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dc.contributor.authorPronin, Kiraeng
dc.date.accessioned2008-11-12T11:02:19Z
dc.date.available2008-11-12T11:02:19Z
dc.date.issued2008-05-26eng
dc.date.submitted2008-05-26eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/2963
dc.description.abstractIn a pure exchange economy with differential information, there may be ex-post Pareto-dominant core allocations which are not attainable as Rational Expectations Equilibria because of information verifiability issues. On the other hand, many of the core allocations in the differential information economy do not seem realistic, given incentive constraints. This fundamental tension between missed trading opportunities and moral hazard will be explored using concepts from cooperative game theory and financial economics.en_US
dc.format.extent416067 byteseng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfeng
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherThe University of Bergeneng
dc.subjectAsymmetric informationeng
dc.subjectLimited arbitrageeng
dc.subjectFine coreeng
dc.subjectCoarse coreeng
dc.subjectFinancial marketseng
dc.subjectPrivate coreeng
dc.subjectIncentive compatibilityeng
dc.titleDifferential Information Economies and Incomplete Marketseng
dc.typeMaster thesisen_US
dc.rights.holderThe authoren_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright the author. All rights reserveden_US
dc.description.localcodeECON390
dc.description.localcodeMASV-SØK
dc.subject.nus734999eng
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Økonomi: 210nob
fs.subjectcodeECON390


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