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dc.contributor.authorHovd, Martha Norberg
dc.contributor.authorFauzi, Prastudy
dc.contributor.authorRaddum, Håvard
dc.date.accessioned2022-04-26T11:30:27Z
dc.date.available2022-04-26T11:30:27Z
dc.date.created2022-04-01T13:31:29Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.identifier.issn2410-387X
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/2992810
dc.description.abstractFully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a powerful tool in cryptography that allows one to perform arbitrary computations on encrypted material without having to decrypt it first. There are numerous FHE schemes, all of which are expanded from somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) schemes, and some of which are considered viable in practice. However, while these FHE schemes are semantically (IND-CPA) secure, the question of their IND-CCA1 security is much less studied, and we therefore provide an overview of the IND-CCA1 security of all acknowledged FHE schemes in this paper. To give this overview, we grouped the SHE schemes into broad categories based on their similarities and underlying hardness problems. For each category, we show that the SHE schemes are susceptible to either known adaptive key recovery attacks, a natural extension of known attacks, or our proposed attacks. Finally, we discuss the known techniques to achieve IND-CCA1-secure FHE and SHE schemes. We concluded that none of the proposed schemes were IND-CCA1-secure and that the known general constructions all had their shortcomings.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherMDPIen_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleOn the IND-CCA1 Security of FHE Schemesen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2022 The Author(s)en_US
dc.source.articlenumber13en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextpreprint
cristin.qualitycode1
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography6010013
dc.identifier.cristin2014552
dc.source.journalCryptographyen_US
dc.identifier.citationCryptography. 2022, 6 (1), 13.en_US
dc.source.volume6en_US
dc.source.issue1en_US


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