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dc.contributor.authorKnappik, Franz Ulrich
dc.contributor.authorMayr, Erasmus
dc.date.accessioned2020-03-12T14:32:58Z
dc.date.available2020-03-12T14:32:58Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.PublishedKnappik FU, Mayr E. "An erring conscience is an absurdity": The later kant on certainty, moral judgment and the infallibility of conscience. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. 2019;101(1):92-134eng
dc.identifier.issn1613-0650
dc.identifier.issn0003-9101
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/21478
dc.description.abstractThis article explores Kant’s view, found in several passages in his late writings on moral philosophy, that the verdicts of conscience are infallible. We argue that Kant’s infallibility claim must be seen in the context of a major shift in Kant’s views on conscience that took place around 1790 and that has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. This shift led Kant to treat conscience as an exclusively second-order capacity which does not directly evaluate actions, but one’s first-order moral judgments and deliberation. On the basis of this novel interpretation, we develop a new defence of Kant’s infallibility claim that draws on Kant’s account of the characteristic features of specifically moral judgments.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherDe Gruytereng
dc.title"An erring conscience is an absurdity": The later Kant on certainty, moral judgment and the infallibility of conscienceeng
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2020-01-22T21:06:56Z
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2019 Walter de Gruytereng
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-1004
dc.identifier.cristin1703776
dc.source.journalArchiv für Geschichte der Philosophie


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