

**The Role of Norad's Oil for Development Programme in
Environmental Management in Ghana**



Master's thesis in Geography

Nicola Trier

Department of Geography

Faculty of Social Science

University of Bergen

Autumn 2014

ABSTRACT

Norad's Oil for Development (OfD) programme entered an agreement with Ghana in 2008 following Ghana's major oil discovery in the Jubilee Field in 2007. Mainly using policies based on the internationally approved concept 'good governance', and on Norwegian oil experience, the programme aims to assist the country in avoiding a resource curse. One area of focus in OfD's programme is environmental governance and, using a political ecology approach, this study examines the nature of this assistance and its possible impact on Ghana's environmental management of its oil industry. From a geographical perspective, the place-specificity of strategies, which is necessary in environmental management, is not sufficient, and the concept 'environmentality' may be applied to describe the power-laden nature of the programme and the OfD discourse's framing of issues related to the collaboration. Accusations of conflicts of interest between the private and public sector also lead to the programme omitting issues relevant to Ghana's environmental oil governance. Its institutional capacity-building approach has, arguably, strengthened the structure of environmental institutions at the macro-level, but is unlikely to be sufficient in strengthening Ghana's environmental management of its oil sector as a whole.

Key words: political ecology; Ghana; Oil for Development; environmentality; Norwegian aid

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My sincerest gratitude goes out to a number of people for their time, assistance and support throughout this process.

Firstly, to my supervisor, Ragnhild Overå, for hours, days, months and years of support, advise, patience and guidance. Your knowledge of Ghana, expertise and enthusiasm made the entire process manageable, fascinating and thoroughly enjoyable.

My thanks also to the other members of staff at the institute for their helpful comments and advise throughout this long process, in particular Håvard Haarstad for his advise on the sometimes-confusing world of discourse analysis. Thanks also to my friends and fellow geography students for their support and contributions.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the informants for their valuable time and the sharing of their knowledge.

And then to my family, without whom this process would have seemed impossible. To mum and dad for always supporting me through all the strange projects I embark upon. Thanks in particular to mum for many long days (and nights) of proofreading and for encouragement and support, whenever and wherever.

Thanks to Anders for your patience and love, and for always being there and encouraging me through all the uncertainties and doubts. Also, for your excellent academic advise and support, and for spa gift cards just when I needed them.

And lastly to my wonderful son, Theo, who indirectly decided the theme and angle of this thesis through his coming to the world at the perfect moment, and for bringing me more joy than I could ever imagine.

Nicola Trier, August 2014

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 The politics and geography of oil.....	1
1.2 The environmental impact of oil	3
1.3 An introduction to Ghana	5
1.3.1 The political economy of Ghana	5
1.3.2 Ghana's geography and environment.....	6
1.3.3 The environmental impact of oil in Ghana.....	8
1.4 The Oil for Development Programme.....	10
1.5 Theme of study and research questions.....	12
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	15
2.1 Oil and the resource curse	15
2.1.1 Good governance	17
2.1.2. Post-resource curse	19
2.2 Development aid	20
2.2.1 Development discourses	21
2.2.2 Petroleum-related aid.....	24
2.2.3 Norwegian aid and Norwegian oil.....	24
2.3 Political ecology	26
2.3.1 Criticisms of political ecology.....	27
2.4 Environmental discourses and narratives.....	28
2.5 Incorporating the concepts and theories.....	30
3. METHODOLOGY	31
3.1 Background research	31
3.2 Primary data production	32
3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews	32
3.2.2 Choice of informants	33
3.2.3 The interview process.....	33
3.2.4 Ethics and positionality	35
3.3 Data analysis and interpretation	37
3.3.1 The methodology of discourse analysis.....	37
3.3.2 Transcribing and translation of the interviews	39

3.3.3 Coding	40
3.3.4 Choosing texts and excerpts	40
3.4 Reflections and limitations of the methodology	41
3.5 Generalization and transferability	41
3.5.1 Validity	42
4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS	43
4.1 The discourses	43
4.1.1 The Norwegian development discourse	43
4.1.2 The professional partnership discourse	48
4.2 Key themes in the discourses	51
4.2.1. Strategies used in OfD's environmental pillar in Ghana	51
4.2.2 Ghana's starting-point seen in relation to the resource curse hypothesis.....	54
4.2.3 Norway as an oil nation	61
4.2.4 The role of the oil companies	63
4.2.5 The co-operation between the Ghanaian and Norwegian authorities.....	70
4.2.6 Local participation and knowledge. Ghana specific strategies?.....	73
4.2.7 Statoil and Norwegian investments	78
4.2.8 Environmental changes in Ghana post-oil production	81
4.2.9 Evaluating OfD's environmental management in Ghana so far.....	85
5. DISCUSSION	88
5.1 The roots of OfD's environmental policies.....	88
5.1.1 The Norwegian experience	88
5.1.2 Global oil policies.....	90
5.1.3 Norway's motives for its aid programmes	91
5.1.4 Resulting environmental policies	92
5.2 Place-specificity in OfD's environmental policies.....	92
5.2.1 OfD's starting-point in Ghana	92
5.2.2 Place-specific OfD strategies in Ghana	94
5.3 Criticisms and omissions.....	95
5.3.1 Capacity building and environmental governance	95
5.3.2 Oil company communication and responsibility	96
5.3.3 MESTI and the EPA Ghana.....	98
5.3.4 Communication between sectors	98

5.3.5 Civil society	99
5.3.6 Environmental research	99
5.4 The discourses surrounding OfD’s environmental management	101
5.5 The political ecology of OfD’s environmental management in Ghana	103
6. CONCLUSION.....	106
LIST OF REFERENCES.....	109
APPENDICES	115
Appendix A: Sample interview guide	115

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig 1: Map of offshore activity areas, Ghana.....	6
Fig 2: Environmental sensitivity map of the Jomoro District, Ghana.....	7

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

COWI – Consultancy within Engineering, Environmental Science and Economics

CSR - Corporate Social Responsibility

DN - Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management

EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment

EITI – Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

EPA - Environmental Protection Agency (Ghana)

FON - Friends of the Nation (Ghana)

GEM - Global Environmental Management

GMA - Ghana Maritime Academy

GNPC - Ghana National Petroleum Corporation

GPF - Government Pension Fund Global

ICRG - International Country Risk Guide

IFC - International Finance Corporation

IMF - International Monetary Fund

IMR - Institute of Marine Research

Klif - Norwegian climate and pollution agency

MESTI - Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (Ghana)

MoE - Ministry of the Environment (Norway)

NCA - The Norwegian Coastal Administration

NDD - Norwegian Development Discourse

NEA - Norwegian Environmental Agency

NGO - Non-governmental Organisation

NOC - National Oil Company

Norad - Norwegian Agency for Development Co-operation

NPA - Norwegian People's Aid

NSD - Norwegian data protection official for research

OfD - Oil for Development

OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

PAH - Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbons

PETRAD - International programme for petroleum management and administration

PPD - Professional Partnership Discourse

PSA - Production Sharing Agreements

PWYP – Publish What You Pay

RW – Revenue Watch

SAP - Structural Adjustment Programme

SEA - Strategic Environmental Assessment

TCPD - Town and Country Planning Department

VTMIS - Vessel Traffic Monitoring Information System

WGI - Worldwide Governance indicators (World Bank)

WRSDF - Western Region Spatial Development Framework

WWF – World Wide Fund for Nature

1. INTRODUCTION

Ghana discovered commercial quantities of oil in 2007 and started production in 2010, naming their oil field ‘Jubilee’, to mark the 50th anniversary of Ghana’s independence, and as a reflection of the nation’s optimism about their find (Dypedokk, 2012). The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation’s (Norad) Oil for Development programme (OfD) entered a partnership with Ghana in 2008 in order to assist Ghana in the governance of their oil, with this assistance being based on Norway’s expertise from their own oil industry. The OfD programme is based on the principle of ‘good governance’. This is given by many development agencies as being the key to avoiding negative trends which are commonly associated with a resource curse, particularly in post-colonial states in the global south (Logan and McNeish, 2012). With the environmental impact of oil production being potentially devastating when poorly managed, as can be seen in neighbouring oil nations such as Nigeria, one of OfD’s ‘pillars’ is environmental governance. This consists of a number of policies and tools aimed largely at strengthening management and building capacity.

This study is a critical analysis of the OfD programme in Ghana, specifically regarding its policies for and impact on environmental management. This chapter will firstly introduce some of the main themes surrounding the geopolitics, governance and environmental impact of oil. It will then introduce the study area, Ghana, describing the dynamics of its oil industry, before moving on to a description and discussion of the OfD programme and its role in Ghana. It then brings these threads together in a discussion of the study topic and resulting research questions.

1.1 The politics and geography of oil

The nature of oil may be described as political since decisions about finding, moving, and using the resource bring together groups of people with different interests and agendas, including some of the most powerful actors in the global economy (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). Oil is often viewed as a means to achieving industrialisation and a ‘take-off’ in development as described in Rostow’s model of development

(Potter et al., 2008), yet many countries have instead seen a worsening of their economy after oil production, with lower levels of democracy, and a greater chance of conflicts. This, in addition to various social and environmental costs, has caused many to experience oil as a curse rather than a blessing. Economists such as Collier (2010) describe the various mechanisms which may cause a 'resource curse', largely being centred around a lack of effective regulation through good governance. Policies of transparency and accountability, along with the strengthening of regulatory institutions, are often seen as key methods in avoiding or reducing its negative effects.

The resource curse may be described as an idiographic phenomenon and each case is unique, as every dysfunctional oil country is dysfunctional in its own way (Maass, 2010). Variation in the effects of the resource curse on well-being can also be found within a country, with rising inequality between different geographical spaces (Humphreys et al., 2007b). Resource curse literature is still very influential in both oil policy and practice, yet newer research suggests more focus on the connection between the specific social politics of oil and the global operation of the commodity markets (Logan and McNeish, 2012) in order to reflect the phenomenon's geographical embeddedness.

Oil itself is geographical as it physically moves from underground across space, being claimed by national governments and others along its path (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). It also crosses national boundaries, through pipelines, shipping vessels and its underground reserves, often causing conflicts of ownership and of responsibilities. The issue of responsibility is particularly relevant in issues of environmental impacts such as oil spills or the release of greenhouse gases, where pollution may also cross regional and national boundaries. Oil is multi-scalar, often being controlled by national governments, and international corporations and institutions, yet its effects, both positive and negative, can be very obviously seen at local levels of community.

The key actors involved in the governance of oil are the state, the oil companies and civil society, these being influenced by a network of national and international politics and socio-economic factors. The state's role in the governance of oil is very much focused on national and international policies used to avoiding a resource curse while civil society, a collective term for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and non-

corporate organisations and institutions, has also emerged as an important actor in the political economy of oil (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). Through holding the government and oil companies accountable for their actions, many believe that civil society groups are a key in reducing the negative social and environmental costs of oil.

Ferguson (2005) describes the oil industry as operating from within ‘secured enclaves’, with the extent of their ‘security’ and the way in which they are governed varying, depending on the states that have nominal jurisdiction over them. Ackah-Baidoo (2013) argues that these enclaves shield the companies, preventing any company-community dialogue, and that it is therefore the role of the government to bridge civil society concerns between the other two actors. It is then the government’s role to both encourage oil production and economic interests, while at the same time communicating and enforcing civil society’s interests and social and environmental concerns. Watts (2004) uses the term ‘oil complex’ to describe the complex network of actors and mechanisms from global to local levels in which oil capitalism operates. This interplay between actors and mechanisms forms dynamic and place-specific results highly suited to geographical studies. Ghana’s experiences and position in the geopolitics of oil will therefore be unique, and the relationship between Norway and Ghana through the OfD collaboration will also produce unique consequences that this study will examine.

1.2 The environmental impact of oil

The production of oil creates different forms of environmental impact, which in the language of economics is known as a negative externality. This may be defined as the costs incurred by other members of society not taken into account by producers and consumers (Mulhearn and Vane, 1999). Using a more ecocentric approach, this study will use the expression ‘environmental impact’ or ‘cost’ in order to bring into the equation damage to the ecosystems themselves. Some of these environmental impacts are highly visible through media coverage, such as the ‘Deepwater Horizon’ oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Other costs are not so visible, often occurring on a smaller scale, but when aggregated, adding up to large scale consequences (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013). These include more long-term activities such as the regular

chemical discharge from exploration, drilling and transportation. The early stages of exploration also have a potential environmental impact, with seismic waves used during exploration, which may be hazardous to marine fauna, and explosive activities (Patin, 1999). The impact on fishing industries, which many countries have experienced, is that trawling has become limited, complicated and dangerous. This is firstly due to exclusion zones around instalments, which attract fish with their bright lights yet exclude fishermen, and also due to structures being installed and abandoned. A burning issue, which this study unfortunately does not have the capacity to include, is the release of greenhouse gases from oil production and the use of oil's associated products. The study will instead focus on the more local effects of water, land and air pollution.

Oil itself may be released into marine environments through blowouts, accidental spills or intentional pollution. In open sea, oil is often rapidly diluted reducing negative impact on marine species, whilst coastal environments are more at risk of degradation, and the extent of impact here is dependent upon quantity, type of oil, meteorological and oceanographical conditions, and the marine and coastal ecosystems (Børresen, 1993). Damage to life along the coast is caused by direct physical contact with oil which covers marine life, either causing immediate damage or inhibiting an organisms life-function. Patin (1999) adds that less obvious consequences may also manifest themselves in the world ocean in the long term, due to its large inertia of response. These long-term effects include sea floor sediments which may contain oil particles for decades (Børresen, 1993).

Nigeria has experienced an ecological disaster as a result of its oil industry, largely from oil spills and gas flaring. Unsustainable oil production has rendered the Niger Delta region one of the five most severely petroleum-damaged ecosystems in the world (Ayuba, 2012). There are approximately 300 spills per year in the Delta with devastating consequences for Ogoni fisheries and farms, and studies have revealed levels of hydrocarbons in Ogoni streams in 1997 of between 360-680 times the EC permissible levels (Watts, 2004). Although the geopolitics of Ghana's oil is different from that of Nigeria's, Ghana is nevertheless aware that it has a great challenge to face in its own environmental governance of the resource.


1.3 An introduction to Ghana

1.3.1 The political economy of Ghana

Ghana is regarded by many as a ‘model country’ in terms of macroeconomic and political stability, investor friendliness, good governance, and efforts to reduce poverty, but yet it remains a relatively poor country (Gary, 2009). According to the World Bank, it has evolved into a stable and mature democracy showing good performance on democratic governance. The 2012 report of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) places Ghana between the 50th and 60th percentile on political stability, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, and voice and accountability (World Bank, 2014). This reflects an improving environment for democratic governance, more effective public institutions and persistent economic growth, with high growth prospects in the long-term, despite the country also having a high fiscal deficit (ibid.).

Commercial quantities of oil were discovered in 2007 off the western coast of Ghana, with production starting in late 2010, this being an unusually rapid progression. The Jubilee Field, located some 60 kilometres offshore in the Gulf of Guinea, has estimated reserves of about 2 billion barrels of oil and 5000 billion cubic feet of gas (Kumar et al., 2013). In 2011 there was also significant discovery in the Voltaic Basin with further discoveries expected following the issue of a large number of exploration licenses. There is additional potential in developing a downstream gas sector, which can generate domestic energy supply. Ghana’s oil reserves are relatively small, but many see the oil discovery as a great chance to boost Ghana’s development and to aid in meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals set for 2015. Indeed, GDP increased by 6,7 per cent in 2012, although it remains to be seen if the oil revenues will aid in poverty reduction. The management of these revenues will be decisive, and recent trends, such as the country announcing that it would ask the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial help, may be an indication of poor management in this early phase of production (Mark, 2014).

Fig.1 Offshore activity areas in Ghana.



Source: GNPC Ghana (2014).


The oil reserves discovered so far are not so large that the country will become reliant on them, but will rather continue with a mixed economy, with principal exports being gold, timber, minerals and cocoa. Nationally, 43 per cent of the population are employed in the service sector, 42 per cent in agriculture and 15 per cent in industry (Ministry of food and agriculture, 2013). Fishing and farming are important livelihoods in the Western Region where oil has been discovered, and on a national basis. With fish being the preferred source of animal protein, about 75 per cent of domestic fish production is consumed locally, with over 2 million fishermen, processors and traders, about 10 per cent of the population, participating in this sector. Agriculture is mostly on a smallholder basis using traditional techniques, but some large commercial farms also exist (ibid.).

1.3.2 Ghana's geography and environment

Ghana has a valuable coastline which, in addition to oil extraction, is used for tourism, human settlements, industrial development, mining and an extensive fishing industry (United Nations, 2011). Sekondi-Takoradi, also known as 'the oil city', has a

vibrant fishing industry linked to its urban economy and society, and the Western Region as a whole produces a third of the fishing harvest in the country, in addition to having one of the highest biodiversities (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The region has wetlands, rainforests and nine major rivers that flow into it. It also has the Cape Three Points Forest Reserve, the last protected coastal forest in the entire Gulf of Guinea, and the Ankasa National Park, which is the most biodiverse terrestrial site in Ghana. The Jomoro District (Fig.2) is directly north of the Jubilee Field and contains the Amansuri wetland, which is the largest freshwater marsh in the Western Region. Many of the district's beaches are used by nesting marine turtles. These features are also seen as an asset to the eco-tourism industry in the district (CRC-URI, 2010). Offshore, there are a number of lagoons which are important areas for the breeding of marine species, providing protection from large predators and a constant supply of nutrients (Obeng-Odoom, 2014).

Fig. 2 Environmental sensitivity map of the Jomoro District, Ghana.



Source: Coastal Resources Centre, URI (2010).

There are concerns as to the impact of the oil sector on these coastal and marine ecosystems. Oil spills can be devastating for marine and coastal environments,

including the humans who live there and who are largely reliant on resources from them for their livelihoods. With fisheries playing a major role in coastal areas and communities, and, in addition, inland communities being reliant on this source of protein, a reduction in catch or the polluting of marine species is of crucial importance in Ghana. The biggest fishing fleet in the Western Region is composed of canoes that are seen at every landing beach in the region (CRC-URI, 2010), and the small-scale nature of these fisheries make them particularly at risk. The very high human use ranking related to coastal fisheries in the Jomoro region can be seen in Fig. 2. In addition, fishing is very much the core of many coastal communities' history, culture, economy and social structure (e.g. Overå, 2011), and environmental changes could affect the entire way of life in these communities. The country's mining sector lead to a great deal of social and environmental costs, with mining towns such as Obuasi, Wassa and Tarkwa experiencing loss of land, jobs and deteriorating health in local communities (Obeng-Odoom, 2014) and there are fears that these experiences may be replicated in the oil sector if poorly managed.

1.3.3 The environmental impact of oil in Ghana

According to various media and academic sources, Ghana has already experienced environmental costs as a result of the oil industry, although the actual source of pollution may often be difficult to trace back to a specific activity or site, due to the physical nature of oil. Research carried out using water samples from the Jubilee Field indicated the discharge of low toxicity oil-based mud and discharges from drilling fluids, and an elevation of oil and grease levels, which affect water quality (Obiri, 2011). Further research on the concentrations of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) and total petroleum hydrocarbons in aquatic organisms was recommended in the study. Other scientific studies carried out by Ghanaian researchers have found similar results and describe the high metal concentrations in deep-sea sediment as potentially causing serious environmental and ecological implications such as loss of biodiversity (Nyarko et al., 2011, Kumar et al., 2013).

Several NGOs, including Ghana's Friends of the Nation (FON) have reported negative findings and trends, the most obvious being the washing ashore of 25 dead whales on the coast of Ghana since 2009, with the investigation report as to the reason for their deaths still outstanding (Friends of the Nation, 2014). Several local fishing

communities in the Western Region have reported that their coastline is covered in black decomposing sargassum, a free-floating seaweed, its colour leading it to be associated with oil production, although this has not been scientifically documented. Gas flaring has also been very much criticized, as the infrastructure for the utilisation of gas in Ghana has not yet been completed. This may also be associated with health issues. The communities, who have already complained about less catch due to the lights used around the rigs attracting fish, feel that the response to their complaints from the authorities so far is inadequate (Ackah-Baidoo, 2013).

Several oil spills have also been reported, the first in November 2011, with an oil flake coating beaches in several fishing communities and waterfront hotels in Ghana's Ahanta West District. No official clean-up action was set in motion, with locals apparently receiving little information about the incident and being left to clean up the oil (Badgley, 2012). Kosmos Energy has been held accountable for spilling toxic drilling mud on several occasions, although a clean-up was never initiated and the set fine never paid due to lack of sufficient legislation (ibid.). A source at the Ghana Maritime Academy (GMA) reported in Dogbevi (2011), also claims that there have occurred several more cases of both oil spills and dumping of toxic waste, polluting nearby beaches. The source claims that the absence of a Vessel Traffic Monitoring Information System (VTMIS) which could record activities of vessels calling at the country's ports or passing through its territorial waters, in addition to weak legislation, continues to make the practice of dumping attractive to vessels which found it cheaper than legal disposal.

Such incidents of pollution often lead to widespread social and environmental impacts which are hard to measure in economic terms alone, for example, concerning their effect on non-commercial marine species, or the impact on the everyday life of fishing communities. Critics are concerned that environmental protection strategies and impact assessments currently in place are insufficient due to institutional weakness. OfD's environmental pillar offers expertise and capacity building to potential partner countries, aimed at strengthening some of these insufficiencies, and therefore assisting in better environmental governance.

1.4 The Oil for Development Programme

The OfD programme was started by the Norwegian Government in 2005 with the goal of aiding ‘economically, environmentally and socially responsible management of petroleum resources which safeguards the needs of future generations’ (Norad, 2012b, p.3). It stresses that assistance is ‘tailor-made to suit domestic conditions and demands’ (ibid., p.9) and within the field of environmental management, methods include assistance to develop basic legislation, regulations and guidelines for management and systems for monitoring the industry. These include tools such as environmental and social impact assessments, risk reduction measures and action plans to reduce accidental pollution. OfD also organises training modules through the international programme for petroleum management and administration (PETRAD) aimed at government officials within the oil sector, but which all can attend, on topics including environmental management. The programme has been described as a response to the resource curse hypothesis based on Norway’s understanding of ‘good governance’ (Solli, 2011).

Ghana, through the state owned oil and gas company, Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), applied for assistance from OfD shortly after the discovery of oil in 2007 and a contract was signed between Ghana and Norway in 2008. Ghana contacted Norway because its experience in the oil industry was sought after for institution building and knowledge transfer, according to Olsen, at the time the Norwegian minister-counsellor in Ghana and deputy head of mission for OfD in Ghana, quoted in Espelund (2010). The goals and objectives of OfD in Ghana are described as, ‘short-term co-operation to provide assistance to ongoing governance activities related to the Jubilee Field development, management of petroleum data and petroleum legislative framework. Long-term co-operation to provide advice and assistance with competence and capacity building to governance institutions within resource management, revenue management and environmental management’ (Norad, 2012b p.36).

In the area of environmental management there have been several areas of focus in Ghana. Firstly, a baseline survey carried out by the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen ship which took sediment and water samples both prior to oil production and again, three

years later. Support was provided in developing an environmental needs assessment and strategic environmental assessment (SEA), and several training visits both in Ghana and Norway took place involving the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Ministry of Environment, Science, Technology and Innovation (MESTI) from Ghana, and the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (MoE), Norwegian climate and pollution agency (Klif) and the Norwegian Directorate for Nature Management (DN). A spatial development framework for the Western Region was initiated, this led by the Danish organisation Consultancy within Engineering, Environmental Science and Economics (COWI), but with Norwegian aid through OfD also playing a major role in the project. In addition, environmental advisers from MoE, Klif and DN (Klif and DN were later combined into the Norwegian Environmental Agency (NEA)) were made available for support related to petroleum activities (Norad, 2012b).

The OfD programme has, however, been criticized on several counts. Firstly, there has been criticism of the programme for operating from a nomothetic perspective through failing to take into account the local factors of development and instead operating on the basis that 'governance issues have predefined answers to be implemented by experts' (Solli, 2011 p.66). The programme is also based on Norwegian experience whereas many oil exporting countries, including Ghana, are not in the same position as Norway was during its early extraction period. Norway's avoidance of a resource curse is, arguably, due to a great number of social, political and economic variables making its oil history far more complex than often portrayed.

Other criticisms include, that the programme targets countries where Norwegian companies operate or compete for licenses, that it targets the wrong institutions, and that informal power structures may overrun the programme's good intentions (Solli, 2011). Hansen (2007) adds that the programme is based on the leaders of the receiving country having good intentions for the oil money produced, intentions which he argues are not always in place, and also that Norwegian financial interests through, for example, the state owned Statoil, are incompatible with the programme's interests. A large number of Norwegian companies, including Aker Solutions and Ocean Rig, currently have commercial interests in the Jubilee Field. It is also remarked that although Norway has a long history of foreign aid, OfD is the first substantial Norwegian aid programme in Ghana in the last three decades. Norad

previously provided aid for fishery modernization in the country during the 1960s and 1970s (Simensen, 1991).

1.5 Theme of study and research questions

With these criticisms of the programme in mind, and including the complexities of the geopolitics of oil, this study will analyse the extent to which the environmental management of oil in Ghana may be improved using tools based on Norwegian expertise from its own oil industry. The resource curse phenomenon, being the foundation for OfD's programme, is often studied using a political economy approach and its analysis often points to political and economic factors at a macro-level as being a main focus for policy-making and management strategies, often with external or interventionist policy implications. Attempting to achieve 'good governance', using tools such as capacity building to strengthen institutions, and practices of transparency and accountability in the companies involved in extraction, is defined at an international or national level as the main focal point for Ghana in order to avoid a resource curse. From a geographical perspective, there is little reference to local context and place-specificity (Logan and McNeish, 2012), despite the factors shaping Norway's oil history being historically and geographically unique.

'Environment' is a topic with an apparently sketchy inclusion in resource curse literature. When mentioned, it is often referred to from a macro perspective using terms such as the resource curse causing 'devastating environmental damage' (Karl, 2007 p.257) and economic tools and management strategies at a national level being suggested as keys to reducing environmental externalities (Humphreys et al., 2007a). It may be argued, however, that environmental degradation is a field in which there are no generally accepted rules or norms as to which politics are to be used and that policy measures must therefore be agreed upon (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). This makes environmental policy-making a complex and multi-levelled issue and the actors involved can be seen as part of a network of social commitments, ideas and power relations (Leach and Mearns, 1996) historically and geographically. This complex relationship between nature and society forms the foundation of political ecology.

A political ecology approach, including tools such as discourse analysis, provides an appropriate method of studying these factors and examining a deeper level of the implications of OfD's work in Ghana, from a more environmental perspective. Discourse analysis studies the way in which knowledge is formulated and validated by society as truth and analyses the connection between the literary and the political (Dittmer, 2010). The study will investigate whether the programme may be viewed as a 'blueprint development strategy', based on Norway's experience or if it can rather be deemed an inclusive and flexible strategy which uses a learning process approach, as described by Roe (1991). Such blueprint development strategies are often limited in their inclusion of local context, instead focusing on the macro-level of capacity building and securing 'good governance' discourses.

The study will also examine the nature of development discourses and the extent to which they 'frame' environmental issues (Bøås and McNeill, 2004) in order to achieve acceptance and support for their policies. This may be described as a discourse's hegemonic depth and extent (Peet, 2002 in Dittmer, 2010). Using post-structuralist discourse analysis, a Foucauldian analytical perspective on power relations in OfD's collaboration with Ghana will be used to examine the discourses, including motives for aid and the effect of this on policy.

Main research question:

To what extent can Norad's Oil for Development programme aid Ghana in reducing the negative environmental impact which may be associated with oil production?

The research has been organized and guided by the following sub-questions:

- What strategies does the OfD programme use in order to improve the environmental management of oil in Ghana?
- To what extent do these strategies use a place-specific and dynamic approach, as suggested by newer research?
- How do different discourses surrounding the OfD programme describe its environmental policies and practices in Ghana?

- To what extent can a political ecology approach to analysis of these discourses contribute to the understanding of the challenges involved in strengthening Ghana's environmental governance of oil?

The main theoretical foundation for the study, described in Chapter 2, is firstly, issues and concepts surrounding the governance of oil and the resource curse. Development aid is then discussed, followed by theories and concepts from political ecology relating to environmental management, and the use of discourses and narratives in issues of environment and development. Data production for this study has been carried out in Norway as I was unable to travel to Ghana at the time due to family circumstances, and Chapter 3 will discuss the choice of methodology in relation to these circumstances, and how data production and analysis were carried out. Chapter 4 presents the empirical findings from data production, and Chapter 5 discusses these findings, using the theoretical foundation to situate them in a broader geographical context. The findings are then summarised in Chapter 6.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section will describe some of the main geographical theories and concepts related to the research topic. The field of research crosses the boundaries of many disciplines, but three main theoretical areas can be distinguished: (1) The geopolitics of oil and the resource curse; (2) Development aid, including Norwegian foreign aid, petroleum-related aid and development discourses; (3) Political ecology and environmental discourses. The first group is relevant for understanding the general geopolitics of oil and will discuss the concept of the ‘resource curse’ and related political concepts such as ‘good governance’ and ‘capacity building’, which many of OfD’s policies are centred around. The second theoretical area on development aid examines the politics and power within and surrounding development programmes and thereby provides a foundation for discourse analysis of the OfD programme in Ghana. This introduces further concepts including ‘developmentality’ and ‘hegemonic discourses’ and a discussion of the use of ‘framing’ in development discourses. The third group is relevant to the understanding of the nature of environmental research and management of oil and how discourses and narratives are used in relation to these. Here the concepts of ‘environmental governance’ and ‘environmentality’ are introduced and discussed.

2.1 Oil and the resource curse

An appropriate starting-point in the geographical analysis of an oil-producing nation, particularly a post-colonial state, is the phenomenon known as the ‘resource curse’. According to the most traditional development theories prior to the 1980s, an abundance of natural resources was a blessing, enabling developing countries to achieve industrial development and economic growth. Since the late 1980s, however, studies have shown tendencies towards what has become known as the resource curse hypothesis, which suggests that an abundance of natural resources may actually be a curse for developing countries (Rosser, 2006). More specifically, trends have shown lower growth rates, lower levels of human development, more inequality and poverty, conflicts and in many cases, devastating environmental damage (Karl, 2007). Although this thesis does not contain an in-depth economic and political analysis of the resource curse’s causes and consequences, the hypothesis is relevant since the

OfD programme is described as being largely based on it (Solli, 2011). It also provides an insight into the geopolitics of oil and the complexities oil-producing nations face which may, in turn, influence their environmental management.

The geopolitics of oil extraction is unique, as described in the previous chapter. Oil's nature as a non-renewable resource, and its production, which may be described as operating within 'enclaves', can cause economic and political distortions within a country known as a 'resource curse'. Economic distortions that may occur are, firstly, a currency appreciation due to resource revenues having a negative impact on other industries, known as 'Dutch Disease'. Secondly, economic disruptions may occur due to fluctuation in commodity prices (Humphreys et al., 2007b). A main political distortion, referred to as 'rent-seeking behaviour', may arise due to the gap (or rent) between the value of a resource and the cost of extracting it, which provides incentives for private and state actors to use political mechanisms to capture this rent (ibid.). This may lead to the eroding of democracy, and various forms of corruption. Van Gyampo (2011) uses Nigeria's wide-scale corruption and uneven development as an example of this erosion of democratic processes and of institutional structures due, in part, to rent-seeking behaviour.

Collier (2010) argues that initially weak governance is the cause of a resource curse and that democracy, good governance and accountability are therefore keys to avoiding it. Restraints upon government are fundamental to this democracy since natural resources provide strong incentives to eroding it. Research suggests that institutions are a key variable in determining whether a country's natural resources will be a benefit or a curse (Kolstad et al., 2009). Solli (2011) argues that oil can become a curse, 'if and when public institutions that are to govern it are incapable of executing their tasks and it is unclear which institutions have what roles and tasks' (p.67). He states that institutions which will provide successful grounds for oil production have a strong bureaucracy, an absence of corruption and a reliable judicial system, factors which could explain Norway's relative success as an oil nation.

The resource curse is then place-specific. Dutch disease, for example, is not inevitable as may be seen in Malaysia, who used their revenues from resource export to diversify their economy (Collier, 2010) and arguable Norway, although the country's

oil reliance is also a debated issue (e.g. Milne, 2014). According to the UN human development index, Norway ranks at the very top, Nigeria close to the bottom, and Malaysia just above the middle scores, these all being resource rich oil-producing countries. Inequalities also arise within a country due to distortions in the economy, with rich countries containing poor people (Humphreys et al., 2007b).

In summary, Collier describes the resource curse equation as the quality of governance relative to the value of natural assets. The quantity and value of the natural resource, and the value and diversity of other industries in the country are therefore highly relevant in the equation. With such variation, it is of interest to study each country with extractive industries in its unique context in order to examine the variables and study correlations. With governance being a key in the likelihood of experiencing a resource curse, internationally accepted strategies used by development organisations in oil-producing countries, such as the World Bank and OfD, are based on the concept of ‘good governance’, but what does the term actually imply?

2.1.1 Good governance

There are numerous definitions of ‘governance’ and ‘good governance’ with most containing concepts related to democracy, accountability and anti-corruption measures and some giving specific policy implications rooted in various socio-economic and political dimensions. In general, definitions of ‘good governance’ are more normative than those of ‘governance’, focusing more on specific policies of what ought to be (Grindle, 2011). Solli (2011) describes good governance as a term originating from the World Bank, used in relation to an analysis of their structural adjustment programmes (SAP). The idea is based on the view that African states are ‘failed’, the reason given for the SAPs not having the desired effect. In a failed state, governance is therefore seen as too weak to receive aid, and very little constructive results from the aid due to lack of management. In other words, the lack of capacity in the authorities impedes the aid programmes in reaching their stated goals (Utenriksdepartementet, 2004 in Solli, 2011). Capacity building is therefore seen as another key concept contained in good governance.

The World Bank today, describes good governance as often being defined in terms of the mechanisms thought to be needed to promote it. In general, however, they have taken as a starting-point the five dimensions of good governance that was developed in the World Bank's Corruption Study for Europe and Central Asia and contained in the Bank's public sector strategy: public sector management, competitive private sector, structure of government, civil society participation and voice, and political accountability (World Bank, 2013a). OfD describe principles of good governance such as transparency, accountability, anti-corruption and gender equality as being cross-cutting in all assistance provided, and that this assistance emphasizes capacity development in public sector institutions. Support is also provided to international organizations, civil society, media and parliamentarians (Norad, 2013). OfD's definition of good governance is therefore normative, and its policy implications reflect Norway's own experiences from the oil industry, in addition to being guided by internationally accepted strategies on resource extraction, such as those used by the World Bank.

A strong and independent civil society is described as a necessity to achieve good governance. According to Collier (2010), it is exactly 'social pressure' that is necessary in avoiding what he calls 'plundering', a term greatly resembling rent-seeking behaviour associated with a resource curse, and he stresses the importance of making the right choices along a chain of decisions, influenced by this social pressure, where every decision may be considered a potential weak link. Although aid programmes such as OfD include support of civil society as a part of good governance and therefore their programme policies, such support is often marginalized. In the case of OfD, the aid is financial only and comprises approximately 10% of their budget (Solli, 2011).

The quality of governance is often measured using a rating called the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which forecasts financial, economic and political risks using a set of 22 components. Overall, a political risk rating of 0.0% to 49.9% indicates a Very High Risk; 50.0% to 59.9% High Risk; 60.0% to 69.9% Moderate Risk; 70.0% to 79.9% Low Risk; and 80.0% or more Very Low Risk. In 2012, Ghana was assessed at 66.5 for political risk and 69.5 composite risk, increasing from 64.5 and 66.5 respectively, in 2011 (PRS Group, 2012). Other indicators include the World

Bank's Worldwide Governance indicators (WGI), which place Ghana at approximately 55% in 2012, where 0 is lowest and 100% is highest score (World Bank, 2013b). Norway comes in at approximately 96% and Nigeria at 15%, for comparison. There are, however, debates as to how accurate such ratings are, since the components they are based on relate largely to the meaning the individual organizations place in the terms 'governance' and 'good governance' (Grindle, 2011). They give an indication, however, of the state of institutions and quality of governance, and thereby the likelihood of a resource curse occurring in resource-extracting countries, according to the principles given in the majority of resource curse literature.

Development discourses using the term 'good governance' have been criticized because of the normative nature of the term, and it has been suggested that Norway's, and that of a number of other Western countries', approach to good governance seemed to symbolize visions of the donor country's own state and democracy (Hoebink, 2006 in Solli, 2011). The World Bank's use of the term 'good governance', and other development organizations that have adopted the concept, often focus on capacity building at the macro-level in order to achieve this ideal state. Solli (2011) argues that capacity building is very much a political issue since it involves questions of whose capacities to prioritize and build and for whose purposes. This is also in agreement with Bøås and McNeill (2004), who suggest that developing agencies may use terms such as 'good governance' in a way which appears to be common sense and therefore hard to argue against, since it is a term with obviously positive connotations. Section 2.2.1 will further discuss the use of development discourses in the context of development aid.

2.1.2. Post-resource curse

Newer research on extraction industries suggests that the hypothesis of the resource curse tends to stereotype national politics and flatten out critical social and historical evaluation (Logan and McNeish, 2012). From a geographical perspective, the approach is largely focused at a macro level. It analyses national and international institutions with the main conclusion being that strengthening national institutions and using transparency and accountability in political and economic policies will lead to avoidance of a resource curse. The focus on democracy or good governance is largely

at a national level with little reference to local context. The theories and approaches suggested for avoiding a resource curse operate from a political economy perspective, often with external or interventionist policy implications. Logan and McNeish (2012) suggest exploring how and why effective local, regional, national, and international institutions actually work in particular times, places and circumstances. They criticize economists such as Collier's 'technocratic approach' and suggest a more dynamic one using qualitative social geography in addition to the political economy of resource extraction (p.16).

In addition to focusing on local knowledge and civil society participation, Bridge and Le Billon (2013) also suggest that oil governance institutions at the international level are thinly developed and describe the need for an effective platform to negotiate the place of oil in the long term. Many of those in existence today, such as the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), are tied to their producer or consumer roots, they argue, and those which are not, such as Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), are only driven by voluntary participation.

In order to study environmental management, the focus of this study, it is necessary to include this dynamic, geographical context, including the nature of social and cultural groups in their locales. The peripheral nature of the environmental impact of oil in resource curse theory leaves what may be described as a 'knowledge gap' (Ostrom, 1998) with policies being angled mostly towards economic and political governance. Theories and concepts surrounding the study and management of nature-society relations and their inclusion in policies aimed at good governance are discussed in sections 2.3, *Political ecology* and 2.4. *Environmental discourses and narratives*.

2.2 Development aid

It is important to consider the nature of development aid and the reasons for giving it (Potter et al., 2008) and although aid in general is said to be based on altruistic motives, there is a great deal of literature analysing hidden connections in the aid-system and ulterior motives of donors. It may be argued that there is no such thing as a free gift and that the receiver of a gift will always be in a diffuse form of debt to the donor (Mauss, 1995 in Nustad, 2003). In the context of development, this concept has

played out in different ways and the history of foreign aid is filled with murky examples of SAPs and other development strategies which led to unwanted and often unexpected consequences. An example from Ghana is a World Bank development project in the 1980s which did lead to a growth in GDP, but also to the reduction of the country's forest area to 25 per cent of its original size by the late 1980s. This was due to increased timber exports as a result of trade liberalisation required by SAPs (Rich, 1994 in Potter et al., 2008).

Scott (1998) describes development schemes as being carried out in spatially and temporally unique settings and to ignore these particularities is an invitation to practical failure, social disillusionment or both. This is in agreement with the use of a dynamic principle, as described by Logan and McNeish (2012). Scott argues for the use of this geographical perspective, which includes the particularities of space and time, in a constantly changing natural and human environment, since the more general the rules, the more translation they need to be locally successful.

The 'gift' of development aid in earlier periods, such as in the example given above regarding Ghana and the World Bank, did not use this geographical perspective, instead focusing on one particular aspect of economic growth and liberalisation. The power of the 'gift' in this sense is its ability to define one view as 'true', while silencing other views (Nustad, 2003). This concept is the core of the use of development discourses.

2.2.1 Development discourses

A discourse may be defined as sets of connected ideas, meanings and practices through which we talk about or represent the world (Aitken and Valentine, 2006). These ideas and meanings may be described as knowledges, and are culturally and historically specific (Wylie, 2006). Development agencies can be said to use discourses and narratives to achieve their goals, given that politics is socially constructed and that the distribution of power will decide their influence, such as how these discourses may become hegemonic (Roe, 1991). Bøås and McNeill (2004) analyse the relationship between ideas and power and describe developing agencies as often adopting a doctrine of political neutrality. This includes using terms such as 'good governance', as previously described, which they argue is a term hard to view

from a negative perspective. They describe this process as ‘framing’ which firstly draws attention to a specific issue and secondly determines how such an issue is viewed, this through silencing certain aspects that are not neutral or positive in their discourse and accentuating those that are.

Peet (2002) in Dittmer (2010) refers to a discourse’s hegemonic depth and hegemonic extent, with hegemonic depth being its regulatory power through the use of framing of topics and approaches, and extent being the geographic distance across which the discourse becomes hegemonic. By examining how behaviour, attitudes and beliefs, or knowledges, become sedimented and reproduced through repetition (Wylie, 2006) it is possible to establish the hegemonic depth and extent of a discourse. Dittmer (2010) describes this ‘sedimentation’ of discourses in policy as ‘policy discourses’, which become manifest in material practices by the state through repetitive performance, giving examples from discourses surrounding NATO and the EU. In this sense, discourses are both descriptive and performative since they are embedded in material social practices, behaviour, institutions and constructed environments (Sayer, 2000 in Dittmer, 2010). This study will examine the extent to which OfD’s discourse has been reproduced through repetition, amongst actors in Norway and in Ghana, or its hegemonic depth and extent.

The concept ‘new aid architecture’ has been used to describe the shift in development discourses from top-down approaches based on conditionality, such as that used in SAPs, to participation and partnership from a bottom-up approach (Sande Lie, 2011). This shift is partly in order to include civil society, in agreement with the good governance definitions and policies described above. Participation in practice, however, is often limited to the implementations stages of projects and is aimed at mobilising community groups rather than empowering them to influence and share control over development (Malena, 2000 in Potter et al., 2008). Scott (1998) argues that many development schemes, despite their apparently good intentions, have little confidence in the skills, experience and knowledge of ‘ordinary people’ (p.346), another argument as to why participation in development programmes may be largely rhetoric.

Sande Lie (2011) uses the concept 'developmentality' to describe the asymmetrical relationship between donor and receiver, where donor institutions are applying new forms of governance that enable them to retain control, although their rhetorical claims may suggest the opposite. Developmentality is built on Foucault's concept 'governmentality' or the 'art of government', through which governments aim at producing citizens best-suited to fulfilling their policies (ibid.). Developmentality denotes that although the donor's development discourse includes the promise of partnership, participation and self-governance, this execution of freedom is framed by the donor's objectives and standards and thus the will to make their own concepts, policies and practices hegemonic.

Development agencies may also use narratives which Roe (1991) defines as a story or argument which may be distinguished from, but may have its roots in, ideology, myth and conventional wisdom in development theory and policy. He describes the objective of such a narrative as persuading the reader to believe something or to act a certain way, much the same as a discourse, and that it is structured as a story where a situation or event leads to a certain consequence. Adger et al. (2001) add that a narrative also contains a cast, or the 'heroes', 'villains' and 'victims' in the story, which, for example, in the case of an oil spill in Ghana, could describe OfD's environmental aid as being the heroes, the local communities and fishermen as the victims and the oil companies as the villains. Neumann (2005) adds that actors may agree on the central facts and events of a narrative but yet come to very different conclusions about causes and effects.

Development narratives may often fail to take into account the uncertainties which may occur in development strategies and to lack empirical support when tested, leading many to question what may be described as 'blueprint development', and to adopt a more learning-process approach which allows for trial and error (Roe, 1991). This view supports the arguments given above in post-resource curse literature, that development schemes should be based on a dynamic principle, using a geographical approach.

2.2.2 Petroleum-related aid

Bridge and Le Billon (2013) argue that petroleum-related aid programmes such as OfD have a limited affect alone, since oil wealth often insulates producer governments from both external and domestic pressure (p.202). This is similar to the concept of oil enclaves as described by Ferguson (2005) or a ‘state within a state’ (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013 p.159). A strong civil society is therefore required to penetrate these enclaves and hold the government accountable. Civil society is supported by aid agencies such as OfD but, as previously discussed, only with a small per cent of their budget.

Kolstad et al. (2009) highlight the need for petroleum-related aid programmes to reflect the policy implications of recent research in resource curse theory and the need to strengthen the right kind of institutions (p.954). They argue that institutions that work well in Norway, for example, do not necessarily work well in other social and political contexts and that institutions may also be hard to change due to their unique history and vested interests. This again supports the use of place-specific and dynamic strategies in development aid.

There is also the argument that rather than focusing on the governance of oil, the long term goal should be to move beyond oil (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) and therefore that development assistance should focus on *reducing* the reliance on mineral exports such as oil (Maass, 2010). Reasons for this are environmental at local and global scales, with global warming being central to the argument, and also social, due to the inequalities oil can cause in countries that have not managed to govern the resource sufficiently (ibid.). Although Norad provides aid to sustainable energy research and programmes, OfD does not include this aspect in its programme, as the name implies.

2.2.3 Norwegian aid and Norwegian oil

Specifically related to Norwegian aid programmes, there are discussions as to the nature of Norway’s foreign aid and the motives for the huge sums it spends on it each year. Tvedt (2009) describes Norway as having a national ‘do-gooders regime’, defined as a normative regime where ideas and rhetoric about ‘doing good’ regulate the system’s internal relations and give it its external legitimacy (p.26). He argues that research on Norwegian development aid must free itself from the pompous image

with which the field portrays itself, and from dogma and moralisation's discursive realm (p.11). The Norwegian model is described as a symbiosis between research, organisation and state but Tvedt argues that some development schemes based on spreading this Norwegian model are somewhat flawed from the start. An example is that there may be conflicts of interest, as described in a case involving Norsk Folkehjelp and Statoil in Angola, where Statoil had financed a demining machine costing 3.4 million Norwegian Kroner on the condition that Norsk Folkehjelp worked to promote Statoil's interests in Angola. Many of the key actors involved in this and other aid projects were also personally involved in both private and state interests. It has been claimed that Angolans and Nigerians hardly see the difference between Norwegian aid workers and Norwegian oil representatives, especially since the embassies are responsible for co-ordinating aid (Solli, 2011).

In an interview in Maass (2010), Sadad al-Husseini, regarded as an expert on the oil industry, admits that corner-cutting in the oil industry is the norm, which deems it valid to question how a country with economic interests in Ghana can at the same time remain neutral in its position as 'teacher' and 'protector'. Husseini explains that oil companies, as any other companies, are exposed to commercial pressures and when facing financial troubles will cut corners often in areas of health, safety and environmental guidelines (ibid.). Logan and McNeish (2012) describe Norway as a country of wealth and peace but question the validity of a 'Norwegian model' due to its 'questionable investments and dealings abroad' through Statoil and its Government Pension Fund Global (GPF) (p.8). Although Statoil is not a direct investor in Ghana at the time of writing, Norway has a great number of investments in the oil industry as suppliers of goods and services, with large companies such as Ocean Rig and Aker Solutions having a strong presence there. Ihlen in Solli (2011) argues that the Norwegian oil industry badly needs support for the view that its companies and aid programmes 'do good' abroad, in order to expand internationally. The reasons for a petroleum-related aid programme being the first substantial Norwegian aid programme in Ghana the last few decades may be questioned in this respect.

Tvedt (2009) describes the research behind many Norwegian aid-policies as being judged by a single bureaucrat from the aid-organisation who validates his choice on the basis that the research will benefit certain users' interests. He describes this use of

power as random and undemocratic (p.94). This can be seen in regard to questioning the scientific validity of research, given that the nature of science is also politically constructed. There are then questions regarding whether OfD's programme is based on the most applicable and relevant research on oil extraction and environmental management, or if there may also be conflicts of interest involved here.

2.3 Political ecology

The use of discourses and narratives in issues relating to development and environment is a central aspect in political ecology and many of the concepts introduced in the previous sections may be studied using this approach. Theories and methodology from the discipline are relevant in this study in order to examine discourses being used by OfD and how they relate to its practice in the area of environmental management in Ghana. The foundation for political ecology is that environmental problems may be perceived in a variety of ways (Blaikie, 1985 in Peet and Watts, 2004) and may therefore be considered socially constructed. A political ecology perspective to research then, defines that human transformation of natural ecosystems must be understood in relation to the political and economic structures and institutions in which these transformations are embedded (Neumann, 2005 p.9). Adger et al. (2001) argue that a key issue in political ecology is the analysis of multi-level connections between global and local phenomena in environmental issues as well as decision-making and hierarchies of power. Using methods such as discourse analysis, this approach is often used to uncover these underlying structures and political construction in relation to empirical research. It is widely argued that the material analyses in political ecology cannot be conducted in the absence of, or separated from, discourse analysis (Neumann, 2005).

Given the political and economic embeddedness of nature-society relationships, analysis of environmental issues necessitates the inclusion of this multi-scale complexity, particularly concerning widespread social and environmental impacts which cannot necessarily be efficiently measured in economic terms. Patin (1999) argues that there are no commonly accepted methods of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) or attempts to describe the state of an ecosystem, and a qualitative approach is therefore necessary. The advantages are that this allows us to differentiate impact factors and provides a relative assessment of possible consequences of these.

Robbins (2006) argues that theories of environment were invariably linked to theories of political domination in colonial states, which has lingered on well into the post-colonial era. He questions the role of research and the way forward for those seeking to analyse social and environmental processes, while admitting the political embeddedness of any claims about society and nature (p. 314). His suggestions are to carry out empirical study of how organisations operate, how local people engage with agencies and knowledges under conditions of unequal power, and to expose alliances, positions and practices and what effect these have. Methodologies used must unite scientific environmental research questions with inquiry into the power of science.

2.3.1 Criticisms of political ecology

Political ecology has been criticized for leaning too much towards political events as the cause of environmental change, with too little focus on the environmental events or processes themselves. Vayda and Walters (1999) argue that some political ecology research prejudices political factors as being the most important by using restrictive questions about how events are affected by factors privileged in advance by the researcher. He suggests rather the use of ‘event ecology’ which includes more detailed study of actual environmental changes using open questions about why these events have occurred. This study does not have the capacity to include any specific details of biological data and research, which this argument implies a necessity for, but a larger study could introduce further data of this nature, in addition to political analysis. However, there is also the discussion of what actually constitutes the ‘ecology’ and ‘environment’ that Vayda and Walters describe, since political ecology opens up the definition of ‘environment’ itself as being socially constructed (Peet and Watts, 2004).

Bryant (1998) describes the need for more focus on the link between the organizational attributes of actors and their capacity to act in political-ecological conflicts. He argues that much research in the field of political ecology has focused on the role of the state, but less on the role and capacity of other organisations such as NGOs, businesses and community groups. This is an angle which is relevant in this study and is more present in newer political ecology research.

2.4 Environmental discourses and narratives

Adger et al. (2001) define two forms of discourse regarding environmental impact as global environmental management (GEM) and populist. They describe GEM discourses, for example used by development agencies, as claiming the existence of a global environmental crisis and defending the use of top-down, interventionist and technocentric solutions defined at a macro-level. Populist discourses are often more concerned with negative local impacts as a result of such external interventions and are used by, for example, environmental NGOs. Political construction and use of scientific knowledge in these discourses can be revealed using discourse analysis.

The concept of 'environmental governance' refers to the analysis of a qualitative shift in the manner, organisations, institutional arrangements and spatial scales by which formal and informal decisions are made regarding uses of Nature (Bridge and Perreault, 2009 p.475). Within this field, studies that are concerned with the way in which discourse and the apparatus of governance are increasingly centred on environmental phenomena are referred to as 'environmentality' or 'eco-governmentality' this being evolved from Foucault's 'governmentality' (ibid.) in much the same way as Sande Lie's concept of 'developmentality'. This is then concerned with the Foucauldian perspective of power, discipline and subject formation within environmental governance. Agrawal (2005) defines environmentality as the knowledges, politics, institutions and subjectivities that come to be linked together with the emergence of the environment as a domain that requires regulation and protection (p. 226). His studies in India examine the way in which 'expert knowledge' and methods of governance influence individual interests so as to bring them in line with the interests of those in positions of power. Bridge and Perreault (2009) argue that institutions, organisations and relations of environmental governance are inherently power-laden and analyses of this governance should therefore aim to uncover this power-geometrics and examine their origins and implications (p.492). Development agencies working with environmental issues are a common study group within the field.

Goldman (2001) argues that the World Bank uses environmentality through the financing of a process that specifically targets resource-based populations, accounts

for them and the quality of their environment, and compels participation in a new global environmental governing process. He describes the role of SEAs, and the professionals (or experts) who develop them, as being critical to this process, in addition to the process of restructuring state institutions through the use of techniques such as capacity building (p.194). This shift occurs through a process whereby local officials learn that in order to 'speak with expertise' on development and planning issues, they must adopt the neoliberal eco-rationalities and technologies presented to them at workshops, planning sessions, and projects. The imperative to use these concepts and tools, in order to be taken seriously, compels local officials to advance policies and projects that re-order institutional, ecosystems and human landscapes in ways that are accountable to market-forms of government and development (Goldman, 2004). There are also variables here, however, such as the actors, technologies and ideas included in the projects, and to gain a more complete picture, one must also take into account the views and statements of those who are being targeted by eco-governmental projects (Ward, 2012). This implies the need for a greater focus at the level of individual actors, using empirical study from a geographical perspective.

Northern aid agencies use a discourse that Goldman (2001) describes as 'green development knowledge', which overlaps with processes of professionalism, authoritative forms of power and disciplinary mechanisms (p.205). Opponents of the World Bank's and other agencies' projects and strategies question the role of their scientific authority. When critically analysing environmental narratives and discourses, Neumann (2005) suggests that we do not reject science and empiricism, but rather recognise that scientific knowledge must be specified and contextualised geographically, historically, culturally and politically.

Environmentality, then, examines the extent to which, for example, development agencies use the framing of expert knowledge, and various techniques of governance, in order to gain influence over individuals and make their policies and practices hegemonic. These specific factors are emphasized in the perspective as being relevant in order to examine the field of environmental governance, and may be situated within the broader concepts of hegemonic depth and extent, and that of policy discourses.

2.5 Incorporating the concepts and theories

Using discourse analysis from a political ecology perspective, this study will seek to incorporate the concepts described in this chapter in the empirical analysis of OfD's environmental management. It will look at how the resource curse discourse is being used in OfD's development discourse and the extent to which the programme incorporates newer suggestions within this field including the use of a geographically-specific and dynamic approach. It will then examine the nature of OfD's development aid and the politics surrounding the programme in relation to Norway's status as an oil-producing country. Using discourse analysis, it will examine power relations and possible motives for the programme, exploring the extent to which the discourses may be described as hegemonic, incorporating the concept of developmentality.

Relating Robbins' theories and methodologies regarding the political embeddedness of claims about society and nature to the research questions, the study will investigate firstly if oil pollution has occurred in Ghana's Western Region, and continue by analysing who carried out the research, how the pollution is categorised and by whom, who the research is being financed by and who may gain from its results being positive or negative. It will also look at local participation, or how local groups have engaged with OfD actors and to what extent their knowledges have been included or framed. Using the concept of environmentality, the study will examine the political nature of OfD's environmental governance in Ghana, including how expert knowledge and governance techniques have been used to influence actors and groups.

3. METHODOLOGY

This chapter outlines and discusses the choice of methodology for the study, both in data production and in the analysis of the data. The theme of this study, an analysis of OfD's environmental management programme in Ghana, calls for qualitative methods of research from human geography. The study uses intensive qualitative research, described in Clifford et al. (2010) as being focused on a single case study, or small number of case studies, with the maximum amount of detail, which is analysed to reveal connections between events, structures and mechanisms.

Primary data production was carried out in Norway during the autumn of 2013. This consisted of five semi-structured interviews with six informants (see appendix 1). Discourse analysis has been the main tool employed to explore the texts and transcripts. Purposive sampling has been used, which seeks to maximize variation by including the extreme situations or discourses, in order to include all possible situations and views (Gobo, 2004). In order to use this method, policy documents, reports, evaluations, and other texts, many of which were provided by the informants themselves, have also been analysed using the same textual analysis techniques as the interview transcripts. In the analysis of both the primary and secondary data, background research into the text's social circumstances, including its author, production and circulation (Waite, 2010) have been key aspects of the study in order to explore the nature of the various discourses. The concept and methodology of discourse analysis are discussed further in section 3.3, *Data analysis and interpretation*.

3.1 Background research

Collecting relevant secondary data was the first stage of the research, in order to provide a foundation for primary data production. Firstly, documents and reports describing OfD, in particular the environmental policies which OfD have implemented or planned in Ghana, were studied. Background information about Ghana's coastal and marine environment was then collected in addition to data on the more general environmental impacts of the oil extraction industry, including examples from other areas with a longer history of extraction, such as Nigeria. Using purposive

sampling, secondary data was examined revealing different discourses on the OfD programme in Ghana and on development aid in general. These texts are from media-, official-, and academic sources and the variation in these different genres of text provides an interesting contrast in rhetoric and social context.

3.2 Primary data production

3.2.1 Semi-structured interviews

The main source of primary data has been semi-structured interviews. This method enables the interviewer to use predetermined questions as guidelines, while at the same time allowing for a more conversational manner than with a structured interview, in order to explore important topics further (Longhurst, 2010). It is seen as an alternative approach to realist interviewing, which is more concerned with uncovering facts and truths, and it rather views the interview data collected as accessing various discourses and narratives through which people describe their worlds (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, 1997, in Silverman, 2003). This is therefore of benefit when carrying out discourse analysis at a later stage.

To develop the interview guide, the secondary data was studied in detail in order to develop appropriate questions which would provide knowledge of the informants discursive position at that time. The interview guide was structured so as to begin with questions which are easy to answer and gradually moving towards more in-depth questions which need a more personal insight (Longhurst, 2010).

Issues of ethics such as anonymity and confidentiality are central when using interviews, as are both the researcher's positionality, and what may be described as the informant's and researcher's statuses and roles. A person's status is their formal rights and duties, for example rules and instructions on how a person should behave in a specific job. Their role is then the more informal rules and expectations which affects how a person chooses to behave on the basis of their status (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). Positionality may be defined as the way our own experiences, beliefs and social location affect the way we understand the world and go about

researching it (Aitken and Valentine, 2006). These issues are discussed in section 3.2.4, *Ethics and positionality*.

3.2.2 Choice of informants

The informants who were chosen to be interviewed are all involved in, or have been directly involved in OfD's work in Ghana. The first informant contacted was a representative from Norad who was directly involved in the programme's work in Ghana and has worked there for a number of years. From him, the names of several other informants from the NEA and the MoE who had been directly involved in the programme's environmental pillar in Ghana were obtained. Through communication with these, I was led to the representatives from these two institutions that were thought to have the most information on the research topic. From these three first interviews in Oslo, the names of two further informants who were involved in OfD's environmental pillar were suggested and these were later contacted and interviewed. This process is known as snowball sampling, defined as picking up some subjects who feature the necessary characteristics and through their recommendations, finding other subjects with the same characteristics (Gobo, 2004).

Many attempts were also made to contact some key actors working with the programme on the Ghanaian side, also partly through snowball sampling, and with Ghanaian NGOs, but this proved to be challenging. The informants I spoke to seemed reluctant to give me any information without first talking to their superiors, who were unavailable at the time. I was advised by these informants to send emails directly to their superiors, but these were never answered. Ideally, and possibly in a larger study, on-site fieldwork in Ghana would also have been carried out in order to obtain more and potentially different discourses. This was not possible in this study, however, due to family circumstances, as described in the introduction. The primary and secondary data produced in the research, though, has provided a depth of material to work with and has shown a variety of views and interpretations of OfD's environmental management work in Ghana.

3.2.3 The interview process

Three of the semi-structured interviews were carried out in Oslo and two in Bergen. There were in total six informants, all male, and the interviews took place at their office or in a meeting room at the institution they represented. All of the informants

said that they had busy schedules, but they managed to find time for the interview quite quickly after I had contacted them, and none of them seemed rushed or distracted during the interview itself. The security at the sites in Oslo, in particular at the MoE but also at the NEA and Norad, was strict and having cleared security, I waited in reception until the informant came to collect me. The sites in Bergen were more informal and I phoned the informants in person on my arrival, who then met me and took me to the meeting area. Despite these differences, the atmosphere during all of the interviews themselves was experienced as friendly and relaxed.

The informants described their role in the OfD programme in Ghana first and then gave their responses to my questions. My first impression was that some of these responses appeared to be personal views or experiences and others more representative of the discourse of their institution. Some informants appeared to be concerned that they were giving me information I had already received from others, so I had to point out several times that their information was of interest and it was their personal experiences and viewpoints on the programme and Ghana that I was interested in. In some cases, informants began providing information before the interview had formally started and seemed eager to describe their part in OfD's work. At times I felt it necessary to interrupt these so as to bring the subject back to issues that were more relevant to my study, this due to the one hour time limit that was agreed upon. Others seemed more cautious and obviously curious about what aspects of the programme I was interested in. These interviews had a more 'question and answer' format, at least during the early part of the interview, mostly becoming more informal throughout the hour.

The interviews were recorded on a digital recorder, with consent from the informants. This is beneficial since it is more accurate than relying on our memory of a conversation and it can be replayed for detailed analysis of language and possible roles or statuses adopted throughout the interview. In addition, it enables us to analyse sequences rather than single sentences or phrases, which is vital for making sense of conversation (Silverman, 2003). It is then, considerably more appropriate to carry out detailed discourse analysis of transcripts than of notes taken during an interview, although various notes made on first impressions there and then were also included in the analysis.

I also attended a two-day workshop in Bergen focused on Ghana's oil industry and which included participants from Ghana. This provided a wealth of information and an indication as to different discourses from the various presentations and informal conversations with participants. In this situation I did not use an interview guide, but rather asked more general questions about OfD in Ghana and followed up with more intuitive questions.

3.2.4 Ethics and positionality

Research ethics, including the researcher's behaviour and responsibilities, if the methods used are just, and the role of the research in pursuit of social change, are issues to be considered in all types of research (Dowling, 2010). In Norway, the Norwegian data protection official for research (NSD) provide guidelines regarding confidentiality and ethics, which were followed throughout the study. This included reporting the theme of the project and intended methods of data collection and storage for approval before commencing fieldwork. The informants received an information sheet describing the project and asking their permission to be interviewed, including use of their names, and all consented to this. Despite this, I decided at a later stage to use anonymity, rather using the name of the institution they represent, this because I could not see that their names would add necessary data to the research. The informants did not appear to react negatively to their names being used, so I do not think that their answers would have been significantly different had they known that their information would be anonymous. They were nonetheless representing their respective institutions.

Positionality, being how people view the world from different embodied locations (England, 2006), is an important aspect of qualitative research in general but particularly important when working with discourse analysis. This includes both how a researcher *views* others, and how they are viewed *by* others. One aspect of this is in relation to our social status: our gender, age, class, race and so on. All of the informants from the semi-structured interviews were men, somewhat older than me, and white Norwegians. My positionality or status, as a younger, female, English, master-student may have influenced their roles as older, professional, male Norwegians. Although familiar with Norwegian culture, having lived here for over a decade, there were some aspects of the Norwegian system and culture which were

explained in a greater amount of detail than perhaps necessary, but I did not experience this, nor communication in the Norwegian language, as a hindrance.

Our experiences, history and background shape our understandings of the world and the knowledge we produce (England, 2006) and I was particularly aware throughout the research process of my interests and background in environmental science. Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) discuss status and role expectations in, for example, an interview situation and that it is important to be aware of both your own status as well as the status of the informant. I considered my status and how I could be perceived as an 'environmentalist' by the informants due to my background. This awareness and analysis of oneself as a researcher, also known as 'reflexivity' (England, 2006), was then of great importance. MacKian (2010) argues that we begin analysing and interpreting from the very start of our planning process, so reflexivity should be included throughout the entire research process. As part of this reflexivity, I kept a notebook which included ideas about the research and my role in it, in addition to observations and collected data, throughout the entire research process. This is recommended as part of an ethical review of the research undertaken, as well as being useful as a part of the discussion of our positionality (Dowling, 2010).

Dowling (2010) describes what she calls power relations in research, an example being an informant and researcher having an asymmetrical relationship, or significant differences in social positions between the two. The opposite is reciprocal relationships where the researcher and informant are in comparable social positions. In the case of this study, the relationship was asymmetrical to varying degrees, due to myself being a student and those interviewed being professionals. This was somewhat noticeable during the interviews with MoE and particularly Norad, where the informants were in positions of considerable influence, when compared to the researcher. Again, it is important for the researcher to use critical reflexivity, taking matters of power relations into the analysis.

3.3 Data analysis and interpretation

3.3.1 The methodology of discourse analysis

The concept of discourse has been introduced in the previous chapter, while this section will discuss the methodology of carrying out a discourse analysis. There are many branches of discourse analysis, but the one deemed most appropriate for geographical studies of this nature is poststructuralist discourse analysis, often associated with Foucault. For Foucault, discourse refers more broadly to the totality of utterances, actions and events which constitute a given field or topic (Wylie, 2006). He refers to them as the rules and structures that underpin and govern statements that are produced, that these statements have common elements which has a unifying effect, and that they indeed have a real effect on the world (Waitt, 2010). This may be related to the concept of ‘policy discourses’ and the hegemonic depth and extent of a discourse, discussed in the previous chapter. Dittmer (2010) describes poststructuralist discourse analysis as using a more normatively neutral perspective of ideologies, this when compared to other branches such as Marxist discourse analysis, and I deemed this as being important in an academic research project of this type.

Using discourse analysis, interpreting data is a two-stage process, often described as double hermeneutic, as the researcher must interpret an informant’s interpretation of reality (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). If we agree that all data is produced or constructed, then it is vital also when analysing and interpreting interviews and texts to be aware of our positionality. One does not, therefore, provide a ‘truth’ at the end of the research, but rather a situated reading of life’s phenomena (Dittmer, 2010)

Foucault feared that a methodological template would become too formulaic and reductionist, and so discourse analysis is often thought to be better carried out somewhat intuitively (Waitt, 2010). There are, however, guidelines developed in the field of social science, and geography specifically, which I have chosen to use in this study. Fairclough (2003) describes three prongs of discourse analysis as, firstly, the text itself, related to the rhetoric used. Secondly, the ‘discursive practice’ including the immediate context in which the discourse is employed, or its production, distribution and consumption, and thirdly ‘social practice’ including larger ideologies in which the social context is located.

When analysing the text itself, there are many tools within the fields of rhetoric and semiotics which are of help. Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) provide a detailed toolbox for carrying out text analysis including the analysis of symbols with attached connotations which are used to describe things, and the use and analysis of structural metaphors. An example of the use of these tools is the following excerpt, from an article in the *Financial Times* newspaper about Norwegian petroleum aid.

‘But the Norwegians have little to show for their efforts around the world so far. São Tomé, which sought Norway's help in 2005, has been criticized for its shaky and opaque start to awarding its oil fields and Nigeria's situation has worsened’ (Hoyos, 2006).

This may be compared to Erik Solheim’s introduction in the annual Oil for Development report from 2010.

‘The programme takes a broad approach to petroleum sector management, covering the management of resources as well as of revenues and the environment. All our efforts are informed by principles of good governance such as transparency and accountability.’ (Norad, 2011).

Taking the word ‘opaque’ as a symbol with a negative connotation and as the dichotomy of ‘transparent’, and similarly ‘shaky’ as a symbol with a negative connotation which may be viewed in contrast to the positive connotation of the symbol, ‘accountable’, one can begin to analyse the texts and gain more understanding of the different discourses and narratives used about Norway’s petroleum aid.

As part of ‘discourse practice’, identifying the status of the author or respondent (stakeholder analysis) is an important part of the process and the situating of the data according to their status (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). This also includes an analysis of the intended use of the discourse, its audience and its circulation. In the example given above, one could comment on the statuses of the authors respectively, as female and male, journalist and politician, British and Norwegian, and how this affects the rhetoric in their texts or responses.

When moving from text analysis to broader social context, the challenge is to connect the data set to the broader realm of geographical practice (Dittmer, 2010). Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) suggest that the context an individual places a phenomenon in can also be described as which cognitive categories they place an observation in, and how they relate these to other categories. They state that data is an observation plus a category or concept and by overlooking this contextual knowledge, which can be both historical and cultural, the meaning of an individual's comment or text can be distorted or, at worst, absent. Through the analysis, I have attempted to gain knowledge of such local contexts or categories through the texts and interviews.

The concepts and theories discussed in Chapter 2 also provide tools as to how to make the 'jump' from the text and discourse practice to social practice, this being the third branch of Fairclough's system. Using a political ecology perspective, this includes how discourses may become sedimented and reproduced, becoming 'policy discourses' and how these reflect larger ideologies. By including the wider discussions surrounding the resource curse, development aid, and environmental management, it is possible to locate the social practice at different scales within which the discourses are located.

3.3.2 Transcribing and translation of the interviews

The interviews were transcribed in full from the audio recordings, including pauses, emphasized words and phrases, laughter and other behaviour which was taken note of, and could be used in identifying and describing a discourse. The transcribing process was useful as I became aware of certain details that were not noted during the interviews. The transcriptions were then translated from Norwegian to English. I carried out the translations myself, being fluent in both languages and, again, the process was useful in becoming familiar with the texts. Translation was challenging at times due to a number of Norwegian idioms used in the interviews. In the text excerpts chosen for the analysis, however, I am satisfied that the texts have not lost any significant detail from their original meaning through the translation process. In addition, during the interviews, I used or repeated some of the key words and phrases from the OfD programme such as 'capacity building' and 'good governance' in English so as to be certain of the intended meaning.

3.3.3 Coding

Having transcribed and translated the interviews, I had become very familiar with the texts, but used a system of coding, which is the process of identifying and organising themes in qualitative data (Cope, 2010). This aided in finding and categorising excerpts that related to different aspects of the research. There were some areas that I had previously deemed important, but which were later regarded as less relevant having analysed the extent of the material. This included some of the more technical environmental monitoring data. Other aspects emerged as very central to the research questions, often through the recurrence of certain codes, some of these not having been previously considered. The text was marked with the chosen codes in order to aid in analysis and sorting. These codes, firstly, represented a particular theme such as ‘environmental impact of oil’ or ‘corruption’ and, secondly, frequently repeated expressions such as ‘personal opinion’ or ‘assistance’, or often repeated topics, in order to comment on trends within the texts. Inconsistencies were also coded.

3.3.4 Choosing texts and excerpts

A diversity of texts were chosen for the study because they contributed to identifying the different discourses, this being purposive sampling. Text excerpts that contributed to identifying and describing the motives behind these different discourses were also highlighted, in addition to excerpts that related to a specific theme deemed relevant to the research. These texts are from both primary and secondary sources, since primary data production was limited to Norway and I was reliant on Internet sources to identify further discourses.

The study has included several different types of texts and genres based on the concept of intertextuality, the assumption that meanings are produced as a series of relationships between texts, rather than residing within the text itself (Waitt, 2010). Intertextuality includes the presence of elements of other texts within a text, or quotations (Fairclough, 2003). This has provided the opportunity of interpreting discourses which were not obtained through primary data production, since the texts which were analysed contained aspects of other texts. It is important to be aware of the genre of a text using this method, since the producer of each genre is addressing a particular audience and the background of the author, text and place must be researched to form an interpretation (Waitt, 2010).

3.4 Reflections and limitations of the methodology

When using the concept of intertextuality and analysing reproduced discourses, it is important to consider that the author of a text's own discourse will have coloured the text itself. It may to a large extent come down to claims from the author that what is reported has actually been said. As part of this process one must continuously analyse the reliability and validity of data collected or produced, particularly secondary data. Some organisations' websites, for example, may have a very obvious discourse, while others are more discreet, but in both cases it is important to double check any facts and figures which have been used in certain ways to portray their specific discourses.

The study has used a relatively small number of interviews, and texts, but with a lot of detail, or intensive qualitative research. The research might have gained an interesting angle with the carrying out of on-site fieldwork in Ghana, and this is something I hope to carry out at a later stage. This produces primary data through what Aase and Fossåskaret (2007) describe as participating observation: to be situated in the fieldwork over a period of time, which creates a unique insight into the research. This could also have included more biological and environmental data as part of a larger project perhaps, in addition to interviews and observation.

Again, it is important to consider that the results of the research do not provide a 'truth' as such, but rather the situated description of an issue, as is the case with all forms of qualitative research. The results are not less useful, however, and may be generalised and transferred to other studies.

3.5 Generalization and transferability

The total number of samples used in qualitative research is often not large enough to be representative of a group or population and the methods of collection are often not random, such as those used in quantitative research. The knowledge about processes occurring gained through qualitative research can be generalized and transferred to other similar studies, a process known as 'transferability' or 'generalization'. Gobo (2004) describes this as generalizing about the nature of processes occurring rather than quantifying results. Baxter (2010) describes generalization in qualitative research

as being achieved by carefully selecting cases and creating theory which is neither too abstract nor too case specific. This theory may then be tested to see if it applies in other cases.

This study has used purposive sampling, carried out by analysing OfD's own environmental discourse, along with the discourses of critics of OfD and petroleum-related aid. There are also middle positions which criticize certain aspects of the programme while praising others. An analysis of the relationship between the structures influencing policies and actions has been carried out and by analysing these variables, rather than quantifying the features, it is possible to generalize about general structures and relationships, which may then be transferred to other studies (Gobo, 2004). The study does not, therefore, use generalizing phrases such as 'most believe that...' but rather describes trends and patterns in the discourses. Examples of research that these knowledges may be transferred to are, studies focused on other aspects of the OfD programme and its collaborators, or further research on environmental management in Ghana in general, related to the oil industry or otherwise. It could also be transferred to research on more political issues of petroleum-related aid, and Norway and Ghana's political systems and governance.

3.5.1 Validity

Poststructuralist thinking has challenged the assumption of a single truth and therefore certain claims to knowledge, making the validity of quantitative research in this field a debated topic (Mansvelt and Berg, 2010). The concepts of generalization and transferability described above, however, are common methods used to assess the validity of qualitative research. In addition to these, Jackson (1985) in Dittmer (2010) argues for the importance of a focus on the logic of connections claimed by the researcher, this being a method of assessing the validity of the analysis. Also, research may be deemed valid by those outside the intended audience, to see if others recognize the discourses found by the researcher (Dittmer, 2010). This has occurred throughout this research process through supervisor consultations and discussions with other students, including those belonging to different fields of research.

4. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

This chapter is an analysis of the data produced from interviews, policy-, assessment- and evaluation documents obtained from informants, and secondary sources, using the methods described in the previous chapter. It will firstly identify the discourses being used about OfD, drawing together similarities and highlighting differences between these where possible. It will then highlight specific areas in the discourses regarding OfD's environmental management in Ghana, which relate to the research questions and thus provide an indication as to the wider nature of the programme and its impact.

4.1 The discourses

Two main discourses used about OfD's environmental management in Ghana have been identified, having carried out a discourse analysis of the interviews and official documents. In addition, a number of other discourses arose during data production, covering different aspects of the environmental impact of oil in Ghana from both primary and secondary sources. Categorising the discourses which emerged through the interview process was challenging. There were many similarities in the discourses, in part because all of those formally interviewed were involved directly with the programme from the Norwegian side, therefore having a paid role in OfD. They also had similar backgrounds, as discussed in the methodology chapter, being Norwegian males of similar age and social status. There were, however, certain distinctions which allowed differentiation between what I have named the *Norwegian development discourse* (NDD) and the *Professional partnership discourse* (PPD). These discourses will first be described, outlining what defines them, their intended use and who is using them. This will include a discussion of the roles and statuses of the informants and their motives for using the specific discourses. The study then turns to specific significant aspects of OfD's environmental programme in Ghana, which arose from the data production, discussing the different discourses and narratives used within each theme.

4.1.1 The Norwegian development discourse

The main institution using the NDD is Norad, but aspects of it have also been identified in the other interviews. Those using this discourse have as their goal the promotion of the OfD programme and to some extent a Norwegian model. They are

interested in gaining support for OfD in order to gain continued financing of their work with the programme. Their audience is the general public, from local levels of civil society to levels of governance, both in Norway and potential partner countries, making the discourse accessible at an international level. The discourse is circulated through the media, and through private and public meetings such as interviews and reports. Their motives for promoting the NDD are based on their roles and statuses as part of the OfD programme in Norway. All of the actors interviewed using this discourse are Norwegian and directly connected to the programme. The deeper lying motives for OfD's programme as a whole are discussed in sections 4.2.7, *Statoil and Norwegian investments* and 5.1.3, *Norway's motives for its aid programmes*.

One example of Norad's use of this discourse is the four-minute long video on their website entitled, 'Norwegian oil expertise is sought after' (Norsk oljekunnskap er ettertraktet) (Norad, 2014). This describes OfD's work in Ghana using expressions such as that Norway's help is 'extremely sought after' and it shows interviews in which informants claim that OfD has been 'God sent'. It describes Ghana's oil industry in a positive light with claims such as, 'Most people in Ghana are waiting impatiently to partake in their oil wealth', therefore generalising about a population, while silencing the view of groups who do not experience oil in this light. It may be described as a commercial for OfD, which uses the framing of an issue to gain public support.

The NDD can be distinguished from others in the interviews and collected documents by formulations used which portray a specific attitude about OfD and aid programmes in general. One such aspect is that foreign aid is deemed necessary for development of the environmental sector in poorer countries.

"As is quite common, directorates are pretty well staffed and well-trained, have some resources, partly because they are sponsored by foreign donors [laughs], even before we come into the picture" (Informant, Norad).

This statement refers to directorates in Ghana, and in other countries that the informant has experienced through his work, having a greater capacity than the ministries because the directorates are often the target of foreign aid, rather than the

ministries. This very much suggests the necessity of foreign aid in capacity building. In Ghana, the EPA had received foreign aid prior to OfD's involvement, from the World Bank, Denmark and the Netherlands, and the informant describes OfD as, "*supporting the forces of good that already existed there*", in part due to this aid which was previously given. These "*forces of good*" are seen as being a direct result of foreign aid. MESTI had not been targeted by these aid programmes before OfD came into the picture and was described by the informant as "*relatively weak*" in part due to the lack of foreign aid aimed at this institution. OfD chose to "*work*" directly through the ministry since it was "*where policy-making took place*", an area deemed important in the OfD programme and according to Norad's informant, "*we have given them legitimacy and authority*" and in general "*strengthened the ministry*".

The words "*weak*" and "*strong*" are symbols with very obvious negative and positive connotations and are being used here in relation to pre- and post-development aid, giving an insight into the way OfD and development aid in general is viewed by the informant. Also, the use of the phrase "*we have given them*", rather than 'helped' or 'assisted' them, implies that the ministry had a great need which OfD was generous enough to respond to, implying an asymmetrical relationship. This may be seen in relation to the concept of a 'gift' in the context of development aid, which creates a debt to the donor (Nustad, 2003). The word "*work*", which is used on several occasions by the informant, for example "*Before we started work in Ghana (...)*", suggests the category that the relationship is placed in, and that Norway has a 'job' to do there. This also implies Norway being in a position of power in Ghana.

Norad's informant explained that he has worked for over 20 years with aid and development in over seven different countries and that "*There is no Norwegian aid programme that is so popular and in demand as OfD.*" He describes how Norway's experiences "*May contribute to making their everyday life a little better.*" The words and phrases, "*popular*", "*in demand*" and "*making everyday life a little better*" are symbols with clearly very positive connotations in regard to the OfD programme's work. The latter has something of an overtone of superiority, or what Tvedt (2009) would categorise as coming from the 'national do-gooder's regime', also described as Norway's execution of power through aid in relation to the receiving country. Tvedt also describes Norway's intentional shift in foreign policy from missionary work to

‘normatively neutral’ aid, but expressions such as ‘God sent’ and “*forces of good*” may more resemble the rhetoric of the former.

Other aspects that define the NDD are the use of words and phrases such as “*capacity building*”, “*competence building*” and “*expertise*”. These occur relatively often throughout many of the interviews and form key focus points in OfD’s work. The terms form a part of OfD’s ‘good governance’ concept, which is used widely by development aid organisations on a global scale, as discussed in Chapter 2. It is described by Norad as being ‘cross-cutting and essential’(Norad, 2012b, p.9).

An example is given in this summary of OfD’s work in Ghana related to environmental management, using a fairly common formulation found in the NDD.

“You could say that the point of this co-operation is to conduct competence development in Ghana, and in counsel, based on Norwegian experiences, about the challenges they face” (Informant, MoE).

This indicates a co-operation between the giving and receiving countries in order to develop capacity to handle development challenges. This co-operation may be seen in relation to the discourse of using a ‘participatory’ approach to development, as described in the concept of ‘new aid architecture’ (Sande Lie, 2011). OfD’s strategies are described as being based on “*Norwegian experience*”, a term very central in the NDD.

“[What is] unique for OfD is that there are not very many others who can offer the same experience as we can. What we do is that we offer Norwegian experiences, we don’t export a Norwegian model, which you can just copy. We pass on our experiences then we try to adapt them with the partner country (...)” (Informant, Norad).

When asked what some of these adaptations were, the informant explained that it was the Norwegian ministries and directorates that have this experience and that they pass them on to their partners in the receiving country. The NEA passes on their experiences with environmental management of oil to the EPA Ghana, for example.

The technical co-operation lies, therefore, with these institutions. The NDD is quick to deny the exporting of a “*Norwegian model*”, instead using “*Norwegian experience*”, and insist that the programme is adapted to their partner country. The informants from IMR, however, describe using the Norwegian model through OfD’s work in Angola.

“We had some training work in Angola for some years too, and used the Norwegian model more directly there. Then we saw that not everything worked equally well in Africa as here at home and it had to be adapted a little. (...) In Ghana I would say there are lots of good things and some are a bit more difficult, as we have gradually become aware of!” (Informant, IMR).

The distinction between the Norwegian ‘model’ and ‘experience’ is somewhat unclear. The Norwegian model in oil production as described by Thurber et al. (2011) comprises three distinct government bodies: a national oil company (NOC) engaged in commercial hydrocarbon operations, a government ministry to help set policy, and a regulatory body to provide oversight and technical expertise. Norway’s oil ‘experience’ is very much based on this model and therefore constitutes the bulk of OfD’s suggestions to its partner countries. Solli (2011) argues that OfD is based on Norwegian experience but many oil exporting countries, including Ghana, are not in the same position, politically or economically, as Norway was during its early extraction period in the 1970s, in addition to changes in international regulations and standards. In both cases, “*adaptions*” are required, a word which is used frequently in the NDD, and which is contained in both the quotes above, although specific details about these adaptions were hard to come by in this discourse.

The informant from Norad described the goals of OfD as firstly having legislation, structure, and appointed responsibility in place in the partner country, secondly that they have the competence, capacity and people to follow this through, and thirdly that these authorities are held responsible by civil society, the media and others. He feels that the first two points are in place in Ghana, whilst the third point has been to a large extent covered by other aid agencies such as the World Bank. These goals, which are often described and unified by the term ‘good governance’ are repeated in many of Norad’s reports and in other Norwegian development programmes and appear to

constitute the ‘master plan’ for development used in the NDD. The goals can be said to be based on Norway’s own experience from its oil industry but also show great similarities to modern international guidelines for development aid, for example those used in the World Bank’s development discourse.

The NDD may be generalised into the ‘new aid architecture’ concept due to the rhetoric describing a participatory approach, rather than a top-down approach based on conditionality. It is based on the concept of good governance, with the discourse’s definition of this including participation from civil society. This reflects the World Bank’s development discourse, and is in line with the definition of new aid architecture. The extent to which the discourse can be described as ‘developmentality’ as used by Sande Lie (2011), where this ‘freedom’ is framed by the donor’s objectives and standards in order to make policies hegemonic, will be discussed throughout this and the following chapter.

4.1.2 The professional partnership discourse

The discourse used by informants who have worked with more practical aspects of the OfD programme’s environmental pillar is somewhat different to the NDD. Those using this discourse are not directly employed by OfD, but are professionals within their field and referred to as ‘external consultants’, being contracted for a period of time by the programme. They do not have the same motives for promoting the programme as the NDD, but are nonetheless cautious in their criticisms of it, stressing that these criticisms are very much their own “*personal opinions*” or “*experiences*”. Their audience is smaller than that of the NDD, perhaps being limited to interviews with researchers and other public or private meetings about the programme. This may be at local, national or international levels, but with less of a span than the NDD due to these actors seemingly having less motive for its promotion through media and other sources. The actors may, all the same, have personal motives for their discourse about OfD, related to their own social, political and economic embeddedness and their roles and statuses as professional, Norwegian men. Their livelihoods are not dependent on the programme, but while they are contracted, they receive payment for their work with it, an aspect that may influence their discourse.

Goldman (2001) describes the role of professionals in development plans as being vital to the aid organisation's master-plan and that the process of 'green development knowledge', overlaps with processes of professionalism. His argument describes a framing of environmental issues, which compels participation in a global environmental governing process. The analysis of the PPD will therefore incorporate this argument and examine the extent to which these actors frame environmental issues, silencing other discourses.

In general, the collaboration between Norway and Ghana is described in a different manner, using more moderate formulations, and being perhaps more reflective and based on personal experiences than the NDD. One example is the word "*assist*" being used a great deal by the informant from Bergen municipality.

"[OfD in Ghana] is based on assisting the authorities in every way related to the fact that they have discovered oil and (...) to assist with everything, really, that Norway has experience with" (Informant, Bergen Municipality).

"Assisting the authorities" may be compared to the NDD's, *"giving the authorities what they need"*. The term implies a more symmetrical relationship and although *"assist"* may be used in a similar way to 'aid', 'give' and 'help', the interpretation of the context in which it was used, placed the relationship between the two countries in a different category than that of the NDD.

The PPD describes *"working alongside professionals"* from Ghana, in contrast to the NDD which gives more an impression of having to 'teach' the Ghanaians what they need to know.

"By being able to play a role, which is partly a professional role alongside professionals from Ghana, is very interesting because we have different experiences, and to some extent different backgrounds and so on, so we can play ball" (Informant, Bergen Municipality).

The expression *"play ball"* conjures images of a ball being passed back and forth between players, a metaphor for a game, but also implying a joint venture in which

ideas are passed back and forth between participants. This suggests a symmetrical power relationship. It also portrays the process in a more light-hearted manner, suggesting a good 'sporty' relationship or friendship between participants.

One informant describes the problem-solving process where he poses questions based on his experiences in the field, to open for discussion with Ghanaian professionals. When asked about the decision-making process, he remarked, *"I would never go there and say that this is how it should be done"*. The formulations used in this discourse portray a mutual co-operation and work-projects alongside equals, rather than the more asymmetrical relationship which at times shone through the NDD.

The informant from NEA describes his role in the process of *"needs assessments"*, including a workshop with his *"Ghanaian equivalents"* at the EPA, and that Norwegian consultants were *"made available (...) just to get a grip on the issues and challenges facing Ghana."* The expression *"needs assessment"*, also described by the informant from MoE, implies an inclusive approach, particularly when the Ghanaian institutions were involved throughout the entire process. Also, the term *"Ghanaian equivalents"* being similar to *"working alongside professionals"*, places the co-operation in a different category from the NDD.

"We started meeting in 2008 and talked for maybe a couple of years before we got the answer to what was needed to be done in Ghana. (...) We arranged something called a 'needs assessment workshop', and this was something that we chose to do because we didn't feel that we got very far with just talking to people. They said 'we know there are plenty of challenges related to the oil and gas industry, but we do not know what to ask for of aid from Norway, and we do not know what your competence is', in a way. So it was very liberating that they said [this], because we realized that we had to approach things more systematically and in a way unfold: What is it that this oil business can create of challenges and opportunities in the area of environment? And then we tried to explain this, in a setting where there were many Norwegian institutions involved and the corresponding Ghanaian institutions, so that these institutions could meet their opposite number and have professional discussions about their needs. Out of this came a report that defined these needs and this was used as the basis for this agreement" (Informant, MoE).

“Professional discussions” are also mentioned here, in addition to phrases such as *“institutions meeting their opposite number”*, this referring to a ‘twinning’ process, for example between the EPA Ghana and Klif, and MESTI and MoE. This points to a more equal power relation, and the entire needs-assessment process is described as being carried out in a very humble, cautious manner. Perhaps the discourse even describes the approach as being ‘too cautious’, since it took over two years before the Ghanaian authorities said that they did not know what to ask for.

In general, formulations used in the PPD are more modest and open-minded in many ways, and these actors categorise their roles in the context of a two-way equal partnership. They do not appear to have the need to ‘sell’ their product in the same way as the NDD, but speak, all the same, largely positively about their own work with the programme. There are, however, similarities between the two discourses in that they both support the general idea of OfD and development aid and portray the sharing of the ‘Norwegian experience’ in a very positive light.

4.2 Key themes in the discourses

Described below are some of the key themes regarding OfD’s environmental programme in Ghana, which emerged from the interviews that were carried out in particular, and also from the various documents which have been studied. Some secondary sources have also been used to illustrate the different discourses within each theme. The themes have been highlighted because they were deemed important aspects in relation to the theme of the study either by myself, or by an informant, and provide answers to the specific research questions.

4.2.1. Strategies used in OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana

Norad’s reports describe OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana as being steered by a committee of ministries, in particular the MoE, with key implementing institutions such as NEA and the Norwegian coastal authority (NCA) in the area of environmental protection. In addition, it has a range of consultancies, research institutions, international organizations and civil society groups which are involved in the

programme's implementation. Its main focus is, however, at the national level, with MESTI being a main target, as previously described.

It was explained by the informant from Norad how the programme was normally categorised into four parts or 'pillars': resource management, environmental management, safety, and revenue management, and although the focus of this research was the environmental pillar in OfD's programme, it was impossible to detach that from the programme as a whole.

"In a society there are no islands that work really well or badly while the rest works entirely differently. So it is very much related to both the general structure and attitudes in society" (Informant, Norad).

"Islands" is used as a metaphor for the different pillars of OfD, and that the general structure and attitudes in a society will shape the outcome of the programme as a whole, and therefore the outcome of each pillar. This may be interpreted as the 'will' and 'ability' of a country to succeed, a topic which is discussed by many of the informants as being an important factor in the success of OfD's programme. In this respect, there is a reference to place-specificity in both discourses, but rather than suggesting adaptations, the NDD describes placing the result of the programme to a large degree in the hands of the receiving country, depending on its will and ability to succeed.

From the interviews and Norad's reports, there were three main initiatives which were included under the environmental pillar in OfD's programme, which started out quite early, even before the OfD agreement was fully in place. The first was the Dr Fridtjof Nansen baseline research, which was conducted in Ghanaian waters. The second was a SEA of the oil industry and the third was the Western Region Spatial Development Framework (WRSDF), a land-use planning strategy. Interviews were carried out with key actors involved in all of these three initiatives.

The Dr Fridtjof Nansen research cruises took baseline samples prior to oil production in 2009, and then three years later to compare the results in order to identify biological and chemical changes. Samples were taken both from the sea-floor and

water column along transects running from the coastline and in to deep-water where the oilrigs are situated. This was a co-operation between Norwegian and Ghanaian institutions and scientists, organised by the Norwegian IMR. The work got underway early on, due to the boat being in the area on other business, so the baseline samples were taken before oil production started up. The boat discovered, amongst other things, a live coral reef which was the first of its kind to be discovered in Ghana, in addition to discoveries about the direction of the ocean currents, which have great implications for the oil industry's pollution control. The concentration of pollutants such as hydrocarbons and metals found in the 2009 samples was described as generally low in the study report (IMR, 2010). The results of the second cruise sample analysis are not yet available.

The development of the SEA for the oil and gas sector was described as a long process, with its roots in several other plans, drafts and needs-assessments. This was a co-operation between private consultants, the MoE Norway and several institutions in Ghana, including the EPA and MESTI. The object of the SEA in Ghana is described as, 'The formalised, systematic and comprehensive process of evaluating the environmental effects of policy, plan or programme and its alternatives, including the preparation of a written report on the findings of that evaluation, and using the findings in publicly accountable decision-making' (SEA, 2013 p.8). The SEA, which was given to me by the informant from MoE, uses the term 'environment' to include not only the physical environment but also social, cultural, micro-economic and institutional conditions that constitute the human habitat. It therefore refers to environmental 'risks' and 'opportunities' throughout the assessment and recommendations. In defining the word 'environment', the report suggests an appreciation of the concept being socially constructed and therefore an approach to the study more in line with modern political ecology in this respect.

Lastly, a land-use planning project, the WRSDF is very much related to infrastructure development and urban growth due to the oil industry. The project is a co-operation between the Danish COWI, OfD, and the Town and Country Planning Department (TCPD) and MESTI in Ghana. Its goal is, 'to provide policy direction on how the region's space economy should develop over the next 20 years (...) and provides a platform for integrating social, economic, infrastructure and environmental

developments' (TCPD, 2009). Its main focus points are settlement patterns, economic activity areas, environmental management and infrastructure development. In the area of environmental management, it stresses the need for environmental and social impact assessments, various limits and controls on emissions and the preservation of culture and traditions in the region.

In addition to these three main projects, there have been training programmes, workshops and various visits to and from Ghana by OfD participants in order to aid in developing legislation and build capacity and expertise. In particular, twinning between Klif and EPA Ghana has been highlighted in an evaluation of OfD as being particularly successful (Norad, 2012a).

4.2.2 Ghana's starting-point seen in relation to the resource curse hypothesis

A central question that was posed in the interviews was based on resource curse literature, which commonly suggests that the necessary institutions need to be in place prior to oil production starting up, in order to avoid the impacts associated with a resource curse. Was this the case in Ghana? In every interview, the answer was no, these were not in place before oil production started, this in part due to the short space of time between oil discovery and production start. Some believed that Ghana had done a good job with establishing a legal framework, and with capacity building, whilst others thought that the process had been far too slow. The informants described their opinions about Ghana's starting-point in general, this giving an indication of what initiatives would be necessary to improve the country's environmental management. The informants sometimes compared Ghana's starting-point to that of other oil-producing countries, this mostly portraying Ghana in a positive light.

Some informants believed, however, that Ghana had an "*undeserved good reputation*", possibly because it was an English-speaking country, which made communication easier with aid institutions when compared to other, non-English speaking, African countries. They also thought that the environmental authorities were too passive and did not have the active role they should and that Ghana was actually "*not as functional*" as they thought beforehand. Most, however, believed that Ghana had a relatively good starting-point compared to many other African countries. The EPA was particularly mentioned as being unusually effective.

“It was not the case that everything was in place before oil production got started, since they made the findings and managed to start production in the Jubilee Field in two years, I think. (...) It went really quickly, so the institutions weren’t in place. (...) But if one is to speak of environmental management, the starting-point in Ghana was particularly good in the sense that you had the EPA Ghana, which had a fairly high standing. We don’t see this in many countries we work with, where environmental management is fairly bad. We started simply on another level in our collaboration with Ghana than we have done in other countries” (Informant, NEA).

Capacity building was named as a key factor in OfD’s work in Ghana. Most believed that Ghana had a relatively “*weak*” starting-point, in terms of their administrative system and a weaker system of implementation, when compared to Norwegian conditions. Regarding the question of the right institutions being in place one informant stated, “*It’s clear that a regulatory framework is a passive thing as long as you do not manage it*”. Considering the tone used while making this comment, it was interpreted to mean that a focus on capacity building was vital, rather than the development of further regulatory documents, which has been very much a focus of other aspects of OfD’s environmental work. In general, those using the PPD were of the opinion that Ghana did not have sufficient capacity to handle all of this ‘paperwork’ being developed, this suggesting the need for more of an emphasis on the second part of OfD’s programme, ‘competence, capacity and people’ to carry out their work.

The terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ were used frequently during the interviews when describing Ghana’s starting-point. Some informants pointed out that this was their personal view or opinion, whilst others suggested that this was just the way things were. The NDD tended towards the latter, whilst in the PPD, it was specified that the terms were used based on the actor’s own experiences. The NDD could be seen as using these terms in order to defend their aid programme as a whole, and specific strategies within it, while the PPD may have less of an agenda.

There was some disagreement as to how “*accommodating*” Ghana was, in terms of people being able to express their views and opinions, this being an aspect often

included in ‘good governance’ definitions. One informant believed they were quite liberal in this area.

“It seems like a country that is reasonably accommodating, compared to many other countries you go to, where you almost don’t dare to say what you really think. So there should be hope for Ghana really!” (Informant, NEA).

Other informants described Ghana as having a layer of well-educated elite that did very well, while at the same time, a much less effective system existed beneath them containing workers who did not dare to voice their views. Many important issues did not, therefore, reach the surface due to poor communication between these different social layers. The elite were often those who were publicly visible from outside their institutions and this was described in the PPD as showing the world a “*glossy picture of themselves*”. The EPA Ghana and other institutions involved in OfD in Ghana were said to follow this pattern.

“You have these middle-managers under the layer of top-elite, which slow-down processes because things have to go through them and there’s a very poor communication flow. (...) They are very bound on what they have the authority to do and (...) they say nothing in the presence of their boss because they are afraid of saying something wrong. There’s no flow of information and it’s a bit scary really” (Informant, IMR).

This portrays a slightly different discourse, revealing issues of power and authority within the Ghanaian institutions. “*Poor flows of communication*” and being “*afraid*” and “*bound on what they have the authority to do*” have negative connotations and symbolise a ‘restriction’ in being able to make their views heard. This discourse gives the impression of an area that needs working on in order to achieve a more efficient environmental management system and better governance. It is also consistent with my experiences in attempting to interview Ghanaian actors, where I was informed that I would have to talk to their ‘bosses’ at the various institutions. It is, however, in contrast to the “*strong*” EPA that the NDD gave the impression of. Some may have given this impression of strength based on the “*glossy picture*” which Ghana is said to export of its well-educated elite. Others may have had other motives for implying

the EPA's strength in their discourse. A leader at the EPA Ghana who had been educated in Trondheim in petroleum technology, was mentioned in the context of how this put Ghana in a much better position than many other countries OfD had co-operated with. This may be seen as implying that the EPA was 'strong' due to Norway's superior education programme in petroleum technology. There was also reference to the number of employees as being a factor in its strength, suggesting a more quantitative evaluation.

Another aspect to be considered is the social, cultural and political structure in Ghana being different to that of Norway. The hierarchy of power described as existing in institutions such as the EPA may be ascribed to Ghana's political history. Whitfield (2010) describes Ghanaian politicians as having a history of being suspicious of civil servants' loyalty, and that incentive structures within the civil service actively discourage initiative and proactivity. She also describes the frustration of civil servants as being underpaid compared to domestic or donor-funded consultants, and as being bypassed when ministers appoint political advisers to get things done. The economic decline of the 1970s also led to an exodus of professionals, and acquiring or retaining good staff continues to be a problem today. Whitfield argues that as a result of these factors, Ghanaian bureaucracy may delay or halt implementation.

OfD's training workshops, such as those run by PETRAD, are very much focused on competence building with the elite from different institutions, according to some informants, whilst the real focus should be more on those working on the ground within different aspects of the petroleum industry. The PPD suggests more capacity building at a lower level, in order to be able to implement and 'handle' all of the policies being made. This argument would agree with Whitfield's analysis of Ghana's political history.

"PETRAD comes and trains these top bureaucrats and people higher up in the system, but what they need is technical training and experience building for people who can work with more practical things, and then they can also include the locals here. (...) It's more basic education at a very practical level that is important" (Informant, IMR).

The informant from Norad, however, argues for the programme's focus at a macro level, or what could be described as focussing on the elite. He describes, *"emphasizing the ministry since that's where policy-making is"* and that it was therefore important that they had the *"expertise"* and *"capacity"* to carry out their role. According to the analysis in Whitfield (2010), the factors influencing government policy-making in Ghana were shaped by what the political and bureaucratic elite found desirable and perceived to be feasible, and by their authority and ability to get those actions implemented. This suggests a somewhat undemocratic use of power, an aspect which OfD may or may not have considered in its macro-level focus.

Regarding the issue of corruption, which was not included in the interview guide, but brought up by the informants themselves when talking about Ghana's starting-point, there were a number of different discourses, and what can be described as hesitancy and silences were noted during some of the interviews.

"Corruption is a serious factor in many African countries but I would say that, we have not noticed at least, not that I have myself experienced, or heard of others who have had problems with corruption, in relation to our co-operation with OfD" (Informant, MoE).

Reasons given for this absence were that OfD does not involve much direct financial aid, but rather pays the wages for the hours the Norwegian partners have worked. The amount of actual capital that Ghana received through OfD was described as *"insignificant"*. Although the actual figures were not mentioned, the amount may be seen as insignificant in relation to the revenues that oil itself generates.

Corruption was described as an *"opposing force"* to Ghana's work with capacity building.

"You can see what has happened in Norway, the process of building up from nothing, an administration and an instrument for dealing with the oil industry. So you see that they have a huge challenge. Their starting-point is much weaker. And it must happen quickly, they have to be powerful, they must have a legal capacity, right? They must

be able to implement what they want, implement decisions. And there are opposing forces; from the chiefs, there is corruption everywhere. I mean, yes, Ghana's very democratic and all, but I think that corruption is, in many areas, carried out so that... You don't know of course who is corrupt, you do not know how much the government is corrupt, who is corrupt there and who is corrupt elsewhere, but you hear about it all the time. There are many considerations to be taken. And it is clear that this is a counterforce which can be very destructive" (Informant, Bergen municipality).

The informant uses very strong formulations and symbols in this excerpt, such as the view that one must be “*powerful*” in order to overcome “*destructive counterforces*”. The “*powerful*” that he refers to is based on a strong democratic legal system, which holds actors accountable, such as the system in operation in Norway. He refers to time as being an important issue: things needed to happen “*quickly*” this agreeing very much with resource curse theory that the right institutions and legislation need to be in place preferably before production starts up. He did not mention whether he personally had experienced corruption in relation to OfD, in contrast to the informant from MoE, who made it very clear that he had not, but suggested that you “*heard about it all the time*”, and that it was a hidden or disguised process that you never quite knew where was occurring.

Regarding Ghana's starting-point for its oil industry, the topic of the mining industry's environmental impact and “*learning from past mistakes*” was brought up during the interviews. I was told by some informants that private individuals and groups were responsible for most of the environmental damage, which has been widely reported, rather than the larger mining companies who had gradually introduced more environmentally sound practices. Much of the mining that uses damaging techniques, such as the use of cyanide and arsenic to extract gold, had apparently been done without permission from the authorities, and was therefore beyond their grasp when it came to environmental regulation. This phenomenon is known as ‘Galamsey mining’.

The NDD contained mainly positive rhetoric about Norwegian investments in the mining industry in Ghana, and that these were very focused on environmental and social impacts. There was no mention of lack of environmental regulation in this

sector. The PPD described “*serious environmental problems*” from gold mining activities during the period prior to increased corporate social responsibility (CSR) focus, and which had yet to be cleared up. Although the larger companies were now “*more cautious*” they did not have the necessary systems for handling discharge from the industry and the piles of waste from earlier periods were still polluting groundwater and rivers, according to this discourse.

The connections between the oil and mining industries regarding lack of regulation, and the mining industry’s environmental impact, did not appear to be relevant to the Ghanaian people, according to these discourses. Their optimism over their oil find was still huge. The PPD suggested creating more links and better communication between the oil and mining industries, however, in order to improve both sectors.

An evaluation report of OfD often uses Ghana as an exception to the general trends in OfD’s work. It is described as the ‘best performing country’ of OfD’s core countries (Bolivia, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and Timor-Leste) and ‘best in class’ and ‘the most positive exception’ to various governance problems reported in other countries (Norad, 2012a p.24). This implies that its starting-point was much better than that of other countries, agreeing with the views of the majority of my informants.

There was a reference to Ghana’s enormous national focus and consciousness about their oil industry; that this was their big chance and they were going to get it right. This was described as being a factor that would contribute to their success in both discourses. Some informants described the actual people and “*national feeling*” or “*pride*” and that they had a “*willingness to succeed*”. There were references to lack of religious and political conflicts and that the level of basic education was reasonably good, despite them not having practical expertise in many aspects of work with the oil industry.

The fact that Ghana has a varied economy was also given as a reason for them having a better chance of avoiding a resource curse. These views may again be seen as place-specific factors, which influence the programme’s success. There was general agreement, therefore, in both discourses, that Ghana’s starting-point was better than many other African countries OfD has worked with, which meant that their ‘job’ was

easier and that it had a reasonably good chance of avoiding a resource curse, despite things not being in place before production started up.

4.2.3 Norway as an oil nation

According to the NDD, the way in which Ghanaians view Norway as an oil nation is very positive and its successes are widely known.

“Everyone speaks very warmly about Norway and recognises Norway as a relatively successful oil nation. It is something that everyone is aware of, and we might well be that. After a while, though, we haven’t only done wise things either. (...) If you ask the average Ghanaian about what they know about Norway he says, ‘Oh yes, you have oil just like us and you’ve been very competent, or lucky, in managing it, and we will be too’” (Informant, Norad).

This attitude on the part of Ghana, according to the discourse, formed the basis of the collaboration between the two countries, as they sought contact with Norway after the discovery of oil in order to gain from their expertise in the field. The use of the word “everyone” gives the impression of there being a global agreement regarding Norway’s “success”. The framing of this issue is a typical trait of the NDD, which silences other discourses about Norway, for example, debates about oil reliance in Norway, and the country’s role in global issues such as climate change.

The PPD summarise Norway’s history as an oil nation and why these experiences may be useful for other countries developing their oil industry.

“Norway is in the situation that we have an offshore oil industry which is very important for Norway and we have fisheries that are also important, [and have been since] before oil discovery. And we have been running an oil business for 40 years, so the experiences we have, where we made some mistakes and we have done some things that have been more correct, so there has been some trial and error, but at least in some areas we have come up with a system for environmental monitoring which works quite well. Also it is very important to have a regulatory framework as a foundation that oil companies must adhere to. (...) This puts pressure on the

companies in that they must be very restrictive in what they do (...). And these experiences we have from Norway, we feel may be useful for other countries.”

A second informant adds, *“The first time I was out in the North Sea in the 90’s, it was a pretty messy affair in some of these fields and what we see in Norway is that they have taken hold of these problems and gone from situations in which oil companies argue and push the consultancy companies to get them to change their results and things, to that this has become part of their daily routine. [In Ghana] they are up and running and getting all this started”* (Informants, IMR).

Both the discourses then, admit that Norway has made mistakes in the past, but through a long process, has managed to create a good system of management, which may be shared with receiving countries. The PPD includes an ‘admittance’ to issues of corruption in Norway in the past, with oil companies *“pushing”* the consultancy companies to change their results. There was much discussion about current Norwegian policy with its operating oil companies and many believed that this ‘model’ was also the way forward for Ghana in its environmental management of oil.

“We believed it was important that the EPA Ghana quickly entered into a dialogue with the industry so that they realized the need for them to do surveillance of the area and influence the petroleum industry. Make agreements about this. This is the way things are in Norway: The polluter pays. And we offered them insight on how we do it in Norway when it comes to this monitoring offshore and helped to draft this in Ghana. (...) In Norway we just say, ‘No it is not our problem. It’s you who has an operation here, we have set the conditions; that this operation will take place within this and this emission limit, and regarding the impact on nature. You must prove to us that this is so.’ And this is the only way forward” (Informant, NEA).

These aspects of Norwegian policy, with regard to the polluter pays principle and monitoring responsibilities applying to the operating oil companies through a national plan, were described in the PPD as one of, if not the, most important aspect to focus on in Ghana’s environmental policy. This could be described as a direct exportation of the Norwegian oil model. The term, *“the only way forward”* leaves little room for discussion or ‘adaptions’ and could be interpreted as the Norwegian way is the only way, in this issue. This comes back to the fine line between exporting the Norwegian

model versus Norwegian experience, but both discourses gave the impression that Ghana should adopt this aspect of Norwegian policy.

According to the evaluation report of OfD, the Norwegian model was considered to be the 'golden standard' by many, therefore having a very positive connotation to many of those involved in the programme (Norad, 2012a). Many of those interviewed for the report had also stated that they had asked for Norwegian assistance based on this model and were free to reject it if they chose to. The report portrays a very strong argument for this aspect of the programme: that it is free, the co-operating countries have chosen it themselves, and that they are 'free to reject' aspects of it. The report includes a wide range and number of informants and data from both countries, so that the general findings from this source regarding critique of Norway exporting its own model are overwhelmingly positive.

In this respect, the NDD, regarding the export of the Norwegian experience, has become hegemonic, with both Norwegian and Ghanaian actors praising the optionality and non-conditionality of the programme. How 'free' Ghana actually is to reject aspects of the programme, however, and the extent to which the co-operation is a symmetrical partnership will be further examined.

4.2.4 The role of the oil companies

Communication and the content of the agreements between the Ghanaian authorities and the operating oil companies, was a topic that was much discussed in the interviews. There was talk of responsibilities in terms of environmental monitoring and oil contingency plans, and suggestions that the oil companies operating in Ghana should be, at this monitoring stage, financing environmental sampling and analysis. These ideas are very much influenced by Norwegian policy, as discussed in the section above. It was reported by actors using the PPD that the EPA Ghana seemed to feel that they themselves were responsible for environmental monitoring and had planned on developing a large, complex and very expensive laboratory for this purpose. The EPA had also wanted to continue using the Dr Fridtjof Nansen research ship for further sampling but had been advised against this by several actors working under OfD, who stressed that this was not their responsibility but that of the oil companies.

“We told them, because they wanted the Nansen to take further samples and make analyses for basic research down there. We said that we advised the EPA Ghana, for one thing, we did not want to give aid for this, for the second, we did not feel that this was a public task (...). They have probably gone a bit far in getting aid to continue with things that we believe are the industry’s responsibility” (Informant, NEA).

This was obviously an area with an unresolved potential and a certain amount of disagreement between the two countries. It was also brought up as an extremely important and central area of OfD’s work in Ghana, through the drafting of agreements and national plans in order to monitor the industry’s self-financed analyses. This disagreement is further discussed in section 4.2.5, *The co-operation between the Ghanaian and Norwegian authorities*.

When asked if they had any direct contact with the oil companies operating in Ghana, all of the informants replied that they had very little or no direct contact, but picked up information from and about them through other sources, such as the EPA Ghana. Communication between the oil companies and the authorities was described by the PPD as being relatively good in Norway, less so in Ghana.

“The communication with the oil companies, I think, is one of the things that has gone quite well here in Norway. We have a close dialogue with them and, for example, when it comes to environmental monitoring, the oil companies are represented in the group making plans for the monitoring together with the Norwegian authorities. I feel that in Africa in general, the industry is on one hand and the government on the other and communication between them is not as good as it could be” (Informant, IMR).

Regarding the oil companies’ responsibility in Ghana, it was suggested that the companies had the main responsibility in oil contingency plans, for example in the case of an oil spill, as in the Norwegian model. In the area of surveying and analysing though, it tended to vary from country to country.

“In a country like Ghana, they have... I do not know the details of exactly how far their responsibility goes, but the government has to make sure that someone is doing

everything, to put it that way, either they or the oil companies. And that will have an impact on licensing and things. But in Ghana it's relatively tidy" (Informant, Norad).

The government, *"making sure that someone is doing everything"* refers again to the need for a national plan and the defining of roles. Although the appointing of responsibilities is contained in OfD's 'master plan', it appears to be an area that remains unresolved, and also one which contains disagreements between the two countries. According to the PPD, this was far from *"tidy"*, as several other excerpts in this section will show. Regarding a national plan and the responsibilities of the oil companies, it was stressed that this was not in place in Ghana.

"They have not quite managed to systematize things, so they have sent people out to assist the oil industry in making their own plans but haven't really seen the value of creating a national plan that everyone has to follow. I think that is maybe the most important thing to work with (IMR informant).

The NDD suggested that the oil companies preferred to operate in a predictable environment, since that was what they were used to from Norway.

"[The oil companies] say that the great thing about having Norway in a country like this [Ghana], to the extent that the Norwegian experience has an impact, the oil companies will face a regime that they are familiar with already. Because the Norwegian model is also used, or... Norwegian management principles are used in many other countries too, and that the oil companies therefore know well, both in the developed world and in the not so developed, so the more people who use it the happier they are. They are not happy because they know that the tax rate will probably be higher too and so on, but for them, for an oil company, it is much more important that there is predictability, orderliness, absence of corruption, this is much more important than whether they pay 54-55 per cent tax really" (Informant, Norad).

This portrays the oil industry, and particularly Norway, in a very positive manner, again using symbols with positive connotations such as *"familiarity"*, *"predictability"* and *"orderliness"*, similar to the word *"tidy"*, which is used several times by the same informant. The PPD, however, described the oil companies as

trying to get away with looser controls in this area if they were able to do so. One explained that the same oil companies in Ghana are also operating in the North Sea.

“They live very well with our requirements [in Norway], they are almost expected to get them down there too and if they don’t then they see their chance to get away with things in a fairly straightforward way” (Informant, NEA).

The expression, “*get away with things*”, can be seen very much as a contrast to the previous excerpt’s portrayal of an orderly and predictable system, instead evoking more an impression of “*untidiness*” and even “*chaos*” in the relationship between the authorities and the oil companies. Much literature on oil suggests that corporate altruism is rare and shortcuts and corrupt practices are common (e.g. Maass, 2010, Bridge and Le Billon, 2013, Logan and McNeish, 2012). This has also been the case in Norway’s not so distant past, according to the PPD.

There also arose some conflicting stories about Tullow, the main oil company operating in Ghana. Tullow’s own discourse, available from their many reports and which I have named the *Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) discourse*, claims that, ‘We are committed to protecting the environment for current and future generations as well as ensuring our local communities, employees and suppliers are kept safe and well. We also work to prevent major accidents at our facilities through strong safety processes’ (Tullow Oil, 2014 p.57). This rhetorically implies sustainability, in its inclusion of ‘future generations’, in addition to including ‘local communities’, as expected in regard to CSR discourses. Safety is also included in connection with environmental concerns, as is often the case in oil contingency plans. This discourse categorises its environmental policies as ‘tidy’ and ‘orderly’, in much the same way as the NDD described the oil companies’ policies in Ghana.

The informant from MoE reported that they had had some contact with Tullow, but mainly through the EPA Ghana. He spoke of the EPA setting more demands for the oil companies in the area of environmental management and research, which were costly procedures that the EPA would eventually benefit from. The process had not been without its problems, however.

[This communication] appears to be a bit problematic. At first it was actually pretty easy, but there were some changes in personnel and so on, in the oil companies, that made it all a bit more difficult, and that combined with a slightly cautious attitude from the environmental authorities in Ghana. So here there is an unresolved potential which one should absolutely grasp” (Informant, MoE).

The words and expressions, “*problematic*”, “*bit more difficult*”, “*slightly cautious attitude*” and “*unresolved potential*” are symbols with negative connotations and seem to point to an area where OfD has not succeeded in its plan as hoped. Despite these ‘problems’, however, the informant describes Tullow as being a “*relatively small new company, but have had a huge success in the countries they operate in.*” This can be seen in contrast to the narrative used by others about Tullow.

“Tullow have had some trouble round and about in Africa, but they enter into so many difficult areas. They were chased out of East Africa; Kenya, or some place where they had some activity. The locals didn’t get work and there was only foreign labour and eventually there were so many demonstrations and riots that they had to leave the area. They struggle with that in Ghana too, they expressed that themselves” (Informant, IMR).

Being “*chased out*” and being the cause of “*demonstrations and riots*” are in strong contrast to the implications of a “*huge success*”. It is possible that the informant from MoE was implying economic success, but this was not specified in the interview. It is also possible that he was unaware of these issues.

Another issue also arose in the PPD relating to the oil companies’ responsibilities, which varies greatly from the NDD referring to this as being “*relatively tidy*”. The dialogue describes an oil company spill-response plan and highlights an important issue regarding the responsibilities of oil companies and the authorities in Ghana.

“One of the things that scared me when I saw one of these oil spill response plans for Ghana was that some of those beaches where the fishermen live, a few thousand fishermen, they have their houses, they prepare the catch, they have all their daily needs, they wash themselves in the sea and in the rivers that run from it, there’s

training, and schools, it's all taking place in this beach area! And then there were probably some engineers from the oil companies that ran some models and calculated that x number of tons of oil could reach the beach there and then we need ten bulldozers, and 30 large trucks and then we can scrape it up and drive it away, so we can handle so and so much oil on the beach. And then they forgot that 3 or 5 thousand people live along the beach. And their houses and everything are there. If you were to follow the plan that they have there, that means that absolutely everything is just bulldozed away from the beach.

And then I asked, 'What about the people who live here, will they have to be moved and things?' And I got, 'This is the authorities' responsibility', and that it was the Directorate for Civil Emergency or something that would make plans on how to evacuate people and then accommodate them. It was not the oil company's job. They have to clean up the beach, while the authorities were responsible for taking care of the people who lived there. And this is then a huge gap in the system which is not in place. (...) And this has been approved by the government who say that they will take care of the second bit, but they have not really begun working on it, I believe. It is quite typical that they do not have local knowledge, they have sort of just looked at the technical models and quantities of oil" (Informant, IMR).

I was told that the government had approved this plan as it was, despite the IMR's objections being communicated, and that the plan had been developed by Tullow. The narrative here portrays a very obvious gap in Ghana's environmental and social management policies, which the OfD programme does not seem to have been able to cover, in that they do not have any direct contact with the oil companies. This narrative agrees with that of the NEA and literature on the politics of oil, which describes the oil companies as "*trying to get away with things*", if they have the chance to do so. It is therefore in strong contrast to the 'CSR discourse' that Tullow themselves circulate, and with the NDD. In addition, the narrative also points out the lack of efficient government regulation, since the authorities are said to have approved the plan. This is an area which OfD should be able to influence through their support of the ministries, and through the drafting of national environmental policies, but the PPD claims that the authorities had not listened to their advice on the matter. This supports the view that Ghanaian authorities are 'free to reject' aspects of the programme. Perhaps in this case it was due to the potential effect on licences, as

suggested by Norad's informant. In terms of Ghana's environmental governance, however, this is indeed a *"huge gap in the system"* that should be filled before a larger oil spill occurs.

The PPD argued that the passing of a national plan was vital to Ghana's success in environmental management of the oil sector. The system they suggested, based on the Norwegian model/experience, was that a national plan should oversee the environmental monitoring and analyses that the oil companies carried out, otherwise the oil companies would be able to create their own environmental guidelines, as in the example of the contingency plan given above.

"What we see is that the oil companies have these company policies for environment that they follow. But I think it is very important that there is a national plan for environmental monitoring (...) so that they build up expertise in Ghana and have a set of rules that environmental research shall be conducted according to a standard that they themselves define" (Informant, IMR).

The *"standard that they define"* again suggests a non-conditional and optional agreement and that the Ghanaian authorities should be in charge. They argue the importance of this control, in particular, now that a number of new companies were entering the equation from China and India, amongst other countries. Since the companies are largely free to create their own CSR and environmental policies, they apparently had some *"weird parameters"* in their proposals for monitoring, in addition to some important parameters that were omitted. They gave the example of an oil company plan from Angola that had omitted mercury and several important heavy metals from their list of chemical parameters which, *"looked very impressive since it had so incredibly many other parameters, but if you looked at it a little critically, there was good reason to question it"* (Informant, IMR).

In general then, there was agreement in both discourses that the oil companies should have the financial and practical responsibility for environmental monitoring, rather than the EPA Ghana, whilst a national plan should oversee the procedures and set their own environmental standards, which the oil companies should adhere to. Whilst the NDD described the relationship between the oil companies and authorities in

Ghana as “*tidy*” and “*nothing to worry about*”, the PPD described the oil companies as trying to get away with whatever they could if they had the chance, and provided examples of this in the various proposals that IMR had the opportunity of studying. This section has also shown that Ghana has chosen to ‘reject’ aspects of the programme in its refusal to listen to IMR’s advice, and is therefore not bound on this matter, at first glance.

4.2.5 The co-operation between the Ghanaian and Norwegian authorities

There were a number of interesting discourses which gradually came to light through the interviews about the nature of the collaboration between the authorities in the two countries. The NDD describes how the OfD programme was “*extremely sought after*” and popular and that the authorities were very grateful for the aid, advice and assistance. The PPD also, to a large degree, describes a good co-operation between Ghana and Norway during the work that these actors carried out under the OfD programme, and that they had received feedback from Ghana that their work had been helpful.

“Yes, we have always had a very good relationship with them and the senior management there has always supported the collaboration in a very positive way. And it is also the case that Norway has, in a way, become the leading country in co-operation with Ghana in the area of oil, both in the environmental and resource areas. So we feel that we have a responsibility, and that does not mean that others are not in picture, but that happens often under the direction of the co-operation that Norway and Ghana has” (Informant, MoE).

The informant here refers only to the “*senior management*”, agreeing somewhat with the claims that the ‘layer of elite’ receives the capacity building and expertise. Although agreeing that much of the collaboration had been “*well-received*” and “*helpful*”, a different discourse also emerged from the IMR and NEA: that there was actually a certain amount of conflict regarding, in particular, the purchase of laboratory equipment and, also, the use of the Dr Fridtjof Nansen research ship. It was inferred that funding for the analyses from the research cruise was being withheld as a kind of protest about the EPA’s behaviour in this issue. The informant from Norad told a different story as to why the tests had not been analysed.

“Part of the point here is that it is not Norway that should do this. This is something we help Ghana to do. It’s the Ghanaian universities and institutions that are involved, and do these analyses. Some of it must be done in Norway because laboratory capacity is not so good in Ghana, but it is part of the development process” (Informant, Norad).

When asked about the Ghanaian reluctance to return the Nansen ship, the informant explained that the ship was used in many countries but it did return to Ghana eventually, and described the process as being very *“neat and orderly.”* This can be seen in contrast to the comment of another informant:

“There’s been some cleaning up to do after this on the Ghanaian side, with regards to this thing with Fridtjof Nansen and their desire to use the programme further for monitoring and not just for basic research” (Informant, NEA).

The expression *“neat and orderly”* being a symbol with a positive connotation, may be seen in contrast to *“cleaning up”*, a metaphor referring to something dirty or broken, which needs to be fixed. The informant from NEA explains in detail about these disagreements between the Norwegian and Ghanaian authorities.

“They wanted to keep sailing, basically, when they saw their chance to do so, but they were stopped en route. So the research was conducted but the analysis was not done, and they have been withheld until the embassy opens up the money and pays for the analysis. But it must be underlined that you do not do that kind of thing again!” (Informant, NEA).

This was based on an agreement between the actors on the Norwegian side of the cooperation, that since things had gone in to a monitoring phase, beyond the baseline research that OfD funded, the oil companies should finance further research. As previously discussed, this is very much based on Norway’s own model which the various Norwegian actors from OfD had advised Ghana to follow. The development of a high-tech laboratory, as previously mentioned, was also a topic that had obviously caused some friction between OfD and Ghana, in particular the EPA. OfD

had advised against the lab, since both development and running costs and requirements were described as being “enormous” and “unrealistic”. Again here, according to Norwegian policy and advice, it was not the EPA’s responsibility to do further sampling and analyses, but that of the oil companies. Nonetheless, the EPA had received aid for the development of this lab from the World Bank, ignoring the advice given. This is also contradictory to the claim that most aid “comes under the direction of the collaboration between OfD and Ghana”, as quoted above.

"What we've seen is that [the EPA] go out and buy the most expensive items that exist of analytical instruments, for many millions of dollars, and we know that they will not get them up and going because it is too advanced. There are horrendous operating costs involved, and there need to be lots of people with expertise to keep it running properly, they think that if they buy the most expensive items one can find in the world, (...) and other equipment that we barely have here in Norway, this is what they ordered, with funding from the World Bank. And we have said that you are never going to get this going! And then we are looked upon as if we do not have confidence in them, almost like we're racist. We have advanced equipment but we do not wish the same for them. But we know that there are special requirements for the buildings where they'll install the equipment, and for power supply; there is a tremendous power usage and they have an unstable power supply in Ghana (...). The power goes twice a day, so you'll never get operational" (Informant, IMR).

The tone of this excerpt was somewhat aggressive regarding this matter. The same informants describe other technical and financial difficulties with the EPA building their planned laboratory, such as the heat produced from the instruments, energy use and building adaptations, which were neither planned nor budgeted for. The informant from the NEA reported that Norway had “been strict with them” on this matter, but that they could not force Ghana to do or not do anything either. He believes that the EPA’s plans for the laboratory are to make them look, “strong” and give them more the impression of “authority”, but that it was a “false dream”, for many of the same practical and financial reasons given by the IMR informants. The PPD portray the EPA as being stubborn and uninformed in this matter. The EPA apparently regarded OfD as “racist” and believed that OfD “do not have confidence in them”, apparently not wishing for Ghana what Norway has.

The inclusion of race in the discourse may almost be seen as having a colonial overtone in that white people from a rich country are accused of not wishing the same for Ghana as they have themselves. The reasons for OfD's objections to the laboratory at this time appear to be sensible, however, and Norway's experiences with this matter may have saved Ghana a lot of unnecessary time, effort and money. The laboratory being financed by the World Bank, without communication with OfD, was obviously a sore point for the Norwegian actors who had advised against it.

These conflicts over the development of a laboratory and use of the Nansen ship were central to OfD's environmental projects. If it is indeed the case that funding for analysis of the second set of samples taken from Nansen is withheld in protest at Ghana's behaviour, then the entire Nansen project, given as a central project in OfD's environmental pillar, has had a limited effect on environmental management in Ghana. At the time of writing, I have received no information that this issue has been resolved.

This section also shows the use of the Foucauldian concepts of power and discipline, since Ghana's unwillingness to comply with the advice of OfD actors, led to it being 'punished'; its funds were withheld and "*it must be underlined that you do not do that kind of thing again!*" These issues were silenced entirely in the NDD. Although Ghana is free to reject aspects of the programme, this rejection resulted in negative consequences regarding the rest of the programme. In this respect, OfD can be said to have retained power over the receiving country by using conditionality, although their rhetoric states otherwise. This is in accordance with the concepts of 'developmentality' and 'environmentality'.

4.2.6 Local participation and knowledge. Ghana specific strategies?

With civil society participation, local knowledge, and dynamic, place-specific strategies being suggested in literature on oil governance, a question in the interview guide was related to the inclusion of these perspectives in the programme. The PPD described a certain amount of contact with the local population in the area potentially affected by the oil industry, including traditional chiefs and fishermen. The narratives of the meetings with local actors or stakeholders brought to light a different *environmentalist discourse*. One of these narratives was that the fishermen were their

own worst enemies, using damaging techniques such as bottom trawling and the use of dynamite to increase their catch. In addition, some of these fishermen reportedly blamed the oil industry for the fact that they had to use these techniques because of reduced catch. According to the PPD, this reasoning was misguided, and rather based on the spreading of an environmentalist discourse, which blamed the oil industry as the root of all evil.

“(...) There are actually some organisations from different countries, without mentioning any in particular, travelling around and telling everyone that everything the oil industry does is terrible, and if there aren't any fish then it is the oil industry's fault. (...) I feel sometimes that a message is being spread that is not completely rooted in reality” (Informant, IMR).

They refer to this environmentalist discourse as a *“rhetorical strategy”*, and that there are many other activities going on along the coast that do much more damage, including run-off from farming and uncontrolled land-use. In addition, there is little public focus on these other practices since the local, national and international focus is on the country's oil industry. The informant believes that it is unpopular and not *“politically correct”* to argue against this focus. With their background in marine research, these informants have a scientific approach to different forms of environmental degradation and their view of this ‘anti-oil’ discourse as being uninformed is therefore due to their roles and statuses as scientists. A discourse that blames the oil industry for ‘all evil’ without scientific data to support it is obviously framing the issue, but it is also possible to view IMR's narrative as being somewhat uninformed. It disregards local discourses and narratives without fully investigating what their claims are based on, and if there could be any truth in their claims against the oil industry. The analyses of the second Nansen ship cruise samples are, after all, yet to be carried out. It is also possible to frame scientific information, constructed by experts, in order to support different discourses, as argued in the concept of ‘environmentality’. The *“reality”* that they speak of is therefore also constructed, as is that of the environmentalist discourse they describe.

The informant from the land-use planning project talked about the traditional chiefs, who were often included in meetings held on different aspects of the oil industry's impact on local areas.

“You have an administration that is structured much like in Europe (...) but at the same time you have a traditional governance that are the chiefs who hold (...) a substantial authority, particularly over rights to land. And there can arise conflicts of interest periodically. They did things rather wisely, so that the chiefs meet in national bodies and they are aligned and co-ordinated with the government and parliament. So you always consult with the chiefs. (...) And it's my impression that they have quite an influence on policy, nationally, regionally and locally. They've been involved in lots of workshops out here [under the OfD programme] and in that context, the chiefs are always invited along with technical experts” (Informant, Bergen Municipality).

The informant explains how the chiefs also represent coastal areas and local fisheries' interests in such meetings with the authorities and other groups, but describes their job as “*difficult*” due to conflicting interests. On the one hand they want to protect their traditional society and on the other they have commercial interests providing opportunities related to the oil business. Through such workshops, as described above, Goldman (2001) suggests that participants must adopt the rationalities and technologies presented to them, so as to speak with expertise, this being a part of the concept of environmentalism. Although the chiefs and other participants are ‘free’ to make their own choices and influence policy, they may, to some extent, also have been influenced by the NDD.

Although some aspects of OfD's environmental programme, such as the land-use planning project, have involved chiefs and other civil society groups and individuals, Norad's informant said that OfD did not work directly with local actors and groups, but that other organisations were working more at that level. OfD did, however, give financial support to several national and international organisations working more ‘on the ground’. In 2011 and 2012, these included Revenue Watch (RW) and Publish What You Pay (PWYP), organisations working with increasing transparency and accountability in transactions carried out relating to the oil industry. Other NGOs

receiving the most amount of financial support were the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) (Norad, 2013).

“It is important that these authorities, those in responsible positions, are held responsible by civil society, the media, various watchdogs that exist. OfD aids in this process in various countries. In Ghana we have been not very focused on this, from the Norwegian side, because when we started, at least when I arrived there in 2009, it turned out that there were already many others who were doing it. They have a pretty astute civil society and media, who already then in 2009 had access to resources both from external donors and some from the government too actually. So there was not much need for Norway to step in and contribute as much there. (...) We have involved many civil society organizations and the media in these training activities and things, but it's sort of a division of labour. The World Bank and others have done much of what is called expectation management and public information with the authorities. Although we are probably mostly at the higher-levels, working with laws and things like that, there are others, both local and international NGO's, for example, working more with the population and things like that” (Informant, Norad).

The “*watchdogs*” described here relate to ‘accountability’, an important aspect of good governance, according to the NDD, and this is described as being in relatively good shape in Ghana, partly due to the work of other aid organisations such as the World Bank. Local participation projects, such as the “*training activities*” described here, may also be more aimed at mobilising community groups than empowering them to influence and share control over development (Malena, 2000 in Potter et al., 2008).

Several informants criticized the co-operation (or lack of it) between fisheries and the oil industry, but this issue did not seem to be directly covered by OfD. The Nansen research ship worked very much with this issue in other countries, but not as a part of OfD.

“What has been insufficient is the establishment of good systems for coexistence between fisheries and the oil industries. There is still much to do there and it is something that is on the programme here, but which we haven't been very involved in.

In Norway, it's to a large extent the petroleum directorate that looks at that type of problem, and the coastal authorities” (Informant, MoE).

With very obvious links between environmental costs in marine and coastal environments and impact on fisheries, this seems a very relevant omission. In Ghana specifically, many of those who are, or are at risk of being, directly affected by the oil industry, are involved in fisheries along the coast, and have constituted the main civil society group who have criticized the oil industry so far. This criticism has come to light through meetings and through local NGO's who report the local communities' concerns. OfD not focusing more attention on this group is, then, a large gap in their inclusion of civil society and local knowledge.

From the interviews, some of the specific initiatives used in OfD's environmental management programme in Ghana seemed to have been adjusted to suit Ghana's specific needs. The land-use planning project worked from a geographical perspective and included place-specific strategies at different scales. The Nansen research project had also developed what they called the 'Ghana model', which was created to suit Ghana's specific needs at the time. The SEA and needs-assessment activities were collaborations between the two countries, and, although very much based on Norwegian environmental policy, the Ghanaian authorities were included throughout the entire process. Again, in these processes, it is hard to quantify the extent to which the NDD has influenced actors in Ghana, 'compelling them into restructuring institutions, ecosystems and human landscapes' (Goldman, 2001) in ways that are accountable to their discourse. The extent to which the strategies are dynamic is also debateable, since the OfD programme is time-limited and is therefore somewhat limited in following the industry's dynamic effects in Ghana.

It was suggested in the PPD that there were initiatives that were not included in the programme, which would have been very relevant for Ghana, such as co-operation between the oil industry and fisheries, and better communication between the authorities and the oil industry. The OfD programme as a whole could, in this respect, be criticized for Ghana-specific initiatives that it left out, rather than those it included. As stated in the evaluation report of OfD, Norwegian agencies alone may not cover the needs on the local-partner side and peer learning may be more relevant than the

transfer of a more global knowledge. ‘Regional collaboration and alternative skills centres are part of the OfD toolkit - they could be used more’ (Norad, 2012a, p.144).

4.2.7 Statoil and Norwegian investments

Conflicts of interest between private and state actors are a common critique of the OfD programme, as discussed in Chapter 2. According to a large number of media sources and Statoil itself, Statoil bought a share of a Hess-operated licence in Ghana’s Jubilee Field in 2012 (Statoil, 2012) but then apparently withdrew, with nothing further about the case being mentioned in the media except that ‘Statoil has left Ghana about as quickly as it arrived, although the Norwegian oil and gas firm says it is still open to investment in the West African country’ (Energy Intelligence group, 2012). When the question was posed to one informant about Statoil’s involvement in Ghana, I was informed that there were not any clear links as yet.

“Statoil has actually considered Ghana for many years (...) and they are still very interested, but they have still neither bought themselves shares, that I know of, nor been granted any licence. Whether they are still interested in this, you’ll have to ask them” (Informant, Norad).

The informant silenced this issue in his discourse, and it seems unlikely that he did not know of Statoil’s purchase and sudden exit from the Hess-operated licence. In an interview, Nore, the director of OfD, states that ‘I’m a bit tired of rejecting the fact that OfD is some kind of conspiracy between Norad and Norwegian commercial interests’ (Sæbø, 2010). But tired or not, the accusations will continue as long as Norway is involved in ‘questionable dealings abroad’ through Statoil and the Government Pension Fund Global (GPF) (Logan and McNeish, 2012) and the NDD silences this issue.

Further on the subject of Norwegian investments in Ghana, it was explained that the Norwegian embassy in Ghana, “wore two hats”.

“The embassy administers aid, but at the same time, and this is included in the foreign instructions, that (...) Norwegian embassies should facilitate the Norwegian business sector. So we have been in contact with Statoil and other Norwegian

companies but what they want to report and things is often limited, and that's fair enough!" (Informant, Norad).

It came to light in the PPD that the main consultant in the development of the OfD-funded SEA for Ghana was a man who had worked over a longer period of time for Statoil as environmental consultant. His position in OfD's work would be categorised as 'external consultant', according to Norad's list of contributing actors in OfD. This was explained in a casual manner, which did not give the impression of any potential conflict of interest.

Norway also has investments in Ghana's mining industry through the GPFG. The fund owns a part of several mining companies operating in Ghana. When asked about the environmental degradation which has occurred in connection with the mining industry there, the GPFG were described as "*very serious investors*" in the NDD.

"In this sense, Norway is there indirectly as investors in Ghana. (...) The GPFG, amongst others, have been in Ghana and seen how mining operates there, both in terms of human rights and environmental concerns and so on" (Informant, Norad).

These investments are described in a positive manner and it is suggested that Norway's experiences from mining could also be passed on to Ghana, despite there not being any official aid given to this sector through OfD. A popular alternative discourse used by many civil society organisations describes some of the GPFG's investments as being extremely controversial and even unethical (e.g. *Framtiden i Våre Hender*, 2013). Although the fund introduced ethical guidelines in 2004, the first country in the world to do so, it is, all the same, continuously criticized for unethical investments, for example in coal, and in individual companies who operate using environmentally damaging behaviour or with little regard for civil-rights. It is strongly argued, therefore, that this ethical framework needs strengthening (Aftenposten, 2013).

There was no direct suggestion in the NDD, or in the PPD, of any conflicts of interest resulting from Norwegian investments in Ghana, despite this being an argument often used about the OfD programme and aid programmes in general. Hoyos (2006) reports

that energy company executives pointed out conflicts of interest when Norway advised oil-rich governments on licensing rounds in which Norwegian companies were bidding. She refers to Statoil, and previously Norsk Hydro, as partially state-owned companies and highlights the state's partnership with the private sector in Norway. A senior executive at an oil company active in Africa stated that 'Even if they are not given preferential status, they often have access to data - such as seismic information - before their competition' (Hoyos, 2006).

Solli (2011) describes Norway's commercial and geopolitical interests as a 'controversial rationale for an aid programme' (p.74). Although Norwegian aid is said to be motivated by values, rather than self-interest, Erik Solheim, at the time Norway's minister of international development, acknowledged that the OfD programme was, 'in fact among the most difficult and delicate we work with' (Solheim, 2009 in Solli, 2011, p.74). Solheim's expression, 'difficult and delicate' may be seen in contrast to Norad's informant's "*but what [the Norwegian companies] want to report and things is often limited, and that's fair enough!*" the latter almost implying that Norwegian companies may adopt a policy of secrecy when it suits them. Transparency in policies and transactions is regarded as an important aspect of avoiding a resource curse, yet there appears to be a differentiation between countries if Norway is freed from upholding this policy, yet Ghana is being encouraged through OfD, amongst others, to use it.

The idea of aid being motivated by values, rather than self-interest, may not always be that easy in practice, especially when the embassy has the two roles of combining Norwegian commercial interests with administering aid. Norad's informant worked at the embassy for a number of years and has a background from the Norwegian oil business. Neither the NDD nor PPD openly described any conflicts of interest, but Statoil's involvement in Ghana being silenced and an undertone of Norway being 'above the rules' in its 'dealings abroad' are noteworthy.

According to the findings from an evaluation report of OfD, the programme has 'Focused on building the capacities of public administration bodies and avoided the commercial concerns of the public sector so as not to be accused of a conflict of interest with regard to Norway's own private sector actors' (Norad, 2012a, p.27).

This implies that the avoidance of contact with the oil companies has been deliberate and deemed necessary by Norad, so that OfD may ‘avoid accusations’ as to Norway’s own interests in the partner country. Dealings with the oil companies and the reviewing of their contracts and procedures in Ghana, was deemed an important area where the programme could be improved in the PPD. Oil contracts typically last for two to three decades (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013) and I was informed that they are extremely difficult to undo or change, making it essential that they contain sufficient environmental content and responsibility clauses. This issue may indeed be described as ‘difficult and delicate’ and is further discussed in the next chapter.

4.2.8 Environmental changes in Ghana post-oil production

When asked if there had been any significant environmental changes after oil production had started up in Ghana, all of the informants interviewed agreed that there had *not* been. Some reported that they had heard of instances of dead whales being washed ashore, and tar balls which had reached the coastline, but that this had apparently not been traced back to the oil industry and could just as well have come from other sources. There were also some reports about friction between the oil industry and fisheries due to safety zones. Both the NDD and the PPD were very decisive in this matter and there were many similarities in responses to this issue.

“What I know to be some issues are that the fisheries have not always understood that there are safety zones around the installations which they must stay away from, so there’s been some friction there. Also, there’ve been some alleged oil spills that have not been traced back to oil production in Ghana, but that could just as easily have come from tank pots or other vessels that seep out bunker oil (...)” (Informant, MoE).

It was explained that tar balls can be washed on to the beach in many ways, and may originate from, for example, natural seeps and tanker traffic. The geological and oceanographical conditions in the Jubilee Field are also described, including that the oil is found at extremely deep depths, and that the waters are fairly calm, making it highly unlikely that these issues are related to the oil industry. The PPD, nonetheless, argues the need for a better oil-spill contingency plan, due to the huge amount of tanker traffic along the coast, and an improved VTMISS.

In an interview found on a Ghanaian news website, a representative from the EPA Ghana was asked about the increasing number of dead whales since oil production started up. He remarked that, ‘The whales are not being washed ashore as a result of the oil exploration. (...). I have studied geoscience and there is no link between dying whales and oil and gas exploration activities’ (Ghana oil and gas online, 2013).

These discourses using phrases such as “*alleged oil spills*” and that fishermen have “*not always understood*” the concept of exclusion zones present a framing of environmental impacts, giving the impression of an uninformed environmentalist discourse. The EPA’s statement denies any connection to the whale deaths outright, with ‘no link’ to the oil industry, dismissing the environmentalist discourse entirely.

The results of the three-year research by the Nansen team had, at the time of writing, yet to be analysed due to alleged disputes on funding and responsibility, so there are few scientific sources of data available on environmental impact of the oil industry so far. When asked if they had any indications of change, the IMR seemed to think that there would be very little and they had not expected there to be either.

“I guess we have an indication that there have not been very big changes since we were last there but we’ll have to see the analyses. We may see some minor changes in the immediate area.”

“Its not like we stuck our hands into a pigsty, but that wasn’t really expected either.”
(Informants, IMR)

Interestingly, a group of Ghanaian scientists have published an article reporting finds of high concentrations of toxic chemicals, particularly in the deep-water sites of the Jubilee Field, which they report may have serious environmental and ecological implications such as the loss of biodiversity and the harming of fish due to the metals’ bioaccumulation along the food chain. They suspect these to be the result of drilling activities during exploration (Nyarko et al., 2011). The research they carried out took place from the Nansen research boat in 2009. This may be seen in contrast to the informants from IMR who reported a very limited impact when asked about the oil industry’s environmental impact so far. In IMR’s report from the 2009 study, this slight increase in metal concentrations at the deep-water sites was explained as

‘corresponding to the particle size of the sediment, as smaller particles have higher affinity to chemical compounds’ (IMR, 2010 p.57). The concentrations of metals was described, in general, as being ‘low’. This point illustrates how different actors may reach very different conclusions using the same data. It also illustrates the use of framing in discourses and the role of scientific research in decision-making (e.g. Tvedt, 2009, Goldman, 2001, Neumann, 2005).

As previously discussed, the IMR informants regarded other coastal and aquatic activities as posing a much larger threat to both ecosystems and local communities than the oil industry, at present. Others described shipping vessels as a larger threat than the oil industry. The informants from IMR also commented on Norway’s position as an oil-producing and fish-producing nation and that the two industries are possible to combine, but with a lot of effort.

“[Norway has] a very large oil industry and what we see is that all the major fish stocks are in very good condition. They have barely been in better condition. All of them. And we’ve had an oil business for 40-years. (...) So if you’re careful and have monitoring regimes and somehow keep a look out, there’s no problem having multiple operations simultaneously. But it requires a lot” (Informant, IMR).

The language used here portrays a somewhat opinionated narrative about Norway’s policies and current situation. The on-going issue of oil-exploration in Norway’s Barent Sea, in the regions of Lofoten, Vesterålen and Senja, for example, has been a controversial political issue for decades, in part due to oil-versus-fishing discussions. Some of these arguments are specifically based on data that strongly advises against combining oil with the fragile ecosystems and marine species in this area and rather suggest the use of the precautionary principle. The argument that fishing and oil can be combined then, is place-specific, not even applying to Norway at a national level. The discourse given by IMR, that Norway has apparently succeeded in this feat so far, is, in any case, not necessarily applicable to Ghana’s diverse ecosystems, fishing traditions and oil industry.

An *environmental discourse* in Ghana has described changes in marine environments and fish catch. As described above under section 4.2.6 regarding local participation,

the IMR informants described local fishermen as blaming the oil industry for reduced catch, as certain organisations had informed them that this was the case. Ghanaian environmentalist discourse sources such as FON, however, do not seem to have blamed the oil industry directly in many cases, but do demand answers to the negative trends that society has noticed. One source reports that fishermen are angry about the 500-metre restriction zone around the Jubilee Field, with its bright lighting attracting fish. Being ‘angry’ about the restriction zone is a different symbol from “*not understanding it*”, as described in the PPD. Pollution, including tar balls, noise, tanker traffic and ballast water were also mentioned as being disturbing for fishermen (Badgley, 2011). The spreading of decomposing sargassum is also given as being a possible result of oil pollution, but has yet to be empirically researched. There have also been visible oil spills, and discharge of toxic mud which Kosmos has been held responsible for, this being a different rhetoric from the “*alleged spills*” described in the PPD. These issues then, were framed in the NDD and PPD, either intentionally or through lack of local knowledge.

A representative from FON, which is a leading environmental NGO in Ghana, describes health issues due to gas flaring, in addition to dead whales and conflicts between fishermen and the oil industry. He suggests that Ghana had rushed into oil extraction, but reports that his organisation wants scientific analysis behind the negative trends that civil society had noticed, so that their questioning of the industry’s practices was not taken to be propaganda. This may be seen as similar to the type of ‘environmentalist propaganda’ that IMR described as blaming the oil industry as the root of all evil.

‘What we are doing now is playing catch-up. But the industry is not going to wait for us (...) and by the time we catch up, things could have gone out of hand. We should be more active, but advocacy should be evidence-based so that the duty bearers do not dismiss us as propagandists’ (Oil in Uganda, 2012).

The environmentalist discourse that I have found from various Ghanaian NGO’s is a well-considered discourse that suggests that civil society wants to be taken seriously. They include concrete environmental events that have occurred post-oil production and demand ‘evidence-based advocacy’, rather than jumping to conclusions, such as

that described by the informants from IMR, based on their meetings with individual fishermen. Until proven otherwise, it is reasonable to question the role of oil pollution in the changes that local communities have noticed after oil production started up. Respecting these views is an important aspect of hearing the voice of different stakeholders and in civil society holding the industry accountable for its actions, if and when they are proven. These concepts are included in OfD's 'good governance' definitions and according to the NDD, accountability in Ghana works relatively well which is why the programme does not direct more focus towards it.

4.2.9 Evaluating OfD's environmental management in Ghana so far

All of the informants felt that their work in Ghana had been helpful, based on feedback from the Ghanaians they had been co-operating with, and on their own personal impressions of their respective projects. Some pointed out areas that needed more focus, many of these being previously described in this chapter. Most were optimistic about a renewed three-year contract that was in the making at the time of writing and seemed eager to do more.

The informant from Norad suggested strengthening MESTI as a main area of focus. Although they had "*gained expertise and capacity to do their part of the job*", this was "*not a job that was completed*". He did, however, in general feel that OfD had achieved its main goals in Ghana in developing legislation, structure and appointing responsibilities, and in capacity building and staffing.

One informant explained that one of the very positive things in OfD's work so far was Klif's training with the corresponding departments at the EPA Ghana, when they wanted to develop their oil and gas department. He described this as a partnership that has continued, including various visits to and from Ghana between the two departments. Another summed up his experiences with the programme.

"My experience has certainly been that it has worked. Not in the sense that my mere presence has turned all the workers into experts, because we all have our limitations, but you can share the skills you have and together you can develop something" (Informant, Bergen municipality).

The informants from IMR suggested the way forward was for West African countries to harmonize their procedures with regard to regulations and monitoring, this suggesting a more international approach to environmental management. They did not know if this would be included in OfD's programme, however. They also suggested more communication between the different sectors within Ghana and felt that they had been, and would continue to be, an arena that brought these together.

“We see that communication between the fisheries authorities and environmental authorities in Ghana is not very good, in my opinion. But we've had people from both institutions with us, so I feel that we are almost a catalyst in trying to achieve co-operation, and who (...) bring the institutions together on the boat. We've also had people from the mapping authorities and port authorities and have tried to include as many as possible, but it's a hard job to create something that will last after we've left” (Informant, IMR).

Several other informants also believed that communication between the public sectors, and between the authorities and oil companies, needed much more focus. This in addition to increased communication and openness within institutions. Some stated that the bringing ashore of gas, and the infrastructure involved in this, would be a great challenge, while others discussed the use of onshore exploration in the Volta region as a big challenge in the possible future. The risks and opportunities involved in onshore exploration, particularly with regard to drinking water which is collected from the Volta Basin, were discussed in detail, with onshore exploration in general being described as *“a whole different ballgame”*.

Norad's evaluation of OfD's work in Ghana and other countries, carried out by an independent organisation, praised OfD's work in Ghana in many areas. As an overall assessment of OfD's environmental pillar in Ghana the report states that, ‘The relevance of the programme is clearly high. Efficiency, effectiveness and impact will only become visible over time’ (Norad, 2012a, p.62). It suggests in general that the environmental management pillar should have a wider reach and more strategic approach. This includes ‘identifying the full range of actors that could be included in the environmental capacity development programme: public sector offices, civil-society organizations, media, youth groups etc.’ (p.xxiii). It also suggests more

clarity in the use of key instruments such as SEAs and EIAs and strengthening monitoring. In Ghana specifically, it mentions the role of the EPA and the petroleum commission as being somewhat uncertain, suggesting that the authorities need to define their position. This may be seen in contrast to the NDD which described the “*who should be doing what*” as being largely in place. The report otherwise praises the programme’s progress in Ghana, with the planning of the activities being ‘relevant and realistic’ (p.65).

The SEA of Ghana evaluates existing information on the oil and gas sector, describes various scenarios of development and includes different stakeholder interests in its assessment. It highlights many interesting points and, although not being aimed at or about OfD, provides many hints as to areas that need more focus in environmental management, which OfD could learn from. These include issues of screening oil companies to ensure that they are able to manage oil-spill incidents, investing in modernizing the local fishing industry because of potential conflicts between the two industries, reviewing legislation for compensation and fines, and integrating research into oil and gas development (SEA, 2013). The evaluation report’s suggestion of more clarity in the use of SEA’s would seem a point that OfD should consider in its future work.

In general, the NDD was less critical in its evaluation of OfD’s environmental management than the PPD. In light of their motives for using their respective discourses, they chose to emphasize certain aspects of the programme while silencing others. The PPD evaluated the programme based more on their own roles in OfD and their own experiences through their work. Examples are, the IMR informants suggesting more communications between the fishery and oil institutions and the Bergen Municipality informant emphasizing work on land-use projects in co-operation with traditional groups, which he had been in contact with through the WRSDF project. The PPD was more reflective about their work and the programme as a whole. The NDD also believed they “*still had work to do*” but did not suggest any specific areas of focus that were not already being used through the programme. Areas for suggested improvement are available in written form in the SEA and Norad’s evaluation of OfD, and it will be interesting to see if these suggestions are included in OfD’s future projects.

5. DISCUSSION

The previous chapter analysed the empirical data using techniques from qualitative geography, including discourse analysis. It firstly examined the environmental management strategies used by OfD in Ghana, relating to the first research question. The data provided insight as to the inclusion of place-specific and dynamic strategies, based on newer research within the field, this relating to research question two. It has also identified and examined the discourses being used about the programme's environmental management focus and how different actors describe environmental practices and policies in Ghana. This provides answers to research question three. This chapter seeks to summarize and further analyse the empirical findings using the theoretical concepts introduced in Chapter 2, situating them geographically and examining connections between the findings. Research question four, regarding the use of a political ecology approach, will be discussed in relation to this process. The analysis will then lead to a conclusion as to the extent to which OfD can aid Ghana in the environmental management of its oil industry.

5.1 The roots of OfD's environmental policies

In order to further understand the influences and motives surrounding OfD's environmental policies, it is necessary to examine the programme's own geographical and historical roots, in accordance with using a place-specific and dynamic approach to research (Logan and McNeish, 2012). It also aids in stakeholder analysis of the actors working on OfD's environmental pillar, making it more possible to situate the empirical data (Aase and Fossåskaret, 2007). This process leads very much to Norway's own oil experience or the 'golden standard' of the Norwegian model, as quoted in Norad's evaluation. It also includes global influences on oil policy, and larger trends within development aid such as 'new aid architecture' (Sande Lie, 2011). These factors, in addition to hidden motives which emerged through the discourse analysis, define the nature of the OfD programme's environmental pillar.

5.1.1 The Norwegian experience

Norway's roots for its environmental policies in OfD can firstly be traced back to its own oil industry. Norway is often given as the 'exception' in resource curse literature and its oil history has been carefully analysed in order to understand how the country

managed to turn its oil into a blessing. The Norwegian model has become a byword for avoiding the negative effects of oil production on its markets and social fabric (Logan and McNeish, 2012). It is hardly surprising that Norway's advice through OfD is sought after then, and that, according to the NDD, it is one of the most popular and in-demand Norwegian aid programmes.

Norway's oil industry began some 40 years ago and the analysis shows that it did not have a particularly well-organized environmental policy to begin with, this including spills, pollution, and issues of corruption related to oil companies 'pushing' consultants to change their results. Norway has, however, had time to learn from its mistakes and is described as having a good system of environmental management in place today. The discourses describe Norway's desire to pass these lessons on to others through OfD. It is argued, though, that there is no single Norwegian experience and that Norway's apparent success is due to a number of variables. The country's position prior to extraction, as a highly developed, technologically advanced and honest bureaucracy with a strong democratic state are given as reasons by Karl (2007). It is also argued that conflicts between oil actors and society, and society's determination to secure its own power and position in relation to the big companies, had a major role to play (Ryggvik, 2010 in Logan and McNeish, 2012 p.4). The power of the trade unions and the moderate rate of production in the early years are also given as variables which shaped Norway's oil story, this revealing a more dynamic political picture than is often suggested. In general, Norway's 'golden standard' was far more complex and more conflict-filled than often portrayed through the various discourses about the industry, including the NDD.

Even today, there remain environmental conflicts in Norway over oil exploration in the Barents Sea. There are debates as to whether the country should continue its 'oil dream', despite the PPD suggesting that the fishing and oil sectors can be successfully combined, with pollution from the oil industry being largely a thing of the past in the country. It is exactly conflicts of interest between fisheries and oil in the North of Norway which is the focus of this debate, however, and, in addition, wider discussions over a transition from oil to renewable energy, which should arguably be the general focus of development aid programmes (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013,

Maass, 2010). Yet communication between these sectors was described as ‘missing’ from OfD’s programme in Ghana.

The analysis shows that the OfD programme is directly based on Norway’s experiences from its oil sector, but whether these are based on the ‘golden standard’ discourse or on the alternative discourse, which describes a more complex version of Norway’s oil history, may be discussed. The former portrays a fault-free Norwegian model ready for export, while the latter includes a multi-level historical and geographical analysis of Norway’s situation today, including a more dynamic social and political picture.

5.1.2 Global oil policies

On a global scale, OfD follows the internationally accepted strategies contained within ‘good governance’, which includes buzzwords such as ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’. These concepts are supported and promoted by a great number of international organizations such as the World Bank, PWYP and EITI. They may be seen as contributing factors both for oil policy in Norway today and in OfD’s policies with its collaborating countries. They have their roots in resource curse theory, very much based on economic and political principles at the macro level of governance. Sande Lie (2011) describes the strategies used by aid organizations today as ‘new aid architecture’, and I argue that OfD may be generalized into this category. The concept suggests the use of a rhetorical participatory approach, although in practice the agencies hold a degree of control, which has been observed throughout the empirical findings.

Both the NDD and PPD suggested a ‘participatory’ process in their work with Ghana. Expressions such as ‘playing ball’ were used to illustrate this. The analysis shows that needs-assessments were the starting block for the environmental pillar in Ghana, suggesting a participatory decision-making process. The Ghanaian environmental authorities did not know what help to ask for, however, so it was deemed necessary that the Norwegian side took more control over decision-making, in terms of what strategies were necessary. Although ‘participation’ through such meetings and workshops was described, one may also apply the concept of ‘environmentality’ here, in which local officials learn that in order to speak with expertise on development and

planning issues they must adopt the neoliberal eco-rationalities and technologies presented to them through these meetings (Goldman, 2001). It could be argued then, that the Norwegian model, based on global principles in extractive industries, is projected into Ghana's development of its oil sector, to a large extent using a top-down approach, although the NDD and PPD's rhetoric describe otherwise.

5.1.3 Norway's motives for its aid programmes

Norway's motives for OfD and other aid programmes are often contested, as shown in Chapters 2 and 4. Tvedt (2009) describes Norway as having a national 'do-gooder's regime' which is flawed from the start. Logan and McNeish (2012) strongly criticize Norway's investments and dealings abroad and suggest that OfD's motives and actions are therefore also questionable. The informant from Norad, who has a background from the Norwegian oil industry, the Norwegian embassy in Ghana, and now works for OfD, admitted that the embassy, 'wears two hats', one to administer aid and the other to promote Norwegian economic interests. The view that there was any conflict of interest related to this was silenced in the informant's discourse. Another of OfD's employees reported that he was 'tired' of denying these conflict of interest claims.

It is argued that OfD is probably one of the most important tools the Norwegian government possesses to aid the reputation of its own oil industry, this in particular after a Statoil corruption scandal in Iran in 2003 (Ihlen, 2007 in Solli, 2011). Statoil has also been involved in further 'scandals' since 2003, both nationally, such as their refusal to pay a fine after a seven year leak in the Veslefrikk field in the North Sea, and internationally, such as its controversial tar sand industry in Canada. Ihlen argues that the Norwegian oil industry badly needs support of the view that their companies and aid programmes 'do good' abroad, in order to expand internationally. Norwegian aid being established in Ghana after the country's oil discovery may be seen in relation to this argument.

Although I did not personally gain any insight as to specific conflicts of interest through my research, there are certain aspects of the discourses that are noteworthy. The NDD very much promoted the view of Norway's popularity, which relates to Ihlen's argument, perhaps in an attempt to make this discourse hegemonic. This was

seen in phrases such as, ‘everyone speaks very warmly about Norway’, and other descriptions of OfD’s ‘popularity’ due to Norway’s own ‘successes’. It was also exclusively positive in its description of Norwegian investments in the mining industry in Ghana. The fact that Statoil had at one point bought a share of a license in the Jubilee Field was also silenced. Neither was there any mention of conflicts of interest in the PPD. This may then be described as framing in both discourses.

5.1.4 Resulting environmental policies

Based on these factors then, the environmental programme in Ghana includes a main focus on environmental governance, through capacity building and developing of legislation at MESTI in particular, and also the EPA Ghana. Capacity building is aimed at strengthening these institutions and appointing responsibility so that they have the ability to enforce legislation. The system of environmental management suggested is based on the polluter pays principle, as in the Norwegian model. Focus on civil society was described as being covered by other groups (including the World Bank) so this aspect of ‘good governance’ is supported in economic terms only. Specific participatory strategies such as needs assessments, twinning, development of the SEA and the Nansen research cruises, were chosen as being the most relevant for OfD financed collaboration in Ghana. The extent to which these policies are relevant and place-specific will now be discussed.

5.2 Place-specificity in OfD’s environmental policies

New aid architecture discourses, such as the NDD, describe a participatory approach which includes civil society and local knowledge, and that is ‘tailor-made to suit domestic needs’. Examining Ghana’s starting-point at the time of collaboration with OfD provides a basis for this investigation. The decision-making processes that led to OfD’s strategies is also, however, coloured by the power relations and motives underlying the programme, as defined in the previous section.

5.2.1 OfD’s starting-point in Ghana

According to the resource curse discourse, Ghana’s starting-point in terms of its governance and the strength of its institutions is deemed as influencing the outcome of its oil experience. Both discourses agreed that these were not in place but that the country had a better chance of succeeding than other African countries that OfD was

involved in. Corruption was said to exist ‘everywhere’, without specific examples being given in the interviews. This strengthens the argument of the need for strong institutions that monitor and regulate the oil companies’ activities, based on the polluter pays principle, and this is a main focus in OfD’s Ghana collaboration.

In the analysis, Ghana was described as a relatively democratic African country with many natural resources, a developed institutional structure and a ‘curious and willing population’, a high percentage with a basic education. Fishing is one of the country’s main sources of income and livelihoods in coastal regions, not dissimilar to Norway prior to oil extraction. The majority of fisheries are small-scale and highly vulnerable to environmental change. In addition to fishing, mining, and in particular gold mining, was and remains an important industry, although the socio-economic benefits of this are debated. This varied economy is deemed beneficial in avoiding economic distortions associated with a resource curse.

Although the NDD spoke positively of Norwegian investments in mining, the PPD spoke less positively of the industry, but blamed environmental damage largely on illegal mining. Some studies seem to support the view that mining companies are committing more to CSR (Obeng-Odoom, 2014), in line with the discourses given in the NDD. Others conclude that gold has done more harm than good in general, with environmental and social costs highlighted (Taabazuing et al, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 2014). A main reason given for the mining sector not leading to economic development and better social welfare is institutional weakness. There is also a lack of incentives to improve institutional performance and governance of the sector (Ayee et al., 2011). The extent to which Ghana’s experiences from the mining industry will be duplicated in its oil industry are questionable. In general, the dynamics of gold are different from oil so that even similar processes may generate different political, ecological and socio-economic outcomes (Obeng-Odoom, 2014).

In environmental management, particularly the EPA Ghana was described in the analysis as a ‘rare strength’ compared to many other lesser-developed countries. MESTI was described as ‘relatively weak’. The ‘high standing’ of the EPA appears to be something that has created conflicts in OfD’s work, as they apparently ‘refused to listen to Norway’s advice’ regarding the sharing of responsibilities between the

private and public sectors, and what Ghana wanted of equipment and services. This attitude on the part of the EPA led to OfD's financial aid for the carrying out of analyses being withheld by the embassy as a direct consequence of their behaviour, a form of Foucauldian 'power' and 'discipline'. The 'strength' of the EPA could then be described as backfiring somewhat, since they are 'free to ignore advice', yet at the same time bound by 'conditions', as described in the concept of developmentality. This whole issue was omitted in the NDD, with the will of the EPA being silenced. Institutions may be hard to change due to their long history, social cohesion or political and economic interests (Stevens & Dietche, 2008 in Solli, 2011) and perhaps the EPA was unwilling to be changed to the degree that OfD suggested, in part, due to these factors.

Communication within the institutions was also described as being poor in the PPD, with well-educated elite receiving most of the 'capacity building' schemes aimed at the institutions, whilst the workers lower down in the system were left behind. Possible reasons for this lack of communication may be found in Ghana's political history and social structure, such as the lack of trained staff due to the economic decline of the 1970s (Whitfield, 2010).

The extent to which OfD has considered these unique Ghanaian factors in its policies, from the time they entered the agreement in 2008 until the present date, will now be discussed. Both discourses claim that they use 'adjustments' to their Norwegian experience, making their policies place-specific and relevant.

5.2.2 Place-specific OfD strategies in Ghana

Some of the specific strategies used by OfD appear to be relevant, efficient and helpful in strengthening Ghana's environmental management of its oil industry. The WRSDF land-use planning scheme is place-specific, inclusive and thorough. The routing of pipelines, road building, and the 'opening' of land for development can cause social and environmental impacts (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013), and the management of this development is therefore of high importance. Needs-assessment projects, and capacity building and 'twinning' between the institutions were deemed 'important' and 'helpful' processes, as the staff learned some of the challenges and complexities of the oil industry based on Norway's experiences.

The SEA of the oil and gas industry is thorough, although currently, the ‘capacity’ for its implementation is arguably not sufficient. Norad’s evaluation report suggests that OfD’s focus on SEAs is very positive, since the oil companies’ EIAs may have a more distorted focus (Norad, 2012a). The SEA may then be seen as forming a starting-point for a ‘national plan’, which was deemed necessary if Ghana is to follow the Norwegian model of the polluter pays principle.

The Nansen ship has provided important place-specific environmental data through its research cruises, an absolute necessity in environmental management. Unfortunately, analysis of the latest samples remains absent due to disagreements between the two countries. If they are carried out, however, this will provide vital information as to chemical and biological changes related to oil production.

5.3 Criticisms and omissions

5.3.1 Capacity building and environmental governance

I suggest that issues relating to environmental management often fall outside the standard, internationally accepted strategies used to avoid a resource curse, based on the concept of good governance. The PPD also agreed with this, describing environmental policy as being ‘peripheral’ in resource curse theory. ‘Environmental governance’ is included in OfD’s concept of ‘good governance’, along with terms such as ‘sustainability’, but these lack the inclusion of the complexity of environmental management, as described in the concept of political ecology.

With OfD being very much based on resource curse theory, it is possible to question where the research foundation and decision-making basis for its environmental policies come from. The focus of the programme is largely on capacity building, and I also question to what extent environmental concerns may be addressed within this strategy. One area which was highlighted through the interviews was that the training projects, or capacity building, was largely aimed at the top layer of elite and there seemed to be little ‘trickle-down’ of this knowledge and expertise to those working more ‘on the ground’. Both the NDD and PPD deemed their own work with capacity

building ‘useful’ and ‘helpful’ at the levels they had worked at, this based partly on feedback from their Ghanaian ‘partners’. There was agreement that capacity building at different levels was both the most important and perhaps the most difficult tool that they had.

According to the evaluation of OfD’s environmental pillar in Ghana, current regulations were inadequate at an institutional level with clear laws, policies and regulations not being in place. It does state that the public sector bodies are in place, however, with a relatively strong administration and good co-ordination with Klif (now NEA). In general, the report deems that capacity building has not been sufficient in helping to develop adequate regulations, but that the collaboration with Klif in particular has helped to strengthen the capacity of the EPA and MESTI to some degree.

5.3.2 Oil company communication and responsibility

Norad’s evaluation of OfD also highlighted specific areas in environmental management that the programme does not systematically deal with. This included risk sharing and recourse for pollution damage under potential emergency situations, and hazardous wastes from drilling fluids and mud, which in some cases were not mentioned in agreements at all, at other times without definition (Norad, 2012a). The report suggests the ‘need for much tougher implementation’ including precise formulation on responsibilities and rules for costing, this through supplementary environmental regulation to petroleum laws and review of the oil companies’ Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) (p.68). Oil companies may use PSA’s to seek recourse for pollution costs, and some are directly contradictory to environmental regulations that are in place. The report suggests greater transparency in this area, according to EITI’s principles.

The fact that many of those interviewed did not know the content of contracts and agreements between the oil companies and authorities was therefore surprising in this respect. The informant from Norad stated that he did not know the details of these contracts, but that it was ‘relatively tidy’ in Ghana. Others had read parts of contingency plans and were extremely negative to the obvious omissions with regards to responsibility in the case of pollution. The relationship was described as ‘difficult’

and ‘an unresolved potential’, and the lack of communication highlighted as being an important omission in OfD’s work. I was told that OfD indirectly worked with the oil companies through their capacity building and needs assessments with the EPA and ministries, but, at the same time, that the flow of information was poor due to various internal power struggles between the elite and other workers. The authorities were also described as having a ‘cautious attitude’ towards the oil companies. The concept of oil enclaves, or a ‘state within a state’ may be applied here, with the companies having their own rules and systems of governance. This may be intimidating to the Ghanaian authorities which do not have experience in dealing with them.

The reason for OfD not dealing directly with this issue was suggested in Norad’s evaluation report: that OfD has allegedly avoided contact with the oil companies involved in Ghana so as ‘not to be accused of a conflict of interest with regard to Norway’s own private sector actors.’ If it is correct that the authorities have a ‘cautious attitude’ towards dealings with the oil companies and that the EPA ignored advice given by IMR regarding omissions in the contingency plan, then there is perhaps little OfD can do through capacity building in this area. It is, nevertheless, the area that may have the most impact on livelihoods and ecosystems with regards to the responsibilities and costs of spills and other forms of pollution.

The analysis has shown that in the case of oil pollution and spills, Ghana does not seem to have a sufficient national contingency plan that covers both inhabitants and ecosystems, with ‘who should be doing what’ remaining somewhat open to interpretation. Although the EPA is supposed to be playing a leading role in the environmental regulation of the oil industry, the Ghana Maritime Authority (GMA) has the official responsibility of controlling marine pollution, but with a lesser remit than the EPA (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The GMA was not mentioned by any of my informants. Obeng-Odoom (2014) suggests that in the face of such institutional weaknesses, the state tends to depend on the goodwill of the oil companies to self-regulate. The PPD suggested that it is the enforcement of a national plan, which ensures that the oil companies are carrying out their appointed responsibilities, that is most important and currently insufficient. This work had apparently been hindered by the EPA’s ‘attitude’, which preferred a different emphasis, namely to have more control of monitoring responsibilities themselves.

5.3.3 MESTI and the EPA Ghana

Although the NDD described their main focus as being on MESTI, there was very little information in the analysis about this institution. The vast focus of the narratives was on the EPA. Local discourses have less faith in the EPA's strength than described in the NDD and PPD. In a study, most of those interviewed in an oil community did not believe that the EPA has the necessary capacity to execute its responsibilities (Egyir, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 2014) and the EPA is described as being poorly resourced and lacking in key instruments to put their plans into effect (Taabazuing et al, 2012 in Obeng-Odoom, 2014). The PPD suggested that although much of the 'paperwork' was in place, the authorities lacked the capacity to carry out and enforce their plans and regulations. In this respect, more capacity building, but at practical levels of enforcement, could be emphasized in OfD's programme.

A coral reef was mentioned, that the EPA seemed very eager to protect after it was first discovered on a research cruise by the Nansen ship, although it was a fair distance away from the nearest rig. It was suggested that the EPA almost needed to have a 'specific thing', such as a coral reef, to protect because they did not seem to fathom the extent of their responsibility and work. Perhaps it is too early on in the process for there to be enough visible changes, making the risk potential seem somewhat smaller to them. OfD can perhaps do little to change their attitude in this respect. The issue of dead whales being washed ashore was, however, quickly dismissed by the EPA as not possibly having anything to do with oil, although studies on the impact of seismic exploration suggest otherwise (e.g. Patin, 1999, Compton et al., 2007).

5.3.4 Communication between sectors

It was highlighted in the PPD that other institutions, such as those related to fisheries, and other more local stakeholders, such as the traditional chiefs and environmental NGO's, should be more involved in the decision-making process and the sharing of expertise and skills. Also communication between the oil sector and other industries, including mining and fishing, was said to be lacking in OfD's programme. The lack of policies aimed at co-operation between the oil and fishing industries is surprising given Ghana's geographical position and the social, cultural and economic importance of the fishing industry in particular. The location of the oil fields is offshore,

potentially impacting fish stocks and coastal areas. Although this co-operation is suggested in the SEA, it does not seem to have been implemented in any way through OfD, other than the actors from IMR ‘bringing together the different sectors on the Nansen boat’, a co-operation that they admitted was unlikely to continue ‘after they had left’. Norway’s success in combining these sectors has therefore not been transferred to aid in Ghana’s needs.

5.3.5 Civil society

The secrecy of transactions and contracts between the public and private sectors is the area of resource curse theory that is perhaps the most relevant in environmental management, and also the area that I feel is most lacking in OfD’s programme. So long as they do not take part in the private sector’s dealings, they can only encourage the authorities to practise transparency. With Norwegian commercial interests involved, this ‘encouragement’ may even be lessened. If certain aspects of the resource curse’s rent-seeking behaviour are already occurring, accountability will become increasingly less attractive for the elite to practise without a great deal of pressure from, for example, civil society groups. As previously discussed, pressure from civil society in Norway’s own oil industry was given as a main factor for its relative success.

OfD does support civil society groups to some extent. Norad’s evaluation states that although the programme supports such groups financially through separate funding sources, it does not directly support them, this being an area of potential. Throughout the research, I often found it somewhat confusing when trying to establish which projects and funding came from OfD and which came from separate sources. There seemed to be a lack of co-ordination here and some contradictions, an area which has also been criticized in the evaluation report. More direct contact with civil society groups could be beneficial for OfD’s future decision-making processes in Ghana, as a source of local feedback on actual areas with an unresolved potential. Funding alone has a limited impact, whilst creating arenas for stakeholders to meet may have a much greater one on Ghana’s environmental management as a whole.

5.3.6 Environmental research

I would argue that more specific environmental strategies using current research on the environmental management of the oil industry are needed in order to provide a

more complete picture of risk-assessment and pollution reduction. Patin (1999), for example, has provided an extensive study of the environmental effects of the oil industry throughout the different stages of development. There also exists a wealth of information on risk-assessment techniques with regard to oil production which could be incorporated (e.g. Salter and Ford, 2001, Patin, 1999).

Although the Nansen ship has carried out tests of the sea-floor and water column, none of the informants could describe environmental mapping done along the coastline in relation to oil production. According to Obeng-Odoom (2014), the EPA Ghana has not carried out risk assessments for farmers and fishermen or the environment in the Western Region, but claims that ‘Ghana’s offshore petroleum industry has had no significant effects on the marine and coastal environment for now due to minimal activity’ (EPA Ghana, quoted in Obeng-Odoom, 2014 p.270). In an OfD evaluation report from the summer of 2014, a monitoring survey of the coastline had reportedly been completed, suggesting that this omission was very recently included in the programme (Scanteam, 2014). I would, all the same, suggest more focus in general on environmental research and risk assessment, using geographical methods such as GIS to map-out potentially fragile areas. This approach to environmental management is more qualitative, which, according to Patin (1999), allows a differentiation of impact factors and provides a relative assessment of the possible consequences of these. As described in the analysis, the environmental and social costs of coastal pollution could be substantial, and risk assessments and systems of compensation are therefore vital.

I would also suggest more focus on the environmental impacts that have already occurred, tracing them back to their sources. This was an aspect that was entirely silenced in the NDD and to some extent the PPD. The EPA has also disregarded reported environmental changes, denying their connection to the oil industry. Yet Kosmos Energy has apparently spilled 706 barrels of toxic substances into the sea, causing severe environmental damage, which it was fined for after an investigation (Obeng-Odoom, 2014). Environmental narratives describe less fish catch, an increasing number of dead whales being washed ashore, health issues due to gas flaring, and conflicts between fishermen and the oil industry, mainly due to exclusion zones. Articles published by Ghanaian scientists, who had been on the Nansen

research cruise, also report pollution on the sea-floor, probably as a result of exploration, but these results were not mentioned in the NDD or PPD. As Neumann (2005) argues, although actors agree on the central facts and events, they come to very different conclusions about causes and effects. With the exception of the Nansen research boat, OfD does not deal directly with any of these issues of environmental change, and to some extent appears to dismiss their existence, or at least their importance, with the EPA apparently following suit.

5.4 The discourses surrounding OfD's environmental management

The two main discourses that were identified in the empirical analysis were the NDD and the PPD. From the research, two other discourses also emerged, the environmentalist discourse and the CSR discourse. I also described a local discourse regarding the capacity of the EPA.

I have argued that the NDD may be generalised into the 'new aid architecture' concept. The NDD suggests a participatory approach without conditionality, yet it is more rigid in its approach to development than its rhetoric often suggests, defending OfD's main focus at the macro-level with phrases such as 'after all, that's where policy-making occurs.' It uses international consensus to imply that there is only one approach to development of an oil sector (Solli, 2011), and although the discourse suggests 'adaptions' of this approach, the analysis shows that examples of these adaptions in policy have been too few. I also argue that the NDD may be said to use developmentality, as I have shown throughout the analysis. This silences other development and environmental discourses, and therefore the 'freedom' used in OfD's rhetoric is framed by their objectives and standards and their will to make their policies and practices hegemonic (Sande Lie, 2011).

In many ways, the PPD may also be categorised in the same way, and I have shown that in the concept of environmentality, the role of professionals is firmly integrated in the 'grand development scheme' of aid organisations, also with the aim of hegemony. I would, however, underline a distinction here on several issues. Firstly, in the case of OfD's lack of communication with the operating oil companies, where actors using this discourse described the seriousness of this omission in OfD's

programme, in contrast to the NDD, which framed the issue. Within the PPD, I would also highlight subtle differences between the actors' responses on certain issues. In general, the discourse seemed reflective on aspects that were lacking in the programme and its shortcomings, such as a more inclusive approach at different levels and better forms of communication between different actors at different scales, this agreeing with newer research. All the same, some of the actors' framing of Ghana's environmental impact so far is noteworthy.

Some assumed the scientific superiority of Norway in a manner more similar to the NDD. This may, in part, be due to these experts having little confidence in the skills, experience and knowledge of 'ordinary people' (Scott, 1998), since the Ghanaian environmental discourse was so readily dismissed. It may also be seen as an attempt to make OfD's discourse hegemonic through the role of experts framing local discourses, in accordance with environmentality. This issue may be seen in relation to the suggestions of Robbins (2006): that we examine firstly if oil pollution has occurred in Ghana's Western Region, and continue by analysing who carried out the research, how the pollution is categorized and by whom, who the research is being financed by, and who may gain from its results being positive or negative.

In the categorizing of pollution due to oil-related practices, the PPD implied that the results were 'nothing to worry about' and that other activities damaging the environment in Ghana should receive more focus than the oil industry. Ghanaian scientists disagreed and considered the oil-related changes to be significant and worth public attention. The environmental discourse used by local groups and individuals describes concrete changes in their communities' environment and demands answers as to why these changes are occurring. It may be questioned why this environmental discourse is dismissed as being uninformed without further investigation. Local knowledge could be described as being framed and/or underestimated in both discourses in this respect. This is in accordance with the concepts of developmentality and environmentality, where the donor attempts to bring the will of individuals in line with their own will.

OfD is financing the environmental research at this stage, and may potentially gain from its results. This would imply 'hidden alliances' (Robbins, 2006), returning the

discussion to Norway's motives behind the programme and conflicts of interest. The oil companies' responsibility for the funding of environmental monitoring versus the EPA's monitoring, and the lack of national regulations overseeing this process, is also an important issue here. Until this division of roles and responsibilities is settled, unmonitored and unregulated oil pollution may occur in various forms and quantities.

The discourses regarding conflicts between OfD and the EPA over this matter were quite distinct. The fact that the EPA had refused their advice, both in the passing of contingency plans and on the responsibility of the oil companies in management, was described in a heated manner by the PPD, with talk of 'punishment' for their actions. Their freedom to reject had consequences. The NDD silenced the issue entirely. With the EPA also denying any environmental impact of oil so far, it may be questioned to what extent actors from this institution may also be framing environmental issues. This could be due to OfD's influence on them, or that the NDD may be described as hegemonic in line with 'environmentality', or perhaps due to other motives. The EPA was described as being 'relatively strong', yet a local discourse shows that local groups have little faith in it. There may also be some form of alliance in this matter. Perhaps it is merely the position of a Norwegian university graduate in the EPA that portrays this 'glossy image' of it to the Norwegian actors in OfD.

Another aspect of the research suggesting the hegemonic nature of the NDD is the overwhelmingly positive response to questions regarding the nature of the OfD programme in Norad's evaluation report. Despite the variety and large number of informants from both countries, there was open support for the exportation of Norwegian experiences through OfD, which was described as free and without conditionality, since receivers were free to reject advice. The extent of this hegemony will perhaps vary through time and experience.

5.5 The political ecology of OfD's environmental management in

Ghana

This study has used a political ecology approach to examining OfD's influence on Ghana's environmental management and the use of this perspective in the research has revealed some of the complexities involved in this process. It has looked at an

environmental issue which concerns human impact on a natural ecosystem, related to oil production, and has tried to understand it in relation to the political and economic structures and institutions in which this impact is embedded, this in accordance with Neumann's (2005) definition of political ecology. According to Adger et al. (2001) political ecology is the analysis of multi-level connections between global and local phenomena in environmental issues as well as decision-making and hierarchies of power. The study has looked at multi-level connections in OfD's programme, for example whether civil society is being included throughout the programme's planning and implementation stages, and how national and international policies influence each other on a more global scale.

The decision-making process has been widely discussed throughout the discourses, for example, how the Norwegian experience provides a 'blueprint' which may be used as it is, adapted or rejected, all of which we have seen examples of here, and to what extent different actors are being involved in the process. Hidden motives, which may have influenced the choice of policies, have also been examined, this also relating to the concept of environmentality, regarding power relations and hegemonic discourses. Hierarchies of power have been analysed, from those of Ghanaian fishermen, hierarchies between workers and elite in various institutions, the NDD's attitude towards the importance of their own work, and global oil policies steering OfD's programme. The study has also used Robbin's (2006) ideas on post-colonial environmental research in the categorisation of pollution and who stands to gain from the results of the research. Political ecology's emphasis on the necessity of a 'bottom-up' approach to environmental management has been used throughout the study in order to analyse the place-specificity of the programme.

A political ecology perspective, using discourse analysis, has therefore been useful in revealing and analysing specific factors which other more macro-level approaches to research may have overlooked. An example is the constant contextualisation of data including the analysis of categories that data is placed in by different actors. These subtleties of analysis may be seen, for example, through the manner in which the words 'assist' and 'help' were used by different actors involved in the OfD programme. The interpretation of the context in which they were used placed the discourses describing the OfD collaboration in different categories. Also, the

categories in which different actors placed the environmental impact of oil, revealed the political nature of the programme, this being of great importance in environmental research of this type. Analysis of the actors' roles and statuses was also an important tool in the study.

Based on the analysis, and according to the principles of political ecology, I would suggest that OfD's programme as a whole and particularly the environmental pillar, is not following newer research within the field of resource extraction, and that its predominantly macro-level focus will therefore not have the influence on Ghana's environmental management that is required for its oil industry. I would suggest more focus on scientific research of Ghana's coastline, more risk assessments on ecosystems and livelihoods and more specific geographical information on the risk areas. This, in addition to the inclusion of local knowledge in decision-making, would provide a more complete environmental management package. OfD could carry out capacity building within these specific focus areas, involving a wider spectrum of authorities, scientists and local participants. I would also suggest more focus on and input in the environmental impacts that have already occurred and that may be linked to the industry. This relates to accountability, a buzzword in OfD, yet little effort seems to have been made to penetrate the oil enclaves and demand answers, due to 'cautious attitudes' and 'avoiding accusations of conflicts of interest'.

Civil society in Ghana has posed reasonable questions regarding what they perceive as changes to their environment, which have yet to be answered by the authorities, despite scientific research existing on some of these changes. This very much illustrates the importance of considering the political embeddedness of environmental research and management. One aspect of research cannot exist without the other, as is the main theme of political ecology. Perhaps this pressure from NGO's and other actors will eventually lead environmental management in a more inclusive and accountable direction, as was arguably the case in Norway.

6. CONCLUSION

The OfD programme's environmental pillar is largely based on capacity building at a national level of governance, whilst newer literature on resource management and environmental management suggests more place-specific and dynamic approaches. This analysis has shown the need for capacity building at lower levels of the labour force, since the trickle-down effect of knowledge transfer has not had the intended effect, in part due to Ghana's social and cultural history, which may have been overlooked in the programme's policy-making. At the level of elite within their institutions, where much of the collaboration has occurred, needs-assessments, policy-making and capacity building have, arguably, given positive results and lead to the strengthening of Ghana's environmental management structure at the macro-level. According to the resource curse hypothesis, this is an important achievement, which will benefit oil governance and may therefore reduce the negative environmental impact associated with a resource curse.

Some of the specific strategies under OfD's environmental pillar are both place-specific and dynamic, such as the WRSDF and Nansen research cruises, both of which use geographical techniques in their research, mapping and planning. The impact of these schemes may be beneficial to Ghana's environmental management of oil, although the political embeddedness of scientific research and the framing of its results must be considered in the resultant policy-making.

Omissions from the programme include co-operation with the operating oil companies in order to oversee the content of contracts regarding contingency plans, monitoring and responsibilities. The clarity of roles in the case of pollution and spills is unclear. Some of the procedures based on the Norwegian oil-model and the polluter pays principle, which OfD strongly suggests that Ghana should adopt, appear almost voluntary for the oil companies to follow through the lack of a sufficient national plan. Yet OfD avoids contact with the private sector in order to avoid accusations of conflicts of interest, therefore having limited impact in this important area through institutional capacity building. The EPA's views of their roles and responsibilities have at times been in conflict with the advise of OfD, leading to consequences such as

the withholding of funding. Communication between sectors with overlapping interests, such as the fisheries sector, is also poor, yet this has not been an area that OfD has focused on, according to the analysis.

The OfD programme uses aspects of environmentality in its collaboration with Ghana, with its content to a large degree being defined by the Norwegian actors involved with the programme, due to their expertise and experience, and based on the programme's political embeddedness. Framing of the nature of the collaboration, and of environmental issues related to oil production, has been revealed in the discourses. The hegemonic nature of the NDD has also been illustrated through the framing of these issues, bringing the will of the receivers of aid in line with that of the donor's. Although the NDD describes a participatory approach in its rhetoric, this analysis has shown that this has not always been the case and that being free to reject aspects of the programme leads to a form of disciplinary response, or conditionality. This is in accordance with developmentality.

A political ecology approach to the research has been a useful tool in revealing and analysing the challenges OfD faces in its collaboration with Ghana. It has been used to examine the political embeddedness of environmental management and research, including the role of scientific research, power relationships and decision-making processes. The perspective requires focus on the unique and place-specific factors that influence environmental policy and practice, and, using discourse analysis, subtleties in the texts were revealed relating to these factors which other macro-level approaches may have overlooked. The importance of these issues in the OfD programme's policies and practices has been illustrated throughout the analysis, and I would therefore conclude that political ecology is highly suited to studies of this nature.

Based on this perspective, and in order to include a more complete environmental management package, I would suggest more focus on specific geographical research and risk assessments on coastal ecosystems, including the livelihoods of those reliant upon them. The analysis has shown a knowledge gap in this area, despite a new report describing some increased focus on this area of research. The report, however, does appear to indicate a more positive turn in the collaboration in recent months through

the inclusion of more Ghana-specific strategies, as this analysis has prescribed. Accountability to local groups and civil society is also largely absent in the collaboration with Ghana in any form other than financial aid, despite it being included in OfD's 'good governance' definition, and the analysis shows that claims of changes to the local environment have been framed by both OfD and its partners at the EPA. Such accountability to civil society was a factor in Norway's own apparent avoidance of a resource curse, and should therefore not be dismissed in Ghana's attempt at following the 'golden standard'.

LIST OF REFERENCES

- ACKAH-BAIDOO, A. 2013. Fishing in troubled waters: oil production, seaweed and community-level grievances in the Western Region of Ghana. *Community Development Journal*, 48, 406-420.
- ADGER, W., BENJAMINSEN, T., BROWN, K. & SVARSTAD, H. 2001. Advancing a Political Ecology of Global Environmental Discourses. *Development and Change*, 32, 681-715.
- AFTENPOSTEN. 2013. *Oljefondets etikk er svekket* [Online]. <http://www.aftenposten.no>. Available: <http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikker/Oljefondets-etikk-er-svekket-7367181.html> - .U84-GsbgBoQ [Accessed 22 July 2014].
- AGRAWAL, A. 2005. *Environmentality: Technologies of government and the making of subjects* Durham, Duke University Press.
- AITKEN, S. & VALENTINE, G. 2006. *Approaches to Human Geography*, London, Sage Publications.
- AYEE, J., SØREIDE, T., SHUKLA, G. & MINH LE, T. 2011. Political Economy of the Mining Sector in Ghana. The World Bank.
- AYUBA, K. 2012. *A review of oil exploration and spillage. Its environmental impact in the Niger Delta of Nigeria*, Saarbrücken, Lambert Academic Publishing.
- BADGLEY, C. 2011. *Fishing and the offshore oil industry: A delicate imbalance* [Online]. The Center for Public Integrity. Available: <http://www.publicintegrity.org/2011/06/10/4859/fishing-and-offshore-oil-industry-delicate-imbalance> [Accessed 20 May 2014].
- BADGLEY, C. 2012. *West Africa oil boom overlooks tattered environmental safety net* [Online]. The Center for Public Integrity. Available: <http://www.iwatchnews.org/2012/01/19/7896/west-africa-oil-boom-overlooks-tattered-environmental-safety-net> [Accessed 20 May 2012].
- BAXTER, J. 2010. Case Studies in Qualitative Research. In: HAY, I. (ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. Ontario: Oxford University Press.
- BRIDGE, G. & LE BILLON, P. 2013. *Oil*, Cambridge, Polity Press.
- BRIDGE, G. & PERREAULT, T. 2009. Environmental Governance. In: CASTREE, N., DEMERITT, D., LIVERMAN, D. & RHOADS, B. (eds.) *A Companion to Environmental Geography*. Oxford: Wiley- Blackwell.
- BRYANT, R. 1998. Power, knowledge and political ecology in the third world: a review. *Progress in Physical Geography*, 22, 79-94.
- BØRRESEN, J. 1993. *Olje på havet*, Oslo, Ad Notam Gyldendal.
- BØÅS, M. & MCNEILL, D. 2004. Power and ideas in multilateral institutions: towards an interpretive framework. In: BØÅS, M. & MCNEILL, D. (eds.) *Global Institutions and Development: Framing the World?* London: Routledge.
- CLIFFORD, N., FRENCH, S. & VALENTINE, G. 2010. *Key Methods in Geography*, London, Sage Publications
- COLLIER, P. 2010. *The Plundered Planet*, London, Penguin Books.
- COMPTON, R., GOODWIN, L., HANDY, R. & ABBOTT, V. 2007. A critical examination of worldwide guidelines for minimising the disturbance to marine mammals during seismic surveys. *Marine Policy*, 32, 255-262.
- COPE, M. 2010. Coding Qualitative Data. In: HAY, I. (ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. Ontario: Oxford University Press.

- CRC-URI 2010. Hen Mpoano. Our Coast, Our Future. Western Region of Ghana. Narragansett: Coastal Resources Center - University of Rhode Island.
- DITTMER, J. 2010. Textual and Discourse Analysis. In: DELYSER, D., HERBERT, S., AITKEN, S., CRANG, M. & MCDOWELL, L. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Geography*. London: Sage Publications.
- DOGBEVI, E. 2011. *More oil spills to be expected on Ghana's coasts* [Online]. <http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com>. Available: <http://www.ghanabusinessnews.com/2011/11/05/more-oil-spills-to-be-expected-on-ghanas-coasts-report/> [Accessed 14 May 2012].
- DOWLING, R. 2010. Power, Subjectivity and Ethics in Qualitative Research. In: HAY, I. (ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. Ontario: Oxford University Press.
- DYPEDOKK, K. 2012. *Landprofil 2010-2011: Ghana* [Online]. Fellesrådet for Afrika. Available: <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/20457.html> [Accessed 24 July 2014].
- ENERGY INTELLIGENCE GROUP. 2012. *Statoil exits Hess-operated license offshore Ghana* [Online]. <http://www.energyintel.com>. Available: <http://www.energyintel.com/pages/articlesummary/791067/statoil-exits-hess-operated-license-offshore-ghana> [Accessed 21 November 2013].
- ENGLAND, K. 2006. Producing feminist geographies: Theory, methodologies and research strategies. In: AITKEN, S. & VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Approaches to Human Geography*. London: Sage Publications.
- ESPELUND, G. 2010. *Ghana vil unngå oljens forbannelse* [Online]. Oslo: Norad. Available: <http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/nyheter-og-reportasjer/arkiv-nyheter-og-reportasjer/ghana-vil-unng%C3%A5-oljens-forbannelse> [Accessed 25 October 2011].
- FAIRCLOUGH, N. 2003. *Analysing Discourse. Textual analysis for social research*, Oxon, Routledge.
- FERGUSON, J. 2005. Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa. *American Anthropologist*, Vol.107, 377-382.
- FRAMTIDEN I VÅRE HENDER. 2013. *Krever mer etisk og klimavennlig oljefond* [Online]. Oslo: FIVH. Available: <http://www.framtiden.no/201301225988/aktuelt/etiske-investeringer/krever-mer-etisk-og-klimavennlig-oljefond.html> [Accessed 10 Aug 2014].
- FRIENDS OF THE NATION. 2014. *Friends of the Nation* [Online]. Available: <http://www.fonghana.org> [Accessed 19 March 2014].
- GARY, I. 2009. *Ghana's Big Test: Oil's challenge to democratic development* [Online]. Oxfam America. Available: <http://www.oxfamamerica.org/static/oa3/files/ghanas-big-test.pdf>.
- GHANA OIL AND GAS ONLINE. 2013. *Ghana sets up committee to determine cause of whales' death* [Online]. <http://www.ghanoilonline.org>. Available: <http://ghanoilonline.org/2013/12/ghana-sets-up-committee-to-determine-cause-of-whales-death-see-more-at-httpwwwghana-sets-up-committee-to-determine-cause-of-whales-death/> [Accessed 19 March 2014].
- GOBO, G. 2004. Sampling, representativeness and generalizability. In: SEALE, C., GOBO, G., GUBRIUM, J. & SILVERMAN, D. (eds.) *Qualitative Research Practice*. London: SAGE Publications.
- GOLDMAN, M. 2001. The Birth of a Discipline: Producing Authoritative Green Knowledge, World Bank-Style. *Ethnography*, 2, 191-217.

- GOLDMAN, M. 2004. Eco-governmentality and other transnational practices of a "green" World Bank. In: PEET, R. & WATTS, M. (eds.) *Liberation Ecologies: Environment, Development, and Social Movements*. New York: Routledge.
- GRINDLE, M. 2011. Good Enough Governance Revisited. *Development Policy Review*, 29, 199-211.
- HAJER, M. & VERSTEEG, W. 2005. A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievements, Challenges, Perspectives. *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 7, 175-184.
- HANSEN, K. 2007. *Olje mot utvikling* [Online]. Oslo: Aftenposten. Available: <http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/debatt/Olje-mot-utvikling-6610316.html-.T46RpdXicXV> [Accessed 16 April 2012].
- HOYOS, C. 2006. Norway's mission to save poorer nations from 'oil curse' fails to win wide praise. *Financial Times* [Online]. Available: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/7d824630-e153-11da-90ad-0000779e2340.html-axzz1nVK3rD00> [Accessed 25 Feb 2012].
- HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. 2007a. Future directions for the management of natural resources. In: HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. (eds.) *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. 2007b. What is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth? In: HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. (eds.) *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- IMR 2010. 2009 marine environmental survey of bottom sediments in Ghana. Bergen: IMR.
- KARL, T. 2007. Ensuring Fairness: The case for a transparent fiscal social contract. In: HUMPHREYS, M., SACHS, J. & STIGLITZ, J. (eds.) *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- KOLSTAD, I., WIIG, A. & WILLIAMS, A. 2009. Mission improbable: Does petroleum-related aid address the resource curse? *Energy Policy*, 37, 954-965.
- KUMAR, R., SAMPSON, A., DORATHY, E., WOKAMA, I. & ABLORH, M. 2013. Study on Environmental impact of oil and gas activities in Ghana- Analysis by graphical approaches using Matlab. *International Journal of Engineering Trends and Technology*, 4, 344-348.
- LEACH, M. & MEARNNS, R. 1996. Environmental Change and Policy. Challenging Received Wisdom in Africa. In: LEACH, M. & MEARNNS, R. (eds.) *The Lie of the Land. Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment.*: Oxford: James Currey, Portsmouth NH: Heinemann.
- LOGAN, O. & MCNEISH, J. 2012. Rethinking Responsibility and Governance in Resource Extraction. In: LOGAN, O. & MCNEISH, J. (eds.) *Flammable Societies. Studies on the Socio-economics of Oil and Gas*. London: Pluto Press.
- LONGHURST, R. 2010. Semi-structured Interviews and Focus Groups. In: CLIFFORD, N., FRENCH, S. & VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Key Methods in Geography*. London: Sage Publications.
- MACKIAN, S. 2010. The Art of Geographic Interpretation. In: DELYSER, D., HERBERT, S., AITKEN, S., CRANG, M. & MCDOWELL, L. (eds.) *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Geography*. London: Sage Publications.

- MANSVELT, J. & BERG, L. 2010. Writing Qualitative Geographies, Constructing Meaningful Geographical Knowledges. In: HAY, I. (ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. Ontario: Oxford University Press.
- MARK, M. 2014. *Ghana's plea to IMF a sad recognition of the perils of prosperity* [Online]. <http://www.theguardian.com>. Available: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/aug/08/ghana-imf-oil-inflation-currency> [Accessed 20/8 2014].
- MILNE, R. 2014. *Norway: Cruise control* [Online]. <http://www.ft.com>. Available: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/abe0f6f6-8f0c-11e3-9cb0-00144feab7de.html-axzz3B1GdR0B7> [Accessed 20/8 2014].
- MINISTRY OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE. 2013. *Fisheries* [Online]. Ghana: MOFA. Available: http://mofa.gov.gh/site/?page_id=244 [Accessed 24 July 2014].
- MULHEARN, C. & VANE, R. 1999. *Economics*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan.
- MAASS, P. 2010. *Crude world: the violent twilight of oil*, London, Penguin Books.
- NEUMANN, R. 2005. *Making Political Ecology*, London, Hodder Education.
- NORAD 2011. Oil for Development Initiative. Annual report 2010. Oslo: Norad.
- NORAD 2012a. Facing the Resource Curse: Norway's Oil for Development Program. Oslo: Norad Evaluation Department.
- NORAD 2012b. Oil for Development Programme. Annual Report 2011. Oslo: Norad.
- NORAD 2013. Oil for Development Programme. Annual report 2012. Oslo: Norad.
- NORAD. 2014. *Ghana* [Online]. <http://www.norad.no>. Available: <http://www.norad.no/no/om-bistand/landsider/afrika/ghana> [Accessed 16 July 2014].
- NUSTAD, K. 2003. *Gavens makt. Norsk utviklingshjelp som formynderskap*, Oslo, Pax Forlag AS.
- NYARKO, E., BOTWE, B., LAMPTEY, E., NUOTUO, O., FOLI, B. & SADDO, M. 2011. Toxic metal concentrations in deep-sea sediments from the Jubilee Oil Field and surrounding areas off the Western coast of Ghana. *Tropical Environmental Resources*, 9&10, 584-595.
- OBENG-ODOOM, F. 2014. Black Gold in Ghana: crude days for fishers and farmers? *Local Environment: The International Journal of Justice and Sustainability*, 19, 259-282.
- OBIRI, S. Environmental Issues Associated with Oil and Gas Production. Building capacity after a disaster: Sharing lessons from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, 2011 Accra, Ghana.
- OIL IN UGANDA. 2012. *Ghana: the environmental costs of oil* [Online]. <http://www.oilinuganda.org>. Available: <http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/environment/ghana-the-environmental-costs-of-oil.html> [Accessed 20 May 2014].
- OSTROM, E. 1998. The international forestry resources and institutions research program: a methodology for relating human incentives and actions on forest cover and biodiversity. In: DALLMEIER, F. & COMISKEY, J. (eds.) *Forest Biodiversity in North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean*. Paris: UNESCO.
- OVERÅ, R. 2011. Modernisation Narratives and Small-Scale fisheries in Ghana and Zambia. *Forum for Development Studies*, 38, 321-343.
- PATIN, S. 1999. *Environmental impact of the offshore oil and gas industry*, New York, EcoMonitor Publishing.

- PEET, R. & WATTS, M. 2004. Liberating Political Ecology. In: WATTS, M. & PEET, R. (eds.) *Liberation Ecologies. Environment, development, social movements*. London: Routledge.
- POTTER, B., BINNS, T., ELLIOTT, J. & SMITH, D. 2008. *Geographies of Development. An introduction to Development Studies*, Essex, Pearson Education Limited.
- PRS GROUP. 2012. *Ghana: Elections 2012* [Online]. <http://www.prsgroup.com>. Available: <http://www.prsgroup.com/icrg-commentary/ghana-elections-2012> [Accessed 22 July 2014].
- ROBBINS, P. 2006. Research is theft: Environmental inquiry in a postcolonial world. In: AITKEN, S. & VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Approaches to Human Geography*. London: Sage.
- ROE, E. 1991. Development Narratives, Or Making the Best of Blueprint Development. *World Development*, 19, 287-300.
- ROSSER, A. 2006. Escaping the Resource Curse. *New Political Economy*, 11, 557-570.
- SALTER, S. & FORD, J. 2001. Holistic Environmental Assessment and Offshore Oil Field Exploration and Production. *Marine Pollution Bulletin*, 42, 45-58.
- SANDE LIE, J. 2011. *Developmentality. An Ethnography of the New Aid Architecture and the Formation of the World Bank-Uganda Partnership*. PhD, University of Bergen.
- SCANTEAM 2014. Review of Norway's Support to the Petroleum Sector in Ghana. Final Report. Oslo: Scanteam.
- SCOTT, J. 1998. *Seeing Like a State. How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press.
- SEA 2013. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of the Oil and Gas Sector. Accra: MESTI, MoEP.
- SILVERMAN, D. 2003. Analysing talk and text. In: DENZIN, N. & LINCOLN, Y. (eds.) *Collecting and Interpreting Qualitative Materials*. London: Sage Publications.
- SIMENSEN, J. 1991. *Utdanning som u-hjelp. NORAD og Ghana Nautical College 1964-1980*, Oslo, Ad Notam.
- SOLLI, A. 2011. From Good Governance to Development? A Critical Perspective on the Case of Norway's Oil for Development. *Forum for Development Studies*, Vol. 38, 65-85.
- STATOIL. 2012. *Statoil in Ghana farm-in* [Online]. <http://www.statoil.com>. Available: http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2012/Pages/25Apr_Ghana.aspx [Accessed 21 November 2013].
- SÆBØ, M. 2010. *Olje eller utvikling* [Online]. <http://www.xmag.no>. Available: <http://www.xmag.no/id/1463> [Accessed 5 June 2014].
- TCPD 2009. Harmonising the use of land for sustainable growth and development. Ghana: Town and Country Planning Dep.
- THURBER, M., HULTS, D. & HELLER, P. 2011. The Limits of Institutional Design in Oil Sector Governance: Exporting the "Norwegian Model". *Energy Policy*, 39, 5366-5378.
- TULLOW OIL 2014. Tullow Oil Plc 2013, Corporate Responsibility Report. London: Tullow Oil Plc.
- TVEDT, T. 2009. *Utviklingshjelp, Utenrikspolitikk og Makt. Den norske modellen*, Oslo, Gyldendal Akademisk.

- UNITED NATIONS. 2011. *Natural Resource Aspects of Sustainable Development in Ghana* [Online]. United Nations. Available:
<http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/ghana/natur.htm> - oceans
 [Accessed 27 November 2011].
- VAN GYAMPO, R. 2011. Saving Ghana from Its Oil: A Critical Assessment of Preparations so Far Made. *Africa Today*, 57, 48-69.
- VAYDA, A. & WALTERS, B. 1999. Against Political Ecology. *Human Ecology*, 27, 167-179.
- WAITT, G. 2010. Doing Foucauldian Discourse Analysis- Revealing Social Identities. In: HAY, I. (ed.) *Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography*. Ontario: Oxford University Press.
- WARD, L. 2012. Eco-governmentality revisited: Mapping divergent subjectivities among Integrated Water Resource Management experts in Paraguay. *Geoforum*, 46, 91-102.
- WATTS, M. 2004. Antinomies of community: some thoughts on geography, resources and empire. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, Vol.29, 195-216.
- WHITFIELD, L. 2010. The State Elite, PRSPs and Policy Implementaion in Aid-dependent Ghana. *Third World Quarterly*, 31, 721-737.
- WORLD BANK. 2013a. *What is Governance?* [Online]. World Bank. Available:
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/EXTMNAREGTOPGOVERNANCE/0,,contentMDK:20513159~pagePK:34004173~piPK:34003707~theSitePK:497024,00.html> [Accessed 22 July 2014].
- WORLD BANK. 2013b. *Worldwide governance indicators* [Online]. Available:
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx> - reports [Accessed 22 July 2014].
- WORLD BANK. 2014. *Ghana Overview* [Online]. Available:
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ghana/overview> [Accessed 28 June 2014].
- WYLIE, J. 2006. Poststructuralist theories, critical methods and experimentation. In: AITKEN, S. & VALENTINE, G. (eds.) *Approaches to Human Geography*. London: Sage Publications.
- AASE, T. & FOSSÅSKARET, E. 2007. *Skapte Virkeligheter. Om produksjon og tolkning av kvalitative data*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget.

APPENDICES

Appendix A: Sample interview guide

Introduction: I'm studying how the Oil for Development programme can aid Ghana in the environmental management of its oil industry.

-Can you tell me your role in the programme?

Resource curse

-It is hard to avoid the topic of the 'resource curse' in this issue. Much research agrees that a strong democratic government, with the right institutions in place, is necessary before oil production starts up. Do you agree with this and was it in place in Ghana before production began? (Good governance still key?)

-Has this become more 'in place' in recent years, for example, through the country's experiences from its mining industry? (Cyanide in water, etc.)

-What separates Ghana from neighbouring countries such as Angola, Chad and Nigeria, which have experienced significant environmental damage associated with oil production?

-It is alleged that all instances of the resource curse are different and each country experiences different aspects of it. Are there any areas that could be improved based on recent research that puts more focus on place-specific issues? To what extent is the Norwegian model transferable?

Environment

-What are the main focus areas in environmental management in Ghana? (Mapping of vulnerable areas, training, etc.)

-Which groups and institutions do you work with in Ghana and Norway?

-How has Ofu been received by the various institutions? EPA, ministry?

-To what extent have the operating oil companies been included the programme?

-Feedback from local groups? To what extent have they participated in aspects of the programme?

-Has oil production had any negative environmental impact or affected the fishing industry so far? (E.g. Seismic surveys, pollution, reduction of area to trawling).

-What methods have been used to calculate compensation?

-What methods and procedures have been used to assess the environmental impact? Risk analysis at different levels, locally, nationally?

-Environmental protection requires continuous monitoring and adaptation through the various stages of production. Is Ofd still part of this or have the national institutions taken over the work? Feedback?

-What about long-term monitoring? (Chemicals such as polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons)

-What is your impression of Ofd's impact on environmental management so far? What has been particularly successful and what has not worked as well as expected?

General

-Are Statoil still investors in Ghana or have they sold their share? What experiences have they had in Ghana?

-Are the environmental management procedures used in Ghana similar to those used in Norway?

(NB. Although this was the general structure of the interviews, specific questions related to the informant's role in the programme were added where this was felt to provide additional and relevant information. Similarly, questions were removed that were not relevant to their role.)