Vis enkel innførsel

dc.contributor.authorCarlsen, Benedicte
dc.contributor.authorLind, Jo Thori
dc.contributor.authorNyborg, Karine
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-23T09:35:36Z
dc.date.available2021-02-23T09:35:36Z
dc.date.created2020-04-17T15:36:15Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn1057-9230
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2729688
dc.description.abstractIn social insurance systems that grant workers paid sick leave, physicians act as gatekeepers, supposedly granting sickness certificates to the sick and not to shirkers. Previous research has emphasized the physician's superior ability to judge patients' need of treatment and potential collusion with the patient vis‐á‐vis an insurer. What is less well understood is the role of patients' private information. We explore the case where patients have private information about the presence of nonverifiable symptoms. Anyone can then claim to experience such symptoms, reducing physicians' ability to distinguish between sick patients and shirkers. Doubting a patients' reported symptoms may prevent good medical treatment of the truly sick. We show that for all parameter values, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium is that some physicians trust all claims of nonverifiable symptoms, sicklisting shirkers as well as sick; for many values, every physician is trusting. In particular, if physician strategies are observable by patients, extremely strong gatekeeping preferences are required to make physicians mistrust. To limit unwarranted sicklisting, policies reducing the benefits of shirking for healthy workers may be better suited than attempts to convince physicians to be strict.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherWileyen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleWhy physicians are lousy gatekeepers: Sicklisting decisions when patients have private information on symptomsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2020 The Authors.en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1002/hec.4019
dc.identifier.cristin1806848
dc.source.journalHealth Economicsen_US
dc.source.401
dc.source.1412
dc.source.pagenumber778–789en_US
dc.identifier.citationHealth Economics. 2020, 29 (7), 778–789.en_US
dc.source.volume29en_US
dc.source.issue7en_US


Tilhørende fil(er)

Thumbnail

Denne innførselen finnes i følgende samling(er)

Vis enkel innførsel

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal