Appointment of judges to the Norwegian Supreme Court: Safeguarding judicial independence in light of recent political attacks on the Polish judiciary

Abstract

Judicial independence is under threat in several democracies, and statutory reforms frequently target appointment of Supreme Court judges. In NOU 2020: 11, the Norwegian Commission of the Courts addressed these issues but suggested only minor changes to the existing Norwegian appointment procedure. This thesis assesses whether the Commission’s recommendations are necessary and sufficient for safeguarding the independence of the Norwegian judiciary. The current Norwegian procedure is analysed in light of international and supranational obligations and functionally comparable aspects of Polish judicial appointments. Through a legal cultural approach, I address the implications of Norwegian and Polish history, judicial review, legal method, public confidence and judicial career for the suggested amendments to the Norwegian procedure. A recurring theme is the complex interplay between democratic legitimacy and judicial independence. Taking all these factors into consideration, it becomes evident that the Commission’s reluctance to blindly follow international recommendations to increase judicial autonomy seems well-founded and indeed sensible.