dc.contributor.author | Gabrielsen, Tommy Staahl | |
dc.contributor.author | Johansen, Bjørn Olav | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-29T12:12:13Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-03-29T12:12:13Z | |
dc.date.created | 2022-08-22T11:22:41Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1058-6407 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3060921 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the incentives of national retail chains to adopt national (uniform) prices across local markets that differ in size and competition intensity. In addition to price, the chains may also compete along a quality dimension, and quality is always set locally. We show that absent quality competition, the chains will never use national pricing. However, if quality competition is sufficiently strong there exist equilibria where at least one of the chains adopts national pricing. We also identify cases in which national pricing benefits (harms) all consumers, even in markets where such a pricing strategy leads to higher (lower) prices. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Wiley | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | National pricing with local quality competition | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2022 The Author(s) | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/jems.12494 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 2044897 | |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 48-74 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 2022, 32 (1), 48-74. | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 32 | en_US |
dc.source.issue | 1 | en_US |