

Introduction:

On May 12 2016, Dilma Rousseff left the presidential palace in Brasilia after the country's Senate had voted to commence impeachment procedures against her. Delivering a brief speech to supporters, she lambasted the 'coup' against her and the Brazilian democracy, and pointed an accusatory finger at her vice-president for five years, Michel Temer.¹ Temer was indeed the first person to benefit from her fall, assuming office as president the same day.

It may have been forgotten during the current period of unusual democratic stability in Latin America, but Rousseff's accusations against her deputy, together with recent similar processes in countries such as Paraguay and Guatemala, resonate well with the history of the vice presidency in the region. Often labelled 'a magnet for conspiracies',² or a 'coup-maker on a state salary',³ the office has repeatedly been found at the centre of real or imagined coups and intrigues to oust sitting presidents.

Such accusations may, in turn, stem from the fact that Latin American presidents have often had vice-presidents who come from outside of their own parties. As we will demonstrate, presidencies with such 'external' vice-presidents are almost three times as likely to suffer interruptions such as coups and impeachments than are those who have a designated successor with the same partisan background as the president.

1. See for instance *Folha de São Paulo*, May 16 2016.

2. J. Lloyd Meecham, 'Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real.' *The Journal of Politics*, 21:2, (1959), pp. 258-275.

3. See Ariel D Sribman, *La Vicepresidencia Argentina (1983-2009)*, *Cadernos de Estudos Latino-Americanos*. (Porto: Edições Universidade Fernando Pessoa, 2011), p. 9

There is thus reason to believe that the vice presidency matters, and in this article, we give an account of the institution's historical evolution and current role in Latin America. More specifically, we study how vice-presidents have been elected and what role they have played during government crises. Over time, we thus observe a regional tendency towards electoral systems that should promote greater political congruence between the president and the vice-president, and, hence, decrease the likelihood of conflicts between the two. In today's Latin American democracies, however, electoral considerations have often led presidential candidates to pick running mates from outside of their own political party. By doing so, however, presidential candidates may unwittingly be reinforcing a source of potential tension that constitution-makers in Latin America have historically tried to abolish.

Yet, our argument is not that the vice-presidency is the primary cause of such instability. Rather, we believe that the institution represents an unjustly overlooked intermediary variable and possible causal mechanism in the relationship between presidentialism, political instability and factors such as party fragmentation. Accordingly, the principal purpose of this essay is to provide an empirical and analytical description of the vice presidency in Latin America and its relationship to the presidency, thereby demonstrating its political relevance in general, and its relevance for the literature on presidentialism and governance in particular. In doing so, we are in a sense juxtaposing two positions with regard to the vice presidency; one that presents the institution as mostly inconsequential, and one that sees it as an important factor for understanding the outcome of government crises in the presidential regimes of Latin America. But above all our approach is inductive, as we attempt to use our overview of the vice-presidency to formulate some initial propositions regarding when and how the institution may

matter, and point to further lines of inquiry into the vice presidency, its role and significance, and its relevance for studies of presidentialism in Latin America.

Previous studies and our data:

Vice-presidents are often dismissed as irrelevant and have rarely been the focus of systematic academic enquiry and consideration. There are exceptions to this neglect, however. For instance, Juan Linz indicated the risk that the vice presidency may bring an unqualified or unpopular politician to the presidency.⁴ Similarly, Shugart and Carey briefly discuss the possible benefits and disadvantages of having a vice-president, and the merits of different forms of electing its titular (they conclude that the best solution is no vice presidency and a special election to fill presidential vacancies).⁵ But there is to our knowledge no systematic comparative study of the office's political role neither in normal political times, nor in times of crisis, and one searches in vain for the inclusion of this variable in most systematic cross-national studies of different aspects of Latin American presidentialism.⁶

4. Juan Linz, 'The Perils of Presidentialism'. *Journal of Democracy*. 1:1 (1990), pp. 51-69; Juan Linz, 'Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?', in *The Failure of Presidential democracy*, edited by Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), ch. 1, pp. 32-34.

5. Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 91-93. See also, Joseph Uscinski: 'Smith (and Jones) Go to Washington: Democracy and Vice-Presidential Selection'. *Political Science and Politics*, 45:1, (2012), pp. 58-66.

6. See e.g., Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern (eds.): *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State

Even so, individual vice-presidential offices in Latin America have lately received increased scholarly attention, possibly due to the prominent role some of them have played in a number of recent presidential crises. Such studies, which tend to be inspired by the US literature on the

University Press, 2008); Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart (eds): *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); José Antonio Cheibub, *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Aníbal Pérez-Liñán: *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Taylor C. Boas: *Presidential Campaigns in Latin America: Electoral Strategies and Success Contagion*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). See also Sérgio H. Abranches, 'Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro', *Dados*, 31:1 (1988), pp. 5-34; David Altman "The Politics of Coalition Formation and Survival in Multi-Party Presidential Democracies: The Case of Uruguay, 1989-1999", *Party Politics*, 6 (3), 2000, pp. 259-83; Jorge Lanzaro (ed.) *Tipos de presidencialismo y coaliciones políticas en América Latina*. (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2001). For exceptions, however, see Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet: 'Conclusion: Presidential Breakdowns Revisited' in Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet (eds.) *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 213-228, and Kathryn Hochstetler and David Samuels, 'Crisis and Rapid Reequilibration: The Consequences of Presidential Challenge and Failure in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, 43 (2), 2011, pp. 127-145. Another recent, but partial, exception can also be found in Germán Bidegain, 'Vicepresidentes en América del Sur: Una agenda de investigación', *Colombia Internacional*, 89, (2017), pp. 159-188.

institution, fall mostly within the fields of political history and law.⁷ Although they often contain considerable empirical information, there is often little of theoretical and comparative insight in these case-studies.

The Argentine vice presidency is perhaps the most studied vice-presidential office in Latin America, which may be because it is also the oldest such institution in continuous existence in the region.⁸ The Argentine studies have focused either on the relationship between the president

7. For Argentina, see Mario D. Serrafiero, *El poder y su sombra. Los vicepresidentes* (Buenos Aires: Fundación Editorial de Belgrano, 1999); Mario D. Serrafiero, 'Vicepresidencia efimera y ruptura anunciada: el caso de la Alianza', in *Anales de la Academica Nacional de Ciencias Morales y Políticas* (Buenos Aires: Academica Nacional de Ciencias Morales y Políticas, 2007); and Sribman, *La Vicepresidencia....* For Uruguay, see Pablo Mieres, 'Las candidaturas vicepresidenciales en las campañas electorales. El caso de Uruguay 2009'. Paper presented to the 4to Congreso Uruguayo de ciencia política, Montevideo, November 2012. For Mexico, see Diego Valadés, 'La sustitución presidencial en México y en derecho comparado' in *Documento de Trabajo. Derecho Constitucional*, (México, D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2004). For a recent comparative analysis, see Pablo Mieres and Ernesto Pampín, 'La trayectoria de los vicepresidentes en los regímenes presidencialistas de América', *Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época)*, 167 (2015), pp. 101-134.

8. See Nelson Castro, *La sorprendente historia de los vicepresidentes argentinos* (Buenos Aires: Ediciones B. Argentina, 2009); Serrafiero, *El poder y su sombra...*; Serrafiero, "Vicepresidencia efimera..."; Sribman, *La Vicepresidencia....*

and the vice-president, or on the historical and institutional development of the office.⁹ With exception of the more journalistic account of Nelson Castro,¹⁰ the role of vice-presidents during presidential crises has received less attention in Argentina.

In Bolivia, former vice-president, and subsequent president Carlos Mesa directed a project on the vice presidency, which focused mainly on the institution's history,¹¹ and in countries such as Colombia and Brazil one can find shorter articles about the office and its inclusion or exclusion in various constitutions throughout history.¹² Likewise in Mexico, even though the vice presidency was abolished in 1917, there has lately been a constitutional and legal discussion focused on whether or not there is a need for such an institution. While some observers point to the country's troublesome history with the office, others have focused on the

9. Serrafiero (*El poder y su sombra...*) offers the most comprehensive study of the vice presidency of any Latin American country to date, analysing the vice presidency from its inception in Argentina in 1853, elections of presidents and vice-presidents, the role of vice-presidents in government, and the relationship during both normal times and crisis, between the president and vice-president.

10. Castro, *La Sorprendente Historia...* 2009.

11. Gustavo Aliaga P. et al. *El Vicepresidente ¿La sombra del poder?* (La Paz: Vicepresidencia de la República, 2003).

12. Hernán Alejandro Olano García, 'La vicepresidencia de la república en la historia constitucional de Colombia', *Quid Iuris*, 27, 2015, pp. 133-196; Alcides de Mendonça Lima, 'O vice-presidente da república na constituição federal de 1946.' <http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/rda/article/viewFile/11036/10016>.

need for clear rules for presidential succession during times of instability, and hence argued for reinstalling the vice presidency.¹³

Although we are convinced there is more literature on the vice presidency in the various countries in Latin America than we have been able to find and review, we believe that there is still an absence of systematic studies on the institution. Given the reputation for political meddling that the vice presidency has traditionally enjoyed in Latin America, and the recent and historic instability of the continent's presidential regimes, we find this lacuna puzzling. The following pages are an attempt to remedy this absence by providing an overview of the institution and the role that it has filled in the politics of the continent. In doing so, we draw on data from two unique recent datasets on vice presidencies in Latin America.¹⁴

The first one deals with the vice presidency and the rules of succession in Latin American constitutions since independence. Data comes from 188 constitutions and 68 constitutional

13. María del Pilar Hernández, 'Sobre la sustitución presidencial' in *Estudios Jurídicos en Homenaje a Marta Morineau. Sistemas jurídicos contemporáneos. Derecho Comparado. Temas diversos*, ed. Nuria González Martín (Mexico, D.F: UNAM, 2006), pp 409-439. Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, 'Creación de una vicepresidencia en México', in *Gobernabilidad y Constitucionalismo en América Latina*, ed. Diego Valadés, (México D.F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2003), pp. 251-252; Diego Valadés, 'La sustitución presidencial en México y en derecho comparado', in *Documento de Trabajo. Derecho Constitucional*. (México, D.F.: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2004).

14. For a description of the data-bases, see the appendix. For a detailed list of the sources used to build each dataset, please contact the authors.

amendments relating to the rules of succession.¹⁵ The second dataset focuses on the political relationship between presidents and their vice-presidents,¹⁶ and on the occurrence of political crises and ‘presidential interruptions’.¹⁷ It covers democratic countries in Latin America in the

15. The Latin American Presidential Succession and Vice Presidency database (LAPSVP) focuses on whether there is a designated successor (vice-president or *designado*) or not; the line of succession; how the successor is elected; the mode of succession (permanent/temporary); the duties of the successor/vice-president; re-election rules for president and successor; and other related variables. The database includes all constitutions since independence with exception of constitutions under the Central American Federation and Panamá before it became independent in 1904. For further information, see the appendix.

16. This classification is essentially made on the basis of political positions and party affiliations in the period immediately before the electoral period. Accordingly, presidents and their deputies may be coded as coming from different parties even if the two candidates nominally appear as a joint coalition in the election or even if the vice-president comes to integrate the president’s party for the election. As long as the vice-president belongs to an identifiable party that had a separate existence until immediately before the electoral period, this is coded as an “external” vice-presidential candidate, the same is the case with persons who were clearly political independents prior to their inclusion on a presidential ticket. The reason for this backward-looking classification is that classification based on position during the electoral campaign or in office may understate differences, as the president and the vice-president may have a clear interest to appear more united than they really are.

17. A presidential interruption, or breakdown, can be defined as the premature termination of a presidency, but which has not led to a simultaneous democratic breakdown. For analyses of the concept and phenomenon, see e.g. Kathryn Hochstetler, ‘Rethinking Presidentialism:

period from 1978 to 2015 and contains information on 114 presidencies and 214 combinations of presidential and vice-presidential candidates.¹⁸

These databases provide us with unique systematic data for Latin America in its entirety on the methods for electing vice-presidents and on the relationship between them and their presidents. Below we use this evidence to present an account of the historical evolution of the vice-presidency from independence onwards, and to analyse the role of the vice presidency during recent (1978-2016) elections and government crises in democratic Latin America. Our approach in this regard is primarily comparative, as we juxtapose different classes of countries and vice-presidencies with each other, in order to see how the vice presidency interacts with different factors in its political environment.

The Origins of the Latin American vice presidency:

In adopting republican constitutions, the newly independent states of America faced the twin problem of how to select a head of state and how to make provisions for succession in case those rulers would become incapacitated. In the tumultuous years after independence, several mechanisms were tried for the former task. Simón Bolívar proposed a president for life for

Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America', *Comparative Politics*, 38:4, (2006), pp. 401-418; and Pérez-Liñán, *Presidential Impeachment...*

18. Note that Peru, Costa Rica and (until recently) Panama have a system with double vice-presidents (a system that has also been employed in other countries historically, e.g. in Bolivia following the 1880 revision of the 1878 Constitution). In the following analysis we report on the first vice-presidents. As the order of succession between the vice-presidents is set, this does not affect the conclusions below. For further information on the data-base, see the appendix.

Bolivia in 1826, and later installed a dictatorship in Gran Colombia in 1828, and Mexico attempted a monarchy under Iturbide in 1822. With the exception of the Brazilian monarchy, all such experiences were short-lived. Under inspiration from French Enlightenment thinking and the example of the United States, the constitutional solution that eventually prevailed was presidential systems with direct or indirect, periodic elections of the head of state.

Following the U.S. example, presidential succession in Latin America, in turn, was often entrusted to a vice-president.¹⁹ As can be seen in Graph 1, most of the constitutions that came into force in the newly independent Latin American republics included a vice-president.²⁰

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19. The U.S. vice presidency was partly designed to secure a national vote behind the presidential candidate, and partly modelled on the position on the Lieutenant Governor in the U.S. states. In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton had proposed a vice-president as presidential successor, elected the same way as the president. Hamilton argued that since the vice-president could end up in the presidency it was important that he was elected in the same manner as the president, which would secure the same qualities in the vice-president as the president, and "authorise the vice-president to exercise the same authorities ... as the president". Cited from Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, ed. by Cynthia Brantley Johnson (New York: Pocket Books, 2004), p. 490. See also Goldstein, Joel K. *The White House Vice Presidency. The Path to Significance, from Mondale to Biden*. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2016), pp. 11-13.

20. The graph does not distinguish between countries with one or more vice-presidents. See note 18 above.

The Latin American vice presidency, however, came quickly in disrepute, and Graph 1 shows that the popularity of the office in the region has varied considerably over time. The anecdotes and histories concerning tensions and conflicts between presidents and their deputies are many, and it is possible that the source for the conspiracy myth lays in the developments during this early period after independence. For instance, the first two vice-presidents of Mexico (Nicolás Bravo and Anastasio Bustamante) both tried to overthrow their presidents, even though only the latter was successful (in 1830).²¹ After even more conflicts involving the vice-president under the first presidency of Santa Anna in the early 1830s, the office was abolished for the first time in 1835.²²

The controversies surrounding the vice presidency were not unique to Mexico. During the turbulent early 19th century, the role of the vice presidency was also enhanced by the long physical absences of presidents who led their armies in war.²³ Returning presidents would often find themselves in conflict with the vice-presidents who had comfortably ruled in their stead. The most famous example is probably the one of Gran Colombia where vice-president

21. Jan Bazant, 'Mexico from Independence to 1867' in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, ed. by Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp, 423-470, p. 431ff.

22. See Will Fowler, *Santa Anna of Mexico* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007).

23. Another cause for presidential absence that enhanced the vice-president's power consisted in presidents who were not interested in actually ruling their countries. Examples include Santa Anna in Mexico and General Santana in the Dominican Republic, and some presidents during the 1890s in Colombia.

Santander ruled during Simón Bolívar's absence in the wars of liberation. Upon Bolívar's return, their increasing political differences generated a deep rift in government, and Santander was accused of treason.²⁴ When Bolívar took dictatorial power in 1828, he removed the vice presidency.²⁵ Similar conflicts occurred both in Bolivia in the 1830s,²⁶ and in Argentina during the war of War of the Triple Alliance.²⁷

Accordingly, the office's reputation for being 'a magnet for conspiracies' (in Lloyd Meecham's term²⁸), and conflicts between presidents and vice-presidents led to the abolishment of the vice-

24. In fact, one of the Santander-faction's demands had been to curb presidential power so that Bolívar would rule with a 'consejo de gobierno', which would include a seat for the vice-president. See Carolina Guerrero, 'Los Constituyentes de la Unión Colombiana: Una creación limitada y menguada' in *Procesos Constituyentes y reformas constitucionales en la historia de Venezuela: 1811-1999*, ed. by Elena Plaza and Ricardo Combellas (Caracas: Universidad Central de Venezuela Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Políticas, 2005), pp. 75-106, p. 102.

25. See e.g. Mario Sznajder and Luis Roniger, *The Politics of Exile in Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 62-65, and Guerrero, 'Los Constituyentes de la Unión Colombiana...?.'

26. See Carlos D. Mesa G., 'Reseñas biográficas de los vicepresidentes de Bolivia' in *El Vicepresidente ¿La sombra del poder?*, ed. by Gustavo Aliaga P., Carlos Cordero C. and Carlos D. Mesa G., (La Paz: Vicepresidencia de la República, 2003), pp. 259-335, p. 264f.

27. See F. J. McLynn, "The Argentine Presidential Election of 1868." *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 11:2 (1979), p. 310. As a contrast, US President Lincoln stayed in Washington DC during the US Civil War.

28. Mecham, 'Latin American Constitutions...?'

presidency in six countries during the 1830s alone (see Graph 1).²⁹ Presidents thus often gained the upper hand in conflicts with their deputies. But while removing the vice presidency may have terminated a source of conspiracies, it also removed an element of power sharing, and served the interests of powerful presidents with little interest in being checked by a vice-president.

Furthermore, one could argue that it was not the vice presidency itself that caused tension between presidents and their deputies, but rather the electoral formula that tended to elevate antagonists to the presidency and vice presidency. Contrary to what would subsequently become the norm, several early constitutions such as the Mexican charter of 1824, Chile of 1828 and Peru of 1828 gave the vice presidency to the runner-up in the presidential election (as did the 1787 U.S. Constitution).³⁰

29. In Bolivia 1839, Chile 1833, Honduras 1839, Mexico 1835, Nicaragua 1838, and Peru 1834. See e.g. Carlos D. Mesa G., ‘Apuntes para una historia de la vicepresidencia y de los vicepresidentes de Bolivia’ in *El Vicepresidente. ¿La sombra del poder?*, ed. by Gustavo Aliaga P., Carlos Cordero C. and Carlos D. Mesa G. (La Paz: Vicepresidencia de la República, 2003), pp. 91-104; Simon Collier and William F. Sater, (1996), *A History of Chile, 1808-1994* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), pp. 49-50; Héctor Fix-Zamudio, ‘Marco Jurídico’ in *México y sus constituciones*, ed. by Patricia Galeana (México, D.F.: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998), pp. 198-242; Raúl Chanamé Orbe, *La República Inconclusa* (Lima: Derrama Magisterial, 2012), p. 216.

30. The runner-up electoral system for the vice presidency was present in seven constitutions in our dataset. Data from early constitutions regarding the election of vice-presidents, however, are fraught with problems, and in constitutions where the text is ambiguous and other sources

But this electoral formula also brought almost automatic divisions between presidents and vice-presidents, as the new president's principal competitor became his designated successor, obviously giving the latter incentives to promote the demise of the former. This point was not lost on the politicians of the early 19th century. In the United States the problem was solved by introducing separate ballots for presidents and vice-presidents in the electoral college in 1804. In Latin America, however, it was more common to simply abolish the institution altogether.

cannot confirm the electoral formula, we code the data as missing. Early constitutions were often short-lived, and no election might have been held within the life of the constitution, which makes coding impossible in ambiguous cases. Also, in several cases it is somewhat difficult to interpret whether the election of the vice-president was independent or whether the vice-president was the runner-up to the presidency. Furthermore, if the president did not win 50 per cent of the votes in the electoral college, the final election would often be decided by Congress, which would decide among the top contenders both the presidency and the vice presidency. In some elections we suspect that the independent election of the vice-president worked in practice as a runner-up system in which Congress gave the vice presidency to the runner-up of the presidency as a consolation prize. E.g. in the 1825 presidential election of the Central American Federation, the election went to the federal Congress after none of the two candidates (Manuel José Arce and José Cecilio del Valle) obtained the minimum of 50 per cent of the registered votes. Congress gave the presidency to Arce, who had obtained less votes than del Valle in the electoral college (34 vs. 41) and the vice presidency to del Valle. Del Valle eventually declined the vice presidency, however, which after another failed attempt was given to Mariano Beltranena. See Franklin D. Parker, 'Jose Cecilio del Valle: Scholar and Patriot', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 32:4, (1952), pp. 516-539.

But in spite of its reputation, the vice presidency provides a practical, economical, and stable solution to succession should the presidency become vacant, and during decades leading up to the year 1900, vice-presidents gradually became more common in Latin American constitutions again (see Graph 1).³¹ Furthermore, constitution-makers in several countries turned their attention to finding a formula for electing the vice-president that would ensure a proper balance within the executive power, but without creating the tensions recurrent in the runner-up model. As can be seen in Graph 2, which shows the use of different electoral formula (the runner-up model, the independent election of the vice president and the shared ticket model), already at the inception of the new republics a different electoral formula had been tried; the separate election for vice-president. This electoral formula co-existed with the runner-up system after independence, but as the latter system was not employed after the mid-19th century, independent election of the vice-president became predominant in Latin America. In 1906, independent elections of the vice-president were employed in six out of nine countries with such an office. In total, of the 125 constitutions on which we have data on the mode of election of the vice-president, 38 constitutions in 13 countries established independent elections for the office.

31. The trend, however, was not unequivocal as both Mexico after the Revolution and Venezuela after Gómez's coup in 1908 removed the vice presidency. See, Hernández, 'Sobre la sustitución presidencial-'; and Friedrich Katz 'Mexico: Restored Republic and Porfiriato, 1867-1910' in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 3-78; and Allan R. Brewer-Carías, *Las Constituciones de Venezuela. Estudio preliminar* (San Cristóbal, Venezuela and Madrid: Ediciones de la Universidad Católica del Tachira and Centro de Estudios Constitucionales Madrid, 1986), p. 85f.

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But even if the use of a separate ballot for electing the vice-president did not automatically create the same tension as the runner-up model had done, it constituted no guarantee against electing an incongruous combination of a president and a vice-president from different parties, and conspiracies involving the vice-president continued to be a recurring feature on the continent. Hence, apart from vice-president Gómez' overthrow of Castro in Venezuela in 1908, the Colombian vice-president Marroquín overthrew president Sanclemente in 1900,³² the Dominican vice-president Vásquez organised a coup against president Jimenes in 1902,³³ and in 1934 vice-president José Luis Tejada was rumoured to have participated in the complot that sealed the fate of President Salamanca in Bolivia. Interestingly, Tejada and Salamanca had been elected on a joint ticket, but as representatives of different parties. Salamanca's overthrow thus contained elements that presaged future patterns.

Towards the modern vice presidency:

During the first decades of the 20th century, the portion of Latin American republics having vice-presidents held relatively stable at one in two. What varied was the mode of election. Whereas the runner-up and separate ballot model had dominated the electoral formulas for the

32. Sebastián Mazzuca and James A. Robinson, 'Political Conflict and Power Sharing in the Origins of Modern Colombia', *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 89:2 (2009), pp. 285-321.

33. Campillo Pérez, Julio A. (1982), *Elecciones dominicanas: Contribución a su estudio*, ed. Academia Dominicana de la Historia (Santo Domingo: Relaciones Públicas S.A.), pp. 125-131.

vice-presidency during the century of independence, it gradually became more common to elect the vice-president on the same ballot as the president. This model had been pioneered in a couple of countries around the year 1900, and would become increasingly popular during the course of the 20th century. This popularity may have been because it promised to end divisions between presidents and their designated successors, and is also most certainly related to the invention and establishment of parties and party systems, and the increasing prevalence of direct over indirect elections. Indeed, from the 1920s independent elections for the vice presidency would steadily decline and from the mid-century onwards, only Brazil during the second republic (1946-1964) applied this electoral formula for the vice presidency.

Actually, developments in Brazil would provide a reminder of the perils involved in applying this system. In the 1960 election the right-wing politician Janio Quadros was elected president, while João Goulart from the other end of the political spectrum was re-elected vice-president on a separate ballot. When Quadros suddenly resigned in the fall of 1961, Goulart became president. The political position of the executive shifted accordingly, which—in the polarised political climate of the 1960s—set the country on the road to a military coup. Of course, neither did joint tickets guarantee political stability. In the same year as the Brazilian coup against Goulart, Jaime Paz Estenssoro was overthrown in a coup by his erstwhile running mate, air force general René Barrientos, whom he had reportedly picked as his deputy to ensure the loyalty of the armed forces. Just as in the case of Brazil, Barrientos's act of treason spelt an end to democratic politics, and ushered in fifteen years of military governments.

Given that vice-presidents in several countries thus contributed to the processes that led to the downfall of democracy, it is somewhat surprising that the period since democracy's return to Latin America in the 1980s, has coincided with a renewed popularity of the vice presidency. At

the initiation of the third wave of democracy, only three out of every five Latin American countries had a vice-president. During the following years that portion would rise to more than four out of five, as Nicaragua (1987), Venezuela (1999), Colombia (1991) and Paraguay (1992) installed the vice presidency, and Honduras substituted such an office for the country's three 'presidential delegates' in 2003, only to return to the previous system in 2008/09. As can be seen in Graph 1, the vice presidency has today attained what seems to be a region-wide and permanent presence in Latin America as, the only two Latin American countries, apart from Honduras, that today do not have a vice presidency are Chile and Mexico.

With the renewed enthusiasm in the vice presidency, the joint ticket model for electing vice-presidents has become predominant. In some countries, this may have been because of the lessons taught by history. Accordingly, the 1988 constitution in Brazil kept the vice presidency, but stipulated that its holder should be elected on the same ticket as the president. Similar arrangements were set up in country after country, until at the end of the 20th century, the separate election of vice-presidents had gone the way of the runner-up model of the previous century. True, some special arrangements survived into the 2000s. For instance, Bolivia's 1967 constitution (in force until 2009) stipulated that Congress should select president and vice-president in case no single ticket received more than fifty per cent of the popular vote. In 1989, the Bolivian congress famously picked Jaime Paz Zamora (who had come in third place in the popular vote) for the presidency, but chose the running mate of Hugo Banzer (who had come in second place) to be his deputy. More dramatically, in Paraguay in the year 2000, a by-election was held for the post of vice-president following the murder of the previous incumbent (which

also led to the downfall of the president, rumoured to be behind the killing of his deputy).³⁴ In the event, the contest was won by the opposition candidate, leading to a situation of political tension within the government.³⁵

But even with the ticket-sharing model, conflicts between presidents and their designated successors have continued to be a common feature in Latin America. In Panamá, for instance, a conflict regarding allegations of corruption between president Martinelli and his vice-president Varela, from different parties, reportedly left Martinelli's government dysfunctional.³⁶ In Honduras, president Zelaya and his vice-president Santos, both from the Liberal party, experienced serious rifts between them, which ended in Zelaya opposing Santos's bid to run for the presidency in 2008. The conflict weakened Zelaya's position in his own party, contributing to his downfall in 2009.³⁷ Similarly, the case of Dilma Rousseff being ousted in favour of her

34. Indeed, the events behind this murky episode contained elements of the runner-up model. President Cubas had previously been the running-mate of the controversial general Lino Oviedo. As the latter was forced to withdraw from the race, Cubas became presidential candidate. As per the statutes of the Colorado party however, his vice-president became the previous opponent of Oviedo in the party primaries.

35. Yet, it has been argued that this may actually have saved president Macchi from impeachment from his own party, the Colorado party, as they feared that his disposal would lead their opponents in the Liberal party to gain the presidency Pérez-Liñán, *Presidential Impeachment...*, pp. 29-35.

36. See e.g. *The Economist*, November 24 2012.

37. Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet, 'Epilogue. The Breakdown of Zelaya's Presidency: Honduras in Comparative Perspective' in *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin*

vice-president had a precedent in neighbouring Paraguay where an alliance of convenience between the presidential candidate Fernando Lugo and the Liberal party that had supplied his vice-president, turned sour in 2012 as a botched land eviction led to deaths and the following crisis exposed Lugo to the machinations of his vice-president's party that voted him out office through an express impeachment that left his deputy in power.³⁸

The vice presidency today:

As can be seen in Graph 1 above, the vice presidency is today more common in Latin America than ever before, meaning that most Latin American presidents have designated successors waiting in the wings. During normal political times, however, the vice presidency in Latin America is commonly considered un-important and in most countries the office and its functions remain under-institutionalised. Exceptions to this rule include Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay, where the vice-president is also the speaker of the Senate.³⁹ While this is often a ceremonial task, it can at times have a crucial importance, as when vice-president Julio Cobos

America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies, ed. by Mariana Llanos and Leiv Marsteintredet (New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 229-238.

38. *Latin American Weekly Report*, June 28 2012, 'Lugo's impeachment plunges Paraguay into political limbo'; Leiv Marsteintredet, Mariana Llanos and Detlef Nolte, 'Paraguay and the Politics of Impeachment'. *Journal of Democracy*, 24: 4 (2013), pp. 110-123.

39. Bolivia might currently have the most powerful vice presidency in the region. Under Evo Morales, Vice-president Álvaro García Linera has taken a prominent position as an important ideologue, intellectual and political actor. Whether the strong and visible vice presidency in Bolivia will survive the current government, however, remains to be seen.

cast the decisive vote against the Argentine government's proposed law on agricultural taxes in 2008.⁴⁰ Cobos's actions are a reminder that the vice presidency during normal political times may play the role as a check on the president, and contribute an element of power sharing to the presidency. Yet, as could be suspected, such a function is likely to be resisted. Even though presidents cannot remove the vice-president, or the office through constitutional reform, presidents can find other ways to neutralise the vice-president, as Cobos would learn when the president isolated him after his decisive vote.⁴¹

Today, all vice-presidents except the Venezuelan one are elected together with their presidents as part of a joint offer to the electorate.⁴² Theoretically, such a joint ticket should create a greater

40. Sribman, *La Vicepresidencia...*, pp. 88ff.

41. A president's power to isolate or side-line the vice president may vary with the executive and legislative duties in the various countries' constitutions. Side-lining a vice president is likely to be easier in countries where the vice-president has no constitutional duties, and any tasks are assigned by the president. This is the case in five countries in Latin America today, including Ecuador where in August 2017, president Moreno—unable to remove the vice-president—stripped his vice-president of all his executive tasks by decree following the disclosure of vice-president Glas's involvement in the Odebrecht-scandal.

42. In Venezuela, the authority to name and remove the vice-president rests with the president only. This formula is very rare, but not unique to the Bolivarian constitution of Venezuela. The formula is possibly inspired by Simón Bolívar since it first appeared in the Bolivian constitution of 1826, where the president for life selected the vice-president, although in that case the selection had to be confirmed by Congress. A similar system existed in Guatemala between

political cohesion within the executive. Yet, the peculiarities and multi-party nature of Latin American politics seem to have conspired against such logic, as many presidential hopefuls seem to be doing exactly what constitution-makers in the region have tried to avoid; creating a potential political division at the centre of executive power that can be exploited to upset the democratic process. They have done this by picking their vice-presidents from outside of their own party.

The vice presidency and cross-party alliances in Latin America

Studies of the US vice presidency often stress the ‘balancing’ potential of the running-mate, whereby qualities of the vice-president should complement those of the presidential candidate in order to appeal to broader electoral segments.⁴³ Whereas in the stable two-party system of the US, such balancing relates to qualities such as age, gender and geographic origin, it is not uncommon in Latin America, in particular in the continent’s more fluid multi-party systems, for presidential candidates to take a step further and balance their tickets by including persons from outside of their own party.⁴⁴ Indeed, of the two leading tickets in presidential elections in

1956 and 1964 where the president sent a list of candidates—*designados*—to the vice presidency, but Congress selected the first and second *designado* from that list.

43. See e.g. Lee Sigelman and Paul J. Wahlbeck, ‘The "Veepstakes": Strategic Choice in Presidential Running Mate Selection’, *American Political Science Review*, 91:4 (1997), pp. 855-864; and Danny M Adkison, ‘The Electoral Significance of the Vice Presidency’, *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, 12:3 (1982), pp. 330-336.

44. In particular during the so-called “left wave”, ticket-balancing has become common as a number of nominally leftist presidential candidates have sought to demonstrate their moderation through their vice-presidential candidate in order to appeal to the centrist majorities in the electorate.

Latin America since 1978, 95 out of 201 (47 per cent) have included what can be called ‘external’ candidates for vice-president, i.e., persons who either have had a background in other political parties or who were political neophytes without any previous partisan experience (the latter group amounts to 30 candidates ranging from persons who were well-known without being politicians—several of them being media personalities—to virtual unknowns whose primary quality may have been to not overshadow the presidential candidate him- or herself.).

Such joint candidacies have sometimes made for very strange political bedfellows, as candidates strive to draw votes from across the political spectrum. Accordingly, the Banzer-Zamora ticket in Bolivia 1993 contained both a former guerrilla (Zamora) and the dictator he had sought to overthrow (Banzer). Likewise, Daniel Ortega was joined by Jaime Morales Carazo—a rightist politician and erstwhile *Contra*—for his electoral bid in 2006. Less dramatically, but still remarkably, Dilma Rousseff picked Michel Temer, a leading politician in the center-right, clientelistic PMDB (*Partido do Movimento Democrático do Brasil*) for her running mate in 2010. In doing so, she was only following the precedent established by her political mentor, however.⁴⁵ For his fourth and successful run for office in 2002 Lula da Silva had made a choice of running mate that would effectively allow him to dispel fears regarding the presumed radicalism of the PT (*Partido dos Trabalhadores*); the business-man José Alencar from the rightist *Partido Liberal*.⁴⁶

For the moderation of the "turn to the left" in this regard, see Fredrik Uggla, ‘A Turn to the Left or to the Centre?’, *Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies*, 3(2008), pp. 9-19.

45. *Latin American Weekly Report*, August 25 2016, ‘Brazil: President in the Dock’.

46. Wendy Hunter, ‘The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers’ Party in Brazil’, *World Politics*, 59:3 (2007), pp. 440-475.

As can be seen in Table 1, mixed tickets are much more common in countries that have a larger number of political parties. Indeed, the difference in party fragmentation between those elections in which there is at least one external vice-presidential candidate on either of the two leading tickets and those in which there is not, is statistically significant at the .01 level.⁴⁷ While the material only allows for speculation in this regard, one may assume that it is the need to appeal to sympathisers of other parties and/or to secure future legislative majorities that explain this correlation. In Brazil since 1985, for instance, only three of the 16 leading vice-presidential candidates have come from the same party as the presidential candidate (which is locally known as '*chapa puro sangue*' or 'full-blooded ticket').

- - - TABLE 1 HERE - - -

Even more remarkably, all of the eight vice-presidents elected in Brazil since the return of democracy have had a background in a party different from that of the president. Brazil is an extreme case, but since 1978, out of 114 elected Latin American presidencies in systems in which a vice-president is also elected, 43 (38 per cent) have had deputies who did not have a background in the president's party (15 of these were political independents prior to their elevation to the vice presidency, with the rest coming from other parties). Thus, in practice Latin American politicians seem to have circumvented the institutional safeguard (the joint election) against divisions and potential strife within the executive power. Interestingly, this seems to have an effect on the emergence and outcomes of government crises.

47. For the former, the mean effective number of political parties was 4.31 with a standard deviation of 2.23, and for the latter the same figures were 2.96 and 0.90, respectively.

The vice-president in times of crisis:

While it has not been uncommon for relationships between presidents and vice-presidents to sour to the point where the latter have become vocal critics of their governments, as was the case in the examples of Fernández-Cobos in Argentina and Martinelli-Varela in Panamá mentioned above; this normally means little for the operation of the presidency. Indeed, the full importance of the office becomes apparent only during full-fledged political crises. This is of course in line with the institution's function, which is to provide an institutionalised structure for succession should the president become incapacitated, die or be removed. In such instances, the political relationship between vice-president and president is likely to acquire particular importance.

It can be suspected that presidents with external vice-presidents will be more likely to suffer attempts to bring about their forced interruption. The reason for this would be that interruption would in such circumstances lead to a greater political change than if the vice-president were a loyalist from the president's own party. Opposition parties seeking a political change would find the chances of producing such a change increased in the presence of an external vice-president. Indeed, several vice-presidents have actually been open about this possibility. For instance, when the Ecuadorian President Gutiérrez ran into increasing problems in 2004, and Congress considered how to impeach him, his vice-president Alfredo Palacio, an independent outsider, declared in national media he was more than ready to become president should it come to that.⁴⁸

48. *Latin American Weekly Report*, June 1, 2004.

For the 'external' vice-president and his/her party, the prospect of a presidential interruption opens an unexpected road to the presidency, and thus an incentive to bring about such events. The party of the vice-president would actually have a stronger incentive to topple the president than if they had only been an opposition party among others, as such actions will not only hurt a political competitor, but also give them the supreme executive power. A slightly different logic, but no less compelling may apply to other allies to the government. Even though they may not be next in line of succession, they may see in a less politically tainted vice-president a stronger guarantee for their interests than a beleaguered president from an unpopular party.

Accordingly, it could be assumed that external vice-presidents would stand a better chance of ascending to the presidency after an interruption brought about by external agents than would an internal one. Whereas it would make little sense to interrupt a presidency only to have the president replaced with a potentially vengeful loyalist, a vice-president without direct partisan ties to the president is likely to show more gratitude towards the promoters of the interruption,⁴⁹ while bestowing a cloak of democratic legitimacy to the events that brought about the president's demise. It is likely that a president's opponent may find an external vice-president more open to such possibilities, hence increasing the risk for the president.

In fact, evidence is rather clear on how important the question of vice-presidential partisan affiliation is during crises that lead to presidential interruptions, i.e, to presidents' leaving office

49. For the importance of the opposition controlling the line of succession, see Andrés Malamud's analysis of the fall of President de la Rúa in Argentina ('Social Revolution or Political Takeover? The Argentine Collapse of 2001 reassessed', *Latin American Perspectives*, 42:11(2015), pp.11-26).

before the fixed end of their term. Table 2 displays all 21 instances of permanently interrupted presidencies since 1979 in the Latin American countries with a vice presidency.⁵⁰ The table identifies the main reason for the president's fall, the relationship between president and vice-president, and the eventual outcome for the vice-president. It is organised according to the reason for each president's demise, i.e., natural causes (illness, death), presidential resignations or whether an external actor forced the president's ouster through votes in congress or a coup. As will be seen, there are certain systematic differences among these groups of cases, which indicate the importance that an external vice-president may have in times of presidential crises.

- - - TABLE 2 HERE - - -

With regard to the reasons for interruption, for most of these there is no evident association between their occurrence and the presence of an external vice-president as interruptions due to natural causes, presidential resignations or military interventions happen with equal frequency no matter what the political relationship between president and vice-president.

However, when it comes to successful impeachment processes or congressional dismissals of popularly elected presidents with vice presidencies in Latin America, it is notable that all of these have occurred in situations in which the vice-president has either come from a party different from the president's (Temer in Brazil and Franco in Paraguay, for instance) or been a

50. Excluding Venezuela under Carlos Andrés Pérez, as there was no vice-presidency in the country at that time.

political independent (Maldonado in Guatemala and Palacios in Ecuador).⁵¹ The evidence thus seems to support the above argument that an external vice-president may embolden a president's opponents and thus increase his or her vulnerability to forced interruptions.⁵² Even though a simple association does not suffice to affirm causality in this regard, the connection is strong enough to indicate that the vice-president's political affiliation should be a factor to consider in future studies of presidential interruptions.⁵³

The far right column of Table 2 points to another interesting relationship between the vice-president's political affiliation and his or her chances to remain in office after a presidential interruption. Cases in which death or illness was the cause of presidential disruption have always led to the assumption of the vice-president, no matter what his or her partisan affiliation. This would be in line with expectations, as such events do not depend on political actors and

51. Maldonado had been installed as vice-president just months prior to the impeachment of President Pérez Molina since the former vice-president, Roxanna Baldetti (a loyalist to Pérez Molina), had already been successfully removed in the same scandal that eventually toppled the president.

52. Furthermore, Samuels and Shugart only register one occurrence in their 53 countries in the period between 1946 and 2007 in which the party of a president has initiated and voted in favour of impeachment. That was the case of Raúl Cubas in Paraguay. See David J. Samuels and Matthew S. Shugart, *Presidents, Parties, Prime Ministers. How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behaviour* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 108-120.

53. On this point, see also Ana María Mustapic, 'América Latina: las renunciadas presidenciales y el papel del Congreso', *Política*, 47 (2006), pp. 55-70.

their possible calculations. Yet, in the cases in which succession is triggered by political crisis, the pattern is different, and outcomes seem related both to the way in which the president leaves office, and with the political relationship between president and vice-president. In the eight cases in which presidents have resigned on their own initiative in midst of crises, this has normally forced out their vice-presidents from political power as well (if they had not already left office before the president did so, as in Argentina 2001 and—by being assassinated—in Paraguay in 1999). This outcome is not surprising if the vice-president is perceived to have been jointly responsible for the situation causing the crisis. Accordingly, in no case has a presidential resignation led to a vice-president from the president's own party to assume power. The only case in which a vice-president has taken power after a presidential resignation was one in which the designated presidential successor was a political independent: Carlos Mesa, who assumed the Bolivian presidency upon Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's resignation in 2003. Significantly, Mesa had distanced himself from the president during the preceding crisis, a move that his political independence may have facilitated. At any rate, Mesa's actions seem to have made him acceptable for the opposition in Congress and on the streets, leading him to become the sole exception in this regard.

The association between the vice-president's affiliation and the outcome of a presidential interruption appears even clearer when such an event is brought about by the actions of outside parties, i.e., by a coup or an impeachment. In such cases, the final outcome appears closely related to the political affiliation of the vice-president. In the two cases of coups interrupting a presidency, the one vice-president who was allowed to assume power (Gustavo Noboa in Ecuador) was an independent who had been included on the presidential ticket of the ill-fated Jamil Mahuad, but who had come to oppose many of the government's policies. In the coup in

Honduras in 2009, conversely, Manuel Zelaya's vice-president was a handpicked close collaborator to the president and fell with him.⁵⁴

Likewise, just as there is a connection between successful impeachment processes or congressional dismissals (a group in which we include the instance of the Guatemalan congress stripping Otto Pérez Molina of his immunity from prosecution) and the presence of an external vice-president, all of these vice-presidents, except one, were able to assume power after their presidents had been forced out of office. The exception was Rosalía Arteaga in Ecuador, vice-president to Abdalá Bucaram in 1997, who only kept power for two days after congress had dismissed Bucaram, after which she lost it to the president of congress.

The patterns described above also hold true when we look at the survival rate of Latin American presidents with internal, external or no vice-presidents.

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54. The coup against Zelaya is the also only one of a presidential interruption enforced by external actors in which the president and his deputy came from the same party. Honduras was indeed a special case. The elected vice-president Santos had resigned in November 2008 to compete for the presidency in 2009. President Zelaya then nominated his Minister of Defence, Aristides Mejía, as vice-president, but the opposition challenged this promotion. When Zelaya was disposed by the coup in June 2009, a congressional majority including Zelaya's own Liberal party supported the coup and sidestepped Mejía with the argument that Congress President Micheletti (also of the Liberal party) was the constitutional successor of Zelaya.

Since 1978, there have been 43 elected presidents in Latin America with 'external' vice-presidents. Ten of these governments, or 23 per cent, ended prematurely (excluding health reasons). In comparison, of the 71 elected presidents that had vice-presidents from the president's party, only six, i.e. eight per cent, saw the presidency permanently interrupted by crises or by external actors, and in no case through impeachment as detailed above.⁵⁵ In the countries that have not had a vice-president at all, though, there has only been one presidential interruption during the period (the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela).

While such figures demonstrate a possible correlation, they should not be confused with causality. As was shown above, features such as party fragmentation also correlate with external vice-presidents, and could by themselves increase the risks of presidential interruptions leading to a spurious conclusion regarding the connection between the two factors. Similarly, although we can give anecdotal evidence of vice-presidents inviting such interruptions, or of how the opponents of disposed presidents reasoned, closer studies of the processes involved are required to substantiate any causality in this regard. What the data does show, however, is that the vice-

55. Furthermore, in three of these six cases (Guatemala 1993, Dominican Republic in 1996, and Peru in 2000), these early terminations of the presidencies could actually be said to have been a response to earlier anti-democratic actions by the presidents themselves, which means that their classification as interruptions can be debated. A similar argument could possibly be made with regard to Cubas in Paraguay who is in the same group. Leiv Marsteintredet, 'Explaining Variation of Executive Instability in Presidential Regimes: Presidential interruptions in Latin America.' *International Political Science Review*, 35:2, (2014), pp. 175-196.

presidency and the relationship of its titular to the president seem to represent important intermediary variables for explaining political developments during government crises.⁵⁶

In sum, then, Dilma Rousseff's fate does not appear extra-ordinary, but rather as another case of a little-noticed connection between vice-presidential affiliation and the risk for presidential interruptions. 'External' vice-presidents seem to attract interruptions and are also more likely to benefit from these than are vice-presidents drawn from the president's own party.

Conclusions:

This article offers the first comprehensive overview of the vice presidency in Latin America. By focusing on the institution's role during elections and presidential interruptions, we have tried to demonstrate the political relevance of this hitherto overlooked office.

Combining two original datasets on the vice presidency, we show how Latin American countries have struggled with the question of presidential succession and the incentives for tensions and betrayal that it may imply. From having chosen vice-presidents from runner-ups, or through separate ballots, which risked giving the vice-presidency to political opponents to the president, most countries have eventually tried to solve this problem by electing president and vice-president on the same ticket. But electoral calculations seem to conspire against such a solution. Accordingly, giving the vice-presidency to persons from outside of the president's

56. Similarly, whereas in contemporary Latin America only two external vice-presidents have subsequently been elected to the presidency (Paz Zamora in Bolivia in 1989 and Varela in Panama in 2014), seven external vice-presidents became presidents through presidential interruptions.

own party has become a common strategy in Latin America, and seems to be related to the need to build presidential support in a multi-party setting.

It may not always be possible to equate the creation of such mixed electoral tickets with the separate election of the vice-president.⁵⁷ In particular, the former strategy would seem to require an element of ideological proximity and is often the result of formal cross-party alliances, which is not the case with the separate ballot. Yet, the considerable pragmatism evident in choosing running-mates, combined with the ephemeral nature of many party alliances, means that the result of both mechanisms of election may be similar; namely the institution of designated successors to the president who have little interest in his or her permanence in office.

Accordingly, while the choice of external running-mates may be rational from an electoral perspective, it may also put the stability of the executive in danger. This suspicion is supported by our data, as vice-presidents from outside of the president's party are associated with a markedly increased risk of presidential interruptions, particularly in the form of impeachment proceedings. Such external vice-presidents also seem to have a greater chance to benefit from such interruptions.

The mechanism that underlies such developments appears to be related to the vice-president's role as a designated successor to the president. In fact, this succession formula makes presidential regimes confront some of the same succession dilemmas that authoritarian and

57. We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers of the article for making this point.

monarchical regimes face.⁵⁸ This privileged position may induce the vice-president to conspire against the president, and/or embolden the latter's political opponents if they sense that there are internal divisions within the executive. Although they are clearly not helpless when confronting such situations, presidents have less room for manoeuvre given the vice-president's constitutional protection, which in most countries means that he or she cannot be removed by the president.

Yet, the political stability that Latin America has enjoyed during recent decades means there are too few cases to draw a firm conclusion as to the causal impact of an 'external' vice-president on presidential survival. It is possible that countries with such vice-presidents are also more crisis-prone to begin with, because of higher degrees of party fragmentation, possibly weaker party systems and similar variables. Therefore, we cannot claim that the presence of a vice-president (even an external one) is by itself the cause of instability and presidential interruption. Rather, we see the institution as a possible intervening variable that may explain the outcome of periods of instability and attempted overthrows of the executive power. In such cases, the succession role of the vice-president combined with the institution's ability to confer a degree of legitimacy to presidential interruptions seem to make it more consequential than has often been assumed, and it appears from our description that the question of whether the president and his/her deputy share partisan affiliation has particular importance in this regard.

58. See Jason Brownlee, 'Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies' *World Politics*, 59:4 (2007), pp. 595-628; and Andrej Kokkonen and Anders Sundell, 'Delivering Stability - Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000-1800', *American Political Science Review*, 108:2 (2014), pp. 438-453.

In the end, though, a definitive answer on the effects of having a president and a vice-president from different parties will require further research. Even so, we hope that the preceding pages indicate that the vice-presidencies may hold considerably more political importance than is commonly assumed. More in particular, we believe that the above analysis indicates a number of possible further enquiries related to the vice-presidency. We still know little of the role of vice-presidents in presidential governments during normal times and what may explain potential variation in the office's performance across the region. Similarly, our assumptions above concerning the legitimacy and power that follows from different modes of electing the vice-president could certainly be discussed further, and more refined models developed in this regard, possibly combined with more detailed evidence on how the vice-president can serve as a vote-winner. On a related note, the fact that external vice-presidents are more common in multi-party settings indicates that the office may often have an important role in the formation and maintenance of government coalitions, and should be considered by scholarly debates on such issues. Likewise, the extent to which the vice-president—particularly an external one—can serve as a mechanism for power-sharing and internal accountability within the executive power can offer a promising avenue for further enquiry regarding the role of the vice-president in the normal operation of the presidency. Related to this, and in a sense contrary to our analysis above, the importance of the vice presidency for maintaining political stability by offering an institutionalised solution to presidential interruptions, remains to be explored,⁵⁹ along with the

59. We owe this argument to Andrés Rivarola. For related arguments, see Hochstetler and Samuels, 'Crisis and Rapid Re-equilibration...', and Leiv Marsteintredet and Einar Berntzen, 'Reducing the Perils of Presidentialism in Latin America through Presidential Interruptions', *Comparative Politics*, 41:1, pp 83-101.

quasi-parliamentary mechanisms evident in impeachment and dismissal processes that shift executive power from one party to another by way of the vice-president.

Table 1: *External Vice-Presidential Candidates on the Two Leading Tickets at Different Levels of Party Fragmentation (Latin American Elections 1978 – 2016):*

Number of Effective Parliamentary Parties:	Elections:	External vice-presidential candidates:	External candidates/election:
– 3.0	38	22	0.59
3.01 – 4.0	23	22	0.96
4.01 –	30	42	1.40

Source: VPILA dataset. (Sources for number of effective number of parliamentary parties:

Appendix III in Manuel Alcántara, ‘Elections in Latin America 2009-2011: A Comparative Analysis’, Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 386, 2012 and Michael Gallagher, 2015.

‘Election indices dataset’, 2015 at

http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/index.php. The

correlation (Pearson’s r) between the number of effective parliamentary parties and external vice-presidential candidates on the two leading tickets is .454, and is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Table 2: Interrupted Presidencies in Latin American Democracies with Vice-Presidents 1978-2016.

Reason	Country	President	Year	VP name:		Outcome:
Natural causes (death)	Ecuador	Jaime Roldós Aguilera	1981	Oswaldo Hurtado	I	VP assumed the presidency.
Natural causes (suicide)	Dominican Republic	Antonio Guzmán	1982	Jacobo Majluta	I	VP assumed the presidency.
Natural causes (death)	Brazil	Tancredo Neves	1985	José Sarney	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Natural causes (illness)	Bolivia	Hugo Banzer	2001	Jorge Quiroga	I	VP assumed the presidency.
Natural causes (death)	Venezuela	Hugo Chávez	2013	Nicolás Maduro	I	VP assumed the presidency.
Resignation	Argentina	Raúl Alfonsín	1989	Víctor Martínez	I	VP left power with president. Elections already held.
Resignation (after failed self-coup).	Guatemala	Jorge Serrano	1993	Gustavo Espina	I	Loyal VP failed to take power. Congress elected new president.

Resignation.	Argentina	Fernando de la Rúa	2001	(Carlos Alvarez)	E	VP had already resigned. Congress elected new President.
Resignation (pending impeachment).	Paraguay	Raúl Cubas	1999	(Luís María Argaña)	I	VP had been murdered. The head of senate assumed power.
Resignation.	Peru	Alberto Fujimori	2000	Ricardo Marquéz Flores	I	First VP had resigned shortly before. Second VP declined. Congress elected new president.
Resignation (new elections).	Dominican Republic	Joaquín Balaguer	1996	Jacinto Peynado Garrigosa.	I	New elections called, VP ran but was defeated.
Resignation (new elections).	Bolivia	Hernán Siles Zuazo	1985	Jaime Paz Zamora	E	VP resigned to run in upcoming

						elections but was defeated.
Resignation.	Bolivia	Gonzálo Sánchez de Lozada	2003	Carlos Mesa	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Coup/uprising.	Ecuador	Jamil Mahuad	2000	Gustavo Noboa.	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Coup	Honduras	Manuel Zelaya	2009	Aristides Mejía	I	VP went into exile. President of congress took power.
Impeachment	Brazil	Fernando Collor de Mello	1992	Itamar Franco	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Dismissed by congress.	Ecuador	Abdalá Bucaram	1997	Rosalía Arteaga	E	VP assumed the presidency for a few days, but leader of congress took over soon.
Dismissed by congress.	Ecuador	Lucio Gutiérrez	2005	Alfredo Palacios.	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Impeachment	Paraguay	Fernando Lugo	2012	Federico Franco	E	VP assumed the presidency.

Congress removes immunity, leading to resignation.	Guatemala	Otto Pérez Molina	2015	Alejandro Maldonado	E	VP assumed the presidency.
Impeachment	Brazil	Dilma Rousseff	2016	Michel Temer	E	VP assumed the presidency.


Notes: Elaborated by the authors. E and I denotes external (with no background in the president's party) and internal (with a background in the president's party) vice-presidents, respectively. Vice-presidents whose names are in brackets had left office before their presidents' fall.

Table 3: *Interruptions to Elected Latin American Presidencies with External, Internal or No Vice-President, 1978-2016.*

	Total number of presidencies	Interrupted	Per cent interrupted.
External vice-president	43	10	23 %
Internal vice-president	71	6	8 %
No vice-president	24	1	4 %


Note: These figures exclude interruptions of health reasons and deaths (five presidencies in total, see Table 2). Venezuela after 1999 and Honduras (except 2005-2009) are also excluded due to their anomalous succession rules. The rank correlation coefficient (Spearman's rho) between the status of the vice-president and the occurrence of an interruption is (-.220) and significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).

Graph 1: *Share of Countries with One or More Vice-Presidents in Latin America Since Independence.*



Sources: Data from The Latin American Presidential Succession and Vice Presidency database. .

Graph 2: *Electoral Formulae for Electing the Vice-President in Latin America.*



Notes and sources: The graphs show the share of countries with a vice presidency with each electoral formula. Data from The Latin American Presidential Succession and Vice Presidency database..

Appendix: Description of the databases used.

Vice-presidents in Latin America (VPILA).

Maintained by: Fredrik Ugglå, Stockholm University.

The database contains data on the two leading tickets in every presidential election, plus additional data on substitute vice-presidents. Apart from election results, it contains data on the personal and partisan background of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, as well as information of possible interruptions to their periods in office.

Years covered: 1978-2016

Countries covered: Argentina (1983-), Brazil (1985-), Bolivia (1980-), Colombia (1991-), Costa Rica (1978-), Ecuador (1979-), El Salvador (1984-), Guatemala (1985-), Honduras (2005), Nicaragua (1990-), Panama (1994-), Paraguay (1993-), Peru (1980-), República Dominicana (1978-), Uruguay (1984-).

Number of cases: 220

Variables: Country; year; presidential candidate's name; vice-presidential candidates name; presidential candidate's party; presidential candidate's age; vice-presidential candidate's party prior to election campaign; relationship between presidential and vice-presidential candidate [0=same partisan position, 1=different factions within same party, 2=different parties]; vice-presidential candidate's age; electoral system; election results; number of candidates in

presidential election; party fragmentation; party fragmentation in previous election; other information on president/vice-president; information on possible second vice-president.

Main sources: Local newspaper sources; Deiter Nohlen (ed.): *Elections in the Americas*, two volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Manuel Alcántara and Flavia Freidenberg (eds): *Partidos Políticos de América Latina*, three volumes (Salamanca: Ediciones Universidad, 2001); Alcántara, 'Elections in Latin America 2009-2011'; Gallagher, 'Election indices dataset'.

The Latin American Presidential Succession and Vice Presidency database (LAPSVP)

Maintained by: Leiv Marsteintredet, University of Bergen

Brief description: The database contains data on constitutional succession rules, rules or election and reelection of presidents and vice-presidents, and regulations of the vice presidency of all countries in Latin America from independence.

Countries covered (since year): Argentina (1819), Bolivia (1826), Brazil (1824), Chile (1822) Colombia (1830), Costa Rica (1844), Dominican Republic (1844), Ecuador (1830), El Salvador (1841), Guatemala (1825), Honduras (1825), Mexico (1814), Nicaragua (1826), Panamá (1904), Paraguay (1844), Peru (1823), Uruguay (1830), Venezuela (1821).

Main Sources: National Constitutions, including constitutional reforms relating to rules of elections, re-election, term limits, presidential succession and the vice presidency. The point of

departure has been the Cervantes virtual database on constitutions, gaps have been filled in and double checked against specific country sources.

Number of cases: 256 (188 constitutions and 68 reforms).

Variables: Country; year of constitution/reform; vice president (presence/absence), number of vice presidents/designates; who is presidential successor; rules of succession; rules of presidential election; rules of election of successor; electoral term president; electoral term vice president; term limits president; term limits vice president; rules of impeachment (majority required to depose president/vice president; number of veto points in impeachment process); duties of vice president.

Data has been gathered during 2015 and 2016. Mikal Rian has assisted with the collection of the data. Marsteintredet can be contacted for a complete list of sources for the database.