masses under the banner of Islam like (Callard, 1957) & (Jalal, 2014) but there has been little research on what constitutes identity of a Pakistani? What was the identity for a Muslim living in the Pakistan in the first place, after the partition when a considerable number of Muslims were still left behind in India during the partition? The state of Pakistan states the 'two nation theory' as the fundamental reason of partition in all official textbooks. After the partition of Bangladesh in 1971, where does the 'two nation theory' and 'Islamic ideology' stand? To answer these questions, I will look deeper into the construct of the Muslim national identity and to what extent religion was a part of it? Moreover, the question of if the movement for Pakistan was a religious one or purely based on politics? Was it actually Islam that gathered together the masses for a separate country for Muslims i.e. Pakistan and if it was, what happened to that binding force right after the partition?

This research is important because in Pakistan, the question of the Pakistani identity is not easy to answer and there is still a sense of uncertainty and confusion over who a Pakistani is and what role religion has as far as the national identity is concerned. There is a severe polarization between the religious far right who want the Pakistan to adhere to Islamic law and on the other side, people who want Pakistan not only for Muslims but also for the non-Muslims in the country and advocate for no role of religion in the religious matters of people. Besides that the various ethnic identities in Pakistan that have always remained strong seem to be in conflict with the national identity. This research will explore if that is true and what are the causes of that?

Chapter 2: Historical Context

To understand the context of the nationalism in present day Pakistan, we have to look in detail the background and the origins of the Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent. In this chapter, I will give a background to the origins of the Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent, its political and religious aspect, and the events of the Pakistan movement, the partition and so on. This will help build a better understanding to the context to the origin, evolution and the possible conflict/crisis of the national identity in Pakistan.

2.1 Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent:

It is important to notice how the Muslim minority of the subcontinent changed itself into a nation to win a homeland only in seven years (1940-47) and lost half of it in the next twenty four years in the form of Bangladesh. Muslims in the subcontinent in general were aware of the differences in their own communal group and the Hindu majority along with other groups. However, this awareness was not the same throughout the Muslims population in the subcontinent. The educated Muslim elite was more aware and had a strong feeling of connection with their communal group but it was a lot less on the level of the masses (Islam, 1981).

2.2 Colonialism and Ethnic Identities

Muslims had ruled India for centuries before the British Colonialists dislodged it completely in the mid nineteenth century. Before the British took over in 1857, the Muslims had ruled India through autocratic regimes. Amongst the number of reasons, one of the reasons of the downfall

of the Mughal Empire was the different factions of the Muslims as well as the Hindus that wanted the share of the power from the Mughals. Besides a few exceptions, there were not a lot of efforts to integration of the Hindu population with the Muslim rulers. And even lesser efforts to integrate the different factions of Muslims and Muslim ethnic groups with each other. Asaf Hussain explains that the development of these ethnicities were on ethnic and communal lines rather than national. (Hussain, 1976)

Goldman explains that after taking over, British rulers also encouraged the ethnic identities and differences through their policies fearing the Muslim revivalism in the subcontinent. These policies resulted in the inter-culture alienation and inter-ethnic animosities and eliminated the chances of integration and unity among the Muslims for a long time. This was done by gifting and providing for towards the ethnic groups that were loyal to the British and others were deprived of development and modernization. (Goldman, 1974) Goldman's point of view is also evident from the numerous expeditions sent to the tribal regions bordering present Afghanistan. These were sent in order to quell the rebellion of the local Pathan tribes in the region. These regions were also controlled though a different law, a Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) was devised in 1901. This special set of laws meant to punish the people and control the rebellion also alienated these people from rest of the subcontinent.

This was the same situation in Baluchistan with the *Maari* and *Bugti* tribes and in Sindh with the *Hur* tribes. All these ethnicities and regions remained neglected and in a way punished by the British ruler. While most of Sindh was deprived of any kind of development, the sea port of Karachi, being a strategic port brought development to the urban region. Hence different areas were treated differently and there existed a huge disparity in infrastructure and modernization even within a province. The Muslim Punjab on the other had had a different treatment. Muslims from the Punjab areas had supported British Rule in one way or the other. To encourage this, the British gifted large tracts to land to these people and this was how Punjab got in hold in hold of a powerful elite comprising of landed aristocrats. (Paracha N. , 2016)

Muslims were on one hand, aware of the fact that Hindus are in majority in the sub-continent and on the other hand, the British as the 'Christian' rulers. Some religious leaders mobilized the masses to do *Jihad* i.e. a religious struggle against the British but they mostly were ineffective and the message was not accepted equally by all Muslim population. Then there was the idea of

creation of Muslim schools for the revival of Islam in the subcontinent as a desperate effort and movements like Deoband started. The argument being that the problems Muslims face is because they have gone away from Islam and the goal was to preserve the Muslim way of life in the region. (Islam, 1981)

2.3 All India Muslim League (AIML)

Different from these religious movements and more reformists in nature was the Aligarh Movement. It called for pragmatic and modern approach to make the lives of the Muslims in the sub-continent better. The founder of the movement Sir Syed Ahmed Khan called for better relations with the British, modern education, securing rights of Muslims, jobs in the civil service and more importantly a reinterpretation of Islam for modern times (Islam, 1981) This movement was starkly opposite to the Deoband movement. It was the result of Sir Syed Ahmed's reformist movement that a whole generation of Muslims was educated and it was the same class of educated Muslims that later became part of All India Muslim League (AIML) during the movement for Pakistan. Another notable personality in this regard is Allama Iqbal, the poet philosopher is usually associated with the mobilization of the masses and giving the idea of a 'Muslim nation' or 'Muslim Ummah'. Iqbal viewed Islam as a binding force for Muslims in the sub-continent and he was successful in convincing the AIML to use Islam to unite Muslims who had different linguistic and ethnic origins. Iqbal was also of the opinion that a community based on Islamic ideology was not possible without a polity so the creation of an Islamic state on the principles of Islam was also necessary. Some historians see Iqbal's view of nationalism as both territorial as well as ideological as he thought of a Muslim nation based on Islam and this community to be in the territorial framework of a polity. (Islam, 1981). However, the idea of the Universal Muslim community also faced criticism for not being practical and more of a wishful thinking (Paracha N. , 2016)

Muslim League was created in 1906 as a political party loyal to British to 'safeguard rights and interests' of Muslims in the region. Jinnah staunchly supported Hindu Muslim unity and in several occasions he openly expressed his views regarding this. In 1916, he managed to bring both Muslim League and INC to work together for the independence of India from the British.

AIML kept a secular outlook and though it talked about Muslims as a different nation, its stance always differed from the staunchly religious Muslim leaders or organizations.

Religion was a big tool to mobilize the Indian Muslims politically. The leaders in the AIML knew that in a democratic set-up for India in future, there will be not a lot of place for the Muslims as they were a minority in India. Asaf Hussain divides the leadership in AIML into two factions. A religious one that saw the need of a separate homeland to safeguard Islam and their Muslim identity and a secular one, led by Jinnah that looked at the Muslims as a minority in India and a new state was needed to safeguard their rights. Both the factions had their differences but they agreed that Hindu domination was the bigger threat than the British rulers (Hussain, 1976)

The founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah was a staunch supporter of Hindu-Muslim unity for a long period. It was as late as 1913 that he joined AIML and even later when he advocated the idea of Muslim nationalism. His speech from 1940's AIML conference was an important one where he openly described Muslims as a totally different group from the Hindus whose religious philosophies, social customs, literature, civilization and culture were totally different from the Hindus in the region. This, according to Jinnah was the reason Muslims needed a separate political entity within a loose Indian confederacy. Although along with other differences from Hindus, religion did count for a big factor as far as AIML and Jinnah's idea of Muslim nationalism was concerned but the structure or vision of an Islamic state was never mentioned either by Muslim League or by Jinnah. This is the point which creates confusion as the movement of Pakistan was apparently based on 'Muslim nationalism' and a 'country where Muslim could practice Islam' but there was no blue print of an Islamic state or Islamic law as part of the constitution after the separate state will be created. This made the Muslim national identity for Pakistanis inherently problematic as there is no sure answer of what the Muslim League wanted or how the founder of Pakistan wanted the country to be in terms of structure and constitution.

2.4 Partition of British India, 1947:

In the official textbooks version of Pakistani history, Allama Iqbal, a Muslim poet and philosopher, envisioned the idea of Pakistan as early as 1930. Going through the text of his

speech, you can understand that his idea was all about an autonomous north-west Muslims state within or outside the British India. (Taillieu , Lalman , & Winand , 2000)

During the elections 1945-46, Muslim League openly called for a separate homeland for Muslims of the sub-continent. This was a slight deviation from previous call of a state loosely bound under the Indian federation. The largest Muslim population was in the provinces of Bengal and Punjab. Although during the 1930s and early 1940s, Muslim League got successful to some extent in Bengal but even as late as 1930's elections, Muslim League was nowhere to be seen in terms of electoral success.

The idea of Muslim nationalism which was mainly advocated by Allama Iqbal first and later was adopted by Jinnah and Muslim League was mostly accepted by the educated Muslim class in the subcontinent and masses to some extent in Muslim parts of Bengal but not in other Muslim parts of India. (Ali M. , 2001) As mentioned earlier, Muslim League and its idea of Muslim nationalism didn't get any support from Muslim population even till late 1930s. So what happened before the elections of 1945-46 that got Muslim League and its ideology of Muslim nationalism a significant support? The official narrative in Pakistan is that Muslim League's success was in the idea of the Muslim nationalism but the historical events show something different. Nadeem F Paracha looks into the development before the elections just before the partition of the sub-continent. The success of Muslim League in Punjab depended heavily on the support it got from the landed elite and Pirs (religious leaders) who were supporters of the 'Unionist Party' before. Moreover, the faction of Jamiat Ulma e Hind (JUIH) that also joined AIML helped a lot to counter the narrative of the of faction of JUIH that labeled Muslim League as a secular party. (Paracha N. F., 2017) So, it was JUIH and some religious leaders who were part of the INC who had a more religious narrative as compared to Muslim League. Muslim League's narrative for a separate state for Muslims did not get a considerable support from Punjab even as late as 1937's election where it managed to win one seat out of 175. The elections of 1945-46 changed the history of the subcontinent as it showed that AIML is the sole representative of the Muslims in the region. The reasons why, however are missing mostly from the official version of history which is taught as a compulsory subject in schools and colleges in Pakistan. The biggest reason ho Muslim League was able to secure a solid win in Punjab was

more political than ideological. It was the addition of the Pirs and Muslim landlords along with some leader from JUIH that was a game changer for Muslim League. (Mujahid, 2013)

It was in early 1940s when Muslim League started using the argument to 'fight against anti-Muslim forces' and along with the influential spiritual leaders, they managed to build a strong narrative for the Muslims in Punjab in favor of the Muslim League. These spiritual leaders had massive following where people believed their choice and voted for Muslim League as a support towards their spiritual leader. The point to be noted here is though Muslim League was countering the religious leaders against Pakistan through some firebrand mullahs on its side as well but also in Bengal, a narrative of Muslim League was specifically visible in Bengal which was that everyone who is being exploited financially and socially will be protected in the new country as it is made for safeguarding minority rights. During these elections, a considerable number of lower class Hindus had also joined Muslim League as they bought this narrative (Ghosh, 2016) So under Jinnah's leadership, AIML on one hand did a good job mobilizing the educated youth on the slogan of Pakistan, state based on Islamic principles and on the other hand even some non-Muslim minorities were considered 'untouchables' or lower class Hindus also bought into this idea of Pakistan where the rights of the weak and exploited will be protected. How any of these two narratives would be practical in the state to be born was not mentioned either by Jinnah or Muslim League before creation of Pakistan. However a speech by Jinnah to the first ever constituent assembly of Pakistan gave a primarily secular view of the country.

Pakistan got its independence from the British Empire in 1947 resulting in two parts i.e. East Pakistan and West Pakistan. The subcontinent as a British Colony (presently India, Pakistan and Bangladesh) had to be divided after the British left in a hurry in 1947 after being devastated in the Second World War and a number of problems they were facing in India. Although a considerable number of Muslims still remained in India who couldn't move to Pakistan, the new homeland for Muslims came into being for reasons mostly political. (Jalal, 2014) The provinces which had the Muslim majority were divided and the remaining Pakistan was not what Jinnah or Muslim League had originally envisioned to. In May 1947, after the idea of partition of Bengal and Punjab, Jinnah referred to such Pakistan as a truncated, mutilated and moth-eaten Pakistan. (Jinnah, 1947)

The newly formed country was unique in the way it had a highly diverse population brought together under the banner of Islam and put into a geographical area which was also not physically connected. So there were differences not only in the culture, ethnicity and languages of the people of the new country but also in the geography. East and West Pakistan were separated by a thousand miles of India which became a hostile territory for Pakistan soon after the partition. The events of the partition also created an atmosphere of animosity which never ended. The biggest mass migration in human history turned out to be chaotic and bloody also because of the ill planned partition plan which was completed in a matter of weeks by the British. This is why a huge number of people had to migrate to either Pakistan or India. Mass murders and rapes resulted in a million people dead and even more homeless. (Ghosh, 2016) Partition almost immediately led to disputes as right from the beginning, the newly created state of Pakistan felt insecure from the much bigger neighboring India. The leaders of Muslim League in general as well as the founder of the country, Jinnah had used a lot of religious rhetoric during the movement to create Pakistan and gather Muslims under one banner but after the creation of Pakistan, Jinnah rarely referred to the concept of an Islamic state. He did however mentioned clearly the importance of Urdu language and the Muslim faith as vital to the newly created country's national identity which not only was little ambiguous in the first place but also a source of conflict right from the beginning as the people from Bengal starting opposing the idea of Urdu as a national language right away.

According to Ayesha Jalal, as long as Jinnah was alive, the ideologue of an Islamic state was limited to symbolic gestures. Jinnah's use of Islamic references while sticking to his democratic and secular vision of the new born state. Religion was always an important part of the Muslims living in the subcontinent but it was limited to personal faith, this political connotation to it was new. Pakistani state's reliance on 'two nation theory' for nationalism did not address the ambiguities related to the Pakistani identity. Rather state sponsored historians wrote the history for general consumption and most importantly, for school and college text books highlighting the tyranny of Hindu and the importance of two nation theory (Jalal, 2014)

The country was run on the basis of the 1935 act of British India with little changes until a constitution could be made for the new country. According to historians like Ayesha Jalal, Jinnah always wanted the people of Pakistan to choose representatives who would create a framework

to run the country. But the founding father of the new country did not live long enough to form a constitution for the country or set a path for the identity for the new nation. (Jalal, 2014)

2.5 Objectives Resolution

Liaquat Ali Khan, the then Prime Minister presented a charter called the ‘Objectives Resolution’ in 1949, which later became part of the all the constitutions in coming years. This was meant to set a direction on which the new constitution would be made but it also gave a vague picture of that. This document gave an ambiguous direction for the future constitutions as a lot of content of the resolution was open to interpretation. For example, the objective resolution states that ‘sovereignty belongs to Allah’ which can be interpreted as anything one might wish. (Paracha N. F., 2017) A number of historians consider the objective resolution the first step to push the country towards the path to become an Islamic country as before that, the religious element present in the speeches by Jinnah and other Muslim league leaders was limited to being just a rhetoric. Muslim League managed to be the sole representative of the Muslims under the banner of Islam but after partition, it was a different story to keep the country integrated. There was a need felt to create an identity which would be powerful enough to keep the highly diverse population together. The state of Pakistan had to come up with a reason why the country was created, why was the partition needed and how are the people living in Pakistan different from those living in India. So as Ayesha Jalal comments, history and facts were replaced very early on with ‘ideology of Pakistan’. The reason this happened was also because of the confusion of why Pakistan was created in the first place? (Jalal, 2014) A considerable literature points towards religion as the reason for which Pakistan was created, which is similar to the state version of history. And it’s the similar state narrative that tried to create an Islamic national identity forcing the religious identity on top of all other identities. (Paracha N. F., 2017) I argue that this was inherently problematic and is the reason the Pakistani national identity till day remains weak and barred with confusion. The highly diverse people of country, after partition, had little in common. Instead of recognition of the differences amongst the people and the strong ethnic and cultural identities, the state of Pakistan went for a unified identity and for that Urdu and Language and the religious identity were used. Urdu was selected to be the national language of the country which was spoken by a small percentage of the population. Urdu language as national language was especially alien to the people in Bengal who were greater in number than

the West Pakistanis. This complete disregard to all other languages led to Urdu-Bengal language controversy which later forced the state to give Bangla language the status of national language as well. (Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*, 2014)

2.6 The Aftermath of Bangladesh

East Pakistan had been asking for more autonomy and representation in the military and bureaucracy for years after independence. The war in 1965 with India and later the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 were traumatic for the country as the bigger part (in terms of population) of the country separated. After the separation of East Pakistan, the country also lacked an established form of democracy and the new leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto took over as civil martial law administrator. For historians like Nadeem F. Paracha and Ayesha Jalal (2014), this was a time where a number of pan-Islamist movements began to gain popularity. This is the time when the state of Pakistan also aligned itself with the popular aspects of this movement. This had also to do with the global politics at that time. The oil rich monarchies were active against secular and modern Muslim nationalism. This money also proliferated into the country gradually. (Paracha N. F., 2017) Researcher like Ayesha Jalal also terms this as a major turning point as far as the evolution of Muslim nationalism was concerned. Z. A. Bhutto was a popular leader who wanted to take the country out of the despair of 1971 war and East Pakistan debacle. His government began to align with the popular ideas inspired by pan-Islamism. A number of genuine aspects of Pakistani nationalism were given up as the alternative ideas were adopted. It was this time period when the curriculum of the public schools and colleges saw a big change with more religious aspect to everything taught. This is also the time when Pakistan-studies as a subject were introduced up to the twelfth grade. This was a response by the state to fill the ideological void that was left after the separation of East Pakistan. The Pakistani state became increasingly skeptical of any kind diverging and pluralist ideas over time. A number of nationalist leaders have been suppressed by the state and even their justified demands and calls for recognition are seen as a divergence from the Pakistani nationhood. (HRCP, 2006)

2.7 Islamization of Pakistan

During the regime of General Zia ul Haq regime, the cold war was at peak and United States took advantage of the strong military dictator in Pakistan for the *Jihad* i.e. holy war in Afghanistan. He was allowed to decide by the Regan administration, how to use billions of US dollars to fight the Soviets. (Ali T. , 2003) This made the country focused more on the war in Afghanistan than the problems in the country itself. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) expanded to a massive spy agency with finger in every sphere of life in the country. Tariq Ali states that the ISI used enormous funds to establish military organizations which would be then trained to fight and sent to Afghanistan for *Jihad*. (Ali T. , 2003) This period also saw an influx of fighters from all over the world who were called *Mujahedeen*. The mujahedeen were trained, armed and supported by the Pakistani state. The curriculum in the schools and colleges in Pakistan was changed to include more and more verses from Quran that mentioned Jihad i.e. the fight for God. Out of nowhere, the people in Pakistan saw these armed groups running wild in the country, backed by the military regime and its intelligence agency. (Ali T. , 2003) There was also an influx of ‘petro-dollars’ from Saudi Arabia as well which did not come without any strings attached. Saudi Arabia, as part of its foreign Policy has been promoting the ‘Sunni-Wahabi’ strand of Islam in other Muslim countries and that’s what it did in Pakistan as well. During the Zia’s regime, the country saw establishment of tens of thousands of religious seminaries all over the country which were mostly funded by the Saudi Kingdom. A number of these religious seminaries established during the cold war had a single purpose of nurturing and training fighters against the Soviets in Afghanistan. This hybrid of a confused Pakistani nationalism and Pan-Islamic nationalism managed to become part of the state and polity of Pakistan gradually. This exposure to these ideas through education slowly has changed the society. Ayesha Jalal has called this period as the Islamization of the Pakistani society to such radical levels that the Pakistani identity takes a back seat and Islamic or Muslim identity is what comes first.

As described by a leading political author, Tariq Ali, Zia’s period of rule as a military dictator plunged the country into a security state which changed or even destroyed the social fabric of the country. (Ali T. , 2003) After 9/11, Pakistan decided to support the US’s war on terror on a great cost. The country was engulfed in a wave of terrorist attacks. The armed groups that were once

created to fight the Soviets turned against the Pakistani state and its people. The confusion about the Pakistani nationalism and identity still remains today.

Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework

In this chapter, I will define some basic concepts that will be later used in the research. I will also mention and explain the theories that I will use for the research.

3.1 Defining Concepts:

3.1.1 Nation

One of the most prominent proponents of the constructivist school of thought, Benedict Anderson defines nation as the following

Nation is an imagined political community because most of the members of even the smallest nations will never know, meet and hear most of the members of their nation. Yet, they still feel themselves linked to each other. (Anderson, 1991)

3.1.2 Nationalism

Ernest Gellner, provides a concise definition of nationalism which is

A political creed that underlies the cohesion of modern societies and legitimizes their claim to authority. Nationalism centers the supreme loyalty of the overwhelming majority of the people upon the nation-state, either existing or desired. (Gellner, 1983)

Nationalism refers to the need for affirmation of national or communal identity as the anchor of individual identity. This is one of the fundamental forces at work in political societies giving them meaning (Pfaff, 2005)

We have examples like Greeks, Finns and the Czechs who won the right to self-determination through a nationalist ideology and in these cases, nationalism played a positive role. But there are examples where nationalism took nations towards chaos and genocide. Some ideas suggest that state based or civic nationalism can play a positive role for the country while ethnic nationalism, at times can lead to radicalization of nations and lead to chaos (Pfaff, 2005)

3.1.3 Nation-state

The concept of nation-state can be defined as:

Nation-state is an ideal where the cultural boundaries match up with the political ones. A state where a great majority is conscious of a common identity and shares the same culture. (Davis, 1997)

3.1.4 Ethnic nationalism

Elizebeth Kiss defines Ethnic nationalism in the following way:

'Ethnic nationalism is defined by the politics of identification with and allegiance to a nation, a collectivity defined by what its members regard as shared descent, history and culture'. (Kiss, 1996)

Ethnic nationalism is considered by most scholars a political phenomenon. But in practice the non-political expressions are hard to separate from the political ones.

3.1.5 National identity

It can be defined as the sense of a nation as a cohesive whole, as presented by distinctive traditions, culture, language and politics. (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)

How national identity can impact the people of a country positive and negatively revolves a lot around the composition of the nationality. It also depends on the groups that the national identity wants to bring together and their local/ethnic identities (Pfaff, 2005)

3.2 Study Theories

3.2.1 Nation-state vs. State-nation

Nation-state refers to a state that has only one nation in its territorial boundaries. This is an ideal state that doesn't exist in modern times. Most states existing today are made up of a number of identities. In this approach, most nation builders will think that the presence of only one national identity is a pre-requisite for a stable state. Most of studies of the states are also aimed at the idea of achieving a uniform national identity. According to some authors, this is inherently problematic as it is a bias towards conflict. (Khan, 2009) Nation-state approach revolves around

the doctrine of territorial sovereignty where the state wants a complete unity and loyalty from all of its inhabitants. This approach conflicts with people's other identities based on race, language, religious beliefs and culture. When more than one type of identities demand loyalty and both identities are different from each other, it can cause a friction between different groups belonging to different ethnicities etc. The chance of conflict can be minimal if the two distinct identities do not clash with each other. Some states are able to successfully contain and accommodate such conflicts using a number of different policies but some states fail to do so.

On the other hand, there is the State-Nation approach, where a national identity evolves slowly inside the territorial boundary of a state. It is also in line with the constructivist view of nationalism.

Both nation-state and state-nation represent a political-institution approach but they differ in some ways. Nation-state approach has the following characteristics:

- (1) States using policies with the nation-state approach will attempt to privilege one identity over other sociocultural identities that have a potential of political mobility. Historically this approach has been fulfilled uses various routes such as building a common cultural identity among those living in the state.
- (2) The people who do not share the allegiance are encouraged to assimilate voluntarily. At times, states also use various sorts of social pressures that force you to assimilate, which also involves destroying alternative cultures.
- (3) In extreme cases, it can even involve violence or ethnic cleansing. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004)

The state-nation policies respect and even encourage legitimate public as well as political expression of social and cultural differences. States develop mechanisms with which they can accommodate conflicting and competing ideas and claims without giving privilege to a single one or imposing one of them on the entire population. This also involves creating a sense of belonging on one side and on the other side protecting the diversities that are cultural social and political in nature. This sense of belonging at times involves the inculcation of 'constitutional patriotism' and other times, an attachment to the common symbols of the state. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004) The state-nation approach also seen in democratic societies uses institutional

protection in the form of federalism or asymmetrically federal system. This can be seen in countries like Canada, India etc. These countries because of their vast diversity within on democratic system have included special prerogatives for the cultural and historical differences that are protected by their constitution. Why this approach was used in the countries like Canada, India, Spain and Belgium and not in Pakistan which will be discussed later in the analysis part in Chapter 6 of this thesis.

3.2.2 Postcolonial Nationalism

Lowell W. Barrington explains the nationalism in post-colonial nations in the light of the colonial legacy and the patterns that can be seen in these states after independence from the British. In his book he mentions that the countries that faced some kind of colonial rule, nationalism emerged as movement that was spearheaded by broad range political and intellectual elite. The nationalist leaders who are different ethnically and culturally often unite together as they share a common interest to get rid of the colonial power and establish an independent nation-state with a distinct, unified national identity. In most cases, after independence has been achieved, divisive tendencies challenge the national unity that was once obtained during the independence movement. A common type of divisive force is the rise of other nationalisms based on ethnicities, languages that emerge over the course of time. These internal nationalisms call for autonomy, more rights or even succession. (Barrington, 2006)

He believes that the ethnic nationalism does have the tendency to emerge once the postcolonial nations are independent but there are two categories in this regard. The first ones are those nations that have been successful to build political systems that consolidate and empower the civic nationalism and as a result national unity. This can be a result of the ties amongst the political elite who are ethnically and politically different but they commit to strengthen common political institutions which are inclusive and are based on accommodation, negotiation and recognition of autonomy.

The second case is of those nations that experience ethnic nationalism surpassing the civic nationalism. The postcolonial nations that see the degeneration of civic nationalism and national unity are also marred with regimes that are exclusive to a few, centralist and patrimonial. In this case, the suppression of the ethnic nationalism and use of violence is common and in worst case scenario, the nation breaks apart.

3.2.3 Primordial Theories of nationalism

Primordial nationalism focuses on historic and inherent social practices as the source of the identity for the nation. This approach to nationalism believes that nations are product of the inherent group-oriented nature of people. It also believes that nations are historic entities are formed by a shared language, sense of territorial belonging and even a common descent.

3.2.4 Constructivist Theories

Constructivist theory states that nations and nationalism are just forged concepts that are a response to social and historical circumstances. Constructivism also links nationalism to the process of modernization stating that because of the emergence of the industrial economies broke the social bonds that traditionally existed and this called for a national identity for the people.

Among the constructivist view of nationalism, Benedict Anderson is a big proponent of the school of thought. He considered the concept of nation as complete fabrication. An artificial bond made between people that did not exist before its recognition. So the members of the nation share a communal image with other members. An image that is not based on the commonality itself but only on the recognition of the commonality. (Anderson, 1991)

'It is an imagined community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign'

So according to this view, a nation is conceived as a sort of fraternity between the people. So it is not the common or shared characteristics that may have created the fraternity in the first place, but it is the concept of fraternity itself that keeps the people together.

According to Anderson, imagined communities do not mean that these communities are in any way not real or fake. He calls it imagined because he believes that a community that is so large that its members do not recognize each other on a face to face basis has to be an imagined one, at least to some extent. He also believed that in past, the liberal as well as Marxist thinkers did not fully recognize the power of nationalism. He sees the roots of the concept of a nation during the end of the 18th century when countries like United States and Brazil went through a replacement system. These Spanish colonies after freedom were one of the first to develop a national consciousness.

In contrast to Ernest Gellner, who connected the nationalism with industrialization in Western Europe, Anderson believes that nation states in Europe are a response to the rise of nationalism in the European diaspora. So according to him, nation building is a process that can be copied and is a transportable action. Imitating the old entities, new political entities copy the nation state model. Ernest Gellner gave the idea that that nations are artificially created entities. He thought of a nation as a socially conceived construct. The possibility of this entity depended on how long the concept of nationhood is perpetuated by the nation's elites. Moreover, that nationalism and nations are fabricated and constructed concepts which don't depend on historical events. (Gellner, 1983) According to Gellner,

A mere category of persons (occupants of a given territory, speakers of a given language for example) becomes a nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their share membership of it. (Gellner, 1983)

For Gellner the source of nationalism is the fabrication of recognition. It does not depend on some shared characteristics which existed from before. His ideas about nationalism are in conflict with the pre-constructivist notion that nations already existed before a manifestation of nationhood. But this does not make him an opponent of the idea of nationalism. He rather deems it a necessary mechanism that was needed in order to unify the social and political boundaries and for uniting culture with state. So nation and nationalism according to Gellner we legitimate and necessary. He also believed that the nations were formed and perpetuated by the elites of the society but it does not mean they do it to empower themselves. Gellner thinks of homogenization of culture something not only important but necessary in the construct of a nation.

Chapter 4: Research Methodology

4.1 Research Design:

This is a qualitative research and I will be studying Pakistan's national identity and the conflict involved within. The study will focus on understanding the phenomenon in a context specific setting where the researcher does not attempt to manipulate the phenomenon of interest. (Patton, 2002) So the intention of the study is not to establish a causal relationship between variables or

use statistically significant findings to generalize, rather goal is to build a proper understanding of the phenomenon. According to Yin, a qualitative inquiry answers *what* and *how* question. In my study, the ‘what’ question refers to what constitutes Pakistan’s national identity? The ‘how’ question refers to the process of creation and evolution of the Muslim nationalism and the Pakistani national identity in the sub-continent. This will explain how the Muslim religion became part of the Pakistani identity and how has it changed the identity over time. Since the research aims to build a better understanding of Pakistan’s national identity, I chose to use qualitative design instead of quantitative one.

The study is exploratory in nature and I will rely on the use of theoretical knowledge and literature as well as the data to build a fact-based understanding of the ‘*what*’ question i.e. What constitutes Pakistan’s national identity and what have been the changes in it over time. I will be using the above mentioned theories to build up an understanding of the ‘*how*’ question. In this context, the *how* will cover the understanding of nation building process in Pakistan and explaining the ethnic identity conflict in Pakistan.

4.2 Data

Regarding the use of data, I am using both using only secondary data but from multiple sources. As Creswell explains, one of the key components of qualitative research is the utilization of data from multiple sources. (Creswell J. , 1998) For this study, the secondary source of data included documents, books, and newspaper and journal articles, transcript of speeches, press statements, official government documents, and government published textbooks. The study relies on the secondary source of data for several reasons. The secondary data shows the holistic picture to answer the ‘what’ and ‘how’ question’.

4.3 Validity and Reliability

In the study I will be using multiple sources of secondary data. Use of multiple sources of data ensures validity of data. As using more than one source of data is important for triangulation which increases data validity. In my study, the secondary sources of data help in triangulation and hence will ensure validity.

Chapter 6: Analysis

In this chapter I will use the theoretical knowledge to explain the Pakistan's identity problem. Loring Danforth explains that the modern nationalism has a goal to 'assimilate and homogenize the population of the new state so that all its citizens are also by definition members of the nation that the state embodies'. (Danforth, 1995) Nationalists build and support nations that claim to represent homogenous people or groups that share similarities. The problem with this notion is that none of the criteria for nationhood implies self-identification or shows the group sentiment. The nations that came into being in the 19th and 20th centuries had to be forced onto all members of the population without them sharing the same sentiment or not.

Eric Hobsbawn also wrote that 'the logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate linguistically and ethnically homogenous population was the mass expulsion or the mass extermination of minorities'. (Hobsbawn, 1995) If one had to add another outcome to the ones mentioned here would also be forced assimilations. As mentioned above as well that most scholars today would agree that the idea of nation and nation-states is an artificial fabrication and a socially constructed phenomenon.

6.1 Composition of the Pakistani National Identity

6.1.1 Contested Views about Pakistan

The ideological uncertainty has deep roots in history of the Muslims in the British India. Farzana Shiekh believes that the main pillars, on which the idea of Pakistan was resting on, although informed by Islam, were strongly contested. The viewpoints within the Muslim intellectuals were highly debated and showed a total lack of consensus. (Shaikh, 2009) This is also visible from the viewpoints of the Muslim leaders who were part of congress who openly opposed the Muslim League's idea of a nation that needed a territory. The other group was the religious clergy who also thought that the division of India would also divide the Muslims and still a number of Muslims will still be left in India. Moreover the clergy did not buy the idea of a nation-state as they considered Muslims to be a universal nation or 'ummah'. These contrasting as well as competing ideas and conceptions of the religious community and the nation in general remained

contested. One of the founding fathers of Pakistan and the country's national poet for example had a very different view about nation states. He wrote poems to show his love for Hindustan, which was the British India. He also believed that Muslims belonged to a universal nation and made up a universal Islamic community which was not restricted by the territorial boundaries. This was in complete contrast to the politics of Mr. Jinnah and AIML especially after 1940s who called for a Muslim nation in British India whose economic and political interests were in danger by the Hindu majority. This contrast of ideas within a single political party i.e. AIML shows the problematic relationship between territorial nationalism and Islam. These conflicting notions and ideas did not stop at the partition of the British India. They remained alive and kicking in the newly created state as well and even today pose a threat to the consensus problem the country is facing. The result of the contradiction of ideas soon translated to an ambiguous trajectory for the newly born state. Right before the partition of British India, it was not clear that the 'Muslim nation' included which people? Did it include only the people who belonged to the Muslim majority north-western and eastern regions of the British India or to all Muslims living in the subcontinent? Because a considerable number of Muslims stayed in India as it was not possible for them to migrate to Pakistan.

6.1.2 The Myths and Muslim Nationalism

The Pakistan Studies textbook of the 10th grade printed by the federal board of education states the following

Pakistan was made in 712 A.D. when the first Muslim, Muhammad Bin Qasim invaded India. (Punjab Book Board, 2012)

This statement is significant because this shows the state's narrative regarding the roots of the Muslim nationalism in India. Nadeem F. Paracha believes that narratives like these were just used to build up the idea of 'Muslim nationalism' in the sub-continent. He points at this narrative of calling an Arab conqueror who invaded India in 712 A.D. as the 'first Pakistani'. He believes this is an important point of entry for a nationalist narrative which contrasts the narrative built up by the early founders of Muslim nationalism in South Asia and later on in Pakistan as well. (Paracha N. F., 2017) The people who encourage a divergent narrative for Pakistan insist that Pakistan's nationalism has to be understood from the point of the invasion of Sindh by Muhammad Bin Qasim. This should mean that all subsequent Muslim invaders and rulers in

India were also Pakistanis and contributed to the Muslim nationalism which later on became Pakistani nationalism. But this is not the case, and a prime example is of Mughal Akbar who ruled India from 1556 till 1605. He is treated with disdain by the same narrative that shows Qasim as a hero. The reason being, Akbar was not really fond of the religious clergy and had brought Islam into an overly pluralistic disposition. The rational understanding of his actions was to garner the support and loyalty of the big non-Muslim population under his rule. This pragmatic approach was part of the politics and made sense but the narrative that overrides all other narratives in Pakistan right now, considers it against Islam. This is highly problematic and the authors who were hired by the Pakistani state to write the official history of the Muslim nationalism in India and then Pakistan have gone to any lengths to support this narrative. One prime example is I.H. Qureshi, who writes in his book published in 1962 that including Hindus in the matters of rule by Akbar and his inclusive policies damaged the early Muslim nationalism in India by a lot which was being constructed organically. He adds that despite the course being corrected by the King Aurangzeb later on, the damage to Muslim nationalism had been done and that is why the Muslim rule ended when the British took over India. He mentions one of the biggest reasons for this fall as the 'strengthening of the Hindus'. (Qureshi, 1962)

If we read the neutral authors and historians, there is a total different picture painted there. The Muslim invaders in India took pride in their language and regional lineages instead of the religion Islam. They also recruited from people from similar ethnicities. A common cause of distrust amongst different invaders was different ethnicities and backgrounds who always tried to overthrow each other. (Ali, 2001) This was far from a time of evolution of the Muslim nationalism in India as described by I.H. Qureshi and a number of authors who wrote history books in accordance with the state narrative. There is no evidence of Muslims sharing a united nationhood based on the Islamic faith before the 19th century. On the contrary, at times, the divisions were encouraged by the rulers for political gains. The Muslim invaders in the subcontinent invoked the Muslim sentiment during war and invasions and when they were ruling they suppressed the clergy as an absolute rule of religion or *Sharia* would have proved detrimental to their reign and would bring the clergy to power. Even today, the state of Pakistan has an official narrative of finding the Muslim nationalism in Muhammad Bin Qasim from 712 and hailing the Muslim invaders in India as heroes who fought for Islam and against the non-Muslim Hindus. (Punjab Book Board, 2012) The above discussion shows that this narrative is a

fabrication based on myths but is still alive and active as the country's official narrative and in the text and history books. The evidence suggests against any kind of Muslim nationalism in the subcontinent before the 19th century.

6.1.3 Explaining the Muslim Nationalism in India:

A number of authors have suggested that the decline of the Muslims in the subcontinent and later the British Colonialism gave the required ingredients for the Muslim nationalism in the region. The rise of the Hindus politically was also perceived as a threat by the Muslims of the British India. This is where they felt the need to gather themselves politically.

One of the signs of a sense of nationhood in India was that amongst the Muslims was that Persian language was replaced by Urdu as the preferred language. The reason behind it was that Persian was the language of the immigrants from Central Asia and Persia who stopped traveling to India after the Muslim rule ended. Urdu language has its roots in the 14th century when it began to form as a language which was a mixture of Sanskrit, Arabic, Farsi and Prakrit. (Rehman, 2013)

A very well-known historian, Dr. Mubarak Ali is of the opinion that the Muslim Identity in the British India can be analyzed on the basis of a consciousness that was social, political and religious. He thinks that the concept of a political Muslim identity only emerged after the British colonized India. (Ali, 2001) They introduced democratic institutions like the electoral process and this is when the Muslims in India realized for the first time that they are under threat as a minority against the Hindu majority. Historically, the Muslims of the Northern India were the ones to determine and affirming Muslim identity basing in on their political needs and economic interests. Rest of the Muslims followed their suit and looked at all political issues through the lens of these Muslim elites.

6.1.4 The Two Nation Theory

Muhammad Ali Jinnah who was an unorthodox Muslim, was also a nationalist who strived for his nation. He believed that Islam did provide a cultural base for mobilization of the Muslim majority in the British India. Even in 1928 in an all party's conference, he supported the idea of separate electorates if he was assured of 33% seats in the center. This idea was not much appreciated by the Punjab and Bengal representatives. They wanted a more decentralized setup. Until 1937, Jinnah's party could not appeal the masses and could get only 5 percent of the

Muslim votes. That was the time when he coined the idea of ‘two nation theory’. He called Islam and Hinduism not just religions but ‘social orders’. In his speech in Lahore in 1940, he said,

The Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different philosophies, social customs and literatures(...) To yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State. (Jaffrelot, 2002)

The two nation theory basically narrated that Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations in the British India that are completely different socially, religiously as well as culturally and after the British leave India, in a democratic system, Muslims will not be able to stand up to the Hindu majority. This theory gathered a lot of support for the AIML but it totally ignored the ethnic divide the Muslims had within themselves as well not to mention the two parts of Pakistan (East and West) separated by a thousand kilometers. It is important to know the composition and nature of the different Muslim ethnicities in the subcontinent to understand the Muslim identity dynamics.

6.1.5 The Ethnic Divide of Muslims in India:

The Muslim population in India comprised of three communities. The first one was the ‘conquerors’ who came from the North-West along with their entourage. This group had always enjoyed a sense of superiority and political power. The second group was the immigrants who came to India under the Muslim rule who were mostly Turkish, Pathan, Persian, Arab and Central Asian. They had come to India to seek a better life or careers for themselves. Since they were believed to share a common ethnic background with the conquerors, they were allowed economic and political opportunities and integrated with the ruling elite. The third group comprised of the local converts who were never able to integrate with the Muslim elites. Another reason for them being at the lowest of the social ladder was because they did not share any ethnic lineage with the other better off Muslim communities. This shows how powerful common ethnic origin or lineage was in India and how it divided the Muslims of the subcontinent. Ethnicity was far more powerful in keeping the different Muslim communities separated and divided and it was much stronger than the aspect of common religion in India.

If we explore the local literature about the history of the regions that were under rule, we can see this clear divide between the Muslims that were ruling and other people from their ethnic group versus other Muslim groups from different ethnicities. Sindh was the first region in India that was invaded by Muslim conquerors. In Sindh, one of the main sources of history of the region is known as '*Chachnama*'. In this text, the Muslim conquerors are clearly mentioned as 'Arabs' and not as Muslims. In the same fashion, the invaders who conquered the Northern regions of India are mentioned only by their ethnic identity of 'Turks' and not by their religion i.e. Muslims. It also mentions that in 1206 when the Turks established their kingdom in India, the rulers belonged to the Turkish ethnicity and no other Muslim group of different ethnicity shared any kind of power. Similarly the Afghan invaders like the Lodhi never gave any position of power to someone of non-afghan ethnicity. Even when he needed support to rule, he called for help from the Afghans and never from the Muslims of the other ethnicities. (Kufi, 1900) Similarly the famous Mughal Kings also snatched power from another Muslim dynasty. During the rule of the Mughal Kings, there were even a united rebellion formed against them by the Muslim Afghans and the Hindu Rajputs as both of them were under threat from the Mughals. During the Mughal period as well, not only the darker skinned lower caste converted Muslims but also the ethnic Afghans were also deprived of any kind of political or military position. (Ali, 2001) During Mughal rule, some conquerors like King Akbar also included the upper class Hindu Rajputs in their administrative structures to integrate Hindus and strengthen the rule as well. He considered their support strategically more important than that of the lower class Muslims. Since there was no common interest, the different groups of Muslims were divided culturally and politically on the basis of castes, professions and classes.

After the rise of the East India Company and the fall of the Mughal Empire in 1803 A.D., the *Ulema* i.e. the Muslim clergy began to present themselves as the saviors of the Muslims. There were several movements that were religious in nature meant to protect Islam from the effects of Hindus. In face of the Christian missionaries that were active in India and Hindu revivalist movements, Muslims felt threatened and the *Ulema* tried to defend the Muslims in the face of these threats. This was the first time where the Muslims felt the need to unite against the new challenges they felt. This revival and consciousness of religion for the first time contributed to Muslims recognizing their distinct identity. However the religious movements didn't do much for the Muslims politically and all the religious movements failed in British India especially after

the failed rebellion attempt of 1857, the Muslim upper class lost even the little left over power they had. During this dark time, when Muslims were specially targeted for planning the rebellion against the British, Muslims searched for pride in Muslims in rest of the world. They started taking pride in the greater Muslim identity rather than their Indian Identity. This was visible from the *Khilafat Movement* where the Muslim religious leaders called for solidarity with the Ottoman Caliphate. At this point, as Dr. Mubarak Ali writes, the Western Educated Muslims and the *Ulema* gathered for the consciousness of the Muslim Identity. This concept was extra-territorial nationalism and sharing a bond with the Muslims from all over the world ended to some extent after the failure of movement to protect the Ottoman Caliphate. (Ali, 2001)

The concept of a Muslim national Identity also brought them in conflict with the Hindus and the revivalist movements from both Hindu and Muslims further parted them. This contributed to the more religious consciousness among the Muslims and the Muslim politicians made use of that. This was the first time when the concept of ‘two nation theory’ was used. This came completely out of a political necessity as the Muslim elite wanted to secure a better share for them in the government jobs and political representation.

At this point in time, Muslim intellectuals restructured the Indian history basing it completely on religion to strengthen the idea of the two nation theory. The Muslim invaders were given new titles of heroes who fought against the Non-Muslim Hindus. This revival had different reasons. For the clergy, the need to bring back Islam in the lives of Muslims and the Muslim Identity was the only chance for the Muslims to gain back their lost honor. Although this didn’t mean anything in terms of politics in the British India, it did help the Muslim League use this chance in their favor. For the Muslim politicians, it was a chance to gain more power and representation by exploiting the Muslim sentiment in the wake of the Muslim consciousness. During this time, what mattered was the political aspect which meant the ‘two nation theory’ had a political rational rather than religious. This is also evident from the fact the most of the leadership was privately secular but did put lot of emphasis on Islamic values and identity in public. Mr. Jinnah who was a western educated Muslim leader who later on led the AIML was more close to the British in his lifestyle than the Muslims of the subcontinent. (Paracha N. F., 2017) The hypocrisy in appeals to religion, which was central to the Pakistan movement, did not go away with the partition. It persisted for years to come.

The nature of the British rule in India also impacted the Muslim politics. The representative political system was used by the few privileged and educated Muslims who enjoyed the spoils of the office. In this setup, the local and short term interest was ahead of looking at the all-India perspective. To be successful in the colonial political system, you had to get the local factions of the Muslims with you and against the other Muslim rival. Also politicians derived a lot of support from the local landlords. This resulted in a system where Muslims would stay divided and a minority in the all-India perspective. In addition to that, the geography that has dispersed Muslims in all over India also played a vital role in the Muslim divisions.

6.1.6 Stages of nationalism

Geoffrey Barraclough (2007) explains the process of nationalism in roughly three stages during the nationalist movements in Asia during the early 20th century. The first one is called 'proto-rationalism. This refers to the efforts to reexamine the indigenous culture. The second stage is the rise of new leadership with liberal tendencies. The final stage is to increase the base of resistance against the imperial power. This involves the mobilization movements of the masses. The workers and peasantry has to be mobilized to the form a united resistance against the imperialist power.

In Pakistan, these stages have also been accurate. The first stage was the reexamination of indigenous culture where the religious clergy, local Muslim leaders and poets made an effort to go back to their culture and religion. The clergy called for a revival of true Islamic values, the national poet of Pakistan, Allama Iqbal revived the success stories of the ancestress of the Muslims in the subcontinent. The second stage, which is the new leadership, was also accurate in Pakistan where Pakistan saw leaders in the form of Sir Syed Ahmed Khan who was responsible for a new generation of educated Muslims in the beginning of the 20th century. Mr. Jinnah also proved to be a leader who was successful to gather masses on one platform first against the British and then for a separate country. The third stage is the mobilization of the masses which involved making sure the message of the AIML and Mr. Jinnah went to each and every Muslim in India and uniting them to show British their political power. Pakistan quite accurately passed through all the three stages mentioned by Barraclough (2007).

6.1.7 In light of the theories of nationalism

During the Pakistan movement, a group of people with similar interests were called a nation and a territory was demanded for them to live separately. This was also inherently problematic as it goes with the primordial view of nationalism which focuses on the historic social practices and an 'ideology' as sources of the identity for the nation and the belief that nations are formed when a group of people have a shared language, sense of territorial belonging or even a common descent. This view of nationalism is old and has been widely criticized by the modern theorists.

This primordial approach explains how the state of Pakistan views the national identity and Pakistani nationalism. It is rooted in only one shared characteristic i.e. the religion of Islam. And it was assumed that a nation was already present in the subcontinent which just needed a territorial boundary. There are two problems with this approach. First, as discussed above, the two nation theory and Muslims being called a nation was a political maneuver that helped the Muslim League to secure people's support, votes and later political power. The historical roots of the Pakistani nationalism that were said to be dated to 712 were based on myths as discussed earlier. The people who made up the population of Pakistan in 1947 and even today are different from each other culturally, socially, ethnically and linguistically as well. So, in short, the notion of a 'Muslim nation' living in British India was based on a myth. And the second way to look at it is how the constructionist view defines nationalism. In the theoretical framework I have mentioned the modern constructivist view of nationalism, which contrasts from the primordial view in a way that nation-states and nationalism are a complete fabrication and that nations are nothing but 'imagined communities'. The proponents of the constructionist view have taken the emphasis away from primordialism towards circumstantial and structural approaches. The proponents of constructivist view think of nation as an officially created entity which is necessary for modernization.

The problem with the Pakistani state narrative here was that exploiting the religious sentiments of the Muslims in sub-continent, they managed to garner the support of ethnically, economically and socially diverse group of Muslims. They also succeeded to get a separate piece of land but since the differences between the Muslims that made up Pakistan were so much stronger to divide them than the common religion could ever keep them united. And after the state of Pakistan was created, there was no genuine effort to build up a national narrative that would be

inclusive and would cater to and include all the diverse groups of people that made up the population of the new country. Rather an ‘ideology’ based on myths was propagated as the reason for creation of Pakistan and Pakistani nationalism.

6.2 NATION BUILDING PROCESS IN PAKISTAN

In this part I will try to find the answer to the second research question posed in the beginning of the thesis.

What went wrong with the nation-building process in Pakistan? Why has it been hard for Pakistan to hold its diverse, plural and ethnically complex population together?

Looking at Hobsbawm’s statement that ‘nationalism comes before nations’ one can relate it to the Italian statesmen’s way of putting it that ‘we have made Italy, now we have to make Italians’ In Italy, at the time of unification less than 3 % of the people spoke Italian properly. Compare it to the case of Pakistan where a new country that was created was given Urdu as a national language that only 4% of the population spoke. (Paracha N. , 2016) According to the constructivist view, nation-building is a slow process that is necessary for modernization. As Gellner puts it,

‘Nations are neither pre-existing nor they can be formed by an ideology or proto-jingoism’ (Gellner, 1983)

This homogenization/assimilation process can become more complex when the population for the new state has lot more differences and contrasts and very few similarities. That is the case of Pakistan where the answer to create a unified identity and unity amongst the population was sought in sticking to the vague and confusing ideas of ‘two nation theory’ and later on ‘Pakistan.

The problems with the nation building process in Pakistan were many. First, this was a false notion that there was already a Muslim nation in the British India which succeeded in getting a territory to live in. As discussed above, Muslims in India were never one nation rather different groups came together politically to secure their political and economic interest. The notion that a Muslim nation already existed and that too since 712 A.D., was based entirely on myths and propaganda by the Muslim League. This abolished the need to work on nation building which is

a slow and continuous process. And as the example of Italy above, after getting the territory, nation building process actually starts.

Right after the partition, the country saw the migrants from India and the local populations setting about the ideas for the nation of Pakistan and a projection for the country's future. It was not only the matters of politics that were experimented upon but also about what kind of Muslim or Islamic country will Pakistan be?

Since its birth as a sovereign country, Pakistan is in search for a separate identity. Since Pakistan adopted a new name (in contrast to India) and was rather unknown in the world, the leaders of the newly built country started working on the distinct identity for the new country. At this point, the leaders used the same idea on which Pakistan was created i.e. two nation theory and Islam as the uniting force for the distinct national identity. In addition to this Urdu language also became the official symbol of being a Pakistani. This was inherently problematic because at the time of Independence in 1947, there was a considerable amount of non-Muslim minority present in the country. According to the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, non-Muslims comprised of 23% of the total population and only 4% of the Pakistani population spoke Urdu. (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1951) Instead of creating a national identity on the territorial basis, the basis for national identity was chosen to be religion and Urdu language which not only went directly against the religious minorities in the country but also shadowed the plurality and diversity the country had. Thus slogans of one religion, one language and one nation emerged in a bid to create a unified national identity by the state of Pakistan. This did not have roots in the society and the population and it did not take long before the signs started to show.

6.2.1 The Mohajir Dominance and Urdu Language

The Lahore resolution had emphasized that the constituent units of the new country will be sovereign and autonomous. As Jaffrelot (2002) explains, this was just mentioned to reassure the regions with Muslim majority. In practice, when the new country was formed, it was a centralized state. The government machinery totally dominated the Mohajir nationalists who wanted to govern a nation-state. According to the census of Pakistan 1951, Mohajirs were only 1/10th of the total population of the Pakistan. (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1951) The influence the Mohajir political elite had on Pakistan was very strong. The architects of Pakistan and the founders of AIML were also Mohajirs which also gave them a privilege in one way. The leaders

of Pakistan like Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan also belonged to the same ethnicity. Another reason was their domination of bureaucracy in British India. 95 out of a total of 101 Muslims of Indian Civil Service that had migrated to Pakistan were Mohajirs. Interestingly only one of them was from West Bengal (Jaffrelot, 2002) Looking at these numbers, the composition of the bureaucracy can be imagined. The country that was short of civil servants immediately made use of their experience and education. In Sindh, they were one fifth of the total population and yet they represented 57 percent of the population.

As the new country was a creation of Mohajirs and since they were running the state affairs, Urdu language was given the national status and the national and provincial assemblies were asked to use it. An institute was established to work for the development of Urdu literature and implementation of the Urdu language in the government bodies.

6.2.2 Pakistan Ideology

Pakistan went through a number of problems right after its inception. Military dictatorship and martial law changed the place where power resided in bureaucracy, politicians and military. In the absence of political leadership and lack of constitution, the bureaucracy became very powerful. The military takeover in 1958, partnered with the bureaucracy to share power. During this time, the term ‘ideology of Pakistan’ existed but was rarely used. The focus was on the word Pakistan, to keep the two parts of the country united. The problem here was that this effect to keep the countries united was only limited to the use of slogans and propaganda to instill nationalism in the people. Meanwhile, the economic disparity widened over time and the people of East Pakistan realized they were not given their political rights.

6.2.3 Separation of East Pakistan

The first major incident was the demand by the Bengalis to redefine the meaning of Pakistani by insisting that Bengali should also be recognized as a national language. Their demand was justified in a way that at the time, only 4 percent of the population spoke Urdu and it was deemed as the population of the elite by the masses. (Shaikh, 2009) This was beginning of the many power struggles that the country saw. This one however was between the middle class Bangladeshi population that demanded recognition and a share in decision making and the much smaller Urdu speaking elite that was running most of the government machinery at that time. The creation of Pakistan exposed the fault lines in the composition of the national identity for

Pakistan and the two nation theory. As mentioned before, the ethnic identities that were very strong with the local population were completely ignored. The local populations in different regions of Pakistan saw Urdu language as alien as it was spoken only by the migrant population from India. The idea of 'Urdu as an imposed language of the outsiders' was being felt the most by the Bengalis. The state narrative of calling Urdu synonymous for being Pakistani also called the Bengali demand as being anti-national. The founder of Pakistan, Mr. Jinnah was also a migrant but did not speak Urdu very well himself. In 1948, while speaking in Dhaka, he said that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu, anyone who tries of mislead you is the enemy of Pakistan. As the Bengalis went on strike, Jinnah ordered that the writing system of the Bengali language to be changed to Arabic and then even with Roman script. Originally the Bengali language was close to Sanskrit which is entirely different from Arabic or Roman script. (Oberlies & Pali, 2001) This decision that was made in haste completely ignored that language was central and a very important part of the Bengali identity. There were a number of problems with how the state of Pakistan took the issue of Bangladesh. First and foremost, they were more in population than any other province or ethnic group in Pakistan. Even then their language was denied the official status. Secondly trying to change the script to Arabic would mean changing the soul of the language. The intellectuals and middle class of the Bangladesh did not accept it and considered it an attack on their identity. This is why the government had to quickly retreat from this step. The Bengali language movement became widespread in 1952 where fierce riots erupted in Dhaka. The Bengalis were able to get their language recognized in 1956. (Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*, 2014) By this time, a sentiment against the Bengali population had already been created specially in the ruling class in West Pakistan who thought of Bengalis to be against the language of Islam and Pakistani. Bengalis could never be mobilized on the slogan of Pakistan ideology, their ethnic nationalism and Bangladeshi language proved to be more effective for mobilization when they demanded their rights and representation. The Pakistan Ideology was popularized intentionally by the government when East Pakistan demanded autonomy. The ambiguous terms and fabricated slogans of Pakistan Ideology didn't help and the succession movement in East Pakistan reached its peak.

The separation of East Pakistan was a serious blow to the very existence of Pakistan. It was detrimental to the 'two nation theory' on which the country relied entirely for its national identity. After the East Pakistan debacle, instead of learning the lesson that East Pakistan was

denied its political and economic rights, the state of Pakistan came up with a plan to save the Pakistan ideology. It was said that the Pakistan Ideology was never implemented in its true spirit which is the reason why Pakistan lost its East Wing. Pakistan ideology was further expanded to Islamization of Pakistan.

6.2.4 Role of the Military:

Pakistan faced a refugee crisis in 1947 where over 7 million refugees entered Pakistan after the partition. (Shaikh, 2009) Muslim league was not competent enough to handle these affairs and the entire task of governance to the more experienced civil bureaucracy and the military. This set the course for future decision making in the country. All this contributed to making the security policy take over everything else in the country. This is why right from the inception of the country, military had a superior position within the state establishment and it only grew stronger over time. (Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Economy of Defense*, 1991) Ijaz Khan (2009) is of the opinion that in the security oriented India centric policy affected the country both domestically and in its foreign policy as well. And in this background, the Pakistani military gradually dominated the decision making elite in Pakistan. The decision and policy making went from the civil bureaucracy to the general of the Pakistani Army. This was also damaging for the country as the chances of conflict got a lot higher. Any call for autonomy and rights by the ethnic groups was deemed as a threat to unity of the country and a continuation of the external threat i.e. India. So even in the case internal political turmoil, a lot of times, fingers were pointed at an invisible 'foreign hand'. (Khan, 2009) It was not long after independence that General Ayub Khan overthrew the government and took over the country as a military dictator who vouched to make Pakistan a pro-western, anti-Soviet and Muslim state. With the military takeover, the space started shrinking for any kind of democratic or political voices. At this point in time, although the military and the religious political lot had their differences but both perceived the Indian and Soviet threat as the biggest one to the country and Islam in general. And this not limited to these two factors, as (Khan, 2009) mentions, the religious political parties and military had an invisible and informal alliance against communism, socialism, secularism, cultural and ethnic nationalism.

Under the military making the decisions for the country, another concern that had hit the East Pakistan hard was one unit scheme, which was introduced apparently to minimize the differences between the two parts of the country. And presenting the plan, the then Prime Minister said,

'(after this idea is implemented) there will be no Begalis, no Punjabis, no Sindhis, no Pathans, no Balochis...the disappearance of these groups will strengthen the integrity of Pakistan' (Singh, 2018)

Another problem was the lack of constitution. Pakistan got its first constitution in 1956 which was not agreed upon by all political parties and it did not work for long. The incompetence by the civilian government gave the chance to both the military as well as the bureaucracy to intervene and take complete charge of the government. Two years after Pakistan got its first constitution, a military dictator took over the country. Nadeem F. Paracha (2017) believes that the military coup also was the start where the state that already made all India centric policies became even more conscious about the security. All calls and demands for recognition from different groups specially the East Pakistani were dealt with suppression. The military rule shrank the space for democratic political parties and participatory government to almost non-existent. (Paracha N. F., 2017) The lack of democratic political parties and representation was also a big reason for discontent among the people, especially in East Pakistan. General Ayub Khan came with a western capitalist agenda and the result was generation and accumulation of wealth with only a few. It was during this regime that the 22 families became wealthier than the rest of the Pakistan together. (Paracha N. , 2016) This economic disparity was not taken well in different parts of the country especially in East Pakistan where people had the lowest income levels in all of Pakistan. General Ayub Khan was also responsible for the direct elections in 1965. This was done to take away the little left power from the political parties as well. These elections were held on non-party basis. This experiment did a permanent damage to the political system of the country where the democratic political parties lost their significance completely. (Paracha N. , 2016)

One year after India got its first constitution; it held its general elections and people chose their representatives. In comparison it took Pakistan nine years to come up with a constitution and the first general elections took place in 1971. This too was under a martial law rule of General Yahya Khan. This was the first time the people could vote in general elections. The elections

results clearly showed the structural divide in the country. The Awami League led by Shaikh Mujeeb ur Rehman won 160 out of a total of 162 seats in East Pakistan and got less than 1% of the total votes in the West Pakistan. On the other hand, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) won 88 out of 144 seats but failed to get any seats in East Pakistan. The political, military and bureaucratic elite did not want to see Shaikh Mujeeb come to power. This denial led to insurgency in Bangladesh and the way the state of Pakistan responded to that was extremely violent and suppressive. The operation codenamed 'searchlight' that lasted before the succession of East Pakistan was tragic and the details of which were horrifying. Most of them were kept covered by the West Pakistan for years. It was on 16th December 1971 when after intervention from India, Dhaka fell and the Pakistan Army surrendered to Indian forces.

6.2.5 The Aftermath of 1971 War

After the succession of East Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto from the People's Party came to power in rest of the Pakistan. The events of 1971 had shaken the West Pakistan as well. Pakistani state re-interpreted the spirit of the Lahore resolution and the concept of 'Ideology of Pakistan' was introduced. The loss of East Pakistan had solved the problem of the geography for Pakistan but the ethnic nationalism continued to gain power. One of the most notable changes regarding national identity and nationalism was inclusion of 'Pakistan Studies' into the national curriculum as a mandatory subject. In some places it replaced social sciences as a subject. This was done to reinforce the Pakistani identity and nationalism in the generation to come. History was rewritten with an even stronger emphasis on the Muslim nationalism in British India and the two nation theory as the ideology of Pakistan. The books of Pakistan studies are basically the official narrative of history, society nationalism and Pakistani identity.

6.2.6 Islamization of Pakistan

Since the Pakistan movement saw the religious identity as Muslims being an import part of the movement, its centrality to the Pakistani identity remained important to the state after Independence as well.

The role of religion in politics and governance in Pakistan was always unclear. The religious narrative was always the part of the rhetoric by AIML leaders and Jinnah himself. But there were no details about how and what would be done to make Pakistan the 'model Islamic democratic country' the path Jinnah chose. Now after independence, Jinnah's speech to the first constituent

assembly, which has been mentioned above, also made sure that the state of Pakistan will be secular in nature. But Jinnah did not live long after independence. One of the ways Islam was used as a symbol of being the true Pakistani was by the migrant population from India against the local population. This was especially visible in East Pakistan where the beliefs of the Bengali population were considered not 'pure' Islam and that it was suffused with the rituals of the Buddhists and Hindus. This was even declared as a threat to the Pakistani identity. After 1971, a number of religious political parties also took charge of reviving the Islamic nature of the Pakistan movement and their struggle for an Islamic Pakistan. This 'hijacking' by the religious elements in the society only became complex with time as the country decided to take part in the cold war. The country saw a wave of religious extremism after the goals of the cold war were achieved while radicalizing a significant portion of the country. This was the start of the sectarian conflict in Pakistan on a bigger scale which added to the problems of conflict the country was already facing.

6.3 The Identity Conflict in Different Provinces

The Pakistan's national identity is based primarily on the religion and that in one way negated all the other aspects of the identity like the language, history, culture, ethnicity or a basis of political rights. This is evident throughout the country's history. But the ethnic identities have stayed very strong both before and after the partition. Moreover, there is no simple way to explain why different ethnic identities came in conflict with the national identity and with other ethnic identities as well. This process of identity conflict had roots in the event of partition and what happened after that but in some cases, like that of the Mohajir identity, it was as late as the 1970s when the Mohajirs got the identity conflict with the national identity. Similarly the different provinces and ethnicities went through a different experience which changed or faded their support for the national identity. Below I will briefly discuss the relationship of the major ethnicities in Pakistan to the state and the Pakistani nationalism and how it changed over time. Also at the end I will use the Barrington's work on Postcolonial nationalism to explain the pattern in Pakistan. Although Pakistan is culturally and ethnically very diverse but I will be considering only the major ethnicities in this part. This will include the people from the tribal areas/FATA, Pashtuns from KPK, Sindhis, Balochis, Punjabis and Urdu speaking ethnic Muhajirs.

6.3.1 East Pakistan:

The founder of Pakistan, Jinnah who also became the first Governor General of the country made it very clear after independence that Urdu will be the national language and refused to accept the Bengali language as a national language although that was the most spoken language in the country at that time. (Khan, 2009)

The Bangla language was very close to the people of East Pakistan and the majority of the population there spoke only Bangla language. The decision to not include their language which was central to Bangladeshi culture, as the national language made them feel left out. The Bengali sub-nationalism after the creation of Pakistan never died down with the state's imposition of the Islamic identity or the Urdu Language. The reasons were economic, cultural, social and political which, with time became severe. What was the reason that the province that gave the most support to Jinnah and Muslim League during the Pakistan movement started to have a conflict with the Pakistani state soon after the independence? As G.S. Choudhry explains it, Bengalis were in majority in terms of population but they had a fear of domination by the minority from the other part of Pakistan. Pakistan was supposed to be a democracy according to Jinnah and a democracy does assure safeguards for regional autonomy, equitable economic development, cultural safeguards and representation in bureaucracy and the military. The first in this series of events that ultimately led to the movement for separation of East Pakistan was the language issue. (Choudury, 1972)

The political order in the newly formed country resembled that of a democracy but as G.S. Choudhry explains that neither the federation nor the parliamentary system was genuine. During the eleven years of this parliamentary democracy, after the independence, there were no elections at all. This failure of the democratic system gave all the power into the hands of an executive that had the help of a bureaucracy and the military. The ruling elite were senior bureaucrats, none of whom were Bengalis, even though Bengalis made up more than half of the country's population. (Choudury, 1972) This small ruling elite which was composed of senior bureaucrats and military officers ingrained this sense of deprivation in the Bengalis over the years as they were not part of any decision making process and even the key posts inside Bangladesh were held by officers from West Pakistan. The Bengalis saw the change of faces

from the British to the West Pakistan's elite ruling them on both federal as well provincial levels with little to no Bengali representation.

Choudhury also explains how the superior 'Muslim Identity' became a problem here as well. There was little contact between the East and West Pakistanis. And the people from East Pakistanis were considered socially lower the Pakistanis from the other part of the country. They even called the Bengalis 'not real Muslims' and 'converts from lower cast Hindus' (Choudury, 1972). This result was obvious; the Bengalis held on to their sub-national Bengali identity even more firmly and a feeling of bitterness and animosity towards the West Pakistan and the government. The nationalism or patriotism can flourish only when you are given part in resources and a responsibility to share. Besides common faith, there was hardly any bond between the people be it social, cultural, ethno-linguistic between the people of East and West Pakistan. With time, the people of Bangladesh and specially a lot of university students became aware of the importance of region which in some cases was more than the religion. Bengalis had supported the movement of Pakistan but the shallow slogans of Islamic Ideology along with the economic, social and political injustices made the ideological connection fade away. Choudhury believes that the most serious challenge to Pakistani nationalism was the disparity in terms of economics that the two parts of Pakistan faced. According to the government of Pakistan's estimates in 1960, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 32 percent higher than its Eastern wing during 1959-1960. In 1969-1970, the per capita income in West Pakistan was 61 percent higher. (Choudury, 1972) In ten years, the economic gap doubled, the sense of deprivation had to follow.

Keeping in view of the social treatment, almost no representation and a huge income disparity between the two parts of Pakistan, it was no surprise that the Bangladeshi nationalism grew stronger with time. The political leaders in East Pakistan criticized the government policies and easily won people's support. Jinnah's Two Nation Theory believed that the Muslims of India are different from the Hindus in every aspect of life. While it might have been true for the Northern Indian Muslims to some extent, the majority of the Muslims and Hindus who were ethnically Bengali had a lot more in common than the differences. Apart from religion, there was not a lot that wasn't common with the Bengali Hindus. On the other hand, with the West Pakistanis, Bengalis had nothing in common besides the Muslim faith and that was not strong enough bond

to keep the two parts together. Especially after the severe continued disparities between the two parts of the country.

6.3.2 FATA

A more problematic region to handle for the British was the Tribal region bordering Afghanistan. This area had an acute problem of rebellion and militancy. This is why the British ruled this region through the tribal elders and not directly. After partition this region was called Federally Administrated Tribal Area (FATA). This remained a semi-autonomous region of Pakistan which was treated uniquely as late as 2018. This region includes seven tribal regions and six tribal agencies in the bordering region with Afghanistan. This region caused trouble for the British during the colonial period as well. The British controlled the regions with a set of laws specially made for this region which were called Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). These regulations were only made to control the areas and contain any kind of rebellion. The local ethnic Pashtun population supported the movement for an autonomous region of 'Pashtunistan' during the partition which was rejected by the British Government. After the creation of Pakistan, the government kept treating the region with the exactly the same way as the British did. The Pakistani state never gave it an equal status as rest of the provinces and this hard to govern area remained semi-autonomous. These areas became problematic for the state in the late 1990s and early 2000s when a military movement of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) declared a religious fight (jihad) against the state of Pakistan and its people after 9/11. They started launching its attacks throughout Pakistan. It was specially had to deal with this militia because there was no rule of law in the tribal region of FATA anyways. The state of Pakistan never tried to integrate that region to the rest of the country until as late as 2018 when efforts are being made to include it into the province of KPK.

A movement that is more recent is spearheaded almost entirely by the Youth of the tribal regions is the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) or the Movement to Protect Pashtuns. The leaders of PTM argue that the state of Pakistan have used the ethnic Pashtuns to further its foreign policy goals first in Afghanistan and then in the tribal regions of Pakistan. PTM blames the state and its security apparatus for the failure to control TTP in FATA. This movement has seen a surge in the years 2017 onwards. This movement has various dimensions but the most important one is that it shows how strong, even after 70 years of Independence, the ethnic identities in Pakistan are.

Trying to understand the PTM and the mindset behind it, one discovers that the people of the tribal areas have never been treated as part of Pakistan. The British legacy of controlling an ‘ungovernable region’ continued after the partition as well. There is no state infrastructure in this area like schools, roads or hospitals. The tribal people were encouraged, trained and armed to take part in Kashmir war in 1947, in the war of 1965 and also during the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. (Ali T. , 2003) The claim by the PTM is that the state never gave development, protection or any kinds of basic facilities to these tribal regions and just used them for its own goals that were not in the interest of the people of the tribal areas. The tribal region is composed of mostly Pashtuns whose ethnic identity has always been very strong. This is the first time in a long time that a purely ethnic national movement is challenging the state from the tribal region.

6.3.3 The Pashtuns

In Pakistan, the *Pashtuns* or *Pathans* make up about 40 million of the 210 million people of the country. This ethnic group has members both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. During the British rule, there was a temporary border established by the British in 1893 called the Durand Line that separated the current Pashtun regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Racine, 2010) The British in India recruited people into the military based on the concept of ‘martial races’ which meant that they considered some races better in terms of physical strength and fighting abilities than the other. These included primarily the Rajputs, Punjabis, Sikhs and in a smaller percentage Pashtuns as well. So the military in Pakistan always had some Pashtun representation. (Paracha N. F., 2017) After the partition, the Pakistani military was majorly Punjabi. The Pashtuns were recruited in the military in more numbers for two reasons. First was the continuation of the colonial concept of the ‘martial races’. Second, the Pashtuns historically had been a difficult region to rule. The British had struggled to rule over this region as well. This was also done for better integration of the people of Pashtun ethnicity as the state treated it as a threat. During the partition, the leader of the Pakistani Pashtun region declared that he supported an independent region for the Pakhtuns and boycotted the referendum which resulted in the region added to the Pakistani territory in 1947. Ghafar Khan’s son started a political party in Pakistan named as the Awami National Party (ANP) in 1957 maintaining a progressive outlook and evoking Pashtun nationalism. ANP over the years called for limited federal power and more resource allocation to the provinces through provincial governments. It also called for recognition of local identities, culture and linguistics and even reorganization of the federal units based on these factors. The

ANP had mostly presence only in the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) a name given by the British and remained unchanged until 2010. The name of the province was changed to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) only after ANP came to power in the province. The state of Pakistan had been against an ethnic based name for decades especially for the province of KPK as it could help Afghanistan in its claim to the region. In recent years, the movement that started to protect the people of the tribal regions of Pakistan from the state's atrocities changed its name to Pakhtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM). This movement has been giving the narrative that the Pakistani state apparatus, specially the military is primarily dominated by the Punjabis. And the Pashtuns in Afghanistan, KPK and in the tribal regions of Pakistan have been used only to further Pakistani state's interest and foreign policy. This movement has picked up a lot of support from the Pashtuns in different parts of Pakistan, specially the youth from the tribal regions. The state of Pakistan has been treating it as a threat to the national security specially if it gathers support from the Pashtun population of the KPK. Various members of the movement have been tried in the court for terrorism charges and even threatened to be tried with treason charges. (Newyork Times, 2019)

6.3.4 The Balochs

Baluchistan is the region mostly populated by ethnic Balochs as well as Pakhtuns. This is the least populated province of Pakistan which is the largest in size. It also is the province of Pakistan that has seen recurring militant movements which have a basis in ethnicity. There are movements that demanded a greater share in power and resources, major portion of which goes to Punjab. On the other hand some militant movements like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) openly call for succession and even challenge the inclusion of Baluchistan into Pakistan. This province specifically has a very nationalist sentiment. And whenever a democratic government is formed, Baluchistan has chosen nationalist parties and leaders. The situation in the province can also be assessed that during the 70 year history of Pakistan, Baluchistan has seen five major conflicts and a military operations as response to date.

These movements have been contained by the Pakistani state several times and at time there was a temporary political solution and other time, use of forces but the movements have never been eradicated completely. In 1980s and 1990, a big number of Afghan refugees came to Pakistan and a number of them settled in Baluchistan. The Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan were not

really welcomed by the ethnic Balochs as they considered the Afghan Pashtuns outsiders and not Pakistanis. In 1999, General Musharraf, after a coup took over the power reigns. He launched a development plan to expand a deep sea port of Gwadar. This also sparked opposition from the ethnic Balochis who accused the ethnic Punjabis of stealing all the Baloch resources and colonizing the province. And Baluchistan saw another military operation in 2006 with its most popular leader, Nawab Akbar Bugti getting killed in the operation. This sparked massive protests and a fresh wave of Baloch nationalism. In 2006 report of Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, the situation in Baluchistan is described as war-like and the reasons being political as well as economic. (HRCP, 2006)

6.3.5 The Sindhis

It was after the separation of the East Pakistan that the Baloch and Sindh ethnic nationalism started to gain momentum. They pressed for a more territorial Pakistani identity rather than the state promoted Muslim nationalism. This tendency garnered even more support after Bhutto won in a landslide victory in 1970. The Sindh nationalism was refuel and so were the ethnic tension between the Urdu speaking migrants and the Sindh nationalists. The province of Sindh has the city of Karachi that has become a melting pot of different ethnicities, Karachi has historically been the center of business and it still is today. The ethnic problem with Sindh is that Karachi being a business hub generated most of the wealth and taxes. But when it comes to spending, the province of Sindh always chooses the ethnic Sindh leaders who are not from Karachi and they spend mostly on their own cities and villages. This has created ethnic tensions for a long time now.

6.3.6 The Mohajirs/Urdu Speaking People

The word 'Mohajir' means a refugee or a migrant in Urdu. Mohajir identity as a means of politics is central to the ethnic conflict in the city of Karachi. The shift of the Mohajirs away from the Pakistani identity and reviving the Mohajir identity was based in the competition for resources and deprivation. A central point of change in Mohajir identity in terms of politics was the Cold War and influx of millions of refugees in Pakistan. A large number of them settled in Karachi and the city saw a competition for limited resources. Moreover, the Mohajirs historically were the most enthusiast supporters of the Pakistani nationalism. Their support for the Pakistani nationalism also made more sense because they were in leading positions in administration and bureaucracy. As this hegemony was challenged with the bureaucracy getting slowly dominated

by the Punjabis, they could no longer enjoy all the positions of power, the Pakistani nationalism also faded. This was replaced by the Mohajir nationalism. This is when Mohajir Qoumi Movement (MQM) emerged, to protect the rights of the Mohajir nation. Since the Mohajirs had come from different regions of India, the only point of similarity that could be used was the Urdu language. The industrialization of Pakistan, which was mostly focused in Karachi during the 1960s, gave a lot of opportunities to the Mohajirs living there. During the 1970s however, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was a Sindhi, introduced the process of nationalization which stalled industrial growth and the Mohajir industrialists were hit hard. During the cold war, as mentioned above, things became worse for the Mohajirs with the increasing influx of Afghan refugees, Punjabi speakers and Pashtuns started taking part in the business in Karachi. So today Karachi is the center for ethnic conflict with almost all major ethnicities of Pakistan present in one city and competing for resources.

6.3.7 Punjab

According to the census of 1951, the Punjabi made up one fourth of the population of Pakistan. (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1951) Like the Mohajirs in the bureaucracy, Punjabis occupied 80 percent of the posts in the military. Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the military started running affairs for the country in the background. In 1958, it did not remain in the background anymore; it came to the front screen with the military take over. This gave the Punjab dominated military a chance to rise to power eventually. Punjabis were also a big part of the bureaucracy. During partition, they made up a bigger part (55%) of the bureaucracy, even more than the Mohajirs. (Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, 1951) Another area of dominance was agriculture. Pakistan has remained an agrarian society and that's the biggest profession in Pakistan. Punjabis benefitted a lot from the canal system established by the British as well as the green revolution of the 1960s. The Mohajirs who were a very small group in terms of numbers were dominating the bureaucracy but Punjab although making 1/4th part of the total population were still over-represented in the military as well as the bureaucracy. The two ethnicities did dominate the affairs of the country but there were stark difference in the way they thought and worked. Punjabis were mostly from the rural areas of British India and depended mostly on the government jobs like the civil service or the military. Mohajirs on the other hand were working more for the private sectors, as business men or professionals. They had a more liberal mindset and kept the Islamic identity pretty close to them. The source of national identity in the Punjab

was often with the anti-India sentiment. Before partition, they were mostly anti-Hindu Congress because of their belief that it was posing threat to Islam. This conservative and anti-India mindset stayed after the partition as well. The state-oriented mindset of the Punjabis differed from the secular and liberal mindset of the Mohajirs. After the two major leaders of Pakistan, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali passed away within four years of independence, the Mohajirs also lost ground to the Punjabis. Another reason was the rising interference of the military in politics. The shift of power to the Punjabis was materialized after the shift of the capital from Karachi to a city in Punjab, Rawalpindi and later on to Islamabad. Although within three decades of independence, the Mohajir dominance almost completely faded from the bureaucracy but the national identity that was once created by the Mohajir elite stayed. This was also possible because Punjabis supported the creation of Pakistan and the two nation theory, the Muslim Pakistani identity continues as the official identity in Pakistan.

6.3.8 Conclusion

From the above discussion, it is more clear how the different ethnic groups in Pakistan had an together different treatment in the newly formed country. But the more the ethnic groups were represented; there were lesser conflicts of that group with the state. The various contradictions during the Pakistan movement also continued after independence. For example, in the Lahore resolution, it was stated that the different provinces of Pakistan will enjoy autonomy and sovereignty which never happened. Similarly in the constitution of 1956, it was mentioned that Pakistan will be a Federal Republic. This, in practice never happened. Instead, the Punjabi dominated political establishment kept the country very centralized. The conflict in the provinces as explained individually above can be explained through Barrington's work on 'Postcolonial nationalism' which has been mentioned in the theoretical framework part of this thesis. Barrington has mentioned different patterns he can see in the postcolonial nations.

6.3.9 In the light of Barrington's Post Colonialism nationalism

He also categorizes two kinds of postcolonial nations. The first case is of the nations that have been able to forge a national unity. These involve political systems that consolidate a strong civic nationalism. This also indicates ties among the political elites representing different political or ethnic groups. In a number of examples of such nations, the political elites have established inclusive regimes where power sharing is based on negotiation, accommodation and the

recognition of autonomy. Another aspect is that of the dual civic and ethnic identities. In this regard, the nationalist movement and its results will depend on whether the national leaders are able to mobilize people in their preferred political direction or not. (Barrington, 2006)

The second pattern is of the nations where civic nationalist unity becomes weak over time in the face of ethnic nationalism. This can happen as Barrington argues because of the mismatch between the territorial/national and the ethnic nationalism during the colonial period extent to the period after independence as well. He also puts the ill-advised designs and placements of the national borders by the British rulers responsible for the evolution on nationalism and the strife in the postcolonial states on ethnic grounds.

The example of India shows how the 580 princely states that were inside the territorial boundaries of India were immediately annulled and new provincial boundaries were established that did not coincide with the older boundaries. This initially became the reason for a few insurgencies but with time, the new boundary structuring seemed to have reduced the tensions between the different ethnic and political regions.

In contrast, the Pakistani state kept most of the state boundaries set up by the British as such for most of its history. The state of Pakistan has always been hesitant to give ethnic based names to provinces as well. The prime example is the province of KPK, it was called the North-West Frontier Province as late NWFP as 2010. The above mentioned problems in FATA also emerged mostly because the newly formed country never tried to make it a separate province or since the population of this region is so close culturally and socially to Pashtuns, it should have been merged in the KPK but it ruled as the same they the colony was ruling the people.

Another prime example of these demarcations by the British that were never changed by the new state is of Sindh. The dynamics of the city have been mentioned above and after the 1980s the ethnic tensions have been high. The Sindh is the 2nd most populous region of Pakistan and Karachi alone has a population of over 20 million. Karachi is politically and administratively different from Sindh. A big reason for the tussle for power in Sindh is also because almost every time, the rulers of Karachi are not elected by the people of Karachi. Since they win from Sindh province they govern the city of Karachi as well. This creates ethnic problems and Karachi

should long have been a province of its own but it was never changed. Once again Barrington's explanation goes valid here as well.

Another characteristic such states also have commonly is that the ethnic groups that are in power, favor the people of the same ethnicities and other ethnic groups feeling deprived and discriminated. This causes tensions between the ethnic groups and the weaker ethnic groups will call for more rights, autonomy or succession (Barrington, 2006)

The example of Pakistan also shows the same. As mentioned earlier, the ruling elite of Pakistan comprised of migrants from India who made up most of the bureaucracy and the government. At this point, there was little to no representation of the ethnic Bengalis, Balochis, Pashtuns and Sindhis in the government, military or bureaucracy. The Punjabis however made up a big part of the military. The problem was very serious for the East Pakistan that comprised majorly of the Ethnic Bengalis. They made up more than half of the population of the country and were severely under presented in any kind of power sharing structure. Most of the Pakistani senior bureaucracy was made up of ethnic migrants and none of them were from Bangladesh. It goes the same with the military as well. Pakistani military continued the British legacy with the martial races and excluded Bengalis from the military as well. During the 1971 operation in East Pakistan, there were no Ethnic Bengal Officers in the military top brass. (Choudury, 1972)

Now if you look at what Barrington says about the post-colonial states, you can see that explaining the situation in Pakistan as well. These ethnic groups specially the Bengalis, taking advantage of their numbers started asking for recognition of language, more autonomy and representation. This was not responded well by the central government and as discussed in detail above, the East Pakistan separated from the West and became Bangladesh.

Another aspect is that the mismatch between the territorial/national and the ethnic nationalism that was present during the colonial period can extent to the period after independence as well. If we look at the case of Pakistan, we can see this pattern in Bangladesh, Baluchistan as well as in the FATA/tribal regions. The relations of a number of ethnic groups were strained already with the British colonial powder. But the new state of Pakistan kept the same policy of ruling and controlling instead of governance based on democratic values. A prime example of this is how the state of Pakistan has treated the tribal region over time. As late as 2018, the tribal region was

still controlled on the basis of Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR). This special set of laws was a British invention to control the insurgency in the region. The Pakistani state never tried to change that. No efforts were made to include that region into the rest of the Pakistan giving it a status of a province and establishing a government. Compare this with the treatment of the province of Punjab which was mostly loyal to the British and British rewarded it by giving a lot of land to the people there and recruiting more Punjabis in the military than any other ethnicity. The same patterns and the same strained relations continued after the partition which created ethnic tensions and conflicts.

6.3.10 State-Nation vs. Nation-State Approach

Nationalist Movements become successful when the nationalist goals of the elite also coincide with the goals of the masses. If the leaders are able to make policies and nationalist goals that are also shared by the belief system and values of the society and culture in general, the nationalist movement can organically succeed. (Walker, 1990)

The nation-state and the state nation approaches have been described in detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Looking in the light of the political-institution approaches, the Pakistani state has mostly adopted a nation-state approach where various form of social pressures are used to create a unitary national identity. This can be analyzed looking at the roots in how the country was created and the aftermath of events of the partition as well. After the creation of Pakistan, we had discussed in detail above, how differences that were ignored during the movement of Pakistan started to rise again. The reason was that these were

As the work by Juan et al. (2004) shows that in countries that have more than one territorially based, linguistic, cultural majority is present, if the political leaders try to homogenize the state with one culture and one language, it would not have worked. The participatory democratic, individual rights and inclusivity would never be achieved. In these cases, the policy response of accommodation and participation often results in the constitutional protection in the form of asymmetrical federalism. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004)

Now we take a look at Pakistan, the country has almost always taken the nation-state approach. We have discussed the circumstances where the Muslims in the South Asia briefly came together, ignoring their differences, to get rid of the British colonial rule and from the Hindu

majority in India. The country as a result of partition was extremely diverse. All five provinces of Pakistan named NWFP, Bengal, Baluchistan, Punjab and Sindh had a territorially based, cultural and linguistic majority. The newly formed government chose a nation-state approach where it used the flawed concept of a Muslim nation in British India and tried to impose it on the inhabitants of the new country. Pakistani state has used all three routes for the imposing one socio-cultural identity over all the others present in the country as mentioned by Juan et al. (2004)

- (1) States using policies with the nation-state approach will attempt to privilege one identity over other sociocultural identities that have a potential of political mobility. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004)

In context of Pakistan, I have explained in detail above, how the slogans of one faith, one language, and one nation were intentionally popularized after independence. This was done completely ignoring the 23% of the religious minorities living in Pakistan at that time. (Jalal, *The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics*, 2014)

Moreover, Urdu language was made the national language and was imposed on a population where only 4% of the people knew how to use it. Hence being the Urdu speaking Muslim Pakistani identity was privileged over all other socio-cultural identities.

- (2) The people who do not share the allegiance are encouraged to assimilate voluntarily. At times, states also use various sorts of social pressures that force you to assimilate, which also involves destroying alternative cultures. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004)

One of the ethnic groups that did not share the allegiance was the province of Bengal, which was later called East Pakistan. Since they resisted the imposition of Urdu as a source of identity since the partition, a source of social pressure was making Urdu the only national language. This was not only a source of social pressure but also a political pressure. Bengalis had to learn Urdu language if they wanted to be part of the government structure or the bureaucracy.

The second route above also mentions ‘destroying alternate cultures’. One example of destroying alternate cultures was forcing the Bengalis to learn Urdu language and more serious than that was the attempt to change the Bengali language’s way of writing. The government of Pakistan

wanted the Bengali language to be written in Arabic transcript instead the Sanskrit. This would've changed the soul of the Bangla language and Bengalis considered it as an attack on the Bengali culture itself. The people of Bengal gave a strong reaction to it after which the decision was reversed. (Paracha N. F., 2017)

(3) In extreme cases, it can even involve violence or ethnic cleansing. (Juan J, Alfred, & Yogendra, 2004)

Once again, we can use the example of Bengal or East Pakistan. The language controversy had sparked protests in Dhaka, the capital of East Pakistan in 1952. The state used violence against the students where three students of University of Dhaka were killed. This fueled the already growing Bengali nationalism and in a less than two decades, the Bengali leaders openly demanded complete autonomy from the West Pakistan. The mandate of the East Pakistani people was rejected in 1971 which started an insurgency in West Pakistan. This was answered with brute force and unnecessary use of violence. The result of incalculable loss of human life which some even called a genocide of ethnic Bengalis. The estimates are of between 300,000-3,000,000 Bengalis being killed and roughly 10 million fleeing to India as refugees. (D'Costa, 2012)

One reason East Pakistan fits perfectly in the description by Juan et al. (2004) is because it has the strongest socio-cultural tendencies for ethnic nationalism other than the one propagated by the state of Pakistan. This is not visible in the same way or with the same strength in other ethnic groups in Pakistan because of a number of reasons. First, the Bengalis were a majority group and it was hard to impose an identity of a small minority on the biggest ethnic group in Pakistan i.e. Bengalis. The province of Baluchistan has and even today has a very strong sense of the ethnic identity but the state tried to contain it through the tribal elders there who are rewarded for their loyalty with the state. (HRCP, 2006) As far as the other provinces are concerned, they have been accommodated in one way or the other. The province of Punjab has the most representation in the military as well as bureaucracy. The ethnic Mohajirs have been leading the bureaucracy and government for decades. Till the time, they were enjoying the power in bureaucracy; there was no show of Mohajir nationalism or movement. Pashtuns are also encouraged to participate in the military as well as the civil bureaucracy. So the state of Pakistan instead of giving constitutional protection to all the diverse ethnic groups and using asymmetric federalism has only tried to accommodate the bigger and stronger ethnic groups and contain the smaller ones.

Now, had the state of Pakistan followed the state-nation model where all the ethnic groups of Pakistan were recognized, accommodated and allowed to participate in government, the state of Pakistan would not need the ambiguous idea of Muslim nationalism and 'two nation theory' it still tries to hold on to. Juan et al. (2004) believes that if the states with major socio-cultural and ethnic identities implement safeguards for them in the constitution and accommodate and recognize them socially and politically, with time, this can take the form of a shared culture of inclusivity and shared culture with attachment to the state symbols. They've called the result of this 'constitutional patriotism'. Thus to keep the countries with ethnically diverse groups of people united in one democratic system, along with the safeguards some special prerogatives that respond to the different social, cultural demands and ethnic or historical identities.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The above discussion provides us with a few conclusions.

1. The Pakistani national identity lacks a solid base and is more of an empty slogan raised by the rulers of the country to further their interests and trying to unite the country on one platform. The Pakistani nationalism based on Islamic identity and Urdu language is not shared by the different ethnicities completely. Even in future, the country can see a number of ethnic nationalist movements because the factors that cause them are still there.
2. The territory of Pakistan does not have one 'nation' as propagated by the state of Pakistan. Pakistan has a diverse range of ethnicities that have a very strong bond with their ethnic background, language and culture.
3. The state of Pakistan has been using the 'nation-state' approach to create a unifying identity in a country of highly diverse ethnic identities which has been proved to be problematic.
4. The nation-state policy by the state of Pakistan after independence has cost the country dearly as it has lost half of its part in the form of Bangladesh not to mention the countless lives lost. This approach has also started a number of ethnic conflicts in different parts of the country.

5. The ethnic conflict with the national identity in Pakistan can be explained the work on 'postcolonial nationalism' by Barrington (2006)
6. The way forward to deal with the ethnic conflicts is through decentralizing power, giving the provinces autonomy and responsibility, inclusion in democratic process, recognition and representation of all ethnic groups in the country.

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