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Populist Radical Right Voters in Contemporary Democracies in
Western Europe: Operationalizing and Testing the
Three-Dimensional Political Space hypotheses

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Abstract

This thesis operationalizes and tests a new theoretical framework of how to map populist radical right voters in the political space. While such research has been dominated by two-dimensional frameworks, the framework of this thesis is three-dimensional as proposed by Kitschelt in recent work.

To be able to operationalize the new three-dimensional framework the thesis is based on thorough review of both the dominant two-dimensional and the newer theories regarding political dimensions and the populist radical right. The theories were then applied to find the best suiting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent the values constituting the three-dimensional political space.

The re-theorized framework has never before been empirically tested. The evidence presented in this thesis suggest that the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters are different on these three dimensions. This supports Kitschelt's argument in that we ought to consider the political space as three-dimensional. By using three dimensions this thesis was able to capture important variation in how populist radical right voters can be placed in the political space.

This thesis has discovered the presence of an important issue that does not fit into the three-dimensional political framework. The *gay rights*-issue represents values that are different from the ones constituting the three dimension. Neither Kitschelt nor I could have expected these results.

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Abbreviations

AP	Arbeiderpartiet
CDP	Christen-Democratische Partij
CD&V	Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams
CVP	Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei
DF	Dansk Folkeparti
ESS	European Social Survey
FPÖ	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FDP	FDP. Die Liberalen
FN	Front National
FNb	Front national (Belge)
FP	Folkepartiet liberalerna
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet
GPS	Grüne Partei der Schweiz
H	Høyre
IIA	Independence of irrelevant alternatives
K	Det Konservative Folkeparti
Kesk	Suomen Keskusta
Kok	Kansallinen Kokoomus r.p
KRF	Kristelig folkeparti
LN	Lega Nord
LPF	Lijst Pim Fortuyn
M	Moderaterna
MP	Miljöpartiet de Gröna
PS	Perussuomalaiset
PRR	Populist radical right
PvdA	Partij van de Arbeid
PVV	Partij Voor de Vrijheid
REP	Die Republikaner
SAP	Socialdemokratiska Arbeiderpartiet
SD	Sverigedemokraterna
SDd	Socialdemokraterne
SDP	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue
SF	Socialistisk Folkeparti
SP	Senterpartiet
SP.a	Socialistische Partij Anders
SPn	Socialistische Partij
SPs	Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz
SVP	Schweizerische Volkspartei
V	Venstre
VLD	Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten
Vihr	Vihreä liitto
VB	Vlaams Belang
VVD	Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie
WVS	World Values Survey

1

Introduction

1.1 Political dimensions and the populist radical right

Explaining the populist radical right (PRR), their breakthrough, their success and their political impact, have been both a challenging and popular task for scholars over the last three decades. The success of the populist radical right parties have attracted major attention. The debate concerns definitional disputes about the party family, what the consequences will be when the parties reach government, who vote for them, their uniqueness, their impact on democracy, and much more.

One topic of the research on populist radical right parties has been on how these parties and their voters can be placed in the competitive political space. In this political space, political parties can both rise and demise (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi, Grande, Lachat, Dolezal, Bornschier, and Frey 2008). Many scholars have used political dimensions to help explain the success of the populist radical right parties, e.g. Bornschier (2010ab); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008). Up until recently, scholars have agreed that there are two solid political dimensions: one cultural and one socio-economic (Bornschier 2010ab; Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Kriesi et al. 2008). This thesis contributes to the debate by presenting evidence from comparative voting analyses, which challenges the dominant two-dimensional account. The results found in this thesis are based on Kitschelt's (2012) re-theorization of the political space.

Kitschelt's seminal study of the transformation of European social democracy is built on the traditional two-dimensional framework ranging from a cultural *libertarian–authoritarian* pole to an economic *socialist–capitalist* pole (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 15). He argues that

populist radical right parties are mainly placed alongside the economic *capitalist* and cultural *authoritarian* poles. Although Kitschelt's work is of great importance for understanding both party competition, the development of political parties and voter preferences, his work from the 1990's is in need of modification (de Lange 2007; Ivarsflaten 2005). In this respect Kitschelt himself has introduced an improvement of the structure of the political space (Kitschelt 2012).

Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space started with the major breakthrough of the populist radical right party Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) in the Dutch national election of 2002. The leader of the party, Pim Fortuyn, argued that immigration, and especially Islam, challenged the very foundations of liberal democracy, e.g. gender equality, freedom of expression, Western traditions and gay rights. The combination of values that brought upon the success of the LPF cannot be explained by the traditional two-dimensional framework. Kitschelt (2012: 241-244) argues that the cultural- and socio-economic dimensions are not enough to explain and analyze voter preferences, especially regarding populist radical right parties after the success of the LPF. The re-theorization of the theoretical framework splits the cultural *libertarian–authoritarian* dimension into two separate dimensions: one containing group-issues (immigration, ethnicity, European integration) and one containing traditional libertarian versus authoritarian issues (law and order, gender equality, gay rights). This re-theorized theoretical framework has never before been operationalized or empirically tested. This thesis sets out to do exactly that, with an exclusive focus on the voters of populist radical right parties in contemporary Western European democracies. For this thesis, I put forth the following research question:

Can the new three-dimensional political space outlined by Kitschelt in recent work, better explain populist radical right voting patterns than the existing and dominant two-dimensional frameworks?

The thesis sets out to explain and compare the different political dimensions that constitute voter preferences to the populist radical right parties in contemporary Western European democracies. The thesis will operationalize the re-theorized theoretical framework outlined by Kitschelt (2012), and test if this three-dimensional framework can better explain the populist radical right voting patterns. In order to do this I focus first on the traditional theories of the political space by Kitschelt (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008) and Bornschieer (2010ab).

1.2 Justifying the thesis

This thesis has two main contributions. First of all I will operationalize the issues belonging to the three dimensions. This operationalization is based on thorough reviews of both classic and newer theories regarding the dominant two-dimensional framework, the re-theorized three-dimensional framework and the populist radical right. I also use the cultural theories of *grid* and *group* as suggested by Kitschelt (2007; 2012). I then apply these theories to find the best suiting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent the values constituting the three-dimensional political space.

The second contribution of this thesis is the empirical testing of this exact theoretical framework. Kitschelt (2012) introduced a re-theorized theoretical framework consisting of three dimensions to distinguish voters of the populist radical right. The framework has never before been empirically tested. The results will be tested with both binary and multinomial logistic regression analysis. The binary analysis combines all countries in a straight comparative voting analysis, while the multinomial analysis examines each country in order to be able to discover cross-country differences.

If Kitschelt (2012) is right about needing to consider the political space as three-dimensional when doing research on the populist radical right, this will give important suggestions for future research.

1.3 Structure of the thesis

Chapter two will present and discuss the theoretical framework. The chapter starts by discussing the definition of parties chosen for this thesis. I then present the classical theories of political dimensions and discuss each author's perspective of the structure of the political space. After this, I present the background for re-theorizing the political space before presenting the re-theorized three-dimensional framework. Finally, I present the content of each of the three dimensions constituting the political space along with my hypotheses.

Chapter three presents the data and methodological choices of this thesis. In this chapter I evaluate my methodological choices as well as explaining why the European Social Survey 2012 was chosen to represent the data foundation of the thesis.

In chapter four the operationalization of the three-dimensional political space is presented. Each concept is thoroughly discussed according to the theories. In addition to the theoretical

foundation of the three concepts, I test if the variables that have been outlined to constitute each concept actually belong together, using principal components analysis. The results from principal components analysis are being used to create indices of each dimension.

In chapter five I present the results from the analysis. First, the indices that was created based on the theoretical operationalization of the three dimensions is tested with binary logistic regression analysis. After this, the results from each country is presented. The separate country analysis is estimated with multinomial logistic regression analysis. This analysis compares the populist radical right voters with the voters of the other major parties in each country.

The final chapter presents the discussion of the results based on the three-dimensional political space. In this chapter I answer the hypotheses as well as the general research question. Finally, I summarize the contributions of the thesis and give suggestions for future research.

2

Theoretical framework

In this chapter I put forward the theoretical framework constituting the foundation of the thesis. In the first section I present an overview of definitional disputes as well as emphasize and defend my own choice of definition and case selection. The next section presents an overview of the literature of political dimensions structuring the political space, as well as populist radical right parties. I first present an overview of the dominant two-dimensional frameworks. The two-dimensional frameworks are important for two main reasons. First of all to understand Kitschelt's re-theorization, and second to be able to operationalize the new re-theorized framework. Thereafter, the re-theorization of the theoretical framework is presented. Finally, I present my main hypotheses.

2.1 Definition of parties

An important debate of populist radical right parties is how to classify them. Kitschelt and McGann (1995: 35) distinguishes between four different types of right-wing parties. *Fascist parties*, *welfare chauvinist parties*, *new radical right parties* and *populist antistatist parties*. Right-wing parties have been defined in many different ways. They have been classified as *Extreme Right* parties (Ignazi 1992; Lubbers et al. 2002), *Populist Radical Right* parties (Mudde 2007), *Radical Right-Wing Populists* (Betz 1994), *Anti-Immigrant* parties (van der Brug et al. 2000) and many more.

I have chosen to use the label *populist radical right* (PRR) to classify the party family. The labels populism, radical and right are important contributors to these parties ideologies and characteristics. *Populism* is an ideology and rhetoric used to separate *the pure people* from the

corrupt elite (Mudde 2007: 23; Rydgren 2007). Other groups such as immigrants and ethnic minorities are also commonly excluded from the *pure people* (Rydgren 2007: 245). A common feature of parties in the populist ideology is that they strategically oppose the political class, criticizing other established parties, while at the same time trying not to appear anti-democratic (Rydgren 2007). The populist rhetoric of these parties can even be used in a way that makes these parties appear as the true democratic defenders (Betz and Johnson 2004: 312).

Radical is a term often connected to the term extreme (Rydgren 2007). The populist radical right party family are considered a radical party family, and sometimes even extreme, because they reject pluralist values. Even though they accept a liberal democracy, their ideal is an ethnically homogeneous society not compatible with pluralist values (Rydgren 2007: 243). Their ideal society is an *ethnocracy*, where democracy has been redefined and adjusted to an ethnic homogeneous group (Minkenberg 2000: 181). Givens (2005) uses the term *Radical Right* to classify the party family. She argues that the term nationalism is of exceptional importance for the party family. In addition to nationalism, she argues that the party family also have two features in common: an anti-immigrant policy strategy as well as being anti-establishment parties¹.

The term *right* is now commonly associated with positions on socio-economic issues (Rydgren 2007: 243). Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argue that parties can be classified in the radical right category if they have discovered the *winning formula*. The winning formula is the combination of market-liberal and authoritarian right values. Both Rydgren (2007) and Minkenberg (2000) disagrees with the classification of parties based on the winning formula. They argue that populist radical right parties are mainly concerned with cultural issues and that they employ market liberal values more as a tactical tool, but not as one of their main concerns.

A common way for creating classifications is by analyzing ideologies (Ennser 2010). Mudde (2007) classifies PRR-parties using three distinctive ideologies: *nativism*, *authoritarianism* and *populism*. The term *populism* has already been discussed above. Amongst the three, nativism is held to be of exceptional importance (Mudde 2007). In the nativist ideology countries should be inhabited exclusively by one native group: the true nation. Non-members of this native group are considered threatening towards the homogeneous society (Mudde 2007: 19). In this perspective, immigrants and other unfamiliar cultural groups are regarded as threats towards nationalism. The third element, authoritarianism, is an ideology believing in a strictly ordered society with strict laws, and where insubordination towards authorities will be punished severely (Mudde 2007:

¹Anti-establishment parties consider themselves as outsiders of the party system and therefore unaffected by the government and other parties (Givens 2005: 20).

23). Authoritarians are concerned with laws and the justice system trying to create a safe society protected from criminals and disobedient individuals.

Table 2.1 represents three commonly used classifications of populist radical right parties. These are the classifications by Mudde (2007; 2012), Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Golder (2003). The parties presented in table 2.1 represents the major parties classified as populist radical right in Western Europe. The table also includes the two most recent successful parties: Sverigedemokraterna (SD) in Sweden and Perussuomalaiset (PS) in Finland. Sverigedemokraterna won 5.7 percent of the vote in the Swedish general election in 2010 and overcame the electoral threshold. In the Finnish general election in 2011, Perussuomalaiset won a substantial share of the vote (19.1 percent). Scholars have overall agreed in classifying Sverigedemokraterna as belonging to the populist radical right party family (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2012: 1). The classification of Perussuomalaiset is somewhat more controversial, because the PS advances a number of issues as equally important to the immigration issue, such as linguistic issues (Ivarsflaten and Gudbrandsen 2012: 1).

Table 2.1: A definitional chart of PRR-parties in Western Europe

Country	Party	Mudde (2007, 2012)	Kitschelt (1995)	Golder (2003)
Austria	Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ)	PRR	Populist Antistatist	Populist
Belgium	Vlaams Belang (VB)	PRR	-	Populist
	Front national (Belge)(FNb)	PRR	-	Populist
Denmark	Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	PRR	-	Populist
Finland	Perussuomalaiset (PS)	-	-	-
France	Front National (FN)	PRR	New Radical Right	Populist
Germany	Die Republikaner (REP)	PRR	Populist Antistatist	Populist
Italy	Lega Nord (LN)	-	-	Populist
Netherlands	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)	Neo. Populist	-	-
	Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV)	PRR	-	-
Norway	Fremskrittspartiet (FrP)	Neo. Populist	New Radical Right	Populist
Sweden	Sverigedemokraterna (SD)	PRR	-	-
Switzerland	Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)	PRR	New Radical Right	-

The table represents a definitional chart of populist radical right parties in Western European democracies. I have included three different classifications of these parties. It is clear from these classifications that new populist radical right parties have risen since Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Golder (2003) wrote their classifications. Perussuomalaiset (PS) in Finland and Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) in Norway are the only parties included in my analysis not classified as the populist radical right by Mudde (2007; 2012). Mudde (2007) argues that these parties do not have a consistently nativist appeal and therefore cannot be classified as the populist radical right. Both Kitschelt and McGann (1995) and Golder (2003) classify FrP as a *new radical right*

party and a *populist* party. FrP itself strongly rejects similarities with other populist radical right parties and also collaborations with such parties (Hagelund 2003: 47).

The most important concept of the PS is true *Finnishness*- Finland for the true Finns (Arter 2010). The manifesto of the PS also express that they are a party for *the people* and that they trust and listen to the people (Arter 2010: 490). According to Arter (2010) the PS should be classified as a populist radical right party. The classification used in this thesis is an open definition. The empirical analysis of this thesis will discover if the voting patterns are substantially different in the cases of Norway and Finland.

Jungar and Jupskås (2014) used electoral manifestos to classify the parties studied in a two-dimensional political space on an economic left/right dimension and a sociocultural libertarian/authoritarian dimension. Their empirical study concludes that the PS should be included in the populist radical right party family. Interestingly, they also conclude that the FrP should be treated more carefully when studied as the populist radical right. When considering the political space as three-dimensional, as I will do in the analysis to follow, I reach the opposite conclusion.

Only seven of the thirteen parties presented in table 2.1 is included in the final analysis of this thesis. First of all, to obtain reliable results, it is crucial that the parties that are being examined have support from a certain amount of voters. The basic threshold is 5 percent. Following this threshold excludes the Die Republikaner from the analysis. In addition, Italy, France and Austria do not have data present in the European Social Survey 2012 and can therefore not be included in the empirical analysis². Lastly, the Belgian case is a special one. Having two party systems has also resulted in two populist radical right parties. For the Belgian case only the Flemish voters are included in the further analysis.

2.2 Supply vs. demand

One debate concerning populist radical right parties is how to theorize them. What theories are the best? Which theories explain the most? This debate is between demand- and supply side theories. The choice of demand or supply has been a matter of taste and topic. Where demand side theories focus on changes and developments in values, interests, attitudes and preferences of PRR-voters, supply side theories concentrate on party programs, party organization and political opportunities of populist radical right parties, and the parties themselves (Rydgren 2007: 247).

²Detailed argumentation of the chosen survey can be found in section 3.3.

Populist radical right parties mobilize individuals to vote for them. The goal of this thesis is to examine voting patterns of populist radical right voters in a three-dimensional political space in Western Europe. Some of the important theories of this thesis have both supply- and demand side perspectives. The demand side theories tend to concentrate on ethnic competition, winners and losers of modernization, political discontent and protest-voting (Rydgren 2007). Immigration and the protection of national values have been recognized as one of the most important factors for PRR-voting in previous research (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). The focus of this thesis is on voters and therefore on demand side theories.

2.3 The dimensionality of the political space

Kitschelt and Kriesi et al. have different perceptions concerning the emergence and structure of the political space. They do however agree that there are two main political dimensions, one cultural and one economic. The content of the political dimensions is different in some ways and will be elaborated in this section of the theory chapter.

Knudsen (1989) presents a discussion of different approaches for identifying cleavage dimensions. Knudsen (1989) argues that the given structure of a cleavage is expected to produce separate dimensions. This is because different cleavages cut across each other creating space for parties to be placed along opposing poles. For instance, Knudsen explains that on the economic left–right dimension where one can expect a clear separation between socialist and capitalist parties, the traditional determinants for the placement on this dimension are the cleavage variables of social class, or education and income (Knudsen 1989: 500). Aardal (1994) argues that it is important to separate between issues and cleavages. Cleavages vary over time with regards to salience (Aardal 1994: 226). An issue, can be important in one election and diminish in the next. This thesis examines the dimensionality of the political space with regards to populist radical right voters. The concept of each dimension is constituted by different issues that are important for explaining its structure and the opposing poles.

In the following sections I will first discuss the dominant two-dimensional accounts. The dominant two-dimensional framework by Kitschelt (1994) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) is discussed first. Second I discuss the two-dimensional framework by Kriesi et al. (2008) and then the framework by Bornschier (2010a). The two-dimensional accounts are important to

understand Kitschelt's re-theorization. In addition, the contents of the two-dimensional accounts is necessary to be able to operationalize the re-theorized three-dimensional framework. Finally, I will elaborate on the new three-dimensional account by Kitschelt (2012).

2.3.1 From libertarian–authoritarian to socialist–capitalist


The theoretical framework by Kitschelt (1994: 9) is inspired by the slogan of the French revolution: *liberty, equality and fraternity*. The slogan represents three ultimate values identified by the majority of citizens. These values are reflected through social institutions. The value of liberty is fostered by the marketplace, using free exchange among individuals. Uniting liberty with equality depends on some sort of allocation, e.g. majority voting or a fair leader which promotes equality (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Kitschelt (1994: 9) argues that equality and liberty are both complementary and contradictory values. For example, people who prefer liberty over equality tend to promote market institutions, while people who prefer equality over liberty promote political mechanisms for redistribution (Kitschelt 1994: 9). Kitschelt refers to these two alternatives as *liberal capitalism* and *socialism*.

The third value, *fraternity*, constitutes an independent dimension which crosses the dimension of equality and liberty. Kitschelt (1994: 9) refers to fraternity as belonging in a communitarian social order with face-to-face contact and shared norms. Kitschelt refers to these citizens as communitarians. Communitarians are divided between equality and liberty for the sake of fraternity. They do not approve of the domination of markets and organizations, but call for interaction with citizens and promotes common goals and rules (Kitschelt 1994: 9–10).

Figure 2.1 represents the relationship between the ultimate values of liberty, equality and fraternity, and social organization. The corner marked *libertarian socialism* blends fraternity and socialist demands. Kitschelt (1994: 11) argues that this vision entails organizations and communities with self-managing workers. The corner marked *libertarian capitalism* calls for free market exchange and free organization of individuals. The corner marked *authoritarian capitalism* represents traditional and hierarchical communitarian integration, e.g. church authority, militarism and patriarchy. These are all important features for free market capitalism (Kitschelt 1994: 11). The final corner marked *authoritarian socialism*, represents redistribution of resources along with hierarchical principles and social order.

What has now been outlined above can only be described as the ultimate values of Kitschelt's theoretical framework. An in-depth outline of the typology and political ideology of the ultimate

Figure 2.1: The ultimate values structuring social organization



values would require too many pages of this thesis, but I will devote a few pages presenting the main arguments of Kitschelt's theoretical framework.

Political preferences of individuals are shaped by a variety of experiences, beliefs and processes. Kitschelt (1994) refers to Katznelson (1986) in the process of his theoretical framework. Katznelson (1986) has developed a framework for the formation of social classes.³ Kitschelt (1994: 13) argues that the framework of Katznelson is useful for reconstructing the emergence of political preferences over the economic and cultural dimensions. Kitschelt (1994) discusses a variety of different variables and factors which can affect individuals' placement on the two political dimensions. Examples of such variables are the divide between public and private, domestic and international, work experience, work situation, education, organizational experience, family structure, age, gender and so on. These are all factors and variables which Kitschelt highlights as important for formation of political preferences and placement on the political dimensions.

Kitschelt (1994) has developed a theoretical framework concerning preference formation and people's political dispositions on the two political dimensions: the socio-economic and the cultural. Each of the two political dimensions have two political axis. Kitschelt (1994: 11) has named the axis of the economic dimension, *socialist-capitalist*, and the axis of the cultural

³See Katznelson (1986: 14–21) for more information.

dimension, *libertarian–authoritarian*. The content of each of the variables mentioned above can be outlined and used to understand the content and structure of the different dimensions. For example, Kitschelt (1994: 15) explains some of the placements according to markets. In the sense of the public and private sector, employees in the public sector are much less exposed to competition and pressure of the marketplace. While employees in the private sector are exposed to higher competition and more focus on profitability. In this way, private employees and business owners may be more opposed to redistributive policies as well as taxation. Market experiences are characterized by both relations of property, employees and the location of production. Such structures affect the self-interests of individuals (Kitschelt 1994: 15–16). Also, the work environment of individuals can contribute to their personal satisfaction and happiness (Kitschelt 1994: 16). Kitschelt (1994: 16) argues that the situation of people’s work environment primarily influence their preferences on the cultural *libertarian–authoritarian* dimension and not the economic *socialist–capitalist* dimension. Kitschelt’s argument is that some work environments offer work independence, creativeness and communicative reinforcement, while other work environments do not, and in addition have a greater focus on monetary earnings. A creative and independent work environment encourages workers to be more active in participation which also influence their political participation (Kitschelt 1994: 16–17).

Another important indicator that may affect people’s political preferences along the two political dimensions is education. Kitschelt (1994: 17) argues that an individual’s level of education is highly connected with their work environment. Individuals with higher education often have greater control of their work environment with greater opportunities for independence, creativeness and communicative reinforcements. Less educated individuals are typically more authoritarian, while higher educated individuals typically prefer a more libertarian community.


Gender is also argued to have an indirect effect on political preferences through work experience and education (Kitschelt 1994: 18). This is because women are often employed in organizations working with people and symbols.⁴ Gender itself does not have any direct effect on political preferences on the libertarian–authoritarian axis of competition. In this respect, age should be taken into account (Kitschelt 1994: 29). Age and life-style are factors that affect people’s political preferences. Kitschelt (1994: 19) argues that people who have lived their lives in standard households are the ones that are least likely to support libertarian values on the

⁴Working with symbols is characterized as working with health care, social work, counselling and communication. This type of work involves interpretation of personal competence and individuality and is characterized with more left-libertarian preferences of politics (Kitschelt 1993: 304)

socio-cultural dimension, while individuals who have not lived most of their life in a standard household are more likely to prefer libertarian values and oppose authoritarian values.

Figure 2.2 represents the political dimensions of social democracy structured by occupational groups as explained above. The *socialist–capitalist* axis represents the economic dimension of Kitschelt’s theoretical framework. At one extreme, the *socialist* pole represents full governmental intervention in the economy. The *capitalist* pole represents a minimum of governmental intervention in the economy. The socialist pole is characterized by individuals working in the public sector with little or no competition from the outside, and an independent work situation. The capitalist pole is characterized by individuals working in the private sector with great competition from the local and international market.

Figure 2.2: Political ideologies and occupational groups: The competitive dimensions of social democracy



Kitschelt (1994) argues that the political competition has shifted from the socialist–capitalist and libertarian–authoritarian towards the angled line in figure 2.2. The angled line represents the connection between the socio-cultural and economic political dimensions. In Kitschelt and McGann’s opinion, the combination of capitalist and authoritarian appeals is what constitutes the ideal-typical voter of the populist radical right (Kitschelt and McGann 1995: 19).

At the socialist extreme, a large public sector characterized by universal welfare policies

and redistributive politics are typical features. At the capitalist extreme, a small public sector characterized by limited welfare resources and limited redistribution are typical features (Kitschelt 1994). The cultural dimension is represented by the *libertarian–authoritarian* axis. The libertarian–authoritarian axis can be explained by the concept of *hierarchy* (Stubager 2008: 328). A position at the *libertarian* pole involves values against social hierarchy. This means a free and equal interaction between individuals with a minimum of governmental restrictions. Examples of issues located at the libertarian pole are: support of immigration, recommendation of pro-environmental policies and encouragement of gay rights. A position at the *authoritarian* pole involves values supportive of social hierarchy. This means that some individuals are superior to others. Such values call for a maximum of governmental restrictions. Examples of issues located at the authoritarian extreme are: opposition towards immigration, restrictions against gay marriage and other alternative ways of living, support of a strict society with tough incentives against crime, as well as low concerns for environmental issues (Kitschelt 1994; Stubager 2008). Individuals located at the libertarian pole are typically higher educated people working with symbols and people. They are also often women. Individuals located at the authoritarian pole are typically lower educated men, working with objects and documents.

In the paragraphs above I have discussed the main contributions of Kitschelt’s original two-dimensional theoretical framework. This thesis is concerned with if and how the voting patterns have changed in this political space. The next section will discuss the original two-dimensional framework of Kriesi et al. (2008).

2.3.2 Integration–demarcation


Kriesi et al. (2008) base their theories on the winners and losers of globalization. The winners of globalization are those who benefit from increased competition and should therefore support an opening of boundaries. This is a process of international *integration*. The losers of globalization are those who do not benefit from increased competition. The losers of globalization should seek protection for themselves through supporting the closing of national borders. Kriesi et al. (2008: 9) refer to the divide between winners and losers of globalization as a conflict between *integration* and *demarcation*.

There is an integration-demarcation divide on both the economic and cultural dimensions. Each dimension is structured by an open and integrationist position, and contrasted by a defensive and protectionist one. The economic dimension is categorized by a neoliberal free trade position

at the integration pole, and contrasted by a protectionist position with protections of the national market as the main object at the demarcation pole. The cultural dimension is categorized by an open universalistic, cosmopolitan position at the integration pole contrasted by a protectionist and exclusionary position at the demarcation pole. Kriesi et al. (2008: 13) argue that the new conflict, in the form of globalization, can be expected to reinforce the pro-state and pro-market opposition on the economic dimension. The pro-state is in this case argued to be more protectionist. This means that it is located at the demarcation pole. The pro-market position is in favour of national competitiveness regarding the world markets and is therefore placed at the integration pole.

Figure 2.3 below represents the positioning of the new left parties and the populist radical right parties, each occupying their own corner of the political space.

Figure 2.3: The positioning of parties along the integration–demarcation divide



Kriesi et al. (2008) have developed twelve issue categories representing the two political dimensions. Each of the twelve categories represent different directions so that they can be placed in the integration–demarcation divide. Kriesi et al. (2008) divide the issues of each category between support versus opposition. Being supportive of an issue is placed at the integration pole, while being against an issue is placed at the demarcation pole. The twelve categories each represent a maximum number of issues of each category. This serves as a good overview of central issues that could be included in operationalizing the re-theorized theoretical framework.

There are three categories on the economic dimension. These are *welfare*, *budget* and *economic liberalism*. These categories refer to the traditional opposition between state and market, left and right. The *welfare* category represents support versus defence for expansion of

the welfare state, as well as support versus defence of redistributive tax reforms. The *budget* category is structured by support versus defence of a rigid budgetary policy, support versus defence for cuts in expenditures, and support versus defence of tax reductions. The last category, the *economic liberalism* category, is structured by support versus defence of deregulation, support versus opposition to market regulation, and support versus opposition to the protection of agriculture (Dolezal 2008: 59).

There are six categories representing the cultural dimension, and an additional three categories representing what Dolezal (2008: 59–60) refers to as a residual category. The six categories representing the cultural dimension are *cultural liberalism*, *Europe*, *culture*, *immigration*, *army* and *security*. The *cultural liberalism* category is the biggest of the six. It represents support versus opposition of the new social movements, support versus opposition of cultural diversity and international cooperation, support versus opposition of national sovereignty, as well as support versus opposition of traditional values and customs. The *Europe* category represents one of the new issues: support versus opposition of European integration.

The *culture* category represents support versus opposition towards education, culture and scientific research, while the *immigration* category represents support versus opposition of a strict immigration policy. The two last categories of the cultural dimension, *army* and *security*, represents support versus opposition towards armed forces, defence and nuclear weapons, as well as support versus opposition towards fighting criminality, corruption and tougher laws on crime (Dolezal 2008: 59–60).

The last three categories are called *residual* categories. This is because, according to Kriesi et al. (2008), they do not belong automatically on either the economic or cultural dimension. The three residual categories are *environment*, *institutional reform* and *infrastructure*. The *environment* category represents support versus opposition towards environmental protection. The *international reform* category represents support versus opposition of referendums, federalism and decentralization. At last, the *infrastructure* category represents support versus opposition for improving the country's infrastructure such as roads and public transportation (Dolezal 2008: 60).

The next section will outline the argumentation from Bornschier (2010a) and discuss his view of the emergence of a new cleavage and the populist radical right parties.

2.3.3 Libertarian–universalistic and traditionalist–communitarian

Bornschieer (2010a) argues that the changing factors of the national and international society have brought populist radical right parties to the political arena, struggling to preserve the old national traditions and culture. This has, in Bornschieer's opinion, created a new cultural conflict based on values. The new cultural conflict spans from a libertarian–universalistic pole to a traditionalist–communitarian pole. Bornschieer has named the two poles after the debate between liberals and communitarians. The universalistic pole represents individual autonomy and community, while the traditionalist pole represents values linked to the preservation of traditional communities, where traditional values and customs are threatened by the multicultural society (Bornschieer 2010a: 2).

Bornschieer (2010a) argues that populist radical right parties consists of an ideology opposing the development of a multicultural society placing them at the traditionalist end of the new cultural dimension. On the other hand, the populist radical right party family constitutes a more moderate ideology than other extreme right party groups. This is due to their belief in democracy as well as their nativist appeal being more differentialist than exclusionist (Bornschieer 2010a; Mudde 2007: 3). Bornschieer (2010b: 424) expects populist radical right parties to mobilize voters on a communitarian and traditionalist political agenda.

When operationalizing the political dimensions, Bornschieer uses the same categories as Kriesi et al. (2008) to test his theories. He argues that the categories are for illustrative purposes only. Bornschieer's analysis covers newspaper articles over 30 years in six West European countries. His analysis concludes that the rise of universalistic values since the 1960s triggered a counter-reaction, resulting in a traditionalist–communitarian issue development. Bornschieer (2010a: 440) also argues that the cultural and economic dimensions stays as two separate dimension and cannot be combined as one single political dimension as some researchers argue (van der Brug and van Spanje 2009).

What exactly is liberalism and communitarianism from the perspective of voters attitudes? How can they be defined, and how can they be measured or critiqued? Walzer (1990: 12) argues that liberalism, in its simplest form, is the theoretical justification of the advancement of knowledge, technology and development. For individuals this can be seen as the pursuit of liberty and happiness. Communitarianism on the other hand, is the articulation of discontent with the theoretical justification of knowledge, technology and development, and the argument that individuality is a product of community. Walzer (1990: 11–12) argues that ever since family

membership has decreased, loyalty towards leaders, parties and movements have also decreased. Walzer himself states that liberals are able to stand outside all political organizations, and choose freely amongst the parties that best serve their values and interests. They are independent voters, choosing for themselves what party to vote for as well as choosing freshly each time (Walzer 1990: 12).

I have now discussed the dominant two-dimensional accounts by the main authors Kitschelt (1994); Kitschelt and McGann (1995); Kriesi et al. (2008) and Bornschier (2010a). The next section will present the background for re-theorizing the dominant two-dimensional frameworks.

2.4 Why re-theorize the structure of the political space?

Before September 11, multiculturalism was most often openly challenged by political figures of the extreme right. Since then, issues of multiculturalism, of liberal democracy and values, and especially of Muslims, have become part of Western European politics (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 4). A special case in this context, is the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn, leader of the populist radical right party Lijst Pim Fortuyn, was a defender of liberal values and liberal democracy. He challenged the political debate and argued that Islam was a *backward religion* by its denial of equality for women and its intolerance towards homosexuality (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007: 19-20). In this way, Fortuyn used his critique against immigration and Islam as a way of promoting liberal values and to defend liberal democracy. The re-theorization of the dominant two-dimensional framework grew out from this discussion. Fortuyn criticized Islam, and at the same time he positioned himself as a defender of liberal values. He promoted values of freedom, sexual equality and gender equality. In the dominant two-dimensional frameworks the possibility of being both liberal on the libertarian–authoritarian dimension as well as being an opponent of immigration and multiculturalism was non-existing. The electoral success of the Lijst Pim Fortuyn gave reason to re-theorize the dominant two-dimensional theoretical framework.

Populist radical right parties have often been labelled anti-liberal. Many populist radical right parties in Western Europe, are though considering themselves as defenders of liberal values (Akkerman 2005). Grouping liberal versus authoritarian values together with attitudes towards immigration and exclusionism makes, if this is true, no sense. To allow voters and parties to be either libertarian or authoritarian (*grid*), and inclusionary or exclusionary (*group*),

it is necessary to separate these issues into two dimensions. Kitschelt (2012) argues that, like Lijst Pim Fortuyn, other populist radical right parties like the Front National in France, and Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, have tried to split these values in order to broaden the prospective electoral coalition and to be able to include those who endorse an exclusionary position on *group*, but otherwise defend a liberal position on *grid* (Kitschelt 2012: 246). Akkerman and Hagelund (2007) compared the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet with the Dutch Lijst Pim Fortuyn and discovered a broad inclusion of values constituting the *grid*-dimension such as family values and gender equality.

Several articles have been written about why the Lijst Pim Fortuyn was so successful in the national election of 2002 (Aarts and Thomassen 2008; Bélanger and Arts 2006; van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003; Lubbers and Güveli 2007; Pellikaan et al. 2007). All articles find the cultural attitudes of voters to be of greater importance than the economic preferences. Some have a greater focus on class-based voting (Lubbers and Güveli 2007), while others focus on protest voting (Bélanger and Arts 2006; van Holsteyn and Irwin 2003). Regardless of the original focus, they all found different cultural values to be of importance for LPF-voting in the Netherlands. This constitutes an important foundation for Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space.

The next sections will elaborate on the re-theorized three-dimensional framework as outlined by Kitschelt (2012). Finally, some concluding remarks concerning the three dimensions will be presented together with my hypotheses.

2.5 Grid, Group and Greed: A re-theorized theoretical framework of the political space

What characteristics determine political preference formation? This is a question of endogeneity. People may choose their political preferences due to their occupational ties, but they may also choose their occupation because of their political preferences (Kitschelt 2012: 232).

In the sections above, various theoretical frameworks have been discussed. Ranging from libertarian to authoritarian, from socialist to capitalist, and from libertarian–universalistic to traditionalist–communitarian. The correction and modification of the theoretical framework originates from the following question: are libertarians necessarily cosmopolitans, and are authoritarians necessarily xenophobes and anti-globalists? In a recent book chapter, Kitschelt (2012) emphasized that the political space should no longer be seen as structured along two

political dimensions. In his perspective we ought to consider a third dimension structuring the political space. He calls the three dimensions *grid*, *group* and *greed*.

The terms *grid* and *group* have existed for a long period of time under the term *grid–group cultural theory*. The terms *grid* and *group* refer to two dimensions of political society. Grid–group cultural theory is built on cultural biases. The idea is that, everything human individuals do, their preferences and their justifications are culturally biased. This includes individuals ways of life, political preferences, political cultures and ways of organisation (Mamadouh 1999: 396). Cultural bias is, in the terms of grid–group cultural theory, a consistent grouping of preferences. The *group* dimension questions membership and citizenship; what factors are necessary for group membership? The *group* dimension is strong when individuals are member of such a group, and it is weak when individuals do not belong to such a group. The *grid* dimension constitutes certain rules, regulations and boundaries that individuals meet in their daily lives and interaction (Douglas 1978: 7–8).

Kitschelt (2012) also introduces a third political dimension to the grid–group cultural theory. He calls the third dimension *greed*. The *greed* dimension is the economic contribution to the grid–group cultural theory, and is similar to Kitschelt’s definition of the socialist–capitalist dimension (Kitschelt 1994). The *greed* dimension contains questions of redistribution of income and assets where individuals can have political preferences for or against redistribution (Kitschelt 2012: 232). Being for redistribution can be seen as a way to reduce inequality, supportive of the funding of public services, fighting for social and distributive egalitarianism, and better standards of living. The opposition towards redistribution will be classified here as *market-liberal*. Market liberal voters support open markets, privatization and deregulation.

Taken together, Grid–group cultural theory constitutes four independent cultures. These four cultures are *fatalism*, *individualism*, *hierachy* and *egalitarianism* (Grendstad 1999). *Fatalism* is constituted by high grid- and low group values. Fatalists are individuals that recognize societal rules and constrictions, but do not belong to any group. Fatalists tend to avoid social interactions with others. *Individualism* is recognized by both low grid and group values. Weak perceptions of tolerance for societal constrictions along with weak feelings of membership. Individualists are highly self-interested, self-fulfilling and authority-challenging individuals. *Hierarchy* on the other hand is constituted by high grid and high group values. Individuals belonging to the *hierarchy*-culture are categorized by strong group-membership and high respect for authorities. *Egalitarianism* is recognized by low grid- and high group values. Egalitarians are ideally

organized in small groups reaching collective decisions (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998: 36–37; Grendstad 1999: 464–465).

Although this thesis will examine three dimensions constituted in a slightly different way than the grid–group cultural theory, and even though there will be no thorough discussion of the four cultures, the outline of these four cultures are helpful in operationalizing the three political dimensions. Kitschelt’s argument is clear. The process of preference formation needs to be re-theorized. In the next sections I present the demand-side perspective of the three-dimensional framework and my hypotheses.

2.5.1 The demand-side perspective

The demand-side perspective is directly related to the winning formula based on the dominant two-dimensional account. Kitschelt (2012: 242) admits that the original winning formula is outdated. First of all, the analysis by Kitschelt and McGann (1995) testing the winning formula was based on 1980s data. Much have changed since then:

1. The traditional petty bourgeoisie, being a significant part of Kitschelt’s winning formula with their market-liberal and authoritarian preferences, has shrunk significantly. This group is therefore no longer available for the populist radical right.
2. The blue-collar working-class has declined since the 1990s. This has created a backlash where a greater deal of the labor force are now experiencing more economic uncertainty. In this sense there should be an increasing share of the population with more economically redistributive (greed), more authoritarian (grid) and more exclusionist (group) positions (Kitschelt 2012: 243). This would create a tremendous opportunity for the populist radical right to mobilize voters.
3. The final point here is from a supply-side perspective but can be directly connected to the demand-side as well. The events of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks in Europe where Islamic fundamentalists challenged Western liberalism has opened new opportunities for parties to mobilize voters on new dimensions. In this respect, populist radical right parties are increasingly arguing that exclusionary policies are needed to prevent Islamic immigrants and fundamentalism from undermining Western liberalism (Kitschelt 2012: 244).

The last point has made it possible for populist radical right parties to mobilize voters on libertarian values together with exclusionary and parochial group-values. In this way, *authori-*

tarian values, are no longer a necessary condition for PRR-voting. Pim Fortuyn was the first party leader of a populist radical right party ever to test this strategy (Kitschelt 2012: 244). He combined liberal positions of family, gender and equality with exclusionary values of nationalism and immigration and gained broad support (Akkerman and Hagelund 2007; Pellikaan et al. 2007). In a similar way Aarts and Thomassen (2008) show, with examples from Dutch voters, that political conflicts are quite stable with the exception of a cultural cleavage operationalized by integration vs. demarcation of immigration, ethnicity and European unification. Kitschelt (2012: 246) argues that populist radical right parties intensify their anti-immigrant group appeal while they are letting go of some parts of their authoritarian grid positions, such as family roles, gender roles, and laws and justice.

In the next, and final, section of the theory chapter I elaborate on the content of the three dimensions and present my hypotheses.

2.6 The content of the three-dimensional political space

This section presents and discusses the political dimensions constituting grid, group and greed, and demonstrates the different issues and categories implemented into each of the three dimensions. I also present my hypotheses: one for each of the political dimensions.

In Kitschelt's original framework, he argued that the slogan of the French revolution marked the corner stone of the political space, constituting three ultimate values. He used the concept of *fraternity* to explain the contents of the cultural libertarian–authoritarian dimension, while he used the concepts of *equality* and *liberty* to explain the contents of the economic dimension (Kitschelt 1994). Other researchers argue that these ultimate values are separate values that can be used in the same framework (Sachs 2012). These ultimate values fit with the main concepts (or ultimate values) of the three-dimensional political space.

2.6.1 Redistributive and market-liberal greed

The *greed* dimension represents the old economic dimension that Kitschelt (1994) named socialist–capitalist which spans from a socialist left to a capitalist right. The economic dimension is divided between people wanting equal economic opportunities for all with generous income redistribution and welfare policies at the one extreme, and people wanting less redistribution, lower taxation and free markets at the other extreme. I have chosen to name the two poles of

the economic dimension *redistribution* and *market-liberal*. Issues typically represented by the economic dimension are questions of deregulation, redistribution, budgetary policy (taxes) and welfare spending. Kitschelt (1994) argues that the economic dimension in a great degree can be centred around the conflict between private and public, and domestic and international economic competition. Kriesi et al. (2008) categorize the economic dimension by market-liberal free trade at the integration pole and a protectionist national position at the demarcation pole. They also, like Kitschelt, include questions about the welfare state, distribution of assets and questions about taxation in their operationalization of the economic dimension. In Kitschelt's later work, re-theorizing the political space, and introducing the economic dimension as *greed*, he focus more on the economic dimension as containing questions of (re)distribution (Kitschelt 2012).

Although Kitschelt (2012) argues that *money matters most*, he also hypothesizes the economic dimension to matter *less* for voting behaviour in countries where the mainstream parties agree on the most important economic issues, such as redistribution and welfare spending. In these cases, he expects the PRR-voters to be placed at the centre on the economic *greed*-dimension in the three-dimensional political space. The economic dimension, and issues concerning the economy in general, have traditionally been regarded as important for populist radical right parties and voters (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). In Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space, he expects voters of populist radical right parties to have moved either from the right pole to the centre, or to have remained at the right side of the economic *greed*-dimension. Regardless of the expected placement of voters in the political space, the economic *greed*-dimension is expected to be an important factor for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in contemporary Western European democracies. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H₁: *The greed-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

2.6.2 Inclusive and exclusive group

The issues on the *group*-dimension have, in the previous theoretical frameworks, been included in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension. Political and social issues connected to the *group*-dimension include questions of citizenship, immigration, European integration and questions of nationalism and ethnic diversity. Important for the group dimension is the question of inclusion or exclusion towards the different groups and issues presented here. Should immigrants be included or excluded from citizenship rights? Should they have the right to vote? Should immigrants and

ethnic minorities have their rights protected?

Group-issues concerning immigration and ethnic minorities have been considered the most important issues for populist radical right parties and voters. Populist radical right parties need to at least mobilize voters on such issues to be classified as a PRR-party (Mudde 2007). Kitschelt (2012: 245) hypothesized that PRR-parties and voters would be placed on the exclusionary side on the *group*-dimension when compared to the other mainstream parties and voters. The substantial importance of these values have been one of the reasons for re-theorizing the political space. Combining values of other dimensions can potentially be overshadowed by the group-issues. In addition, as demonstrated by Pim Fortuyn, populist radical right parties and voters can be divided on other cultural issues than those belonging to the *group*-dimension.

Although the issues belonging to the *group*-dimension are argued to be important, and sometimes the most important, scholars strongly argue against perceiving them as single-issue parties (Carter 2005). In the re-theorized framework constituting a three-dimensional political space, the *group*-dimension is perceived as an important concept for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. This leads to the following hypothesis:

H₂: *The group-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

2.6.3 Libertarian and authoritarian *grid*

The *grid*-dimension is similar to the one that Kitschelt (1994) labelled *libertarian–authoritarian*. Different in this framework, is the separation of group-issues as an individual and independent dimension. The ultimate value of *liberty* is a good representative for the *grid*-dimension. The theoretical framework of this thesis has captured the issues in the libertarian–authoritarian dimension by contrasting libertarians versus authoritarians, or communitarians. Sachs (2012) similarly emphasizes the ultimate value of *liberty* by contrasting the values of libertarians versus communitarians. He argues that:

libertarians' fear of developing a statist or collectivist society that suppresses choice, decision-making, the uniqueness of individuals, and that submerges our individuality and diversity by converting us all into mere members of groups or communities (Sachs 2012: 370).

In this way Sachs (2012) argues that individuals and individuality are essential values in the concept of *liberty*. In grid-group cultural theory, this is argued to be one of the defining features

of the *grid*-dimension. The basic principles constituting the *grid*-dimension, is the *boundary drawing* amongst individuals, constituting law and order issues, restrictions of the freedom of each individual, e.g. religious freedom and gender equality (Lockhart 1999).

Kriesi et al. (2008) separate a cultural and an economic dimension that they argue to constitute the political space. Dolezal (2008) presents six different categories, in addition to a residual category, to classify the cultural dimension. Each of the six categories represents a handful of different issues. Combining that many distinct issues and categories together to capture the variation and structure of *one* political dimension can become too much. The accumulation of issues and categories by Kriesi et al. (2008) is in itself an argument for the separation of cultural issues into two different political dimensions; as argued by Kitschelt (2012: 245) combining values of other dimensions can potentially be overshadowed by the group-issues. Issues that might not have been important for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting, may have been treated as important because of the strong effect of the *group*-issues.

Kitschelt (2012) emphasized that populist radical right parties and voters could be placed in both the libertarian, centre and authoritarian poles of the *grid*-dimension in the three-dimensional political space, depending on the countries examined. He argues that while PRR-parties intensify their *group*-appeal they may let go of some of their authoritarian *grid*-positions. The positioning of the voters on the *grid*-dimension may be different depending on the countries examined. Following Kitschelt (2012) this leads to the following hypothesis:

H₃: *The grid-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

3

Data and methodology

This chapter will discuss the methods and data chosen to best answer the research question of this thesis. The methods chosen for this thesis will be presented first followed by a discussion of the assumptions of the methodological approach. Finally I discuss the data foundation of this thesis.

3.1 A quantitative approach with logistic regression analysis

This thesis aims to operationalize the three-dimensional political space in Western European democracies, and to probe the explanatory power of these dimensions for explaining the populist radical right vote. In order to do so I have chosen to apply a quantitative approach. To be able to generalize, a quantitative approach is necessary, as well as being able to measure effects across a large sample of observation (George and Bennett 2004). George and Bennett (2004) argue that a potential weakness with the quantitative approach is the relations to the objects being researched. In quantitative methods this relation is distant, but as long as the research question and the methodological choices are strongly embedded in the theoretical framework one ensures good validity. An advantage with this thesis is that the variables chosen are strictly embedded in the theories and thoroughly discussed, both theoretically and analytically. This remedies some of the distance towards the research objects.

Due to categorized dependent variables, ordinary OLS (ordinary least squares) is not sufficient. My dependent variable in part one of this analysis is a dichotomy of *vote for a populist radical right party*. In part two it has multiple categories. The original variable asks the respondents what party they voted for in the last national election. Respondents have been coded as 1

if they have voted for a PRR-party and 0 if they have not. Although logistic regression is different from ordinary regression analysis, the goal is the same, and that is to find the best fitting and interpretable model to describe the relationship between an outcome variable and a set of explanatory variables (Hosmer, Lameshow, and Sturdivant 2013: 1). The distinguishing feature of a logistic regression model is that the outcome variable is binary or dichotomous.¹ The general principles of logistic regression is more or less the same as for ordinary regression models, as long as this difference is accounted for (Hosmer et al. 2013).

Figure 3.1: Illustration of linear versus non-linear relationship




Figure 3.1 compares the curvilinear relationship of the logistic regression model with the linear relationship found in an ordinary least squares model (Menard 2002: 8). The dotted line represents the linear model, while the S-shaped curvilinear line represents the logistic curve. Here the values of the discrete binary dependent variable are transformed into a logistic curve that is S-shaped. The S-shaped curve represents the probability of an event (Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson 2010: 338). It moves between 0 and 1, but never reaches them.

¹With a dichotomous dependent variable there are two kinds of binary regression models that are mostly used for research: logistic regression and probit regression. The two models are very similar and results are almost identical (Skog 2004: 390). Choosing the one over the other should not have any impact on the research results.

3.1.1 The binary model

Formally, the binary logit model can be written as²

$$Pr(y = 1 | x) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta x)}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta x)}$$

The error term ε is not included in this equation because it can be calculated from y . In this equation, ε is assumed to be logistically distributed with $\text{Var}(\varepsilon) = \pi^2/3$ which leads to the formal binary logit model presented above. The value assumed for $\text{Var}(\varepsilon)$ does not affect the value of the probability. It changes the spread of the distribution but not the proportion of the distribution above or below the threshold (0 and 1) (Long and Freese 2006: 134). The error term in logistic regression analysis is different from ordinary linear regression analysis. It is not normally distributed and it is not homoscedastic (Skog 2004: 360).

The results from logistic regression analysis can be estimated in two different ways: as odds ratios or as logged odds. The odds ratios expresses the probability in terms of the odds of $y = 1$ (Baum 2006: 253). It describes how much more likely an outcome is to occur than for another. If an outcome has 80 percent probability of occurring and 20 percent for not occurring then the odds will be $0.8/0.2=4$. The odds is four times larger for the outcome to occur than not to occur (Skog 2004: 363). An advantage with estimating the results as odds is that they are easy to interpret. However, the results presented in this thesis will not be presented as odds but as probabilities calculated from the logged odds. The logit has no upper or lower boundary. When the probability of an outcome to occur comes closer to 1, the logit has a positive direction. When the probability of an outcome to occur comes closer to 0, the logit moves towards a negative direction (Pampel 2000: 13). It is important to note that the odds, logit and probabilities are three different ways to express exactly the same thing (Menard 2002: 13). The logit and odds are estimated in the statistical package, while the (predicted) probabilities are being calculated on the basis of either the odds or the logit.

3.1.2 The multinomial model

This thesis sets out to explain if and how voters can be categorized alongside a three-dimensional political space. In order to do this it is necessary to compare the voters of the populist radical right

²All equations presented here are from Long and Freese (2006). All the equations presented in this chapter are constructed as probability models.

parties, not just with all other voters in a dichotomy, but with the voters of the other mainstream parties. In this way, the voters of PRR-parties can be categorized to the left, centre or right of the voters of the other parties on the three dimensions. In order to do this, I use the multinomial logistic regression model, where the voters of the populist radical right parties in each country are compared with the mainstream voters of the left and right.

An outcome is nominal when there are several unordered categories. The multinomial logit model *can be thought of as simultaneously estimating binary logits for all comparisons among the alternatives* (Long and Freese 2006: 224).

The formal statement of the multinomial logistic regression model can be written as

$$\ln \Omega_{m|b}(x) = \ln \frac{Pr(y = m | x)}{Pr(y = b | x)} = x\beta_{m|b} \text{ for } m = 1 \text{ to } J$$

b represents the base category and is also referred to as the comparison group. For the comparison group, the log odds of an outcome will always be 0 when it is compared to itself, meaning that the effects of the independent variables will also be 0. This can be solved by computing the predicted probabilities:

$$Pr(y = m | x) = \frac{\exp(x\beta_{m|1})}{\sum_{j=1}^J \exp(x\beta_{j|b})}$$

The predicted probability is the same regardless of the base outcome b . Although the output of the model changes with different base outcomes, the probability remains the same. The base outcome used in this thesis is always the vote for a populist radical right party (Long and Freese 2006: 228).

3.1.3 Model estimation

Model estimation for logistic regression analysis is different than that of an ordinary regression model. Because of the nonlinearity of the dichotomous dependent variable and the nominal dependent variable, different estimation methods are used. Logistic regression uses *maximum likelihood* to estimate the models. Maximum likelihood estimates *are the values of the parameters that have the greatest likelihood (i.e., the maximum likelihood) of generating the observed sample of data if the assumptions of the model are true* (Long and Freese 2006: 76). The likelihood

function calculates the probability of the observed data if a given set of parameter estimates were actually true.

The basic measure of estimating how well the maximum likelihood procedure fits the model is by the *likelihood value*. In logistic regression analysis, the measuring of model estimation fit is estimated by the value of -2 times the log of the likelihood value. This value is usually referred to as $-2LL$. The minimum value of $-2LL$ is zero and refers to a perfect model fit. Low values therefore indicates that the model fits well, while large values indicates that the model fits poorly (Hair et al. 2010: 419-420). The $-2LL$ values will not be directly presented in this thesis. Instead I present the likelihood ratio value (LR). The likelihood ratio is a test based on the likelihood value of the model that has been estimated and a model based on H_0 (Baum 2006: 256). H_0 claims that the probability of $Y=1$ (in this case vote for a PRR-party) is the same regardless of the values on the independent variables (X). The difference between the $-2LL$ value of the model based on H_0 and the full model constitutes the value of likelihood ratio (Skog 2004: 375). A significant LR test indicates that the effect of the independent variable being equivalent to zero can be rejected (Long and Freese 2006: 144).

In addition to the likelihood ratio test, this thesis uses pseudo R^2 and AIC (Akaike's information criterion) as additional measures of model fit. As for the LR test, pseudo R^2 is also based on the value of $-2LL$. The R^2 value ranges from 0.0 to 1.0 where 1.0 represents a model with perfect fit (Hair et al. 2010: 420). Pseudo R^2 can be measured by different techniques. This thesis uses the measure of McFadden's R^2 . McFadden's R^2 is known as the *likelihood-ratio index* and compares a model with just the intercept to a model with all the parameters (Long and Freese 2006: 109). Regarding Akaike's information criterion, all else being equal, the model with the lowest AIC are considered the model with the best fit (Long and Freese 2006: 112). AIC is calculated using the likelihood of the model and the number of parameters in the model. The value reported by Stata is equal to the N times this value (Long and Freese 2006). Regardless of this, the model with the highest pseudo R^2 and lowest AIC, is the better-fitting model.

3.2 Assumptions of the logistic regression model

In this section I discuss the assumptions of the logistic regression models as well as the results from the different tests. The assumptions of the logistic regression model are equivalent, but simpler than those of an ordinary least square model. Because of the dichotomous or nominal

dependent variable the requirements for the error term is different. The error term does not have to be homoscedastic and it does not have to be normally distributed. There are three main assumptions of the logistic regression model.

The first assumption regards the logistic regression curve. The curve of the logistic regression analysis needs to be curvilinear, or S-shaped. This can be tested by performing a Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The Hosmer-Lemeshow test measures the deviation between predicted and observed frequencies. Results from the Hosmer-Lemeshow test that are not statistically significant ($p > .05$) suggest that the model cannot be rejected (Skog 2004: 381-382). If the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is statistically significant this indicates that the model is not S-shaped. Non S-shaped models can be remedied by including a polynomial variable or dummy variables (Skog 2004: 385). This assumption was checked for by using the Hosmer-Lemeshow test. The binary regression models in the analysis chapter have been tested. None of them have significant results and it is fair to say that the models fit the S-shaped curves well (Skog 2004: 383-385).

The second assumption regards the error term. The variation in the error term needs to be independent. This assumption is always achieved with a random sample. This is the case for the European Social Survey where the observations are independent and not influenced by each other (Skog 2004: 380). The assumption is more vital for time series data and panel data analysis. Because the data gathered by The European Social Survey have been selected with a random sample the second assumption is accounted for.

The third assumption is of spuriousness. The relationship between the dependent and the independent variables should not be caused by underlying factors that could be the cause of the dependent variable, as well as correlated with the independent variables (Skog 2004: 380). The most important remedy for spuriousness is a solid theoretical foundation and operationalization of the variables included in the analysis. The theoretical foundation as well as the variable operationalization in this thesis is solid. In addition to this, a multivariate model increases the reliability that the results are not spurious. The binary and multinomial logistic regression model make the assumption that the odds do not depend on other available alternatives. The assumption is known as the *independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)* (Long and Freese 2006: 243). To test the *IIA* one compares the estimated coefficients of the full model, with those of a restricted model. This can be done by performing a Hausman–McFadden test and a Small-Hsiao test. Both tests examine the H_0 that the odds of the outcome of the full versus restricted model are independent of other alternatives. The third assumption is the most important one as well

as the most difficult to account for. Both the Hausman–McFadden test and the Small-Hsiao test concludes that there are no underlying spuriousness affecting the results. The tests was performed by estimating the full multinomial model for each country, and then estimating a restricted model. Both tests concluded that the H_0 could be supported. The odds of the outcome of the full versus restricted model are therefore independent of other alternatives.

3.3 Data: why use surveys?

Surveys provide us with essential information regarding mass opinion on political issues (Johnston 2008: 385). The research question of this thesis is directly connected to the attitudes of PRR-voters. This makes survey data ideal for answering the research question.

Choosing the data to create the foundation for this thesis was a long process. Several surveys were closely considered and evaluated. First of all I chose to use international surveys and not national surveys. There are positive and negative sides to both. National surveys contain more questions and more observations than international surveys, but on the other hand it creates challenges when wanting to compare across countries because the different surveys asks different questions to the respondents. The weaknesses of the national surveys are the strengths of the international surveys, and vice versa. The international surveys have fewer observations and questions, but at the same time it gives researchers the advantage of comparability across countries. This exact advantage of comparability is the main reason that I chose to focus on the international surveys.

The datasets considered for this thesis were the European Social Survey (ESS), the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), the European Values Survey (EVS), the World Values Survey (WVS) and Eurobarometer. There are many reasons for choosing the European Social Survey. It is well-documented, it is academically driven, and it has been used in many published articles by well-known researchers. There are, nonetheless, four main reasons that determined my choice for the European Social Survey for conducting this analysis.

1. The ESS has variables that asks the respondents what party they actually voted for in the last national election and not what they think they would vote. Asking the respondents what party they actually voted for is a more precise measure which I believe has more validity.
2. The Western European countries are well represented in the ESS.

3. The ESS contains variables representing the essence of the three dimensions. This makes the ESS an ideal data-foundation for this thesis.
4. It is the survey that is most *up to date*. The interviews for the latest version of the ESS were conducted in 2012 and makes it unique in capturing attitudes structured on three dimensions.

An advantage with some of the other surveys, and especially the World Values Survey, is that it provides time-series data which makes it possible to map attitudes over time. However, this is not the goal for this analysis, but I would recommend future research to investigate this further. For instance, the World Values Survey is carrying out a new wave from 2010–2014. This would make excellent data for capturing attitudes over time on three dimensions.

3.3.1 The European Social Survey

The European Social Survey is a cross-national large-scale survey and is academically driven. The ESS has been conducted every two years since its starting year in 2001. The ESS measures patterns in attitudes, beliefs and behaviour of diverse populations in more than thirty countries (ESS 2014: 5). The data gathered by the European Social Survey are selected by strict random probability sampling, and the data gathering is conducted by face-to-face interviews (ESS 2014: 7). I use the newest version from the ESS, round 6. The 6th round contains data gathered from 24 different countries from all over Europe. The complete dataset contains 46257 respondents. As I only include countries from Western Europe in my analysis, as well as countries with a significant populist radical right party, I only examine seven countries in this thesis. The countries included in this analysis are Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Flanders and the Netherlands.

4

Operationalizing the three-dimensional political space

In the following subsections I will account for my operationalization of the variables representing the three-dimensional political space included in this analysis. I will discuss them according to the theories presented in this thesis and according to previous research. I will also account for the validity of the different variables.

4.1 Theorizing concepts

To construct, aggregate or evaluate concepts one must first consider the theories embodied in the concept (Goertz 2008: 103). I have already made clear that this thesis introduces two contributions– operationalizing and testing the new theories constituting the three-dimensional political space. The following part of this thesis constitutes the first contribution. I do this, as Goertz (2008) suggests, by considering the theories embodied in the concept. The following sections will assess each of the variables according to its contributions to the different dimensions based on the theories presented in the theory chapter. Operationalizing the three-dimensional political space based on the existing theories is essential. In addition to this I will empirically test if the chosen issues load on the dimensions that I expect them to, by using principal components analysis.

There are two main ways to create indices¹. The first is theoretical and analytical, the second is empirical and driven by data. This part of the analysis will employ the first approach,

¹For an excellent introduction to construct scales in a similar way as I do, see Evans and Heath (1995).

driven by theories. The advantage of using the theoretical and analytical approach, is that it is not easily influenced by factors from the outside. I also want to create indices because the structure of the political space is much more than just single issues. Creating indices better represents the dimensionality that this thesis seeks to examine. The three dimensions that have been theoretically outlined in the theory chapter, can be captured as concepts. The three dimensions constitutes three different concepts with different content. In the sections to follow I will emphasize the content of the variables from the European Social Survey 2012 that, based on the theories, best classifies the concepts of the three dimensions.

In the further analysis of this thesis, I am interested in how voters of populist radical right parties can be placed in the three-dimensional political space. All the different issues that are presented in the operationalizing sections will therefore contain a direction, so that it is clear exactly how the voters are expected to be situated.

4.2 The dependent variable

The dependent variable for this thesis is the respondent's vote-choice. The following question was asked of all respondents: *What party did you vote for in the last national election of [country]*. This results in one variable per country. The different variables were then recoded into dichotomous variables, where 1 represents vote for a populist radical right party, and 0 represents vote for all other parties. I have created one variable which joins the different countries and one variable for each country. This has been done so that the analysis can be run both jointly and separately for each country.

I wanted to use a survey that asked the respondents what party they actually voted for because this is the variable with the highest validity. A disadvantage with such a question is that voters might not remember what party they voted for, or they do not want to answer, which eventually results in many missing values ².

To be able to draw conclusions based on the results it is important that enough respondents have actually voted for the party that is being examined. I have chosen countries with a populist radical right party that reached the overall threshold of five percent in the national election before the 2012 collection of ESS data. This is to ensure that an adequate number of respondents have voted for the populist radical right when conducting survey research. The descriptive statistics

²The respondents that did not remember what party they voted for, or refused to answer have been coded as missing values and excluded from the analysis.

from table 4.1 demonstrate the dichotomous dependent variable for each country. The columns to the left represent the frequencies of voters who have voted for the populist radical right, and voters who have *not* voted for the populist radical right. The column to the right represents the amount of populist radical right voters in percent ³.

Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of *vote* based on the seven countries

	PRR	Non-PRR	Min	Max	Percentage PRR-voters
Dependent variable					
Vote	733	7198	0	1	9.24
Norway	125	987	0	1	11.24
Denmark	105	1101	0	1	8.71
Sweden	58	1250	0	1	4.43
Finland	194	1239	0	1	13.54
Switzerland	119	560	0	1	17.53
Flanders	46	844	0	1	5.17
The Netherlands	86	1217	0	1	6.60
N=7931					

The overall percentage of voters who voted for a populist radical right party based on all the seven countries is 9.24 (733 respondents), which is an overall good representative number of respondents that have voted for the PRR. The results from the following analysis is therefore reliable based on the frequencies of the dependent variable. Based on the frequencies from table 4.1 there are two countries with a lower number of respondents representing the populist radical right voters: Sweden and Flanders. The N of PRR-voters in Sweden and Flanders for the ESS 2012 is 58 and 46.

For the separate country analysis, I use both binary and multinomial logistic regression analysis, comparing the populist radical right voters with the voters of the other mainstream parties of the left and right. I also include those who did not vote for any party ⁴. When conducting the separate country analysis, Sweden and Flanders needs to be treated with care because of the low response rate amongst the populist radical right voters.

³The numbers in table 4.1 are based on the data set with no missing values to get the most precise results.
⁴Respondents who did not remember what party they voted for, or refused to answer are still excluded from the analysis.

4.3 The independent variables

In the following section I will account for the operationalization of the independent variables. The variables will be grouped and discussed in order of the three different political dimensions outlined in the theory chapter. I will explain in detail how and why the different variables are of importance as well as account for their validity for the research question of this thesis (Moses and Knutsen 2007: 60; King et al. 1994: 151).

4.3.1 Operationalizing *greed*

This part of the analysis will concentrate around finding variables that are fitted to represent the three-dimensional political space. To be able to answer the research question asking if such a three-dimensional political space is needed to map populist radical right voters, I need variables that can be grouped together representing each dimension, but that nevertheless can be compared with the other dimensions. For conducting this analysis I will start by presenting the variables representing the economic *greed*-dimension. I have chosen to build my model starting with the economic dimension because this is the dimension that has been used to classify political parties and voters the most. It therefore serves as a good starting point. Since the 1950s, theoretical frameworks for understanding voting behaviour and political competition have been diverse and separated. The theoretical frameworks developed from the economic tradition have had major influence. A grand contributor in this respect is the work *An Economic Theory of Democracy* by Downs (1957). This book inspired many scholars of political science, including Kitschelt. An important contribution by Downs, that inspired Kitschelt's theorization, was the economic element, and mainly that political competition unfolds along a left—right political axis. This axis spans from a socialist left to a market-liberal right, as already explained in the theory chapter.

The *greed*-dimension contains attitudes towards state ownership and economic intervention in the economy, as well as production, industrialization, welfare spending, redistribution, and privatization and open markets (Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990; Harvey 2005).

Many academic researchers have argued that a market-liberal view on economics is an important feature of PRR-parties (Betz 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995). Other scholars have argued that market-liberal economics is not a defining feature and rather a secondary feature for PRR-parties (Arzheimer 2008; Mudde 2007). Mudde (2007) argues that PRR-parties use the economy to accentuate their nativist, authoritarian and populist appeal, but nevertheless

argues that the economic issues are not a core feature of the PRR-parties' political platform. Rydgren (2004: 127) demonstrates that economic issues are of secondary importance for the PRR-party Front National in France. Mudde may be right in that economic liberalism is a secondary feature of PRR-parties, but if we take a look at the history of some parties, we will find other examples. Fremskrittspartiet (then called Anders Lange's Party) in Norway started out as a market-liberal party introducing tax-reduction and public intervention as their main political platform (Hagelund 2005: 149). It was not until the mid 1980's that the immigration-issue became important for FrP (Hagelund 2005: 150). Zaslove (2009) argues that although economic issues no longer can be regarded as a defining core feature of PRR-parties, it is nevertheless an important issue that needs to be taken into account in analyzing such parties.

I have chosen two variables to represent the economic *greed*-dimension. The first variable, *gvctzpv*, asks the respondents if they believe it is important for democracy that the government protects all citizens against poverty. The variable ranges from 0 to 10. High values indicate that *the government should not protect all citizens against poverty*. I have named this variable *economic protection*. This is a variable connected to the welfare state and involvement in the state economy. According to Kitschelt's theories, populist radical right voters should be opponents of a welfare system that protects citizens. The left pole of this variable signifies attitudes supportive of the welfare state in protecting citizens against poverty, while the right pole of this variable signifies opposition of the welfare state in protecting citizens against poverty. The validity of this variable is good for two main reasons. The first is that it represents an essential issue in the economic *greed*-dimension by focusing on the protection of citizens against poverty which is directly connected to the welfare state. The second is the use of the word *citizens*. A reason for populist radical right voters being sceptical towards universal welfare policies is the universal terminology. Including the word *citizens* in the variable-question excludes the *group*-element from this variable, increasing its validity. Voters with rightist attitudes on this variable should be motivated by the economic *greed*-dimension alone, and not influenced by the other dimensions.

The second variable *grdfinc*, asks the respondents if they believe it is important for democracy in general that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels. The variable ranging from 0 to 10 and is coded so that high values indicate that *it is not important for democracy that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels*. I have named this variable *income redistribution*. This variable represents the redistribution-issue of the economic *greed*-dimension. The *equality*-term is very central for this variable. Should people be

equal in the means of income, or should they not? As for the *economic protection*-variable, the rightist pole signifies a minimum level of government intervention in the economy, but in this case, by not reducing the differences in income levels.

The economic issues in the European Social Survey 2012 are not as well represented in surveys as cultural issues. This is a common issue with most surveys where attitudes towards economic issues are not as commonly represented as attitudes towards political and cultural issues (Dolezal 2008: 61). Using a certain data material sets some boundaries of what issue-categories are represented. The most important issue categories for the economic *greed*-dimension are covered by the ESS 2012. Ideally I would have chosen more than two variables to represent the different aspects of the economic dimension including taxes, privatization, the welfare state as well as the two issues already included. Unfortunately, the two variables are the only variables including an economic issue present in the ESS (2012). Another reason is that Kitschelt (2012) could be right in expecting economic issues of being of second importance, or perhaps not important for PRR-voting at all.

Both of the variables chosen to represent this political dimension are coded so that they measure rightist market-liberal economic preferences from the respondents. Positive coefficients in the further analysis indicate more market-liberal attitudes for the populist radical right voters. Table 4.2 below represents descriptive statistics of the two variables based on the seven countries.

Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for *greed* based on the seven countries

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Greed				
Income redistribution	2.39	2.21	0	10
Economic protection	1.57	1.75	0	10
N=7931				

It is clear from table 4.2 that the mean distribution of the two economic variables are quite low, with a mean of 2.39 for the *income redistribution*-variable and 1.57 for the *economic protection*-variable. This indicates that the voters examined in this thesis, are generally to the left on the economic axis. The descriptive statistics in the table above is based on all the voters from all seven countries with listwise deletion of missing values (Allison 2001). Although the descriptive statistics does not show the distribution of means for the different countries, it can be expected that the Nordic countries are more supportive towards state intervention in the economy than the other countries in this analysis. This is because the Nordic countries has a strong tradition for a strong and well-functioning welfare state ensured by large state intervention (Kleinman 2002).

4.3.2 Operationalizing *group*

In grid-group cultural theory, politics is, in the first place, about drawing boundaries. The boundaries that are drawn constitutes the *group*-dimension where the line is drawn between friends and foes. For populist radical right parties, this is done by categorizing the in-group and the out-group. Who belongs to the in-group and who belongs to the out-group? Who are *the others*? The *group*-dimension represents the nativist appeal of populist radical right parties and their voters.

Countless research have found issues of immigration and ethnicity important for PRR-voting in Western European democracies. It can therefore be argued that attitudes representing the *greed*-dimension and the *group*-dimension have been the dominant issues that should be stable across countries. The *group*-dimension outlined in this thesis represents the *group*-issue. I have carefully selected four different variables to represent the *group*-dimension based on the theories. In this section I will outline the issues from the European Social Survey that best describe the group-appeal of the *group*-dimension. What is interesting about the *group*-dimension is that all issues containing an *us* and *them* classification can theoretically be categorized as an issue belonging to the *group*-concept. Following Goertz (2006: 27), concepts are about ontology and deciding what is important about an entity. For the *group*-dimension the important characteristics are the separation of an *in-group* and an *out-group*. The issues that will be discussed here, all represent a group-appeal referring to an *in-group* and an *out-group*.

The variable *eufyf* represents the EU-issue. Respondents were asked if they believe that European unification should go further or if it has already gone too far. The variable ranges from 0 to 10 where high values indicate that *European unification has already gone too far*. Populist radical right parties are not in favour of the European Union⁵. Dansk Folkeparti (DF) have stated that they want to leave the EU and that they oppose it (Mudde 2007: 163). Buch and Hansen (2002) have demonstrated that the Danish people have a very low level of identification towards Europe, and that they are more attached to the nation itself. European governments are restricted in their policies by the European Union due to European integration (Fennema 2005). Thus PRR-parties regard the EU as an outside threat, making decisions on behalf of others, weakening national borders and threatening nationality (Mudde 2007; Eatwell 2005; Kriesi and Frey 2008; Almeida 2010). I have named this variable *European Union*. The *European Union*-variable can be regarded as a controversial issue. This is because it can contain more attitudes than just the one

⁵FrP is an exception.

representing this dimension. Both economic issues and exclusive attitudes towards immigration can be captured by this variable, as well as believing in a strong state. The EU has become part of a shared authoritative power with national and subnational governments. European integration has involved deepening and broadening of authoritative decision-making (Marks and Wilson 2000: 436). Nevertheless, Kriesi et al. (2008) emphasize European integration as one of the defining features of populist radical right parties brought about by globalization and immigration. According to the theories, the EU-issue is to consider as a central issue for populist radical right parties. Theoretically, this should also be an issue that mobilizes the voters of populist radical right parties. For the *European Union*-variable the European unification refers to the out-group, while the in-group is the nation either wanting to expand European unification, or believing that it has gone too far.

Populist radical right parties are very sceptical towards ethnic minorities. They find it intolerable that ethnic minorities and their rights are protected, and especially within the borders of *their* state (Mudde 2007: 149). In the ESS 2012, the variable *imsfetrn*, asks the respondents if they believe that their country should allow people of a different race or ethnic group as the country's majority to come and live there. The variable ranges from 0 to 3 where high values indicate that *the country should not allow people of a different race or ethnic group as country's majority to come and live here*. I have named this variable *multiculturalism*. The defence of national identity against all threats, both outside and inside the state, is a core element of the populist radical right party family (Betz 2005: 34). The term *ethnic minorities* are connected to all groups that is not the majority of a country, being Samis in Norway, Muslims in Denmark or Indonesians in the Netherlands. Pim Fortuyn stated that *Democracy with its free expression, its separation of church and state and equality between men and women, in short our way of life, is too precious to let them be traded in for the green totalitarianism of Islam* (Betz 2005: 35). He regarded Islam as a great threat to liberal democracy and wanted to get rid of it with all means possible. The *multiculturalism*-variable refers to ethnic minorities/groups and people of a different race as the out-group. In this case, the in-group is the country's majority, or the nation. The variable asks a clear question that does not involve any noise in involving other dimensions, and most importantly it represent both immigration and ethnic minorities which are essential issue-categories for the *group*-dimension.

The goal of this section has been to choose variables based on theoretical evidence, by discussing the content of the variables and how they can contribute best in representing the

group-dimension in the further analysis. The next variable represents the group-issue excellently. The variable *imueclt* from the ESS 2012, asks the respondents if they would say that their country's cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants. It ranges from 0 to 10, and high values indicate that *the country's cultural life is undermined by immigrants*. I have named this variable *cultural threat*. The variable represents an important feature of populist radical right parties. They believe that some groups of ethnic origin or cultural background do not belong in their ethnocentric concept of society. In their opinion, immigration, the concepts of citizenship, and multiculturalism represents a fundamental threat to liberal democracy (Betz 2005: 36). Immigrants and ethnic minorities are regarded as the *out-group* and therefore understood as a threat to the superior *in-group* which represents the nation. The essence of the group-issue is captured excellently by the *cultural threat*-variable. The *cultural threat*-variable represents the external threat of immigration from outside which may cause changes to the country and is expected to be perceived as dangerous and threatening by PRR-voters. It captures the nationalistic element from the *group*-dimension excellently, that immigration is regarded as an outside threat towards the pure in-group (Mudde 2007).

As already made clear, the essence of the *group*-dimension is the group-element. What should be done with immigrant- and ethnic minority groups? How do these groups affect the country? What rights should they have? The variable *imwbcnt* asks the respondents if they would say that their country is made a worse or better place to live because of immigration. The variable ranges from 0 to 10. High values indicate that *immigrants make the country a worse place to live*. I have named this variable *quality of life*. Populist radical right parties have, by many scholars, been categorized as single-issue parties. Mudde (2007), though not considering the populist radical right parties as single-issue parties, argues that the minimalist definition of PRR-parties must contain the nativist appeal. To be classified as a populist radical right party, the parties must at least mobilize voters over the immigration-issue. The *quality of life*-variable is a good measure of this nativist appeal. It captures the attitudes of voters who believe that the country is made a worse place to live because of immigrants, and clearly separates the in-group from the out-group.

Table 4.3 represents the descriptive statistics of the four variables chosen to represent the *group*-dimension of this thesis.

Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics for *group* based on the seven countries

Group	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
European Union	5.07	2.38	0	10
Quality of life	4.27	2.05	0	10
Cultural threat	3.49	2.19	0	10
Multiculturalism	1.24	.783	0	3
N=7931				

The *European Union*-variable has, in the entire sample, a mean placed at the centre. The *quality of life*-variable and the *cultural threat*-variable have slightly lower means than the *European Union*-variable. This indicates that, based on the entire sample, voters are overall quite inclusive towards immigrants, with more centrist attitudes towards the EU.

4.3.3 Operationalizing *grid*

In the paragraphs ahead, I will present and discuss the selection of variables representing the *grid*-dimension. This will be done in the same way as above, by focusing on the theoretical consistency of the variables. I have started by going back to older work such as Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), and worked my way up to the most recent theories by Kitschelt (2012). Adorno et al. (1950) classified the authoritarian personality using Freudian techniques. The concept of *authoritarianism* was classified as *predispositions to intolerance*. However, the seminal study of Adorno et al. (1950) have received both theoretical and methodological critique, especially for their Freudian perspective on the childhood origins of authoritarianism (Altemeyer 1981; Stenner 2005). Going back to grid–group cultural theory, I have already emphasized that politics in the first place is about boundary drawing. Secondly, politics is about the importance of following a certain amount of rules. This constitutes the *grid*-dimension, i.e. sharing obligatory rules, as well as the members of the society’s rights. These rights are, e.g. to express their preferences, choosing their own life style, and following traditions and customs (Kitschelt 2007: 1179). While the *group*-dimension is about group-membership, the *grid*-dimension is about restrictions on individual behaviour (Grendstad 2003: 2). Following Goertz (2006), the important characteristics of the *grid*-concept is the drawing of boundaries through rights and restrictions, making issues of law and order and choosing life style essential for capturing the essence of the *grid*-dimension. Based on this, and the theories laid out in the theory chapter, I have chosen five issues from the European Social Survey 2012 that best represents the *grid*-dimension.

An important contribution to the *grid*-dimension is the traditional element. The traditional

element includes gender issues, gay rights, family issues and religious issues. The European Social Survey 2012 has two questions concerning such traditional issues. I have chosen two different variables to represent the traditional element of the *grid*-dimension. The first variable, *freehms*, asks the respondents if gay men and lesbians should be free to live life as they wish. The variable ranges from 0 to 4 where high values indicate that *gay men and lesbians should not be free to live life as they wish*. I have named this variable *gay rights*. It is important to note that, depending on how you define it, the *gay rights*-variable can be linked to the *group*-dimension. This is because it contains an element of an in-group and an out-group, the out-group being gays and lesbians. If one follows the theories by Kitschelt (2012) it is important not to categorize sexual minorities in the same way as ethnic minorities and immigrants. These theories, inspired by the openly homosexual Pim Fortuyn, depend on liberal comprehensions of sexual minorities and gender roles to be correctly defined. It is therefore more accurate to categorize the variable concerning sexual minorities at the *grid*-dimension rather than at the inclusive–exclusive *group*-dimension. The *gay rights*-issue is one of the basic elements representing the *grid*-dimension. It represents a classical hierarchic element by asking what should be allowed and what should not. In this particular case the variable represents the rights of sexual minorities and if they should be free to live their lives as they wish. This variable has an obvious authoritarian element. Thinking back to the three ultimate values of the French revolution (equality, liberty and fraternity), this variable represents the value of liberty. It involves questions of freedom and the treatment of those committed to a certain lifestyle. The *gay rights*-variable is one of the variables that most clearly cannot be connected to immigration in one way or another. Although it contains a group-element it is fair to say that authoritarian versus libertarian values on the *gay rights*-issue cannot be explained by exclusionist values towards immigration, as for example negative views on the universal welfare state. The *gay rights*-issue is, in this way, a great indicator for representing the *grid*-dimension without correlating with the issues representing the *group*-dimension.

The second variable representing the traditional element is *imptrad*. The variable asks the respondents if it is important to follow traditions and customs handed down by religion and family. The variable ranges from 0 to 5 where high values indicate that *it is important to follow traditions and customs*. I have named this variable *tradition*. Pim Fortuyn promoted anti-immigrant values along with liberal socio-cultural values regarding religion, gay marriage, euthanasia and gender values. Bornschieer (2010a) argues that traditional values and the protection of these values are important for the populist radical right and their electorate. Walzer (1990) argues

that traditionalist values are important for communitarianism. Universalistic principles may lead to violations of traditions within established communities. In this way, communitarianism argues that identities are grounded in our cultural tradition (Bornschieer 2010a). The protection of traditional values have been used to explain the influence of populist radical right parties (Minkenberg 2000). It stands as a contrast to multiculturalism rejecting different religions and customs. Following this train of thought, the *tradition*-variable can also be linked to immigration and the *group*-dimension, by wanting to protect tradition by rejecting the culture of immigrants. The variable, as it is, does not ask questions about immigration, but of following traditions and customs. As already argued, the essence of the *grid*-dimension is of boundary drawing and rights and restrictions. The boundary drawing for the *tradition*-variable is not a direct *law and order*-issue, but an expectation of individuals (of the in-group) to respect and honour their traditions and customs.

Another section included in the *grid*-dimension is one that often has been classified as a classic populist radical right feature, namely the authoritarian appeal. I use Mudde (2007; 2012) as the defining feature for classifying populist radical right parties. Mudde's maximum definition claims that populist radical right parties have a significant authoritarian appeal on politics. Altemeyer (1981) classified right-wing authoritarianism as the covariation of authoritarian regression, submission and conventionalism. Typical authoritarian issues are believing in a strong state, believing in the importance of following rules, and believing in the importance of a safe and secure society where criminal actions are punished severely (Mudde 2007: 145). These are classical issues concerning libertarian versus authoritarian values and should be included in the analysis. I have chosen three variables to represent the libertarian versus authoritarian element of the *grid*-dimension.

The first variable, *impsafe*, asks the respondents if they believe it is important to live in safe and secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger safety. The variable ranges from 0 to 5. I have coded the variable so that high values indicate that *it is important to live in secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger safety*. Respondents with high values for this variable are typically individuals with zero-tolerance for criminal actions. I have named this variable *security*. Security is an important part of the authoritarian appeal of populist radical right parties. Most parties call for the building of more prisons to be able to hold a secure and safe society. Most parties also argue that the current legal system is too soft and focused on rehabilitation rather than to protect citizens from the criminals (Mudde 2007: 146–147).

The second variable, *imprule*, asking the respondents if they believe it is important that people follow rules and do what they're told, ranges from 0 to 5. High values indicate that *it is important that people do what they're told and follow rules, even when no-one is watching*. This is a classic measure of authoritarianism where following rules and maintaining order is understood as the right thing to do. I have named this variable *follow rules*. The *follow rules*-variable is a good representative for Mudde's definition of authoritarianism. He argues that following rules and obeying authorities is a defining feature of the authoritarian element. In addition, the insubordination of the rules set by the authorities should be punished, sometimes severely. This variable captures the very essence of authoritarianism. Going back to the older and original texts of authoritarianism, Adorno et al. (1950) characterized an authoritarian person as being raised by strict rules and seeking the same pattern when becoming adults. The variable also corresponds with more updated definitions of authoritarianism by Stenner (2005). The boundary drawing that captures authoritarianism for this variable is the very core of this element, namely the importance of following rules at all times, even when no one is watching.

The third variable representing the authoritarian appeal, is *ipstrgv*. The variable asks the respondents if they believe it is important that the government ensures safety against threats and to live in a strong state that defends its citizens. The variable ranges from 0 to 5. High values indicate that *it is important that the government ensures safety against all threats and that the state is strong so it can defend its citizens*. I have named this variable *strong state*. A common feature amongst populist radical right parties is the view of contemporary democracies as too weak and incapable of defending themselves against both outside and inside threats (Mudde 2007: 146). Populist radical right parties want to strengthen the independence of the police force as well as build more prisons and increase the maximum penalty. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) argue that authoritarians favour longer punishments for criminal actions than non-authoritarians. They also argue that religious and traditionalist people are more authoritarian in their way of thinking. We can therefore expect a correlation between the variable *imptrad* representing the traditional element with these three variables representing authoritarian values. The *strong state*-variable is concerned with safety and security, but the issue is directed towards outside instead of inside threats. The variable also asks if the state should be strong to defend its citizens. The defence of outside threats could trigger many thoughts for voters. For instance, voters with exclusive attitudes for the *European Union*-variable should also have authoritarian attitudes on the *strong state*-variable. However, these two variables do not correlate. The boundary drawing

that is central for this variable is the insurance of safety against threats. This implies, as for the previous variables, a certain amount of ground rules that must be followed.

The five variables chosen to represent the *grid*-dimension have very clear contents not referring to other issues captured by other dimensions. The descriptive statistics of the five variables is presented in table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics for *grid* based on the seven countries

	Mean	Std.Dev.	Min	Max
Grid				
Gay rights	.705	.888	0	4
Tradition	3.15	1.33	0	5
Security	3.28	1.27	0	5
Strong state	3.35	1.19	0	5
Follow rules	2.97	1.35	0	5
N=7931				

The descriptive statistics presented in the table above indicate that the voters in Western Europe are overall very liberal towards *gay rights*-issues. The descriptive statistics also demonstrate that the voters are overall placed at the centre on the other four issues.

4.3.4 Excluded issues

This thesis sets out to examine the three-dimensional political space in relations to populist radical right voters in Western European democracies. Because of the exclusive focus on the three dimensions I have excluded some issues that have often been connected to populist radical right parties. I will briefly explain why these issues have been excluded.

Populism

Research have demonstrated that populist radical right parties use a populist rhetoric. They present themselves as working *for* the people and *with* the people (Golder 2003; Mudde 2007). Populist radical right parties wish to solve the problems that they see as introduced by the state by letting the people decide. They argue that political parties and politicians should listen to the *vox populi*, the voice of the people, and not the experts and judges (Fennema 2005: 10-11). The concept of *populism* when connected to the voters, are usually seen as a way to *protest* against the government. In this thesis, I am concerned with the issues belonging to the three dimensions, and to examine if the issues constituting the three dimensions are able to distinguish the populist radical right voters from the voters of other mainstream parties. The protest element does not

belong in such a framework.

Environmental issues

Environmental issues have been linked to immigration issues. The populist radical right party, Nationale Aktion of Switzerland, was the first party to incorporate environmental issues in their political programme stating that Switzerland being a small country was overpopulated and its land spoiled due to an overflow of immigrants⁶ (Skenderovic 2007: 169). It is possible to argue that environmental issues fit the *grid*-dimensions because of the restrictions caring about the environment might trigger. Protection of the environment and similar issues require changes of lifestyle as well as keeping an open mind towards such challenges. It is therefore arguable that voters can be both libertarian and authoritarian on such issues. Nevertheless, the environmental issues do not fit the three-dimensional framework as it is. Future research might include such issues as a residual category.

Control variables

This thesis does not contain control variables. There are many reasons for this decision. First of all the goal of this thesis is to operationalize and empirically test Kitschelt's re-theorized three-dimensional framework, and *not* to explain voting in the best possible way. The most common control variables used when doing research on populist radical right voters are gender, age, education, unemployment and occupation. Although there are no control variables presented in the analysis of this thesis, I have run all the models with control variables just to examine if controlling for certain demographic variables affect the results. All the models that will be presented in the further analysis have been run with the variables *gender*, *age*, *unemployed* and *education*. The results that will be presented in the further analysis did not change when controlled for the most common socio-demographic factors.

4.4 Principal components analysis

To test if the variables that I have chosen load on the dimensions that I have outlined them to do, I use principal components analysis (PCA). PCA allows a large number of independent variables to be systematically reduced into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables, called principal

⁶The Nationale Aktion lost almost all its significance in the late 1990's due to the popularity of the SVP.

components (Dunteman 1989: 5). These components make it easier to interpret what variables that belong together, for example, on a political dimension. The goal of principal components analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of the data (Dunteman 1989: 7). In this way it works as a tool for developing further analysis and indices (Wold, Esbensen, and Geladi 1987). PCA searches for linear combinations of the original variables that are uncorrelated, in order to capture most of the variation. The first principal component detected is the linear composite closest to the fit to the n observations to the p dimensional space (Dunteman 1989: 10). The goal of PCA is to extract the most important information from the data, compress the size of the data, and thus simplify it (Abdi and Williams 2010: 434).

Kitschelt and McGann (1995) used questions from the World Values Survey, and in the same way as I do, tested the loadings of the questions they had chosen with principal components analysis. The goal of PCA is not to empirically test if the politics in the seven Western European democracies takes place along three dimensions, but rather to test if the questions that I have chosen from the European Social Survey 2012 belong to the three separate dimensions outlined from the theories.

In the sections above, I operationalized the questions that I chose to represent the three dimensions outlined by Kitschelt (2012). Although I based my decisions on the existing theories, the variables I ended up with are based on my judgement of what questions from the European Social Survey 2012 that best fit the three different dimensions of *grid*, *group* and *greed*. The principal components analysis is a good reliability check to test if the variables that I have chosen really load on the dimensions that I have outlined them to. The results from principal components analysis, presented in table 4.5 show that the questions are grouped along three different dimensions in the way that I had thought, with the exception of the *gay rights*-issue.

The results from the principal components analysis presented in table 4.5 suggests that it is unproblematic to find components on the three dimensions. The results are more deviant than first expected. PCA finds that the components load on three dimensions, but a central theoretical item does not empirically load as expected. The *gay rights*-issue somewhat surprisingly does not load on factor 2 together with the other *grid*-issues.

The principal components analysis in table 4.5 are adjusted with varimax rotation. The components with eigenvalues greater than .5 are in bold for easier interpretation of the results. All variables are also coded so that the components should have the same sign.

It is clear from the results that the questions chosen from the European Social Survey 2012

Table 4.5: Issue loadings using principal components analysis

	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
Group			
European Union	0.5717	-0.1361	-0.1985
Quality of life	0.8349	0.0574	0.0749
Cultural threat	0.8013	0.0868	0.1059
Multiculturalism	0.7354	0.1486	0.0617
Grid			
Gay rights	0.3305	0.2711	0.0448
Tradition	0.0841	0.6442	-0.0086
Security	0.1302	0.6516	-0.1294
Strong state	0.0828	0.6250	-0.2958
Follow rules	0.0468	0.6853	0.0675
Greed			
Income redistribution	0.0523	-0.0567	0.8479
Economic protection	0.0831	-0.0525	0.8385
<i>Eigenvalues</i>	2.358	1.831	1.593

Principal components analysis with varimax rotation
 Values greater than .5 are in bold

load on three dimensions, as expected. As already noted, it is surprising that the *gay rights*-variable does not load on the *grid*-dimension as I expected it to. The *gay rights*-issue is one of the most central issues for re-theorizing the political space inspired by Pim Fortuyn. As is made clear from table 4.5, the *gay rights*-variable cannot be included in the index to represent the *grid*-dimension in the further analysis. However, I choose to incorporate it in the further analysis as a secondary issue. Based on the results from PCA it is not possible to incorporate the *gay rights*-issue into the *grid*-dimension, but it can nevertheless be included in the further analysis as a separate issue. The literature on gay rights-issues in respect to political institutions, parties and voters, are almost non-existing (Bob 2012). It is interesting that this appears to be a different issue than the ones representing the three dimensions.

The remaining variables load on the expected components. Principal components analysis is often used to create indices where values greater than .5 loading on the same factor can be combined in an index. I construct indices using the variables carefully chosen to represent each dimension. I construct indices by multiplying the variables representing each dimension together. I thereafter standardize them by dividing the computed index by its number of values. This results in an index ranging from 0 to 1. To be able to compare the results from each dimension, as well as the *gay rights*-issue, with each other it is important that the indices are standardized⁷.

The *greed*-dimension was constructed by multiplying the *economic protection*-variable with the *income redistribution*-variable. This resulted in an index ranging from 0 (0+0=0) to 20

⁷More information about alpha values for each index, as well as correlation tables can be found in the appendix.

(10+10=20), that was again divided on 20, resulting in an index ranging from 0 to 1. In addition, I tested the reliability of the index using Chronbach's alpha (α) (Peterson 1994). The reliability score of the index representing the economic dimension was .66. It is therefore recommended to treat the two variable as issues representing the same dimension. I have named this index *greed*.

The *group*-dimension was constructed in the same way as above, by multiplying the variables chosen to represent the dimension from the European Social Survey. I multiplied the variables *European Union*, *quality of life*, *cultural threat* and *multiculturalism*. In the same way as for the *greed*-index, I standardized the variable so that it ranges from 0 to 1. The index has a reliability score for α of .67, the same as for the *greed*-index. This indicates that the index can be constructed based on results from both principal components analysis and Chronbach's alpha. I have named this index *group*.

The *grid*-dimension was constructed, also by multiplying the variables chosen to represent the *grid*-dimension and then standardizing it so that it ranges from 0 to 1. For this dimension, one item was excluded from the index as it did not load on the same dimension. The index was created by multiplying the variables *tradition*, *security*, *strong state* and *follow rules*. The reliability score of α for this index is .60. Both Chronbach's alpha and the results from principal components analysis approves of creating an index of the four variables chosen to represent the *grid*-dimension. I have named this index *grid*.

5

Analyses

I start this analysis chapter by testing the indices constructed to represent the three-dimensional political space. This is done by testing one index at a time in a bivariate model before including them all together in a multivariate logistic regression model. Thereafter I present the results from the cross-country analysis, by introducing and discussing the results for one country at a time.

5.1 Testing the indices representing the three-dimensional political space

In this section I will test if the three dimensions *greed*, *group*, and *grid*, together with the *gay rights*-issue, are important explaining the populist radical right voting pattern in contemporary democracies in Western Europe. The results are presented in Model 1 through 5, where Model 1 through 4 tests one dimension and issue at a time, while Model 5 combines them all into one analysis. I use binary logistic regression analysis where the dependent variable is a dichotomous 0-1, where 1 represents a vote for the populist radical right. I use clustered standard errors which specifies that the observations are independent across the seven countries, but not necessarily independent within the countries (Long and Freese 2006: 86). I will comment the results for each model before having a further discussion of the final model. When commenting the final model I will also demonstrate the predicted probabilities of the three dimensions and *gay rights*-issue graphically.

In Model 1, results for the *greed*-index alone is presented. In the theory chapter I discussed that scholars disagree if socio-economic values are important for populist radical right voting, and to what extent. The results from table 5.1 indicate that the economic dimension alone does

Table 5.1: Indices representing the three-dimensional political space

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.217 (.354)				-.280 (.402)
Group		6.09*** (.584)			5.97*** (.599)
Grid			1.32** (.534)		-.030 (.513)
Gay rights				1.43*** (.215)	.524** (.211)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.32*** (.229)	-5.30*** (.436)	-3.14*** (.403)	-2.58*** (.181)	-5.27*** (.590)
N=7931					
LR Chi2	0.38	108.92***	6.09**	44.34***	174.15***
Pseudo R^2	0.0002	0.1451	0.0068	0.0174	0.1475
AIC	4890.23	4181.93	4857.77	4806	4176.54

Clustered standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

not have any significant effect ($p=0.631$) on the probability of voting for the populist radical right, rather than for the other parties in contemporary democracies in Western Europe.

The *group*-index presented in Model 2 has, as expected, a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the .001 level. Looking at the strong coefficient, the *group*-dimension is clearly substantially important in mobilizing voters for the populist radical right in Western Europe. The model fit has also improved significantly compared to Model 1. Pseudo R^2 is now 14.5 and AIC has decreased from 4890.23 to 4181.93.

The *grid*-index in Model 3 has a positive coefficient in a binary logistic regression model and is statistically significant at the .01 level. The result from Model 3 alone indicate that PRR-voters can be placed to the right of the other voters when they are compared to all other voters for all seven countries in a bivariate model. When comparing Model 2 and 3, AIC and pseudo R^2 indicate that Model 3 fits worse than Model 2.

The *gay rights*-variable in Model 4, also has a positive coefficient. The result from Model 4 is statistically significant at the .001 level. The coefficient is, similar to the *grid*-index, not as strong as *group* in Model 2. AIC and pseudo R^2 indicate that Model 4 has a better fit than Model 1 and 3, but it still fits worse than Model 2.


In Model 5 all variables are included simultaneously. This is to test all the variables in a multivariate model to control for spurious effects. Only two of the variables remain significant at the .05 level. *Group* remains the strongest coefficient and significant at the .001 level. The *gay rights*-variable also remains statistically significant at the .01 level, but the coefficient of *gay rights* is not as strong as *group*. These results support Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political

space. The results demonstrate that it is meaningful to distinguish *group* from *grid*. The results from Model 5 indicate that the effect of libertarian versus authoritarian values are not necessary to distinguish populist radical right voters in a binary model. Combining such issues together with *group* might camouflage insignificant results from *grid* as significant because the effect of *group* is so strong. The second interesting result from Model 5 is that separating *gay rights* from *grid*, as suggested by the principal components analysis, gets empirical support.

The results presented in Model 5 are different from the bivariate models. The statistically significant result for the *grid*-dimension is now insignificant ($p=0.953$). The *greed*-index remains insignificant ($p=0.486$), while *group* remains the strongest coefficient significant at the .001 level. In addition, the *gay rights*-issue is also statistically significant at the .01 level. The same analysis as presented in table 5.1 has been run for each country individually. The results were almost identical and I will therefore not present the full results in the text ¹. I will now present the predicted probabilities for each dimension as well as the *gay rights*-issue from Model 5 graphically, and discuss the results for each of the graphs. I will also discuss the results for each country according to the graphical presentations.

The predicted probabilities presented in figure 5.1, demonstrate the distribution for the *greed*-dimension, all the countries compared.

Figure 5.1: Predicted probabilities for *greed* with 95% CIs



The predicted probabilities are overall around 8 percentage points regardless of the different values of the *greed*-index. This result does not explain the pattern of populist radical right voting.

¹I have included the binary models for each country in the appendix.

When computing the analysis by country the results remain the same. None of the countries have a statistically significant result for the *greed*-index when conducting a binary logistic regression analysis. The results indicate that the *greed*-dimension is not necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting when compared to all the other voters. However, if the PRR-voters are placed to the left of the mainstream conservative parties in the respective countries, as well as to the right of the mainstream parties of the left, this would fail to be demonstrated by the analysis above, because all these parties are grouped together in the dichotomous dependent variables (Kitschelt 2007: 1183). It is therefore necessary to conduct further analysis where the mainstream parties of the left, centre and the right are being compared to the populist radical right in each country.

Figure 5.2: Predicted probabilities for *group* with 95% CIs





Figure 5.2 demonstrates the distribution of the predicted probabilities ranging from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) values of the *group*-index. When conducting the analysis by country, the results remained almost identical to those from Model 5. The *group*-dimension remained the strongest coefficient for each case and was also statistically significant at the .001 level in each case. Based on the binary results it is clear that the *group*-dimension is the most important in explaining voting patterns for the populist radical right. It is also clear that when voter’s attitudes are at the exclusionary side of the *group*-dimension they are significantly and substantially more likely to vote for the populist radical right in any of the seven countries represented in this analysis. Grouping all the countries together, the predicted probability of voting for the populist radical right ranges from 0.5 to 67 percent. The graphic curve presented in figure 5.2 is also

quite steep when ranging from the more centrist values to the more exclusionary values.


Figure 5.3: Predicted probabilities for *grid* with 95% CIs



The graphical presentation of the predicted probabilities in figure 5.3 says it all. When comparing all the countries into one analysis, the likelihood of voting for the populist radical right is equal for all the values of the *grid*-index. This indicates that populist radical right voters are widely scattered across the entire *grid*-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the populist radical right based on the *grid*-dimension, is just below 10 percentage points regardless of the values of *grid*. When compared to all other voters, PRR-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other parties when all countries are combined together. The one exception is the Swiss case where the *grid*-index has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the .001 level. Voters of the SVP can therefore be placed to the right of the other voters in Switzerland on the *grid*-dimension. A similar result is also found in Finland where the *grid*-index has a positive coefficient and just fails to be statistically significant at the .05 level ($p=0.060$). Although the result is not statistically significant, it can be expected to find interesting results for the *grid*-dimension in the Finnish case when the PS-voters are being compared to the voters of the other mainstream parties.

Figure 5.4 is the final graph to be presented. The figure presents the predicted probabilities of the *gay rights*-issue graphically. In contrast to the *grid*- and *greed*-dimensions there is a clearer pattern for the *gay rights*-issue. As the attitudes of the voters move towards more authoritarian values on the *gay rights*-variable the probability of voting for the populist radical right increases. When compared to all other voters the PRR-voters can be placed to the right on the *gay rights*-

Figure 5.4: Predicted probabilities for *gay rights* with 95% CIs



issue. When conducting the same analysis by country, the results for the *gay rights*-issue was significant only in one case: the Swedish. As in Model 5, the coefficient in the Swedish case was positive and statistically significant at the .05 level.

There has been little research on the topic of gay rights and sexual freedom in relations to populist radical right parties and voters (Bob 2012). This is interesting because some parties, like the Austrian FPÖ, have this included in their party programme (FPÖ 2011). The Austrian FPÖ, unfortunately not included in this analysis, have incorporated the importance of family issues in their party programme. They explicitly argue that marriage is between a man and a woman and that they are against same-sex relations. The Finnish PS also argues that they are against same-sex relationships (Arter 2012). The Dutch PVV, on the other hand, argue that they are liberal defenders of gay rights (Morris 2014). It is interesting that the results from Model 5 empirically support the separation of *gay rights* from *grid*, but it is also interesting that the results do not point in a direction that can be linked to Pim Fortuyn and the background for re-theorizing the political space.

Model 5.1 is the final model for this analysis and will be used to examine the seven West European countries that are being compared. The independent variables will be the same for each model. The dependent variable are uniquely constructed for each country where the major parties as well as non-voters are being compared with the country's populist radical right party. Comparing both parties inside each country and comparing countries with each other will create a clearer picture of the three-dimensional political space.

5.2 Results from multinomial logistic regression analyses

In this section I present and discuss the results for the seven Western European countries included in this thesis. The models presented in this section compare voters of populist radical right parties with voters of the major parties, as well as non-voters for each country. The models examine if the three dimensions as well as the *gay rights*-issue contribute to distinguish the voters of populist radical right parties from the voters of the other mainstream parties. I first present the results from the four Nordic countries: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland. I expect these countries to have similar results. Thereafter, I present the results from the three remaining countries: Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

5.2.1 Norway

Table 5.2 represents the results estimated by multinomial logistic regression analysis to test the hypotheses. The model examines if the attitudes constructing the three dimensions contribute to distinguish voters of Fremskrittspartiet (FrP) from the other mainstream parties in Norway. I chose to use the four parties that received the most votes and in that way also had the most respondents. In addition to comparing FrP-voters with the voters of the mainstream parties, I also compare them to the non-voters². The parties that are being compared to FrP in table 5.2 are the conservative party Høyre (H), the social democratic labour party Arbeiderpartiet (AP), the centrist and agrarian party Senterpartiet (SP), and the Christian democratic party Kristelig Folkeparti (KrF). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 169 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.

In this thesis I am primarily interested in discovering if the attitudes constructing the three-dimensional political space are necessary to explain the pattern of populist radical right voting. The multinomial logit model examines the log odds of voting for FrP rather than any of the other mainstream parties presented in the model, as well as being a non-voter on the three dimensions, *greed*, *group* and *grid*, as well as *gay rights*.

The results for the case of Norway is presented in table 5.2. The independent variables (the attitudes constructing the three dimensions in addition to the *gay rights*-variable) is listed in the

²The non-voters in this thesis constitutes all the respondents who answered that they did not vote. Those respondents who did not remember what party they had voted for was coded as missing values.

left column together with the model estimation (LR Chi2, pseudo R^2 and AIC). The coefficients reported in the model are log odds. These will only be interpreted as predicted probabilities in the further analysis. The model also includes the standard error for each independent variable ³.

Table 5.2: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Norway

	AP-voters compared to FrP-voters	SP-voters compared to FrP-voters	KRF-voters compared to FrP-voters	H-voters compared to FrP-voters	Non-voters compared to FrP-voters
Greed	-.835 (.665)	-2.44 (1.01)	.430 (.927)	1.83*** (.646)	.077 (.644)
Group	-7.10*** (.738)	-3.11*** (.957)	-6.21*** (1.03)	-5.70*** (.753)	-5.34*** (.720)
Grid	.737 (.651)	-.095 (.898)	.088 (.963)	.192 (.667)	.792 (.647)
Gay rights	-.117 (.467)	1.06 (.579)	3.03*** (.569)	-.126 (.487)	-.287 (.464)
<i>Constant</i>	4.39*** (.557)	1.41 (.744)	1.47 (.793)	3.261*** (.569)	3.39*** (.552)
N=1352					
LR Chi2	230.47				
Pseudo R^2	0.0538				
AIC	4100.577				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

The results from table 5.2 support Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space. The results from the Norwegian case demonstrate that it is necessary to separate *group* and *grid*. While the effect of group is strong and substantial among the FrP-voters, the effect of grid is not. The FrP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the *group*-dimension, but not distinct from the other voters on the *grid*-dimension.

The results from table 5.2 demonstrate that FrP is the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes on the *group*-dimension. When compared to the voters of all the other parties, including those who did not vote, FrP is the dominant party in mobilizing these voters. The voters of FrP is to the right of all the other voters on the *group*-dimension. Having standardized the variables make it possible to compare the coefficients. It is worth noticing that the coefficient of the *group*-dimension is several times larger than the other coefficients.

The results for the economic *greed*-dimension demonstrate that FrP is not the dominant choice of voters who hold market-liberal values. The results demonstrate that the conservative Høyre is the dominant choice of these voters. The voters of FrP is widely spread across the *greed*-dimension, and cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties.

³Standard errors of more than 2 can indicate multicollinearity between the independent variables in the model. I will not discuss this in the further analysis unless there is a problem. The standard errors are presented in parentheses for each of the following models.

Kitschelt and McGann (1995: 145) found that FrP-voters could be placed to the right of all the other voters but H in the two-dimensional framework. My results demonstrate that FrP-voters are to the left of the conservative voters, but not to the right of the voters of the other mainstream parties.

The results demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage from separating *group* and *grid*. The insignificant results for *grid* emphasize the importance of separating the two dimensions. FrP-voters are not distinct from the voters of any of the other mainstream parties, as well as the non-voters on the *grid*-dimension. Kitschelt (2012) argued that by separating *group* and *grid* we could discover that populist radical right parties are intensifying their group appeal, while they are letting go of some of their positions on *grid*. This argument is supported by the results from Norway. The FrP-voters are mobilized by a strong group appeal, but are widely scattered across the *grid*-dimension and in that way not distinct from other voters on grid issues.

The results from table 5.2 also demonstrate that FrP is not the dominant choice for voters who hold opposing attitudes towards same-sex relationships. The results demonstrate that KrF is better at mobilizing these voters. The FrP voters are not distinct from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the *gay rights*-issue. The results give empirical support in separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension as suggested by principal components analysis. In the binary model with the dichotomous dependent variable⁴, *group* was the only variable separating FrP-voters from the voters of the other parties. The results from multinomial logistic regression analysis supports this finding. The voters of FrP are significantly to the right of all other voters on the *group*-dimension, but not distinct from the other voters on any of the other dimensions. On the *greed*-dimension the FrP voters serve as a contrast to the conservative voters, and on the *gay rights*-issue FrP voters serve as a contrast to the Christian democratic voters. The results demonstrate that *group* clearly is the important dimension, but they also demonstrate that *grid* does not belong together with *group*, and that the *gay rights*-issue should be treated separately from *grid*. The results emphasizes the importance of separating the political space into three dimensions. Although all the three dimensions do not have an independent and significant effect in the Norwegian case, it accentuates that issues at the *grid*-dimension might not be as important as previous research has argued.

Kitschelt (2012: 245) emphasized that the re-theorization of the political space into three dimensions can make it possible to discover variations of populist radical right parties. This

⁴The results from the binary logistic regression model with the dichotomous dependent variable can be found in the appendix.

thesis will not try to discover different variants of populist radical right parties. I will, however, use his classification of the parties of being *to the right of*, *to the left of* and *not distinct from*, to summarize the results from table 5.2. The model below uses five different classifications for each variable. The column to the left (--) is used if the PRR-voters are further to the left on one dimension than all the other voters they are being compared to. The second column to the left (-) is used if the PRR-voters are to the right of one other party, but not distinct from the voters of the other parties. The column in the middle (=) is used when the voters are not distinct from the voters of the other mainstream parties with no significant results, or if they are both to the left of and to the right of the other mainstream parties and can be placed at the centre of the dimension. The two columns to the right (+ and ++) represent voters to the right of one or some of the other mainstream parties (+) and to the right of all of the other mainstream parties (++).

Norway	--	-	=	+	++
Greed		X			
Group					X
Grid			X		
Gay rights		X			

Looking at the model above, it is clear that the *group*-dimension is the most important in explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in Norway. The *greed*-dimension, *grid*-dimension and *gay rights*-issue, does not separate the voters of Fremskrittspartiet from the voters of the other mainstream parties in Norway.

5.2.2 Denmark

The methodological approach for the Danish case is the same as for the Norwegian case. In addition to the DF I have chosen the four mainstream parties of the left and right, as well as the non-voters and created a dependent categorical variable. The parties that are included in this model are the Social democratic Socialdemokraterne (SDd)⁵, the Liberal party Venstre (V), the socialist party Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF), and the Conservative party Det Konservative Folkeparti (K). The voters who voted for the remaining Danish parties were excluded from the analysis together with those who did not remember what party they voted for. In total 327 respondents were excluded from the analysis.

The results presented in table 5.3 are similar to those from the Norwegian case. Only two of the three dimensions have an independent and significant effect on the probability of voting for

⁵The original abbreviation for the Socialdemokraterne is SD, but having already included an SD (Sverigedemokraterna) earlier it is necessary to separate them. I therefore added a "d" for Denmark.

the DF compared to the other mainstream parties in Denmark. Again, the results demonstrate the importance of separating *group* and *grid*. In Denmark, the DF is clearly the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes on the *group*-dimension, while the voters are not distinct from any of the other voters on the *grid*-dimension. The results also give added insight from including the *gay rights*-issue. While the DF-voters are to the right of the voters of the social democrats and the socialists, they are not distinct from the voters of the liberals and the conservatives on the *gay rights*-issue.

Table 5.3: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Denmark

	SF-voters compared to DF-voters	SD-voters compared to DF-voters	V-voters compared to DF-voters	K-voters compared to DF-voters	Non-voters compared to DF-voters
Greed	-3.09*** (.890)	-2.00*** (.707)	1.59** (.641)	3.24*** (.899)	.146 (.702)
Group	-8.18*** (.854)	-6.96*** (.715)	-5.35*** (.685)	-5.92*** (1.01)	-6.84*** (.739)
Grid	-1.06 (.883)	-.098 (.782)	.787 (.770)	-.651 (1.09)	-.231 (.805)
Gay rights	-2.54*** (.807)	-1.22* (.557)	.005 (.489)	-.922 (.895)	-.555 (.558)
<i>Constant</i>	5.72*** (.712)	5.26*** (.645)	3.01*** (.629)	1.97* (.862)	4.45*** (.658)
N=1162					
LR Chi2	301.77				
Pseudo R ²	0.0793				
AIC	3554.641				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

In the starting breakthrough of Dansk Folkeparti the mobilizing characteristic of the DF-voters, compared to voters of other parties, was on the economic dimension (Andersen 1992: 199). The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that Dansk Folkeparti is not the dominant party of those voters who hold market-liberal attitudes on the economic *greed*-dimension. The conservatives and the liberals are better at mobilizing these voters. The results also demonstrate that the DF-voters are to the right of the social democratic voters and of the socialist voters. The DF-voters are located to the centre of the economic *greed*-dimension by being to the left of the mainstream parties of the right, and to the right of the mainstream parties of the left. The overall probability of voting for the DF based on the *greed*-dimension alone, is around 9 percent.

The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that *group* is the most important dimension for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in Denmark. The results demonstrate that DF-voters are to the right of all the other mainstream parties, as well as non voters on the *group*-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the DF ranges from 0 and 68

percentage points for low (0) and high (1) values on the *group*-index. The *group*-dimension is both statistically and substantially important for populist radical right voting in Denmark.

As for the Norwegian case, the *grid*-dimension does not have an independent and significant effect on the probability of voting for the DF rather than any of the other mainstream parties. The predicted probability of voting for the DF based on the *grid* dimension alone is 9 percent regardless of low or high values on the *grid*-index. The DF-voters are widely scattered across the *grid*-dimension and cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other mainstream parties, as well as from the non-voters. The results demonstrate that we gain important analytical leverage from separating *group* and *grid*, and that in previous research the importance of *group* may have camouflaged the insignificance of *grid* (Kitschelt and McGann 1995).

In the public debate, DF has gained attention for being homophobic (Larsen 2014). It could therefore be expected that the voters hold some of the same attitudes as those that are being profiled in the media. The results from table 5.3 demonstrate that the DF-voters are to the right of the socialist and social democratic voters. The DF-voters are almost identical to the Liberal voters on the *gay rights*-issue, and not distinct from the conservative voters or the non-voters. The predicted probability of voting for the DF when all other attitudes are at its mean, varies between 8 and 13 percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the *gay rights*-variable. The results give empirical leverage for separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension, but neither the *grid*-dimension or the *gay rights*-issue separate the voters of Dansk Folkeparti from all the other voters. Only the *group*-dimension is able to distinguish the DF-voters from the voters of all the other mainstream parties in Denmark.

The model below summarizes the results from table 5.3 in the same way as for the Norwegian case. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the DF-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the DF-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

Denmark	– –	–	=	+	++
Greed			X		
Group					X
Grid			X		
Gay rights				X	

When summarizing the results, it is clear that the *group*-dimension is the dominant dimension in mobilizing voters for Dansk Folkeparti in Denmark, as it was in the binary model. While the

DF-voters can be placed at the centre in the *greed*-dimension, the voters are not distinguishable from any of the other voters in the *grid*-dimension. The results give important additional insight for separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension. The DF-voters are to the right of the socialist and social democratic voters on the *gay rights*-issue, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other parties, nor the non-voters on this issue. The only dimension that actually mobilizes voters to vote for the DF, is the *group*-dimension.

5.2.3 Sweden

For the Swedish case the mainstream parties that are included in the model are the social democratic party Socialdemokratiska Arbeiderpartiet (SAP), the liberal conservative party Moderaterna (M), the liberal party Folkepartiet liberalerna (FP), and the green party Miljöpartiet de gröna (MP). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 279 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for. Kriesi et al. (2008) treat the green parties in Western Europe as the opposite of the populist radical right, so to be able to include the green party (MP) in Sweden is an interesting contribution.

The results presented in table 5.4 are very similar to the results for the cases of Norway and Denmark. The results demonstrate that we gain important analytical leverage in separating *group* and *grid*. The SD-voters are further to the right than any of the voters of the other mainstream parties, as well as the non-voters on the *group*-dimension, while they cannot be distinguished from any of the other voters on the *grid*-dimension. As for the Danish case, we gain important additional information by including the *gay rights*-issue separately.

The results from table 5.4 demonstrate that the SD is not the dominant choice for voters who hold market-liberal attitudes on the economic *greed*-dimension. The conservative party Moderaterna is better in mobilizing these voters. The results also demonstrate that the SD is not the dominant choice for voters holding redistributive attitudes at the economic *greed*-dimension. The social democratic SAP is better at mobilizing voters who hold redistributive attitudes. The predicted probability of voting for the SD based on the *greed*-index alone is approximately 4 percent, regardless of the different values of *greed*. The results demonstrate that SD-voters cannot be distinguished from the green, liberal and non-voters on the *greed*-dimension. As for the Danish case, the voters of Sverigedemokraterna can be placed at the centre of the economic

Table 5.4: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Sweden

	MP-voters compared to SD-voters	SAP-voters compared to SD-voters	FP-voters compared to SD-voters	M-voters compared to SD-voters	Non-voters compared to SD-voters
Greed	-1.54 (1.05)	-2.95*** (.910)	.436 (.992)	1.68* (.862)	.162 (.892)
Group	-11.1*** (1.13)	-7.91*** (.927)	-9.81*** (1.12)	-8.84*** (.948)	-8.02*** (.962)
Grid	.413 (.973)	.310 (.858)	-.414 (.985)	.138 (.865)	.458 (.884)
Gay rights	-4.78*** (.978)	-1.11 (.689)	-1.78* (.864)	-2.08*** (.719)	-1.35 (.723)
<i>Constant</i>	6.58*** (.837)	6.41*** (.772)	5.86*** (.845)	6.29*** (.775)	5.52*** (.787)
N=1369					
LR Chi2	315.90***				
Pseudo R ²	0.0724				
AIC	4095.908				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

dimension.

Looking at the *group*-index, it is clear that SD-voters are significantly more exclusionary when compared to voters of all the other mainstream parties in Sweden, as well as non-voters. The *group*-dimension is the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the SD. Looking at the *group*-index alone, the predicted probability of voting for the SD ranges from 0 on the extreme inclusive axis (0) to 74 percent on the extreme exclusionary axis (1). The results demonstrate that the SD is the dominant party for mobilizing voters on the exclusionary *group*-dimension, and the most important in explaining the voting pattern of the Swedish populist radical right voters.

The results from table 5.4 demonstrate, in the same way as for the Norwegian and Danish cases, that we get important analytical leverage in separating *group* and *grid*. The voters of the SD are widely scattered across the *grid*-dimension and cannot be distinguished from any of the other mainstream voters, nor non-voters. The overall predicted probability of voting for the SD, based on the *grid*-dimension alone, is around 4 percent. I find it surprising that the *grid*-dimension has no effect in the Swedish case. Some of the issues included in the *grid*-dimension are actually embedded in the logo of the SD. The party clearly stands for *Safety & Tradition*, two important issues captured by the *grid*-index in this analysis. The issues constructing the *grid*-dimension are also central issues in the programme of principles of the SD (Sverigedemokraterna 2011). It is therefore interesting that the SD-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other mainstream parties on the *grid*-dimension.

The results from the Swedish case demonstrate that we gain important additional insight by including the *gay rights*-variable in the regression model. The SD-voters are to the right of the voters of the conservative party, the green party, and the liberal party in Sweden. The SD-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the social democrats or the non-voters on the *gay rights*-issue. In the cross-country binary regression models Sweden was the only case where the *gay rights*-issue clearly played a part. The multinomial regression results support this finding. Overall, the predicted probability of voting for the SD, based on the *gay rights*-variable alone, ranges from 3 percent to 11 percent from the lowest (0) to the highest (1) values on the *gay rights*-variable. While the overall probability of voting for the SD was 4 percent based on both the *greed* and the *grid*-dimensions regardless of the different values on the scale, the results from table 5.4 demonstrate important additional insight by separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension.

The Swedish public debate has often categorized the SD as being a single-issue party. Erlingsson, Vernby, and Öhrvall (2014) found that this is not the case neither from a supply or demand side perspective. They argue that the SD mobilize voters on more than just the immigration issue. The results from table 5.4 demonstrate that voters are only *mobilized* to vote for the SD by the *group*-issues. However, the results also demonstrate that the *gay rights*-issue plays some part. More importantly, the results demonstrate that *grid* and *group*-issues should be treated as belonging to separate dimensions, and that we also gain important additional insight in separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension.

The model below, summarizes the results from table 5.4 in the same way as for the Norwegian and Danish case. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the SD-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the SD-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

Sweden	--	-	=	+	++
Greed			X		
Group					X
Grid			X		
Gay rights				X	

Summarizing the results from table 5.4, the placement of SD-voters in the three-dimensional political space is identical to that of the DF-voters. The voters of the SD can be placed in the centre of the economic *greed*-dimension, and to the right in the *group*-dimension, being more

exclusionary than the voters of the other mainstream parties. The voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the *grid*-dimension and is therefore placed at the centre. While being to the right of some of the other parties at the *gay rights*-issue, the voters of the SD is placed to the right, but not to the far-right, on the *gay rights*-issue. The summary of the voting patterns for the Swedish case are very similar to what was found in the binary models, where *group* played the biggest part, but closely followed by the *gay rights*-issue.

5.2.4 Finland

The largest mainstream parties that was chosen to represent the Finnish case are the liberal conservative party Kansallinen Kokoomus r.p (Kok), the social democratic party Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen Puolue (SDP), the centrist, agrarian and liberal party Suomen Keskusta (Kesk), and the green liberal party Vihreä liitto (Vihr). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 350 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for. The voters of these parties are, as in the previous models, being compared to the voters of the populist radical right party.

The results from table 5.5 demonstrate that the Finnish Perussuomalaiset most definitely can and should be included in the populist radical right party family as suggested by Jungar and Jupskås (2014). The results demonstrate that *group* is the dominant dimension for mobilizing voters to vote for the PS, same as for the other Nordic countries. The results also give important analytical leverage for separating *group* from *grid*, but in a different way than for the other Nordic countries.

The results from table 5.5 demonstrate that the PS is, as for the other Nordic countries, not the dominant choice for voters who hold market-liberal attitudes at the economic *greed*-dimension. The conservative party Kok is better at mobilizing voters on the *greed*-dimension. The results also demonstrate that those who did not vote are more market-liberal on economic issues, than the PS voters. Looking at the *greed*-index with all other variables at its mean, the predicted probability of voting for the PS varies between 14 (0) and 3 (1) percent for low and high values on the *greed*-index. This is a different result than for the other Nordic countries where the predicted probability was consistent for the different values. However, the PS-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the social democrats, liberal agrarian, and green parties in

Table 5.5: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Finland

	Vihr-voters compared to PS-voters	SDP-voters compared to PS-voters	Kesk-voters compared to PS-voters	Kok-voters compared to PS-voters	Non-voters compared to PS-voters
Greed	-.353 (.804)	-.361 (.672)	1.03 (.661)	3.12*** (.591)	1.58*** (.557)
Group	-6.99*** (.833)	-4.35*** (.681)	-3.71*** (.714)	-6.62*** (.678)	-3.49*** (.599)
Grid	-1.70** (.699)	1.33* (.607)	1.85*** (.641)	1.11* (.580)	.213 (.533)
Gay rights	-4.22*** (.677)	-.767* (.378)	.500 (.369)	-.426 (.360)	-.448 (.323)
<i>Constant</i>	4.69*** (.565)	1.82*** (.523)	.352 (.558)	2.49*** (.498)	2.41*** (.466)
N=1712					
LR Chi2	370.39				
Pseudo R ²	0.0633				
AIC	5532.892				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Finland.

As for the Norwegian, Danish, and Swedish cases, the *group*-index has the strongest effect in the Finnish case. The predicted probability of voting for the populist radical right in Finland varies between 1 percent and 54 percent for low (0) and high (1) values of *group*. The results demonstrate that the PS is the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes at the *group*-dimension. The PS voters can be distinguished from the voters of all of the other mainstream parties as belonging to the right side of the *group*-dimension.

Deviant from the three previous cases, the *grid*-dimension has an independent and significant effect in the Finnish case. It has a statistically significant effect for all parties compared to PS-voters, except for the non-voters. The coefficients have both positive and negative directions and give important empirical leverage for separating *group* and *grid*. The voters of the PS can be placed to the left of the voters of the conservative Kok, social democratic SDP, and agrarian liberal Kesk. They can also be placed to the right of the voters of the green Vihr-party. The PS-voters can, however, not be distinguished from the non-voters on the *grid*-dimension. Looking at the *grid*-index alone, the probability of voting for the PS varies between 15 and 9 percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the *grid*-index. The results from table 5.5 indicate that the PS-voters can be placed at the centre of the *grid*-dimension. The Finnish case gives important support for Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space where voters can be both to the right on the *group*-dimension and to the left at the *grid*-dimension when compared to the voters of other mainstream parties.

The results from table 5.5 also support the separation of the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue. Comparing the voters of PS to the voters of SDP serves as an important example. On the *greed*-dimension these voters cannot be distinguished from each other, but at the *group*-dimension, PS-voters can be placed to the right of the SDP-voters. On the *grid*-dimension, PS-voters can be placed to the left of the SDP-voters, and finally, on the *gay rights*-issue, PS voters can be placed at the right of the SDP-voters. The PS-voters can also be placed to the right of the green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the *gay rights*-issue. Although all parties support traditional and secure family patterns (Fremskrittspartiet 2009; Sverigedemokraterna 2011; DF 2012), the PS is the only Nordic populist radical right party that have the *opposition against same-sex partnership* embedded in their party manifesto (Arter 2012: 815). The results for the *gay rights*-issue do *not* indicate that the PS mobilizes voters on this issue. Only that they are different when compared to some of the other voters, and that it cannot be merged with the *grid*-dimension.

The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.5 in the same way as for the previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the PS-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the PS-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

Finland	--	-	=	+	++
Greed		X			
Group					X
Grid			X		
Gay rights				X	

Summarizing the results based on table 5.5 the placement of the PS-voters in the three-dimensional political space is different from the other Nordic cases. As for the Norwegian case, the PS can be placed to the left of the conservative party, but cannot be distinguished from the other voters on the economic *greed*-dimension. Identical to the other cases, the PS-voters are significantly more exclusionary on the *group*-dimension than the voters of all the other mainstream parties and can be placed further to the right on the *group*-dimension. On the *grid*-dimension the PS-voters can be placed both to the right of, and to the left of, the other mainstream parties. It is therefore fair to say that the PS-voters are located at the centre of the *grid*-dimension. Finally, on the *gay rights*-issue, the PS-voters can be placed to the right of social democratic and green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the conservative and liberal

voters. The results from the Finnish case demonstrate that we gain important empirical insight from conducting a multinomial and not just a binary logistic regression analysis. In the binary model, only the *group*-dimension was able to distinguish the PS-voters. Although this is also the case with the multinomial regression results, we gain important information about the direction of the results when they are compared to the different parties.

5.2.5 Switzerland

The major parties representing the Swiss case for this thesis are the socialist left party Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz (SPs)⁶, the liberal party FDP. Die Liberalen (FDP), the Christian democratic party Christlichdemokratische Volkspartei (CVP), and the green party Grüne Partei der Schweiz (GPS). For the previous cases, this results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 231 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.

Based on the results from table 5.6, Switzerland represents a unique case. The results indicate that the SVP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the economic *greed*-dimension, to the right of all the other voters of the mainstream parties on the *group*-dimension, and to the right of some, but not all voters on the *grid*-dimension, when compared to voters of other mainstream parties in Switzerland. In addition, although the results support separating the *gay rights*-issue from *grid*, we do not gain any added information from including the *gay rights*-issue in the regression model.

Green parties are often regarded as the counter image of populist radical right parties (Kriesi et al. 2008). In the case of Swiss voters, the SVP-voters can be regarded as opposites from the green GPS-voters. The SVP-voters are to the right of the green voters on all dimensions, including the *gay rights*-issue. The coefficients are also strong when compared to the results of the other parties. The coefficients of *group* and *grid* are strongest when SVP-voters are compared to the GPS-voters.

The results from table 5.6 demonstrate that the SVP is better to mobilize voters on the *greed*-dimension than the other mainstream parties, except for the liberal FDP. The SVP-voters can be

⁶The original abbreviation for the Sozialdemokratische Partei der Schweiz is SP, but having already included an SP earlier it is necessary to separate them. I therefore added an "s" for Switzerland.

Table 5.6: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Switzerland

	GPS-voters compared to SVP-voters	SPs-voters compared to SVP-voters	FDP-voters compared to SVP-voters	CVP-voters compared to SVP-voters	Non-voters compared to SVP-voters
Greed	-2.50** (1.01)	-2.64*** (.860)	.924 (.751)	-1.86* (.808)	-1.72*** (.597)
Group	-7.01*** (1.08)	-6.85*** (.924)	-4.73*** (.907)	-4.49*** (.864)	-4.15*** (.670)
Grid	-4.49*** (1.06)	-4.27*** (.949)	-1.39 (.987)	-1.02 (.968)	-2.76*** (.767)
Gay rights	-2.28** (.883)	-.632 (.619)	-.638 (.604)	.874 (.524)	-.054 (.429)
<i>Constant</i>	6.71*** (.844)	6.82*** (.784)	3.23*** (.838)	3.14*** (.831)	6.11*** (.675)
N=1104					
LR Chi2	205.69				
Pseudo R ²	0.0655				
AIC	2986.442				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

placed to the right of the voters of the other mainstream parties on the economic dimension, but not further to the right than of the FDP-voters. The predicted probability of voting for the SVP based on the *greed*-dimension alone ranges from 8 to 21 percent for low (0) and high (1) values of the *greed*-index. Based on these results the *greed*-dimension plays a bigger part in populist radical right voting in Switzerland, than in any of the Nordic countries.

Although the coefficients representing all of the three dimensions are quite strong, the strongest effect is found for the *group*-dimension. Comparing voters for each individual party with the SVP-voters, the *group*-index is the most important in each case. Looking at the *group*-index, it is clear that SVP-voters are significantly more to the right when compared to voters for all other mainstream parties in Switzerland, as well as non-voters. The *group*-dimension is the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the SVP. The probability of voting for the SVP based on the *group*-index is 1 percent for low (0) values and 49 percent for the highest (1) value. This is lower than for the Nordic countries. What is unique for the Swiss case, is that all the three dimensions have a quite substantial effect on the probability of voting for the populist radical right.

The results from table 5.6 give important analytical leverage for separating *group* and *grid*. The results demonstrate that the SVP-voters can be placed to the right of socialist, green, and non-voters, but that they cannot be distinguished from the liberal and Christian democratic voters. The predicted probability of voting for the SVP based on the *grid*-dimension alone, ranges from 2 to 19 percent for low (0) and high (1) values. This is a substantial growth in percent compared

to the results from the Nordic cases. The results place the SVP-voters to the right of the socialist, green and non-voters, but the SVP-voters cannot be distinguished from the liberal and Christian democratic voters on the *grid*-dimension.

Finally, the results also support separating the *gay rights*-variable from the *grid*-dimension. The result is only significant when compared to the green GPS-voters. Looking at the predicted probabilities alone, the probability of voting for the SVP based on the *gay rights*-variable is 11 percent regardless of the different values on the *gay rights*-variable. This makes it clear that the *gay rights*-issue is not important for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in Switzerland. The variable only serves as a contrast when comparing the SVP-voters with the green voters, but does not give any additional analytical insight.

Lachat (2008) found that voters in Switzerland were structured along two dimensions- the economic, and the cultural. The results from table 5.6 support that voters are mobilized to vote for the SVP based on both economic and cultural issues. However, the results also demonstrate that the political space is more complex than what is argued by Lachat (2008). Issues representing *grid* and *group* do not belong together. The results support Kitschelt’s re-theorization of the political space into three dimensions. It also supports separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension.

The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.6 in the same way as for the previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the SD-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the SD-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

Switzerland	--	-	=	+	++
Greed				X	
Group					X
Grid				X	
Gay rights				X	

Summarizing the results from table 5.6 it is clear that the populist radical right voters in Switzerland stand out from the previously examined Nordic voters. As for the Nordic cases, the *group*-dimension is the dominant dimension for mobilizing voters to the SVP. However, the *greed*-dimension also stands out where the SVP-voters are placed to the right of all other voters except for the liberal FDP-voters. On the *grid*-dimension the SVP-voters can be placed to the right of the socialist, green, and non-voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the

remaining parties. Finally, on the *gay rights*-issue, the SVP-voters can be placed to the right of the green voters, but cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other parties, or the non-voters. As for the Finnish case, the results from table 5.6 demonstrate that we gain important empirical insight from conducting a multinomial and not just a binary logistic regression analysis. In the binary model, both *group* and *grid* was able to distinguish the SVP-voters. In the multinomial model we gained additional insight for the economic *greed*-dimension, as well as being able to distinguish the SVP-voters from only some of the other voters on the *grid*-dimension.

5.2.6 Flanders

The major parties chosen to represent the Flemish case are the Christian democratic party Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams (CD&V), the socialist party Socialistische Partij Anders (SP.a), the liberal party Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (VLD), and the green party Groen!. This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 413 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.

The results for the case of Flanders stand out from the previously discussed results. Flanders is the only case where the *greed*-dimension has no effect on the probability of voting. In Flanders, the VB-voters are not distinct from any of the other voters of the mainstream left and right on the *greed*-dimension. As for the previous cases, the *group*-dimension is the dominant dimension for mobilizing voters to the VB. The results also support Kitschelt's re-theorization of the separation of *group* and *grid*. The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the *grid*-dimension, except as a contrast when compared with the green voters. Deviant from the previous cases, the *gay rights*-issue does not offer any additional insight when separated from *grid*.

The results from table 5.7 demonstrate that the VB-voters are widely scattered across the *greed*-dimension. The results indicate that the VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other mainstream parties on the *greed*-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the *greed*-dimension alone is around 5 percent, regardless of low (0) and high (1) values. The *greed*-dimension does not have any effect on the probability of voting for the VB, and the voters cannot be distinguished to the left or the right of any of the voters of the other mainstream parties.

Table 5.7: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Flanders

	Groen!- voters compared to VB-voters	SP.a- voters compared to VB-voters	VLD- voters compared to VB-voters	CD&V- voters compared to VB-voters	Non- voters compared to VB-voters
Greed	-1.61 (1.35)	-.860 (1.09)	1.50 (1.04)	.655 (1.01)	.221 (1.00)
Group	-9.90*** (1.36)	-5.67*** (1.01)	-5.49*** (1.02)	-4.55*** (.947)	-6.28*** (.952)
Grid	-4.38*** (1.38)	-.229 (1.20)	1.27 (1.21)	1.50 (1.15)	.687 (1.13)
Gay rights	-.457 (.954)	-1.07 (.739)	-1.22 (.737)	-.701 (.669)	-.200 (.652)
<i>Constant</i>	7.83*** (1.09)	4.54*** (1.00)	3.01*** (1.01)	2.86*** (.977)	4.51*** (.960)
N=825					
LR Chi2	148.86				
Pseudo R ²	0.0548				
AIC	2619.209				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Although the most important mission of the Vlaams Belang is to establish an independent Flemish state to preserve their Flemish nationalism, rejecting multiculturalism is also an important issue in their party manifesto (VB 2014). Looking at the results from table 5.7, it is clear that the *group*-dimension is the dominant factor for mobilizing voters to the VB in Flanders. The coefficients are several times stronger than those representing the *greed*- *grid*- and *gay rights*-issues. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the *group*-dimension alone ranges from 0 to 46 percent for the lowest (0) and highest (1) values. Based on the results from table 5.7, the VB is the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary values on the *group*-dimension. The VB-voters can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other mainstream parties on issues belonging to the *group*-dimension.

The results from table 5.7 demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage for separating *group* and *grid*. The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the other voters of the mainstream parties in Flanders, other than as a contrast with the green voters. The results indicate that the VB-voters are widely scattered across the *grid*-dimension. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the *grid*-index alone is 6 percent, regardless of the different values on the *grid*-dimension. The values representing the *grid*-dimension are well represented in the manifesto of Vlaams Belang. They argue for strict authority and the importance of living in secure surroundings as well as protecting family traditions (VB 2014). It is therefore interesting that the *grid*-dimension does not play a bigger part when structuring voters in the political space.

In the Nordic cases, and especially the Finnish case, we gained important additional insight from separating the *gay rights*-issue from the *grid*-dimension. The results from table 5.7 serve as a contrast to this. The predicted probability of voting for the VB based on the *gay rights*-variable alone ranges from 5 to 9 percent for low (0) and high (1) values on the *gay rights*-variable. The overall probability is low and does not give added insight beyond that of the *grid*-dimension. The VB-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of any of the other parties on the *gay rights*-issue alone.

When summarizing the results, it is clear that *group* constitutes the dominant factor in voting for the VB compared to other parties in Flanders. The model below summarizes the results from table 5.7 in the same way as for the previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the VB-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the VB-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

Flanders	--	-	=	+	++
Greed			X		
Group					X
Grid				X	
Gay rights			X		

Summarizing the voting patterns from table 5.7, only the *group*-dimension can be used to distinguish the voters of the Vlaams Belang from the voters of the other mainstream parties in Flanders. The VB-voters can be placed to the right of all other voters in table 5.7, but they are *not* distinct from any of the other voters on the *greed*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue. The VB-voters can also not be distinguished from the other voters on the *grid*-dimension, except when compared with the Groen!-voters in which the VB-voters are to the right. The results are consistent with those from the binary model. In the Flemish case we did not gain any additional insight from conducting a multinomial logistic regression model other than as a confirmation of the results from the binary model.

5.2.7 The Netherlands

The final case to be presented in this thesis is the case of the Netherlands. The major parties that have been chosen to represent the Dutch case are the Christian democratic Christen-Democratische Partij (CDP), the conservative liberal party Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie

(VVD), the socialist party Socialistische Partij (SPn)⁷, and the labour party Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA). This results in a dependent variable with 6 categories. Respondents who voted for other parties than those mentioned here were excluded from the analysis. In total 363 respondents were excluded from the analysis because they either voted for another party that will not be included in the model, or because they did not remember what party they voted for.

The results from table 5.8 demonstrate, as for the previous cases, that *group* is the dominant factor for populist radical right voting in the Netherlands. The PVV-voters can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other mainstream parties, as well as those who did not vote. The results also demonstrate that we get important analytical leverage from separating *group* and *grid*, but the results do not provide us with additional information when looking at the *gay rights*-issue separately. Similar to the Danish case, the *greed*-index points in both positive and negative directions when compared to the voters of the other mainstream parties. What is special for the results in table 5.8 are the positive coefficients for both *grid* and *gay rights* when PVV-voters are compared to the voters of the Christian democratic CDP.

Table 5.8: Mapping voters in the three-dimensional political space: Netherlands

	SPn-voters compared to PVV-voters	PvdA-voters compared to PVV-voters	CDP-voters compared to PVV-voters	VVD-voters compared to PVV-voters	Non-voters compared to PVV-voters
Greed	-3.68*** (.979)	-2.36*** (.827)	.804 (.917)	2.32*** (.765)	-.279 (.770)
Group	-9.15*** (.919)	-7.08*** (.842)	-8.86*** (.981)	-7.29*** (.808)	-6.28*** (.781)
Grid	-1.67 (.900)	-.888 (.820)	3.83*** (.986)	1.07 (.814)	.139 (.797)
Gay rights	.099 (.891)	.172 (.777)	1.70* (.807)	.353 (.740)	1.03 (.722)
<i>Constant</i>	5.97*** (.789)	7.02*** (.732)	1.88* (.861)	3.88*** (.721)	4.66*** (.713)
N=1354					
LR Chi2	339.17				
Pseudo R ²	0.0754				
AIC	4206.562				

Standard errors in parentheses

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that the probability of voting for the PVV based on the economic *greed*-dimension varies significantly between parties. The results demonstrate that Partij Voor de Vrihejd is not the dominant choice for voters who hold market-liberal attitudes on the economic dimension. The VVD is better at mobilizing these voters than the populist

⁷The original abbreviation for the Socialistische Partij is SP, but having already included an SP earlier it is necessary to separate them. I therefore added an "n" for the Netherlands.

radical right in the Netherlands. The overall probability of voting for the PVV based on the *greed*-dimension alone, is 5 percent compared to 73 percent for the VVD-voters on the market-liberal axis. The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that PVV-voters can be placed to the right of the mainstream voters of the left and to the left of the VVD-voters, while they cannot be distinguished from the Christian democratic and non-voters on the economic *greed*-dimension. This places the PVV-voters at the centre on the *greed*-dimension.

As for the other six cases examined in this thesis, *group* is the dominant factor for mobilizing voters to the PVV in the Dutch case. The predicted probabilities of voting for the PVV rather than the other mainstream parties of the left and right, based on the *group*-dimension, ranges from 0 to 67 percent for the lowest (0) and highest (1) values on the *group*-index. The PVV-voters can clearly be placed to the right of all the other voters on the *group*-dimension.

I will discuss the results for the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue simultaneously because they both have a positive and statistically significant coefficient when compared to the same party. The results indicate that PVV-voters are to the left on the *grid*-dimension and on the *gay rights*-issue when compared to voters of the CDP. The results are interesting because this indicates that the PVV-voters follow some of the same attitudes as the Lijst Pim Fortuyn, where one could expect to find liberal attitudes on the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue. However, the result only serves as a contrast when compared to the Christian democratic CDP, comparable to the findings from the Norwegian case. The voters of the PVV cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties, or the non-voters, on neither the *grid*-dimension or the *gay rights*-issue. The predicted probability of voting for the PVV based on the *grid*-dimension alone is quite low. The overall probability of voting for the PVV based on *grid* alone is 6 percent, regardless of the different values of the *grid*-index. The results for the *gay rights*-issue is similar and ranges from 7 to 4 percent depending on the values on the *gay rights*-variable. The PVV, like Pim Fortuyn, openly defends the rights and liberties of people living in same-sex relationships (Morris 2014). The results from table 5.8 demonstrate that we do not gain any added insight from including the *gay rights*-variable in the regression model.

Muis and Scholte (2013) conclude their paper on populist radical right parties, trying to find the winning formula in the case of Partij Voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands, that immigration- and cultural issues are the most important in explaining the success of the party. Kriesi and Frey (2008: 165) argue that attitudes constructing the cultural dimension were more important for voting in the Netherlands than economic attitudes. The results from my analysis

support Muis and Scholte (2013) and Kriesi and Frey (2008) from a perspective looking at the populist radical right voters only. Economic attitudes are not important for voting PVV in the Netherlands. The dominant motivator for PVV-voting is the attitudes constructing the *group*-dimension. Schumacher and Rooduijn (2013) argue that protest attitudes and the evaluation of party leaders are important reasons to vote for the PVV in the 2006 and 2010 Dutch elections. Although this analysis does not contain neither protest attitudes or the evaluation of party leaders, the results from table 5.8 demonstrate that the picture is more complex than that. Voters are structured along three dimensions where attitudes belonging to the *group*-dimension are the most important.

The model below summarizes the voting patterns from table 5.8 in the same way as for the previous cases. The columns in the middle (– = +) are used if the PVV-voters are different in the left or right direction from one or some of the other voters, or if they can be placed at the centre of the relevant dimension. The columns further to the left and right (– – and ++) are being used if the PVV-voters can be distinguished either to the left or the right from all the other voters of the mainstream parties.

The Netherlands	--	-	=	+	++
Greed			X		
Group					X
Grid		X			
Gay rights		X			

Summarizing the results from table 5.8, the placement of PVV-voters in the three-dimensional political space is comparable to the previous cases. The voters of the PVV can be placed in the centre of the economic *greed*-dimension and to the right at the *group*-dimension, being more exclusionary than the voters of all of the other mainstream parties. The voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties on the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue, other than as a contrast with the Christian democratic voters. The results are consistent with the binary results with the dichotomous dependent variable. By conducting a multinomial logistic regression analysis we gained some additional insights as contrasts to the other parties.

5.3 Summary of the analyses

In this analysis chapter I have empirically tested the re-theorized theoretical framework of the three-dimensional political space (Kitschelt 2012). I have presented the results from seven Western European countries and tested if the three-dimensional framework is able to explain the voting patterns of populist radical right voters better than the dominant two-dimensional accounts.

The results indicate that the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters are different on the three dimensions, and that *group* and *grid* should be separated. By using the three-dimensional framework the analyses have captured important variation in how populist radical right voters can be placed in the political space, as hypothesized by Kitschelt (2012).

The results have also demonstrated that we gain additional insight from including the *gay rights*-variable in some cases, but not in all. The results have emphasized that these issues do not belong together empirically. The next chapter will discuss these results further.

6

Discussion

In this final chapter I discuss the results presented in chapter five in a comparative perspective, as well as answering the hypotheses presented in chapter two according to the research question. I start by summing up some of the general impressions from the analysis chapter before comparing the results from each country. I then begin to answer the hypotheses and the general research question. In the final concluding remarks I present discussions of the contributions of this thesis, as well as suggestions for future research.

6.1 Discussion of results

In this thesis I have operationalized and tested a new theory concerning the structure of the political space in relations to populist radical right voters. I have done this by carefully selecting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 according to the theories that was outlined in the theory chapter. I then tested if the issues that I had chosen loaded on three different components as was expected from the theoretical outline. This resulted in three indices and one separate issue. The three indices representing the economic dimension called *greed*, the boundary drawing dimension of law and order issues called *grid*, and the dimension concerning inclusion and exclusion of immigration and ethnic minorities, called *group*, as well as the separate issue of *gay rights*. The indices and the *gay rights*-issue was again tested by using binary logistic regression analysis to see if populist radical right voters was significantly different on the three dimensions when compared to all other voters. I then tested if voters of populist radical right parties in seven contemporary Western European democracies could be distinguished from voters of other mainstream parties of the left and right, and how the populist radical right voters could be placed

on the three dimensions in each country.

The general impression from the regression results with a dichotomous dependent variable, grouping all seven countries into one analysis, is that *group* is the most important dimension for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. This is consistent with the general impression of most research done on the topic (Ivarsflaten 2008; Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2008). The second impression from these results is that the *gay rights*-issue is the second most important factor for mobilizing voters to the populist radical right in Western Europe. This is an unexpected result both in relations to the theoretical framework, and in relations to the issue not belonging to the *grid*-dimension. The third finding from the binary logistic regression model is that the *greed*-dimension and the *grid*-dimension is not statistically significant, and has in this way no effect on populist radical right voting. I also argued why it is important to test the three dimensions along with the *gay rights*-issue, comparing populist radical right voters with the voters of the other mainstream parties, by conducting cross-country voting analysis.

The analysis done by country revealed both expected and surprising results. As for the binary model, all countries had negative and statistically significant coefficients for the *group*-index, confirming that the group-issue is of substantial importance in mobilizing voters for the populist radical right in Western Europe, compared to all other mainstream parties, as well as non-voters. In comparing all the models representing the seven countries it is clear that *group* is a defining feature of the populist radical right voters, which has been emphasized by many scholars (Mudde 2007; Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008). The findings from this thesis, conducted with new data, support previous research arguing that an exclusive and nativist appeal is important for populist radical right voting.

The second clear finding that I would like to emphasize is the findings for the *greed*-index. As many scholars have stated, populist radical right parties and voters are to the right on the economic *greed*-dimension supportive of more market-liberal values. Kitschelt and McGann (1995) argued that market-liberal values of being to the right on the economic dimension was part of the *winning formula* for populist radical right parties together with exclusionist and authoritarian values on immigration-issues and law and order-issues. In later work, he argued that the placement of parties and voters on the economic dimension is something that could (and should) vary over time and across countries (Kitschelt 2007). As argued by Ivarsflaten (2005), voters do not necessarily need to be as far to the right as Kitschelt has argued. The findings from this thesis supports Kitschelt (2007) and Ivarsflaten (2005). In the multinomial logistic

regression models representing the seven countries, voters can be placed both to the far right (Switzerland) and to the centre. Flanders is the only case where the *greed*-dimension is not significant when compared to any of the other parties.

The findings for the *grid*-dimension as well as the *gay rights*-issue deserves more room and discussion than the *greed* and *group*-dimension which are already well embedded in the academic literature. As already mentioned, it is interesting that we do not have more research on the subject of gay rights as it is a topic that is well argued for by party leaders in the media, at least in the recent period of time (Morris 2014). As found in the analysis chapter, both the *gay rights*-issue and the *grid*-dimension have the most varied results between countries. The results indicate that the populist radical right voters in Western Europe can be placed both to the left (more libertarian) and to the right (more authoritarian) than the other mainstream parties. The next section will discuss the results and the theories according to each of the three dimensions and answer the hypotheses.

6.2 Answering the hypotheses

In this section I answer my hypotheses. I answer each of them by discussing them comparatively based on the results from each of the seven countries. I start by discussing the results for H₁ which was compiled based on the *greed*-dimension. I then discuss the results for H₂ that was compiled based on the *group*-dimension. Finally I discuss the results for H₃ that was compiled based on the *grid*-dimension.

H₁: *The greed-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

There is broad scholarly agreement of the importance of the economic dimension for the supply by parties and the demand by voters in Western Europe. Concerning populist radical right parties and voters, Kitschelt and McGann (1995) embedded the economic issues in their famous *winning formula*. Betz (1994) also argued that economic issues was of importance for the supply and demand of populist radical right parties. More recent research did not find economic issues to be of importance for populist radical right voting (Carter 2005; Ivarsflaten 2005; Mudde 2007). In later research, Kitschelt has argued that economic preferences and issues might be of

secondary importance and that such factors could and should vary over time and across countries (Kitschelt 2007 2012).

The results from this thesis supports the more recent research in respect to several aspects. The results from the straight comparative voting analysis clearly demonstrate that the economic *greed*-dimension does not have any effect on the probability of voting for the populist radical right when compared to the other voters in Western Europe. Relating to the straight comparative voting analysis alone, the *greed*-dimension is not necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. When breaking up the analysis in different countries a more nuanced picture emerges. The populist radical right voters in the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark can clearly be placed at the centre of the *greed*-dimension, while the populist radical right voters in Norway and Finland are not distinct from the voters of the mainstream parties, except when compared to the conservative voters where they are placed to the left. In Flanders, the *greed*-dimension had no effect at all and the VB-voters could not be distinguished from the voters of any of the other major parties. Only in Switzerland are populist radical right voters to the right of the voters of the other major parties, except when compared to the liberals in which they cannot be distinguished from.

The voters can, in all cases except for Switzerland, be placed at the centre of the economic *greed*-dimension when compared to the other mainstream parties of the left and right, or not be distinguished from the voters of the other major parties. The voters of the conservative parties are overall better in mobilizing voters who hold market-liberal attitudes at the economic *greed*-dimension. Switzerland and Flanders are two special cases regarding the economic *greed*-dimension in each direction. The results from the Swiss case supports Betz (1994) and Kitschelt and McGann (1995) in that economic issues are important in explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. In this analysis Switzerland may in fact be a prime example of Kitschelt's *winning formula*. Flanders on the other hand does not have a significant *greed*-index when the populist radical right voters are compared to the voters of any of the other mainstream parties. The effect of the *greed*-dimension is clearly strongest in the Swiss case and completely absent in the Flemish case. The *greed*-dimension reveals interesting cross-country differences as expected by Kitschelt (2007). the dimension cannot be merged with any of the other dimensions and should remain separated as an independent economic dimension. The overall results from this thesis supports H₁ in that the *greed*-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting, although it is not necessary in every case that has been examined. It also

supports Kitschelt (2007; 2012) in that the impact on economic issues can deviate depending on what countries are included in the analysis, and that the populist radical right voters, with the exception of Swiss voters, are *not* to the far-right on the economic *greed*-dimension, but rather at the centre.

H₂: *The group-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

The findings in this thesis supports what we already know: issues connected to inclusion or exclusion of certain groups are of substantial importance for populist radical right voting. All successful populist radical right parties have used a rhetoric supportive of the *true nation* and excluding the influence of immigrants or ethnic minority groups (Betz 2002; 2003). The early results from the straight comparative voting analysis demonstrated a clear pattern for the *group*-dimension. The populist radical right parties in Western Europe are the dominant choice for voters who hold exclusionary attitudes on the *group*-dimension. The findings from the straight comparative voting analysis are supported and intensified when breaking up the analysis into different countries.

The findings from the multinomial models representing all of the seven countries demonstrated that populist radical right voters in Western Europe can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other major parties on the *group*-dimension. The findings support the minimum definition presented by Mudde (2007) where populist radical right parties *to the least* need to have a nativist rhetoric. Although the multinomial models presented in the analysis chapter reveal some differences among the populist radical right voters in the seven Western European countries, the results for the *group*-dimension is consistent both within and between countries. The *group*-index has the strongest coefficient in every case that has been presented in this thesis. It is clear that the *group*-dimension is the most important for mobilizing voters to vote for the populist radical right in contemporary Western European democracies. It cannot be merged with any of the other dimensions and should be treated as a separate dimension in future research.

The results presented in the analysis chapter emphasize that the *group*-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting in all the seven countries examined. The results therefore supports H₂: the *group*-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.

H₃: *The grid-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting.*

Relating to the straight comparative voting analysis alone, the *grid*-dimension is not necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. In the binary analysis it was not able to distinguish the populist radical right voters from the voters of the other parties. When conducting the separate cross-country analysis, a more nuanced picture emerged, both for the *grid*-dimension and for the *gay right*-issue. In some countries *grid* is not necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting while it is necessary in other countries. In some countries we gained important additional insight by including the *gay rights*-issue, while in other countries we did not. Most importantly, the results have demonstrated that the *grid*-dimension cannot be merged with any of the other dimensions and that it should remain separated in future research.

The concept of the *grid*-dimension represents the same issues as the well established libertarian–authoritarian dimension but without the group-issue. In this thesis, issues representing security, tradition, strong state and the importance of following rules were included in an index. One of the central issues for re-theorizing the political space was excluded from the *grid*-index because it did not load as expected in the principal components analysis. In the following paragraphs, I point out the instances where we gained important analytical leverage from separating *group* and *grid*, as well as pointing out the cases where we gained important additional insight from including the *gay rights*-issue ¹.

Norway, Denmark and Sweden were the three cases that did *not* have a significant result for the *grid*-dimension. The results demonstrated that the populist radical right voters in Scandinavia are widely scattered across the *grid*-dimension. The insignificant results gave us important analytical leverage for separating *group* and *grid* and demonstrated that while *group* is necessary for explaining the populist radical right voting patterns, the *grid*-dimension is not. However, in Sweden and Denmark we gained important additional insight from including the *gay rights*-issue in the model. In these two cases, the *gay rights*-issue is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting, while in the Norwegian case it only serves as a contrast when compared to the Christian democratic voters. The results have demonstrated that empirically, the *gay rights*-issue does not belong together with *grid*.

¹To increase the reliability of the results presented in the analysis chapter, I have run the multinomial models for each country one time without the *grid*-index and one time without the *gay rights*-variable. The results do not change in any way worthy of mentioning.

Finland represents a special case. The PS-voters can be placed at the centre of the *grid*-dimension, being both to the left of, and to the right of, some of the other mainstream voters. The results from the Finnish case give important analytical leverage for separating *group* and *grid*. The voting patterns of the PS-voters moved in another direction than the voting patterns in the *group*-dimension. In addition, we gained additional insight from including the *gay rights*-issue in the model. The results from the Finnish case demonstrate that the *gay rights*-issue is different from the *grid*-dimension. This was emphasized when the PS-voters were compared to the social democratic SAP-voters, in which the PS-voters could be placed to the left of the SAP-voters on the *grid*-dimension, but to the right of the SAP-voters on the *gay rights*-issue. In Finland, the *grid*-dimension plays a bigger part, and also in opposite direction than the *group*-dimension. In Finland, the *grid*-dimension is clearly necessary to explain the populist radical right voting pattern.

The results for the Swiss case are exceptional. The results presented clear voting patterns for all the three dimensions. The SVP-voters are to the right of the other voters on the *greed*-dimension, to the right of the other voters on the *group*-dimension, and to the right of the other voters on the *grid*-dimension. As for the previous cases, the Swiss voters are only to the right of *all* the other voters on the *group*-dimension. The Swiss case also gives important analytical leverage for separating *group* and *grid*, but the two dimensions do not have different directions, as in the Finnish case. The SVP-voters are to the right of the mainstream parties of the left, but not distinct from the major parties of the right on the *grid*-dimension. Opposite from the Nordic cases, we do not gain additional analytical insight by including the *gay rights*-issue in the regression model.

In Flanders, the results demonstrated that we gain important analytical leverage from separating *group* and *grid*. The results also demonstrated that we did not gain any additional insight from including the *gay rights*-issue in the model. In the Flemish case, the VB-voters were to the right of the voters of all the other major parties on the *group*-dimension, but could not be distinguished from the voters of the other major parties on any of the other dimensions. The results demonstrate the importance of separating *group* and *grid*, but does not support the inclusion of the *gay rights*-issue as a separate issue in the Flemish case.

As for the six previous cases, the results from the Dutch case also demonstrate that we gain important analytical leverage by separating *group* and *grid*. As for the other cases, the Dutch PVV-voters can be placed to the right of the voters of all the other major parties. The results

demonstrate that the PVV-voters cannot be distinguished from the voters of the other mainstream parties, other than as a contrast towards the Christian democratic voters. Including the *gay rights*-issue does not explain more of the voting pattern of the PVV than if it had been excluded from the analysis.

Comparatively, the *grid*-dimension plays a minor part in explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. What my results demonstrate, is that it has been misleading to include *grid*- and *group*-values as belonging to one dimension. The results strongly suggest that these issues should be separated. In some cases the *grid*-values also play the opposite part of the *group*-values. The two dimensions cannot be merged and does not belong together. However, depending on how one defines the *grid*-dimension, the *gay rights*-issue needs to be taken into account. In some cases the *gay rights*-issue explain the pattern of populist radical right voting better than the *grid*-dimension. I have, throughout this entire thesis, treated these issues as belonging to the same concept moving from a libertarian versus authoritarian pole. Based on the results from the principal components analysis, I separated them in the regression analysis. The regression results demonstrated that we gain important additional insight from including the *gay rights*-issue in the Nordic countries, while we do not gain any additional insight by including the *gay right*-issue in Flanders, Switzerland and the Netherlands. The *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue reveal interesting cross-country differences. Based on the above mentioned elaboration, the results support H₃: the *grid*-dimension is necessary for explaining the pattern of populist radical right voting. However, the results also demonstrate that more research is needed on the topic.

6.3 Conclusion

The goal of this thesis has been to operationalize the issues constituting the three-dimensional political space, and to test if the issues included in the three dimensions are able to distinguish the voters of populist radical right parties from the voters of the other mainstream parties in contemporary Western European democracies. It all started with Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space that was inspired by the liberal and exclusionary populist radical right party leader Pim Fortuyn (Kitschelt 2012). To choose variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to operationalize the issues representing the three dimensions I used both classical theories and newer theories, concerning both the dimensionality of the political space as well as populist radical right parties and their electorate. Surprisingly, the first finding was that a central issue

concerning *gay rights* did not belong to any of the three dimensions that I had operationalized. The further analysis, using binary logistic regression analysis and multinomial logistic regression analysis, demonstrated that the *gay rights*-issue is a central issue for distinguishing populist radical right voters from other voters in some countries, and that this cannot be explained by the three dimensions.

This conclusion has two parts. In the first part I summarize the most important findings and give an overview of the populist radical right voting patterns in Western Europe, as well as give an answer to the general research question. In the next section I argue how and why these findings are important for the research of populist radical right parties and give some suggestions for future research.

6.3.1 The three-dimensional political space

Kitschelt (2012) re-theorized the structure of the political space constituting populist radical right parties and voters. He argued that the classical two-dimensional framework was not enough to explain the success of the populist radical right parties after the major breakthrough of Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the 2002 national election. In this thesis I have operationalized the new theoretical framework and tested it according to the populist radical right voters in Western Europe. This thesis supports Kitschelt's re-theorization of the political space. The results discovered both country differences and similarities and support what we already know: issues connected to *group* and *greed* are important. The country differences are largest on the *grid*-dimension and on the *gay rights*-issue. The separation of *group* and *grid* as suggested by Kitschelt (2012) demonstrate that previous research might have emphasized authoritarian *grid*-issues as more important than they really are. The results from this thesis demonstrated that the *grid*-dimension only had an important impact in explaining the populist radical right voting pattern in some of the cases, and in some cases also in different directions.

The overall research question of this thesis is the following: *can the new three-dimensional political space outlined by Kitschelt in recent work, better explain populist radical right voting patterns than the existing and dominant two-dimensional frameworks?* Table 6.1 and 6.2 below summarize the results from the multinomial logistic regression analyses and place the populist radical right voters from each country in the political space to graphically present the voting patterns. Table 6.1 summarizes the results of *greed* and *group*, while table 6.2 summarizes the results of *grid* and *gay rights*.

Table 6.1: Mapping the results for *greed* and *group*

		Greed				
		--	-	=	+	++
Group	--					
	-					
	=					
	+					
	++	Norway Finland	Denmark Sweden Flanders The Netherlands	Switzerland		

Table 6.1 summarizes what we already know from previous research, populist radical right voters hold exclusionary attitudes towards immigration and EU-issues on the *group*-dimension and can be placed to the right of all other voters on these issues (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Mudde 2007). The majority of the voters can also be placed at the centre of the *greed*-dimension. The exceptions are Norway, Finland and Switzerland. The Norwegian and Finnish PRR-voters are to the left of some of the other major parties, but not distinguishable from all of them, while the Swiss PRR-voters are to the right of the majority of the other voters, but not distinguishable from the liberal voters. Table 6.1 summarizes issues from the dominant two-dimensional account, but without the *grid*-issues. The table demonstrates very clearly that issues constituting *group* are the dominant issues constructing the voting pattern of populist radical right voters, where these voters can be placed to the far-right.

Table 6.2 summarizes the results of the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue. The table maps the voting patterns of the populist radical right voters based on the results for each country. The table reveals interesting cross-country differences and emphasize the importance of conducting cross-country research when examining populist radical right voters and dimensions in the political space.

The varying results found for the *grid*-dimension and the *gay rights*-issue supports Kitschelt's argument for re-theorizing the structure of the political space. Libertarian versus authoritarian issues do not belong together with the inclusive versus exclusive group-issues. More importantly, the results indicate that voters of the populist radical right can be both libertarian and authoritarian on both *grid* and *gay rights*-issues. These results support Kitschelt (2012) in that populist radical

Table 6.2: Mapping the results for *grid* and *gay rights*

		Gay rights				
		--	-	=	+	++
Grid	--					
	-	The Netherlands				
	=	Norway		Finland		
				Denmark Sweden		
	+				Flanders	Switzerland
	++					

right voters can differ on the *grid*-dimension when conducting cross-country research. The results mapped in table 6.2 are important in answering the research question. The three-dimensional account outlined by Kitschelt (2012), does in fact explain the pattern of populist radical right voting better than the existing and dominant two-dimensional accounts. There are many reasons for this. First of all, the three-dimensional framework reveals that the *group*-dimension alone is the most important for explaining the populist radical right voting pattern. In doing this, the framework is able to demonstrate that previous research may have given *grid*-values too much attention. This is emphasized by the importance of the *group*-values and the varying *grid*-values. Strong results for *group* could have camouflaged *grid*-values as significant in previous research. Secondly, the three-dimensional framework is able to reveal important cross-country differences for the *grid*-dimension. In Switzerland, the result is as expected from previous research, but in the other six cases it is not. These findings support the separation of *group* and *grid*. The attitudes structuring the two dimensions are different, and they cannot be merged with any of the other dimensions.

Kitschelt's (2012) account of the three-dimensional political space in Western Europe is, however, not fully embraced by the evidence presented in this thesis. The results presented in this thesis discovered the presence of an important secondary issue that does not fit into Kitschelt's three-dimensional framework; the *gay rights*-issue. Empirically the *gay rights*-issue does not belong together with the *grid*-dimension. In some cases the issue is important in explaining the populist radical right voting pattern. This emphasizes the importance of more research on this topic.

6.3.2 Contributions and future research

This thesis has two main contributions. First of all I have operationalized the issues belonging to the three dimensions. This operationalization was based on thorough review of both classic and newer theories regarding political dimensions and the populist radical right. I also used the cultural theories of *grid* and *group* as suggested by Kitschelt (2007 2012). The theories were then applied to find the best suiting variables from the European Social Survey 2012 to represent the values constituting the three-dimensional political space.

The second contribution of this thesis is the empirical testing of this exact theoretical framework. Kitschelt (2012) introduced a re-theorized theoretical framework consisting of three dimensions to distinguish voters of the populist radical right. The framework has never before been empirically tested. The results indicate that the populist radical right voting patterns are different on these three dimensions, and that *group* and *grid* should be separated. By using three dimensions this thesis was able to capture important variation in how populist radical right voters can be placed in the political space, as hypothesised by Kitschelt (2012).

This thesis has discovered the presence of an important issue that does not fit into the three-dimensional political framework. The *gay rights*-issue represents values that are different from the ones constituting the *grid*-dimension. Neither Kitschelt nor I could have expected these results. Something is happening in Western Europe in regards to the values constituting *grid* and the issue of *gay rights*. Empirically these issues do not belong together. The results make it clear that there has been done far too little research on populist radical right voting and gay rights. This should be explored further in future research.

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Appendix

Table 3: Main content of the variables structuring the three-dimensional political space

Greed	
Income redistribution	Important for democracy that the government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels
Economic protection	Important for democracy that the government protects all citizens against poverty
Group	
European Union	Thinking about the European Union, some say European unification should go further. Others say it has already gone too far. What number on the scale best describes your position?
Quality of life	Is [Country] made a worse or better place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?
Cultural threat	Would you say that [country]'s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries
Multiculturalism	Allow many/few people of a different race or ethnic group as most [country]'s people to come and live here
Grid	
Gay rights	Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish.
Tradition	It is important to follow the traditions and customs handed down by religion or family.
Security	It is important to live in secure surroundings and to avoid anything that might endanger safety.
Strong state	It is important that the government ensures safety against all threats. She/he wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens.
Follow rules	People should do what they're told and follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.

Table 4: Frequencies of observations by country

Country	Frequency	Percent
Flanders	1271	10.66
Switzerland	1493	12.52
Denmark	1650	13.83
Finland	2197	18.42
The Netherlands	1845	15.47
Norway	1624	13.62
Sweden	1847	15.49
Total	11927	100.00

Table 5: Correlation between variables

	income	econom	europa	quality	culture	multic	gay	tradi	Secure	Strong	Rules
Income	1.0000										
Econom	0.5115	1.0000									
Europe	-0.0434	0.0019	1.0000								
Quality	0.0894	0.1050	0.2980	1.0000							
Culture	0.1156	0.0921	0.2581	0.6380	1.0000						
Multic	0.0606	0.0821	0.2323	0.5152	0.4776	1.0000					
Gay	-0.0138	0.0421	0.1278	0.1816	0.1848	0.2208	1.0000				
Tradit	-0.0684	-0.0566	0.0190	0.0977	0.1276	0.1383	0.1592	1.0000			
Secure	-0.1099	-0.0766	0.0685	0.1327	0.1136	0.1653	0.1149	0.2513	1.0000		
Strong	-0.1770	-0.1944	0.0400	0.1010	0.0860	0.1206	0.0860	0.2365	0.3544	1.0000	
Rules	-0.0230	-0.0339	0.0071	0.0944	0.1275	0.1134	0.1343	0.2618	0.2576	0.2638	1.0000

Table 6: Index of *greed*

Income redistribution	
Economic protection	
Chronbach's alpha	0.660

Table 7: Index of *group*

European Union	
Quality of life	
Cultural threat	
Multiculturalism	
Chronbach's alpha	0.674

Table 8: Index of *grid*

Tradition	
Security	
Strong state	
Follow rules	
Chronbach's alpha	0.597

Table 9: Testing the indices: Norway

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.427 (.529)				-.062 (.592)
Group		6.09*** (.650)			6.34*** (.690)
Grid			.592 (.542)		-.414 (.606)
Gay rights				.618 (.382)	-.369 (.437)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.15*** (.142)	-5.12*** (.370)	-2.44*** (.362)	-2.20*** (.130)	-4.89*** (.508)
N=1112					
LR Chi2	0.64	100.96***	1.20	2.50	102.30***
Pseudo R ²	0.0008	0.1291	0.0015	0.0032	0.1309
AIC	785.15	684.82	784.58	783.28	689.48

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 10: Testing the indices: Denmark

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.692 (.515)				-.249 (.585)
Group		6.62*** (.612)			6.52*** (.640)
Grid			1.57** (.611)		-.014 (.691)
Gay rights				1.74*** (.409)	.606 (.465)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.51*** (.165)	-5.66*** (.372)	-3.38*** (.423)	-2.62*** (.128)	-5.63*** (.565)
N=1206					
LR Chi2	1.74	147.26***	6.88**	15.83***	149.04***
Pseudo R ²	0.0024	0.2065	0.0097	0.0222	0.2090
AIC	715.46	569.95	710.32	701.37	574.17

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 11: Testing the indices: Sweden

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.552 (.740)				.489 (.845)
Group		8.90*** (.907)			8.89*** (.950)
Grid			1.40* (.730)		-.673 (.870)
Gay rights				2.50*** (.567)	1.43* (.663)
<i>Constant</i>	-3.16*** (.188)	-7.45*** (.550)	-3.94*** (.486)	-3.57*** (.196)	-7.42*** (.747)
N=1308					
LR Chi2	0.54	124.94***	3.78*	17.28***	130.37***
Pseudo R ²	0.0011	0.2631	0.0080	0.0364	0.2746
AIC	478.28	353.87	475.04	461.53	354.45

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 12: Testing the indices: Finland

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	-.674 (.518)				-1.03 (.549)
Group		5.56*** (.549)			5.40*** (.582)
Grid			.141 (.454)		-.934 (.505)
Gay rights				1.37*** (.270)	.503 (.306)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.74*** (.113)	-4.47*** (.291)	-1.94*** (.308)	-2.21*** (.112)	-3.74*** (.431)
N=1433					
LR Chi2	1.75	116.85***	0.10	24.42***	124.25***
Pseudo R ²	0.0015	0.1028	0.0001	0.0215	0.1093
AIC	1138.58	1023.48	1140.23	1115.91	1022.08

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 13: Testing the indices: Switzerland

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.827 (.550)				1.01 (.612)
Group		5.66*** (.694)			5.11*** (.734)
Grid			3.63*** (.685)		2.66*** (.780)
Gay rights				1.06 (.391)	-.170 (.465)
<i>Constant</i>	-1.72*** (.157)	-4.40*** (.391)	-4.09*** (.510)	-1.83*** (.151)	-6.17*** (.676)
N=679					
LR Chi2	2.22	79.53***	31.72***	7.08**	92.93***
Pseudo R ²	0.0035	0.1262	0.0503	0.0112	0.1474
AIC	632.06	554.75	602.55	627.19	547.34

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05
Standard errors in parentheses

Table 14: Testing the indices: Flanders

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	-.197 (.912)				-.907 (.913)
Group		4.69*** (.832)			4.82*** (.860)
Grid			.510 (.972)		-.961 (1.03)
Gay rights				.975 (.567)	.588 (.604)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.87*** (.227)	-5.41*** (.523)	-3.24*** (.663)	-3.10*** (.197)	-4.80*** (.807)
N=890					
LR Chi2	0.05	32.48***	0.28	2.67	34.62***
Pseudo R^2	0.0001	0.0897	0.0008	0.0074	0.0956
AIC	366.09	333.65	365.85	363.47	337.51

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Standard errors in parentheses

Table 15: Testing the indices: The Netherlands

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Greed	.186 (.689)				-.705 (.713)
Group		7.77*** (.737)			8.02*** (.751)
Grid			.788 (.699)		-.349 (.748)
Gay rights				-.107 (.615)	-1.18 (.668)
<i>Constant</i>	-2.69*** (.201)	-6.69*** (.454)	-3.16*** (.477)	-2.63*** (.135)	-6.25*** (.658)
N=1303					
LR Chi2	0.07	133.25***	1.29	0.03	137.81
Pseudo R^2	0.0001	0.2103	0.0020	0.0000	0.2175
AIC	637.63	504.45	636.41	637.67	505.89

***p-value<.001; **p-value<.01; *p-value<.05

Standard errors in parentheses