Thorvald Gran:

PROJECT PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY-MAKING IN FAO

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PREFACE.

With its origin in Max Weber and his analysis of bureaucracy, the term rationality has been close to deified. But while Weber discussed several aspects of the term (for example the relationship between "zweckrational" and "wertrational") and the modifications of rationality through different types of authority relationships (traditional, legal and charismatic), modern organization theory seems to concentrate on a refinement of one kind of rationality: the making and sustaining of distinct goal/subgoal hierarchies.

The role of technocrats or experts in bureaucracy, and their dislike for other than well-founded, scientific premises for their decisions (as spelled out f.ex. by Jean Maynaud in his book "Technocracy") is based on this concept of rationality. The same seems to be basis for the widespread belief in planning as a panacea for social, economic and political shortcomings in almost any society. And when planning and centralization go hand in hand we perceive again that rational hierarchy or pyramide of goals and subgoals - with the planners at the top - as the motivating model.

But is the focus on a special concept of rationality only unrealistic dreaming? Definitely not. The accomplishments are as tangible as one could want. But intangible problems are arising, and administrative systems are being adjusted to them. Diverse social groups with their specific cultural and political institutions are awakening and are able to channel their demands ever more strongly to decision-making centres. This is a challenge -- both to the hierarchical unified system of administration and the concept of rationality that it is built on.

It is basically this perspective, together with a live concern for problems of agricultural and social development, that has motivated the present study. What is a viable concept of organizational rationality? This is the normative or political question in the study. How is top-level policy-making related to lower-level planning of development projects? This is the descriptive question that can make a provisional answer to the first one possible.

Policy-making then is thought of as the explicit construction of goals and general coordinated programs of action for the organization and its main parts. Planning will be a term applied especially to the process of initiating and designing a project blueprint or project plan. Although this division between the two concepts is highly debateable, we choose to use them in this fashion because they then in a meaningful way seem to uncover interesting processes in FAO-processes that in turn perhaps can be criticized using other definitions of the same terms.

The discussion of planning and policy-making that follows is at a micro- or organizational level. Theory in this field has increasingly concentrated on understanding the decision-making processes that precede plan and policy decisions, and the trend has been to focus on technical aspects of communication, information processing and structure. In this study we make an attempt - however rudimentary - to unite this approach with the problems of politics or the problems of choosing between values and allocating resources. We believe in other words that the administrative system in FAO plays a basic role in a political as well as an administrative - process, and that problems discussed at a macro-political level are relevant for a micro analysis.

Planning has been discussed mostly in a national setting. We turn to the international field both as a step towards more comparative study of the role of different nationality groups and as a source of possible modification of our knowledge of planning. Through this approach and through the empirical data on international development projects that are presented, we hope the reader will enjoy the following pages.

I want to thank Professor Knut Dahl Jacobsen for his encouragement and guidance and Arne Løchen for his lengthy and patient introduction to the inner workings of FAO. In FAO a large number of the secretariat personnel kindly let me have their time. My thanks go to them and to Mr. Wirin and Mr. Peters, - then also to Halvor Stenstadvold for stimulating discussions about theoretical problems in general.

Oslo, January 1969

Thorvald Gran

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INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT POLITICS IN FAO.

The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) is in a period of change and rapid expansion. This is a study of how the organization has adapted to change on the one hand and how it has tried to influence change and initiate development in the poor countries around the globe, on the other. The central concern is to identify and discuss the values present in FAO policy and search for their origins through an analysis of the FAO development project program.

It is believed that the values (broadly defined as goals, subgoals and methods) present in the policy of an organization are related to the administrative system and the personnel structure in the organization. Thus we are interested in the process that seemingly generates the values present in the project plans and the nationality and professional structure of the groups that take part in the process of project planning.

Every organization interacts in some way with its environment and the ultimate goal of FAO is to participate in the agricultural development of member countries. FAO could therefore be looked at from the environment, that is, taking the needs of member countries as a starting point, and studying how FAO fulfills these needs. This perspective is not chosen in the present study. We start in the organization and look outwards along the lines defined by the organization through its policy and development projects. We are basically concerned with the organizational processes that scan the environment for information and generate the main lines of policy. A natural continuation of this study would be to approach the work of FAO from a closer acquaintance with environmental demands. Maybe there is a serious discord, a discord that - because of approach - would be difficult to grasp in this study.

Problematic change is a salient feature of FAO from 1959 onwards. In that year the United Nations Special Fund was created in New York and new operational tasks set the organization on a serious test of adaptation and innovation. The new task was first and foremost the planning and implementing of the Special Fund projects. We will, as indicated above, concentrate on the

planning of these projects in the organization.

The earlier functions of FAO had wholly been of a scientific/ advisory character. In 1959 FAO entered the field of concrete operations. The organization suddenly had two major fields of activity, Regular and Special programs as they were defined. This also had a tremendous effect on the size of the organization in budgetary terms, the special programs quickly outgrowing the regular activities.

How has FAO tackled the problem of planning several hundred Special Fund projects? What values are present in FAO policy and why are they there? And generally - does FAO have a policy in the Special Fund sector of its work?

After formulating the analytical framework for the study of planning in an international organization in Chapter 1, the problem of what demands impinged on the organization, how they were perceived and processed in the system will be studied in Chapter 2. By looking at the historical development of FAO we can study the question of what functions the organization has chosen to perform, how it has conceived the environment and how it has adapted to change in this environment.
What is in other words the relationship between the functions and structure of the administrative system and the values or goals it seeks to accomplish in the environment? Has FAO since its start in 1945 acquired the ability to perceive and understand problems of agricultural development in the culturally diverse national societies it operates in, in such a way that local needs are met, or is the organization subordinated to international rivalries and under the control of certain powerful nations? What, in other words, are the main values present in the planning of policy in the organization?

In the third chapter we describe the organization, its environment and resources. We study some of the variables that are related to the size of the organization's resources and some of the structural problems of the organization at the formal level.

We turn in Chapter 4 to the changing role of FAO leadership in defining and pursuing functional goals for the organization. We look at the place the Special Fund program has in relation to problems in the regular program, and the change that the new Director General, Mr. Boerma, may initiate in the organization.

A detailed study of the planning of development projects in FAO and the policy which this process has as its result will be the subject of Chapter 5. By studying the structure of the UNDP/FAO projects operational in 1967 further insight into the policy of the organization will be gained. Why this policy is pursued in the specific FAO-system is again the central question of the study.

It was early in the study-preparation understood that FAO was seriously split over the question of policy-making and operations. This conflict, because it relates to the planning of UNDP/FAO projects and to the problem of bureaucratic change and innovation, will be studied in Chapter 5. Why was the perceived need for administrative change so strong, and why was the morale of the members of the organization so low? Where, in or outside the system, did the demands for change originate? and how are the demands being met?

The main elements in the study, as described above, are depicted in Diagram 1.

DIAGRAM 1

CENTRAL ELEMENTS OF THE STUDY AND THEIR INTERRELATIONS.



After this introductory presentation of what will be studied in the following pages - why have I at all chosen planning of agricultural development in FAO as an object of study? First, I see the task of FAO, to improve production, distribution and quality of food in the underdeveloped parts of the world as a major problem in the last half of this century. Secondly, the multinational or supranational approach to this problem seems to me a potentially promising method, and the study of planning in a multinational social group like FAO may add to our understanding of this approach. Thirdly, a central concern of national studies of administration is the relationship between bureaucrats and clients, in Norway especially lower class and politically marginal clients. A study of FAO's function in relation to diverse underdeveloped national societies in the international system may add to our knowledge about this problem. Especially interesting is the question: Of what importance is it that a client group has administrators in the system who closely identify with the needs and wishes of the group? A central thesis of Professor Knut Dahl Jacobsen [1] is that client groups not "protected" by administrators who socially and professionally identify with the group will lose in the contest for resource allocations from the administrative system. Does this apply to FAO? Is for example the nationality structure in the organization influential on the geographical distribution of projects, and is the professional structure related to the type of projects identified as important in the different project countries?

A fourth reason for choosing FAO is the interest we have in understanding multinational participation in a planning process. What influence does the mixture of different cultures have on the structure and function of an administrative system, and how do the different cultural groups adjust to each other? Can we find aspects of a special type of international public administration, or does FAO for example fall well within the western concepts of rational, efficient, hierarchical organization? It is hoped that a description and study of planning in FAO will indicate possible answers to these more general questions of public administration.

1) Knut Dahl Jacobsen:"Informasjonstilgang og likebehandling i den offentlige virksomhet". Tidssk.f. samf.forskn. Oslo 1965.

CHAPTER ONE: THEORY AND METHOD OF ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES.

1. Analytical model of administrative planning.

a) The role of a model.

It is essential to have a model of what planning is before a study of a specific case is undertaken. By a model is meant an abstract construction of concepts and their interrelationships. The model guides search for information, but is also a constituting element of what we call data. Data are in other words phenomena in our environment observed and registered in relation to a hypothetical or theoretical model. Theory is defined as generalizations based on tested hypotheses, in other words what we may call accumulated knowledge. Hypotheses on the other hand are statements about correlations that have not been tested. Thus it is imperative that these statements lend themselves to falsification. It is easily seen then that models can be constructed by using both theory and hypotheses.

The danger of using theory alone is that knowledge accumulated under specific historical conditions is planted into the supposedly new situation present social research is interested in. Hypotheses should therefore have a central place in model building within the social sciences, more so the more changing the situation is. Thus a central position of f.ex. Heinz Eulau [1] is that the problem situation itself (in casu the planning of development projects in FAO) should be consulted already in the phase when research questions are formulated.

b) Planning as a socio-psychological process.

Before turning to the planning concept, what does present theory of organizations say about decision-making?

A general theoretical proposition is that decisions are made by limited rational human beings, influenced by formal and informal aspects of organization and by individual and environmental preferences and values. The model of man as limited rational is one of Herbert Simons basic viewpoints. [2] Contrary to the implict assumption in earlier theory that all alternative solutions

to a problem are given, Simon says that man in a decision-making situation has to search for alternatives. This search process is in itself highly problematical and interesting. The first limit on man's rationality is the need he has to simplify the problem situation to make search in a limited number of directions possible. The second limit is man's tendency to stop searching already when a satisfactory alternative presents itself or is found. Economic theory usually operates with the older model: Man chooses the best alternative from all possible alternatives. [3] While economics operates with a theory of maximization, Simon suggests for decision-making studies in organizations a theory of satisfaction. Search is stopped when a satisfactory solution is found. Man does not maximize, he "satisfices". Simon suggests the following model for the dynamic relationship between search and satisfaction and factors influencing this relationship. It is believed applicable to both individual and group or team decision-making in an organizational setting. [4]

DIAGRAM 2

GENERAL MODEL OF ADAPTIVE MOTIVATED BEHAVIOR.



A closer look at these variables and their interrelationships pose some interesting hypotheses about organizational behavior. Search is a function of satisfaction, the more satisfied with

activities and procedures in a specific field of work the less search for innovations. This also indicates that when search for information or decision-alternatives is undertaken this will affect the state of satisfaction in the organism. When a certain amount of information has been accumulated search will stop because of felt satisfaction, and a decision will be made. Now because this state most often occurs before all possibilities have been looked into, a theory of maximization would not give the same decision-result as this theory of "satisfaction". Rather one has to study 1) at what point the organism is satisfied enough to stop searching and 2) in what direction, or in what material, or with what people is search undertaken?

When search is increased the expected value of reward is augmented. This in turn increases the feeling of satisfaction in the organism and makes aspirations (A) higher. But increased aspirations in a given situation reduces the feeling of satisfaction in that situation. Thus $S = R - A$. The authors also postulate that A will always exceed R. (The following equation is suggested: $\frac{dA}{dt} = \alpha (R - A + a)$, where a and α is larger than 0) This implies that some search will always be undertaken. The model is hypothetical and could be tested in experimental organized groups. In this paper it will be taken as a postulate.

James March and Herbert Simon suggest in their book a distinction between two kinds of decision-making, so called programmed and unprogrammed decision-making, the latter most often connected with planning. What characterizes the two types according to the authors? Programmed decision-making is undertaken when the problems at hand are familiar to the decision-maker and the process to be followed is known in beforehand. Thus firemen's decisions when the alarm goes is programmed as is the storeholder's decisions when inventory is ordered because a certain minimum level is reached. Unprogrammed decision-making on the other hand is undertaken when new and unfamiliar problems arise and when the organization does not have a ready made method to make the decision.

c) Is planning different from routine decision-making?

The distinction as depicted above does not say anything specific about the decision-making process. It only describes two different starting points for decision-making, one with old problems, the other with new, one with an organizational method present, the other without. Now the interesting question seems to be: When decision-making is undertaken, does the same individual follow two distinct methods in the two situations? If we as Simon concentrate on high echelon decision-making, the first difficulty for the decision-maker is to distinguish between old and new problems. It seems more likely that in the stream of "familiar" problems which arise at a decision-maker's desk new elements and questions are integrated in this stream. These elements are decided upon by partial, and quite programmed, adjustments to the normal and known decision-making procedure. What appears as innovative or new outputs from the organization are exactly certain complex sets of this kind of regulatory decisions.

Thus, what distinguishes planning from routine decision-making is not the process, but the output. Plans in a public administration setting can most fruitfully be defined as a complex set of decisions about a desired future state of affairs, where value considerations or in other words political problems, are a salient feature. [5] Thus the central problem in the study of planning is to identify value premises in the decision sets we choose to call plans, to find their origin and explain their consequences in the social groups we are interested in.

d) The role of values, ideals and identifications.

Peer Soelbergs analysis of how new problems are solved increase the impression that the planning process is programmed even if the organization as such doesn't furnish the decision-maker with a specific method. He seems to document that rationality in decision-making is even more limited than Simon believes. While Simon states that search is undertaken until a satisfactory number of alternatives is found and then choice is made, the central proposition of Soelberg is that long before search is

terminated the actual choice is made. [6] This choice is largely decided by comparing possibilities to an earlier constructed ideal solution. It seems likely that when a new problem is identified the structuring of an ideal solution will be highly programmed by the value and preference structure embedded in the individual. The search process thus becomes even less rational than the process Simon describes. While Simon reckons with some kind of rational comparison between the alternatives that are generated, Soelberg states from his material that this does not seem to take place. Each alternative is immediately compared to the ideal solution and accepted or rejected. The search that continues after choice has been made has a special, non-rational purpose: To find an alternative "poor" enough to obviously confirm the correctness of the choice made long ago.

Thus the position taken in this study is that planning (as unprogrammed decision-making) is best studied as a trait of organizations, not of individuals. Planning, or in other words the process of innovating, is a political process where the dynamic force is the value set and identifications of groups. Through a complex and relatively stable set of interactions, or in other words through organization, the relative influence of the groups is regulated. Because individuals and also small, uninfluential groups seldom can innovate values, innovations in an organization are related to change in the pattern of regulated interactions. Such change implies influence from new groups. We can imagine at least two causes of such change. 1) That new people enter the organization or 2) that environmental support or demands which reach inside the organization boundaries change, thus increasing the influence of some groups, diminishing that of others in the planning system. Usually 1) is a function of 2). If demands are to "reach" the organization, two requirements can be set: 1) that groups in the environment are able to communicate in one form or another their demands to the organization boundary and 2) that those inside the organization perceive as meaningful the demands made. This is also a function of the value set and identifications of individuals processing the demands.

The value sets (consisting of socio-political, economic and technical preferences) serve as a sift for distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information and as a scale for deciding what situations or problems in the environments are worth the effort of FAO. Now if this is correct, and innovation or innovative planning is a result of dissatisfaction with existing work and information about possible alternatives, it adds strength to the idea that innovations by individuals is unlikely, that innovation relevant for the work of an organization is a group phenomenon related to the political influence of groups in and outside the system. This idea of planning is at the base of the following study.

e) The problem of goal formulations.

In contrast to earlier studies of administration (Gouldner, Taylor, Fayol) modern scientists like Simon, Blau, Etzioni, Caplow and March [7] take the finding and formulating of operational goals for an organization as highly problematical. Simon f.ex. takes the position that individuals search for new operational goals when those existing no longer satisfy the individual. This has been used to construct a stress-model of innovation, stating that new goals are formulated and set to work only after a psychological feeling of dissatisfaction has initiated search. Victor Thompson seems to add to this point of view, stating that although some kind of conflict in the organization is essential for organizational innovation, this must probably be combined with a high degree of personal security. It seems natural, considering the position taken in this study on the question of individual innovation, that conflict in Thompsons terms relates to conflict of interests between groups in and outside the organization. If this is the case it is interesting to note again the position of Knut Dahl Jacobsen [9], Shall interests of a specific client group be met in an administrative system it is essential that the group has experts in the system identifying with it. Thus it seems that decision-making is highly programmed and value-bound. To expect culturally determined administrators to be innovative - in an unprogrammed fashion - to the benefit of new or other client groups,

is not encouraged by research results. So although goal formulation is problematical, it would seem most fruitful to study the problems at the organizational or intergroup level, taking the individual goal and value preferences as relatively stable factors.

f) Formal and informal aspects of organization.

In the general theoretical proposition made at the beginning of this section it was pointed out that decision-making is influenced by both formal and informal aspects of organization.

We mean by informal aspects of organization those lines of communication and authority that actually exist, whether these coincide with the formal lines of authority or not. By authority we mean legitimate influence, or in other words the ability of one person to change or orient another person's action without this other person critically reviewing or judging the correctness or usefulness of the action. [10] This implies that both the formal hierarchy of positions and authority in the organization, the legally defined goals and methods and the formal lines of communication, interaction and influence are important factors in a study of administrative decision-making. What we are interested in is the sociological, not the legal question of what planning in FAO is. We are interested in what individual, organizational and environmental factors influence the planning process.

We have hitherto discussed central concepts of organization theory. We have not mentioned any specific implications of this theory for international as opposed to national organizations. Also we have not said anything specific about the model in which these concepts belong. Let us turn to the last problem first.

g) A critique of the systems approach.

As the concepts 'groups', 'organization' and 'environment' indicate, the general approach is one of system analysis. We will define an organization, national or international, as a system of interacting parts, employed essentially in processing and evaluating information. The organization functions in an

environment and can be seen as a subsystem within a larger environmental system. From the environment demands and support impinge on the organization. These demands are screened, processed and communicated within the organization, and the results are decisions, most of them of intraorganizational relevance. Some sets of these decisions are communicated back to the environment as outputs, and are absorbed or discarded there. Depending on the influence of the outputs in the environment they, by way of the feedback mechanism, influence the inputs, and new demands and new support is communicated to the organization. This overview can best be illustrated by David Eastons simple model.[11)]

DIAGRAM 3

A SIMPLIFIED MODEL OF A POLITICAL SYSTEM.



Viewing the organization as a system of interacting groups trying to attain certain goals but through the feedback mechanism and self-maintenance at the same time seeking some kind of working equilibrium, is a view that often neglects the power aspect of organizational control.[12)] To study how group or organization leadership imposes constraints on the interactions and communications of subordinates is therefore important. It is interesting to note two other points Mayntz makes about system theory. 1) The systems approach has normative aspects. By using it the values of pluralism and democracy constitute the

framework for study, An organization is by definition a system of largely autonomous groups curbing each other's excessive claims. 2) Because of 1) the systems approach is probably not as ahistorical as its proponents claim. It represents a study-framework relative to a specific historical and social situation. The systems approach might therefore easily conceal power-conflicts in an organization where several nationality and culturegroups meet.

h) International organization.

The main difference between a national and an international organization is the composition of the membership in the two, and the structure of the environment. To look into the distribution and structure of the different nationality groups in FAO and on the FAO/UNDP projects will be of central interest. Which is the dominant group or groups, how do the nationality groups interact with each other and how are the different groups distributed regionally? Is FAO first and foremost a professional organization and therefore an exponent for a random mixture of cultures, or is there a certain trend in the distribution and mixture of different nationality groups? Secondly, what influence does the mixture of nationalities have on the planning process in the organization? Are differences between nationality groups stable factors in the decision-making process or do the groups adjust to each others administrative preferences? Or is perhaps a completely new organization-ideology developed? [13] Lastly, and very important, does an organizational ideology for how to fix goals, for what goals to choose and for the planning of projects actually exist? As Mayntz points out the problem of normative consensus on the organization level may be fictitious. Maybe there is no cultural system underlying the functional relationships in an organization. [14]

2. Problems of method and data collection.

After the general problem of how FAO develops the plans for the UNDP/FAO projects was clear, general litterature about the organization and the project program was consulted. This litterature is mentioned under appropriate headings in the bibliography. Because this litterature was rather meager on sociological and perceptions data, it was decided to visit the organization at a relatively early stage. It was also important from the start to have the organization point out central problems it encountered in the planning of UNDP/FAO projects. Therefore, after a general layout was ready, FAO was contacted. It responded very willingly and a number of unstructured interviews were held in the Rome-headquarters from 15 september to 5 october,1967. The material, together with a number of documents were analyzed and in January 1968 a structured questionnaire was set up on the basis of the material already gathered. This questionnaire, as it was presented to the organization, is presented as Appendix 1 to this study. FAO responded negatively to the request because "... it would occupy too much time of our officers..." [15)]
The size of the sample was not discussed. A limited number of personal interviews could be held, and in the beginning of March structured interviews with 21 randomly chosen Project Supervisors was held in Rome. In addition a few more unstructured interviews were held.

The interviews were immediately typed out and form the central basis of the following study. The interview results do not make possible any rigid classification, but they are believed to indicate the problem perceptions of some of the central personnel in the organization.

Documents in addition to the biennal programs of Work and Budget and other Conference reports indicating the historical development of FAO and the development of the special activities of the organization are listed in the bibliography. All of the material mentioned there has been referred to or has been consulted during the study period. Several of the unstructured interviews give information on historical questions, and several people outside FAO, but engaged in one way or another in the

organization's work have been consulted.[16)]

The main difficulty in applying the socio-psychological concepts of the Simon-school on the study of planning in FAO was to make the concepts operational.[17)] This created large difficulties even during the interview sessions, often making question adjustments and revisions necessary. Although the analytical rigidness of the study thereby was reduced, a lot was gained in the understanding of what those interviewed felt were central planning problems.

A central question that was pending in the organization while the interviews were taken, was the suggestion to split the organization in an operational and a technical/scientific part. The reason for this suggestion was the new operational demands the UNDP program made on the organization. Many of the interviews centered on this problem and interesting litterature on this aspect of FAO planning had been worked out by the organization. This litterature, central in the following analysis, is also mentioned in the bibliography.

The main base for the analysis of the project policy of FAO is the operational UNDP/FAO program as it existed in 1967. Information about project size, location in the field, location in the organization, and nationality structure of the experts on the 170 projects that were operational, has been gathered from several catalogues (see bibliography) and punched on IBM cards. Together with general information about the environment, income per capita, students pr. 1000 population, population size etc. a picture of the UNDP/FAO project policy is constructed. This policy is in turn related to aspects of the administrative structure of FAO, (operating division, nationality of the Project Supervisors etc.).

Although this description should give a good picture of what FAO is doing where and with what resources, the main theoretical problem is to establish relationships between such variables as nationality of project experts and influence on project policy. Does in other words the expert structure say anything about the preferences, perceptions or values in FAO? or anything about the effect of FAO projects in specific project countries? Although

such questions will be discussed more closely in the appropriate part of the study, the general feeling is that several assumptions underly the conclusions put forward in the following study. To make this feeling explicit, let me briefly state some of the assumptions.

1) I assume that the concepts of organization and planning, developed mainly in the USA and discussed in the preceding pages, are meaningful in a study of FAO. The opposite position, that they are not because FAO is recruited from a number of different cultures with their own administrative traditions is more or less discarded. The main reason for this is the large number of Europeans and Americans in the organization and on the projects. As we shall see, Asians and Africans are a very small minority. However, historical factors also support the idea that FAO is a "western" organization. As we shall see in the next section it was created in an era when American influence was dominant in international organization.

2) An important assumption is that there are systematic differences between nationality groups, differences that have relevance for project planning and implementation. That these are assumed and not discussed is a weakness.

However, by giving an overview of the nationality distribution of FAO experts we get a general picture of political trends in the work of FAO, of who controls the FAO resources, and it enables us later to compare the work of the most important nationals on individual projects. Data on the distribution of experts also makes possible a study of the role of FAO in cultural and political integration. To what degree can FAO ignore national and international political strife in planning UNDP/FAO projects, or in other words to what degree can FAO emphasize its purely professional character and functions? [18)]

Conclusion.

To sum up we want to study the planning process, or the generation and development of project plans in FAO. The general factors we believe influence this decision-making process are displayed in Diagram 4, together with the main interrelationships between the factors or variables. Focus will be on policy-making in FAO as it is a result of individual, organizational and environmental factors

DIAGRAM 4

A MODEL OF DECISION-MAKING.



Main Source: March and Simon, Organizations, John Wiley, 1958

NOTES.

1) Heinz Eulau in Sola Pool, I ch, (ed.) Contemporary Political Science, Toward Empirical Theory. Mc Graw Hill 1967.

2) See H. A. Simon, Models of Man, John Wiley, 1957 and J. March and H. A. Simon, Organizations, John Wiley, 1958.

3) See f.ex. the annexed essay by Milton Friedman in Cyert and March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Prentice Hall, 1963.

4) Organizations, op. cit., page 49.

5) See f.ex. W. J. Siffin, Politics and Planning: Perspective on a Paradox (CAG papers) Indiana Univ. 1966.

6) P. Soelberg: Unprogrammed decision-making (stencil at Inst. of Pol. Science, Oslo 1967).

7) For references to their works, see bibliography.

8) V. Thompson, "Objectives for Development Administration". Admin. Science Quarterly, June 1964

9) K. Dahl Jacobsen op. cit., (page 5).

10) See Robert Dahl, Modern Political Analysis.

11) David Easton, A Framework for Political Analysis. Prentice Hall 1965, page 112.

12) Renate Mayntz, The Study of Organizations, A Trend report for the International Sociological Association (page 19 in stencil, Institute of Pol. Science, Oslo). The same critique has been directed towards the functional approach to the study of international organizations. See Sewell, J.P. An Evaluation of the Functional Approach to International Organization, (unpubl. P H D dissertation, Univ, of California 1962.)

13) On the question of an organizational ideology permeating most of the organization or not, see Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration, Harper, 1957 page 151.

14) Mayntz, op. cit., page 14 in stencil.

15) Letter from FAO dated 28 February 1968.

16) People in the following institutions have been interviewed. The Norwegian Council on Nutrition(functions also as the Norwegian FAO-committee). The Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Overseas Development, London. The Norwegian Directorate of Health and Norwegian agricultural organizations.

17) For a theoretical discussion of this problem, see Ilkka Heiskanen, Theoretical Approaches and Scientific Strategies in Administrative and Organizational Research, A Methodological Study. Commentationes Humanarum Litterarum. Vol. 39, Nr. 2, 1967.

18) For a discussion of functionalism and the role of international organizations in political integration, see Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State, Stanford Univ. Press California, 1964.

CHAPTER TWO.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF FAO, ITS FUNCTIONS AND METHODS

1. The birth of FAO in October 1945.

a) The political forces.

The League of Nations embodied the political and moral ideals of the interwar period. They were represented in concepts like national sovereignty, democracy, and collective security for groups of states. By securing overwhelming force to the peace loving states the power of aggressive or bad states was to be balanced and war avoided in all future. [1)] These concepts initiated the political decisions of the interwar period. On 1 september 1939 they definitely proved a failure.

The creation of the UN system was basically built on the same concepts. The terrifying war situation from 1939 to 1945 created the same psychological setting for political decisions as the first world war, only this time of a new and more frightening dimension. UN was conceived as the new international endeavour by the victorious states. Collectively the peaceloving world should be rebuilt and aggressors controlled. As nations became peaceloving they would be admitted to the organization. It was obvious to many that both Nazi and Communist doctrine were considered aggressive in nature, and Communist states taking part in the war effort against Nazi Germany soon became sceptical to the UN system of organizations. Besides being politically and economically weak, they perceived themselves as persona non grata in the ideological setting of the UN system.

These political forces, nationalism, collective security, balance of power, reconstruction of peaceloving states and communist insecurity were pressing when FAO was born. The organization was in principle to be universal and it was to be centralized in one unified decision-making system, with one collective idea of operations. Each member was to have one vote,

but for a nation to obtain membership after FAO had formally been established a 2/3 majority of member votes was required. Thus the "worthiness" of an applying nation was to be evaluated by the members prior to admittance. Thus universalism in FAO is modified by the normative principle of "worthiness".

b) The social and agricultural setting.

In 1945 the disastrous collapse of Europe was perceived as the main international problem. The poverty of regions in Africa, Latin America and Asia had hardly been noticed, mainly because these regions were without government organizations that could formulate the demands of the indigenous populations. FAO naturally adopted the European reconstruction perspective to its work when it first opened its eyes to the world.

The relation of this perspective to FAO's overall goal, agricultural development, is interesting. When it turned to the problems of agriculture in the USA, FAO soon found that the development of production was not the crux of the matter. Rather agricultural production in the years immediately following the war was overwhelming in these regions, and the use and distribution of surplus was the agricultural problem. This became FAO's main concern in its first years of work. Thus the goals of FAO were adjusted to the political, economic and even military problems of the victorious nations in the Second World War. The directive force in the organization was highly political, and the professional undertakings of the organization were subordinated this force. Considerations of the technical and social problem of increased agricultural production was relegated to a second place, and the universal approach was a more or less empty ideal.

c) The organizational heritage of FAO.

The League of Nations had, through strong personalities like Philip Noel Baker and Fridtjof Nansen, accomplished considerable relief work in the interwar period. In 1943 USA invited a large group of nations to discuss the need and the

methods for this type of work when the war eventually was over. A Conference met in Hot Springs in 1943 with 44 nations participating. The discussions centered on three main questions. [2)]

1) Food standards and the need for food,
2) Food production/food needs,
3) Problems of trade and distribution.

Although the first point, food standards, was brought up as a result of the success of the Health Section of the League of Nations in uniting problems of health to problems of food, the final decision of the Conference to create an Interim Commission did not explicitly join the question of health to that of creating an agricultural organization. The way was thus open for the making of WHO a little later, and for quite serious competition between this organization and FAO concerning what the salient problems of development are and how to solve them.

The Interim Commission dissolved itself in the fall of 1945. It had then worked out a suggestion for a FAO Constitution and an approving Conference was called for in Quebec the same year. Those nations could meet that had approved the suggested Constitution. 37 Countries met, 5 that had approved it did not and the Soviet Union, member of the Interim Commission was one of those nations not meeting. In 1946 5 new members were approved. Finland and Sweden however had still not applied for membership, awaiting the organization's development.

Those were the immediate organizational arrangements that led to the creation of FAO. The organization, however, had a more distant heritage. Around the turn of the century, and around the name and activities of David Lubin, an International Institute of Agriculture was born in Rome [3)]. Lubin believed that the lack of up to date information on a world basis was much of the cause of the strong fluctuations of prices in agriculture. Thus he conceived the Institute as an international clearing house for agricultural information. After the Second World War the Institute was absorbed by FAO, and through the Institute's publications and census work [4)] FAO got a good start on its task of distributing agricultural information,

a type of work that has been central in FAO from the beginning.

d) The impact of McDougall.

The London World Monetary and Economic Conference (1933) ended in prolonging the then current policy of restriction in the face of unemployment, falling prices and surpluses in agriculture. An Australian delegation to the Conference, headed by Stanley Bruce and with Frank McDougall as adviser, felt that a new approach was essential. [5] Together with Sir John Boyd Orr and others they first clarified the close relationship between health and food. Secondly McDougall summed up his own thinking on the solutions of the surplus problem in Europe, and USA. He advanced a more active concern for better social policies as a base for increasing agricultural demands, for better international dissemination of information on food problems and agricultural production, and for a reduction of wholesale prices in several of the developed European countries. His ideas were a base for FAO actions in the first years.

A more general report, written under the auspices of McDougall during the work of the Interim Commission, set out more general principles and suggestions for FAOs future work. These, however, did not really come to the foreground of FAO's activities until the interest in surplus problems had subsided. Some of his ideas from this report were the following: [6]

1) A basic principle for FAO is that the welfare of producers and the welfare of consumers are in the final analysis identical.
2) The barriers that stand in the way of the needed improvements are many and difficult: deep-rooted customs and traditions, lack of education, rigid economic and social institutions, vested interests, lack of money, lack of international collaboration.
3) In some ways the major need in the decades ahead is the development of less advanced societies. This is a great opportunity not only for improving human welfare but for expanding the demand for agricultural and industrial products.

We note the underlying problem of selling the products produced in the advanced societies, that obviously had an important standing in the minds of the creators of FAO. We note also the weight given in these program declarations to social and institutional aspects of development. Improvement in agriculture is related to social change. The following chapters in this study will focus on how and to what degree this problem has been tackled in FAO.

Lastly McDougall already in 1942 formulated ideas on the technical functions as additions to the traditional informative function of FAO.

> "FAO will have special responsibilities towards the less advanced countries. To discharge these duties it will not be enough for arrangements to be made for the provision of agricultural credits. It will be equally necessary to afford technical guidance and help. For this purpose a corps of agricultural technologists may be recruited, drawn from those countries with advanced methods of agriculture and available to be sent to any part of the world to assist in improving agricultural methods... This might well become one of the major purposes of the international organization." 7)

2. The development of FAO. Changing functions.

a) The first Director General.

The Scotsman, Sir John Boyd Orr was in 1945 elected the first DG of FAO, at the age of sixty five. He built the first small FAO-administration in Washington (where the Organization had headquarters until 1951 when it moved into the building Mussolini had set up for his Ethiopia-department in Rome). Several professional committees were established in 1945. With the food crisis in 1946 an International Emergency Food Council was set up, however without any formal authority. A large advisory commission was sent to Greece, to advise the government on its reconstruction policy. Sir John's great idea was a World Food Board with formal and real authority to coordinate trade in agricultural products. The premises for his belief were that lack of food was first of all a problem of distribution. It was technically possible to produce adequate quantities, if prices were stabilized and markets opened. Better distribution required an increase in economic activity.

His idea of an active and powerful board was drastically cut down by the large agricultural producers, and the Food Board ended up with advisory authority on the problem of how to stabilize prices. In addition it could undertake the development of reserves of food and reserves of credit. In Sir John's mind the board suggestion had failed, and after a drastic attack on the DG by the British delegation leader to the FAO Conference, Orr resigned in 1948. [8)]

Even Sir John Boyd Orr, who had participated in the construction of FAO, and who therefore was well acquainted with the political and economic considerations behind the creation of the organization, went too far in his suggestions for FAO activity. The UK and the US would not tolerate even a minimum of international control over their actions in the field of agriculture. The need for FAO to comply with the wishes of the powerful and rich nations was obvious in the first years. Another expression for the major powers' view of FAO as something basically troublesome was the budgetary allocations to the organization. From its inception in 1945 up to 1950 the total annual budget from all 45 members was 5 million dollars. Already from the first FAO Conference Sir John Orr was handed 250 concrete suggestions for work.

b) Continued defeat.

The second DG, the American undersecretary of farm politics, Mr. Dodd, a Democrat, continued in defining FAO's role as that of surplus management. In 1949 he suggested an International Commodity Clearing House, with a revolving fund of one billion dollars, and with all countries being able to buy goods in its own currency at full price. If a country would and could pay in hard currency it would be offered a reduced price. The FAO Conference in 1949 flatly turned the suggestion down, on four arguments: [9)]

1) Soft currency debts are a large burden for buying countries.
2) Hard payments reduce their reserves.
3) The arrangement would interfere with normal trade.
4) Buffer stocks are unhealthy for world economy.

The Conference, to avoid being completely and bluntly negative, agreed to Mr. Cardon's [10] proposal of a Consultative Committee on Surplus Disposal. This commission suggested an Emergency Food Reserve in 1951. At the 1953 Conference this suggestion also was flatly turned down. But in 1954 the surplus problem in the developed countries was becoming acute, and in 1954, at last, a 20 nation subcommittee on surplus disposal was set into action.

The approach of the developed nations to FAO's work was at the level of ideas positive, at the level of even minimum operations deeply negative and sceptical. The resources and the morale of the organization were in the middle fifties at a serious low point.

c) The beginning of change.

Although the attempts of FAO at handling the surplus problem through international coordination were unsuccessful, new areas of work emerged around 1950. The nucleus was the creation of the Expanded Program for Technical Assistance (EPTA). This was the first technical assistance program started by the General Assembly of the UN and based on voluntary contributions from member governments. The EPTA activities were to be executed through cooperation between the UN and the Specialized Agencies. It was a first breakthrough on the operational level for the McDougall ideas, ideas that had been obstructed by several of the developed nations in FAO and in other international organizations. [11]

EPTA concentrated on sending individual experts to assist governments in the evaluation or planning of development policy. Up to 1966 13.000 experts from 90 countries had been on EPTA missions, while 31.000 scholarships had been allotted to personnel from the poorer countries. [12] EPTA, through a Technical Assistance Board in New York, set targets for the possible allocation of funds to the individual countries. This became an influential factor in the approval of projects, possibly to the detriment of individual project evaluations as such. The projects were executed by UN organizations, and FAO took about 25 % of the projects. Overhead costs for administration were allotted to the executing agency, thus making the projects organizationally attractive.

d) The UN Special Fund, the final push to power.

In 1959, the wish in many underdeveloped countries for larger and more effectful action on the part of the UN materialized in the creation of The Special Fund (SF) [13]. The battle for this was intense and complex. Similar ideas had been pending in the UN in the SUNFED suggestion (A Special UN Fund for Economic Development) based on the idea of giving poor countries soft loans. US and other donors were against the suggestion because soft loans resulted in too much waste. The USSR supported SUNFED vigorously. Mr. Paul Hoffman, earlier Ford administrator and leader of the implementation of the Marshall plan, suggested the preinvestment idea as a compromise between existing EPTA activities and the wishes of the several political participators. On this basis the Special Fund (SF) was approved and Hoffman appointed its leader.

The impact of this program on FAO has been enormous.

In budgetary terms the impact of the Special Program on the Regular Program can be illustrated in the following diagram. From about an equal position in the biennium 1960/61 (20 million dollars each) the Special Program has outgrown the Regular Program by more than two times up to 1968/69.

DIAGRAM 5

THE DEVELOPMENT OF FAO REGULAR AND SPECIAL BUDGETS
FROM 1958/59 TO 1968/69



Source: 1. FAO Program of Work and Budgets, C 61/3, C 63/3, C 65/3 and C 67/3

2. FAO Document CL 49/16, page 17 para 36.

This change of emphasis has had large repercussions on the administrative system in FAO. From an advisory/information gathering organization it has become the implementer of a large operational project program in about 100 underdeveloped countries. This change of functional emphasis will be studied in the following chapters.

With the inauguration of EPTA and Special Fund activities most of the specialized agencies distinguished between Regular Program and Special Program, the former being the activities financed by the member governments through their annual or biannual contributions to the organization. Special Programs on the other hand are those that have their financial base in voluntary government contributions.

The central administrative difficulty for FAO has been to integrate the Special Program functions into a system constructed for Regular Program activities. Two central positions on the problem have been: 1) FAO headquarters-system was originally developed on the university model, to gather, develop and disseminate information. Thus, clearly defined subject-matter divisions were erected. The SF program on the other hand requires integrated multidisciplinary planning, administration and implementation. This the system is not geared to perform. [14]
2) The real problem of SF activities, in the opinion of Jones [15] is that Special Fund administrative work hampers and endangers FAO's technical ability. In other words that the two programs have a mutually detrimental effect.

It is believed by this student that through the SF program FAO has received and developed an instrument for international action in the field of agriculture that has for the first time given the organization direct influence over governments and to some extent over the lives of people in rural societies in many of the underdeveloped countries. The influence is to some degree becoming supranational in the sense that decisions on project allocations with consequences in national societies are taken without participation of the countries concerned. FAO, because of the planning and approval systems that are constructed, is influential in relation to governments in underdeveloped countries;

that is, FAO values and preferences are accepted to some degree uncritically by the governments involved. The deciphering of this influence is one of the goals of the following study. A central question underlying this preliminary analysis is to what degree and how FAO-influence through the Special Fund program is related and adjusted to the indigenous social and economic development of the countries concerned.

The Special Fund was to differ from EPTA on several scores.
1) No country targets were to be set. Each project was to be evaluated on its own merits more or less, considering in addition factors like an equitable geographic distribution of the whole program, urgency of needs etc.
2) The SF-projects were to be larger, with the aim of furthering and sustaining capital investments of all kinds, and
3) duration of the SF projects could be longer, up to five years.

However, because of similarities between EPTA and SF, and because of the administrative compelxities that continued to accumulate, the two programs were merged in 1965. The merger was basically administrative, letting the same organs in New York evaluate requests in both programs. David Owen, the British leader of EPTA became Co-administrator of the new UNDP with Paul Hoffman as chief. The two programs were however kept distinct financially, even though EPTA experts more and more were used in preliminary probings for SF projects. One of the reasons for this is the belief in many of the new-nation governments that two programs would attract larger total contributions from the rich nations than one.

This broadly stated, is the base for the development of FAO. The viewpoints and restrictive interests of the developed nations have been accumulated, hopefully because they have until now been the most important for the organization's development. However, the importance allotted to the role of these nations may be an analytical fallacy. A more correct understanding of the development of FAO and other UN agencies may be gained by studying the requirements and demands made on the system by the new nations in Africa and Asia. When studying the politics of

administration in the UN system after 1960 it would probably be specially pertinent to put more weight on this approach. However, would the result in any case be that the rich countries, in their own political and economic interests, control the development of the poor? [16)]

Notes.

1) For a critical discussion of the international principles here mentioned, see J. W. Burton, International Relations, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1965, page 59.

2) The following paragraphs draw heavily on the article of John Ringen, "FAO" in Tidsskrift for det Norske Landbruk, Oct/Nov. 1946, Vol. 53 No 10/11 page 287.

3) From A.H. Boerma, FAO and the World Food Problem, past, present and future. 3 Oct., 1968.

4) The Institute held a world census on agriculture in 1930, ibid, page 5.

5) Taken from The McDougall Memoranda FAO, 1956 page 1.

6) Taken from Hambridge, Gove, The Story of FAO, Van Nostrand 1955 page 54-60.

7) Taken from Hambidge, op.cit., page 82.

8) See Jones, J.M. The UN at Work, Pergamon Press 1965, page 126, and Ringen, op.cit., page 300.

9) Hambidge, The Story of FAO, op. cit., page 72.

10) Director General of FAO from 1949 to 1956 when his failing health made the calling of a Special Session of the FAO Conference necessary.

11) Jacob, P. E. and A. L. Atherton, The Dynamics of International Organization, Dorsey Press 1965, page 498 for the case of WHO.

12) See Onarheiminnstillingen, page 102. *

13) General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII).

14) Taken directly from interviews in FAO.

15) Jones op.cit., page 117.

16) Le Monde asked, on reporting from the FAO Conference in November 1967 when an African was candidate for D.G.: La FAO, va-t-elle cesser d'être un instrument de "contrôle" par les pays riches du développement agricole du "tiers monde"? (Jacques Nobécourt, Le Monde 4 nov. 1967, page 1)

* Report presented to the Norwegian Foreign Department 9 December, 1966, on the continued development of Norwegian Foreign Aid.

CHAPTER THREE

A DESCRIPTION OF FAO AND ITS ENVIRONMENT.

a) The environment. FAO is faced with the problem of communicating meaningfully with about 130 governments on all five continents. These governments are the basic units in FAO's environment, basic because they are the chief sources of information to the organization. FAO is centralized in Rome with one unified administrative structure built around the Weberian principle of a hierarchical, departementalized system of legal authority. Weber showed that this bureaucratic model is related to the emergence of modern industrialized societies. FAO communicates mostly with governments in countries that have not reached this stage of economic development. Is therefore the structure of FAO detrimental to efficient communication with these governments? (efficient in the sense 'what is perceived in FAO is representative of what the individual governments have as intentions'). Although this study does not look into the problem, it would seem valuable to investigate the relative efficiency of communication between FAO with its present structure[1] and the governments in countries at different levels of economic and institutional development. A conclusion might be that to communicate efficiently, the structure of parts of the now unified organization should be more closely related to institutional and economic characteristics of the different regions. A logical extension of this might be to create regional FAOs.

The following diagram is a general picture of FAO in its environment.

DIAGRAM 6

FAO AND ENVIRONMENT



1) Percent of world population 1961, Source Russett (et.al.) World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, Table 1 page 18.

Each of the UN organizations is a sovereign unit with separate membership. UN in New York is only in an ideological sense the leading organization in the system. However, all of the Specialized Agencies and the UN can conclude agreements with each other (like states) and with member governments and institutions in member countries. We note the complex system of institutions that FAO can communicate with at the international, regional and national level. To what degree they communicate, and how the relative influence is between them is an empirical question. But much indicates that at the international level, like at the national level, competition and rivalry is more dominant than cooperation. [2] This may be related to 1) the independant status of each organization or 2) insecurity in each UN organization because the basic idea they represent, world government, is non-functional in the heterogenous nation-state environment that at present exists. [3]

About 67% of the worlds population (in 1961) was represented in FAO through the member governments. The main non-members are USSR and mainland China. East European states are somewhat ambivalent, Poland for example was a member from the start, but withdrew at the height of the Cold War in the ninteenfifties. [4] Poland is now a member again together with Romania, Yugoslavia, and admitted in 1967 - Bulgaria and Hungary. (Hungary is also member for the second time. The country withdrew in 1951). [5]

After the Conference in November 1967 116 nations were members of FAO. 90 of these had UNDP/FAO projects. These countries were distributed regionally as follows. The population size of the receiving countries is indicated to the right in the table.

TABLE 1.

UNDP/FAO PROJECT COUNTRIES AND THEIR POPULATION IN 1961

Region [6]	Number of countries	Population (million)
Africa	35	191
Asia	16	741
America	23	214
South 11 Central 12		
Europe	7	108
Middle East	9	58
Total	90	1312

Source: Russett op. cit. and UNDP/FAO Catalogue, 31 Jan 1968.

Taking 21 of the 133 nations listed in Russett as developed (including Italy and Japan), we find that about 59% of all the underdeveloped countries received UNDP/FAO projects, or in terms of population 905 million people. In 1968 UNDP/FAO expended about 50 million dollars on the program. That is about 5 cents per person - annually.

b) FAO financial resources.

In the Director General's Program of Work and Budget for 1968/69 [7] we find the following information on how FAO expects to use funds allocated to the organization in the two years 1968 and -69.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATED USE OF TOTAL FUNDS ADMINISTERED BY FAO
- 1968/69 (million US$)

	Program	Total fund-operated programs	Estimated amount of funds used for field operations	FAO expend. for operating Reg. Progr. Field projects and FFHC (1)
I	Regular Program	59.9	2.1	36.7
II	Other Programs			
	a. No reimbursement			
	1. FAO/UNICEF	1.7	1.7	1.6
	2. FAO/IBRD	2.6	0	3.5
	3. FAO/Regional Banks	0.6	0	1.2
	b. Reimbursable			
	4. UNDP(EPTA)	32.9	29.0	8.3
	5. UNDP(SF)	92.5	83.0	14.6
	6. World Food Progr.	1.9	0	2.0
	7. Trust Funds	12.5	10.8	2.8
	Total other programs	144.7	124.5	36.0
	minus included in I	5.2		
	Grand Total	199.4	126.6	72.8

(1): The Freedom From Hunger Campaign.

The first column shows the size of the allocated funds for the two-year period. For the 116-nation organization it amounts to 200 million dollars (Or for example about one half of Norway's military expenditures in 1969 [8]).

The second column indicates what part of the numbers in the first are estimated for field expenditures. (about 64%).

The third column is the result of a time-study in FAO, where an attempt has been made to calculate what FAO actually expends on managing and operating the programs. As the numbers indicate,

FAO believes that a large part of the Regular Program funds are used to administer the Special Programs. This has for several years been used as an argument for augmenting the overhead allocations to FAO, from the Special Fund sources (UNDP and others), for planning and implementing the Special projects.

As these numbers indicate, FAO's resources are severely limited when considering the immense and important task the organization has been given. Hundreds of countries and millions of people are desparately in need of resources for development and FAO is an instrument that could be efficiently used towards agricultural improvement if the political will to use the organization existed. But it doesn't. It seems, as Finn Alnæs indicates in his latest book [9], that the well-fed and informed groups in the so-called developed countries have lost hold of the tragic dimension in what goes on around them. When we speak of millions of people desparately needing the services of FAO we seem to lose sight of the fact that we are dealing with millions of individuals, each one often an immense human tragedy. When the geographical distance from them to us is large we seem to lose the sense of urgency and responsibility as if distance has moral importance. We often even end up thinking that FAO's one hundred million dollars per year is quite a lot.

Actually, though, FAO receives about 1/5 of all allocations to multilateral organizations [10]. The rich countries, however, favor the bilateral approach to development endeavours. Of total capital transfers from these countries to the poor countries of the world (about 10 billion dollars in 1966), only 5% went to multilateral organizations. International development action does not have large goodwill. The basic reason seems to be the want the rich countries have to control and benefit from their own assistance efforts.

The third column in Table 2 indicates at least two things. 1) That there is a battle between organizations about who is to pay the administrative costs of the voluntary development programs and 2) that FAO has used large efforts to find out on exactly what programs and projects the experts actually work from day to day. What is the sense of this, considering

the fact that it is just about the same countries that pay the whole bill anyway? Although it is speculation, these countries might pool all their contributions to the diverse UN technical assistance programs, and in this pool make policy decisions on the distribution of funds to the different tasks (industry, agriculture, transportation etc.) in the different regions of the world. While we now have a long list of universal organizations duplicating each other in each region and fighting over who shall do the multidisciplinary tasks, a reasonable corollary to the pooling and centralization of financial policy-making would be a regionalization of the UN system, each region operating with one unified organization.

Where do the financial resources of FAO come from? If we study the Regular Program we find the following repartition of contributions. To depict the base of this distribution the table gives information on the countries' Gross National Product (projections to 1975). This information is gathered from tables 44 and B.10 in Russett. The ranks are also taken from these tables. The total, N, is the total Number of cases in each table in Russett.

TABLE 3

Contributions to FAO and UN Regular Program.

Country	GNP, 1975 billions US$	Rank	Percent of FAO Contr. 1966/67	Percent of UN Contrib. 1965/67
Austria	17	23	0.7	0.5
Belgium	18	22	1.5	1.2
Canada	64	9	4.2	3.2
Denmark	9	31	0.8	0.6
France	92	7	8.0	6.1
Germany, W.	178	3	9.8	7.4
Italy	70	8	3.3	2.5
Netherlands	21	18	1.5	1.1
Norway	7	36	0.6	0.4
Sweden	19	20	1.7	1.3
Switzerland	19	21	1.2	0.9
UK	104	6	9.5	7.2
USA	826	1	31.9	31.9
Total	1444	N=68	74.7	64.3

Source FAO percentages, Report of the FAO Council, 44th session, page 62-64.

The 13 countries in the table contribute about 75% of FAO regular funds. US alone contributes 32%. The same 13 countries represent 64% of the non-voluntary funds allocated to the United Nations Organization. One of the main reasons for the difference in these two percentages is that USSR is a member of the UN and not of FAO. By comparing the percentage distribution to FAO and the UN we notice that while the first 12 countries listed pay relatively more of FAOs budget than of the UNs, the United States pays an equal percentage to the two organizations. According to policy decision in the FAO Conference (eighth session), the FAO scale is to be constructed by directly applying the scale of assesments to the UN. [11)]

The columns in the table can be used to show that the total Gross National Product of a member country is decisive for its scale of contribution. If we compute a correlation coefficient between the variable Percent of FAO Contr. 1966/67 (X) and GNP (1975) (Y), using the formula:[12)]

$$r = \frac{N \text{ Sum } XY - (\text{Sum } X)(\text{Sum } Y)}{\sqrt{[N \text{ Sum } X^2 - (\text{Sum } X)^2]\,[N \text{ Sum } Y^2 - (\text{Sum } Y)^2]}}$$

we find that $r = 0.93$. In other words that $r^2 = 0.865$ or that 86.5% of the variation in the scale of contribution is explained by GNP.

c) Personnel.

The expansion of FAO programs (shown in Diagram 5, page 29) has entailed a similar expansion in personnel assigned to the organization and to the field projects. In 1956/57 the total of FAO personnel was about 1700. In ten years from then the number has increased by over 300% to 5300. The approximate distribution is shown in the following table.

TABLE 4

FAO Secretariat and Field Staff 1/1 1968.

FAO Headquarters, Rome	
Professional Officers	1050
General Service Personnel	1950
Subtotal	3000
Permanent Regional Staff	
Professional and General Service	600
FAO experts in the field	1700
Grand Total	5300

Source: CL 49/16 page 17 and C 67/3 Annex IV, page 394.

The size of FAO is indicated in Table 4 and the expansion in personnel in Headquarters and in the field raise difficult problems of planning and coordination for the organization. Many of those interviewed indicated that when personnel expansion per year went above a relatively small percent coordination in the system got out of hand. In other words they put forward the same argument that often appears in discussions of budgetary expansions. A "reasonable" expansion of this year's budget is the percent applied last year. [13] What can be said for and against this type of thinking?

Obviously if the administrative system is unitary and hierarchical the incoming personnel have to be adjusted to the existing system and get acquainted with superiors and subordinates before efficient action can be undertaken. This is the situation in FAO, and even small increases of personnel create problems. However, if the administrative system is problem-oriented, only loosely hierarchical, and constructed with professional groups as building blocks, then personnel expansion has another effect. First of all the driving force behind expansion is not additions to the existing administrative system, but new problems that require solution. In FAO Special Fund project activity was basically a new problem-set for the organization. New professional groups could have been employed, teams with their own authority system could have been constructed and put into the FAO system without creating the miniscule administrative problems that new personnel now create. It is tempting to draw the conclusion that a hierarchical authority structure like the one FAO now has is only efficient when the organization's task is of the same nature: One task that easily can be divided into subtasks and where one man can have total control of each task. The situation in FAO is as different from this as possible.

The planning problem also becomes enormous when a basically unitary hierarchical system reaches the size FAO now has. Planning is in FAO seen as a problem of coordinating organization units as efficiently as possible. The reports written on FAO administration, as a response to the impact of the Special Fund activities, are a long discussion of the organization's overall

structure. Not that this is unimportant. But as this student sees it, such a discussion is irrelevant as long as the character of the organization tasks are unclear and unstructured. Under a cloak of "the countries themselves have to decide on substantive tasks", a detailed discussion of how to structure the whole of FAO is undertaken. Actually, of course, if FAO really believed that countries should decide all substantive matters, FAO should turn itself into a recruitment agency, sending competent experts to development undertakings planned by the country involved. This is obviously not what the organization wants.

The conclusion then is that because the planning of development projects is a political/professional problem, not a technical/administrative problem, it requires a problem-oriented approach to the structuring of an organization and to the utilization of personnel. First the character of the tasks have to be clarified, then the administration can be built in relation to the tasks.

Table 4 indicates that about 2/3 of the personnel in Headquarters are general service (secretaries, clerks etc.). By using the Programs of Work and Budget from 1960/61 we find the following information on the development of the relationship Professionals/General Service Personnel.

TABLE 5.

General Service per professional in FAO

1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	
937	1080	1080	1280	1493	1637	1815	General Service
535	615	615	714	806	875	988	Professionals
1.75	1.76	1.76	1.80	1.85	1.87	1.84	Ratio

The numbers in the preceding table are from FAO Headquarters in Rome, We notice that the ratio has increased from the beginning, though showing signs of decline again in 1967. This can probably be taken as an expression for increasing administrative work as the organization expands its programs.

However, the numbers may also indicate that as the organization grows the professionals are able to delegate administrative activities to personnel in the general service category. Many of those interviewed in FAO indicated a wish in this direction (although most of them were not willing to delegate administrative functions out of their unit to centrally placed administrative divisions).

We can note from Diagram 5, page 29 that the decline in program growth from 66/67 to 68/69 is paralelled in a decline in the ratio General Service/Professional personnel. Although the relationship of course may be spurious, it may indicate an organizational mechanism. Increasing growth of programs increases the general service/professional ratio, while declining rates of growt cause decline in the same ratio.

The grading of personnel in FAO is highly differentiated. At the top is the Director General. Then follows the Deputy Director General and Assistant Director Generals. The fourth category is Assistant to Assistant Director Generals. At the middle level of the organization the grading of directors is divided in two, D2 and D1. Then follow the five professional grades from P5 (highest) down to P1. The distribution of these categories in Headquarters Rome in 1961, at the beginning of the Special Fund program and in 1967 (1/1) is shown in the following diagram.

DIAGRAM 8.

Relative size of professional categories in FAO



The expansion at the P4 level, corresponding to professionals at the subject matter level of Special Fund projects, is the most striking feature. Secondly we notice the evening out of the "neck" at the D1 level from 1961 to 1967. The organization was criticized by Mrs. Castle of Great Britain [14] for being top heavy. If this was the case in 1961, the situation has changed to one where the middle level of professionals represent the "weight" of the organization - at least numerically.

d) Organization structure.

1. Secretariat. The formal structure of FAO in 1968 is depicted in the following Diagram 9. The size of the seven units under the Director General in terms of allocations over the Regular Program Budget for 1968/69 is graphically expressed in the size of the boxes. In the left hand box is shown the location of the main regional offices. The next one, the Office of the DG, is considered the main overall planning and coordinating unit. The Freedom From Hunger Campaign and The Indicative World Plan team are both placed in this central unit. Then follow 5 departments, the first and the fifth of an administrative service nature, the three others technical-subjectmatter. The percentage of the UNDP/FAO allocations to each department is indicated in the diagram. Beside this percentage we have also given the number of divisions within the respective department in brackets. The immense size of the Technical Department is best understood if both the size of its box in the diagram and the percent of the UNDP/FAO allocations to it is compared to the same dimensions in the other departments.

In 1957 FAO was based on five subject matter divisions (nutrition, forestry, fisheries, economics and agriculture). In addition there was a division for information, one for administration and finance and the DG and his office. In the beginning of the sixties the subject matter divisions were arranged in departments and a Program and Budgetary Service was constructed in the DG's office. Outside this office, but directly under the DG, a FFHC office was erected, as an addition to the other Special Assistants counciling the Director General. In 1962 all the departments shown in Diagram 9, except the Fisheries Department, were in place. Fisheries was until 1965 a division in the Technical Department. The Director General, because of the important unused resources in the sea, suggested in 1965 such a creation. At the Conference in 1965 several countries recorded their doubts about making fisheries a department [15]. Argentina was in doubt about the timing of the suggestion, while France blankly disagreed in establishing a Fisheries Department.

DIAGRAM 9

FAO headquarters Organization and relative importance of departments in 1968/69



1) This division is a joint division between FAO and IAEA, located in Geneva.

It could hesitantly support a modest strenghtening of the Fisheries Division. Finland disagreed because it meant the suggestion should not be implemented before the proposed review of the organization structure had been undertaken.

Then the review of the organization structure was made. These studies will be analyzed later in this paper.[16] A new Director General was elected in 1967 (A. D. Boerma) and he proposed to operate FAO on another organizational base. His suggested structure, that most likely will be implemented after approval in 1969 [17], is depicted in the following diagram 10 (The size of the boxes in this diagram are more or less haphazard). Comparing this chart to the one in Diagram 9 we note some seemingly modest change. The Office of the DG has been renamed the Development Department, an Area Service Unit has been placed at the top, Program and Budget Service at the bottom. The Public Relations Department has been dismantled, and its division for FAO/Industry Cooperation has been transferred to the central Development Department. The Division for Legal Council has been adjoined directly to the DG, while Publications and Information activities have been reduced to office status (box far right). It is noteworthy that one of Dr. Sen's major contributions to FAO, The Freedom From Hunger Campaign, has also been moved to this office. (As we shall see in the next chapter, the new Director General represents a new policy approach to FAO). Further changes are the creation of a policy advisory group directly in contact with the DG, and the suggestion for the creation in 1970/71 of a Forestry Department.[18]

DIAGRAM 10.

New FAO Organization Suggested in 1968.



Each department in 1968 is divided into Divisions, each with a Division Director at its head. Each division again is subdivided into branches, sections or offices. The increasing differentiation of FAO in this sense is depicted in the following table.

TABLE 6.

Differentiation of FAO into subunits

Unit	1962	1964	1966	1968
No. of Departments	5	5	6	6
No. of Divisions	10	15	21	25
No. of Branches	61	64	78	85
No. of Regional Offices	13	13	13	14

Although there seems to be a general concern for reducing the number of subunits, the provisional organizational suggestion of the new DG and the Review Team [19] includes more than 100 subunits in FAO.

2. Conference and Council

Although this study focuses on the function of the Secretariat in the planning of development projects, let me briefly turn to the description of two other important FAO organs. (Both will be considered as parts of the environment). The first is the FAO Conference. This is the supreme FAO-authority. Each member government of FAO has one delegate and one vote in this organ. It meets once every two years and decides on policy and budget. When it meets (usually around November) it is subdivided part of the time in different technical and administrative/economic commissions. The political climate in the Conference is usually

reluctant detractionist on the part of the major contributors while clearly expansionist on the part of the recipient countries.[20] The establishment of the total budget size is usually the major crux of the meeting. However, substantial changes of the Director General's suggestion is seldom made. One informant described the process in the following terms. In the technical commissions where mostly country experts meet, increases are suggested, and the donor representatives seldom deem it possible to oppose these suggestions. (Experts, whatever their nationality, usually want to expand their specific type of work in an organization). Then in the Conference meeting, where the donors more or less can join forces, deductions are suggested. The end result is most often the DG's suggestions.

The interesting question is thus moved to the area of the Director General's function. How, and under what political circumstances, are the main budgetary suggestions compiled and suggested? The budgetary aspect of this process are not delved into here, but is definitely worth a study in itself.

A general perspective on the budgetary process in UN-organizations is given by Jacob and Atherton.[21] They ask about the rationality of the total work arrangement in the international field. What would for example a Congressional Committee say to the fact that the FAO budget (like the others in the UN family) is scrutinized 1) by the FAO Conference for several days 2) by probably each of the 116 member governments? Viewing the size of the budget they ask if this is efficient. This student discussed the FAO budget with representatives of the Overseas Development Ministry in London, and they stated that the budget suggestion from the Director General is scrutinized in detail in the professional units of the British Government.

The FAO Conference is probably most aptly described as a meeting of government representatives, discussing in the general climate of international politics at the time, with subjectmatter experts exerting influence on some specific development questions, but where government influence on FAO's work is limited to an extremely general guidance of policy and to suggesting, as we shall see, on line with other units in the environment of FAO, detailed

national project needs, so specific and in so large a number that choice, and therefore influence, is in the hands of the secretariat.

The FAO-Council, erected in 1949, after a suggestion by lord Bruce who was chairman of the Commission that blankly rejected Mr. Orr's World Food Board proposal, cannot quite as easily as the Conference be defined as part of the environment of FAO. Through its frequent meetings and its smaller size it probably exerts central influence on FAO policy and actions in the field. However, in the area of UNDP development projects its influence is most likely more limited. As we shall see, Special Fund activities are in a peculiar way withdrawn from the decision-making in FAOs legislative organs.

The Council, which is the highest FAO authority between Conference sessions, is elected by the Conference. Due consideration is given to geographical distribution and rotation of membership. (One of the Scandinavian countries for example nearly automatically has a seat). The 31 delegates to the Council are elected for 3 year terms and they meet at least 3 times between Conference sessions. [22] Much of the influence that Council has is exerted through two committees, Program Committee and Finance Committee. [23] They have 7 and 5 members respectively, all appointed by the Council in personal capacity.

3. The Director General

The Director General of FAO is an institution in himself. He is elected by the Conference for a four year term, with maximum possible tenure of 8 years.[24] Article VII of the Constitution of FAO reads: "Subject to the general supervision of the Conference and the Council, the Director General shall have full power and authority to direct the work of the Organization".

e) The United Nations Development Program, UNDP.

Situated in New York, in the UN Headquarters, this is the central agency for the approval of project requests from member countries. To perform this function the organization first of all has a Managing Director and a secretariat, subdivided on the basis

of subject matter and salient fields of development (communications, education, agriculture, industry etc)[25]. The Managing Director submits feasible projects to the UNDP Governing Council, an organ with an equal number of delegates from donor and recipient countries. A Consultative Board usually comments on the projects before they are sent to the Governing Council. On this Board are the Secretary General of the UN, the Executive Chairman of the Technical Assistance Board, [26] and the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. [27] The Directors of the Specialized Agencies are called to meet when projects or questions specifically related to their fields are being evaluated on the Board.

The UNDP set guidelines for the typical UNDP project in 1959.[28] These have in large measure been applied, but their generality have allowed a wide scope of variations, and they have probably been of little value for the relating of project activities to the specific needs of the specific cultural, social and economic regions where the projects have been implemented. The guidelines were a) large projects, around 2 million dollars each b) pre-investment nature of projects that could "clear the path" for more long term investment from other private or government sources, c) total, not annual planning of each project, d) planning of projects on their own merits, not as before under consideration of country targets, and e) project requests should be in the fields of manpower development, industry, agriculture, transport and communications, building and housing, health, education, statistics and public administration. In the resolution establishing the Special Fund (1240 XIII), handicrafts and cottage industries were also mentioned, but these project categories have been dropped...

The large scope of UNDP activity makes it necessary to entrust most of the influence over the structuring of project requests to the Specialized Agencies. Since the start in 1959 1422 requests have formally been registered by UNDP, the total number submitted being much larger. In the nine years that have gone since then, 873 of these requests have been approved by the Governing Council. Because the overwhelming amount of technical information relevant to the different projects is located in the Specialized Agencies, and because they probably have a more direct contact with demanding

groups in the environment (for FAO, agricultural authorities in member countries) these agencies have decisive influence on the formulation of requests. Thus to comprehend the planning process behind the development projects the values present in the Specialized Agencies, and the sources of these values would seem of central interest.

The UNDP formally allocates projects to the Specialized Agencies for planning and implementation. As of 31 May, 1967, FAO had received by far the largest portion of the projects, The following list shows the distribution: [29]
FAO 38%, United Nations 21%, UNESCO 17%, ILO 10%, while WHO, IBRD, ICAO, ITU, WMO and IAEA together received 14%.

From this broad description of the planning system in which FAO is a more or less antonomous part, let me turn to the question of policy making at the top level of FAO.

NOTES

1. By structure here is meant stable patterns of communication and authority and staff composition (in terms of nationality, profession, age etc.)

2. Jacob and Atherton, op. cit., page 39

3. J. W. Burton, op. cit., chapter 5.

4. Morawiecki, W. "Institutional and Political Conditions of Participation of Socialist States in International Organizations, A polish View" International Organizations, No. 2, 1968, page 493.

5. FAO document: Provisional Conference report, 4. dec. 1967, page 200.

6. For a list of the Project countries and the regional placing used in this study, see Annex 2.

7. c/67/3, March 1967, Table I, page XXVII.

8. There are for 1969 about 2500 mill. N. kr. or about 360 million US$.

9. Finn Alnæs, Gemini, Gyldendal 1968.

10. OECD Development Assistance Efforts and Policies, Paris, 1967.

11. See FAO Conference Provisional Report, 14th session page 195.

12. Blalock, H.M. Social Statistics (New York), McGraw Hill, 1960.

13. See for example the discussions in A. Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, Little, Brown and Co. 1964.

14. From "the Observer", Business/news page 9, 9 April 1967.

15. See Report of the 13th session of the Conference page 49, footnote 1).

16. See page 139

17. There will be a FAO Conference in November 1969.

18. CL 51/9 point 66 page 20.

19. CL 51/9 page 25-26.

20. "The Conference in 1963 was deplorable. USA took a firm stand on 15% increase and proposed cuts in the proposed budget" Jones op. cit., page 139.

21. op. cit., page 40-47.

22. General Rules of the Organization, Rule XXV, 2.

23. A. Løchen, the administrative leader of the Norwegian Nutrition Council is Third Alternate to the Finance Committee (1968).

24. Constitution, Article VII points 1 and 2. The Indian Mr. B.R. Sen was elected D.G. in 1956. After two terms of 4 years he was reelected in 1963. In 1967 India again put forth his candidature, but the Conference turned it down. (Provisional Report, para 684.) Total salary for the DG in 1968 $53.000 + allowances.

25. The UNDP is in 1968 undertaking a review of its structure. New arrangements are believed to incorporate the need for more comprehensive planning and evaluation of projects.

26. This Board was created in 1950 (with EPTA) to evaluate the earliest development projects and the country targets.

27. Until april 1967 this was Mr. George D. Woods. The new President is former Secretary of Defence in the USA, Robert S. McNamara.

28. The United Nations Special Fund, An explanatory paper by the Managing Director, (New York, UN, 1959).

29. FAO document C 67/26 page 7, footnote 1).

CHAPTER FOUR

PROBLEMS OF GENERAL POLICY-MAKING IN FAO.

Introduction: The leadership function.

The complexities of the political and organizational system of FAO, partly spelled out in the preceding chapter, makes the process of formulating and deciding on goals that are meaningful for both clients and members of FAO highly intricate, a game of much give and take. In the historical study of FAO we saw how the social and political forces and values present in 1945 interacted with individuals to form the goals, the structure and the size of the organization. The "politics" of the process were obvious. FAO goals were not given just because the organization was established formally. At any time in the first years the problem of development of the "third world" could have been chosen as an FAO goal of primary importance. It wasn't until well into the 1950's.

What are the goals of FAO today? To answer this question is in one sense impossible. At the lowest level of analysis it can be stated that each individual in FAO has goals for his actions inside the organization and it is the sum of these that "really" are the goals of FAO. We could then quickly give up trying to describe them. In another sense the question can be disposed of by merely referring to the explicit goals stated in the FAO Constitution. Many of those interviewed in the organization did exactly this.[1)]

Somewhat more realistically the goals of FAO could be studied by searching for the most influential expert groups in the organization and identifying the values they perceive as most important in different sectors of activity. One hypothesis is that as new groups in the system gain in influence new goals will emerge. The changing position of groups could most interestingly - in the next stage - be studied in relation to environmental pressures and demands. A lack of correspondence could be an indicator of organizational isolation.[2)]

Although the scope is limited, this chapter will look into the role of FAO leadership in the goal-formulating process. What policies have been pursued from this level in the organization and what effect have the goalformulations had on the work of FAO?

The leadership function in an organization can be interpreted in many ways. Leaders can conceive of their role as basically goalformulating or goal implementing. The latter, the traditional "goal" of public administration, was important in FAO in the sense that all activity undertaken had to have its base explicitly in decisions made by government representatives. Further, leaders can centralize or decentralize the decision-making power they control, and leaders can adopt a more or less democratic process within the organization. However, in all cases the leadership must - implicitly or explicitly - take a stand on the overall goals of the organization, and to a certain extent reduce them to working goals for the main parts of the organization. This may be characterized as a necessary long term activity of any organizational leadership. How are the organizational goals formulated and reduced to working goals in FAO, and how have the organization leaders interpreted their role?.

1) <u>The formulation of FAO goals.</u> Legally this is no problem. It is the FAO Conference that decides on the goals and the budget of the organization. But if we ask what decision-making process is implied, a much more complex picture arises. Three main groups of decision-makers take part in the process. 1) The 116 member-governments, 2) The Conference delegates and their advisors and 3) The FAO Secretariat and the DG. Depending on who they nominate as delegate and what his political values are, how binding instructions they give their delegation and how strong they are in the Conference Assembly, the governments will have influence, or even power over goal formulation. The expert advisors have a special influence related to their professional standing. While cleavages between delegates follow traditional political division lines, cleavages between experts often follow the professional

groups. Thus contacts and agreements between experts across political barriers is more likely than between delegates. Therefore if the authority of experts was increased in Conference meetings a stronger regional integration of policy might be the result. However, in the FAO-system today, the third group of participants, formally without decision-making power at all in the Conference, probably exert the most influence over the policy-decisions made. Why? 1) Leading personnel in the secretariat have comprehensive and detailed knowledge about programs, methods and resources in the organization. 2) They have the advantage of initiative through the Program of Work and Budget and 3) The Director General, with the help of the Council, arranges the Conference meeting itself, allowing for a host of tactical considerations. Thus, the suggestions made by the Director General and his secretariat are in large measure accepted by the Conference. [3)]

A more difficult question is the influence units in the environment have on the structuring of the Director General's suggestions. Diverse national and international institutions make their wishes and desires known for FAO, directly and through the Regional Conferences. [4)] In addition a large number of technical, subject matter meetings are held in FAO nearly continuously and here many suggestions for FAO action arise. The FAO and UN field administrations also produce demands that may exert influence. What is the total result? A central point is that the demands by far outstretch resources. If the demands all fell within one policy tendency the Director General's possibility to structure a policy would be limited. But as we shall see they don't coincide and the Director General has a freedom of policy choice that gives him large influence over the direction of FAO's work. How this choice has been made by Mr. B. R. Sen will be our concern in the following paragraphs.

The Director General of FAO then has large influence over the UNDP/FAO programs. Besides the problems of information discussed in the preceding chapter, the administrative system as such plays

an important role. The Governing Council formally has the authority to approve projects. The FAO Conference is for this reason exempt from officially discussing that policy, and from the Conference reports it can be seen that the content of the field projects is discussed indirectly, in relation to the activity of the Divisions. However, the Governing Council and the Managing Director of UNDP largely rely on FAO for advice and guidance on questions of agricultural projects. The result is that the Director General's authority is augmented, and influence is withdrawn from the organs where government representatives sit. Let us look somewhat closer at the reasons for this influence.

One reason for FAO influence is the complexity of the UN system and the complexity of the project planning process. Only the organizations themselves have thorough knowledge of the whole system and the new nations are more or less forced to let them plan the projects. Thus the premises of the organizations become the premises of the countries.

Another reason is the separation of planning and approving organizations. UNDP projects are planned in detail in FAO and approved in UNDP in New York. Government representatives in New York, and even the UNDP administration there, are more or less presented with a fait accompli from FAO. Government representatives in FAO, in Conference, Council and elsewhere, are withdrawn from direct influence over project planning. Their field is Regular Program, Special Fund activities are services done by FAO for UNDP. That UNDP directly finances a large number of the professionals in FAO doesn't help much. Government influence is at a minimum once green light for UNDP allocations has been given.

Another base for organization influence is the idea that project plans are to be compelte in detail for as long as a five year period into the future. We will return to this concept of planning with critical remarks later in the study.

Because of these mechanisms the system of separate Specialized Agencies is slowly tending towards a kind of supranationalism. The main brake on the system is the total allocations the organizations have at their disposal. The central danger is of course

that the values the organizations disseminate are detrimental to the development of the countries in which they work.

A central proposition is that FAO lacks intermediate policy for action towards agricultural development in the poor countries of the world. It does not lack overall, non-operational organizational policy, or suggestions for action at the individual project level. By intermediate policy is meant propositions about how development towards the goals set is to be attained with the organization's resources. Thus the lack is a) a discussion about the dynamic mechanisms that sustain development in the specific regions where FAO has projects, and b) decisions about what mechanisms are to be supported by the organization. Questions at this level concern for example the relationship between regional values (social, religious etc.) and the acceptance of different types of development projects and the consequences of projects of different kind (the problem of how FAO activity in the long run affects political and economic institutions in a project region). Policy statements at this level would, more than a mere geographical orientation, make meaningful planning possible, and would draw the work of FAO out of the purely technical realm, a realm that conceals the political and social aspects of all relevant development work.

Policy-making at this level would probably have other interesting consequences. 1) It would reduce belief in global plans for agricultural development as agriculture would emerge as an integrated activity in the total economic undertakings of national societies and would be seen as something related meaningfully to social and political characteristics of the region in question. 2) It would bring forth the political implications of the technical work done by FAO and therefore make the idea of regional planning possible. Bringing the political questions to the surface in the organization will definitely create difficulties but if increased difficulties go hand in hand with increased realism in planning the choice is at least an interesting one.

In addition to the general policy guidance expressed in the FAO Constitution, it is hoped in FAO that an Indicative World Plan

for agricultural development will provide policy guidance in the future. The Plan received a scathing critique in Neue Zurcher Zeitung[5] 1) for assuming linear extensions to 1975 and 1985 of agricultural and institutional developments existing today and 2) for calculating projections on basically noncomparable and insufficient statistical data. The cultural relativity and the social aspects of change and agricultural development are again suppressed, the real problems being cloaked in technical/economic terms.

The Constitutionally set goals: [6]

- to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under (the member nations') respective jurisdictions,
- to secure improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products,
- to better the condition of rural populations,
- and thus to contribute toward an expanding world economy and ensuring humanity's freedom from hunger,

serve perhaps as a general indicator of the direction in which FAO moves, but are formulated at a level from where it is extremely difficult to deduce operationally coherent development policies. The important question of intermediate policy is hidden in concepts like 'better conditions', 'better standards of living', 'improved efficiency' etc. What exactly do these concepts stand for in the international context that FAO operates?

Examples of policy formulations at the lowest level (individual project-like actions) abound in the reports from the Conference.

1) In a randomly chosen branch, The Food Science and Technology Branch in the Nutrition Division the 14th Conference [7] gave the following directive instructions, Work should be intensified, especially in the fields of efficient production and in the avoidance of waste. The branch should advocate development of both capital intensive and small industries, financed by either private or public funds, or by cooperatives.

2) In the Animal Production Branch, in the Animal Production and Health Division, the same Conference meeting felt that intensification of defining suitable livestock breeds and strains in relation to environment and marketing possibilities was necessary. Increased studies on wildlife management was deemed useful. The role of sheep and goat husbandry in marginal areas should not in the future be confined to milk production. Their potential as meat producers should be stressed, and caution should be exercised to develop goat husbandry only in suitable areas. The possibility of introducing modern techniques in poultry and pig production as a means of relieving animal protein shortages was suggested, with increased emphasis on research and training in this field. Also where feedstuffs could be supplied, poultry numbers could be increased.

Although Conference also evaluated more general tasks of planning (like the IWP) and statistical and economic problems (in the Department of Econ. and Social Affairs), and descriptions of the general development of agriculture (in relation to the FAO document "The State of Food and Agriculture"), the above examples indicate the fragmentary and detailed type of analysis the Conference, on the basis of the Director General's propositions, undertakes. (The last couple of Programs of Work and Budget have contained about 440 pages).

2) <u>The policy of the Directors General.</u>

a) <u>Substantive policy of Dr. B.R. Sen.</u>

B. R. Sen's background before entering the leadership of FAO can support an understanding of his policy. After the independance of India (dominion in 1947, republic in 1950), Sen went to the Indian Embassy in Washington. Later he was ambassador to Italy, Yugoslavia, the United States and Japan. He was leader of the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly, and in 1948 he was member of the Indian delegation to FAO. In 1956 he was the head of this delegation.

Sen was the first representative for a developing country to be elected Director General of FAO. In 1957 he wrote the following:[8]

> "While my allegiance is to all nations, developed and underdeveloped alike, I can, in a special sense, speak for the millions who are striving out of poverty today, in all the world's vast underdeveloped regions."

In 1956 Sen was not, however, the unanimous candidate of the underdeveloped world. An indication of the complexities of the political forces and cleavages working in a FAO-Conference is the following statement in Jones' book [9]

> "Dr. Sen was the candidate of Great Britain, and in fact a host of the underdeveloped countries supported the American nominee..."

In 1957 Dr. Sen expressed the basic goals of FAO:

1) to achieve freedom from want and 2) participate in the achievement of the overall objective, a permanent and progressive peace.[10] In the opinion of Mr. Sen, four basic social forces had to be considered:

1) increasing longevity, making increased food production essential.

2) the awakening of the common man, thus increasing both demand and potential for development.

3) the wish in the underdeveloped countries for technical development.

4) the generosity of the developed countries, the most significant development in international relations after the war.

To implement the goals Sen then wanted to a) strengthen FAO's regional structure and the FAO Committeesand b) strengthen FAO's field organization. However, there were to be no diminution of overall services supplied from the center.

Some of the general aspects of Dr. Sen's policy can be detected already here. The first is the very wide and dramatic goal formulations. They are in a sense more general than even the Constitutional propositions. The peacemaking function of FAO - which

everyone probably would applaud - is not mentioned in the Preamble to that document. Thus Dr. Sen continued in a sense as ambassador at the head of FAO. His dramatic and general goal formulations were intended to awaken the world and make FAO known and influential. This seemed to reduce his interest in more operational goal formulations. [11)]

A second aspect is the relatively small interest taken in the evaluation of the administrative system and how it should function. This is probably related to the lack of intermediate policy formulations. If they had existed, adjustments of the administrative system would have been a much more pressing task. In 1967 The Review Team [12)] had this comment to the structure of the FAO-secretariat:

> We feel ... that a radical departure from that pattern is called for after more than twenty years, and in anticipation of the further strains FAO is bound to face as a result of the increasing demand on its services from member countries. The time for partial administrative remedies is, in our opinion, gone."

A third aspect is Dr. Sen's interest in large projects operated by new organizational units created above the organization but in close contact with the Director General's office, drawing on the resources of the many FAO divisions. Such projects had a public relations value - a general trait of most of the important innovations Sen introduced in FAO. The second social force mentioned on the preceding page is an expression of the importance Sen attached to the informative value of FAO undertakings. The first such special project (besides "a Mediterranean project") was the Freedom From Hunger Campaign (FFHC) in 1960. Its main purpose was and is public engagement in the lack of food. A second project was the FAO/IBRD Cooperative Program, and the latest addition is the Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development. All of these projects were handled by special FAO units. The divisions with the powerful division directors at the top, were kept out or mainly used for support purposes.

Did the suggested program in 1957 represent a policy for agricultural development at the intermediate level (a goal/sub-goal structure that clarifies the purpose of FAO's work and that specifies to some extent the goals lower levels in the organization are to seek)? This statement is what was found to answer the question:[13)]

> "It is important ... to make sure that all of FAO's undertakings are inspired and informed by a sense of common purpose and direction. The direction is set by the purpose, and that common purpose can be only one, which is to maximize FAO's contribution to welfare through the work taken up within its own allotted sphere."

This student believes that it would be difficult from this guideline to decide meaningfully what for example the purpose of FAO development projects should be.

From this base, what were the main policy suggestions of Mr. Sen up to 1967? and how did these suggestions change the direction of FAO?

In 1959 Dr. Sen suggested a program with a total budgetary increase of 10.8% (from about 20 to 22 million dollars(which he characterized in the following manner:[14)]

> "It must be borne in mind, however, that the 1960-61 Budget was virtually a stand-still Budget devoted mainly to the consolidation of FAO's basic structure for meeting its new and increasing responsibilities."

This indicates the basic expansionist zeal of Mr. Sen. He was very interested in acquiring UNDP projects when that program was started, and Mr. Sen engaged FAO directly already at the initial stages of the establishment of the Special Fund. The project program was integrated into the decision-making system already at hand in FAO, and contrary to the other special projects he launched, the Special Fund problems were not discussed at any length in the Program Introductions before 1961. Rather, the problem of reimbursement of overhead costs was a major question from the beginning. It seems in this perspective that the growth of FAO was a central concern for the Director General.

In 1961 Mr. Sen felt reason to mention that the balance of concrete operations and the accumulation of agricultural knowledge must be maintained in FAO activities. Transfer of large chunks of capital is not alone a solution to economic development. A specific determination of needs is necessary at different stages, and this can only be done through study, the traditional work of the UN Organizations.

This seems to be an expression for the notion that FAO is in lack of intermediate operational policy. The objectives and methods to be applied in the different regions of the world with FAO's limited resources have to be clarified and developed through study, and her problem appears in the statement: FAO is an advisory body and is effective only to the extent that Member Governments allow themselves to be guided by its advice.[15] Not only does the organization lack relevant knowledge, it also has difficulties in implementing projects. The two problems may reasonably be seen as related. When these problems were being discussed by the Director General, FAO had already been alloted 49 UNDP projects to a value of 35 million dollars over the UNDP budget.[16]

In 1963 the DG greatly expanded the scope of his introduction to the Program of Work. Although not explicitly mentioning the UNDP program, he felt that the policy of FAO should be concentrated on 4 major themes:

1) increased attention to planning and programming.
2) improvement of human resources, institutional framework and essential government services.
3) improving quality of diet.
4) increasing food supply by reducing waste.

In addition he pointed out the need an integrated organization-wide approach to the work of FAO. To these ends he suggested a budgetary increase of 25%.

Two policy aspects seem to emerge at this point. 1) the idea of more intensive overall planning of agricultural development and thereby of FAO's activity. 2) increased interest in the social, institutional aspects of development. As we shall see later, this has materialized in the recruitment of personnel trained in the social sciences and in a relatively high grading of this personnel in the organization.

In 1965 the Director General of FAO saw the world at the brink of disaster. "... we have arrived at the crucial point where any slackening of effort can spell disaster". [17] He pointed out that the total multi- and bilateral aid had not been sufficient to reverse the dangerous trend of population outgrowing foodproduction. This time the special FAO projects were mentioned as major themes in the work of the organization, while less emphasis was given to planning, production, marketing and institutional improvements. Education was for the first time mentioned explicitly. This field had for a long time been a point of competition between FAO, UNESCO and ILO.[18]

Lastly in 1967, the final Program and Budget written by Mr. Sen, decreed that the food crisis was over us. The bad harvests had probably large influence on the DG's dramatic exposition of the situation. But could there be other reasons? A crisis definition can be used to legitimate the existence of an organization or of parts of its program. A crisis might have made the necessity of a total evaluation of the agricultural problem obvious for everybody, and though serious criticism has appeared both within and outside FAO, the IWP is generally accepted as legitimate. [19] A crisis definition could also spur donors to greater grants to the organization and thus greatly enhance Sen's political standing in the underdeveloped world, the regions that have a majority vote in the Conference.
However, March and Simon's theory of optimum stress [20] as a necessity for innovative, non-neurotic action in an organization, may cast another light over the effect the use of the crisis definition has. Spelling out a crisis may increase dissatisfaction in the organization with the work done to such a degree that working morale dwindles. The interviews taken in FAO in 1968 gave a strong impression that members felt a high degree of non-efficiency in the work and the planning they performed.

Generally, however, it is felt that Sen's use of the crisis terms was an expression for his true perception of the agricultural situation. An expression for strength was his suggestion in 1967 to engage FAO in the problems of family planning as an integrated part of an agricultural development program. Here Sen could reckon

with increased difficulties with the World Health Organization because it of course would feel FAOs interest in family planning as a competition in its field. Sen's innovativeness is most likely related to his general expansionist position as FAO leader, but his wide contact in both donor and recipient countries put him in an creative atmosphere, where information and ideas from different client and member groups gathered in his mind. Such a mixture of information, given it does not overload the processing system, and given this system is geared to absorbing the information, is a high asset if innovation is a goal.

We can thus sum up by saying that the FAO leadership up to 1967 has not explicitly, at the public level, been concerned with FAO's policy role in the UNDP/FAO program. UNDP has been "slipped" into the system. The type of policy-making that Sen has engaged in has left the Divisions quite free to consider, advise and decide on requests for projects. The leadership has further been expansive on both programs, and innovative. New ideas have been put to work in an extra organizational setting, the ambassador, not the bureaucrat, has been at the head of the organization. The environment has been seen more and more in terms of crisis, and the tendency has been to identify always stronger with the poor countries, although never forgetting where the financial resources emanate. Policy-making has been most active at the non-operational level. At the project level the attempt has been made to give everyone something. The alternative, to construct an intermediary theory of development that is feasible within the limited scope of FAO-resources has been more or less left out. However, it is hoped that the Indicative World Plan will be the starting point for a more operationally coherent program for the organization.[21)]

b) Budgetary considerations.

Some of the trends in the Director General's policy in FAO materialize in his budget suggestions. Using the distinctions in FAO budgets between Technical/Economic Program and the different administrative Service Departments (Office of the DG, Public Relations and Legal Affairs, Area Liaison etc), we find the following relation between what the Director General has suggested and what the FAO Conference has approved for technical activities.

DIAGRAM 11

BUDGETARY SUGGESTIONS AND APPROVALS.
TECHN. AND ECONOMIC PROGRAM IN RELATION TO ADMIN. SERVICES.



Source: FAO Programs of Work and Budget.

The Conference has obviously felt the need to expand the technical compared to the administrative program of the organization with about 1% compared to the DG's suggestions. The Conference was generally expansive on the technical side until the Conference in 1965, when it approved a lower percent of the total for functions in this category. In 1968/69 the Conference approval for the technical and economic program for the first time was below 50 % of the total. Whether the relation between the two curves can be used to interpret the political climate in the Conference is difficult to say, but it seems that in 1960/61 the Conference was expansive compared to the DG, the difference between suggested and approved allocations for the technical program being the largest in the budget approved for 1962/63. Then for 1964/65 the DG felt the need to expand, but now the Conference was somewhat more reluctant, and these years seem to introduce a change. However, a major change towards more administrative work is the approval of the Indicative World Plan that is located

in the office of the DG. In 1967 the Conference approved about 1.2 million dollars for this purpose out of the total two-year regular budget of about 60 million dollars.

Obvisously, adjustments made by the Conference are modest. The adjustments generally favor what is defined as technical/economic functions.

Turning to the individual subject matter fields within the technical economic program, we can study the policy of the Director General in somewhat more detail and see the concrete ramifications of the general policy formulations depicted in preceding paragraphs. The following table will also show the "temperament" of the Conference in the different fields of FAO activity. How do the member states use FAO?

In table 7 E stands for estimates (or suggestions made by the DG.) and A for Conference approvals. All numbers are percentages of the total approved budget.

1) From 1963 to 1967 the Director General has only found it appropriate to suggest a relative increase in three subject matter fields: Fisheries, Rural Institutions and Economic Analysis. This corresponds to the following facts. a) his suggestion to create a Department of the fisheries division, which was severely disputed at the 1965 Conference. [22] b) his wide interpretation of the FAO goals, rural institutions opening the field of general societal functions as an integrated part of FAO-work, and c) his interest in planning and long term analysis of the needs and potentialities of the underdeveloped countries.

It should also be noted that on these three policy points the DG has been supported by the Conference, his suggestions being in total increased (from 1957 to 1967 by 0.4 % on fisheries, 1.5 % on rural institutions and by 0.8 % on economic analysis).

2) In 1959 the Conference approved just about without alterations the suggestions made by the DG. Sen was newly elected, he was probably careful and so was the Conference.

In 1961 the tendency had changed to one of general, relatively modest reduction of the Director General's program. In total the Conference reduced the budgets for the units in the table with 0.9 %. Studying the numbers for 1964/65 the Conference seems to have been more active with suggestions both for reductions and expansions, the result being a modest expansion of the DG's

TABLE 7

Budgetary Development within subjectmatter divisions. Estimates compared to approved budgets. Percentages of total budget.

E: estimate A: approval		1958/59	60/61	62/63	64/65	66/67	68/69	
ADG and atomic energy	E		1.8	1.7	1.9	0.8	0.8	
	A	1.4	1.8	1.7	1.0	0.8		
Animal production and health	E		3.6_{0}	3.8_{-2}	3.8_{-1}	3.5_{+1}	3.2	-2
	A	3.3	3.6	3.6	3.7	3.6		
Fisheries	E		6.9_{0}	6.2_{-1}	5.7_{+3}	6.7_{+2}	7.4	+4
	A	7.2	6.9	6.1	6.0	6.9		
Forestry and forest products	E		6.4_{0}	5.7_{-1}	5.0_{+2}	4.9_{+2}	4.5	+3
	A	7.1	6.4	5.6	5.2	5.1		
Land and Water development	E		3.3_{0}	3.7_{-1}	4.0_{0}	3.8_{0}	3.6	-1
	A	3.4	3.3	3.6	4.0	3.8		
Nutrition	E		5.5_{+1}	5.3_{-1}	5.3_{-1}	4.8_{+1}	4.3	0
	A	5.3	5.6	5.2	5.2	4.9		
Plant Prod. and protection	E		3.6_{0}	3.5_{-1}	4.0_{-2}	3.7_{+1}	3.6	-2
	A	3.7	3.6	3.4	3.8	3.8		
Rural Institutions	E		3.8_{0}	4.0_{-1}	4.3_{-1}	4.2_{+17}	5.4	+15
	A	4.0	3.8	3.9	4.2	5.9		
ADG, Econ dept.	E		2.1_{0}	1.9_{0}	1.9_{0}	1.7_{0}	1.7	0
	A	2.1	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.7		
Commodities	E		4.6_{0}	4.5_{-1}	4.2_{+1}	4.3_{+1}	3.9	+1
	A	4.7	4.6	4.4	4.3	4.4		
Economic Analysis	E		3.6_{-1}	3.5_{0}	3.6_{0}	3.6_{+4}	4.0	+8
	A	3.7	3.5	3.5	3.6	4.5		
Statistics	E		4.2_{0}	4.2_{0}	4.2_{+1}	4.0_{+2}	3.8	+3
	A	4.1	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.2		
Totals			0	-9	+2	+36		

suggestions (0.2 %). Then in 1965 major expansions were approved; however, exactly in the sectors suggested by the DG. Especially rural institutions and economic analysis got a boost at this Conference.

In general this analysis seems to support the conclusion that in an international organization like FAO, the policy making or distribution of resources and values in the organization's program is a process that culminates in the suggestion for a Program and Budget made by the Director General nearly a year before the Conference actually meets. Having this important role within the Regular Program, the Secretariat of FAO should be an even more interesting focus in the study of the planning and the policy of the UNDP/FAO projects.

c) Mr. Boerma's plans.

While Mr. Sen saw the world as wandering towards a hunger crisis. the new Director General, Mr. Boerma has started out on "a note of cautious optimism"[23]. He builds his optimism on a) good harvests in 1967, b) more political concern for agriculture in the underdeveloped countries, c) the plans of IBRD to increase investment in agriculture and d) the development of high-yielding wheat and rice strains. This note of optimism might affect the planning process in FAO. While Mr. Sen's approach made expansion of programs a central concern, Mr. Boerma's toned down optimism may make quality and relevance of projects a more natural concern. The adjustment of project content to the new trends in agricultural development may seem more important in the new atmosphere that has been introduced in the organization.

Mr. Boerma has introduced five key areas for FAO activity in the future. Does his approach represent a coherent intermediate theory for development and planning of FAO projects?
The areas are:

1) The development and cultivation of the high-yielding varieties of basic food crops.
2) A war on waste.
3) An attack on protein deficiency.
4) Mobilization of human resources for rural development.
5) Promotion of foreign exchange earnings and savings in the developing countries.

We note the weight put on concrete technical operations. Under point 4 special concern is given to the urban problem, and increased agricultural training is put forth as a means to improvement. The public relation or informative aspects of FAO activity are also reduced in importance. On the methodological side the efficient business like approach is emphasized and overall coordination of planning is to be taken care of by the Development Department (See Diagram 10). Whether this approach will bring the many FAO units into a more coordinated effort for regional development is an open question, but for Mr. Boerma, even more than for Mr. Sen, the problem of what development is in terms of attitudes, understanding and cultural values is more or less subordinated to that of generally producing more and better food. Stating that this should be done more efficiently actually pinpoints the problem. Efficient must be that which fulfills the needs and furthers the values of the clients of an organization. The structure of FAO is to a certain extent being adjusted to regional diversification. [24] An interesting project would be to study how the policy outputs of these units 1) compare to evaluations in the regions of the local problems and their solution and 2) are influenced by or adjusted to the policy of the FAO leadership. One hypothesis could be that conflict will arise in the relation regional units/FAO leadership if the different regional policies are incompatible and that subsequently the role or authority of the regional units will a) never become large or b) be reduced.

Conclusion: The needs of clients.

It appears that FAO leadership is not explicitly concerned with how FAO should use its resources in the different regions of the world. In the UNDP sector policy is theoretically left to UNDP organs and project construction is more or less defined as a technical undertaking. We have attempted to show that this conceals the political aspects and the social problems involved in planning development projects. While FAO leadership has concentrated on what general subjects the organization should work with and the general goals, intermediate policy has been left to the many divisions. Planning is at all levels a question of coordinating. If this coordination is difficult, as FAO has experienced, then this may have its cause within the organization, in the relationships between the different parts of the organization. As the reports on organization structure show, this has been the prevalent diagnosis. However, the cause of difficulties with coordination may also reside in the relationship between the organization and the environment. It may be that the basic structure of the organization and the operational policies it pursues in a way do not correspond to the structures and the problems in the environment. Planning of policy for a system of public administration is not only a question of finding and ranking general goals. It is also a question of understanding the indigenous needs of client groups, constructing and coordinating operational goals in relation to these needs and available resources, and if this doesn't work out, to evaluate and change the organization structure so that the whole system better can perceive the needs of national societies and more keenly and meaningfully communicate with the different client groups. This is perhaps the central problem of leadership in public administration.

NOTES.

1. Of 21 random supervisors interviewed, four were Asians. These four were markedly more reluctant in commenting on the actual goals pursued by the organization in the UNDP sector then were the others.

2. See for example FAO and the World Food Problem: past, present and future, by Mr. Boerma (M 1/79314), page 2.

3. In 1967 for example the exact total budget suggestion made by The D.G. was approved($59.861.000). In 1965, the Conference increased his suggestion with somewhat under 5 %.

4. Recommendations from the 5 Regional Conferencies are found annexed to each Program of Work and Budget.

5. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Sunday Edition, 18.6.67, No. 2654.

6. Preamble to the Constitution of FAO.

7. 55 of the 86 branches are in the 3 technical subject matter departments. The information presented in points 1) and 2) are from the report of the 14th session of the Conference 4 december 1967.

8. Program of Work and Budget 1958/59, page 1.

9. Jones, op. cit., page 131.

10. Program of Work and Budget 1958/59, page 3.

11. His first major operational undertaking, The development of the Mediteranean region, was generally a failure. See Observer, Business News page 9, 9 april 1967.

12. Council Document CL 49/16 page 13.

13. Program of Work 1958/59, page 13.

14. P.W.B. 62/63, FAO Doc. C 61/3 page VI.

15. C 61/3 page III point 4.

16. C 61/3 page 272.

17. C 65/3 page XIV.

18. See Provisional Report of the Council, 21 Nov. 1968 Annex D, Statement by the DG, page D-i.

19. Ibid page Die) for strong support from the new DG.

20. March and Simon, Organizations, op. cit., page 184.

21. Of the 21 project supervisors that were interviewed 12 answered the question whether the IWP would serve as guidance for the planning of projects in FAO or not. 10 answered it would have small value, 2 that it would have some. None answered it would have large value.

22. See earlier in this paper, page 45-47

23. Provisional Report of the Council 21 Nov. 1968, page D i).

24. The Development Department is suggested to contain Regional Service units.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PLANNING OF UNDP/FAO PROJECTS.

We have studied policy-making in the organization from above, the role of FAO leadership and the general characteristics and problems of planning in FAO. In this chapter we approach the problem from below, looking first at the structure and the contents of the project program. Then we turn to the problem of how projects are generated and picked out for implementation. A comparison of FAO and units in the environment, especially UNDP in New York, will indicate the scope of FAO influence on policy. Problems encountered in the search for projects will be discussed and the organization's communication internally and with the environment will be looked into. A third part of the chapter will return to the macro level of analysis and look at the effect it has that FAO operates with two distinct programs, the UNDP (Special Fund) and other activities under the Regular Program. At last we will bring the threads together by a study of wide conflicting views on organizational planning in FAO.

1. Description of the UNDP/FAO program.

a) Number of projects and budget allocations.

From the inception of UNDP to 31 December 1967 UNDP's Governing Council has approved 315 projects for which FAO should be the so-called executing agency [1]. Another 300 were formally in the phase of preparation, and (the following numbers are more or less guesswork) an additional 300 pended in the organization as possible suggestions. Probably around 1000 development projects, more or less well defined were in other words in the planning system of the organization, and all indicators show that this number is increasing. Of the 315 formally approved projects about 170 were operational in 1967, and as these are registered in detail, they will be the base of the following policy and planning analysis.

UNDP earmarks funds for the approved projects, and for the 315 mentioned above, 291 million dollars were allotted. This makes an overall average of 0.92 million dollars per project as the following Table 8 indicates. It also shows the number and the average size of the projects approved each year from 1959 onwards.

TABLE 8.

Number of approved projects and their average size pr. year and in total.

	1959	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	
Number approved										Total
	15	32	16	31	34	39	45	53	50	315
Average size (in mill.$)	0.83	0.78	0.81	0.89	0.81	0.86	1.10	1.16	0.84	Overa 0.92

The number of projects approved each year seems to have temporarily culminated in 1966, and earlier in 1960. This compares to the movement of the upper line in Diagram 12 on the page 81 which shows points of culmination in the same years. As Table 8 shows, the average size has increased quite evenly up to 1966 but then it fell back to the level of 1963/64. This may indicate a change of policy because of dissatisfaction with the results of the projects up to 1966. Several members of FAO have indicated that this is so and that smaller, more flexible projects will be the line from here on.

The earmarkings from UNDP include about 10 % overhead costs to the executing agencies. This 10 % goes to the divisions in FAO that execute the projects and because the reimbursement is connected directly to the individual projects, the size and number of projects a division has the responsibility for affects the size and influence of the division. There is here probably a mechanism strongly affecting the planning process in the organization.

The UNDP conception of development-project activities also contains the stipulation that an approximately equal amount to the earmarking should be furnished by the country itself, especially funds needed for local expenditures. The implementation of this idea is highly variable and is affected by the countries' ability to pay. But on the whole it is probably realistic to state that the average size of the project in monetary terms is 1.5 million dollars.

Diagram 12 depicts the annual earmarkings made by UNDP for projects executed by FAO. For all years exept 1961 and 1967 the yearly total has increased. Compared to the allocations made through the Regular Budget it is obvious that the Special Fund program has been the most expansive.

DIAGRAM 12

Development of earmarkings made by UNDP/SF and expenditures by FAO.



Source: 1) FAO Project Catalogue (SF) no. 21 aug. 21 1967
2) FAO Conference Report on Field Activities, Document C/67/26, page 7.

How can we interpret this material? If we compare the curve for earmarkings with the curve for expenditures actually made by FAO, an interesting feature appears. First of all the organization seems to have a stabilizing effect in relation to the funds and resources that actually flow to the projectcountries. If fluctuations in earmarkings are a result of fluctuations in the willingness of contributors to furnish funds, the international organizations here perform a service for the underdeveloped countries that is essential. By absorbing financial fluctuations they make coherent planning and stable implementation of projects possible.

However the stabilizing effect may have another consequence. The curve indicating earmarkings makes two severe drops in 1961 and in 1967. These reductions may be an adjustment to FAO's relatively stable (and slow?) ability to implement projects. If the movement of earmarkings in the diagram is an expression for the contributors' willingness to expand their contributions, the expenditure curve may indicate a conservative effect of the organizational process. Had FAO been more efficient a larger project program might have been reality. The relative slowness of expenditure increases may of course have their cause in the absorptive ability of the underdeveloped countries concerned, but studies of the World Bank indicate that this is not the case.

On the other hand it should be pointed out that 1966/67 might be a breakthrough in the ability of FAO to implement projects. Because most projects take about 5 years to complete, the effect of consecutive approvals and allocation of earmarkings from UNDP has had a strongly cumulative effect in FAO. Considering that the UNDP-projects in the beginning represented a radically new form of activity, the organization had a hard time adjusting to the impact. Because this impact now is being absorbed, and because a substantial number of projects now are being completed, a conservative effect on the project program size, if it has existed, may disappear, especially if a political will to increase the resources of FAO really exists.

As noted in Chapter 3, page 55, FAO received in 1967 by far the largest part of the total UNDP program. In 1967 this part was 38.3 %. It had risen from 32 % in 1959 when the program was started. This is another indicator of the expansionist policy of FAO in the field of development. Two important reasons can be suggested at this point.

1) The Director General, B. R. Sen has himself opted for the strong expansion line. Several of the unstructured interviews gave support to the position that he has put considerable political pressure on both member countries and on UNDP to adopt more projects in agriculture.

2) In UN circles agriculture has (consequently?) become a more salient feature in the structuring of development plans for underdeveloped countries. Some also hold that this increasing interest in agriculture also is the case in many of the countries that need assistance. In a major speech in FAO's Conference in 1963 [3] President Nyerere of then Tanganyika, strongly supported the importance of agriculture. However, the position is also in doubt. Paul Sigmund in his introduction to the book "The Ideologies of the Developing Nations" [4] states that most of the developing countries stress the importance of industrial development strongly. It is in this connection, and because agriculture has such primacy in development thinking, interesting to note the position of Gideon Sjoberg of the CAG-group in Bloomington Indiana. [5] He postulates the need for an industrial-urban society if development is to get under way and for this reason the need for <u>social change</u> in most underdeveloped countries. The policy of a strong agricultural development is therefore seen as a danger because it basically tends to conserve the existing social order, an order
1) that is detrimental to industrial development and
2) that makes it impossible for the society concerned to withstand the specific ideological impact the assistance has, and therefore makes it difficult for the country to develop its <u>own</u> industrial-urban culture.

In this perspective the expansionist policy on the part of FAO, as UN's specifically agricultural organization, becomes somewhat more problematical than the common notion of development seems to imply. The role of agriculture, even in its technical sense (more efficient production), is put under question and the social

aspects and social consequences of agricultural development programs are brought to the fore as maybe the most important aspects to consider when planning development projects. This of course applies to all kinds of projects, agricultural or not.

It is worth noting that another of FAO's basic assumptions about the development problem recently has been put under serious scrutiny. This is the assumption that a prerequisite for development is some kind of birth or population control. [6] A group of Swedish and Norwegian authors have attempted to show that rapid economic development often has been related positively to a rapid growth of the population, and that it rather is the political and economic system that has the largest influence on development. For them the socialist system seems to be superior. (They suggest for example that while China mainland and India are comparable in population growth, China has had a much more rapid economic development under a socialist economy, while India with a slower development more has been under a system of traditional democracy.)[7] We see here several ways of viewing the contents of the expanding FAO project program.

b) Types of projects and their distribution.

The above resource analysis gives an indication of the size and the development of the UNDP/FAO program. What now is the contents of it?

In 1959 the Managing Director of UNDP emphasized the UN-function of "facilitating new capital investments of all types by creating conditions which would make such investments either feasible or more effective".[8]

The preinvestment concept that Hoffman thus introduced in the work of the United Nations gave the Special Fund a function that neither the World Bank group of organizations nor the Epta had had. Preinvestment meant an integration of capital and expertise in a kind of investigation or planning function in the underdeveloped countries themselves.[9]

The Managing Director further suggested that the assistance given through UNDP should take the form of surveys, research and training, or demonstration and pilot projects o a combination of these.[10] Of the 17 projects approved by the Governing Council in 1959 for FAO-execution, 7 were concerned with problems related to the use of water, 7 to the use of land, while 2 were to construct marine research institutes and 1 was concerned with agricultural training. 10 of the projects were of the survey type, 4 pilot or technical projects and 3 research and training. This corresponds closely to the policy expressed by UN General Assembly and by UNDP Managing Director. (We will return to the question of the relative influence of FAO and UNDP on the program.)

From this base, how has the subject-matter of the projects developed from 1959?

The following Table gives an overview. The classification is based on the organizational divisions.

TABLE 9.

Subject-matter development of the UNDP/FAO projects
Percent distribution

Subject-matter	1959	1962	1965	1967	Total
Animal production and health	-	7	9	14	10
Fishery	12	7	13	10	10
Forestry	-	24	18	18	20
Rural Institutions	23	9	9	4	9
Land and Water	59	40	31	40	34
Nutrition	-	2	2	4	3
Plant Production	6	9	9	10	8
Economic Analysis	-	2	9	-	6
Totals	100 N=17	100 N=31	100 N=45	100 N=50	100 N=287

Source: FAO Special Fund Catalogue No. 21, and Report on Field activities (C67/26) page 8.

In Table 9 it can be noted that land and water projects by far constitute the largest group, with forestry projects as a good second. The table also indicates that Animal production and health and Plant production are the only two fields in even expansion, while Rural institution projects are the only ones in sharp decline. This information will under point 3 help us study the effect the introduction of a distinctly new activity has on a professional organization, like FAO.

The UNDP/FAO projects can also be classified according to the type of work they aim at within the subject matter field. In a report on the field activities of FAO [11] the projects are described in three main categories.

1. Large scale surveys of natural resources and feasibility studies.
2. Projects for demonstration or training.
3. Projects within the field of applied research or technical pilot projects.

A picture of the development of the work-methods applied in the UNDP/FAO program is given in the following table.

TABLE 10

Development of UNDP/FAO project methods. Percentages.

Method	1959	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	Total
Training	6	16	19	20	6	26	9	14	16	14
Research	12	28	38	43	41	18	33	16	31	28
Technical	24	16	0	13	18	31	31	39	39	27
Survey	58	40	53	24	35	25	27	31	14	31
Totals	100 N=17	100 N=32	100 N=16	100 N=30	100 N=34	100 N=39	100 N=45	100 N=57	100 N=49	100 N=319

Source: UNDP(SF)/FAO project catalogue No. 21, 21 august 1967.

From the right hand column we see that survey projects are the largest group on the average, while training projects constitute the smallest. However, training is an important aspect of most of the projects. All of them include some indignous personnel on their staff, and the training of these "counterparts" to continue project work when FAO/UNDP pulls out is essential.

Over 1/4 of the projects fall within the research category. These projects are usually concerned with developing agricultural faculties within universities or with establishing new research centers. FAO has now and then been criticized [12] for its highly scientific approach to agricultural development. From Table 10 it can be seen that from a high around 1962/63 the size of the research group of projects has declined somewhat. To get a more concentrated picture of the change of methods we can divide table 10 in two in the following manner.

TABLE 11.

Time cut 1963 and 1967 on development of UNDP/FAO methods

Percentages

Method	1959/63	1964/67
Training, demonstration	12	16
Research	34	24
Technical pilot projects	15	35
Surveys	39	25
Totals	100 N=129	100 N=190

From the period 1959/63 to the period 1964/67 training and demonstration projects have increased in relative importance, while research projects have declined markedly together with the survey-type of projects, Technical pilot projects on the other hand, have more than doubled their relative importance. These projects are designed to "solve technical problems, improve manufacturing techniques and productivity in processing industries." [13]

We note that the weight on so called technical projects has been increasing while research and survey projects have been declining in relative importance. Although we will look closer at the organizational aspects of this policy in the next section, the change seems to indicate a tendency away from the mapping and study phase of the program towards the implementation and building phase. This may of course be judged in any way one likes, but if questions of basic policy are agreed upon, implementation of projects that physically and economically effect the project countries directly can only be applauded. But if policy questions are still open and if it is correct that basic social and political factors relevant for any development program have not explicitly been discussed or negotiated, the implementation of "technical" projects seems more dubious. It seems to be projects of the study type that can bring out these aspects of development in a specific region, and make possible rational decisions. The technical projects on the other hand to a large degree presuppose such decisions. [14]

c) The geographical distribution of projects.

By comparing the project activities of FAO with the whole United Nations Development Program, Special Fund sector, we are able to get hold of some indicators of the relative role the two organizations have in the planning of development projects.

The resolution [15] establishing The Special Fund clearly stated the political or rather apolitical goals of the program. It said that due consideration should be given to [16]

a) a wide geographical distribution over a period of years
b) non-interference in the internal affairs of the project countries.
c) not attaching political conditions to the projects.

At the same time certain other principles were of a more active and political nature.

1) Consideration should be given to urgency of needs.

This principle may obviously come in conflict with the idea of a wide geographical distribution, especially if the limited resources available to UNDP and the efficiency of the Organization are taken into consideration.

2) Projects should be integrated into national development plans, and project work should be coordinated at the international level. This principle also seems to imply political decisions in the organizations that plan the projects . However, whether such decisions actually are made or not is an empirical question. The foregoing analysis seems to indicate that integration and coordination of project policy is so far not very successful, in other words that the political power of the organizations involved is small.

The overall regional distribution of the UNDP/Special Fund program and changes over the years is given in the following table.

TABLE 12.

R= requests
A= approvals

UNDP project requests and approvals by region.
Change over time.

	1959		1965		1967[1]		In total[2]	
	% of R	% A	% of R	% A	% of R	% A	% of R	% A
Africa	28	8	39	41	41	43	34	36
The Americas	23	31	27	28	31	18	25	25
Asia, Far East	25	31	19	24	23	26	26	25
Europe	4	7	6	5	4	7	9	7
Middle East	19	15	9	2	1	6	6	7
Inter regional	1	8	0	0	0	0	0	0
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N=164	N=44	N=118	N=82	N=108	N=95	N=1422	N=873
% approved		27		69		88		61

1) From april to october
2) Per 30 sept. 1967.

Source: Annual reports from UNDP Managing Director.

The table indicates the relationship between projects requested and projects approved for each region. From receiving 8 % of the approvals in 1959, Africa was allotted 43 % of the projects in 1967, and has of a total of 873 projects received 36 % or 317 projects. The large discrepancy between requests and approvals in 1959 is explained by lack of pertinent information in the requests from the African governments. [17] In 1967 there was a sharp decline in allotments to South and Central America, but overall this region has received about 1/4 of all UNDP/SF projects. About the same portion has gone to Asia and the Far East. The poorer countries in Europe have received around 7 %. It is interesting to note the decline in both requests and approvals from 1959 to 1967 in the Middle East region. Is this a reaction to the political difficulties in the region, and the fact that USSR and other socialist states view some of the Specialized Agencies of the UN in a political, mainly capitalist context? [18] From this unanswered question, let me turn to the regional distribution of operational UNDP/FAO projects. We find the following distribution.

TABLE 13.

Regional distribution of UNDP/FAO projects.
Percentages

Region	1960	61	62	63	64	65	66	Total
Asia	17	20	19	35	31	29	29	28
Africa	25	30	19	12	44	26	45	31
Middle East	33	10	19	19	3	6	3	11
Europe	8	10	5	0	0	3	3	4
America	17	30	38	34	22	36	20	26
Totals	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N=12	N=10	N=21	N=26	N=32	N=35	N=31	N=167

Comparing the right hand column in this table to the same column in Table 12 we find that FAO is somewhat more favorable to the Asian region, the Middle Eastern countries, and about equally interested in the Americas as UNDP as the whole. FAO is however less engaged

in Africa and in Europe. But it is interesting to note that in 1960 the percentage going to Africa through FAO was already at 25 %. Either the information problem was rapidly overwon, or else it was all the time unimportant. The rather large fluctuations in the table from year to year is partly explained by the large-project policy of the UNDP.

From 1960 to 1966 Asia and Africa have both increased their relative part of the FAO program. In the Middle East the reduction has been drastic, while in Europe the size of the program has declined considerably. It is noteworthy that in 1968 the new Director General of FAO, the dutchman Boerma, has expressed himself favorably for a new interest in the European part of the program.[19)]

To get a somewhat clearer picture of the policy behind the geographical distribution of UNDP/FAO projects, let us first compare the distribution of projects to the distribution of population in the project countries. Both the FAO/SF program, the whole UNDP/SF program and the EPTA program will be compared to the population in the project countries.

TABLE 14.

Project distribution compared to population distribution, 1961. Percentages.

Region	UNDP/SF	UNDP/FAO[4)]	EPTA	Population[1)] in proj. countr.
Asia and the Far East	25	28 (20)	33	57
Africa	36	31 (36)	15	15
Middle East	7	11 (10)	18	4
Europe	7	4 (4)	6	8
The Americas	25	26 (30)	26	16
Interregional	0	0	2	0
Total	100 N=873	100 N=167	100 N=12000[2)]	100 N=1312[3)]

1) 90 countries having UNDP/FAO projects. See Annex...

2) EPTA experts in 1960.

3) million inhabitants.

4) The percentages in brackets are based on registered UNDP earmarkings for 351 projects in the FAO system (FAO Catalogue No.22, 31. Jan. 1968), and distort the UNDP/FAO distribution further in relation to population.

Sources: SF, Table 12, FAO, Table 13, EPTA, Sharp, Field Administration in the UN system. Prager 1961. Population, Russetts World Handb., op. cit., figures from 1960.

If a location of projects relative to population size is a goal of the UN system it appears in the table that EPTA is closest to goal fulfilment in Asia and Africa, the total SF-program farthest away from it and FAO in between. In the Middle East The Special Fund is closest, FAO/UNDP again in between. In Europe FAO/UNDP is farthest off, while in South and Central America all UN allocations exceed the relative population size by 10 %. The general conclusion is that this part of the UN system obviously favors Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, and disfavors Asia if population size is used as a measure for equitable distribution of resources. (The analysis also indicates a certain autonomy for each of the UN agencies in the planning of SF-projects).

Let us briefly look at the intraregional distribution of UNDP/FAO projects, in South America and in Africa.

1. South America.

A scattergram of 10 project countries in South America, located in the diagram in relation to project allocations horizontally and per caput income (in 100$) vertically, turns out as follows.

DIAGRAM 13.

Relationship per caput income/project allocations in South America.



Source: Project Catalogue No. 21, op. cit.

1. Bolivia, 2. Paraguay, 3. Uruguay, 4. Venezuela, 5. Argentina
6. Brazil, 7. Chile, 8. Columbia, 9. Ecquador, 10. Peru

We notice first of all that Bolivia and Paraguay in the left hand corner are the two countries with the smallest per caput income and by far the smallest project allocations over the UNDP/FAO program as of august 1967. No data on the reasons for this have been collected, but whether or not for example the revolution in Bolivia in 1952 and the establishment of the National Revolutionary Movement as the dominant leadership in the country has played a role is not known. In Paraguay, with the military in full dictatorial control, the political situation is quite different to the one in Bolivia. Any coherent reason for small UNDP/FAO allocations at this level of explanation is obviously difficult. [20]

Otherwise the countries fall within the theory: The poorer the countries' inhabitants the larger the UNDP/FAO project allocations. In this group of 8 countries the best fitting linear curve has the form: $Y = 6.88 - 0.54X$ and the Pearsons correlation coefficient [21] $r = -0.77$. Thus the per caput income in the country explains $r^2 = 0.59$, or 59 % of the variation in project allocations.

2. Africa.

A comparable plotting of the African project countries according to per caput income and project allocations gives the following picture. We note in Diagrams 13 and 14 that while per caput income spans from $100 to $600 in South America, the bulk of the countries in Africa fall within $50 to $100. While 60 % of the registered countries in South America receive more than 5 million dollars in project allocations, only 30 % of the African countries receive that large an amount.

DIAGRAM 14.

Relationship per caput income/project allocations in some African nations.



1. Congo
2. Central African Republic
3. Burundi
4. Togo
5. Libya
6. Cameroon
7. Congo Brazzaville
8. Uganda
9. Madagascar
10. Tanzania
11. Ethiopia
12. Kenya
13. Somalia
14. Nigeria
15. Ghana
16. Morocco
17. Egypt
18. Sudan.

Sources: Same as Diagram 13, page 92.

In this diagram the countries seem to gather in two groups. In the lower left hand group, with small per caput income, the large majority of countries receive less than 4 million dollars in project allocations. A weak tendency to allocate larger amounts to poorer countries can also be discerned in this group. If we compute Pearsons correlation coefficient for the distribution of the lower left hand group of countries we find it to be $r = 0.29$ or $r^2 = 0.08$. Thus the correlation is very small and other factors are much more important in deciding project allocations.

However, the group in the top right corner, Ghana, Morocco and Egypt, seem to negate the general theory, the poorer the country the larger the allocations. Of the poor African nations only Sudan receives larger allocations than these three. This may indicate that the larger and more developed of the poor countries are in a better position to present their pleas in the international society, and that this superior ability has influence on the allocation of project resources. It may of course also indicate a preference or a large interest in these countries in the organization aiding in the preparation of project requests.

On the other hand quite another distribution may appear if project allocations were compared to size of population in the project countries. This has not been done in the present study, but if we look at a comparable dimension, the total GNP in these African countries and compare this variable to project allocations we find the following distribution.

DIAGRAM 15.



We note that countries 1, 11, 15 and 18 (see list under Diagram 14) constitute a separate group, distributed such that the richest countries receive the least project allocations. But in total we must conclude that there is no distinct relation between the wealth of a nation and what it receives in project resources from UNDP/FAO. There must be other mechanisms at work influencing the allocation, or perhaps it is more or less haphazard. A lack of operational development policy might of course lead exactly to this result. While it might be natural to concentrate on the poorest countries first, a disconnected planning process, with each division in FAO quite independent in project policy making, would naturally in total lead to a random selection of countries according to wealth - as the diagrams 14 and 15 indicate.

3. Asia.

For Asian project countries comparable information on per caput income, population etc. is scanty, but some weak indications of correlations could be found. [22)]

a) Population. To take this variable first, a very slight relationship between population size and project allocations in positive direction appears for 14 countries that were listed in Russetts World Handbook.

b) GNP per caput. Here the situation ressembles the one depicted for Africa, but the deviant group is in the left hand corner, thus generally conforming with the theory of more allocations to poorer countries.

c) % of population in agriculture. Most of the 14 Asian countries have between 70 % and 90 % of their population in agriculture. However, a weak tendency of larger allocations to countries with somewhat lower % in agriculture can be discerned, but it is not significant. A small group of Asian countries with around 50/60 % in agriculture receive quite small allocations compared to the majority of others.

These data indicate the conclusion that FAO and UNDP are concerned with allocating projects to countries in relation to their needs. However, the data also show that countries that are relatively rich and large seem to have an advantage in one way or another. Whether this is through better ability to present information and argue their cause in the organizations concerned, or whether it is because they are favored because of other standards of evaluation than economic poverty, is not known. Overall, however, needs measured in the macro economic terms used here (GNP, GNP per caput, % population in agriculture etc.) don't show any systematic influence on planning of project policy.

d) The recruitment and geographical distribution of experts and project managers.

The following study of the nationality and professional structure of the operational UNDP/FAO projects is meant on the one hand to show the cultural impact of the project program, on the other to serve as a base for the study of some of the values present in the organizational planning process. It is believed that the different nationality groups (See Table 15.) represent relatively distinct administrative, economic and political traditions, and that these traditions more or less are transferred with the expert to the project environment. To what degree the experts' values are absorbed is an open question, but in general, the more experts and the longer their stay the larger the impact. It is of course also an open question explicitly what impact a German, a Russian or an American expert has, a question that could be studied through individual project approaches. But here differences in impact will be taken for granted, with all the dangers of subjectivism and fault this implies.

FAO is generally believed to be a universal, professional, and non-political organization. We will in the following paragraphs try to show to what degree this is the case. What are in other words the criteria for and the values behind the choice and distribution of projects, and what influence does the organizational system have on this process of generation and distribution of scarce resources?

First where do the FAO experts and project managers come from in the world? The following table gives a general answer.

TABLE 15.

NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF EXPERTS AND PROJECT MANAGERS ON 170 UNDP/FAO PROJECTS.

NATIONALITY	1. Project Managers		2. Experts	
	Abs	%	Abs	%
*USSR	3	2	45	3
*Japan	1	1	24	1
China	3	2	21	1
India	3	2	57	3
Other Asian	15	8	144	8
TOTAL ASIANS	25	15	291	16
TOTAL AFRICANS	4	2	12	1
Israel	2	1	20	1
Arab	2	1	24	1
TOTAL MIDDLE EAST	4	2	44	2
Eastern Europe	7	4	61	3
*UK	32	18	341	19
*France	17	10	172	10
*Italy	6	4	60	3
*Germany	6	4	73	4
Scandinavia	13	7	104	6
Other West European	21	13	253	14
TOTAL EUROPEAN	102	60	1064	59
South America	6	4	74	4
Central America	1	1	20	1
*USA	22	13	249	14
*Canada	6	3	52	3
TOTAL AMERICANS	35	21	395	22
GRAND TOTAL	170	100	1806	100

Source: PFb:SF/67, 31 July 1967

*) large powers

55 % of the PMs, 57 % of the experts come from the large powers.
Experts per project (mean): 10.6.

Looking first under point 2 in the table we see that 16 % of the experts are of Asian origin, hardly any of African, and Middle Eastern (3 %) while the very large majority are Europeans (59 %). The idea that FAO, through its expert program at least, is dominated by Americans is not supported by this material, Americans + Canadians constituting 17 % of the experts. Within the European group UK alone represents 19 %, so it can safely be said that the English impact is strong. Of 1806 experts in all, 341 are of this origin. And if the program is dominated by anyone it is by Europeans with 1064 experts and 102 project managers.

The first column in the Table, which is computed on the basis of the 170 project managers, shows a striking feature. The percentages are close to identical to those in column 2. How can this be explained?

1) If the universe of possible expert/project manager choices is structured the same way on the dimension of nationality, if only professional criteria are used when choosing, and if nationality and supply of experts are unrelated, then the table shows near perfect randomness of choice in relation to nationality. All this seems very unlikely.

2) The table may indicate the existence of a very well specified key for the nationality distribution of experts and project managers, so strict that professional considerations must be quite secondary, especially if it is as lifficult to find possible experts as is often said in FAO. If this is the case (it also has a certain unlikeliness about it) then the question is, what is the basis for this key, 60 % Europeans, 20 % Americans and 15 % Asians etc.? Does it for example represent a political preference of the members of FAO, or a preference on the part of FAO and/or UNDP?

After having presented the table and asked the same questions to the FAO secretariat we got the following answer from the Director of the Personnel Division: [23)]

"1. In principle, for certain political and budgetary reasons, international organizations and FAO try to balance the staffing of field projects from the nationality point of view.

From the budgetary point of view, for instance, it should be noted that international organizations try to utilize the currency made available by the voluntary contribution of Member Governments to UNDP, by buying equipment, etc.

2. However, it should be noted that the difficulties of recruitment of specialists not only qualified technically but also linguistically and with previous experience in developing countries, complicates to a great extent the recruitment task of international organizations. In fact, the tabulation prepared by mr. Gran reflects very much the conditions of the labour market of qualified experts rather than the result of a definite nationality recruitment policy.

Therefore, statistically speaking, it is quite normal that the number of experts and project managers coming from the same country is more or less similar."

In the next section a similar indication as the one in Table 15 of the nationality distribution in the FAO secretariat will be given. Maybe the expert distribution has a similar counterpart in the secretariat?

The general conclusion from Table 15 is that the European, not the American element is preponderate and that within the European group the British compose by far the largest subgroup. As we shall see later many indicators show that this group is largely recruited from earlier colonial administrators.

Let us take a closer look at the European group of experts and study how it is distributed in the main regions of UNDP/FAO operations. The following tables give a picture of this, the first one showing how each national expert group is distributed, the second one showing how the whole expert group in each region is composed.

TABLE 16 A.

European experts distributed on projects throughout the world.
% computed vertically.

Experts / Region	East European	British	French	Italian	German	Scandinavian	Other west European	
Asia	33	25	7	3	33	44	23	
Africa	39	34	48	33	21	14	34	
Middle East	10	14	14	12	8	13	13	
Europe	2	4	9	5	3	6	2	
South/Central America	16	23	22	47	35	23	28	
Total	100% N=61	100% N=319	100% N=162	100% N=60	100% N=73	100% N=104	100% N=246	Abs. totals 1026
No. of projects with type of experts N=172	23	65	33	17	31	28	59	256

TABLE 16 B.

Distribution of European experts in the five main regions of FAO operations.
% computed horisontally.

Experts / Region:	Eastern Eur.	British	French	Italian	German	Scand	Other W. Eur.	Totals
Asia	8	33	5	1	10	19	23	99 N=239
Africa	7	32	23	6	4	4	24	100 N=342
Middle East	5	34	17	5	5	10	24	100 N=129
Europe	2	25	32	6	4	13	17	99 N= 48
South/Central America	3	28	13	11	10	9	26	100 N=268

It can be seen (in 16 A.) that only the Scandinavians and the Germans are without their largest group in Africa, while in contrast the French nearly have half of all their project experts in this region. We note also the relatively large % of the French group on European projects. It is tempting to draw a line to the gaullist European policy. Turning to the Italian contingent we note the extremely low % in Asia and the extremely large % in South America, a distribution that may coincide with the Italian knowledge about and contact with this continent. Lastly the Scandinavians are highly concentrated in the Asian region. The general impression is that FAO seeks to avoid "difficult" political combinations in the structuring of projects for the different regions.

In the second percentage-table (16 B.) we see that the British constitute about 1/3 of the total group of experts to each region, except in Europe where they represent 1/4. Here on the other hand the French constitute about 1/3. We see also that "other West European countries" represent a substantial part of each of the regional contingents.

Now sending European experts to the developing regions they are most acquainted with might not wholly further the cause of good projects. In a technical administrative sense it seems efficient, the experts know the language, the geographical region, etc. But in a political, social sense perhaps not. "Unacquainted" experts are more unbound, they probably pose more daring questions and perhaps further more novel solutions to central problems. If this is the case a random distribution of experts in terms of nationality and social background would seem relevant, using professional competence and ability to identify with the needs of recipient countries as central criteria for choice.

As a last picture of the regional distribution of experts we have data on 88 Scandinavian experts, (Scandinavia here defined to include Finland and iceland). These data present the following distribution.

TABLE 17.

Location of Scandinavian experts (in %).

% horizontally

Region / Experts	Asia 1	Africa 2	Middle E. 3	Europe 4	S. America 5	Total	
Norwegian	32	13	10	8	37	100	N= 38
Swedish	56	11	11	11	11	100	N= 18
Danish	15	20	35	5	25	100	N= 20
Finnish	57	29	-	-	14	100	N= 7
Icelanders	60	20	-	-	20	100	N= 5
	36	16	15	7	26	100	N= 88

% vertically

Region / Experts	Asia	Africa	Middle East	Europe	South America	Total
Norwegian	38	36	31	50	61	43
Swedish	31	14	15	33	9	20
Danish	9	29	54	17	22	23
Finnish	13	14	-	-	4	8
Icelanders	9	7	-	-	4	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100
	N=32	N=14	N=13	N=6	N=23	N=88

We note that the largest group of Swedes is in Asia while the largest group of Norwegians is in South America (supposedly on fishing projects). The Danes on the other hand are concentrated in the Middle East, while the Finns and Icelanders are on Asian projects first of all. In the second table we note the preponderance of Norwegians, even if Norway both in population and GNP is smaller than Sweden and Denmark.

We have in the preceding paragraphs gained a picture of the recruitment and placement policy of UNDP/FAO in the operation of development projects. We have the impression that in one sense attempts are made to avoid political contrasts between the project and its environment. What is the situation within the projects? Taking the five main regions FAO operates in, we have looked at each project and registered how many regions were represented by one or more experts.
The result was the following table.

TABLE 18.

The regional spread of experts per project.

No. of regions represented on each project	1	2	3	4	5		
% of projects	15	36	40	8	1	100	N=170

51 % of the projects have one or two regions represented while 9 % have four or five. Again an indicator of a very careful policy of cultural integration appears. The number of regions represented on the average is 2.4.

The professional background of the total number of experts registered (1806, see Table 15) will not be given, only the project managers will be studied on this variable. However, we are interested in the development of the number of experts trained in the social sciences since the start of the Special Fund/FAO program in 1959/60, because this gives an indication of the interest in the organization for the social aspects and social consequences of the project implementations. Although the classification was difficult because of differing and unprecise terminology in the catalogues used, the following Table gives a picture of this development.

TABLE 18'

Experts trained in the Social Sciences on UNDP/FAO projects. (Assignments per year).

Year	1960	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	Total
1. Number assigned	3	3	8	17	13	28	20	4	96
2. No. of projects started.	12	10	21	26	32	35	31	4	171
Coefficient ($\frac{1}{2}$)	0.25	0.33	0.38	0,65	0.40	0.80	0.65	1.00	0.56

The table indicates a close to even increase in the recruitment of this group of experts, and under the assumption of equal number of experts per project, their relative importance has also increased somewhat, as the coefficient indicates. However, the total, 96, is only a little more than 5 % of the total number of experts on the 171 projects. As we shall see later, this group of experts is also located on projects solely under Rural Institutions Division, thus in little contact with the more technical projects (dambuilding, pilot farms, land and water development etc.)

Let us move one step closer the FAO leadership question by studying the distribution of project managers (PMs). First of all how are the project managers distributed regionally?
The following table shows how four main groups of PMs (and their projects) have been placed. (The table giving the overall picture is attached as Annex 5.).

TABLE 19

Location of Project Managers.

Nationality PM ↓	India	Other Asian Country	African	Arab	Eastern Europe	Other West European	South American	Central American	TOTAL
USSR		2			1				3
Scandinavia	2	3	2	3			2	1	13
United Kingdom	1	7	12	2	1	1	4	4	32
USA	1	4	5	4			6	2	22
TOTAL	4	16	19	9	2	1	12	7	70

From this table we get certain indications of UNDP/FAO policy, (it is believed by this student that FAO is practically alone in deciding this location of different nationalities), and it tells a little about the possibility FAO has to locate different nationalities at random (thereby achieving a kind of political integration). (Of course full randomness would not be professionally feasible, taking into account the need for the managers to know the project region and culture, and the advantage it is that he speaks the indigenous language.) However, the table indicates the scope of cultural or multinational integration that FAO accomplishes through the projects.

We note that of 3 Russian managers 2 are on projects in relatively small Asian countries and the other on a project in Eastern Europe. The integrative effect is not striking. We secondly note that the Scandinavian group is extremely well spread in all regions outside Europe. We note also that 8 % of the total number of projects (13 of 171) are led by Scandinavian managers. Turning to the British they again clearly are the largest group, and also the group with widest spread. There is also a clear concentration in Africa with 38 % of the British managers on projects in this region.

However, as we have noted earlier, (page 90), Africa also has the largest number of projects, thus maybe explaining part of the British "preference" for Africa. The Americans on the other hand have their largest group of managers in South America. From the right hand column we see that 54 of all the projects, or 32 % of 171, are anglo-american led.

The conclusion is that there is an obvious preference for putting project managers in places where they have the best knowledge or the largest interest in working. Thus Americans prefer South America, the British Africa where they earlier have been engaged in a number of colonial adventures, and Russians in Asia and Eastern Europe. The Scandinavians also fulfil their image of professional, internationally oriented neutrals.

However, an equally strong conclusion is that the integrative effect present in the location of project managers is strong and undeniable.

By combining information on the distribution of project managers with information on the distribution of experts we find an expression both for the degree of cultural integration in the relationship PM/experts and an expression for the authority relationships in the project program, authority measured in relative control that project managers have over experts from other regions. The following table shows the nationality distribution of experts under each group of project managers. The absolute numbers are given together with percentage computations both horizontally and vertically.

It can be noted that 66 % of the experts under Russian project managers are Asian, 72 % of the experts under British leadership are European while 47 % of the experts under U.S. leadership are American. A tentative conclusion is that the larger the superpower the more authority it has over experts from foreign regions, when the superpower is working in the sphere of international development.

In general it is more common than not to put experts under the control of their "own" project managers. The only two groups of project managers that have more "foreign" experts under their control than their "own" experts are the U.S. Americans and Asians from relatively small Asian powers (Other Asian).

TABLE 20 A.

The distribution of experts under project managers of different nationality.

1. American experts
2. European experts
3. Asian experts

Nationality of project managers	Absolute no.[1] 1.	2.	3.	Total	% horizontally 1.	2.	3.	Total	% vertically 1.	2.	3.	Total
USSR	2	24	51	77	3	31	66	100	1	2	16	4
Other Asian	36	133	84	253	14	53	33	100	9	12	27	14
UK	46	232	45	323	14	72	14	100	12	21	14	18
Eastern Europe	9	44	8	61	15	72	13	100	2	4	3	3
Scandinavia	14	81	23	118	12	69	19	100	4	7	7	7
Other European	73	408	45	526	14	77	9	100	19	37	14	29
USA	117	100	31	248	47	40	13	100	31	9	10	14
Canada	32	12	6	50	64	24	12	100	8	1	2	3
Other American	39	17	13	69	57	25	18	100	10	2	4	4
African Middle East	12	51	8	71	17	72	11	100	3	5	3	4
Totals	380	1102	314	1796		-			100	100	100	100
Correct figures	395	1064	291	1750								
Difference	4%	4%	8%	3%								

1) Estimates

From the table over vertical percentages we see that 31 % of the American experts are controlled by U.S. project managers, 37 % of the European experts by British PMs while 27 % of the Asian experts are controlled by Project Managers from relatively small Asian nations. If we sum up we find that 43 % of the Asian experts, 49 % of the American experts and 69 % of the European experts are controlled by their "own" project managers (Asian, American, European project managers respectively).

We can sum up this information by grouping together the different nationalities of managers and experts from the three main region Asia, Europe and America. We then see clearly how experts from these regions are allotted to managers from the same regions.

TABLE 20 B.

Regional distribution (in %) of experts and managers within the projects.

	Nationality of experts.		
Nationality Project manager ↓	Asian	European	American
Asian	43	14	10
European	38	69	37
American	16	12	49

Source: Table 20 A.

While 14 % of the European experts are under Asian leadership, 38 % of the Asian experts are under European leadership. This may well have its cause in the perceived recruitment possibilities, but it clearly indicates the European preponderance.

It is from the above analysis clear that in the planning of development projects the question of how to structure the projects in terms of nationality combinations is equally important to the question of professional structure of the projects, and that the organization in this sense has to engage in political evaluations. These evaluations tend in the direction of "avoid contrasts" and although these conclusions are normative, we dare say again that

the above material indicates a hesitant policy of cultural integration.

The importance of the European element in the project program may have many reasons. The organization headquarters is situated in Europe, more specifically in Rome, a factor that may attract more European applications and larger European recruitments than from other regions. If however only professional considerations were of importance, we believe that the American element would be stronger than it is because of the extremely large educational capacity of the US. However, Americans may not be as tempted to apply for work in FAO as for example Europeans. The importance of Europeans may also be related to the dissolution of European colonies. It seems natural to believe that colonial administrators not wanting to return to their home countries would apply to FAO or a similar organization for work they feel they know how to do. In many of the unstructured interviews held in the organization information to this effect was given. Several informants added that those applying often did so because they would have social and employment difficulties if they returned to their home country, and that FAO for this reason was " a haven for unsuccessful and unhappy colonial administrators".

We can study these problems a little further by looking at how the different project managers are graded. Grades in the organization range from Director General (DG) down through Directors (D), Professionals (P) to General Service (GS). The relevant scope within the project program is highest D2 lowest P3. The following table shows some interesting data. We note first that the British have an exceptionally low percent in the D1 and D2 classes and a relatively high percent in the P4 class. The picture is exactly opposite for the French project managers. - The Asians are highly concentrated in the middle group, P5, while the Scandinavians are strong on both sides, D1 and P4.
The distributions may indicate a professional quality-evaluation of the personnel assigned to the projects.

TABLE 21.

GRADING OF DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES
(PROJECT MANAGERS)

Nationality Project Man. ↓	Absolute Nos. GRADE					% horizontally					% vertically				
	D2	D1	P5	P4	TOTAL	D2	D1	P5	P4	TOTAL	D2	D1	P5	P4	TOTAL
Asian[1)]		1	14		15		7	93		100		6	19		13
British		2	22	8	32		6	69	25	100		12	29	35	26
French		4	11	1	16		25	69	6	100		23	14	4	14
Scandinavian		3	4	6	13		23	31	46	100		18	5	26	11
Other West European		4	11	5	20		20	55	25	100		23	14	22	17
U.S. American	1	3	15	3	22	5	14	67	14	100	100	18	19	15	19
TOTALS	1	17	77	23	118			-			100	100	100	100	100

1) excluded Russians, Indians and Chinese (Taiwan).

What professions do the project managers belong to and what is the relative importance of the different professions? Let us look at the distribution over time and make some comments about it. We note in the following table that agriculturalists naturally enough form the largest group, representing overall 50 % of the project managers. Although information is missing, it would be of interest to study from what social strata these experts are recruited because a central idea in administration studies is that their identifications are of importance for what problems they find interesting and for what groups in the environment they define as clients to the organization. [24)]

The next largest group is the engineers. Their ideas about successful projects most likely fall within technical categories (like much irrigation water using little energy, dams that don't break down and technically efficient farm machinery). Their interest in social and cultural problems (how does the introduction of a special kind of farm machinery affect the social relationships in a community etc.) is usually small.

Economists and social scientists (sociologists) occupy about equally many positions as project managers. We believe there are significant differences between micro and macro oriented economists concerning the values and goals they deem important, but unfortunately, the material this student had access to did not differentiate. Economists naturally study problems and council clients using economic measures for what is good, what is a successful project etc. Social scientists on the other hand see the different elements of projects in relation to the effect they might have on interpersonal and cultural factors in the specific environment the project is located. Their criteria of success, of useful goals etc, are much vaguer than the other professional groups here mentioned. They probably function more as a mediator of contact and as an adjustment factor between project and social environment.

Developmental trends in Table 22 are difficult to discern, but we note the increased number of engineers employed by FAO from 1964 to 1966. The employment of social scientists as project managers may be dwindling, but the small numbers in the Table make any such statements very uncertain. The overall conclusion is that the distribution represents a good starting point for efficient team work, especially if it represents a norm for most project employments. (The project managers of course have little interaction between themselves).

TABLE 22.

Recruitment of professionals
(Project Managers)

Absolute numbers

Profession PM	Year of project approval									
	1960	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	Total	%
Economist			3	3	2	6	3		17	11
Engineer	1	1	4	1	7	5	6		25	16
Natural science		2				4			6	4
Social science	2	2	3	1	2	2	1	1	14	9
Agriculture	2	5	9	20	17	15	7	2	77	50
Veterinary	6		1	1	4		3		15	10
Total	11	10	20	26	32	32	20	3	154	100
%	7	6	12	17	21	21	12	4	100	

If we study the relationship between profession of PM and project type (see Annex 6 for tabular presentation), we find indications that economists and engineers most often lead survey projects while natural scientists and sosiologist lead research type projects. One of five training projects are led by social science trained managers, while none of the survey projects are led by this type of managers. Only 3 of 100 pilot projects have social science leaders.

Looking at the total number of experts trained in the social sciences the picture is somewhat different.

TABLE 23.

Experts trained in social science related to type of project

	Research	Survey	Training	Pilot
1. No. of experts	26	31	27	12
2. No. of projects	10	18	7	7
Ratio 1:2	2.6	1.7	3.9	1.7

The weight of this type of expert is again largest in training projects, second largest in research and smallest in Survey and Pilot projects. All types of projects however have some contact with this type of personnel.

As was seen in the nationality analysis of the project managers (page 112) the study of their grades could be used as indicators of the evaluation of the different groups. (Whether the grades also indicate authority distribution is an open question that only can be answered through an empirical study of authority). If we make the same study but this time in relation to the professions, the following table can be constructed.

TABLE 24.

Grading of Professionals
(Project Managers)

Profession Project Manager	Absolute nos.						% horizontally						% vertically					
	D2	D1	P5	P4	P3	Total	D2	D1	P5	P4	P3	Total	D2	D1	P5	P4	P3	Total
Economist		4	11	2		17		24	64	12		100		22	11	6		11
Engineer		2	15	7		24		8	63	29		100		11	15	22		16
Nat. Scientist		0	5	1		6		0	83	17		100		0	5	3		4
Social scientist	1	3	7	2		13	8	23	54	15		100		17	7	6		9
Agriculturalist		7	52	17	1	77		9	68	22	1	100		39	52	53	100	50
Veterinary		2	10	3		15		13	67	20		100		11	10	10		10
	1	18	100	32	1	152			-					100	100	100	100	100

We note the very high percentage of economists and social scientists in the D1 class. The one project manager in the D2 class is within the social science category. We note also that engineers are most heavily skewed toward the lower grade P4 and that the only manager in the P3 class is an agriculture man. However, taking the large size of this group into consideration this is not a significant expression for the organization's evaluation of this group. The size speaks more clearly. (39 % of all the D1's are agriculturalists.)

We have in the preceding paragraphs gained a picture of how the accumulated FAO/UNDP project structure looked around the middle of 1967. We have seen how the Asian region has been withheld from a relative share of project resources, mainly because of China mainland not being a member of the UN system.

The projects have in later years tended towards a more technical character with implementation of relatively concrete undertakings as the main line of work. Study and survey projects have seen a decline. At the same time however, the interest for institutional and social aspects of development projects has increased. Rural institutional problems have come more into focus, and the recruitment of personnel trained in subjects related to the social sciences has increased, at least in relation to number of projects started per year. However, the importance of this group of personnel in the organization as a whole is still minute.

The cultural background of the FAO/UNDP projects, that is the basic ideas about the individual's relation to the collectivity, the structure of the good society, the role of leadership, of education and perhaps also of religion, is basically European and especially British. European experts are on all projects, Europeans are leaders on more than half of the projects and thus control the actions of one of every two experts assigned to projects by FAO. The impact of this European orientation may well be very large, and distinct, especially if it is correct that many of the experts are earlier colonial administrators. In general it seems that a more detailed and sociological study of the recruitment of experts to development projects (and to the FAO administration) would be of interest if we want to understand the political, economic and ideological implications of the

project program.

The projects were as we have seen highly spread. 90 developing nations are involved and each receives a few million dollars in project allocations. Trends in the allotments were difficult to find, but some indications of more money to poorer countries were found, especially in Latin America. However, a central conclusion is that FAO has not deemed it possible or necessary to construct a coherent development policy, concentrating on certain aspects of the development problem with its meager resources. Rather it seems that the idea " a little to all" has served as decision-making criterion.

2. The generation and choice projects.

In the preceding pages we have studied the UNDP/FAO policy as it is expressed in the structure of the operational project program. Type and location of projects indicated how UNDP/FAO evaluated their role in agricultural development and the study of experts and project managers gave a picture of the political problems and tendencies present in the field work of FAO. In other words some of the values that permeate the planning of development projects in FAO were disclosed.

What are the sources of these values? In this section we turn to the organizational processes behind the operational program. Although the project program is the final outcome of a number of "siftings" of diversified information and demands for projects in FAO and UNDP, the program will be used to indicate some characteristics of the planning process in the Organization.

Looking back at Diagram 4 we now move downwards to the central variables or factors "search", "focus of information" and "division of labor", to see how these influence the generation, development and choice of projects that are to become operational. We will largely leave aside the sociopsychological problems of decision-making and take a more macro-approach to problems of authority, communication, coordination and focus of information. This way the hypotheses of Simon, Thompson and Dahl Jacobsen more or less

are taken as postulates about the functioning of an administrative system, with all the chance this represents of going astray in an international organization.

The problem of innovation in organizations is important in discussions about administration. Some believe it is important because of rapid change in the environment, and that organizations only survive when they adapt to these changes.[25] Others believe the problem in addition is related to political preferences and values, innovation and adaptation in organizations being a prerequisite for a democratic society.[26] This student believes that the problem of innovation related to individuals in a decision-making situation is in itself a too limited approach because the "real" problem of innovation is the propagation of new values, an ability that individuals generally do not have, their values being unchangeable over relatively long timeintervals. If we agree in the last position, studies of innovation should be held at the organizational level, and the "new man" or "new group"-theories of innovation become attractive.[27] In the present study of planning or project development in FAO we will discuss the problem when investigating the process of project-initiation.

a) <u>The formal planning process.</u>

The formal procedure for applying and setting up plans of operation for the projects, as expounded by UNDP and FAO[28] is in brief as follows.

1. Requests are submitted by member governments to the Managing Director of the UNDP. In each country only one channel is recognized as the correct applicant.
2. After consideration in New York the project-suggestion is transferred to an appropriate agency for professional scrutiny. An investigation team, financed by UNDP <u>may</u> then go to the country concerned if this is deemed necessary.
3. When the Managing Director evaluates the request as satisfactory, he presents it at a meeting of the Governing Council of the UNDP.
4. If approved, the Governing Council formally appoints an agency (usually a UN agency) to set up a plan of operations.
5. The plan of operations must then be approved by the three parties involved: Government, UNDP, and executing agency.
6. Final approval to commence execution is given by UNDP.

This procedure, more or less conceived of centrally, that is in connection with the political trends in the UN General Assembly around the end of the 1950's, is the basis for the development of FAO's work in the UNDP' sector. The procedure puts the organization's focus keenly on the government personnel in each country and makes the planning and implementation of projects highly dependent upon the willingness and stability of this personnel. Although this is a function of the international climate, a climate that emphasizes the sovereignty of individual governments to a point perhaps detrimental to the actual wishes of a large majority of nations, it might be possible to find channels of communication for international organizations that would add to the general contact with the environment and its needs without obliviating the government and UN view of a one channel communication. This question we will discuss later.

Point two was meaningful a) when the plans for UNDP were being borne out centrally in the UN and b) as long as the program was relatively small. As the case is now, with several hundred multimillion dollar projects being requested each year, it has become a hopeless task to evaluate the projects in New York. Formally, however, the procedure has been upheld although in reality some decentralization to the specialized agencies has taken place as discussed earlier.

We note in general the large number of steps that have to be taken before any operational contact with the environment needing the project actually occurs. The planning and approval stages may take two years and more. The danger of separating planning and implementation both in terms of time and place to a degree that makes meaningful work impossible is obvious.

Basically the procedure described above is built on a kind of totality-concept of rationality and planning. Projects are to be requested by governments in need, approved centrally for more than 100 countries and planned by single, more or less universal international organizations. After looking a little closer at the planning system FAO is tied up in, we will return to a normative or somewhat speculative discussion of this concept of project planning.

b. Sociological study of the planning system.

The planning problem can analytically be divided into three: 1) Finding information 2) processing information and 3) making authoritative decisions. These three steps are related to the planner's or the planning group's knowledge. As Press and Arian do in their book, [29] we can distinguish between four kinds of knowledge:

1) technical skills,
2) perceptions about the legal structure of authority,
3) interpersonal relations within the organization and
4) societal values, norms and ideology.

We will look at the relationship between the planning phases and these four types of knowledge consecutively. The analysis will be on a general level, as interviews in the organization trying to clarify these relationships were stopped.

The search for information is related to how attention-directing stimuli impinge on the person or group searching. [30] Some of these stimuli come from the environment, some from the surrounding organization of people and some from the specific knowledge the planner has (as defined above). The relative importance of these sources is an empirical question, but it is believed that the planner's basic knowledge and orientation is of utmost importance. It probably establishes a general framework in which the other factors can vary. Let us therefore take a brief look at knowledge of type 1) within the organization. If we look at the randomly chosen sample of project supervisors [31] we find the following distribution of professional fields:

TABLE 25

Professional background of project supervisors.

Agricultural training	10
Engineering	5
Economists	4
Natural science	1
Social science	1
	N = 21

We believe this table indicates about the same distribution as the one we found for project managers (TABLE 22), agriculturalists having about 50 % and engineers being the next largest group. Whether there is a causal relationship is difficult to say, but it is of course tempting to state that the background of the planners is cause of the technical knowledge distribution in the manager group.

Knowledge of type 2) was difficult to get at, but from the unstructured interviews some ideas can be set forth. a) the legal structure of authority (position descriptions, hierarchical structure, rules of procedure etc.) is very complex and therefore a hindrance for flexible action. b) the legal structure in the organization has not been adjusted to the new operational activities that FAO has acquired mainly through UNDP. This has created a gap in the organization between rules and activity, a gap that has been perceived as a planning crisis, and has explicitly been raised in the organization as such. In section 4 of this chapter a closer analysis of the crisis will be undertaken.
c) As the organization has grown in size the legal structure has become more and more detailed in an attempt to cope rationally with the problems of interaction the larger size poses.
Result: No one has an overview of the rule-repertoire and coordination breaks down with each new rule that is established. For this reason, and because it probably is pro-innovational, many have suggested loosening the rule system in the organization, loosening and building down the hierarchical structure and thereby letting organizational structure more adapt to knowledge of type 1) and 4). [32)]

Knowledge of type 3) also affects the finding of information relevant to the planning of projects. In a multicultural organization like FAO it is believed that relationships between members of the same nationality will be a dominant structural aspect of communication. Only impressionistic data on this exist from FAO: a) When requesting general information on the functioning of FAO a person of nationality A always sent this student to persons of nationality A higher in the organization.

b) When meeting informally, the contact within nationality groups seemed strong. Organizational problems were often discussed.

When asked if language problems were difficult the answer generally was no. The question of whether it was noticeable or not that different administrative traditions were present in the organization, those asked had difficulties in answering. Members in the personnel unit were most frequent in viewing this as a problem. Otherwise the general impression was that adaptation to a specific FAO-way of working was rapid for most newcomers. However, most of the people interviewed clearly distinguished between good and not so good members seen as administrators, and to what degree above mentioned problems constituted this judgement is not known.

More generally interpersonal relations were influenced by two aspects. 1) A high degree of centralization of decision making power, both within the organization and in relation to regional offices and project personnel in the field. It was generally the opinion of the interviewed that this to a high degree stifled initiative in the system. It was also stated that centralization was combined with a high degree of politicizing at the top levels of the organization both internally and in relation to governments. This was often seen as a factor that introduced irrational, non-professional elements into the planning of projects at lower levels, elements that were detrimental to a strong perception of goal fulfilment at these lower levels of the organization. 2) A second point was the perceived gap between top and middle level administrators in the system. Communication between these levels seemed very small compared to communication within them. This seems to explain some of the lack of operational policies at the middle level of the organization, that is policies that were clear and welldefined subgoals under the general theoretical goals of the organization.

On the more psychological level the personnel in FAO seemed rather discouraged and many were of low morale as to the usefulness of their work, etc. Most of those interviewed touched on these problems. Morale had however been at a low at the point of Sen takeover, [33] and had substantially improved since then.

One person interviewed put it this way, "I don't know any Italians outside FAO, and that doesn't matter. But I do personally know about 200 FAO-member life stories. Not one of them is entirely clean even in a simple non-idealistic sense." Another of those interviewed stated that several of his colleagues were useless. These statements stood in contrast to the optimistic viewpoints forwarded in the most active divisions in the UNDP/FAO sector.

The question is whether these psychological reactions are related to the FAO administrative system. Some of the points mentioned like the centralization, the totality of project plans and the impact of new functions can have an influence, but study of this has not been undertaken. One hypothesis mentioned, that the closer Headquarters personnel are to the concrete field activities, the more optimistic they are about their work, probably would be supported in such a study.

Turning lastly to the role of societal values and identifications in the search for project information, we again miss specific data, and we base our comments mainly on the nationality distribution in the organization.

From 1957 FAO was led by the Indian, earlier ambassador, Dr. B. R. Sen. As we have seen in the historical description, his election followed the fall of two American Directors General. Sen's election had substantial support from the British, many of the underdeveloped countries supporting the American candidate Davis. Today the Director General is the dutchman Mr. Boerma. The European element in FAO is definitely strengthened. His deputy however is the American Oris V. Wells, earlier in the US department of Agriculture. In the election in 1967 many underdeveloped countries supported the election of the African Mr. d'Arboussier (he received 30 votes on the first ballot).

We can generally conclude that at the top level in the organization the European/American culture and value orientation is dominant, and that this orientation seems to permeate the rest of the central administration and the field projects.

The probably most influential group of persons in FAO in the operation of the UNDP/FAO field program is the leaders of the divisions, the division directors. Information is not complete or systematic, but some elements of the picture can be set forth.

Americans are centrally placed in policy coordination units and in The Program and Budget division. We find Americans also near the head of the largest FAO department, the technical department.[34] It was obvious that some of the Americans were close to omnipresent in organizational planning. These examples were selected by this student, and say little about the overall distribution of values and societal norms and ideologies in the organization. But we can conclude that several Americans are centrally placed in FAO. Whether this is a function of American appropriations to FAO (well above 30 % of the total) or a function of other factors is not known.

In the FAO headquarters in Rome there seems to be about 140 project supervisors.[35] Taking the small random sample of 21 of these, we find the following nationality distribution.

TABLE 26

Nationality distribution of project supervisors.

Nationality	Absolute	%
European	14	67
American	3	14
Asian	4	19
African	0	0
Total	N = 21	100

Comparing this table to TABLE 15 we again see a general similarity, with a definite majority of Europeans. Let us look a little closer at the structure of this group and their decision-making influence. From which European countries do the supervisors come, how many projects do they supervise and how many experts are under their control?

TABLE 27.

Project supervisors' control over projects

Nationality	No. of supervisors	No. of Projects		No. of experts	
		Abs.	%	Abs.	%
East European	1	2	5	28	7
UK	5	11	30	134	35
France	2	3	8	34	9
Scandinavia	2	7	19	75	20
Other West Eur.	4	5	14	25	7
EUROPEANS	14	28	76	296	78
US AMERICANS	3	6	16	49	13
ASIANS	4	3	8	35	9
Totals	21	37	100	380	100

We note the preponderance of the British within the European group and the lack of Italian or German supervisors in the sample. The table also strengthens the picture of European dominance in this part of the planning system. With 67 % of the project supervisors the Europeans control 76 % of the projects and through these 78 % of the experts. The strength of the British group is more outspoken, with around 25 % of the supervisors they control, 30 % of the projects and 35 % of the experts. The American supervisors on the other hand have 14 % of the supervisors, 16 % of the projects and 13 % of the experts. However, the role of supervisor is often combined with other planning functions, and the Americans in the sample had high positions in the system besides being supervisors. The weak control in this sense of the Asian group is as outspoken as the strength of the British. One of the Asians must even have been without a project at the time of being registered. We can generally conclude that the British and the European influence in this strata of the planning system is strong, and that the social and economic values and technical viewpoints (with all the implications these have for the society where they are applied), will be preponderant in the structuring of project-information and in the choosing of "good" projects in the FAO-conte

c) General relations to the environment.

An extremely interesting and important question that can not be delved into with the material at hand is how actually the planning system described above, with the cultural value base it has, perceives, communicates and exerts influence on the project environments.

How does the FAO system in other words interact with the environment in constructing and implementing projects? It would be very interesting to relate more precisely what we now know about the system, and in general about its interaction with the environment to a detailed study of the planning and implementation of a select number of UNDP/FAO projects. How do the values present in the project plans compare to environmental and systematic (FAO) values, and what happens to the projects when they are implemented? Do they enhance positive values relative to the project region? and do they - in turn - affect the FAO planning system in any way?

In general we believe that most of the project countries take whatever projects they can get, and that this together with the very limited resources, gives the organizations a very large influence over the composition and location of projects. It is also believed that the feedback of project results to the organization's planning work is minimal. All those interviewed on this question stated that reports from completed projects were hardly ever read, and in any case no systematic discussion or use of the results in the reports were undertaken. In the Budget Division there was general agreement that no one knows the effect of projects, except maybe some of the field personnel, but their influence on planning is minimal.

Most of the planners also felt that the question of goals was unproblematical. Agricultural development was for all of them fairly well defined, and it was technical/scientific factors that decided whether the project should be of this or that type. Those who identified problems in this respect were more generally interested in social development, stating for example that they felt much more thought should be put into the relation between agriculture and other sectors of development.[36)]

In general the FAO-problem of communicating and understanding the environment is extremely more complex than in most national settings. The question is however if this complexity is reduced so severely that important information does not reach the organization. First of all the system is geared to communicating with governments (130 odd in all). Problematical situations for FAO are first and foremost defined by national governments. Politically embarrassing problems will probably not reach the organization, in their full force. On the other hand FAO's access to governmental channels of communication and government controlled resources will often increase FAO's potential for action.

It is probably of importance for the work of FAO what kind of governmental system it meets in the country. Structurally it is believed, as an untested hypothesis, that the existence of a central planning and coordinating unit in the government will reduce the relative influence of FAO over other departments in the government. [37] Whether this results in reluctance on the part of FAO in its relation with the government, or whether it increases the responsitivity of FAO to more general aspects of the countries' own problems is not known and open for study.

FAO tries to communicate with the environment through a host of other institutions. FAO/UNDP experts visit the organization's headquarters, especially before going out to projects. In most countries there are FAO or UNDP offices through which information is gained and communication channeled. FAO-committees at the national level also exist, being the local furnisher of answers to most questions the organization sends to member countries. In Norway it was noted that all questions asked by FAO to The Foreign Ministry that were not of clear political content were sent directly to the FAO-committee. [38] FAO also has relatively large regional offices, but these have been used to a large extent as representative organs, not as real participants in the planning and decision-making work at Headquarters. [39]

d) The initiation of projects.

An important proposition in the present paper is that in the operational field-programs the initiative by and large and quite contrary to official policy, is in the hands of FAO experts. The reasons for this are partly found in the structure of FAO and in the financial mechanisms of UNDP. How did the random sample of project supervisors at Headquarters describe the situation? First, 16 of 21 supervisors answered the question on project initiation. 13 or around 80 % stated that projects are in reality initiated by FAO personnel in Headquarters. Two meant that government institutions were the initiators while the last one felt that the FAO country representatives [40] were most active. On asking if this role of initiation was an expected part of their work, 16 of the 17 that answered stated that it was not formally expected. 11 stated that it was expected now and then and 5 that the role of initiation was not expected at all. So we see a conflict. On the one hand most FAO experts take part in project initiation, on the other it is quite strongly felt that this is not formally a legitimate part of their function.

We do not have data on the attitudes of project governments concerning FAOs role as project initiator. On the one hand however we believe that they are in large need of resources and therefore quite categorically accept project proposals. On the other hand the awakening of national sentiments and the establishment of distinct national political systems contradicts to some degree a general acceptance of the relatively unified FAO approach to development. We can speculate here on the relation between FAO and the many project countries. If the large FAO initiative is widely accepted in project countries it could support the idea that, in the present situation, the project countries accept whatever offer the UN agencies make. A consensus in the project countries about the values and the structure of the UNDP/FAO projects would also indicate that FAO works in harmony with the development interests of the poor countries. This would, as Eisenstadt[41] has suggested, allow FAO initiative and responsibility in the planning and implementing of projects. The opposite situation, however, where there is conflict between the values dominant in FAO and the needs of the developing countries, would make the national governments guard their field of influence, and

the initiative and responsibility of outside authorities would be circumscribed. Thus in a period of value consensus power and initiative would be decentralized in relation to national governments and the power of international organizations would augment if they were deemed efficient working units. In periods of value conflict contraction of power would take place in the most influential political organs, for the time being definitely the national governments.

The last description seems to be the one closest to international reality. [42] We are in a period of contraction of power in the hands of national governments. That large project initiative is in the hands of FAO then seems problematical. How can this be analyzed?

1) The political role of FAO may be perceived as unimportant in many member countries. Letting FAO have initiative then results in some project allocations and little political influence, and the initiative is therefore accepted.

2) The structure of FAO may be such as to fulfil the different demands made by culturally and politically different groups in the environment. The above analysis of the structure of the organization and the project program seems to negate this position. (Small Asian representation, agriculture vs., industry etc.)

3) The planning system and the planners in FAO may be working without contact with the conflicting values and needs in the environment. That very little is known in the organization about the impact or success of projects may indicate that this is the case.

The organizational mechanism that furthers the divisions' interest in initiating projects is that the initiator most often will be given the project for implementation and so receive overhead allocations for administrative services. Since the divisions are built around a specific subject matter, they are eager to "sell" their type of projects in member countries. Thus the organizational structure has influence on the policy of the organization in the environment, and we see that the more the organization mirrors the needs of the environment, the more apt it is to work for projects that fulfil these needs.

In this perspective it is interesting to note how OECD recently has answered the question of why there is so much waste and low priority assistance being performed. [43)]

1) Lack of project capacity on the counterpart (Country) side.
2) Duplication of demands (that are presented to the different organizations) because of lack of coordination.
3) Donors (and organizations?) engage in "salesmanship".
4) Demands are adjusted to what can be given of aid.
5) Lack of overall planning.

Point 1) indicates a lack of policy-adjustment between the body giving assistance and the recipient.
Satisfactory "absorption" of the project is thus made difficult. This can have its cause in the lack of sufficient and meaningful communication but also in the fact pointed out under 3) in the list. The second point may well indicate the lack of coordination between assistance-giving organizations, but just as well the interdisciplinary character of most development projects that are meaningful for the recipient countries. This problem would in other words be alleviated if the existing organizations - at least at the policy level - merged. The detrimental effect of the situation described under point 4) would also benefit from a merger. Then the demands made on the assistance-giving organization would not have to be adjusted to a very specific type of goal and most often a very specific type of approach (FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO and their methods etc.). Other criteria like the project's integration into existing national development plans might become more prominent. Point 5) lack of overall planning might also be approved upon.

e) Evaluations of planning and some suggestions.

The strong organizational motives for the initiation of projects and the existing large possibilities for such initiative probably increase the likelihood that points one to five above will affect the project program negatively. How can this be avoided? With the preceding analysis as base, let us discuss the project planning problem in FAO in somewhat more evaluative terms. A provocative question could be; Is the whole conception of a total and detailed plan of operations, fully approved before any attempts at execution are made, a deadend street for international development work?

It is more and more recognized that implementation of projects depends on acceptance and support in the local community. This again requires the project goals to be integrated into the goal and value structure of the community. Now as the project program becomes larger and especially as the communities involved become more and more diversified, planning at the organizational level becomes an extremely complex undertaking. When the goals of an organization are well defined and stable (as for example in relatively small business units in a stable market situation) planning can be a) led in detail from the top and b) disected into a coherent hierarchy of tasks. When the goals do not have this coherent and clear nature, and when the total organizational undertaking reaches a certain size, this type of planning breaks down. Metaphorically we can say: the distance to the environment becomes too large and changes in the environment become too complex to be registered meaningfully in a unified and centralized system.

To attack the planning problem in this situation theory seems to indicate that focus in the organization must be on the goal-setting process itself. It is the formulation of goals that are meaningful and "implementable" in the environment concerned and that can be handled through a possible adjustment of organizational resources that is the primary task. And this task is political in the sense that it is a question 1) of understanding the needs of the clients (or members of the organization), 2) of formulating projects that meet these needs both in substance and method and 3) of distributing the resources of the organization in a way that does justice to the members and that makes fulfilment of at least some needs possible.

This political function is formally taken care of in UNDP's Governing Council. But to the extent that points 1), 2) and 3) actually are decided upon in FAO the decision-making system in the organization should be adjusted to this political task and not to an administrative task. What does this mean? First of all that policy questions that present themselves within the boundaries of FAO be decided upon in the political organs of FAO (Conference and Council). However, to the degree that these questions are left to the secretariat, it also should be structured politically. That means structuring important decision-making points as councils with both professional and representative criteria as qualifications for membership. Because the making of project policy is seen in this paper as a political process left to the secretariat of FAO to a large degree, such units might be relevant in the planning process. The council-idea as used here implies that members are a) permanent b) elected for example by the FAO Council and c) equal in status constantly.
Especially the central organization leadership should then comply to this political model.

This model of political administration is not relevant if project planning is conceived as that (formal) process described above. What implications might the new model have for planning in FAO? Given the professional/political structure of the decision-making system one idea is to let projects be started as soon as the organization leadership has found a request a) professionally and politically reasonable and b) within reasonable limits of the organizations total resources. (These decisions would probably have to be made regionally if they were at all to be made, and not on a global basis as the case is today.)(See also page 34.)

FAO would in these terms start operations on a small scale in the community concerned at a very early stage of project conception, with large chance of having to terminate it. These project-starts or <u>project-embryoes</u> as we might call them, could then be allowed to grow or die depending on their social, political and developmental relevance. A prerequisite for this system would be that the embryonic project team had close contact and access to information a) in the locality b) in the country government and c) in the international organizations concerned. The project's existence and fulfilment would then be dependent upon the

project-team's ability to plan, implement and expand the project as needs and requirements were identified. All the project embryoes would have to compete for resources from the (regional?) organization or organizations working with the subject matter concerned.

Planning at the central level would then become a task of deciding upon main trends of possible development strategies within each region and testing these strategies by planting project-embryoes. The organization would be further required to answer questions and give relevant information to the embryo-teams. Thirdly they would be required to make continual decisions on the distribution of the organization's resources between the different projects as they developed. Lastly a central task would be to work incessantly for as open and as wide channels of communication between project/environment/local and country government and international organizations in general.

Essential for this approach would be relatively long-term assignments of experts and personnel so that projects easily could be stopped and experts transferred to new embryonic undertakings. In this way identifications with specific projects would not be of importance before an embryo had shown that it had ability to "live". As it is now projects are old and established long before any concrete work in the field has been done.

In general this planning model would seem to imply the institutionalization of flexibility and a focus on the regional or even local setting and situation as a basis for project construction and planning. The interaction of planning and implementation would become closely related and organizational decision-making would be a continuous evaluation of development strategies and technical agricultural information. The whole system of FAO could be rebuilt, concentrating on the distribution and use of resources in general at the central level and moving all detailed and more technical aspects of planning to the localities where project-embryoes are planted. Lots of red tape would have to be eliminated and a larger degree of chance and risk would have to be introduced and accepted.

This idea of an "organic" development of projects within a dynamic, regionally oriented development policy and without any clear and formal stages of planning, approval and implementation, may be a viable line of work for international organizations.

FAO's centralized and total approach to agricultural development seems to be increasingly difficult as the scope and complexity of UNDP/FAO activities augments. The "organic" and decentralized approach would not be a return to laissez faire conditions. But it would require another type of planning. On the one hand it would require the development of projects and project plans in the field. On the other it would necessitate continual evaluation and approval of complex requests. The need for operational development policies at the regional level would become overriding and FAO would probably have to be basically restructured to meet the needs of culture-relative and decentralized planning.

3. The effect of UNDP functions on other FAO activities.

FAO, like most of the UN agencies, is divided in its work between so called Regular Program activities and Special Fund activities, each function having its own financial sources and often its "own" personnel in the organization. How does this affect the organization? Are the two distinct activities complementary to each other or do they compete with each other for organization resources? As we have seen in the preceding chapter, FAO has had an implicit policy of integrating the two, obviously hoping that they basically are complementary. The idea has been that Regular Program activity supports the UNDP/FAO project program with vital technical/scientific information and overall policy.

If we compare TABLE 7 page 73 with TABLE 9 page 85 we find some interesting indications of the relationship between regular and special activities in the organization. Looking first at Animal Production and Health projects we note from TABLE 9 that from 1959 to 1967 this type of projects has augmented in that division from 0 to 14 %. Remembering that those units in FAO who prepare projects also usually "receive" them for execution, this increase can be interpreted to indicate an expansionist activity on the part of the personnel in this division.

Comparing this to information in TABLE 7 we note that the Division's estimates for Regular Program activities were increased from the biennium 62/63 to 64/65, and that they showed a diminishing tendency thereafter. This can be interpreted in several ways.

1) The division's main interest is Special Fund activities and this reduces interest in Regular Program. However, from TABLE 7 we note that both in 1961 and 1963 The Conference reduced the budget requests made by the division for Regular Program activities. This indicates a will to expand also there.

2) Since the period before 1963 shows expansion on both programs and after 1963 expansion in Special Fund and decline in Regular Program, the indications in the two tables are purely accidental.

3) When Special Fund reaches a certain size in a division, then interest in Regular Program diminishes. We note in TABLE 7 that in the 1965 Conference, contrary to earlier practice, the approvals

were larger than the estimates for Regular Program activity.

Turning to the Fishery division (from 1965 a Department) we find support for interpretation 2) above. No specific policy can be traced in the tables.

Forestry and forest products division has seen a little increase in the number of projects approved each year and has about 1/5 of the total number of UNDP projects. Here the estimates made for Regular Program activity have been reduced (relatively) and the Conference has from 1963 onwards found it necessary to add on to its Regular Program functions. Here we find a weak confirmation of the hypothesis that increases in UNDP functions decreases activities within Regular Program.

Rural Institutions division which is specifically concerned with agricultural extension services has been expansive in the field of Regular Program activities (TABLE 7), At the same time it has been on a kind of status quo policy in relation to the acquisition of Special Fund projects. Thus the inverse hypothesis receives support in this division. Support, in other words, is given to the idea that although the policy of FAO has been to integrate regular and special activities in the existing divisions, the two all the same are in competition with each other for the time and interest of the secretariat personnel. As a corollary to this we note the need the earlier Director General, Mr. Sen, found to establish units outside and in addition to the existing FAO system to implement most of his special projects. The general conclusion may be that one organization will always have difficulties working for two masters (in this case UNDP on the one hand, member governments on the other).

The same conclusions are supported when we study the remaining divisions. In Land and Water, the absolute largest UNDP/FAO division, we generally note that as UNDP allocations relatively went down, estimates for Regular Program went up, and from 1965, the opposite process set in. Nutrition and Plant Production divisions show only slight confirmation, but the tendency is clearly present. Economic analysis division was also quite neutral up

to 1965. In that year the division got a boost from Conference for Regular Program functions, and although earlier that year 4 new Special Fund projects had been allocated to the division, 3 were approved in 1966 and none in 1967.

Thus, using the above material, there seems to be a competition between two types of activity within the same organizational unit once the activities distinctly have different financial implications and different financial sources. However, certain qualifications seem pertinent.

1. Since the overall UNDP/FAO program has been greatly expanded since 1959, it may not be any expression for explicit political action within a division that the Special Fund component increases. However, this qualification does not affect the relationship between increase in SF/decrease in Regular Program.
2. Also the status quo situation in the UNDP sector may be the result of outside forces, the policy of FAO leadership or UNDP policy in relation to a special type of project. However, variations in division estimates on Regular Program allocations most likely are a function of division policy, and thus indicate explicit decisions on their part.

So even if several external factors may enter into each of the variables "UNDP allocations" and "Regular Program allocations", these qualifications do not erase the possibility of the conclusion made, that the two programs compete for limited organization resources.

4. Conflicting views on organizational planning.

The growth of UNDP operational activities in FAO has created a large problem of planning and coordination in the organization. A Review Team has studied the problems and submitted a report with recommendations for change. The earlier Director General also submitted a report [44] disagreeing on central points with the Review Team. Then a FAO Conference was held, a new Director General elected and a new report [45] was written.

What conceptions of planning do these reports represent and how are the viewpoints related to the material presented in the preceding paragraphs?

1. The Review Team Report.

a) The goals of FAO. All discussion of planning is related to or implies an evaluation of goals. The most technical undertaking has social consequences, and an evaluation of these consequences seem imperative if planning of development projects is the task at hand. If these propositions are valid, it is interesting to note the Review Team's evaluation of FAO objectives. [46]

FAO should

a) increase production, improve the scientific and technical standards, and work to avoid waste.

b) identify areas lagging on technical fronts and improve standards of living in these areas.

c) train indigenous personnel in needed skills and for roles of leadership, in cooperation with governments concerned.

The problems of social development, and the definition of this concept in relation to cultural variations between the regions is not explicitly mentioned. Technical development of agriculture seems to be perceived as socially unproblematical except for the training and motivating aspect of local personnel.

b) Implementing the goals. The most important recommendation of the Review Team is to strengthen the country approach to implementation and planning, and weaken the regional approach.

FAO's country representative should be substantially strengthened in his functions. The idea of embryo planning [47] and this suggestion are in line. However, if the regional approach in the field was to be reduced, this approach was to be strengthened in Headquarters by erecting departments for each major region. This meant a centralization and a polarization headquarters/country representatives. That the result would be a serious increase of headquarters control if the concept of total project planning is upheld does not seem to have been drawn in doubt. This would in turn increase the cultural impact of the value structures present in headquarters.

Concerning headquarters organization the interest in regional planning and operation is again emphasized. However, the major recommendation is to draw a clear line of demarcation between operational and technical/advisory work. The suggestion is to divide the whole organization in two parts: 1. Country and regional programs and operations, and 2. Technical Services. [48] If the preceding analysis of the relationship between the two programs (Special and Regular) has a true empirical base, and if the conclusion of competition is evaluated in terms detrimental to effective goal fulfilment, the suggestion of the Review Team would seem to alleviate the effects of competition.. The Team suggests "daily working relations" between the two parts of the organization at all levels in the system. This of course is the large and problematical suggestion in the report.

c) Contact with the environment. The Review Team idea is that this contact should be channeled through the regional departments, in the operational part of the organization. This implies the belief that the accumulation of technical knowledge in the organization can satisfactorily proceed in the technical/scientific part of FAO, without direct contact with country projects. This is another large question-able assumption in the report and if social contexts take part in <u>constituting</u> relevant "technical" knowledge in the field of agriculture, the Review Team's conception of planning does not incorporate the consequences of this.

It is obviously difficult to integrate relevant considerations on what agricultural planning is in the framework of a universal international organization. Recent research [49] seems to support 1) the idea that a system of public administration should be a mirror of the social environment it is to work in, no matter how technical the objectives are perceived to be, if the fulfilment of client needs is a primary goal and 2) the idea that the administrative system has to have ability to change itself if it is to implement change in the environment. This would require less complexity in the formal relations between organizational personnel and expert teams. Authority in work relations would probably have to be more a function of knowledge relevant to the policy problem at hand than as now a function of formal position. The need for a really efficient and versatile communication system internally and to the project environments would have to be met. The old bureaucratic model of organization based on hierarchical and stable structures of authority would have to be replaced by expert teams structured in relation to problems at hand and restructured as problems change. These more or less utopian images of FAO as a planning and policy making system working as a coordinator of international development action in a national political and social setting would require a whole new concept a) of being an organization member and b) of being an international expert. Probably for this reason the images for the time being are utterly utopian.

2. The Director General, Mr. Sen's viewpoints.

The discussion of FAO goals is left out by the Director General as his position on these is fairly well known. See Chapter Four in this report). But he is in disagreement with the Review Team on central points.

a) FAO cannot be compared to a business organization, and the main reason for this is that operations and expertise are more closely related than in other organizational contexts. Operations are, stated briefly, the dissemination of technical expertise to local personnel. Here the view that technical knowledge is at least to some degree a function of the social context is prevalent. The problem inherent in this position is how to relate it to the existence of a centrally placed universal organization.

b) Because expertise and operations are so closely linked, Mr. Sen, continues, it is not realistic to divide the organization between operations and information. Instead he wants to strengthen the planning and coordinating units directly under the Director General.
c) Neither can the Director General support the idea of moving the regional offices into headquarters. These are necessary units in the field.They coordinate FAO policy and FAO-activity in the region concerned.
Instead he suggests a regional division of some of the units already in headquarters. In general Mr. Sen's concept of FAO is the centralized organization with all important policy making decisions coming from the top and permeating the organization from the top down.

3. The new man, Mr. Boerma.

To tackle these central problems in the coming years the FAO Conference in 1967 elected Mr. Boerma as new Director General. Several months after election not much was heard of his policy intentions.[50] Then in September 1968 there was a joint report from the Director General and an Ad Hoc Committee on Organization. presented to the FAO Council. In general the report presents a view of planning in between the two preceding positions. Operations and information could not totally be separated, but strong operation units could be erected within the most important UNDP/ FAO departments. Also a new department should be created to have "... the decisive role in the formulation of programs and projects.[51] This function should however be coordinated with that of the Economic and Social Department. Three technical departments, Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery should then execute the projects, through their operations units which exist mostly within the divisions (as before). Support of administrative character should be given through another department, the Administration and Finance Department. On top of all this a policy and strategy unit should be erected in direct contact with the Director General's office. The viewpoint here seems to be strongly influenced by norms of efficient business management, where limited decentralization is undertaken under the umbrella of generally well defined operational goals for the whole organization (profit or utility maximization,

increasing production output etc.) As Mr. Sen indicated and has been brought out in Chapter Four of this paper the intermediate operational goals in FAO do not exist in an unproblematical and static form, especially as the overall goals do not seem to allow meaningful operationalizations directly, and as intermediate goals in FAO are closely related to complex multidimensional social change in the project environment. Thus the problem in FAO would seem more to be a question of coordinating demands from below ("grass roots" both in the environment and in the organization) than effecting a general policy in one way or another from above. And this coordinating problem is probably more a question of politics and values than it is of efficient management. Thus structuring FAO would ultimately become a question of building a democratic political system, not an efficient business enterprise.

NOTES

1. The 315 projects are listed in FAO/UNDP Catalogue No. 2, 31 Jan. 1968.

2. See Onarheim-innstillingen page 23.

3. The 1963 McDougall Memorial Lecture, Document C63/LIM/5. 18. Nov. 1963.

4. F. A. Praeger, New York (stencil at the Institute of Political Science, Oslo).

5. Ideology and Social Organization in Rapidly Developing Societies CAG paper Bloomington 1966.

6. See FAO document C67/3 (Program of Work and Budget 1968/69) page iv point 8b.

7. L. Alldén, L. Berntson and G. Persson, Imperialisme og U-hjel- Pax Forlag 1968, page 136-145.

8. Annual Report, (SF/L28, 13 April 1960, page 4 point 3.)

9. Resolution 1240 (XIII), 14 October 1958.

10. Annual Report, op. cit., page 4 point 5.

11. FAO document C/67/26 7. Sept. 1967.

12. See President Nyerere's speech, FAO document C 63/LIM/5, 18. Nov. 1963 page 16 and 17.

13. FAO document C67/26 page 7.

14. For a dramatic exposition of the political and social aspects of a "technical" development project, see Philip Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, Harper Torchbooks, 1966.

15. General Assembly Resolution, op. cit.

16. "SF, if it is to concentrate on relatively large projects, may be unable to ensure a wide geographical distribution in any particular year." Managing Dir. Paul Hoffman UNSF, an Explanatory Paper, UN New York, 1959, page 2.

17. See UNDP document SF/L.28, 13 April 1960, page 11.

18. For a discussion of this question see Morawiecki, W. in International Organization, op. cit.

19. See Introductory address by Mr. A. H. Boerma, UNESCO intergov. Conference of Experts on rational use of the biosphere, Paris, 4. Sept. 1968, FAO document WS/78503, page 2.

20. A book on Latin America that has been consulted is Latin American Politics in Perspective, by Martin C. Needler, Van Nostrand 1963.

21. For the formula used see This paper page 42.

22. For the diagrams see Annex 4.

23. Letter sent from the Programme Formulation and Budget Division of FAO 23. December 1968.

24. See for example H. A. Simon, The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administration, in Contemporary Political Science, (ed) Sola Pool, McGraw Hill 1967, page 86.

25. f. ex. March and Simon op. cit., Chapt. VII.

26. See for example W. Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe 1959, pages 74-102.

27. See the discussion of L. E. Greiners work in V. Vroom (ed.) Methods of Organizational Research, Pittsburgh 1967, pages 68-70.

28. See f.ex. FAO document C59/37 14. Sept. 1959.

29. Press, C, and A. Arian (eds.) Empathy and Ideology, Aspects of Administrative Innovation. Rand Mc Nally 1966, page 3.

30. March and Simon, op. cit., page 154, fig. 61.

31. Those administrators at HQ who have responsibility for the individual projects are called project supervisors.

32. For example V. A. Thompson "Bureaucracy and Innovation", Administrative Science Quarterly, June 1965, page 1.

33. J. Jones, The United Nations at Work, Pergamon Press 1965, page 126.

34. See diagram 9.

35. Listed from UNDP(SF)/FAO project catalogue No. 21, 21 August 1967.

36. For a general discussion of this problem of integration, see UNRISD, Research Notes, Geneva, June 1968, (on the question of social planning).

37. Set forth in an interview with the head of Organization and Methods Section (AM).

38. This committee is united with "Statens Ernæringsråd" in Norway.

39. See page 23 in Review Team Report, FAO document CL 49/16, 1967.

40. FAO often has permanent representatives in the most important project countries working independently or in close contact with the UNDP representative if such is established

41. S. N. Eisenstadt, "Bureaucracy and Bureaucratization" Current Sociology (7) 1958.

42. This position is expounded in J. W. Burton's book International Relations op. cit.

43. Technical Assistance and Needs of Developing Countries. OECD, Paris 1968, page 9 point 5.

44. CL 49/16, 1967, part I review team, Part II D.G.

45. CL 51/9, 1968.

46. CL 49/16, page 15 point 29.

47. Discussed on pages 132-135.

48. See Chart 6 CL 49/16 page 35.

49. F.ex. Dahl Jacobsen and V. G. Thompson op. cit.

50. From "The Rome Daily American" Boerma - FAO must improve. Milno Adrian, page 1 (March 15, 1968).

51. CL 51/9 page 8 point 16c.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

We have approached the problem of international planning by acquainting ourselves with one of the central organizations working in the "non-political" field of economic and social development. As stated in the first chapter we set out to describe the value-structure of the organization and its main operational program, that is how the technical, economic and "ideological" resources of the organization were distributed internally and externally. We focused special interest on the question of nationality distribution, and used this variable as an indicator of the ideological impact of the organization.

This description is seen as a necessary first step towards understanding the planning process, or as described in the first chapter, the formal and informal decision-making process that preceeds the approved plans of operations for UNDP/FAO projects. We tried in the first chapter to analyze the different theoretical approaches to the problem of planning (or unprogrammed decision-making as March and Simon have called it). We found that the conflict of interests and values between interacting and relatively stable groups, or in other words the political process within the organization, would be the most fruitful perspective to adopt. The problem then was to identify the values present in the organization and the development values pursued in the project program and to study the processes internally and externally to the organization to discover how these values come into being. We started inside the organization, and as the study proceeded we understood that to discover and describe the values in the system and in its program was task enough in a preliminary stage. The preceding chapters therefore concentrate on this description, well knowing that a complete picture would require knowledge of the environment, the social and economic surroundings FAO works in, the demands and support present in different client groups and their ability to present these demands to the organization. First then could we see how the values and programs FAO works for are a result or not of pressures and needs in the environment.

But we postulated that political trends and working mechanisms inside the organization also had influence on policy-making or planning and we turned to a more or less total study of the organization to be able to understand this process. What did we find?

1) The definition of the organization goals was closely related to the interests and values of the politically most powerful, groups in the organization. Historically FAO has, in its work effort, represented the development ideals of those nations that won the Second World War. The reconstruction of Europe and in this perspective the disposal of agricultural surpluses and the control of agricultural trade were the main policy questions. The role of FAO even in this field was severely limited, the powerful nations fearing that international action would hamper the attainment of their own goals of economic development.

2) Changes in FAO policy in direction of universal economic development and special concern for the many poor countries in the world, did not occur before this change of perspective gradually took hold in the West-European/American nations. FAO, although formally a sovereign body, seemed to be severely subordinated the political development in the United Nations General Assembly. First when this organ, through open political conflicts, established programs for economic development of the third world did FAO start to expand activities in thi- field.

3) As a corollary to the political influence of the developed nations and the contents this influence had, the structure of FAO, as described in Chapter Three, was a replica of the Weberian efficient, hierarchical western organization. Formally FAO was comparable to a parliamentary system of public administration, a supreme assembly electing a prime minister who in turn appoints the members of his cabinet. Those people satisfied in this system were exactly those acquainted with it, Europeans and Americans. Asians interviewed by this student were reluctant and sceptical towards the organization and did not want to discuss its problems. They were also (for this reason?) a minority in the planning system. [1)]

4) Policy-making at the top level of the organization also showed a close relation to the political and agricultural perceptions of the groups the organization leaders identified with. While Mr. Sen saw FAO's primary goal as that of informing and engaging the world in action against a hunger catastrophe, the new man, Mr. Boerma, defined the primary goal as efficient use of new technical and administrative techniques that in a relatively unproblematical way favor development. Optimistically he felt that through efficiency and technical innovation the goal of development could be attained. There is not a question of right and/or wrong here. The point is that values are a group phenomenon, and that in a planning system individuals will nearly automatically identify with and work for their basic values and viewpoints in the system. Thus, to clarify group structures and their value orientations is a requisite for the study of planning in an administrative system. In international administration, where the value spectrum probably is large, this approach becomes all the more pertinent.

5) The policy-making analysis showed the difficulty FAO faced in trying to make general policy operational at an intermediary level. There seemed to exist a gap between the general policy and the plans for action at the divisional and branch levels. While the Boerma-approach may be able to fill the gap, this immediately raises a new problem at the top level. Filling the gap with coordinated policy assumes a coherent top policy. But is this realistic at the present stage of economic and social development in the world? It seems that FAO as a planning system is in a dilemma. Either it - as Sen advocated - concentrates on the general problem of development in socially and economically different regions, with the problem of integration of overall policy as the main concern, and thus atomizes the organization at lower levels, or else it - with Boerma - concentrates on unifying the organization but then takes as given agreement on overall policy of development. If the dilemma is real, the question of splitting FAO and locating the parts in the regions seemed relevant. This could be seen as an adaptation of organization structure to the central planning problem, that of meeting the demands of social groups on their <u>own</u> premises.

6) The project program corresponded well to the dominant values present in the organizational system, the European/American approach to development, focused on engineering and technical training as main elements in the achievement of economic progress. The dominance of European experts was brought out and the integrative effects (mixing of nationalities) of the project program was studied in some detail. The conclusion was that FAO follows a hesitant policy of integration.

7) Different organizational relationships influencing the planning of the UNDP/FAO projects were looked into, and we found processes supporting the Parkinsonian notion of empirebuilding within the divisions. We found much initiative in the hands of FAO personnel and we analyzed the possible causes and consequences of this. We found most support for the idea that the strong initiative indicated a kind of cultural isolation of the organization, communications with the environment being extremely difficult, and feedback from completed projects on planning of new ones almost non-existent.

An organization working with two distinct programs seems, if our analysis is relevant, to experience the two in a kind of competition with each other for the limited resources of personnel and finances. Although personnel partly are assigned specifically to one or the other program, at the divisional level the dilemma of where to concentrate work and interest seems to exist. What consequences can this have for planning? If policy in the organization is based on a close integration of the two programs (as was the case for the planning of development projects and the more technical scientific work of FAO) the analysis indicates that this integration is difficult to maintain. At the divisional level it can be expected that the central working groups will either concentrate on gathering and developing information on the one program or on the other, thus becoming specialists in one, not both. In our case this would imply either specialist knowledge on the technical/scientific aspects of agricultural development or specialist knowledge on project operations. Thus in general one might expect an administrative group to excel in <u>one</u> field not several. This of course, accentuates the problem of how to approach integrated planning in an administrative system. In general it seems that efficient inter-

group communication is more important than mixture of personnel, if the above results at all allow generalization.

8) The size of FAO had grown rapidly in the years after 1959 and this seemed to have specific effects on planning. First of all the process of completing a plan of operations so that a project could be started in the field gradually took more time. Secondly, as size augmented the problems of coordination mounted. This resulted in a continual strengthening of central coordinating units, mainly because these units became the points in the planning system with most information of a procedural kind. Increased size of an organization probably augments the power of units and personnel with knowledge about the administrative system as such. Thirdly increased size made interdivisional cooperation increasingly difficult, mainly because each division became more differentiated and therefore more self-sufficient, but also because of the Parkinsonian effect the system of project allocations has on each division. Fourthly increased size seemed to increase the administrative workload on professional officers in general, whether they perceived of themselves as mainly agricultural experts or administrators. The first group generally complained of the difficulty it therefore was to keep up in the professional field of knowledge. However, at the same time, only a small percent of those interviewed in the divisions favored a separating of administrative and technical functions in a way that would remove the administrative chores from so called technical divisions. This point can probably be related to the preceding one. Influence in the system was more and more dependent on administrative functions and administrative overview. A last factor that seemed to be a function of increased size was the difficulty of perceiving administrative work as meaningful. As size grew more and more personnel in the organization never had close contact with field operations. Together with the fact that no one seemed to be able to pinpoint objectively real advantages of UNDP/FAO field projects for the project countries, this had a negative effect on the working morale in the organization. It was for many surprising that the function of evaluating completed projects had not become an institutionalized function in the organization. The diffusion of project success-criteria in the system was non-existent, even though certain units had the formal function of "project-evaluation".

These points sum up the direct results of the study. Two questions remain. 1) What light does the study shed on FAO as a whole and its future development and 2) What perspectives does it offer for continued studies of the planning problem?

1) On the one hand FAO seemed to be severely circumscribed by the interests of the different governments that are members of the organization, and by the conflicts between these governments. The limiting effect of national sovereignty on FAO action and initiative was extremely strong, although at times it was felt that the perceptions of the limitation was a rationalization of inaction. On the other hand several factors seemed to be working towards the development of autonomous international influence. Through the financial contributions made to the organization the substantive role increased, and with it the right and the need to decide on the allocations of resources to different interest groups and countries in the environment, a process that in itself implies power. The organization also made choices on questions of project subject-matter and methods, thus directly exerting influence of some kind on the local environment where the project was implemented. Organizational trends also work to strengthen the influence of FAO as an international organization. The supreme body of the organization, The Conference, meets only once every two years, thus making the government influence through this channel almost illusory. The Council meets more often, but here only a fraction of the member governments are represented, and membership rotates. National influence is probably strongest implicitly through the identifications and values of the personnel in the secretariat. But here the idea of the international civil servant, only serving the interests of some kind of international society is strong, thus isolating to a certain degree the professional personnel in the secretariat from outside pressure. This idea also strengthens the influence of the organization.

The contact and working relationship with UNDP also tended to transfer influence to the international organizations. This has been discussed earlier. In general it seems possible to conclude that FAO, and other UN organizations, through the politically "quiet" processes that are augmenting available resources, and through the functions they are fulfilling, are slowly developing a supranational system of international action in the field

of economic and social development.

FAO as a whole is of course much more complex than it has been possible to bring out in the preceding paragraphs. We have tried to focus on the processes of planning and policy-making and the results of these in terms of cultural and developmental values. The general conclusion all the same is that complexity rather than consistency is the character of the organization. It has not yet found a well defined role, and although this may be advantageous for innovation and the ability to adapt to changing situations, it probably hampers the efficient attainment of goals that are set, even if these mostly are constructed at the lowest level in the organization. The dilemma present here, between efficiency and socially relevant adaptation, seems to be of utmost importance in the planning of FAO functions.

Whether FAO represents a viable idea in the long run of how to assist countries towards agricultural, economic and social betterment can not be decided upon today. There seems to be progress, but fatal problems may be inherent in the system. FAO is an extension of national thinking, which is built on the idea that authority can lead and regulate the development of the whole society. The creation of FAO undoubtedly was meant as a step toward world government. But if cultural homogeneity is a requirement for the continued existence of a government, (something the present divisional tendencies in many national societies seems to indicate), then the future for FAO and the other international, universal organizations seems dim.
Nationalism rather than universalism is the trend of our time. The more speculative discussions of FAO's structure and planning methods have more or less been guided by this basic postulate.

2) As a study of planning this paper must be seen as an exploration into the international field using approaches mainly developed in the national setting. Data was hard to get at, and the approach itself may have been too limited already at the start. However, with the movement of planning theory away from the purely social-psychological approach, discussed to begin with, towards a more sociological and political science approach, the present clarification of FAO as a system for policy-making and of the main structural values present in one of the main organizational

programs, may be a fruitful starting point for further studies. Planning has by Dahl Jacobsen [2] been described as the coordination of public policy. What we are interested in are the conditions for the functioning of an administrative system, and the consequences of this system's actions in the environment. We have in this paper concentrated attention on the first relationship, the conditions for the functioning of the administrative system. We have also looked closely at the output of the organization. What we have not done is study the consequences in the environment. This, together with the demands the environment makes on the organization, would be a natural continuation of the present study.

Within the approach used, we have touched on the role of different professional groups in the FAO-system. This study can naturally be brought much further. The problem in the international setting, in addition to the question of the relationship between professional orientation and social change and development, is how an international administrative system influences the professional function and vice versa. Here it seems possible to undertake interesting comparisons between international and national administrative systems. For example, are the conditions for innovation in the two settings radically different? Does for example the isolation [3] of international organizations result in other professional roles than those that develop in national system intimately integrated in the larger social environment?

A central problem of planning has for years been the scope of a planning enterprise. In times of national crisis this scope has usually been widened, in periods of political detraction the opposite usually has taken place. This is probably related to the changing clarity of public goals. In times of crisis the goals of a society become more unified and coherent. This makes more comprehensive central planning possible. It is interesting to note that the widening scope of planning in FAO (represented by the Indicative World Plan for example) was a corollary to an increasingly clear crisis definition on the part of the organization leadership. What will happen when and if this definition of crisis subsides?

The FAO environment is as differentiated as one can imagine, and the differentiation, as noted, is not subsiding if developments within national societies is taken as an indicator. If in addition change and development is a characteristic of this environment, then the consequences for FAO planning follow directly. Planning change and development can probably most fruitfully be seen as a continual process where efficient and open communication with relevant parts of the environment is the essential resource for success. If integration is taken as a normative concept for what kind of development is "best", then the problem of constructing planning teams becomes essential, and the problem of inter-profession cooperation within and between groups a central research question.

Another constraint on planning is the set of tools of measurement so far developed for planners. They are generally to be found in the fields of rigorous system analysis, engineering and economics. A central problem for future research is to develop useful concepts and other tools for measurement of social phenomena, so that these can become an integrated part of the planning process. [4)]

We conclude this study with the feeling that FAO represents an interesting potential for the development of international initiatives and international cooperation, and that the organization has developed a system capable, however inefficiently, of producing plans. But this optimistic note turns to scepticism when our attention is turned to the role of FAO in the environment. What consequences do the plans and the projects have in the developing countries and how are the consequences - if they exist - related to the administrative system described above? That future study will reduce our scepticism, and that FAO will participate in radically improving the lot of hungry and therefore suppressed people, is our real hope.

NOTES.

1. This rather drastic conclusion is based on the sample of supervisors and observation of nationalities of others interviewed in FAO Headquarters. A more complete personnel analysis would be needed to establish it more firmly.

2. This is taken from a recent seminar with the Professor at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo.

3. Isolation in terms of a) distance to the environment (problems of communication and understanding) and b) complexity of the environment (problems of policy-making, that "fit" the needs of clients.)

4. See an interesting discussion of this problem in Social Indicators, R. A. Bauer (ed) MIT Press 1966.

ANNEX 1

QUESTIONNAIRE

Rome, March 1968

This study is interested in the planning of Special Fund projects, especially the work being done from the project idea is initiated until final signature of Plan of Operations. The study concentrates on the opinions and activities of the individual FAO-professional, but it is the overall picture of FAO's function in the planning process which is the goal of the study.

The first set of questions below, that it is kindly asked of you to answer, concerns the birth of project ideas.

1. Have you yourself, in the last couple of years, had any new project ideas, either for whole new projects or for parts of projects in their planning phase? Please circle the appropriate numbers

	very many	many	some	only a few	none
a) for new projects	4	3	2	1	0
b) for parts	4	3	2	1	0

2. Is it expected of you that you in or outside of FAO suggest new projectideas?

definitely expected	expected	expected now and then	not expected
3	2	1	0

3. If you have had new ideas, have any of these "materialized" in signed Plans of Operations?

very many	many	some	only a few	none	no opinion
4	3	2	1	0	X

4. Viewing the total of projects and project-ideas pending in FAO, where do they, in your opinion, originate? Give each of the following groups the percentage that approx. corresponds to its "project-idea-fertility" compared to the others. If you have non opinion, circle the X to the right

	____	A UNDP Resident Representatives
	____	B FAO Headquarters officials
No opinion	____	C National agricultural institutions
X	____	D FAO country representatives
	____	E UNDP personnel, New York
sum	100%	

Do you have any comments to your answer on question number 4? Are there for example other important sources of project ideas, and could you specify one or more of the groups above more closely? For example, which national institutions or organizations are most active in suggesting project ideas? (Please use more paper space if necessary)

5. Which of the FAO-professional officers you know would you off hand say is most active in discussing and suggesting new project ideas?

_____

The following questions concern your opinion about the importance of different kinds of projects.

6. If you were asked to decide upon the relative importance of the following five types of projects for best achieving FAO's goals in the future, what part of the total available resources (100%) would you allocate to each type?

			No opinion
_____	F	Surveys and feasibility studies	
_____	G	Training-institutions	
_____	H	Demonstration projects	
_____	I	Applied research institutes	
_____	J	Technical pilot projects	
sum 100 %			X

7. If we say total control of SF/FAO project policy is 100 %, what part of this control approx. rests with the developed and underdeveloped countries respectively?

Control:	%
developed countries	_____
underdeveloped "	_____
sum	100 %

8. What do you feel should be the relative importance of the following five subject matter fields for best achieving FAO's goals? Again please distribute approximately 100% (of resources) between the five possibilities.

_____	K	Food and animal development
_____	L	Land and Water
_____	M	Agricultural planning and education
_____	N	Forestry development
_____	O	Fisheries
Sum 100 %		

9. Taking todays level of total project resources as given, would you favor a policy of changing the average size of the projects?

I would favor an average that is:

much larger	larger	like todays	smaller	much smaller	no opinion
2	1	0	-1	-2	X

10. What would in your opinion be the most effective distribution of the total project resources between the following areas of the world?

%			
_____	P	Asia	
_____	Q	Africa	
_____	R	The Americas	No
_____	S	Europe	opinion
_____	T	The Middle East	X
Sum 100 %			

Would this also be the most fair distribution of resources? If not, please indicate this distribution in % to the right of the above list.

11. Should interregional projects in your opinion take more or less of the project resources in the future?

much more	more	no change	less	much less	No opinion
2	1	0	-1	-2	X

The study now turns to some questions about the planning process within FAO.

12. What is in your opinion the main purpose of the project supervisor?

13. What is generally speaking the main problem in the work you do related to project planning?

14. Which person or group of persons within and outside your division would you say has most influence on the setting up of project plans? (Put an X on the line if no opinion).

Influence on the setting up of plans:

within my division _____

outside " " (but within FAO) _____

15. How much of your time in FAO is used on the work related to project plans? Using last week as basis for computation, how many hours of a normal 40-hour week do you spend on this work?

Average number of hours per week: _____

16. At what point between initiation of project ideas and final signature of Planops do you usually come in contact with problems related to projects? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line).

_____

initiation of project idea | Formal application to UNDP | submission to Governing Council | signature of Planops.

17. If FAO's work with the projects through the four stages mentioned in the above question is called the planning process, how would you evaluate this process?

very satisfactory ⟷ very unsatisfactory | No opinion

2 1 0 -1 -2 X

18. The Review Team has (in document CL 49/16) suggested to divide the whole Organization in two parts, one technical and one operational. In your opinion, how would this suggestion, if implemented, affect the work of FAO?

very positively ⟷ very negative | No opinion

2 1 0 -1 -2 X

19. When working with problems related to project plans, who are you most often in contact with?

within your division _____

within your department _____

outside your departm. _____

20. Does your work in FAO allow you enough time to keep up with developments within your professional field? (Circle Yes or No)

Yes No

21. It has been pointed out that multidivisional projects pose problems of coordination in the Organization. How do you evaluate this problem?

very large problem | large problem | a problem | small problem | no problem

4 3 2 1 0

22. Do you think a trend toward more multidisciplinary SF/FAO projects is favorable?

very favorable				very unfavorable	No opinion
2	1	0	-1	-2	X

23. How often in your project-related work do you suspect or know that you affect the overall size of project budgets (before Planops is finally signed)?

very often	often	some-times	very seldom	never	No opinion
4	3	2	1	0	X

24. Which person or unit would you off hand say is most influential on the size of project budgets?

_____.

25. About how many projects do you normally have to work with or think about in the matter of a week?

Number of projects: _____

26. In 1967, about how many times were you out in the field discussing project plans?

Number of field trips: _____

27. In the month of February this year, about how many letters did you write to / receive from other international organizations concerned with some aspect of the planning of projects?

	sent	received
Number of letters:	_____	_____

28. If any, which international organization are you in most frequent contact with about project plans?

29. Again in February 68, about how many times did you discuss by letter or otherwise, project plans with representatives of governments of underdeveloped countries?

Approx.number of discussions in Feb. 68: _____

30. How large a value do you think The Indicative World Plan will have as a guidance for <u>your</u> project work in the future?

very large	large	some	little	very little	no value	no op.
5	4	3	2	1	0	X

31. What part of all the problems encountered in planning projects are in your opinion caused by the methods of work in FAO? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line)

0 25% 50% 75% 100%

32. The last question in this group asks you to think of <u>completed</u> projects. How successful would you say they have been compared to the goals set out in the original Plans of Operations? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line <u>or</u> in the box underneath

0 25% 50% 75% 100%

On average the projects have been more successful than hoped for in Planops: _____

The last questions ask for some background information. I repeat that your anonymity will be respected, and that all answers will be treated confidentially.

33. What University Degrees do you have? Please indicate subject matter and University.

34. What are your earlier occupations and their corresponding places of work?

35. To which religious group do you belong? _____

Do you practice your religion actively? _____

36. Pleace fill out the following, circling the appropriate letters where possible, and in the two first boxes using the official symbols, for example TE and NUa.

Dept.	Office/ Branch	Post title	Post grade	Years in FAO In HQ	Years in FAO In field	Nationality

Age	Sex	Family status				No. of children	Profession
	M	A married		D widow/er			
	F	B divorced		E remarried			
		C not married					

What approx. was you total income before taxes in 1967?

US$_____

Are you a member of a political party in your home country?

YES NO

How would you describe the general tendency of your personal political opinions? (Put a checkmark on the horizontal line).

left (socialist)	center (liberal)	right (conservative)

Thank you.

ANNEX 2. Countries officially receiving UNDP/FAO projects as of 1 jan 1968, and the countries population as of 1961.

Code			Population in millions 1961
15	1	Afghanistan	14
2	2	Algerie	11
51	3	Argentina	20
51	4	Bolivia	4
2	5	Botswana	2
51	6	Brazil	73
2	7	Burundi	2
15	8	Cambodia	5
2	9	Cameroon	4
2	10	Central Afr.Rep.	1
15	11	Ceylon	10
2	12	Chad	3
51	13	Chile	8
13	14	China Rep.	11
51	15	Colombia	14
2	16	Congo(Brazzaville)	1
52	17	Costa Rica	1
52	18	Cuba	7
47	19	Cyprus	1
2	20	Dahomey	2
52	21	Dominican Rep.	3
51	22	Ecuador	4
52	23	El Salvador	3
2	24	Ethiopia	22
15	25	Fiji Islands	0.5
2	26	Gabon	0.5
2	27	Ghana	7
47	28	Greece	8
52	29	Guatemala	4
2	30	Guinea	3
51	31	Guyana	1
52	32	Haiti	4
52	33	Honduras	2
14	34	India	442
15	35	Iran	21
32	36	Iraq	7
31	37	Israel	2
2	38	Ivory Coast	3
52	39	Jamaica	2
32	40	Jordan	2
2	41	Kenya	8
15	42	Korea	25
32	43	Lebanon	2
2	44	Liberia	1
2	45	Madagascar	6
2	46	Malawi	2
15	47	Malaysia	7
2	48	Mali	4
47	49	Malta	0.5
2	50	Mauritania	1
2	51	Mauritius	1
52	52	Mexico	36
2	53	Morocco	12
15	54	Nepal	9
52	55	Nicaragua	2
2	56	Niger	2
2	57	Nigeria	36
15	58	Pakistan	95
52	59	Panama	1
51	60	Paraguay	2
51	61	Peru	11
15	62	Philippines	29
41	63	Poland	30
41	64	Romania	19
2	65	Rwanda	3
32	66	Saudi Arabia	2
2	67	Senegal	3
2	68	Sierra Leone	2
15	69	Singapore	2
2	70	Somalia	2
32	71	South Arabia Fed.	6
47	72	Spain	31
2	73	Sudan	12
2	74	Swaziland	2
32	75	Syria	5
2	76	Tanzania	9
15	77	Thailand	27
2	78	Togo	1
52	79	Trinidad og Tobogo	1
2	80	Tunisia	4
15	81	Turkey	29
2	82	Uganda	7
32	83	U.A.R. (Egypt)	27
2	84	Upper Volta	4
51	85	Uruguay	3
51	86	Venezuela	8
15	87	Vietnam	15
32	88	Yemen	5
41	89	Yugoslavia	19
2	90	Zambia	8
			1312

First digit in code:		
1	Asia	741
2	Africa	191
3	Middle East	58
4	Europe	108
5	The Americas	214
		1312

ANNEX 3 Institute for Social Research

PROJECT PLANNING IN FAO

CODEBOOK

Column	Code	Reference
1	1	A Approved project - operational
	2	B Approved project - non-operational
	3	C Preliminary operations authorized
	4	D Field operations completed
	5	E Project Concluded
2,3,4	letters	Country identification from Catalogue No. 22, 31 January 1968.
5;6,7		Special Fund Project number from Catalogue Pfb: SF/67, 31 July 1967.
8,9		Regional identification of project. Corresponds to the first two digits in Code in Annex 2.
10	1	Institutional research project
	2	Survey or study project
	3	Training, demonstration project
	4	Technical "pilot" project
	5	Other
11	1	Animal Production and Health Division
	2	Land and Water Development Division
	3	Plant Production and Protection Division
	4	Forestry and forest products division
	5	Nutrition Division
	6	Fishery resources and exploitation Division
	7	Fishery Economics and Products Division
	8	Economic Analysis Division
	9	Rural Institutions and Services Division
	0	Other
12,13		Budget total in hundred thousand US$.
14		Planned project duration in years.
15,16		Nationality of project manager (PM). (Code as first two digits in Annex 2).
17		Grade of Project Manager.
	1-8	D2, D1, P5, P4, P3, P2, P1, Other. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8).
18		Planned duration of PM's service time in man-months coded in the following manner:
	0	0 - 9 man months
	1	10 - 19
	2	20 - 29
	3	30 - 39
	4	40 - 49
	5	50 - 59
	6	60 - 69
	7	70 - 79
	8	80 - 89
	9	90 and above.

Column	Code	Reference
19,20		Exact number of experts on project
21		Number of experts on project, coded:
	1	1 - 4 experts
	2	5 - 9
	3	10 - 14
	4	15 - 19 (This code has also been applied in columns 27, 31, 39,and 44).
	5	20 - 24
	6	25 - 29
	7	30 - 34
	8	35 - 39
	9	40 and above
22-44		Number of experts in each category (country or region of origin). The following categories have been used:
		(1) ASIA
22		USSR
23		Japan
24		China (Taiwan)
25		India
26		Other Asian
27	(Coded)	Total number of Asians
28		(2) All African countries, except U.A.R.
29		Israel
30		Arab Country
31	(Coded)	(3) Total Middle Easterners
32		Eastern Europe
33		UK
34		France
35		Italy
36		Germany
37		Scandinavia
38		Other West European
39	(Coded)	(4) Total Europeans
40		South America
41		Central America
42		USA
43		Canada
44	(Coded)	Total Americans
45	1-0	Year project was approved 1959 (1), -1967 (9),-1968 (0).
46	1-9	Budget coded:
	1	01 - 04 hundred thousand dollars
	2	05 - 06
	3	07 - 08
	4	09 - 10
	5	11 - 12
	6	13 - 14
	7	15 - 16
	8	17 - 20
	9	20 and above

Column	Code	Reference
47	1 or 0	1 = Regional project (more than one country participating).
48		Number of Norwegian experts
49		Swedish
50		Danish
51		Finnish
52		Icelandic
53-58		Number of experts on project but not included in columns 22-44 (except 27, 31, 39, and 44 where they are included).
53		Rest UK
54		France
55		Other West European
56		USSR
57		Scandinavia
59		Profession of Project Manager
	1	Economist
	2	Engineer
	3	Natural science trained
	4	Social science trained
	5	Agriculturalist
	6	Veterinarian
60		Number of experts on project that are Social Science trained.
61,62		Nationality of Project Supervisor. Coded as in columns 22-44.

ANNEX 4

FAO/UNDP Allocations in Asia related to per caput income, population, and % of labor force in agriculture.

Country 1	Allocations 2	GNP per caput 3	Population 4	% in agric. 5	No. of projects 6	GNP 1957 7
Afthanistan	6.0	0.5	14	85	5	0.7
Cambodia	1.1	1.0	5	80	2	0.5
Ceylon	1.6	1.3	10	53	2	1.2
China (Thaiwan)	2.8	1.6	11	50	4	1.5
India	10.9	0.7	442	71	11	28.6
Iran	11.2	1.1	21	80	11	2.1
Korea	8.5	1.1	34	70	12	0.7
Malaysia	3.2	3.6	7	58	3	2.2
Nepal	2.7	0.5	9	93	3	0.4
Pakistan	9.5	0.7	95	65	8	6.0
Philippines	3.9	2.2	29	59	4	5.0
Singapore	2.3	4.0	2	8	2	0.6
Thailand	4.4	1.0	27	82	6	2.1
Turkey	7.6	2.2	29	77	7	5.6
Vietnam	1.1	0.8	32	-	1	0.9

Column 2: allocations in million US$. Source: Catalogue No. 2

3: hundred US $. Source: Russett, page 155.

4: million Source: Russett, page 354.

5: Approx. 1950 Source: Russett, page 177.

6: As of 1 Jan. 68. Source: Project Catalogue No. 2.

7: billion US $. Source: Russett page 152.


4
hundred $
3
GNP pr. cap. jfr. T.A.
2
1
SIN
MAL
PHI
THA
CHA
CEY
VI
AM
NEP
AFG
KOR
IRA
PAK
IND
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
mill. $
project allocations
proj. cat. 2.


India
Population Russetts 18100
120
110
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
mill.
VIE
IRA
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
project allocations


100
90
% in agr.
80
70
60
50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
project allocations

ANNEX 5.1 Nationality project manager and project distribution

Nationality PM	Project region: Asian	African	Arab	Europe	South Centr.Am.	Total
Asian						
- 11 USSR	2			1		3
- 12 Japanese	1					1
13 Chinese		2	1			3
14 Indian	1		2			3
15 Other Asian	8	2			5	15
Total Asians	12	4	3	1	5	25
20 Africans	1	1	1		1	4
31 Israelites		2				2
32 Arab		1	1			2
Total Middle Eastern		3	1			4
41 Eastern Europe	4	3				7
- 42 UK	8	12	2	2	8	32
- 43 France	1	8		2	6	17
- 44 Italian		2		1	3	6
- 45 German	3				3	6
46 Scandinavian	5	2	3		3	13
47 Other West Eur.	5	9	4		3	21
Total European	26	36	9	5	26	102
51 South Am.	1				5	6
52 Central Am.					1	1
- 53 USA	5	5	4		8	22
- 54 Canadian	2	1			3	6
Total Americans	8	6	4		17	35
Totals	47	50	18	6	49	170

% project managers from large states (-) 55 %

ANNEX 5.2

	Project Region							
Nationality PM	Asia	Africa	Arab	Europe	South/Centr. America	Totals		
Asian	48	16	12	4	20	100	N= 25	15
African	25	25	25	0	25	100	N= 4	2
Middle East	0	75	25	0	0	100	N= 4	2
European	26	35	8	5	26	100	N=102	60
Americans	23	17	11	0	49	100	N= 35	21
Total	28	29	11	4	28	100	N=170	100

ANNEX 6

Profession of P.M. related to project type (⟶)

(Percent in brackets)

Profession P.M.↓	Research	Survey	Training	Pilot		
Economist	4 (24)	7 (41)	1 (6)	5 (29)	(100)	N= 17
Engineer	1 (4)	14 (56)	3 (12)	7 (28)	(100)	N= 25
Natural Sc.	4 (67)	1 (17)	0 (0)	1 (16)	(100)	N= 6
Social Sc.	9 (64)	0 (0)	4 (29)	1 (7)	(100)	N= 14
Agriculturalist	31 (40)	24 (31)	8 (10)	14 (19)	(100)	N= 77
Veterinary	9 (60)	0 (0)	4 (27)	2 (13)	(100)	N= 15
						154

ANNEX 7.

Profession PM ↓ related to
Operating Division in FAO (⟶)
(Percent horizontally in brackets.)

Profession PM (↓)	1 AN	2 LA	3 PL	4 FO	5 NU	7 FE	8 EA	9 RU		Total
Economist				3(18)		2(12)	10(59)	2(11)	100	N= 17
Engineer		23(92)		2(8)					100	N= 25
Natural Science		1(17)	1(17)			4(66)			100	N= 6
Social Science						1(7)		13(93)	100	N= 14
Agriculturalist	6(8)	20(26)	10(13)	27(35)	6(8)	7(9)		1(1)	100	N= 77
Veterinary	15(100)								100	N= 15
										154

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