

Discrimination, anti-prejudice norms and public support for multicultural policies in Europe: The case of religious schools

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Abstract

This study examines public support for a key contested multicultural policy in contemporary Europe: the provision of religious schools. It makes two main contributions, one substantive and one theoretical. Substantively, the main contribution is to provide new experimental evidence demonstrating the existence of discrimination against Muslims on a central issue of multicultural social policy. Theoretically, the main contribution is to propose an explanation for variations in patterns of discrimination that highlights the role of individuals' motivation to control prejudice. Through moderation analysis, we show that individuals who express stronger motivation to control prejudice are more likely to treat Muslim and Christian requests for religious schools equally, and they are more likely to retain their support for Muslim schools in the wake of a threatening Islamist terrorist incident. Because we conducted the experiments in three countries, we in addition find societal-level patterns of variation: Individuals' motivation to control prejudice is more strongly associated with non-discriminatory responses to the question of religious schools where a more multicultural path of accommodation has been pursued. This societal-level variation raises new hypotheses about how multicultural policies may interact with public opinion, and underlines the importance of comparative experimental work.

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Introduction

The integration of new minority groups has been a pressing issue on the European political agenda since at least the 1980s. The past decade or so has seen a marked change in this debate away from general questions about migrants and ethnic minorities towards specific concerns about Muslims and Islam (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Helbling et al. 2014a; Sniderman et al, 2014). In many European countries, Muslims now constitute the largest and most socially distinctive minority group: they are the group that faces the most resistance to accommodation from the majority populations, and attract the most political opposition, particularly from actors on the radical and extreme right (Caiani, della Porta, and Wagemann 2012; Berntzen and Weisskircher 2016). Conflicts over multiculturalism in Europe increasingly focus on practical dilemmas about whether, and how, to accommodate the beliefs, practices, and preferences of Muslim minorities - sometimes in the face of scepticism or outright hostility from the majority.

But what is the role of anti-Muslim sentiment or bias in these controversies? Public debate rarely justifies policy opposition on the grounds of explicit dislike of Muslims, but instead invokes more socially acceptable justifications for opposing multicultural accommodation. Some Europeans may oppose public accommodations for Muslim practices on principled, group-neutral grounds (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007) such as secularism (Imhoff and Recker 2012), universalism (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014), or liberal support for individual autonomy and gender equality (Gustavsson et al. 2016). Research in multiple European countries shows that negativity toward Muslims is widespread in public attitudes (Helbling 2014a), but do all citizens allow anti-Muslim bias to shape policy positions? Prior studies in the United States have found that individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice are less likely to allow their implicit bias to shape their intergroup attitudes (*e.g.*, Dunton and Fazio; Plant and Devine 1998),

but few studies exist that demonstrate whether motivation to control prejudice can reduce discriminatory responses to multicultural policy in Europe.

In this study, we provide evidence of discrimination in public support for multicultural accommodation in the context of a concrete policy issue—state support for Muslim schools. In three Western European countries in which state-supported Christian schools exist—Britain, Norway, and Sweden—we find substantial opposition to granting the same rights to Muslims. Using a randomized controlled experiment, we show that a substantively significant portion of this opposition in Britain and Norway is specifically “targeted” against only Muslim schools, i.e. it is opposition directed at Muslim schools that does not extend to other religious or non-universal private schools.

Nevertheless, we also find that some individuals resist discrimination, even under conditions of heightened threat. Individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice do not systematically exhibit the same degree of targeted opposition to Muslim schools exhibited by those low in motivation. In Norway and Britain, the gap in public support for Muslim vs. Christian schools is nearly eliminated among those highest in motivation to control prejudice, while the gap is completely eliminated or even reversed among highly motivated Swedish citizens. Further evidence from a natural experiment shows that many British respondents reacted to a Muslim terrorist attack by reducing support for Muslim schools, while support levels among those high in motivation to control prejudice were not affected.

Europeans’ attitudes toward multicultural policies accommodating Muslims

Most previous work on policy conflicts about multiculturalism (Bleich, 2011) and views of Muslims (Helbling, 2014a) has examined the issues involved in an abstract and general way, focusing on questions about principles and overall frameworks (Wright et al. 2016). While

research and theorizing at this level is indispensable, this dominant approach departs from the ways in which multicultural conflicts are often discussed in politics and experienced by citizens. Focusing on a concrete political controversy over an everyday issue presents multicultural accommodation in more familiar terms, and hence provides clearer evidence on who will accommodate real minority demands in a multicultural society. A general focus may conflate two related but distinct policy debates: as Joppke (2017) notes, "...[C]ivic integration is national-level policy while persistent multiculturalist policies tend to be local level, so that both may coexist."

A few recent studies examine attitudes toward specific multicultural policies or practices. However, these remain exceptions to the rule (Wright et al. 2016); moreover, most focus on attitudes toward Muslim religious garb such as the hijab, niqab, or burqa (Breton and Eady 2015, Helbling 2014b, Gustavsson et al. 2016). We focus on the issue of state support for religious schools, a prominent example of the conflicts over multicultural accommodation that are multiplying in European and North American education systems, yet one that has seen little systematic study. The most closely related studies examine the issue of support for including Islam in religious education curricula. Van der Noll and Saroglou (2014) find that 27% of a German sample supported teaching about Christianity but not Islam; Statham (2016) finds greater support for teaching about Christianity than for similar teaching about Islam in four European countries.

Despite the paucity of prior research, school policy provides a useful issue context for examining attitudes toward multicultural policy. The three countries in our study—Britain, Sweden, and Norway—have all seen on-going controversy over the existence of Muslim schools and/or multicultural practices in educational settings, such as disputes over teachers and students

wearing religious dress, Muslim parents seeking exemptions on religious grounds from activities such as swimming lessons, and the serving of Halal meat in school cafeterias. But while other issues involve aspects of Muslim practice that lack a clear parallel among Christian or secular majority groups, the schools issue allows for a straightforward comparison in willingness to grant precisely the same set of rights to different groups. A pattern in which citizens oppose Muslim schools while supporting other types of religious or particularistic schools would provide unusually straightforward evidence of discrimination. Moreover, religious schooling is an established part of each country's educational system. Given this status quo, a legal change to ban or inhibit Muslim schools would constitute discrimination in a straightforward legal sense, even if supported by a majority of the population.

Patterns of Opposition: Targeting Muslims, or School Types?

Of course, observed opposition to Muslim schools does not provide evidence of discrimination per se. Opponents of Muslim schools may not prefer discrimination—they might not support Christian schools either. Thus, we first ask whether opposition to Muslim schools is specifically targeted toward Muslims. Given the array of negative attitudes toward Muslims among majority-group Europeans (Helbling, 2014a, Storm et al. 2017), we expect an element of targeted opposition to Muslim schools. In other words, we expect that public opposition toward state sponsorship of distinctive schools will be more widespread when the policy concerns Muslim schools than when it concerns Christian schools or non-religious independent or 'free' schools.

On the other hand, we may find that opposition stems mainly from general principles or values that influence preferences for school policy overall, rather than from targeted opposition to Muslim schools in particular. The literature offers at least two notable principles that lead to

divergent predictions at the aggregate level. First, opposition to Muslim schools may also be rooted in secularism (Imhoff and Recker 2012). Dedicated secularists among majority-group Europeans would consistently oppose religious schools, for the dominant Christian group in society as well for the Muslim minority. Second, non-targeted opposition to Muslim schools might arise from a form of egalitarianism or *universalism* (Elchardus and Spruyt 2014).

Universalists would go further than secularists, opposing all forms of education, such as private or selective schools as well as religious schools, that depart from the ideal of all children receiving the same education from institutions with identical values and selection processes. The cross-national controlled survey experiment described in greater detail below is well suited to detecting the existence and extent of targeted opposition to Muslim schools, allowing us to compare levels of targeted opposition to Muslim schools to opposition to Christian schools (secularism) and private schools (universalism).

Does motivation to control prejudice reduce tendency to discriminate?

Targeted opposition is clearly discriminatory if it involves denying religious schools to Muslims but supporting the provision of identical schools to Christians. As such, if we find a significant degree of targeted opposition on the aggregate level this is substantively important. But discrimination of this kind may vary between citizens. What distinguishes those who discriminate from those who do not? Prior research suggests that at least a partial answer may lie in individual motivations to behave in accordance with social norms against prejudice.

According to the logic of “dual process” models of prejudice (Devine 1989), individuals who are highly motivated to control or avoid prejudice are more likely to prevent any underlying biases and stereotypes from shaping their policy preferences. Recent research on intergroup attitudes widely acknowledges the usefulness of the dual process models, which is increasingly common

in social science research (Kahneman 2011; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). According to this logic, individuals who are highly motivated to control prejudice (corresponding in dual process jargon to “system two”; or “thinking slow”) are more likely to prevent any underlying biases and stereotypes (corresponding to “system one;” or “thinking fast”) from shaping their policy preferences.

It is important to clarify the nature of motivation to control prejudice (MCP) in relationship to conventional concepts of prejudice. Previous research has demonstrated that motivation to control prejudice (MCP) is conceptually and empirically distinct from both implicit and explicit prejudice (Payne et al. 2005, Butz and Plant 2009). Conceptually, a motivation represents an objective or orientation toward action, whereas prejudice is usually imagined as a negative attitude toward an outgroup, or perhaps as set of pejorative beliefs about outgroup members. Empirically, as would be theoretically expected, there is a relationship between MCP and traditional prejudice measures: participants high in internal motivation to control prejudice (IMCP)¹ score lower on explicit prejudice measures (Devine et al 2002, Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones, 2008; Hausmann and Ryan, 2004). This is to be expected, because MCP should lead to active (“system two”) attempt to avoid acting upon any underlying biases. But IMCP does not eliminate automatically activated underlying prejudice from the “system one” cognitive process, as a significant portion of high IMCP participants nonetheless exhibit a relatively high degree of bias on measures of implicit prejudice (Devine et al 2002). High IMCP individuals also seem to respond more effectively to implicit prejudice reduction programs (Cooley 2018).

Rather than treating “social desirability” effects as a nuisance term that gets in the way of measuring true underlying prejudice, dual process models of prejudice incorporate motivation to

¹ In social psychology this construct is often labeled IMS, for Internal Motivation Scale, and measure in a similar way.

conform to anti-prejudice norms directly into our understanding of what constitutes prejudice and what drives prejudiced behavior. Such models provide a coherent account of the lack of association between explicit and implicit measures of prejudice: automatically activated stereotypes and negative biases are widely held, but individuals vary in their motivation to control these automatic forms of prejudice. Those who are highly motivated to control the expression of implicit prejudice are most likely not to discriminate even if they harbor negative implicit biases inside or outside of conscious awareness (Dunton and Fazio 1997, Plant and Devine 1998).

Although MCP reflects a goal of conforming to a particular social norm against prejudice, and is more likely to be found among those with more political tolerance in general, it is not reducible to a general tendency to engage in socially desirable behavior. Studies show little to no positive correlation between MCP and traditional measures of social desirability (Plant and Devine 1998, Ivarsflaten et al. 2010). Moreover, previous research has shown that subjects who are high in internal motivation to control prejudice continue to act in non-prejudiced ways even when others cannot observe or sanction their behavior (Butz and Plant 2009). For example, subjects who are internally motivated to respond without prejudice are *not* more likely to endorse stereotypes of black people in private than they are in public (Fazio et al. 1995; Plant, Devine, and Brazy, 2003).

Anti-prejudice motivations have mostly been researched to examine the dynamics of racial prejudice and other form of discrimination in the US (Butz and Plant 2009), but some studies conducted in Europe have employed this concept to explain otherwise puzzling patterns of support for the extreme right (Blinder, Ford and Ivarsflaten, 2013; Harteveltdt and Ivarsflaten

2018). Building from this work, we hypothesize that motivation to control prejudice is likely to moderate any tendency to discriminate against Muslims in the question of schools.

Discrimination in the Wake of Terror

We have also examined whether and how discriminatory responses to Muslim schools in Britain was affected by the Paris terror attacks of November 2015, the worst terror incident Europe had experienced for over a decade. Previous research has shown that threatening events can produce a wider backlash, as occurred in Britain following the 9/11 attacks on the United States (Meer and Modood 2009). We might expect, then, that news of a violent attack committed by Islamist terrorists may increase targeted opposition to Muslim schools.

On the other hand, a hostile backlash is not a foregone conclusion. For example, an expected backlash against Muslims in American public opinion after 9/11 did not initially materialize, perhaps due to an elite consensus that sharply distinguished Islamist terrorism from Islam in general (Panagopolous 2006). If motivation to control prejudice works as theory suggests, then it should shore up commitments to avoid discrimination, even under the pressure of a more salient threat. British media was at the time filled with calls from elite and media figures across the political spectrum who encouraged people to resist the temptation to blame all Muslims for the acts of a tiny extremist minority. In theory, British people with high levels of motivation to control prejudice should be more likely to heed these calls and maintain their prior attitudes toward Muslim schools. Thus, we hypothesize that (a) the Paris attacks will generate additional opposition to Muslims schools among those low in IMCP, but (b) that IMCP will act as a countervailing force, such that these higher levels of opposition will be observed only among those with little or no motivation to control prejudice.

Data and Methods

The data in the study come from embedding similar experiments in surveys conducted in each of the three countries, once in Norway and Sweden and twice in Britain. In Britain, the experiment was run on the YouGov opt-in internet panel in November 2015 as part of a specially commissioned survey on Muslim integration, and then repeated immediately after the Paris terror attacks. In Sweden, the experiment was run on wave four of the Swedish Citizen Panel (March-April 2012), an opt-in internet panel owned by the University of Gothenburg. And in Norway, the experiment was run on wave four of the Norwegian Citizen Panel (March 2015), a randomly recruited, academic-purpose internet panel owned by the University of Bergen. The sample sizes were approximately 130 people per treatment condition in Sweden, 350 in Britain, and 400 in Norway. The British YouGov opt-in sample is representative by design (Twyman 2008). The Norwegian Citizen Panel sample relies on random recruitment from high-quality population registers. There are some biases in the resulting sample, which we have addressed through controls in the moderation analysis (Høgestøl and Skjervheim 2015). The Swedish sample is opt-in and is known to over-represent men and more educated, liberal, and high-income respondents (Martinsson et al. 2013).²

The differences between the panels make us cautious about comparing the level of commitment to anti-prejudice norms in between countries in a strict sense and about generalizing to the publics in the countries as whole. In particular, the caution is advised with regards to generalizing the main effect result reported below in the case of Sweden. Because of the nature of biases in this sample, the survey may overstate the overall levels of commitment to equal

² The demographics of the Norwegian and Swedish Citizen Panels are described in the cited methodology reports (Høgestøl and Skjervheim 2015; Martinsson et al. 2013). The British YouGov panel is representative on core demographics by design (Twyman 2008).

treatment of Muslims, and as our analysis shows this can lead to an underestimation of the tendency to discriminate in the Swedish population more generally. Similar biases, although somewhat less severe, are also present in the Norwegian sample and so similar caution applies with regards to the generalizability of findings to the country as a whole.

Core Experimental Design and Natural Experiment

We used a between-subjects experimental design to test our hypothesis regarding targeted opposition, secularism, and universalism. We asked respondents about state support for schools, and randomly assigned respondents to be asked about different types of schools—Christian, Muslim, or “free schools.” Within each country, questions posed to respondents were identical aside from the experimental manipulation of school type. Across countries, the content of the question was the same but the wording was somewhat different in order to sound appropriate in each language and setting. This approach follows the lead of past target group experiments used to study prejudice, tolerance, and its impact on policy preferences in the US and Europe (e.g Brooks and Manza 2013: Ch. 4; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Harell 2010; Petersen et al. 2011). The between-subjects design eliminates consistency pressures on respondents that might dampen the gaps in support between Muslim and Christian education in prior studies (Statham 2016, Van der Noll and Saroglou 2014).³ The surveys were fielded online in all three countries, a survey mode which has been found to reduce social desirability bias in responses on sensitive topics (Kreuter et al. 2008, Gnambs and Kaspar, 2015).

In addition to the three-country experimental design, we made use of a natural experiment of sorts arising from the tragedy of the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015.

³ As it turns out, our effect size for Britain turns out to be proportionally larger than Statham’s, consistent with consistency pressures dampening differences in his study, although our main effects findings on Britain are otherwise consistent with his (Statham 2016).

By coincidence, the survey containing our experiment was in the field in Britain just prior to these attacks. To gauge the response of the British public to the attack in relation to our research questions, we fielded the same questions again in the days following the attack. Because the surveys were fielded so close in time, with the attack dominating news coverage in the interim, we can have reasonable confidence that the changes we observe are a result of the attack and the heightened atmosphere of threat in its wake, as discussed above.

Measurement of Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice

We measured motivation to control prejudice through a series of previously validated items probing whether or not respondents have internalised being non-prejudiced as a personal goal or motivation. A representative item asks respondents to agree or disagree with the statement: “I get angry with myself if I have a prejudiced thought.” (See the Appendix for the full set of questions.) Prior psychometric validation studies have confirmed that this Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice (IMCP) scale is a valid and reliable measure in both the US and European contexts; in particular, IMCP is uncorrelated with more generalized tendencies to adjust one’s behavior to social norms or social contexts, such as social desirability or self-monitoring, in both the US (Plant and Devine 1998) and Europe (Ivarsflaten, Blinder, and Ford 2010). Shortened IMCP scales have been validated and shown to predict political attitudes and vote choice in Britain and Germany (Blinder, Ivarsflaten, and Ford 2013). The precise set of questions varied somewhat from country to country. Most notably, the British version included questions that asked specifically about Muslims, while the others were oriented more broadly toward “immigrants” or the anti-prejudice norm in general. All results for Britain were robust to an alternative specification of IMCP omitting the Muslim-specific questions (see table A2.2 in the Appendix). Care was taken in question ordering to minimize priming-effects of the IMCP questions, in light of prior work in which pre-

priming respondents arguably distorted experimental effects (Huber and Lipinski 2006, Mendelberg 2008). In the Swedish and British samples this meant that the IMCP items were administered after the experiment. In the Norwegian sample, they were administered at a separate point in time.⁴

Country Selection

Along with Britain, the choice of these three countries provides further leverage toward understanding connections between opposition to Muslim schools and to prejudice and/or anti-prejudice norms. Sweden and Norway are close to one another and distant from Britain not only geographically, but also in terms of their coordinated market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001, although see Schneider and Paunescu 2012), their more comprehensive welfare states (Esping-Anderson 2013), their languages, and other politically relevant dimensions. Sweden and Norway are also among the most egalitarian nations in the world when it comes to gender roles (Inglehart and Norris 2003).

Sweden and Norway are also similar to one another in their historical and current approaches to education, the policy area we are examining. In all three countries, large numbers of primary and secondary schools were originally run by Christian churches and then gradually (and not without controversy) taken over by the state. However, in both Scandinavian countries, schools were first taken over by states and later secularized. All schools are still publicly financed and strictly regulated by national curricula, but both countries have more recently enacted major reforms (in 1992 for Sweden, 2003 for Norway) to enable private entities to run

⁴ This latter choice is what we believe to be best practice in moderation analysis, but it was not feasible in the studies fielded in Britain and Sweden. We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the somewhat weaker associations between IMCP and discrimination observed in Norway is related to this design choice, and so again we advise caution when it comes to interpreting the differences between countries. Note however that this choice only affects interpretation of the moderation analysis, not the main experimental results.

schools. In both Sweden and Norway, confessional schools remain a marginal phenomenon, encompassing 1.5% and 3.4% of all primary schools, respectively. In Britain, however, a different bargain was struck. Educational reforms in 1944 preserved the status of church schools and their autonomy in the education system, while providing them with public support, an arrangement that has, with modifications, endured ever since. Confessional schools are a major part of the primary school system (37% of all schools in England). They must comply with national educational curriculum and intake rules, and they run alongside secular state run schools, which provide the majority of school places.⁵

Unusually, in the midst of so many similarities, Norway differs from Sweden in one key respect that is critical to our study: the existing political climate around multiculturalism. Policy indices based on expert ratings highlight large differences between our cases in multicultural accommodation. Sweden scores highest (7 out of a possible 8) on the "multiculturalism policy index," which documents the extent of policy accommodation for immigrant and minority groups, including bilingual and multicultural educational curricula, religious exemptions to dress codes, and mandates for representation of ethnic minorities in public media (Tolley and Vonk, 2016; Banting and Kymlicka 2013). Britain scores a middling 5.5 on this index, while Norway scores the lowest of the three at 3.5.

Given this pattern, we would argue that Sweden and Norway should show similar patterns to one another, and distinct from Britain, if attitudes toward Muslim schools are primarily based on attitudes toward schooling, on attitudes toward gender roles, or on broader cultural determinants. However, if opposition to Muslim schools is primarily related to the politics of prejudice and multiculturalism, then it is Sweden that should be the tolerant outlier,

⁵ More detail on the prevalence of religious schools in each country is provided in the Appendix, table A5

and Britain and Norway that should show similar levels of opposition and patterns of connections between policy preferences and prejudice. This would provide further evidence, even if only suggestive, in support the link between prejudice, societal norms and school policy preferences.

Results

Identifying Targeted Opposition

Our first question regards the sources of opposition to Muslim schools in the three countries as revealed in the pattern of direct effects of the survey experimental treatments. Figure 1 (a-c) displays the effects of the experimental manipulations in each of our three national contexts. They show the mean support for each school type, with responses rescaled to the unit interval. Higher values indicate stronger support for a given type of school. The confidence intervals are larger in the Swedish case, because there were fewer respondents in each condition there.

The Swedish results show an aggregate pattern consistent with principled secularism, rather than targeted opposition or universalism. There is no statistically detectable difference in attitudes to the two kinds of religious schools, and both kinds of religious schools are less popular than secular private “free” schools. Just under half of respondents in the Swedish sample oppose each of the religious educational options.⁶ Despite Sweden being a Scandinavian country with a history of a strong universal schools system this pattern of results is *not* consistent with universalism because of the considerably higher support for non-denominational but privately run free schools than for religious schools. However, we must be cautious about generalizing


⁶ Table A1 in the appendix report the models behind figure 1 (a-c).

from our Swedish sample to the Swedish population as a whole due to the imbalances in the sample.


In contrast to the Swedish results, we find strong evidence of targeted opposition in the British and Norwegian samples, where respondents are much less willing to support Muslim schools than Christian schools. The starkest results are found in Britain. Mean support for Muslim schools is 0.29 (s.e. = .01) on the 0-1 scale, compared to 0.62 (s.e. = .01) for Christian schools and 0.47 (s.e. = .01) for free schools. Differences between support for Muslim schools and the other two school types are both statistically significant ($p < .001$, two-tailed t-test). To a substantial degree, British opposition is targeted, rather than consistently secular or universalist: schools run by churches from the dominant Christian tradition are very popular, and privately run "free schools", though less popular, are also much more popular than Muslim schools.

In Norway, the experiment also reveals targeted opposition to Muslim schools, although the differences in support for Muslim and Christian conditions are not as large as in Britain. Mean support for Muslim schools is 0.41 (s.e. = .02), significantly lower than the mean of 0.61 (s.e. = .02) for Christian schools ($p < .001$, two-tailed t-test) and below the midpoint of the scale, revealing more opposition than support. The pattern of effects in Norway is also the most consistent with targeted opposition and inconsistent with secularism. Much as in Sweden, the pattern of direct effects is clearly inconsistent with universalism as well, because both private and Christian schools are much more strongly supported than Muslim schools, whereas a universalist model would predict similar opposition to any deviation from standard, uniform public education.


Figure 1. Target group effects of school type.
(a) Sweden



(b) Great Britain



(c) Norway



The results from the experimental intervention randomly altering the school type show that Muslim schools face targeted opposition in two of the three countries under study - Norway and Britain - where Muslim schools were significantly and substantially less popular than otherwise identically described Christian schools. In this Swedish sample, Muslim schools are in the aggregate treated the same as Christian schools. However, as noted above the nature of our Swedish sample requires caution in generalizing this finding to the Swedish population as a whole. It is possible that the sample has a higher number of respondents committed to controlling prejudice than the country as a whole. As we will show below, individual-level variation in internal motivation to control prejudice matters particularly strongly in the Swedish sample.

Moderation by motivation to control prejudice

While many citizens in Britain and Norway single out Muslim schools for targeted opposition, are highly motivated citizens more likely to treat Muslims equally? We have suggested that those higher in motivation to control prejudice will be more supportive of Muslim schools in general, and expect to see little or no targeted opposition among those high in motivation to control prejudice. We therefore turn now to examine whether motivation to control prejudice moderates the effects of the experimental conditions, and reduces the observed gap in support for Muslim and Christian schools. We expect motivation to control prejudice will be associated with relatively higher support for Muslim schools in all of our contexts while not having a significant relationship with support for other sorts of schools.

Figure 2(a-c) summarizes the impact of motivation to control prejudice on support for Muslim and Christian schools in regression models conducted separately for each treatment condition and each national context.⁷ The figures show that IMCP has a significant impact on views of Muslim schools in all three countries. Meanwhile, IMCP has no effect on views of Christian schools in two of the countries as expected. In Britain, the effect of IMCP on support for Christian schools is negative: British respondents expressing higher motivation to control prejudice were *less* supportive of Christian schools. It is possible that those strongly committed to anti-prejudice norms worry that Christian schools, which are much more widespread in England than the other two contexts, put Muslims and other minority religious groups at a disadvantage. In all three countries, individuals with high motivation to control prejudice treat

⁷ Results from the complete regression models using continuous variables and controls for potential confounders are presented in the Appendix Tables A2.1, A2.2 and A2.3.


Muslim and Christian schools more equally. IMCP has no significant relationship with support for private schools in any of the three cases.⁸

The positive impact of IMCP on support for Muslim schools, and the nil or negative effect on support for Christian schools, means that Muslim schools face less targeted opposition from those more motivated to control prejudice. However, this moderating effect is only strong enough to eliminate targeted opposition completely in the Swedish sample. Since most respondents in the Swedish sample also express moderate to high IMCP, the positive effect of IMCP on support for Muslim schools renders the overall difference in reactions to Christian and Muslim schools statistically insignificant in this case. Put differently, the strong association between motivation to control prejudice and support for Muslim schools, combined with the higher levels of motivation to control prejudice expressed in the Swedish sample, can account for the absence of targeted opposition in the Swedish experiment overall – even though Swedish respondents who scored low on IMCP do discriminate against Muslim schools.


⁸ We focus on Christian and Muslim schools for ease of interpretation. Results from all conditions are reported in the Appendix tables.

Figure 2. Predicted effect of IMCP on support for schools


a) Sweden



b) Britain



c) Norway




The IMCP moderation effect is not based on an experimental intervention and so it is vulnerable to omitted variable bias. In the appendix we have included tables (A2.1-A2.3) showing that the effect of IMCP is robust to the introduction of various demographic and attitudinal controls including demographic variables such as age, gender, and education. While these models do not eliminate the possibility of alternative moderating mechanisms, they do at least suggest the IMCP moderation effect is robust, and alleviate some of the concerns previously expressed about sampling bias, though caution is still required in generalizing the results reported here to the countries as a whole.

Motivation and response to threat: Britain before and after the Paris terror attacks

Finally, we present the results of our study of attitudes before and after the Paris terror attacks. A comparison of British attitudes before and immediately after the November 2015 terror attacks in Paris is presented in Figure 4, which plots the predicted difference in support for Muslim schools

at different levels of IMCP in the survey conducted after Paris, compared with the baseline level of support found in the pre-Paris survey. These results are based on a regression modelling support for schools, in the Muslim condition, as function of IMCP, a dummy variable indicating pre- or post-attack, and an interaction between these two variables (full results in Appendix, Table A4). We find that predicted support for Muslim schools is lower after the Paris attacks among British respondents with low IMCP (below the mean score of 0.6 on the IMCP scale), but is the same in both surveys among those who score above the average (i.e. the pre-attack/post-attack difference is small and not statistically different from zero). Opposition to Muslim schools was higher after the attack among the section of the British public who expressed little motivation to control prejudice turned against Muslim schools in the aftermath of a major Islamist terror incident. Among those with high IMCP, however, support was similar before and after the attacks, consistent with the hypothesis that those motivated to control prejudice will resist the temptation to respond to heightened threat with increased hostility to state accommodation of Muslims.

Figure 4: British support for Muslim schools, post-Paris attacks (baseline: pre-Paris)



Discussion

The results presented demonstrate that discriminatory targeted opposition to Muslims on a central issue of multicultural accommodation - the provision of religious schooling – exists and is widespread enough to pose a serious challenge to multicultural accommodation in two of the three countries studied. Many majority group citizens in Britain and Norway who would provide religious schools to the Christian majority would deny identical schools to the Muslim minority. In all three countries, support for Muslim schools was considerably lower than support for private schools, meaning results are not consistent with the claim that opposition to Muslim schools is based largely on universalist principles, which call for all pupils to be taught in

identical school structures. With respect to Muslim schooling, at least, the majority is willing to support policies that violate egalitarian standards, and instantiate not only de facto but even de jure discrimination.

Furthermore, beyond the core experimental design, a series of additional tests provide evidence that motivation to control prejudice can reduce or even eliminate targeted opposition. First, moderation analysis showed that individuals with high IMCP are more likely to support Muslim schools than those lower in motivation. In the Swedish sample, enough individuals have moderate to high levels of IMCP to essentially eliminate targeted opposition at the aggregate level. There are relatively fewer individuals with high levels of IMCP in Britain and Norway, but these individuals exhibit little to no discriminatory opposition to Muslim schools as compared to Christian schools.

Second, results from a natural experiment before and after a major terror attack carried out by Islamists show that opposition to Muslim schools was unaffected among those with high IMCP, while opposition to Muslim schools was higher after the attacks among those who were not motivated to control prejudice. In addition, our comparative experimental design provides further suggestive evidence that country-level variation in prejudice and associated political and social norms are critical to shaping national-level patterns in targeted opposition to Muslim schools. These latter forms of evidence do not stem from a controlled experiment, and therefore do not confirm a causal interpretation. Nonetheless, we have shown that motivation to control prejudice is consistently associated with lower levels of anti-Muslim discrimination in a central issue of policy accommodation across three European contexts, and provide further insight into the range of conditions under which motivation may reduce discrimination, including under conditions of heightened threat.

These results have important implications for both practical and scholarly debates about multicultural policy, and about whether negative responses to Muslims constitute Islamophobia or principled objections to Muslim practices. In the midst of political debates about multicultural policy, it is important to understand the extent to which opposition from majority-group citizens is rooted in principle or in prejudice. General opposition to private or religious schooling is a very different issue for governments than discriminatory opposition focussed only on a stigmatised minority. The former is a legitimate preference that a responsive government might wish to accommodate; the latter would entail discrimination against citizens on the basis of religion, in a way that governments cannot legitimately enact into policy. Our experimental results provide clear evidence that opposition to accommodating Muslim demands for religious schools is often discriminatory, and our additional tests provide reason to suspect that anti-Muslim prejudice is an important driver of this targeted opposition.

Hostile views and discriminatory opposition are, however, only part of the story emerging from this study. We have highlighted the potentially critical role of anti-prejudice norms in shaping policy debates and public opinion. Our results suggest that when majority group members regard the equal treatment of minority groups as an important personal motivation, they are willing to apply this principle when considering controversial policy issues involving Muslims. Anti-prejudice norms are a potentially valuable resource in building public support for multicultural policy. In all three countries studied, citizens who express a stronger commitment to such norms expressed greater support for, or at least weaker discriminatory opposition to, Muslim schools.

Commitments to social norms against prejudice show considerable power and robustness in shaping the national debate over Muslim integration. In the Swedish case, the strength of the

normative motivation is sufficient to eliminate discrimination in the aggregate, even though respondents in Sweden who reject such norms do also discriminate against Muslim schools. The aggregate pattern found in our Swedish data is consistent with a notion of principled, secularist opposition to religious schooling, with Swedish respondents rejecting both Muslim and Christian schools equally.

The strong role for motivation to control prejudice in the Swedish sample suggests that the politics of prejudice are still highly relevant even in the absence of an aggregate-level gap in support for Muslim and Christian schools. Swedes who express little or no motivation to control prejudice still discriminate against Muslims. The absence of significant aggregate Muslim disadvantage reflects both that the level of motivation to control prejudice was higher overall in the Swedish sample compared to the other two countries, and that IMCP had a stronger effect on Swedes' support for Muslim schools. In other words, our Swedish respondents stand out for broader and deeper incorporation of Muslims under the protection of the anti-prejudice norm, at least on this policy question.

However, while we have provided suggestive evidence that motivations to control prejudice can encourage more equal treatment of Muslim minorities in multiple European contexts, the limitations of our data mean that alternative possibilities cannot be fully ruled out. In particular, we lack the means in these data to fully tease apart the relative roles of motivations and underlying bias, or to fully rule out alternative interpretations of the effect captured by our IMCP measure from some of its correlates. For example, IMCP is correlated (by design) with more conventional explicit measures of prejudice. We argue for IMCP on theoretical grounds, as a better representation of validated dual process models of prejudice, and as a more precise concept than the usual measures of “explicit prejudice”. However, our available data cannot fully

exclude the possibility that the moderating effect of IMCP mixes together the impact of social norms as a conscious brake on discrimination with the mere absence of implicit or explicit hostility to minority groups.⁹ We cannot fully separate out these effects in this study, given the limited battery of items available on large multipurpose national-level surveys. In addition, although there is evidence from previous research that IMCP is a domain-specific measure, reflecting sensitivity to particular social norms sanctioning expressions of prejudice, we cannot determine in this study whether or not IMCP is in turn the product or expression of a broader form of political or social tolerance. This is not inconsistent with our view, but rather prompts further questions about the individual and societal sources of variation in IMCP that are beyond the scope of the present study.

Finally, our results demonstrate the value of conducting cross-national survey experiments, as we uncovered significant differences in responses across contexts. The divergence between Sweden and Norway, and convergence between Norway and Britain instead, suggests that more entrenched multicultural politics may help mitigate discriminatory behaviour. This unusual pattern suggests that each society's path of multicultural accommodation could be important in setting standards for how broadly and deeply anti-prejudice norms apply. Sweden and Norway differ most strikingly from one another in their approaches to multiculturalism, while being quite similar in numerous other social, political, and economic respects, including existing policy toward state-sponsored schools. Therefore, their divergence on preferences toward Muslim schools is striking. Sweden, with the strongest multicultural policies, also shows

⁹ In a dual process framework, explicit prejudice and IMCP are inherently and indeed causally related. Self-reported answers to explicit prejudice questions should be partially driven by IMCP, with respondents who score high on IMCP reporting less prejudice, because reporting prejudice violates the anti-racism norm they are motivated to follow. For this reason, it would require more detailed measures than typically available in national political attitude surveys to disentangle IMCP from explicit prejudice measures.

the strongest connection between anti-prejudice norms and discrimination against Muslim schools, while such norms show the weakest connection to views of Muslim schools in Norway. This striking national difference points to the need for further research, with attention to the nuance of comparative settings. It demonstrates the theoretical and empirical complexity of this issue, and in so doing underlines why we need to be careful about generalizing from one context to another when addressing such issues in political science.

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Appendix

A1. Question wordings in all three countries

A1.1 School Support Experiment

Sweden: Some parents in Sweden would like to send their children to **[Christian/Muslim/religious/private]** schools that follow the same curriculum as other schools, **[but are based on Christian values/teach Islam/are based on religious values/BLANK]** Do you think that parents should be allowed to send their children to **[Christian/Muslim/religious/private]** schools?

Britain:

Some parents in Britain would like to send their children to **[Muslim/Christian/Religious/Free]** schools, which teach the same subjects as the national curriculum but are based on **[Islamic religious/Christian religious/religious/their own particular]** values. Do you agree that parents should be allowed to send their children to **[Muslim/Christian/Religious/Free]** schools?

Norway:

To what extent do you agree or disagree that it should allowed to send one's children to **[Muslim/Christian/religious/private]** schools which follow the same Norwegian curriculum as other schools?

A1.2 Internal Motivation to Control Prejudice

Sweden

1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways because it is personally important to me
2. I try to be unprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own convictions.
3. I get irritated with myself when I have prejudiced thoughts.
4. In my own view it is OK to use stereotypes about immigrants.

Britain

1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards Muslims because it is personally important to me
2. I get angry with myself when I have a prejudiced thought.
3. I try to be unprejudiced towards Muslims due to my own convictions
4. I do not want to appear racist, even to myself.

Norway

1. I attempt to act in non-prejudiced ways towards immigrants because it is personally important to me
2. I do not want to appear to be racist, not even to myself.
3. I feel guilty if I think negatively about immigrants.
4. I try to be unprejudiced towards immigrants due to my own convictions


A2. Full tables for all figures in paper

Table A1: Experimental Treatment Effects: Support for Schools, by Type
Corresponds to Figure 1

School type	(a) Sweden	(b) Britain	(c) Norway
Muslim	-0.059 (0.047)	-0.342*** (0.016)	-0.194*** (0.021)
Private	0.207*** (0.047)	-0.155*** (0.016)	0.038+ (0.021)
Christian	0.452*** (0.033)	0.624*** (0.011)	0.606*** (0.015)
Observations	391	2,221	1,555
R-squared	0.078	0.168	0.091

Cells contain OLS regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.10

Figure A2. Sweden figure excluding messenger conditions for Christian and Muslims schools.



Note: The Swedish data featured additional "messenger" political endorsement manipulations – figure A3 illustrates that our results are robust to analysis of a more limited dataset excluding these treatment conditions.

Table A3: Effects of IMCP on Support for Muslim and Christian Schools
In each case, the no controls models correspond to the results plotted in Figure 2

A3.1 - School type and IMCP interactions in Britain

	Model 1: School type & IMCP interactions	Model 2: School type & IMCP interactions, with controls
<i>Intercept</i>	0.74 (0.03)***	0.86 (0.05)***
<i>School type</i> (reference: <i>Christian</i>)		
Muslim	-0.71 (0.04)***	-0.76 (0.05)***
Private	-0.23 (0.04)***	-0.26 (0.04)***
IMCP	-0.20 (0.04)***	-0.28 (0.06)***
<i>IMCP*school type</i> <i>interactions</i>		
Muslim*IMCP	0.61 (0.07)***	0.68 (0.07)***
Private*IMCP	0.13 (0.07)	0.14 (0.07)*
<i>Controls</i>		
Views of Muslims		0.16 (0.03)***
Left-right attitudes		0.09 (0.04)*
Religious affiliation (ref: Church of England)		
Catholic		0.07 (0.03)*
Minority Christian		0.08 (0.02)**
None		-0.09 (0.02)***
Party identification (ref: Conservative)		
Labour		-0.09 (0.02)***
Liberal Democrat		-0.08 (0.03)**
UKIP/BNP		-0.06 (0.03)*
Other		-0.08 (0.02)**
None		-0.02 (0.02)
<i>R squared</i>	0.20	0.26
<i>N</i>	2217	1839

Table A3.2: School type and IMCP interactions in Britain, excluding IMCP measures which reference Muslims

	Model 1: School type & IMCP interactions	Model 2: School type & IMCP interactions, with controls
<i>Intercept</i>	0.58 (0.02)***	0.68 (0.05)***
<i>School type (reference: Christian)</i>		
Muslim	-0.51 (0.03)***	-0.56 (0.03)***
Private	-0.17 (0.03)***	-0.20 (0.04)***
IMCP reduced	-0.13 (0.03)***	-0.16 (0.04)**
<i>IMCP*school type interactions</i>		
Muslim*IMCP reduced	0.40 (0.05)***	0.47 (0.06)***
Private*IMCP reduced	0.08 (0.05)	0.12 (0.06)
<i>Controls</i>		
Views of Muslims		-0.07 (0.03)*
Left-right attitudes		0.05 (0.04)
<i>Religious affiliation (ref: Church of England)</i>		
Catholic		0.07 (0.02)**
Minority Christian		0.07 (0.03)**
None		-0.08 (0.01)***
<i>Party identification (ref: Conservative)</i>		
Labour		-0.06 (0.02)**
Liberal Democrat		-0.06 (0.03)*
UKIP/BNP		-0.04 (0.02)
Other		-0.06 (0.03)
None		-0.01(0.01)
<i>R squared</i>	0.20	0.27
<i>N</i>	2214	1773

A3.3 - School type and IMCP interactions in Sweden*

	Model 1:	Model 1b: Extended dataset	Model 2:	Model 2b: Extended dataset
<i>Intercept</i>	0.48 (0.12)***	0.46 (0.06)***	0.44 (0.19)*	0.35 (0.10)***
<i>School type</i> (reference: Christian)				
Muslim	-0.45 (0.16)**	-0.39 (0.08)***	-0.48 (0.17)**	-0.43 (0.08)***
Private	0.19 (0.16)	0.21 (0.12)	0.12 (0.17)	0.12 (0.13)
IMCP	-0.04 (0.16)	-0.07 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.18)	-0.08 (0.09)
<i>IMCP*school type interactions</i>				
Muslim*IMCP	0.58 (0.21)**	0.53 (0.11)***	0.62 (0.23)**	0.57 (0.11)***
Private*IMCP	0.02 (0.21)	0.05 (0.17)	0.15 (0.23)	0.16 (0.17)
<i>Controls</i>				
Views of Muslims			-0.03 (0.08)	-0.14 (0.05)**
Male			0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.02)*
<i>Education (ref: degree)</i>				
High school or less			-0.07 (0.06)	-0.10 (0.03)**
University, no degree			-0.07 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.02)
Age			0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)
Left-right ideology			0.07 (0.01)***	0.07 (0.01)***
Political trust			-0.07 (0.03)*	-0.03 (0.02)
Political interest			0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
<i>R squared</i>	<i>0.11</i>	<i>0.07</i>	<i>0.18</i>	<i>0.16</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>391</i>	<i>1140</i>	<i>360</i>	<i>1054</i>

**Note: The Swedish data featured additional "messenger" political endorsement manipulations - model 1b and 2b below illustrate that our results are robust to analysis of an extended dataset including these treatment conditions.*

A3.4: School type and IMCP interactions in Norway

	Model 1: School type & IMCP interactions	Model 2: School type & IMCP interactions, with controls
<i>Intercept</i>	0.63 (0.06)***	0.69 (0.09)***
<i>School type</i> (reference: Christian)		
Muslim	-0.36 (0.08)***	-0.36 (0.08)***
Private	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.08)
IMCP	-0.04 (0.08)	-0.04 (0.08)
<i>IMCP*school type interactions</i>		
Muslim*IMCP	0.24 (0.12)*	0.24 (0.12)*
Private*IMCP	0.12 (0.12)	0.06 (0.12)
<i>Controls</i>		
Attitudes to Muslims		-0.13 (0.04)**
Left-right self-placement		0.02 (0.006)**
<i>Religious background</i> (reference: Church of Norway)		
Minority Christian		0.10 (0.02)*
Other minority religion		0.26 (0.11)*
No religion		-0.05 (0.02)*
Male		0.01 (0.02)
<i>Education (ref: secondary qualifications)</i>		
Primary or no qualifications		0.01 (0.02)
Degree		-0.02 (0.03)
<i>Age (ref 18-29)</i>		
30-59		0.04 (0.03)
60 plus		0.06 (0.03)
<i>Vote preference (ref: Christian Democrats)</i>		
Conservative		-0.07 (0.05)
Progress		-0.11 (0.05)*
Liberal		-0.02 (0.05)
Socialist Left		-0.18 (0.06)***
Centre		-0.09 (0.07)
Green		-0.16 (0.04)**
Labour		-0.15 (0.04)***

Red		-0.24 (0.08)**
Would not vote		-0.11 (0.06)
Not entitled to vote		-0.18 (0.07)**
Other		-0.26 (0.08)**
<i>R squared</i>	<i>0.11</i>	<i>0.18</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>1045</i>	<i>1032</i>

Table A4: Regression of IMCP and British support for Muslim schools, pre- and post-Paris attacks

Model 3 corresponds to the results presented in Figure 4

	Model 1: pre-post only	Model 2: add IMCP	Model 3: Add interaction
Post-Paris	-0.011 (0.022)	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.139* (0.057)
IMCP		0.414*** (0.043)	0.323*** (0.061)
Post-Paris*IMCP			0.183* (0.087)
Constant	0.299*** (0.034)	0.071 (0.040)	0.236* (0.088)
Observations	752	751	751
R-squared	0.0003	0.109	0.122

Standard errors in parentheses
 *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05,

Table A5: Confessional and private governance of schools in Sweden, Norway and England, 2015/2016.

	Sweden	Norway	England
Confessional schools (N)	71	98	6,813
Confessional schools (as % of all schools)	1.5	3.4	37.0 (primary); 19.0 (secondary)
Privately owned schools (%)	17.0	6.3	9.5*
"Academies" (%)	0.0	0.0	22.5
Christian schools (N)	59	98	6150
Muslim schools (N)	11	0	27
Jewish Schools (N)	1	0	48
Sikh schools (N)	0	0	11
Other (N)			
	0	0	5
Muslims schools (as % of confessional schools)	15.5	0	0.4

*Fee paying "independent" schools in England

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Table A6: Sample data compared to population data

	<u>Sweden</u>		<u>Norway</u>		<u>Britain</u>	
	sample	popn.	sample	popn.	sample	popn.
Age <30	16.5%	21.1%	12.1%	20.5%	15.5%	20.6%
Age >60	20.3%	31.1%	32.3%	28.0%	34.4%	30.0%
Gender (% male)	56.6%	49.9%	50.3%	50.0%	49.4%	49.6%
Education (% tertiary degree)	54.5%	25.2%	60.1%	32.2%	26.3%	27.2%

Notes: Age entries indicate proportion of adult population; Education entries indicate proportion of population aged 25-64.

Sources: OECD, Statistics Sweden, Høgestøl, and Skjervheim (2015), ONS (UK)