Filosofisk vertigo: Om Cavell om skeptisisme

dc.contributor.author	Sørli, Richard
dc.date.accessioned	2020-08-06T12:12:19Z
dc.date.available	2020-08-06T12:12:19Z
dc.date.issued	2019
dc.Published	Sørli RA. Filosofisk vertigo: Om Cavell om skeptisisme. Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift. 2019;54(4):203-219	eng
dc.identifier.issn	1504-2901
dc.identifier.issn	0029-1943
dc.identifier.uri	https://hdl.handle.net/1956/23519
dc.description.abstract	Philosophical skepticism is a topic that permeates Stanley Cavell’s thinking. The aim of this article is to clarify some strands in Cavell’s conception of philosophical skepticism, and to show the role appeals to what Cavell, following Wittgenstein, calls «the ordinary» have in the form of critique of philosophical skepticism that Cavell elaborates.	en_US
dc.language.iso	nob	eng
dc.publisher	Universitetsforlaget	eng
dc.rights	Attribution-Non Commercial CC BY-NC	eng
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/	eng
dc.title	Filosofisk vertigo: Om Cavell om skeptisisme	eng
dc.type	Peer reviewed
dc.type	Journal article
dc.date.updated	2020-02-03T12:33:17Z
dc.description.version	publishedVersion
dc.rights.holder	Copyright 2019 The Authors	eng
dc.identifier.doi	https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2901-2019-04-03
dc.identifier.cristin	1785258
dc.source.journal	Norsk Filosofisk tidsskrift

Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Attribution-Non Commercial CC BY-NC