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Temporary Disability and Economic Incentives

Fevang, Elisabeth; Hardoy, Ines; Røed, Knut
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Accepted version
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Accepted version (246.1Kb)
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/1956/19669
Utgivelsesdato
2017-08
Metadata
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Samlinger
  • Department of Economics [268]
Originalversjon
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12345
Sammendrag
We investigate the impacts of economic incentives on the duration and outcome of temporary disability insurance (TDI) spells. The analysis is based on a large quasi‐experiment taking place in Norway, involving a complete overhaul of the TDI benefit system. Our findings show that the labour supply of TDI claimants does respond to both the benefit level and the level of local labour demand. The estimated elasticity of the transition rate to employment with respect to the benefit level is −0.33. We also find that the TDI benefit level significantly affects the transition rate to alternative social insurance programmes.
Utgiver
Oxford University Press
Tidsskrift
Economic Journal
Opphavsrett
Copyright Oxford University Press

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