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dc.contributor.authorBaumgartner, Michael Clemens
dc.contributor.authorFalk, Christoph
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-19T12:22:38Z
dc.date.available2020-05-19T12:22:38Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.PublishedBaumgartner M, Falk. Boolean Difference-Making: A Modern Regularity Theory of Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 2019: axz047eng
dc.identifier.issn1464-3537
dc.identifier.issn0007-0882
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/22302
dc.description.abstractA regularity theory of causation analyses type-level causation in terms of Boolean difference-making. The essential ingredient that helps this theoretical framework overcome the problems of Hume’s and Mill’s classical accounts is a principle of non-redundancy: only Boolean dependency structures from which no elements can be eliminated track causation. The first part of this paper argues that the recent regularity theoretic literature has not consistently implemented this principle, for it disregarded an important type of redundancies: structural redundancies. Moreover, it is shown that a regularity theory needs to be underwritten by a hitherto neglected metaphysical background assumption stipulating that the world's causal makeup is not ambiguous. Against that background, the second part then develops a new regularity theory that does justice to all types of redundancies and, thereby, provides the first all-inclusive notion of Boolean difference-making.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherOxford University Presseng
dc.titleBoolean Difference-Making: A Modern Regularity Theory of Causationeng
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2019-11-25T13:38:36Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of British Society for the Philosophy of Science. All rights reserved.eng
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axz047
dc.identifier.cristin1739320
dc.source.journalBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science


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