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dc.contributor.authorMartin, Ben
dc.date.accessioned2021-02-24T09:41:41Z
dc.date.available2021-02-24T09:41:41Z
dc.date.created2020-10-30T18:06:30Z
dc.date.issued2020-03-13
dc.PublishedSynthese. 2020, .
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2729994
dc.description.abstractGiven the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleIdentifying logical evidenceen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright The Author(s) 2020en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11229-020-02618-y
dc.identifier.cristin1843744
dc.source.journalSyntheseen_US
dc.identifier.citationSynthese, 2020.en_US


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal