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dc.contributor.authorCappelen, Alexander Wrighteng
dc.contributor.authorHagen, Rune Janseneng
dc.contributor.authorSørensen, Erik Øiolfeng
dc.contributor.authorTungodden, Bertileng
dc.date.accessioned2015-03-27T09:54:26Z
dc.date.available2015-03-27T09:54:26Z
dc.date.issued2014-03eng
dc.identifier.issn0034-6586
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/9678
dc.description.abstractMany verifiable contracts are impossible or difficult to enforce. This applies to contracts among family and friends, contracts regulating market transactions, and sovereign debt contracts. Do such non-enforceable contracts matter? We use a version of the trust game with participants from Norway and Tanzania to study repayment decisions in the presence of non-enforceable loan contracts. Our main finding is that the specific content of the contract has no effect on loan repayment. Rather, the borrowers seem to be motivated by other moral motives, which contributes to explaining why they partly fulfill non-enforceable contracts. We also show that some borrowers violate the axiom of first-order stochastic dominance when rejecting loan offers. This seems partly to be due to negative reciprocity, but may also reflect that there are individuals who have a preference for not accepting something referred to as a “loan.”en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherWileyeng
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-NDeng
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/eng
dc.subjectcontractseng
dc.subjectmoral motivationeng
dc.subjectnon-enforceabilityeng
dc.subjecttrust gameeng
dc.titleDo non-enforceable contracts matter? Evidence from an international lab experimenteng
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.date.updated2015-03-04T12:20:51Zen_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2014 UNU-WIDERen_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/roiw.12099
dc.identifier.cristin1149737
dc.source.journalThe Review of Income and Wealth
dc.source.4060
dc.source.141
dc.source.pagenumber100-113
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 179552
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Social sciences: 200::Economics: 210::Economics: 212eng
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210::Samfunnsøkonomi: 212nob


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