dc.contributor.author | Pronin, Kira | eng |
dc.date.accessioned | 2008-11-12T11:02:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2008-11-12T11:02:19Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2008-05-26 | eng |
dc.date.submitted | 2008-05-26 | eng |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1956/2963 | |
dc.description.abstract | In a pure exchange economy with differential information, there may be ex-post Pareto-dominant core allocations which are not attainable as Rational Expectations Equilibria because of information verifiability issues. On the other hand, many of the core allocations in the differential information economy do not seem realistic, given incentive constraints. This fundamental tension between missed trading opportunities and moral hazard will be explored using concepts from cooperative game theory and financial economics. | en_US |
dc.format.extent | 416067 bytes | eng |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | eng |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.publisher | The University of Bergen | eng |
dc.subject | Asymmetric information | eng |
dc.subject | Limited arbitrage | eng |
dc.subject | Fine core | eng |
dc.subject | Coarse core | eng |
dc.subject | Financial markets | eng |
dc.subject | Private core | eng |
dc.subject | Incentive compatibility | eng |
dc.title | Differential Information Economies and Incomplete Markets | eng |
dc.type | Master thesis | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | The author | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright the author. All rights reserved | en_US |
dc.description.localcode | ECON390 | |
dc.description.localcode | MASV-SØK | |
dc.subject.nus | 734999 | eng |
dc.subject.nsi | VDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210 | nob |
fs.subjectcode | ECON390 | |