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dc.contributor.authorRuminska, Agnieszka
dc.contributor.authorEliassen, Sigrunn
dc.contributor.authorJørgensen, Christian
dc.date.accessioned2024-08-09T11:31:04Z
dc.date.available2024-08-09T11:31:04Z
dc.date.created2023-12-04T13:43:04Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.issn0340-5443
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3145584
dc.description.abstractEach member of a breeding pair benefits if the other does more of the parental investment, so there is scope for behaviours that can be interpreted as both cooperative and competitive games between males and females. Extra-pair mating, widespread among socially monogamous birds, adds extra conflict but also potential opportunity to these social interactions. We analyse an individual-based model of a social environment with simple behavioural strategies where game-like patterns and cooperative outcomes emerge. The model focuses on three evolving traits: female propensity for extra-pair copulations and male investment in territorial behaviour and care. Male traits are reaction norms that use experienced within and extra-pair copulations as information input. We found that female extra-pair mating provided incentives for males to reduce territorial aggression and increase care for offspring. However, when adult survival was higher, male investment in care and territoriality changed from being negatively to positively correlated. This happened because longer life expectancy gave more behavioural opportunities for males, where nest desertion maximises lifetime male fitness when female extra-pair copulation is high. This outcome evolved gradually, with stable periods of intermediate extra-pair mating and low territoriality. These were punctuated by cycles of high extra-pair mating, nest desertion, reduced extra-pair mating and relapse to aggressive territoriality before a new stable phase was established. Each successive trait cycle was faster and smaller, indicating that through evolution of reaction norms, the gene pool has a long history that canalizes the evolution of behaviours, which can be interpreted as emergence and refinement of frequency-dependent games.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleEmergence of games from ecological trade-offs: longevity changes strategies for extra-pair mating in birdsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2023 The Author(s)en_US
dc.source.articlenumber127en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00265-023-03395-7
dc.identifier.cristin2208525
dc.source.journalBehavioral Ecology and Sociobiologyen_US
dc.identifier.citationBehavioral Ecology and Sociobiology. 2023, 77 (11), 127.en_US
dc.source.volume77en_US
dc.source.issue11en_US


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal