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dc.contributor.authorLømo, Teis Lunde
dc.date.accessioned2021-08-03T12:20:54Z
dc.date.available2021-08-03T12:20:54Z
dc.date.created2021-02-08T14:26:15Z
dc.date.issued2020
dc.identifier.issn0165-1765
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2766040
dc.description.abstractA manufacturer who offers secret contracts faces an opportunism problem: She undercuts her own input prices and fails to offset retail competition. I show that this problem diminishes when retailers are risk averse and face demand uncertainty. Risk aversion and uncertainty create a bilateral risk sharing incentive that raises equilibrium input prices above marginal cost. The manufacturer can therefore profit from downstream risk aversion when retail competition is fierce.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleVertical control, opportunism, and risk sharingen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2020 The Authorsen_US
dc.source.articlenumber109114en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode1
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109114
dc.identifier.cristin1887716
dc.source.journalEconomics Lettersen_US
dc.identifier.citationEconomics Letters. 2020, 191, 109114.en_US
dc.source.volume191en_US


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