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dc.contributor.authorFlaaten, Gerhardeng
dc.date.accessioned2010-02-05T10:26:19Z
dc.date.available2010-02-05T10:26:19Z
dc.date.issued2009-10-05eng
dc.date.submitted2009-10-05eng
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/3777
dc.description.abstractThis thesis seeks to explain the US Government's role in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. It asks why Lehman did not find a solution in the market before it was too late, and why the Government did not bail Lehman out. The empirical account suggests that Lehman could have found a solution if this was its preference, and that the government did indeed, counter to the official explanation, have the power to rescue Lehman from bankruptcy. The thesis' stylized game theoretical analysis shows that the Government's choice of policy, displayed in how it dealt with events preceding Lehman's failure, provided Lehman with incentives not to find a market solution, which eventually resulted in Lehman filing for bankruptcy - the biggest in history sending shockwaves around the entire world. The analysis further shows that the Government's approach left it unable to credibly deter systemically important financial institutions from relying on a government sponsored safety net, which in the case of Lehman Brothers led to the sub-optimal outcome of bankruptcy.en_US
dc.format.extent443740 byteseng
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfeng
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherThe University of Bergeneng
dc.subjectLehman Brotherseng
dc.subjectConstructive ambiguityeng
dc.subjectSystemic riskeng
dc.subjectToo big to faileng
dc.subjectGame theoryeng
dc.subjectCase studyeng
dc.titleLehman Brothers - A Casualty of Constructive Ambiguity?eng
dc.typeMaster thesisen_US
dc.rights.holderThe authoren_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright the author. All rights reserveden_US
dc.description.degreeMaster i Sammenliknende politikk
dc.description.localcodeSAMPOL350
dc.description.localcodeMASV-SAPO
dc.subject.nus731114eng
dc.subject.nsiVDP::Samfunnsvitenskap: 200::Statsvitenskap og organisasjonsteori: 240::Sammenlignende politikk: 241nob
fs.subjectcodeSAMPOL350


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