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dc.contributor.authorSerdarevic, Nina
dc.contributor.authorStrømland, Eirik Andre
dc.contributor.authorTjøtta, Sigve
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-02T11:36:54Z
dc.date.available2021-08-02T11:36:54Z
dc.date.created2020-09-01T09:47:48Z
dc.date.issued2021
dc.identifier.issn2214-8043
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2765841
dc.description.abstractWe contribute to the experimental literature by examining the causal effect of partner choice opportunities on the earnings of different cooperative types. We first elicit cooperative types and then randomly assign subjects to a repeated prisoner's dilemma game, with either mutual partner choice or random matching. In each period, the individual who fails to attain a partner is excluded from the group. The results from three experiments show that mutual partner choice enables cooperators to outperform free riders; cooperators tend to earn more than free riders and are less frequently excluded. Our findings are robust with respect to varying group size and whether subjects are reminded about their entire partner and earnings history or only their recent history.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleIt Pays to be Nice: The Benefits of Cooperating in Marketsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2020 The Authorsen_US
dc.source.articlenumber101595en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpostprint
cristin.qualitycode1
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2020.101595
dc.identifier.cristin1826373
dc.source.journalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2021, 90, 101595en_US
dc.source.volume90en_US


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