

# A Reaffirmed Call for Responsibility- Sharing

Determinants of Responsibility-Sharing after the  
2018 Global Compact on Refugees

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Master's Thesis

Spring 2021

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## Abstract

This thesis investigates what can explain states' contributions to responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. Refugees and the responsibilities of refugee protection continue to be unevenly distributed among states and limited responsibility-sharing is keeping the international community from finding sustainable solutions for the refugees and the host communities. In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees reaffirmed the call for international responsibility-sharing. Earlier attempts to explain why states contribute to responsibility-sharing have often been limited to responsibility-sharing between certain countries or within specific regions. In the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees states have made commitments through the Global Refugee Forum, offering a unique opportunity to explore international responsibility-sharing with a comparative perspective and a wide scope of contributions. I use a multimethod framework to first explore what responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees looks like and construct a variable measuring *Responsibility-Sharing Commitments*. Thereafter I build a theoretical framework on earlier attempts to explain states' behavior in contributing to responsibility-sharing, which is tested with a negative binomial regression analysis.

I find that a small number of the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum are responsibility-sharing. Despite a reaffirmed call for responsibility-sharing, there is still a great absence of sufficient international cooperation to protect refugees. However, the findings showed that a wider scope is present as the unconventional means of *Material and Technical* assistance, and *Policy and Legal Reform* are being used. Furthermore, the findings from the negative binomial regression suggest that a determinant of contributions to responsibility-sharing is the economic size of the state. Moreover, I find that the asylum capacity, the exposure to displacement in the region, whether a state is a former colonial power, and the number of conventions to protect that the state has signed do not have an effect on states' contributions. This indicates that the tested explanations may not be applicable for explaining why states contribute to an international call for refugee responsibility-sharing. Moreover, it suggests that international cooperation to protect refugees is driven by states' consequentialist logic, which indicates that incentives are necessary for cooperation and that UNHCR's use of resources to implement the principle of responsibility-sharing as a norm might be misguided.

# Acknowledgements

Først og fremst vil jeg rette en takk til Hakan Gürcan Sicakkan for god veiledning, og motiverende ord gjennom opp- og nedturene som året med masterskriving har ført med seg.

Tusen takk til venner som har kommet med oppmuntringer og gitt meg støtte gjennom masterløpet. Spesielt takk til Caroline Lensjø Alvin og Sigrid Jonette Sandsberg Dybdahl for korrekturlesing av oppgaven. Videre vil jeg takke Anne Jorun Kjær for gode og konstruktive tilbakemeldinger.

Året med masterskriving hadde ikke vært det samme uten alle medstudentene på Sofie Lindstrøms hus. Dere har gjort at hverdagen med masterarbeid har vært spesiell gjennom gode samtaler, latter og faglige diskusjoner – tusen takk!

Til sist vil jeg takke familien min for å alltid støtte meg, uansett hva jeg holder på med. Det å vite at dere alltid er der har bidratt til å gi meg en indre trygget gjennom hele studietiden.

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## Abbreviations

GCR	Global Compact on Refugees
GRF	Global Refugee Forum
ICC	Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient
IOM	International Organization of Migration
IRR	Incidence Rate Ratios
RS	Responsibility-Sharing
RSC	Responsibility-Sharing Commitments
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNTC	United Nations Treaty Collection
VIF	Variation Inflation Factor

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Setting the stage

Refugees and the responsibilities of refugee protection are unevenly distributed among the world's states. From 2018 to 2020 there has been displacement of millions of people, due to conflict, such as in the Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, and extreme violence towards the Rohingya who have been forced to seek refuge in Bangladesh. There has been political and economic instability in Venezuela, and climate and weather-related challenges in Mozambique, the Philippines, China, India, and the USA, leading to displacement (IOM 2019, 2). The major migration and displacement events have caused hardship, trauma, and loss of lives. In 2018, the global refugee population held 25,9 million people (IOM 2019, 2). Migration patterns vary from region to region, and where refugees go is often based on geography. States that are close to countries in conflicts that generate large-scale displacements often end up hosting significantly larger numbers of refugees than states further away (Martin et al 2019, 61). The Syrian Arab Republic ranked first in being the origin of the largest number of refugees, with respectively 6.7 million in 2018. Accordingly, Turkey hosted the largest number of refugees, with 3.7 million, mainly Syrians (IOM 2019, 4, 39). In 2020, the least developed countries, namely Bangladesh, Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda, and Yemen hosted 33 percent of the global total of refugees (IOM 2019, 40).

Refugees often end up in developing countries, and according to UNHCR (2019), developing countries host 85% of the world's refugee population. Host countries have to assist refugees according to human rights, as imposed by international agreements, placing a considerable responsibility on the host countries (Kritzman-Amir and Berman 2009, 624). This has called for international "responsibility-sharing", also termed "burden sharing". Responsibility-sharing (RS) is understood as a moral obligation in international law. However, it is based on voluntary contributions, and countries hosting large numbers of refugees continue to face challenges with meeting the needs of protection. Research has found that even though the states that refugees go to act according to the obligations imposed on them by the Refugee Convention, limited RS has kept the international community from finding sustainable solutions to the refugee crisis.



This causes an unbearable situation for both refugees and host states, such as in the case of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, 2). The literature on RS indicates a lack of collective RS, which is necessary for an effective global refugee regime. In addition, there is a trend towards responsibility-shifting rather than sharing (Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, Foster 2012, Kritzman-Amir and Berman 2009, Nagy 2016). During the 2015 refugee crisis European states were mainly concerned about minimizing their own refugee intakes instead of establishing effective RS (Trauner 2016).

## **1.2. Research question**

In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was signed, which reaffirmed the call for international refugee responsibility-sharing. Following the Global Compact on Refugees, states have made commitments to contribute to RS through the Global Refugee Forum (GRF). With the considerable need of increased international RS, it is beneficial to understand what explains differences and similarities between states' contributions. The Global Compact on Refugees offers a unique opportunity to investigate states contributions to RS, as it is relatively new, and can be understood as underexplored compared to its international importance. This thesis examines contributions to refugee RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees and aims to explain what determines whether states contribute. The research question is formulated as follows:

*What can explain states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees?*

Scholars have previously explored states contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing, and there is an ongoing debate in the academic literature about what drives states behavior in contributing to RS. The literature is divided into explanations centering around states' self-interest on one side, and the adoption and implementation of norms on the other side (Thielemann 2003). However, a lot of the studies are limited to geographical areas or entities such as RS between certain countries or within regions (Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 2003; Dorussen, Kirchner and Sperling 2009). Particularly, intra-European responsibility-sharing has been widely studied. On the other hand, there are few studies considering a larger number of

countries. To address this gap in the literature, my research question aims at exploring the RS that states have committed to after the Global Compact on Refugees, which enable an investigation of international RS, spatially limited to the states that have submitted pledges providing a larger number of units. Furthermore, previous literature on states contributions to RS has focused on a limited scope of RS action, mainly financial and physical contributions. However, with the case of RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, it is possible to apply a wider scope.

In order to explore what explains the differences and similarities between states' contributions, it is necessary to first get an overview of the contributions they make. This set forth the precondition of exploring what states contributions to RS looks like. With this, the key questions of thesis are the following:

*What are the differences and similarities between states' contributions to responsibility-sharing?*

*Which determinants can explain states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing?*

With a multimethod design, I will first investigate states' contributions to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, more specifically whether their contributions can be understood as RS and what the contributions look like. This will be done through an empirical exploration of states' contributions based on the commitments to the 2019 Global Refugee Forum. Then I will investigate what explains the differences and similarities between states contributions to RS through possible determinants, in other words – why do states contribute to RS?

### **1.3. Clarifications and scope of the study**

As it is crucial to be precise about what is being studied (George and Bennett 2005, 74), this can be clarified by specifying what is not going to be studied (Goertz 2006, 32).

I do *not* focus on how much states contribute, but rather what makes them contribute and in what way they do it. Numerous studies have investigated whether contributions to RS is sufficient. It is not my intention to take on this question, instead I seek to understand what drives contributions. More specifically this thesis is limited to investigating what contributions to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees looks like and why states have made these commitments to contribute.

## **1.4. Contributions of the thesis**

Through the manual coding and categorization of the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum, a variable measuring responsibility-sharing commitments is created. To the best of my knowledges, a variable measuring responsibility-sharing commitments has not previously existed because there hasn't been a global RS arrangement before. This gives the opportunity of conducting a quantitative investigation with an international comparative perspective using a wider scope of RS. The previous literature on the field has mainly considered a narrower scope of RS when attempting to explain states behavior in relation to refugee RS. The case of pledges to the GRF enables the possibility to investigate a wider scope of RS, and to understand if the existing explanations can be used to explain a wider scope.

The thesis contributes to the literature on states behavior in relation to refugee RS and to the investigation of the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. I build the theoretical framework on earlier attempt to explain states behavior in contributing to responsibility-sharing and formulate four hypotheses. I find that a possible determinant of contributions to RS is the economic size of the state. Furthermore, I find that most of the tested theoretical arguments do not explain states contributions to international RS, as there is no effect of the exposure to displacement in the region, whether a state is a former colonial power, nor the number of conventions to protect that the state has signed.

## **1.5. Structure of the thesis**

For the purpose of context and conceptualization, *Chapter 2* provides an overview of the concept of refugee responsibility-sharing, then the role of the Global Compact on Refugees is outlined before tackling how to measure RS. In *Chapter 3*, I explore states contributions to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees through an exploratory investigation and discuss the results. *Chapter 4* examines previous attempts to explain states' behavior in relation to contributions to RS. From this I generate my theoretical argument and hypotheses. The data and operationalization of the variables are presented in *Chapter 5*. In *Chapter 6*, the multilevel negative binomial regression is outlined, which is the method utilized for the statistical analysis. The chapter also discuss the theoretical and statistical reasons and assumptions for this model. *Chapter 7* is devoted to the results of the analysis. In light of the findings from the empirical analysis, the hypotheses and theoretical framework is discussed in *Chapter 8*. In *Chapter 9*, I provide concluding remarks and suggestions for further analysis.

## 2. International Refugee Responsibility-Sharing

In this chapter I conceptualize responsibility-sharing and present the role of the Global Compact on Refugees. Furthermore, I discuss how responsibility-sharing can be measured and define the scope used in this thesis.

### 2.1. Principle and contributions

The global refugee regime constitutes a set of norms aimed at facilitating cooperation to ensure protection and solution to refugees' situations. According to Betts (2010, 57), the two main norms of the refugee regime are asylum and 'burden sharing', based on the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees that define who qualifies as a refugee, and the organization of UNHCR which was created to follow up on the implementation of the convention. It is important to note that RS can be exercised on different levels of society. States may engage in intra-state RS where a state may distribute responsibility among their federal states or regions (Boswell 2003, Nagy 2017, 5). Regional RS can be exemplified by the intra-EU Common European Asylum System or the Organization of African Unity's Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (Türk 2016, 48). This thesis will focus on the global level, taking into account international RS between states.

The principle of responsibility-sharing was first used in the preamble of the UNHCR Convention related to the Status of Refugees in 1951, referring to the need to share responsibility of refugee protection (UNHCR 1951, Boswell 2003). According to Boswell (2003), responsibility-sharing on the international level was first understood as a principle of solidarity with first countries of asylum struggling to assist large numbers of refugees from neighboring countries, such as through resettlement, financing of refugee camps, etc. Milner (2005, 56) defines refugee responsibility-sharing as "*the principle through which the diverse costs of granting asylum assumed by the host state are more equitably divided among a greater number of states*" (Milner 2016, 1). Through several agreements and declarations, states show a broad agreement on the principle of responsibility sharing.

Dowd and McAdam (2017, 864) argue that while countries who receive refugees have certain legal obligations to assist and protect them, the legal duties of other States to step in and help to relieve this burden is less clear. International cooperation to help refugees through responsibility-sharing is often seen as a moral obligation in international law (Martin et al. 2018, 4). RS is based on the notion that costs from protection and assistance of refugees and displaced persons are distributed unequally, but in the absence of binding commitments from states to share the costs, contributions remain discretionary (Martin et al. 2019, 2; Milner 2016, 1).

When considering financial contributions to the UNHCR, 10 donors make up more than 75% of all contributions. If considering aggregate funding from 1990 to 2012, the United States, the European Commission and Japan accounted for more than 50% of all contributions (Milner 2016, 3). Dowd and McAdam (2017, 892) find that especially developed states are more willing to contribute with financial assistance than relocate and accept refugees into their territory. Even though states have acknowledged the need of more RS, they are still reluctant to acknowledge concrete commitments.

The global need of refugee resettlement is high, and resettlement activities are far from meeting the needed level to solve the situation. In 2015, 1.1 million refugees were in need of resettlement, according to UNHCR, but only 59,563 resettlement submissions were processed (Milner 2016, 5). Based on the UNHCR resettlement criteria, 7.2 million refugees were eligible for resettlement because of protracted situations, this is a number far from the total resettlement commitments by states. Milner (2016, 5) underlines, that if taking into account the 2015 commitments of resettlement from states, more than 87 years would be needed to resettle all the refugees eligible for resettlement in 2015. RS can contribute to both resettle refugees and to lessen the need of replacement through working towards sustainable solutions for the refugees and host communities.

## **2.2. The Global Compact on Refugees**

In 2016, the High-Level Meeting Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants recognized the New York Declaration and reaffirmed the commitment to RS. The Declaration recognizes the burdens that “large movements of refugees place on national resources,

especially in the case of developing countries” (Martin et al 2019, 61; UN 2016). Initially, the UN Secretary proposed a ‘Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing for Refugees’ in 2016, however, the New York declaration was adopted with a commitment to negotiate adoption of such a document two years later (Martin et al 2019, 61). In 2018, the Global Compact on Refugees was signed by 150 states, providing a framework for RS and recognition of need for international cooperation to achieve a sustainable solution to refugee situations (UNHCR 2018 IA para 3, 2). The compact is not legally binding, but through the Global Refugee Forum, every fourth year, states and organizations can declare “concrete pledges and contributions”, that may consist of “financial, material and technical assistance, resettlement places and complementary pathways” (UNHCR 2018 IIIA para 17, 18, 19, 7-8). In 2020 over 1400 pledges was submitted to support the GCR (UNHCR 2020).

The GCR has also received vast critique from scholars (Martin et al 2019; Dowd and McAdam 2017; Hathaway 2018; Chimni 2018). With the non-binding nature, the aim of the GCR to secure “predictable and equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing” (UNHCR 2018) is not obtained, and instead of securing compliance it is dependent on voluntary contributions (Martin et al. 2019, 61-62). It is also critiqued for insufficient addressing aspects of protection such as protection in transit and prevention of early repatriation to dangerous situations. Chimni (2018, 631) suggest the GCR only ends up diluting principles of international human rights and fundamental principles of refugee law. However, Doyle (2018, 619) points out that the rhetoric on RS in the GCR constitutes a great step forward, which underlines that it is an interesting case to look into. In addition, research on GCR is motivated by the commitments, for future research to understand whether the commitments are successful.

### **2.3. Measuring responsibility-sharing: Defining the scope**

To investigate the differences between states’ contributions it is necessary to first define the scope of RS. As previously addressed, states show a broad agreement on the principle of responsibility-sharing, contrarily, the scope of responsibility-sharing is an ongoing debate. There are differing views on whether a narrower or wider scope is the most appropriate. A common challenge of defining a concept is conceptual stretching. To avoid conceptual stretching, it is useful to use the strategy of Sartori’s ladder of abstraction (Collier and Mahon

1993, 846). Similar to Sartori's (1970) extension and intention, I use the terms narrow to wide and differentiate between direct and indirect intention. It is important to note that the scope of RS discussed in academic literature is often a result of how RS is addressed in official documents from international organizations such as UNHCR.

Those arguing in favor of a narrower scope point to physical and financial RS as two essential ways for third countries to take on a share of the responsibility of hosting countries (Boswell 2003; Milner 2016; Dowd and McAdam 2017). Physical responsibility sharing is based on the admission of refugees through relocation or resettlement to third countries. Financial responsibility sharing is based on the provision of financial assistance to host countries for care and maintenance of refugees (Boswell 2003, 1; Dowd and McAdam 2017, 872; Milner 2016, 3). Dowd and McAdam (2017, 872) argue that after the 2011 UNHCR Expert Meeting and the 2016 New York Declaration, responsibility-sharing also include 'other assistance' to host countries, such as technical assistance, capacity building, consultation and information sharing. Which according to Milner (2016, 4) can be understood as a third form of responsibility-sharing.

On the other hand, studies have suggested that over the past 60 years, the scope of responsibility-sharing has widened to include finding sustainable solutions for, and prevention of displacement (Dowd and McAdam 2017, 872). In line with this, Martin et al. (2019, 59) argues for a wide understanding of responsibility-sharing, which includes efforts to address the underlying causes of displacement within and across borders, efforts to find solutions (including resettlement of refugees from host countries to third countries), initiatives to enhance protection, financial support for refugees, internally displaced persons and the communities in which they reside, and technical assistance and training for host countries and local organizations.

Building on a wide scope, Vink and Meijerink (2003, 300) differentiates between direct and indirect responsibility-sharing, where the most direct forms are based on the sharing of people and resources, while the indirect forms include harmonization of policies, which they characterize as sharing of norms. Harmonization of policies as a form of responsibility-sharing can be exemplified by the implementation of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees (Nagy 2017, 5).



Through applying Milner's (2016, 1) definition of responsibility-sharing; a principle where the host states' responsibility is more equitably distributed among states, this thesis will understand commitments by states as RS if the state is directly easing the responsibility of a refugee hosting state. When investigating states contributions to responsibility-sharing it is expedient to exclude measures taken on a national level that might affect the overall refugee situation indirectly and limit the scope to measures aiming to directly relieving the responsibility load of another state. The thesis can therefore be understood as applying a wide and direct scope, taking into account the three mentioned forms of responsibility-sharing, yet excluding indirect measures on the national level such as harmonization of legislation.

### **3. Responsibility-Sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees**

The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an exploratory investigation of the contributions to responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. First the reasons for applying a multimethod framework and conducting an exploratory investigation is discussed, then the coding and categorization is outlined and conducted. Lastly, the descriptive results are presented and discussed.

#### **3.1. Multimethod framework**

The aim of this thesis is to understand *what can explain differences and similarities between states' contributions to refugee RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees*. The research question both emphasizes descriptive arguments and causal relations. A descriptive argument aims to answer *what* questions through describing aspects of the world, while causal arguments in contrast aims at answering *why* questions (Gerring 2012a, 722-723). Asking what can explain differences and similarities in states' contributions to RS requires an investigation of causal relations, but to understand what can explain the differences and similarities it is reasonable to first understand what the differences and similarities of contributions to RS look like. A challenge of using a multimethod research design is that if a mistake happens in the first analysis, it travels through the whole research design (Rohlfing 2008, 1501). This will be taken into consideration when discussing the final results in *Chapter 8*.

The first investigation of this thesis will try to understand *what* states' contributions to RS look like, before theoretical explanations are explored and *why* the contributions are the way they are is investigated.

## **3.2. Exploratory investigation and the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum**

To investigate what the differences and similarities between states' contributions to RS are, an exploratory investigation is conducted. This is done through a manual coding and a qualitative content analysis of the 754 'concrete pledges' that states have made to the Global Refugee Forum following the Global Compact on Refugees. The GCR is a completely new intergovernmental institution. Pledges to the Global Refugee Forum on international RS to refugee protection is unprecedented. Although RS is briefly mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention, it has never been practiced globally by states before the Global Refugee Forum was introduced. It is important to explore empirically what international RS looks like by thoroughly study its first and only appearance in the real world, which are the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum.

An exploratory investigation can contribute to a broad overview of the pledges to the GRF, which can provide foundation for a more in-depth and more limited further study (Grønmo 2016, 100). There is no complete mapping of contributions to RS, and descriptive analysis and statistics are useful for understanding unknown information. The implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, addressed in the *Chapter 2*, offer the possibility to look at commitments to international responsibility-sharing from all countries who have registered pledges.

## **3.3. Coding and categorization of commitments to responsibility-sharing**

Using categorization and variable construction through a qualitative content analysis of the pledges, both the content and context of the documents are taken into account, and it gives the possibility of identifying themes and considering the frequency of its occurrence (Ritchie et al. 2014, 271). The pledges states have submitted to the GRF are available as an excel file on UNHCR's website, and contain 1400 pledges made by states, organizations and private actors (UNHCR 2020). As the goal of this thesis is to understand states' contributions to RS, only pledges submitted by states, or pledges where states are understood as partners of the

contribution expressed in a pledge, is used. This selection limits the scope to 754 pledges. As the pledges indicate states' commitments, *contributions to responsibility-sharing* are operationalized to *responsibility-sharing commitments* (RSC).

The pledges and updates on the pledges are registered by states and organizations through a registration form on the UNHCR Global Compact on Refugees Digital Platform<sup>1</sup>. The registration form contains several options of labelling, including a label of “responsibility sharing arrangements”. When states and organizations have made a pledge, they themselves choose the labels of the pledge in the registration form. A possibility could be to utilize these labels as categories, but when reviewing the description of the pledges, it became clear that numerous pledges were assigned ill-fitting labels, possibly because of bias from the self-categorization. This might be caused by differing perceptions of the labels. Hence, to understand the most advantageous way of coding and categorizing the commitments, a variable for RSC is manually coded, and through conducting a content analysis dimensions and attributes for categorization is discovered.

### **3.3.1. The pledge registration form**

As formulated in the Global Compact on Refugees, “concrete pledges and contributions” may consist of “financial, material and technical assistance, resettlement places and complementary pathways” (UNHCR 2018 IIIA para 17, 18, 19, 7-8). This is visible in the pledges as the labels of contribution types in the registration form fully overlaps with what is formulated in the GCR. In addition, the registration form has optional labels such as area of focus, information about who the pledge will go to and the actor submitting the pledge<sup>2</sup>. ‘Area of focus’ contain labels such as education, statelessness, jobs and livelihoods, protection capacity, solutions, energy and infrastructure, and responsibility sharing arrangements. The optional categories are in accordance with the areas in need of support as expressed in the GCR. When reviewing the

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<sup>1</sup> The pledges are submitted and updated through Global Compact on Refugees: Digital Platform: Pledges and Contributions <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/channel/pledges-contributions>

<sup>2</sup> For complete details on pledges, see UNHCR’s website for the Global Compact on Refugees: <https://globalcompactrefugees.org/article/pledge-follow-up>

description of the pledges, it became clear that some of the labels from the registration form are well suited for categorizing the pledges in addition to categories not available as labels.

### **3.3.2. Variable construction: Responsibility-sharing commitments**

There are many possible aspects to explore considering the pledges to the GRF. In addition to the dependent variable RSC, two dimensions of the commitments are chosen. Concerning the dependent variable, RSC is understood as a commitment to take on a greater responsibility and/or ease the responsibility of other states as defined in *Chapter 2*. With this, I am choosing empirical indicators to measure the conceptual definition of responsibility-sharing. If a pledge is understood as an RSC it is given a ‘yes’, and if it is clear that it is not, it is given a ‘no’. The table 3.1.1. gives a sample of 3 pledges coded as RSC, and 3 pledges coded as not RSC.

Pledge 4310 from Norway is understood as RS because the pledge is a commitment of “...providing support to UNHCR... to implement the tri-partite Memorandum of Understanding... for an Emergency Transit Center (ETM) in Gashora, Rwanda to support vulnerable refugees and migrants evacuated from Libya.” (Pledge ID 4310, GRF Pledges). In other words, through a financial contribution, Norway intends to ease the responsibility of other states. Similar to pledge 4310, pledge 4055 from Germany is a commitment to finance the hosting of “... foreign scholars at risk on a fully funded research fellowship...”. Thus, contributing with financial means to host refugees in the academic sector, and moreover, easing the responsibilities of other states. Likewise, pledge 3093, from the government of the Republic of Korea, pledges to be “...taking part in the international community’s responsibility sharing efforts to resolve refugee issues by providing resettlement places for people who are in vulnerable situations and in need of international protection.” (Pledge ID 3093, GRF Pledges). In contrast to pledge 4310 and 4055, pledge 3093 is taking on a greater responsibility by resettling refugees as a third country, and hence easing the responsibility of states hosting large numbers of refugees.

Pledge 1002, from Namibia, on the other hand, is not understood as a commitment to RS. The pledge indicates a commitment to harmonize legislation, by committing to “...accede and or ratify the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 1961 Convention

on the Reduction of Stateless Persons...” (Pledge 1002, GRF Pledges). With the scope chosen to measure RS in this thesis, harmonization of legislation does not qualify as easing the responsibility of refugee hosting states. Likewise, pledge 1190 from the Government of Angola commits to “... support local integration of refugees who opt to stay in Angola...”. This indicates that Angola is committing to integrate refugees already located within their borders. Hence, the pledge is not understood as directly taking in a share of responsibility from other states. Pledge 2133 from Brazil, on the other hand, commits to “...offer regular migratory pathways for persons who are not eligible as refugees, in particular through the concession of humanitarian visas and residence... for Senegalese nationals who are already living in Brazil, in order to avoid overburdening the national asylum system” (Pledge 2133, GRF Pledges). At a first glance it appears as a complimentary pathway to a third hosting country. However, as the pledge applies to refugees already in the country the focus is on avoiding overburdening the national asylum system rather than ease the responsibility of another state.

**Table 3.1.1. Responsibility-sharing commitments: Coding sample of 6 pledges**

Pledge ID	Name of the pledge	Description of the pledge	RS	Goal of the contribution	Means of the contribution
4310	“Support to the Emergency Transit Center in Rwanda, for vulnerable refugees and migrant evacuated from Libya”	“Norway is providing support to UNHCR, with 50 million Norwegian kroner (approx. 5,4 million USD), to implement the tri-partite Memorandum of Understanding between UNHCR, African Union and the Government of Rwanda, for an Emergency Transit Center (ETM) in Gashora, Rwanda to support vulnerable refugees and migrants evacuated from Libya.”	Yes	Protection capacity	Financial
4055	“Continued funding of the Philipp Schwartz Initiative”	“Germany will continue to fund The Philipp Schwartz Initiative in order to provide universities and research institutions in Germany with the means to host foreign scholars at risk on a fully funded research fellowship. The envisaged annual budget is 10.4 million EUR. The initiative is implemented by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation.	Yes	Protection capacity, Other	Financial
3093	“Resettlement (1)”	The ROK government is taking part in the international community’s responsibility-sharing efforts to resolve refugee issues by providing resettlement places for people who are in vulnerable situations and in need of international protection. In 2015, Korea became the second Asian country to launch a resettlement pilot program. In 2017, the number of resettlement places doubled. To date, a total of 129 refugees have settled in Korea.	Yes	Sustainable solutions	Resettlement and complimentary pathways
1002	“Accede and/or ratify the 1954 Convention”	The Government of the Republic of Namibia hereby commits: To accede and or ratify the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Stateless Persons as well as the 1969 OAU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the 2009 AU Convention on the Protection and Assistance of Internal Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention) by 2020.	No	Statelessness	Policy
1190	“Local Integration (1)”	The Government of Angola pledges to support local integration of refugees who opt to stay in Angola, including former refugees falling under the cessation clauses, namely Sierra Leonean, Liberians and Rwandans.	No	Integration	-
2133	“Offering regular migratory pathways in order to avoid overburdening the national asylum system”	Brazil commits to continuing exploring measures to offer regular migratory pathways for persons who are not eligible as refugees, in particular through the concession of humanitarian visas and residence for Haitian nationals and the authorization of residence for Senegalese nationals who are already living in Brazil, in order to avoid overburdening the national asylum system.	No	Protection capacity	Policy

*Note: The table present three pledges indicated as responsibility-sharing and three pledges indicated as not responsibility-sharing is randomly drawn from the pledge data. Goal and Means of the contributions indicate the given category within the respective dimension*

### **3.3.3. Dimensions of Responsibility-Sharing Commitments: Goals and Means of the contributions**

As states have the possibility of contributing to RS with a wider scope of action, the reviewing of the pledges led to the categorization of two dimensions. The first dimension concerns the goals that are inherent to the pledges, and the second dimension concerns the means. The two dimensions are not limited to RSC, rather all pledges submitted by states are categorized. The dimensions are presented in turn.

#### *Goals of the contributions*

The first dimension constitutes the area the commitment is aiming to improve, in other words the goal. The dimension is not dependent on whether or not the commitment is understood as RS. The categories are in many respects overlapping with some of the categories for ‘area of focus’ that states chose when registering the pledge. Through the categorization, empirical indicators made it clear that the following types were advantageous: education, jobs and livelihood, statelessness, integration, infrastructure and use of resources, protection capacity, self-reliance, health, sustainable solutions, repatriation<sup>3</sup> and other goals. Each commitment has the possibility of having one or more of these goals, and what societal level the commitment is aiming at does not matter for the type of goal it is categorized as. The premises and example of quotes expressing empirical indicators for two of the categories are described in table 3.1.2.<sup>4</sup> If a pledge has an empirical indicator of a given goal, it is assigned a ‘yes’ for this goal.

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<sup>3</sup> Taking into account the critique of the GCR not addressing sufficiently early repatriation to dangerous situations, ‘Repatriation’ is not included in ‘Sustainable solutions’ (Martin et al. 2019, 62). Repatriation might be set in process without safe, voluntary and dignified conditions, as in the case of refugees returning to Myanmar from Bangladesh (Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020).

<sup>4</sup> See table C1 in the appendices for the complete set of categories and coding rules of goals



**Table 3.1.2:** Categories for the goals expressed in pledges to the Global Refugee Forum:  
Protection Capacity and Education

<i>Goal</i>	<i>Realm of the category</i>	<i>Examples of empirical indicators</i>
<i>Protection capacity</i>	If improving protection capacity is the goal of the pledge, it is assigned protection capacity. Protection capacity is understood as the capability of protecting persons.	<p>“...this pledge aims to strengthen the overall protection capacity of relevant government entities with particular focus on enhancing social protection and asylum systems through improved legal and institutional frameworks at national and local levels.” (Pledge ID 1315)</p> <p>“Training to build capacity of government and advocacy organisations to continue to protect and assist stateless persons in protracted situations” (Pledge ID 1342).</p> <p>“Improving the quality of asylum decisions via capacity building activities of the staff members of the Asylum and Legal Affairs Division of the Migration Service of Armenia” (Pledge ID 4148).</p>
<i>Education</i>	If the goal of the pledge is to enhance education for refugees or for the host community, the pledge is assigned the category ‘education’. This can be manifested by inclusion in the national education system, securing refugees rights to education, improving the quality of education, etc.	<p>“Offer guidance counseling for refugees to access higher education in East Africa...” (Pledge ID 2114).</p> <p>“Granting tertiary education scholarship to a person per year who has been granted refugee status in Azerbaijan.” (Pledge ID 4131).</p> <p>“... a project to improve learning conditions in refugee camps in Jordan, Azraq and Za’atari.” (Pledge ID 4146).</p>

For example, in pledge 1315, “...focus on enhancing social protection and asylum systems...” is understood as an empirical indicator for the goal of Protection Capacity and is therefore assigned “yes” for Protection Capacity. In the same sense, pledge 1342 is categorized as having the goal of Protection Capacity because it commits to “...build capacity of government and advocacy organizations to continue to protect and assist...”. Considering the Education, pledge 2114 is understood as having the goal of Education because of the empirical indicator: “...for refugees to access higher tertiary education”. Likewise, is pledge 4131 categorized as Education because the aim of “granting tertiary education scholarship.”

### *Means of the contributions*

The second dimension considers what actions the states are committing to. In other words what tools or means the contribution is initiating. Through the inductive categorization it became clear that the means of contributions that were standing out were the following: financial, material and technical, physical relocation and pathways to third countries, research, policy and legal reform and other means. Four of the categories overlap with some of the labels that states could choose from in the registration form. In the same way as for the categorization of goals of the contributions, the pledges can have empirical indicators for one or more of the categories of means, and the societal level of the contribution is not taken into account. If a pledge has an empirical indicator of a given mean, it is assigned a ‘yes’ for this mean. The premises and examples of quotes expressing empirical indicators for the two categories financial and ‘physical relocation and pathways to third countries’ are presented in table 3.1.4.<sup>5</sup>

For example, pledge 1148 commits to “... allocate(s) an amount of N\$ 70 000 000...”, which is understood as an empirical indicator for use of money or funding and is therefore categorized as financial. In the same manner, pledge 4057 commits to “... bring 50 million euros as a contribution to the response to the Venezuelan crisis...”. The empirical indicator of resettlement and pathway to third countries can be seen in pledge 4049 as “... carrying out resettlement of third-country nationals...”. Similarly, pledge 4270 commits to “...accept a total of 200 refugees in need of resettlement in the timeframe 2020-2021...”, which indicate that the country commits to relocate refugees.

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<sup>5</sup> See appendix table A3 for the complete set of categories and coding rules of means

**Table 3.1.4:** Categories for the means expressed in pledges to the Global Refugee Forum

<i>Means</i>	<i>Realm of the category</i>	<i>Examples of empirical indicators</i>
<i>Financial</i>	<p>If the means of the contribution are based on funding, or use of money, the pledge is assigned ‘financial’. This can be financial contributions to NGOs, states, international organizations, institutions, etc, or directly to refugees, offer something for free that indicates that the state will pay for it. On the other hand, if the pledge intends to construct something with funding from an external actor, the means of the pledge is technical, not financial.</p> <p>It is important to note that the financial category do not take into account whether the pledge was an existing yearly financial contribution or an increase.</p>	<p>“... In order to achieve the above the GoN allocates an amount of N\$ 70 000 000 for the period 2019 to 2023.” (Pledge ID 1148).</p> <p>“... maintain Canada’s existing annual level (\$12.6 million) of unearmarked funding support to UNHCR, and will extend the duration of this support to four years (2020 to 2023) for a total amount of \$50.4 million” (Pledge ID 2168).</p> <p>“...From 2020 to 2022, bring 50 million euros as a contribution to the response to the Venezuelan crisis, providing interventions to alleviate its impact...” (Pledge ID 4057).</p>
<i>Physical relocation and pathways to third countries</i>	<p>If the means for reaching the means of the pledge are based on physical relocation and/or enhancing pathways to third hosting countries, the pledge is assigned ‘physical relocation and pathways to third countries’.</p>	<p>“... accept a total of 200 refugees in need of resettlement in the timeframe 2020-2021, in annual in-takes of 100 persons. This means doubling our previous annual quota.” (Pledge ID 4270).</p> <p>“... Canada will resettle 19,000 refugees in 2019 through its Private Refugee Sponsorship Program...” (Pledge ID 2141).</p> <p>“Contributing to providing safe pathways for refugees by carrying out resettlement of third-country nationals in need of asylum to Lithuania.” (Pledge ID 4049).</p>

### **3.3.4. Internal validity and the challenges of analyzing pledges**

There is great variation in the length and detail of the pledges registered by states (See table A3 in appendix A). Some pledges are very specific and describe how the commitments will be implemented, while other pledges are short in description or lacking information. Some pledges contain a lot of information on current or previous conditions in a geographical unit or for a specified group of people, without specifying what their contribution is. This leads to difficulties for the categorization, and it is not always possible to assign a type for each category for all the pledges in the sample. The lack of empirical indicators can cause a pledge which in reality is a financial contribution to not be assigned ‘financial means’, because it does not state that money will be used. This is a possible source of bias in the data, weakening the internal validity of the categorized variables. In addition, pledges vary with respect to generosity, but the inconsistency in reporting the generosity and the lack of measures to determine the generosity made it not possible to account for in the categorization.

It is important to note that through analyzing the pledges, states’ intention to contribute to RS is not considered. A state might have had an intention to contribute based on a very wide scope of RS action but using a scope that does not acknowledge harmonization of legislation as RS, the data cannot deny a states’ intention to contribute in general but can say something about the commitments according to the scope and definition used.


## **3.4. Descriptive statistics: Responsibility-sharing in the Global Compact on Refugees**

The following section presents the descriptive statistics and tendencies of the dependent variable and the two dimensions goals and means. Based on the categorization, variables are coded categorically using a dichotomous approach. For the dependent variable, *RSC*, 1 indicates ‘yes’, while 0 indicates ‘no’. The same logic applies to the variables of goals and means, where 1 indicates ‘yes’, which implies that the pledge holds an empirical indicator of the given variable, and 0 indicates ‘no’, implying absence of a given empirical indicator. For descriptive statistics of all variables see table B1 in the appendices.

### 3.4.1. Dependent variable: Responsibility-sharing commitments

The distribution on the dependent variable shows that 105 of the 754 commitments from states are understood as RS. With the Global Compact on Refugees placing a lot of emphasis on RS, this is seen as a small share.


**Figure 3.4.1.1:** Distribution of responsibility-sharing commitments



*Note: Black indicates the pledge is understood as an RSC, grey indicates the pledge is not understood as an RSC.*

The distribution of RSC across submitting states, visualized in figure 3.4.1.2, demonstrate variation between countries both for the number of submitted pledges and the distribution of pledges understood as RSC. Some states have a considerable number of submitted pledges, yet none that are understood as RSC, such as Namibia, Chad and Rwanda. Mexico is the country with the largest share of pledges submitted (24 pledges), yet only 2 are considered RSC. As refugee producing countries and countries hosting large numbers of refugees have submitted pledges, they are included in the sample, and it is possible to assume that states who have a lot of responsibility to protect refugees will not submit commitments to take on more responsibility from other states. Other states have some pledges that are RSC and some that are not, such as Netherlands, Spain and Lithuania. In spite of the proportionally low number of pledges understood as RSC, some states have submitted a higher number of RSC, than not RSC. The states with this tendency are Slovenia, Slovakia, India, Iceland, Belgium and Liechtenstein.

**Figure 3.4.1.2: Distribution of responsibility-sharing commitments across countries**




*Note: Black indicates the pledge is understood as an RSC, grey indicates the pledge is not understood as a RSC.*

32 countries have submitted pledges understood as RSC. Considering only the pledges coded as RSC, Germany, Norway, Canada, and Denmark are the four countries who have submitted the largest number, with 7 or more RSC each. All these countries are western democratic countries with high ranks on multiple international indices related to policy, rights and economy. Moreover, none of the four countries are close to refugee producing regions.

Figure 3.4.1.4 demonstrate geographically the frequency of RSC across countries, the darker the color, the more RSC has the country submitted. The distribution indicates that most of the RSC is from countries in the Global North, particularly concentrated in Europe. The distribution on the dependent variable across submitting states show that levels and distributions are varying across countries. Contrarily, there is no RSC from countries on the African continent. The cross-country differences indicate that it is interesting to investigate the country-level of the commitments.

**Figure 3.4.1.4:** Geographical distribution of RSC across countries



*Note: The darker the color, the more RSC the country has submitted*

### 3.4.2. Descriptive statistics of Goals and Means

Considering the total of pledges submitted by states, the categories that have been assigned to the largest shares of pledges are the means of *Policy and Legal reform*, with 496 pledges, and the goal of *Statelessness*, with 262 pledges. Furthermore, among the means, a substantial share of pledges has been assigned *Material and Technical* (182 pledges) and *Financial* (92 pledges). Among the goals, *Protection Capacity* (177 pledges) and *Education* (77 pledges) are some of the largest categories<sup>6</sup>. In view of the pledges considered RSC, the frequency of the various goals and means are considerably different. Keeping in mind that only 105 of the pledges are considered RSC, none or only one of them are assigned either the means of *Research* or *Other means*, or the goals of *Statelessness*, *Health*, or *Self-reliance*. This indicates that these means and goals are not the tools states use or the aim of contribution when committing to RS even though they are imperative in pledges to the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees.


Figure 3.4.2.1 display the distribution of RSC across the goals *Education*, *Protection Capacity*, *Repatriation*, *Integration*, *Infrastructure and Use of resources*, and *Sustainable Solutions*. Among the six categories, it is evident that three of the goals are more prevalent, and is what states often focus on in RSC. These are *Education* (17 pledges), *Protection capacity* (23 pledges) and *Sustainable Solutions* (31 pledges). For the three remaining goals, *Repatriation* and *Jobs and Livelihood* only overlaps with four RSC, and *Integration* and *Infrastructure and Use of resources* only overlap with two RSC. From this, it is apparent that when contributing to international refugee RS, which implies a wider scope, it can be understood as states who take on a share of responsibility from another state focus on education, protection capacity and sustainable solutions.

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<sup>6</sup> See table B1 in the appendices for descriptive statistics of all variables categorized and coded from the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum.



**Figure 3.4.2.1:** Responsibility-Sharing Commitments distributed across different goals




*Note: Black indicates that the RSC has the respective goal, gray indicates that the RSC do not have the respective goal.*

Figure 3.4.2.2 visualize the distribution of RSC across the following means: *Financial, Policy and Legal reform, Material and Technical, and Relocation and Pathways to third countries.* *Financial* contributions are the most used mean when submitting pledges understood as RS, with 59 RSC. This makes up over half of the RSC. Keeping in mind that a RSC can possess

more than one mean, a commitment can have financial as the mean in addition to other means. *Relocation and pathways to third countries* is the second most frequent means with 28 RSC. These are the two most conventional means of RS action. With the wider scope of RS action, the means of *Policy and Legal reform* and *Material and Technical* can be understood as representing newer forms of RS. Despite less RSC are categorized with the newer means of action, for the two mentioned means, it is still a substantial amount. Concerning the total number of pledges, there is a significant change in the distribution of the means *Material and technical* and *Policy and legal reform*. While respectively 182 pledges are assigned *Material and Technical*, and 496 pledges are assigned *Policy and Legal Reform*, only 24 of the *Material and Technical*, and 19 of the *Policy and Legal Reform* are RSC, as visualized in figure 3.4.2.2.

**Figure 3.4.2.2:** Distribution of Responsibility-Sharing Commitments across different means



Note: Black indicates the RSC has the respective goal, gray indicates the RSC do not have the respective goal.

### 3.4.3. Summary and further analysis

The goal of the exploratory investigation has been to answer the first key question: *What are the differences and similarities between states' contributions to responsibility-sharing?* After the exploration of states contributions to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, it is revealed that 105 of the 754 pledges from states are RSC, which is a small share. 32 countries submitted RSC, and there is great variation on the number of RSC between countries. This is a possible indication that the Global Refugee Forum has not been used as extensively for RS as it first appears, and it suggest that there is less international cooperation to protect refugees than expected. Moreover, most of the RSC are from countries in the Global North, particularly concentrated in Europe. Despite the reaffirmed call for international RS, the small share of RSC indicates that there is still a great absence of sufficient international cooperation to protect refugees.

Furthermore, it is obvious that when committing to RS, states often aim towards the three goals of enhancing (1) education, (2) protection capacity and working towards (3) sustainable solutions for refugees and host communities. It is clear that a wider scope of RS is used when states have submitted pledges to the GRF. Particularly *Policy and Legal reform* and *Material and Technical* assistance can be understood as newer forms of contributing to RS. The extended scope of RS suggests that more aspects important to protect refugees and create sustainable solutions is being used. Furthermore, it implies that the wider scope of RS has been adopted to the international cooperation of refugee protection.

States choose their goals regarding RSC based on a range of different reasons, including their existing resources, know-how, and the cost of the type of contribution. However, as the above descriptive portrayal of RS shows, at this stage of knowledge accumulation in this field, it is more important to explain why states choose to contribute to RS at all rather than how. For further investigation of states contributions to RS, it is expedient to focus on whether states have contributed to RS or not. With this, I build on the variable of RSC for further analysis.

## **4. Explaining International Responsibility-Sharing**

The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the previous attempts to explain the issue of states contributions to responsibility-sharing. Thereafter, the theoretical framework for understanding which determinants can be used to explain the differences and similarities between states' contributions is put forward.

### **4.1. Earlier attempts to explain state behavior in relation to refugee responsibility-sharing**

Asylum is based on strong legal provisions, which links the question of why states contribute to asylum with the question of why they comply to international law (Betts 2010, 57; Carraro 2019, 1081). Responsibility-sharing on the other hand, has a weak normative and legal framework, which makes the issue of compliance differ from the one regarding international law. In line with the global debate on how states may contribute to refugee RS, there is an ongoing scholarly debate on what might explain states behavior and motivation in terms of contributions to RS. Some theories explain why states contribute, while others explain the lack of contributions. Not all explanations use the scope of RS as defined in this thesis. A narrower scope is often used, but because they attempt to explain states' contributions to refugee RS, they are expedient to understand the differences and similarities in states' behavior when using a wider scope.

Thielemann (2003) suggest that there are two logics mostly used in the literature on states contributions to refugee RS. The first is a cost-benefit logic, building on states' material motivations, in other words, interest-oriented explanations. The second logic is norm-based, building on non-material motivations. Using the same mindset, I divide the literature into interest-oriented explanations (Betts 2003, Betts 2010, Coen 2017, Noll 2003, Roper and Barria 2010, Schuck 1997, Suhrke 1998, Thielemann 2003, Thielemann 2018) and norm-oriented explanations (Betts 2003, Coen 2019, Thielemann 2003, Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). The interest-oriented explanations consider states' actions as driven by preferences based on calculated consequences, while the norm-oriented explanations

presume actions to be shaped by norms. Most of the literature on states contributions to responsibility-sharing can be understood as applying at least one of the two approaches. Within each approach, different explanations, motivations and views on states contributions to RS can be identified. The following section will address each approach and their respective explanations in turn.

## **4.2. Interest-oriented explanations**

The interest-oriented explanations understand actions as driven by rational and strategic behavior which anticipates consequences based on given preferences. Actors make decisions by evaluating expected consequences of their actions to reach a desired outcome and expect others to do the same. This rational choice approach anticipates that the formation of an actor's preference is external to the institutional context where the actors find themselves. Institutions only affect the strategic possibility of reaching desired outcomes (Thielemann 2003, 254). Building on a cost-benefit logic, the self-interest of the state is the baseline of the following explanations.

### *Refugee provision as a public good: the exploitation hypothesis*

Public goods theory has been used to develop an important analytical tool in the assessment of RS systems (Olsen 1965; Betts 2003, 275; Thielemann 2003, 256). A lot of the existing literature about forced migration and RS assumes that humanitarian provision of refugees, in the form of asylum or contributions to international refugee agencies, is an international good. Public goods are assumed to be characterized by non-excludability and non-rivalry between states. Once a good is produced, it is equally consumed or available to all members of society (Thielemann 2018, 69). Suhrke (1998, 389) emphasizes that the maintenance of the refugee regime's structure in total is seen as a public good, while the security threat for individual states is a private cost. The organized sharing of refugee protection grants a greater international order by allowing more predictable responses and lower costs during a refugee crisis (Suhrke 1998, 398). States value these goods and pursue them through organized international cooperation. By providing protection possibilities, the incentives and necessities to engage in further (secondary) movement of asylum seekers is reduced, which contributes to limit the effects such movements can cause (Thielemann 2018, 70).

Suhrke (1998, 399) illustrates this with the Prisoner's Dilemma, where it is likely that a suboptimal provision and free riding will characterize provision because of the divide between collective and individual interests. Each state is faced with the dilemma of choosing between moral duty and humanitarian obligation under international law, and the desire to minimize the number of refugees within its territory (Suhrke 1998, 398). Even if all states have an interest in maintaining multilateral humanitarian provisions for refugees, their unilateral incentive to cooperate is smaller. Olsen and Zeckhauser (1966, 268) suggest that the distributional consequences cause poor states to free ride on the rich because the richer states' provision will be enough to provide for the poorer states' demands. Larger states will also have less of an incentive to free ride because they are in a position to unilaterally contribute to a significant difference and have more to lose by not contributing (Olsen and Zeckhauser 1966, 269, Thielemann 2018, 69). This challenge is called 'the exploitation of the big by the small' (Olsen 1965, 29).

Betts (2003, 274) critiques the public goods model for assuming that refugee provision is inevitably characterized by collective action failure in the absence of a highly integrated formal regime structure. Moreover, it is not explicitly identified what the range of benefits are, and the varying excludability of benefits between states. Assuming RS is a pure public good, the explanation of provision to refugee protection implies that large countries in terms of economic resources and capacity to protect will contribute more than smaller states. In the intra-EU RS context, there are several examples of the opposite. Several economically smaller states have contributed with proportionally high levels of asylum, such as Denmark and the Netherlands in the early 2000s (Betts 2003, 297).

#### *Exposure to displacement*

Suhrke (1998, 403) points out that logic of the Prisoner's Dilemma is based on an inherent interdependence between the prisoners, but in refugee matters states are rarely in this 'imprisoned' situation. Suhrke (1998, 403) modifies the assumption by considering exposure to refugees in different regions. In regions where multiple states over time are likely to receive large flows of refugees, the prospect of a common destiny and reciprocity can engage states to form RS systems. In regions where the distribution of refugee flow has a tendency to be localized in one area over time, states will have a smaller incentive to engage in RS from the beginning. In such unipolar systems, a small number of states will be in 'prison', while the rest

of the states will only experience an indirect impact of refugee flows (Suhrke 1998, 403). With this it is possible to argue that exposure to refugees in a region is important for states incentive to contribute.

In line with the expectation that regions are a considerable factor, Suhrke (1998, 413) finds that after WW2 and the Vietnam War, states were more likely to participate in RS if it was called for within a region rather than among regions. Within regions, states have a common interest in managing the given refugee flow because it is likely that all will be affected. On the other hand, the case of European RS after the Yugoslav Wars demonstrates that with or without coordination to distribute responsibility, a restrictive dynamic can easily occur (Suhrke 1998, 414).

Similar to Suhrke (1998), Thielemann (2018) takes into account the dimension of exposure to displacement. According to Thielemann (2018, 70) the increased stability and security generated from a state's engagement in refugee protection will be an advantage for all the states in the region, regardless of whether a state has contributed or not. Therefore, benefits of stability and security generated by engagement in refugee protection can be understood as a public good. Thielemann (2018, 70) argue that insights from public goods theory can be highly relevant in cases of large-scale displacement. In situations of small-numbered refugee inflows, implications of stability and security are likely to not be much of a problem, and private goods produced by engagement in refugee protection are likely to shape political responses. In situations of large-scale refugee crisis, stability and security dynamics are expected to be more prominent. Thus, benefits of contributing can be understood as a public good in situations of large-scale displacement, the higher number of displacements in the region, the more states will contribute according to economic size and capacity to protect.

In a study of RS in Europe after the Syrian refugee crisis, Thielemann (2018, 79) finds that the public goods literature can contribute to the understanding of unequal and inequitable distribution of refugee responsibilities, for example the policy choices made by Germany during the Syrian crisis. The public goods literature calls for effective cooperation to curb free-riding dynamics. Thielemann (2018, 79) finds that non-binding RS mechanisms fail to deal with this challenge, indicating an inefficient cooperation.

### *Insurance rationale*

A different interest-oriented explanation is to view RS contributions as an insurance rationale. Schuck (249, 1997) has pointed towards insurance against future events as a motivation to engage in RS. States that do not generate displacement themselves are likely to reject a voluntary obligation to share responsibility for refugees. Yet, even these states might be willing to engage in some responsibility-sharing as a form of insurance against future events. States may rationally prefer to engage in a small and predictable protection burden in order to avoid bearing large unpredictable, unwanted and unstoppable inflows of refugees in the future (Schuck 1997, 249). RS schemes allows states to set off today's contributions against the expected reduced costs in a future crisis (Thielemann 2003, 256, Noll 2003). Thielemann (2003, 256) notes that when taking into account a cost-benefit logic, such a scheme can only be expected to include those who have a similar perception of risks that are worth sharing and will only be agreed upon when contributions reflect the differences in the relative risk perception of each participant.

### *The joint-product model*

Thielemann (2018, 70) suggest that a number of goods produced by refugee protection clearly do not qualify as a public good. For example, protection of individuals seeking refuge from persecution is above all a private good for the individuals concerned. Furthermore, the benefits of reputation that a state receives from increasing its engagement in humanitarian efforts to protect refugees is more of a private good. Building on the limits of RS as a public good, Betts (2003) argues that RS should instead be understood through the lens of Sandler's (1997) joint-product model. The joint-product model differs from public goods by the possibility of a state to derive private and excludable benefits from providing the good (Sandler 1997, 45). Instead of a given good or service providing one single non-excludable and non-rival benefit, the model assumes a good or service can provide multiple benefits that can vary in the degree of publicness between a given group of states.

Joint-products theoretically explain a lower level of free riding behavior because private benefits achieved through joint-products will make national allocations somewhat higher than what they would have been from a pure public goods case (Betts 2003, 278). The greater the share of excludable benefits, the greater should the coherence between received benefits and accepted responsibilities be. Therefore, when the share of excludable benefits is high, the economic size of the allied is expected to have a smaller influence on the sharing of



responsibility, and the exploitation hypothesis will be less relevant (Betts 2003, 278, Thielemann 2003, 257). Testing for a joint-product model, Thielemann (2003, 270) finds ambiguous results in the empirical evidence, suggesting that excludable benefits are problematic to identify in this area.

Betts (2003, 290) on the other hand, identifies and investigates three forms of excludable benefits and suggest the affirmation of a joint-product model. In the refugee RS context, excludable benefits can be about ethical and humanitarian norms such as prestige benefits and altruistic benefits, or deal with state-specific security benefits (Betts 2003, 286-288). Prestige benefits can motivate states to contribute, as a potential status as a humanitarian power can create leverage through linkage with other issue-areas of the regime. Altruistic benefits that derive from a state's wish for rights-based norms can directly affect their own perception of contributing as being a benefit. The state-specific security benefits assume historical links and language between country of origin and country of destination is a basis for refugees' choice of destination, and that these links often are tied to former colonialization. In terms of states' self-interest, they will intend to alleviate a potential security threat imposed by asylum-seekers. With this, they will be anticipated to direct their contributions towards the state's greatest source of asylum applications. Former colonial powers will therefore want security for specific countries they have historical links with, such as the UK earmarking financial contributions to its former colonies (Betts 2003, 288-290).

### *Culpability*

Similar to the state-specific security benefits argument, Coen (2017, 74) points towards culpability as an incentive to contribute to RS. Focusing on unequal power relations, while taking into account the historical and social context in where the political action has taken place, Coen (2017, 74) notes that appeals to share responsibility according to capacity to offer protection has been unsuccessful in overcoming the lack of collective action. She argues that in addition to national interests and capacity, RS can be shaped by culpability and by how states perceive their previous political decisions. In a study of the US's response to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis, she finds that states may resist to acknowledge their contributions to refugee crisis and seek to justify limited action through debates, over establishing culpability in situations of complex causal chains (Coen 2017, 85). Yet, she argues that there is some historical evidence that state's recognition of its causal involvement in refugee-producing conflicts can facilitate action (Coen 2017, 85).

### *Power relations: Incentives to contribute through issue-linkage*

Following the interest-based logic, Betts (2010, 57) highlight issue-linkages as important for explaining states contributions by emphasizing asymmetric power relations of North-South as inherent to the refugee regime. Thus, the dominant conception of the refugee regime as a Prisoner's Dilemma is misinterpreted. The question of states contributions is a puzzle dominated by power and interests other than reciprocity and legitimacy. Betts (2010) base his argument on the fact that most of the world's refugees are located in the Global South, and the refugee regime is creating few norms that commit states in the Global North to contribute to protection of refugees outside their territories. Hence, it is more appropriate to see the refugee regime as an analogy of the Suasion Game, the collective action problem where unequal power relation between the global North and South leads to the South having to accept 'what is on offer' or disengage in negotiations which in turn would hurt them more.

In a qualitative study of four attempts of the UNHCR to facilitate international RS, Betts (2010, 61-62) highlights issue-linkage as a way of overcoming the Suasion game. Issue-linkages refers to how issues are grouped together in formal interstate bargaining. Betts (2010, 77) finds that the most relevant linkages in the refugee regime are substantive linkages. These are based on how issues are grouped together through a structural relationship to each other (Betts 2010, 77). For the global North to voluntarily contribute to RS in the South, they have to be persuaded through substantive issue-linkages about material, ideational or institutional issues so that they will perceive protection in the South as being linked to their interests in other issue-areas such as security, immigration and trade (Betts 2010, 55).

#### **4.2.1. Summary of the interest-oriented explanations**

From the exposition of interest-oriented explanations it is obvious that they all place the foundation of states behavior on self-interest and the cost-benefit logic. If a state perceives a form of self-interest in contributing to refugee RS, whether the self-interest be collective action or private benefits, the chance of states engaging in RS is higher.

Public goods theory assumes international refugee RS to generate non-excludable benefits and expects states' contributions to RS to be shaped by exploitation of the big by the small, where larger states in terms of economic size and capacity contribute more than smaller states. This happens because smaller states free ride on larger states' contributions. In other words, it is expecting states with greater capacity to protect refugees to give a disproportionately larger contribution, while smaller states will have an incentive to free ride and therefore give a smaller contribution. Several scholars have critiqued the public goods theory of not conforming to the case of refugee RS, as excludable benefits might also occur. It is argued that perceiving contributions to RS as contributing to a public good is possible in cases of large-scale refugee inflow.

Both Thielemann (2018) and Suhrke (1998) argue that through exposure to displacement, the public benefits of stability and security generated by engagement in RS is expected to be more prominent, and states will therefore contribute more according to the displacement they are exposed to. Similarly, the insurance rationale logic suggest that states can be motivated to engage in RS as an insurance against future events. However, states will only agree upon this when contributions reflect the differences of relative risk perception of each participant. If a large scale-displacement event is geographically closer to the country, it affects the states' exposure to displacement and can give a more similar perception of risk. Hence, it is possible to argue that when applying public goods theory to large-scale inflow situations, the insurance rationale is also taken into account.

The joint-product model, which assumes provisions to share responsibilities of refugee protection as permitting multiple benefits that can be more or less excludable, expects states' contributions to refugee RS to be positively related to the proportion of excludable benefits allocated to the country when contributing. The state-specific benefit identified in Betts' (2003) joint-product model can be seen in coherence to Coen's (2017) culpability argument, emphasizing that a country's history of contributing events leading to displacement of refugees can have an effect on contributions to refugee RS. In other words, this can be understood as a cost-benefit logic in light of the country's self-interest to participate in RS. Furthermore, the persuasion through issue-linkage can also be understood explaining state behavior as deriving excludable benefits. Although it does not exclude public benefits, it also has to be private benefits present to persuade states to contribute.

### 4.3. Norm-oriented explanations

The norm-oriented explanations build on a logic of what is understood as appropriate in the international society. They do not necessarily reject the self-interest of the states, but rather emphasize the importance of norms for shaping actions. To understand norms in the context of states behavior in refugee RS, the logic of norms will first be addressed.

#### *The logic of appropriateness*

According to Krasner (1982), norms or shared understandings of acceptable behavior underpin most regimes and represents a moral position about what constitutes an appropriate action or outcome. A norm must indicate the specific behavior or action expected from a given actor and can therefore be distinguished from broad moral principles (Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, 4). The norm-based logic understands actions as guided by notions of identity and roles that are shaped by the institutional context where actors operate (Thielemann 2003, 254). In other words, actions are based on identity, priorities and understanding of reality according to socially constructed norms, rules and practices that are publicly known and presumed. The specific sociocultural institutional context might determine what is understood as appropriate, and shape motivation, choices and strategic behavior over time (Thielemann 2003, 255). In short, according to the norm-based logic, decisions are made in line with what is seen as appropriate, and institutions are the main aspect shaping the notion of what is appropriate (Thielemann 2003, 255).

On the international level, the logic of appropriateness applies collective expectations for rightful actions among states and other actors, which govern membership and status and legitimizes patterns of authority (Coen 2019, 2). The acceptance of what is understood as proper and acceptable takes place in a global social hierarchy where behavior is bound by societies with distinctive identities. Coen (2019, 2) suggest that these norms generate a possibility of comparative judgement, where states are ranked and assessed as ‘modern’ and ‘democratic’ in relation to each other. Within this paradigm, one can point towards the contribution by the US to global refugee RS and adherence to norms of asylum as legitimizing the US hegemony and confirmation of a ‘liberal democratic’ status (Coen 2019, 3).

### *Socialization of the Responsibility-Sharing Principle*

Bhattacharya and Biswas (2020, 4) argue that responsibility-sharing and non-refoulement are the main normative pillars of the refugee regime, and states are the key actors expected to support these norms through their actions. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 895) the influence of norms is a linear process with three stages, consisting of emergence, broad acceptance and internalization. In line with Finnemore and Sikkink's linear influence of norms, the process where states institutionalize the constitutive beliefs and practices that are institutionalized in its international environment is called international socialization (Fernàndes-Molina and de Larramendi 2020, 5). This socialization entails the feature that states shift from a "logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness" (Checkel 2005, 5-6). In situations of international socialization, it is often an asymmetric power relationship where the socializer has the role as a (core) member of the relevant community, while the actor being socialized tends to be outside or a novice of the relevant community. International socialization can be understood as a one-way process where the socializer controls the agency and the actor being socialized is a more passive recipient (Fernàndes-Molina and de Larramendi 2020, 6). In the case of refugee RS the agency can be UNHCR, and the actors being socialized are states who have not yet fully adopted the norm.

### *Norms in the refugee regime: a non-linear process*

Contrarily, others have argued that the process of norm adoption is not linear, and norms are often contested in terms of their application and validity, which is the case for the norm of refugee RS (Niemann and Schillinger 2017, Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, 4, Coen 2019, 3). According to Bhattacharya and Biswas (2020, 4), basic norms about the refugee regime seems widely shared on the surface, and few states would counter the notion that refugees should be protected from life threats and that the responsibility and cost of protection should be shared among countries. Yet, there is a trend that states make it difficult for refugees to arrive at their borders, especially in the Global North (Fitzgerald 2019, Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, 4). This indicates that the principle of non-refoulement is weak, and that collective responsibility-sharing is even weaker.

When investigating the links between norms and actions in the case of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Bhattacharya and Biswas (2020) finds that even though the Global North has given financial assets, rich countries has showed little interest in finding long term solutions for the Rohingya people (Bhattacharya and Biswas 2020, 14-15). While the advocates for refugee

norms are located in Europe and North America, the actors who have to bear the greatest share to implement the norms are located in the Global South.

#### *Weak principles and norm evasion*

Another explanation of states behavior in refugee RS is norm evasion. Coen (2019, 8) points towards the lack of RS guidelines, and argue that it has contributed to ad hoc and individualized government responses that can often be categorized by immigration control and geopolitical concerns. The pressure on states from UNHCR, human rights groups, and refugee advocates to accept refugees after major displacement events, indicate that a certain level of refugee resettlement is seen as appropriate. Simultaneously, it is not clear how much resettlement that constitutes sufficient RS or how little resettlement that represent a violation of obligations. The limited number of norms that require positive actions makes it easier for states to limit resettlement as there are few sanctions to fear (Coen 2019, 9). Despite recent normative attempts to reconceptualize contributions to asylum and refugee protection and strengthen more equitable refugee RS, for example through the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P), coercive intervention, rather than non-violent mechanisms has taken most of the focus (Coen 2019, 9). With a lack of mechanisms holding states accountable to clear and specific refugee resettlement standards the RS principle in the international refugee regime is considerably weak (Coen 2019, 9).

Coen (2019, 12) argues that the weak normative status of RS principles makes the lack of measures to hold states who are diverting from refugee protection accountable even worse. Weak norms limit protection of refugees and enriches exploration of norm-evasion in international relations, and foster possibilities to consider practical barriers to implementation of human rights (Coen 2019, 13). According to Coen (2019, 12), RS remain the weakest norm in the global refugee regime and lack any considerate codification or explicit criteria in terms of international refugee- and human rights law. This underlines the importance of acknowledging norms as multidimensional rather than singular units (Coen 2019, 14). When testing for norm-commitment, Thielemann (2003, 270) finds some proof of stronger commitment to a RS norm, monitored by a RS scheme, to increase states’ contributions.

#### *The logic of solidarity: adhering to norms*

Thielemann (2003) argues that even if the goals of contributing to RS are non-materialist, for example by actors adhering to certain norms, the underlying logic of action is often still

consequentialist (Thielemann 2003, 255). With this, he points to acts of solidarity as dependent on actors not acting according to the principle of utility maximation, but rather to the principle of universalization. Acting in the way they wish all others to act as well. Action on this basis is driven by the thought of fairness (Thielemann 2003, 257). If states act with solidarity, it can be seen as providing a way out of situations with the structure of the Prisoner's Dilemma.

In the context of RS, solidarity can be understood in two ways. Either as existing among a group of actors when they are committed to follow the outcome of some process of collective decision making, or to promote the wellbeing of other members of the group, sometimes at a cost to themselves (Thielemann 2003, 258). From this, Thielemann (2003, 258) argues that contributions to RS can be explained by notions of equity guiding the distribution of responsibility according to actual capacity of the different RS regime actors. It can also be explained by the variation among the participating states' commitments to norms that are related to the responsibility to be shared. Yet, he suggests there is little evidence of increasing solidarity between EU member states (Thielemann 2003, 270).

#### **4.3.1. Summary of norm-oriented explanations**

All the norm-oriented explanations have a common focus on norms as the baseline for states behavior in refugee RS. How strong the norms of RS are is what determines states willingness to contribute. In contrast to the interest-oriented explanations, the norm-oriented explanations cannot be as easily divided into different theories and arguments, instead they are more coherent. Still, the explanations slightly differ in the underlying mechanisms explaining how a certain norm is adopted and why states adhere to it. Most of the explanations builds on the logic of appropriateness, except the solidarity argument which also takes into consideration a consequentialist way of thinking.

The argumentation about the linear process of socialization and norm adoption can be understood as explaining whether states will contribute to RS by the level of norm implementation and socialization. The more a state perceives contributing to RS as the appropriate behavior, the more chance of the state contributing to RS. The norm evasion argument indicates that the RS principle as a norm is weak, and states' adherence to the

principle of RS is dependent on mechanisms to hold states accountable, which can explain the lack of responsibility-sharing.

A lot of the norm-oriented explanations focus on the norm of RS, and how the weakness of the norm can explain the lack of state's contributions to RS. The solidarity argument puts forward an incentive for states to contribute not only to act in line with appropriateness, but with a consequentialist logic based on the normative idea of universalization and fairness. States will want to act in line with collective decisions or aid others at a cost to themselves based on notions of equity. Thus, according to the logic of solidarity states will contribute according to capacity.

#### **4.4. Theoretical framework: Expectations and hypotheses**

Several of the outlined explanations do not assume to be exclusive explanations. In addition, as already pointed out, they can also be seen in coherence. It is important to underline that most of the earlier attempts to explain states behavior in relation to refugee RS has focused on physical and financial RS, in addition to a focus on inter regional sharing schemes. The commitments to the Global Refugee Forum after the Global Compact on Refugees are in no way close to a quota system, it is only an initiative to engage states in RS. Yet, it offers grounds to investigate if the emerging wider scope of the principle of RS can be explained in the same manner as previous and more restricted definitions. With the emerging renewal and expansion of the concept through the Global Compact on Refugees and the Global Refugee Forum it is expedient to investigate whether well implemented theories can explain states' behavior to refugee RS in the implementation of the GCR. With this, I argue for the investigation and testing of multiple explanations in the attempt of understanding states' contributions to refugee RS. I draw from the presented literature to identify underlying mechanisms and argue what can explain states' willingness to contribute to RS.

##### *Economic size and capacity*

Considering the interest-oriented theory on public goods, which is based on the security, stability and lower costs during a potential future refugee crisis is understood as non-excludable benefits, and hence a public good. The public goods argument assumes the exploitation hypothesis to shape states' contributions. Larger states in terms of economic size and capacity



to protect refugees will contribute more than smaller states. With this, a state's perception of contributing to the refugee regime as contributing to a public good of security and stability will give states incentives to contribute to RS.

The solidarity argument on the other hand assume that states behavior is driven by the normative thoughts of universalization and fairness rather than utility maximation. With a consequentialist mindset, notions of equity will guide states' behavior, offering states an incentive to contribute to RS according to their economic size and capacity. Thus, with different underlying mechanisms, both the public goods theory and the solidarity argument implies that economic size and capacity to protect refugees will have a positive relationship with commitments to RS, where larger states in terms of economic size and capacity will contribute more than smaller states. Hence, the following hypothesis is formulated.

H1: *Large states, in terms of economic size and capacity, will contribute more than smaller states.*

#### *Regional exposure to displacement*

Suhrke's public goods argument explains that with the prospect of a common destiny and reciprocity, states will view contributions to RS as a public good if the region has large refugee flows. The more refugees in a region, the more prominent will the non-excludable benefits for contributing be. Differently from Suhrke, who consider whether RS is called for within a region, and a more limited scope of RS, I investigate an international call for RS with a wider scope. In the same fashion as Suhrke argues, I will emphasize that in a globalizing world, the displacement may not be derived from within the region. Exposure to displacement within the region may still make the prospect of common destiny and reciprocity more prevalent, but the contributions to RS can be directed to states outside the region. Exposure to displacement will therefore give states a higher incentive to contribute to RS in general.

Furthermore, considering the insurance rationale, states may rationally prefer to engage in RS to avoid large unpredictable, unwanted and unstoppable inflows of refugees in the future, but this will only matter if states have a similar perception of risk. More displacement in the region will result in states perceiving the risk of not contributing to stability and security as higher. Therefore, the more exposed states are to displacement in the region the larger incentive they

will have to contribute to RS. These two underlying mechanisms both assume that the number of refugees in a region will have a positive relationship with states behavior for contributing to RS. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

H2: *The more exposed to displacement of refugees in the region, the more states will be willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing.*

#### *Former colonial power*

Considering the state-specific security benefits of Betts' three forms of joint-products, historical links may be a factor in asylum-seekers choice of destination and will give states incentives to contribute to specific countries to reduce the security threat from increased migration from that country.

Moreover, states behavior can be shaped by culpability from their previous political decisions. Causal involvement in refugee producing conflicts can lead states to feeling culpable which can give an incentive to contribute. I argue that this can be transferred to former colonial powers as in the colonial era, colonizers were often very intrusive. With this it is possible to argue that if a state is culpable of being a former colonizer it has a larger incentive to contribute to RS because of its history.

H3: *If a state is a former colonial power, it will be more willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing.*

#### *Signatory to Conventions*

Following a norm-based mindset, how strong the principle of RS stand as norm in a respective state will affect their willingness to contribute. It is possible to argue that a state's traditions for international cooperation to protect refugees can be an indicator of their recognition and implementation of a norm, considering the theory of socialization and taking into account the international conventions that a state has entered. It is possible to argue that the degree of being exposed to an international norm increases with the number of international conventions that a state is involved in. I therefore expect that states will perceive contributions to RS as the most appropriate action based on how well the norm of RS is socialized in the state. The more

conventions a state has signed, the more socialized and the stronger the norm, moreover, the more willingness to contribute to RS.

H4: *The more conventions concerning international cooperation to protect refugees that a state is signatory to, the more willingness the state will have to contribute to refugee responsibility-sharing.*

## 5. Data and measurement

The purpose of this chapter is to present the data that will be analyzed and the operationalization and measurement of the variables of interest.

### 5.1. Dataset

The data on Responsibility-Sharing Commitments from the Global Refugee Forum is utilized as a basis for a multilevel cross-sectional dataset. I use an original dataset consisting of 1) data on RSC coded from commitments to the Global Refugee Forum in *Chapter 2*, 2) data on asylum decisions, applications, and forcibly displaced population from UNHCR Refugee Statistics Database<sup>7</sup>, 3) data from the United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), 4) economic and control variables from Quality of Government Standard Dataset 2021 (QoG), and 5) data from the United Nations Development Program.<sup>8</sup> The analysis is spatially limited to countries who have submitted pledges to the GRF. The datasets cover 104 of the countries who submitted commitments to the GRF. For complete coding of all variables and the respective data source, see appendix table B1 in the appendices.

#### 5.1.1. Validity and reliability considerations

Validity and reliability are two important criteria to assure the quality of data. Validity refers to the extent that the measured data explain the phenomenon (Grønmo 2016, 241). More specifically, external validity refers to the challenge of generalization (Campbell and Russo 2001, 8). In this thesis, the data cover 104 of the 120 countries that have submitted commitments to the GRF, thus the population and units do not coincide. Still, the selection is understood as sufficiently large to generalize to the population. Reliability refers to the consistency of the measured data and whether it can be replicated (Grønmo 2016, 240). As all data sources are

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<sup>7</sup> The UNHCR Refugee Statistics Database has several datasets available through a data finder.

<sup>8</sup> See appendix table B1 for operationalization, coding and data sources for all variables.

well recognized and available on the respective websites, the data is considered verifiable and reliable (UNHCR 2021; QoG 2021; UNTC; UNDP 2019).

**Table 5.1.** Descriptive Statistics


<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
<b>Dependent variable</b>				
Responsibility-Sharing Commitments	0.936	1.978	0.000	10.000
<b>Country-level variables</b>				
Log(GDP per capita)	9.201	1.285	6.435	11.943
Asylum Capacity	0.257	1.224	-0.964	10.574
Former Colonial Power	0.091	0.289	0.000	1.000
Signatory to conventions	5.791	0.637	2.000	6.000
<b>Regional level variables</b>				
Log(Displacement in Region)	15.032	0.744	13.866	15.872
<b>Control variables</b>				
Liberal Democracy	0.458	0.259	0.039	0.865
International Migrant Stock	7.578	11.930	0.132	75.498
Income Inequality	23.783	10.435	6.300	57.700
Women in Parliament	24.529	12.169	0.000	61.300
<b>N</b>				104

## **5.2. Dependent variable: From the level of commitments to the country-level**

As outlined in *Chapter 2*, contributions to RS are operationalized to *Responsibility-Sharing Commitments* and is seen as having high defining validity. The RSC is based on Milner's (2005,

65) definition of RS as “the principle through which the diverse costs of granting asylum assumed by the host state are more equitably divided among a greater number of states”. The variable is a count variable based on the dichotomous RSC variable indicating whether or not a pledge can be understood as RS. The count variable indicates how many RSC each country has submitted, ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 indicates no RSC and 10 indicates 10 RSC. It is important to take into account that the coding procedure for the variable might cause the distribution to be skewed. As illustrated in figure 5.2.1 there is a large number of zeros, indicating that a large number of countries have not submitted pledges considered as RSC.

**Figure 5.2.1:** Distribution on the dependent variable: Responsibility-Sharing Commitments



*Note: The figure indicates the number of states that have submitted a respective number of responsibility-sharing commitments*

## 5.3. Country level independent variables

### 5.3.1. Economic size

Through the incentive to contribute to a public good, and solidarity where actions are guided by notions of equity, larger states in terms of economic size are expected to contribute more to RS than smaller states. To measure this, the independent variable *economic size* is operationalized to *GDP per Capita*. The variable is gathered from the QoG Standard dataset 2021 and measure the 2018 real GDP per capita in 2011 US dollars.<sup>9</sup> Previous studies have used GDP and GNP as measures of economic size (Thielemann 2003, Betts 2003). By using GDP per Capita, the variable measures GDP relative to population size, which makes the numbers more comparable. With the dependent variable RSC as a baseline, to adjust for skewed data caused by the large difference in values, I use the logarithm of GDP per capita.

### 5.3.2. Capacity to protect refugees: Asylum capacity

In the same manner as economic size, states with larger capacity to protect refugees are expected to contribute more. With a lack of a unified framework on how to measure capacity to protect refugees, the independent variable *capacity to protect refugees* is operationalized to *asylum capacity*. This operationalization can be understood as having a lower defining validity. Asylum capacity is calculated as share of asylum applications not processed relative to total number of asylum applications, in other words, the share of unprocessed applications. The variable is calculated by using the UNHCR Asylum decisions variable “Total decisions”, which indicates the total number of asylum applications processed per year, and the UNHCR Asylum applications variable “Applications” indicating the number of asylum applications the country has received per year. It is reasonable to assume that applications processed a specific year might be from the year before or earlier because of the duration of the asylum application process. In addition, the number of applications can have a substantial variation from year to

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<sup>9</sup> The variable is drawn from the QoG Standard Time-series Dataset to get numbers from 2018, as the cross-sectional data only offer GDP per Capita from 2017.

year. It is possible to assume that when states reflect on their own capacity to protect refugees, they will have more than just the last year in mind. Hence, the variable is based on applications and decisions from 2014 to 2019, capturing data from before the 2015 refugee crisis. The variable is calculated in the following way:  $\text{Total decisions (2014-2019)} - \text{Applications (2014-2019)} / \text{Applications (2014-2019)}$ . Thus, the higher share of unprocessed asylum applications, the less capacity.

### **5.3.3. Former Colonial Power**

Colonial ties can motivate states to contribute to RS through the state specific private benefit that might drive the states incentive to contribute, the possible culpability from previous political decisions, and through historical ties. For example, the UK earmark financial contributions to its former colonies, and can use the Commonwealth for easier access to aid (Betts 2003; Coen 2017; Dorussen, Krichner and Sperling 2009). The independent variable, *former colonial power*, measure whether a state is a former colonial power or not. Based on Hadenius and Teorell's variable of Colonial Origin (from QoG Standard Dataset 2021), former colonial powers include the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, Portugal, Belgium, and Australia. In addition, Japan is included. The selected countries are based on colonization after 1700. The variable is coded in a dichotomous fashion from 0-1 where 1 indicates the country is a former colonial power.

### **5.3.4. Signatory to Conventions**

The more conventions about international cooperation to protect refugees that a state is signatory to, the more socialized the norm of RS is within the state, resulting in more willingness to contribute. To measure this, the variable *signatory to conventions* is included. Previous studies applying a variable for signatory to conventions have used the 1951 Convention Relating to the status of Refugees as a measure (Roper and Barria 2010, 625). As the goal of the variable is to measure states' degree of socialization, it is expedient to include more than one convention or agreement, hence, to measure states signings of conventions and agreements a selection of UN conventions and agreements relating to protection of refugees is



obtained from the UN Treaty Collection. The selection is based on conventions and agreements emphasized as important in the Global Compact on Refugees. The variable is a count from 0-6 that measure the number of agreements and conventions a country has signed.

#### **5.4. Regional level independent variable: Exposure to displacement**

The more exposed states are to displacement in the region, the more prevalent the prospect of common destiny and reciprocity will be. Moreover, the risk generated by not contributing to stability and security will be higher. With a lack of existing data and literature measuring exposure to displacement, taking into account the limits of this thesis, *exposure to displacement* is operationalized to exposure to *forcibly displaced people in region*. The variable is calculated from the UNHCR Population Data on refugees, people in refugee-like situations, and asylum-seekers. The country-level data is summarized to the regional level, applying the following regions: The Americas, Asia and the Pacific, East Africa, Europe, Middle East and Northern Africa, Southern Africa, and West and Central Africa. The specific regions are chosen based on UNHCR's use of regions in the Refugee Statistics. IDPs are not included in the variable because they are located in-country and therefore do not pose the same sense of exposure. The variable does not consider whether a country is bordering a region with large numbers of refugees. To adjust for large differences in values, the variable is logged.

#### **5.5. Country level control variables**

Despite that the outlined independent variables are considered as the main possible explanations for states contributions to RS, it is expedient to assure robustness of the findings by controlling for other factors found important in previous studies. I draw from studies on RS and international humanitarian cooperation.

### **5.5.1. Foreign population**

Thielemann (2003, 265) finds a correlation between stock of foreign population and RS. Following the logic of Festinger's (1954, 117-118) argument of in-group bias, based on the cognitive process of social categorization, people will be biased towards the group constituting "people like us", in contrast to the "devalued others" (Johnston 2001, 491). The larger share of foreign population in a state, the less will the we-identity matter because the we-group will have a wider scope, and the "others" will be smaller. Thus, the larger share of foreign population, the more willing to contribute to RS, a state will be. To control for this, foreign population is operationalized to *international migrant stock*, measured as percentage of population. The variable is from the World Development Index, gathered from the QoG Standard dataset 2021.

### **5.5.2. Level of democracy**

Previous studies have found level of democracy to be of interest. Democratic states are likely to experience a stronger sense of responsibility to contribute to RS to promote rule of law in the area of refugee protection (Roper and Barria 2010, Uzonyi 2015). Hence, level of democracy is included as a control variable, and operationalized to the *Liberal Democracy Index* from Varieties of Democracy, gathered from the QoG Standard dataset 2021. The variable is suitable because the measures level of democracy through taking into account constitutionally protected civil liberties, rule of law, independent judiciary, effective checks and balances and electoral democracy. The variable is a scale from 0 to 1 where the closer to 1, the closer to liberal democracy a state is.

### **5.5.3. Economic and gender Inequality**

Following the logic of appropriateness, states that have more economic and gender equality can be assumed to consider equal opportunities across economic situation and gender for all their citizens as an appropriate goal. When the state gains new citizens, it has to provide equal opportunities for them too, which is not in the self-interest of the state. Therefore, states that are more economically and politically equal will be less willing to contribute to RS. *Economic*

*equality* is operationalized to *inequality of income*. The variable is based on data from 2018 and is gathered from the UNDP Human Development Indices that measure the “inequality in income distribution based on data from household surveys estimated using the Atkinson inequality index”. The higher the score on the index, the more inequality of income in the country. Gender equality is operationalized to *women in national parliaments*. The variable is from the QoG Standard dataset and measure the share of seats held by women in single and lower houses in 2018.

## 6. Methodological approach

The purpose of this chapter is to present the methods of analysis used in this thesis, emphasizing advantages and disadvantages. The dependent variable, RSC, measure the number of RSC states have submitted, therefore a cross-sectional count model is appropriate, more specifically a negative binomial regression. Considerations about causal inferences are discussed before the choice of methods is elaborated, and the specific regression models and estimation technique are discussed.

### *Considerations of causal inference*

A causal relationship can be explained as X being the cause of an outcome, Y. Given certain background- and scope-conditions, the change in X generates changes in Y relative to what Y otherwise would be (Gerring 2012b, 199). The second key question of this thesis, *What are the determinants of states' contributions to RS?*, implies the necessity of exploring causal mechanisms. The theoretical expectations outlined in *Chapter 4* specifies underlying mechanisms and outcomes. According to Kittel (2006, 666), statistical methods can mostly offer the possibility to test hypotheses about correlation but cannot say anything about the causality. In the same fashion several of the hypotheses are generated based on more than one underlying mechanism. Therefore, testing the hypotheses, can only be assumed to indicate correlation between the identified variables and RSC. In addition, George and Bennett (2005, 21) point out that statistical methods exclude contextual factors except from the ones codified in the selection of variables, this underlines the importance of including control variables.

### 6.1. Multilevel Cross-Sectional Analysis

To investigate the relationship between RSC and the identified variables, a multivariate cross-sectional regression analysis of multilevel data will be conducted. The use of statistical analysis facilitates the comparison of information from a large number of cases, providing for statistical control and possible generalization of potential relationships between dependent and independent variables (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, Fearon and Laiting 2008, 757). This comes at the expense of complexity and particularities about unique cases (Ragin 1987, 26). At this stage of investigating contributions to international RS the possibility of generalization is

advantageous. The multivariate regression will identify the effect of one variable on the dependent variable, *RSC*, while other variables are held constant. Thus, predicting the effect of one variable while controlling for the others. This form of modelling enables the opportunity of taking into account the country-level count variable of *RSC*, and testing both on the country-level and the effect of the variable on the regional level.

Multilevel analysis is a technique where the hierarchically lower level is nested within the higher level. This enables the possibility of combining more than one level of analysis in the same model and to explore causal heterogeneity (Steenbergen and Jones 2002, 219). In this investigation, countries are nested within regions. My main theoretical reason for using multilevel analysis is that the theoretical framework (*Chapter 4*) assumes states commitments to *RS* to be affected by exposure to displacement in the region. In other words, I assume that the number of commitments a state has submitted is varying across regions depending on the displacement. Not including variables on the regional level could lead to ignoring important variables that can help to explain *RSC* at the country-level (Finch, Bolin and Kelley 2019, 29). Analyzing data from different levels allows for the exploration of causal heterogeneity and makes it possible to investigate whether factors on higher levels moderate causal effects on lower levels. Thus, providing a generalizability test for the country-level results within the population (Finch, Bolin and Kelley 2019, 29; Steenberg and Jones 2002, 219).

## **6.2. Analyzing count data: Negative Binomial Regression**

This thesis will apply a negative binomial regression, considering the count feature of the dependent variable, *RSC*. Count variables are often overdispersed, meaning the variance exceeds the mean, and the outcome will be skewed (Hilbe 2011, 9; Yang and Berdine 2015, 50). The conditional distribution on the dependent variable, *RSC*, is overdispersed (see table 6.2.1). This can be caused by unobserved heterogeneity or an incorrect assumption about independence of events (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 674). In the case of states submitting pledges with *RSC* to the Global Refugee Forum there is a possibility that if a country has submitted a *RSC*, it is a higher chance of the country submitting several *RSC*. This is what Yang and Berdine (2015, 50) call a contagious event, where the first incident makes it more

likely for the next, even if it's still random. A common model for dealing with overdispersed data is the negative binomial regression (Hilbe 2011).


Furthermore, the large number of zero counts on the dependent variable (see figure 5.2.) requires precautions before fitting a model. An option would be to apply a zero-inflated Poisson regression, which assumes zero-counts to occur in two ways, through a binary process and a count process (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 681). It is not theoretically clear which explanatory variables predict whether RSC always or sometimes has the value zero. Only states who have submitted pledges in the first place are included in the sample, furthermore, there is no theoretically argued limit or mechanism that would cause some countries to be "always zeros". This is in contrast to the assumption of the zero-inflated Poisson regression. A negative binomial model is therefore preferred for analyzing the data.

The negative binomial is an extension the Poisson regression, which is commonly used for count data. Negative binomial has a lot of assumptions in common with the Poisson regression, such as linearity in the model parameters, independence of individual observations and the multiplicative effect of the independent variables (Yang and Berdine 2015, 51). The Poisson model assumes the variance in the count-outcome to be the same as the mean, which is called equidispersion. In Poisson regressions, the dispersion parameter connecting the variance and mean is fixed at 1. The more flexible negative binomial on the other hand estimates the dispersion parameter and allows for independent specification of the variance and mean (Atkins and Gallop 2007, 732). Since the difference between Poisson and negative binomial is in the variance, the regression coefficients are often similar across models, while standard errors can be very different (Atkins and Gallop 2007, 732). In the presence of overdispersion relative to the Poisson distribution, using a Poisson regression can cause deflated standard errors and inflated test statistics, overestimating the significance parameters of the model. Using the negative binomial, it is a great chance that the standard error will be larger, but more appropriate (Yang and Berdine 2015, 50). If a Poisson or negative binomial have a small sample, it might cause bias in the results. As the analysis have 104 units, a possible bias will be considered in the discussion of the results.

### 6.3. Pre-Analysis: Assumptions and model comparison

In this section the assumptions of multilevel modelling and the negative binomial regression are considered. These consist of variation across different levels, the absence of multicollinearity, overdispersion on the dependent variable, an assessment of model choices and linearity of the model.

**Figure 6.3.1:** Responsibility-Sharing Commitments across regions



*Note: The figure shows the distribution on RSC across regions, which indicates the number of countries with the respective number of RSC across regions.*

#### *Intra-Class Correlation*

When analyzing multilevel data, there are three main assumptions (Luke 2004, 17). In addition to (1) theoretical reasons previously discussed, (2) the variables should be independent from one another, and there should be (3) empirical evidence across different levels. Using the Intra-Class Correlation Coefficient (ICC), the degree to which observations are correlated within groups are measured (Hox, Moerbeek, and van de Schoot 2017, 4-7). The ICC can be

understood as measuring the total variance of Y that is *between* countries, where 0 indicates no variance among clusters and 1 indicates variance among clusters but no variance within cluster (Finch, Bolin and Kelley 2019, 24). Based on an empty model, which contains no independent variables, the ICC value is measured to be 0.735. This is well above the often-used threshold of 0.5 and indicates that 73,5 percent of the variation on RSC is between countries (Christophersen 2013, 112). The cross-regional differences are underlined by the distribution of RSC clustered by regions, as illustrated in figure 6.3.1. The differences across regions highlight the advantage of including the regional level when investigating RSC.

### *Multicollinearity*


The second assumption for analyzing multilevel data, and an important assumption for the negative binomial regression is that multicollinearity does not prevent isolation of distinctive effects from each variable. If strong correlation is present in multivariate regression models, small changes in the models may change the coefficients erratically (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 238). A correlation analysis indicates that some of the variables have a substantial correlation. This is visualized in figure. 6.2.1, where the darker the color, the higher level of correlation. The strongest correlation is between *GDP* and *forcibly displaced people in the region*, and *GDP* and *Liberal Democracy* (corr: 0,68  $p < 0,05$  for both). There is also a certain correlation between *Income Inequality* and *forcibly displaced people in region* (corr: -0,62  $p < 0,05$ ). This problem occurs if two or more variables in the model have high correlation with each other (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018). On the other hand, estimation of the “Variation Inflation Factor” (VIF), with results between 1.120 and 3.130 indicates that multicollinearity is unproblematic<sup>10</sup> (Midtbø 2012, 128). VIF scores are usually considered as suggesting that multicollinearity can cause estimation problems if the scores are higher than 10 (Chatterjee and Hadi 2012, 250). With the differing results from the correlation analysis and the VIF test, the highly correlated variables will be considered carefully when interpreting the regression results.

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<sup>10</sup> See table D1 in the appendices for complete results from the VIF-test



**Figure 6.2.1. Correlation Analysis**



*Note: Level of correlation is indicated by degree of color. The more color, the higher degree of correlation.*

### Overdispersion

Because the Poisson model and the negative binomial model are nested, tests for overdispersion and deviance can be considered (Yang and Berdine 2015, 50). As presented in table 6.2., the variance on the dependent variable exceeds the mean. In addition, a dispersion test of a fitted Poisson model confirms overdispersion in the data, with a dispersion ratio of 1.363 and a  $p < 0.05$ . This confirms the assumption that the Poisson model is not suited for modelling the data<sup>11</sup>. A KS test (figure 6.2.2.) of the negative binomial model performs a dispersion test,

<sup>11</sup> See table D2 in the appendices for the results of the overdispersion test.

which is not significant, indicating the data fit the model. Thus, it supports the fitting of a negative binomial model over the Poisson model.

**Table 6.2.1.** Variance and mean on the dependent variable: RSC

Variance	Mean
4.096	0.980

*Addressing the dispersion parameter: NBII and NBI*

For regression analysis, there are two standard variants of the negative binomial. The NBII, which was outlined in the previous section is the most common variant, has a conditional variance that is quadratic in the mean (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 676). The other type of negative binomial is NBI, which has a linear variance function, where dispersion is held constant. NBII often provides a good fit when the assumption of the Poisson fails, yet the poor performance of the Poisson can be caused by poor specification of the conditional mean function, which is maintained for the NBII model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 676). To make sure the model chosen is the one most fitting for the data the goodness of fit is compared across a Poisson, NBII and NBI model. The NBI model was fitted using the `gamlss` package, whereas the NBII and the Poisson is from the `glm` package.

**Table 6.2.2:** Comparison of goodness of fit across count models

*Comparison of Poisson, NBII and NBI*


	<i>Log Likelihood</i>	<i>AIC</i>	<i>BIC</i>
<i>Poisson</i>	-82.770	185.54	211.9832
<i>NBII</i>	<b>-80.0684</b>	<b>182.1369</b>	<b>211.2252</b>
<i>NBI</i>	-82.01027	186.0205	215.1088

*Note: The fitted models are estimated without a multilevel technique.*

Log likelihood is a measure for goodness of fit of the models. As illustrated in table 6.2.2, the NBII model has the highest log likelihood value and is therefore understood as the better model for explaining variation in RSC. The AIC value also indicate that NBII is the model with most

explanatory power, as it has the lowest score. However, considering BIC, the Poisson model does slightly better. In total, the model comparison confirms the choice of NBII as the model most suitable for the analysis.

**Figure 6.2.2.** One-Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test



*Note: The figure presents a qq-plot of the estimated parameter of the multilevel negative binomial model including all variables, a KS-test for correct distribution, dispersion and outliers.*

*Linearity*

An assumption of the negative binomial is linearity of the model. The datapoints in the quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot is approximately on a straight line, which indicates that the linearity assumption is fulfilled. A KS test is used to check for normality in the model by testing whether

a simulated sample comes from the specific distribution (Hartig 2021). The p-value of the KS test is not statistically significant, and the null hypothesis of normally distributed data is assumed. Hence, the assumption of linearity on the in the model parameters is maintained.

### *Outliers*

It is important to investigate whether unusual observations disproportionately influence the results (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 258). To check for outliers, also termed influential cases, I use the outlier test from the KS test. The test score, which is not significant, indicate that outliers is not problematic when fitting the model.

Except from the small sample and the differing results about multicollinearity, the assumptions of the negative binomial regression are met.

## 7. Results

The goal of this chapter is to make a foundation for the discussion of the potential underlying mechanisms explaining states commitments to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact in Refugees. The effects of different determinants are tested using a multilevel negative binomial regression.

When using multilevel modelling, it is important to be aware of level fallacy, which can happen if the researcher draws conclusions on one level based on data from another (Grønmo 2016, 411). To avoid this, models of country level variables are fitted before the regional level is included. The first model estimates the predicted effect all country level independent variables of the analysis. In model 2, country-level control variables are added. Model 3 includes the regional level variable. To measure the goodness of fit and compare the models, log likelihood, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) are used.

The coefficients of a negative binomial represent the change in the logarithm of the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the independent variable (Hilbe 2011). In contrast to linear regressions, the coefficients from a negative binomial can be understood as having a multiplicative rather than additive impact on the dependent variable. This is because the model is estimated using a logarithmic link function. Thus, the coefficient is not linear, instead the dependent variable would be multiplied by  $e$  to the coefficient for each one-unit increase in the independent variable. Often, the coefficients of negative binomial regression are presented as Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) for easier interpretation. With this, standard errors can no longer be related to the coefficient. Therefore, the raw coefficient of the negative binomial is presented. Table 7.1. provides the results of the multilevel negative binomial regression. The three models will be examined and discussed in order before the model fit is compared.

### 7.1. Multilevel Negative Binomial Regression Results

There are various interesting findings that needs to be examined. Model 1 includes the country level independent variables *GDP*, *Asylum Capacity*, *Former Colonial Power* and *Signatory to Conventions*, where only *GDP* is statistically significant. The model indicates a substantial

positive effect of *GDP* on *RSC*, which is significant at 1 percent level. This suggest that the higher *GDP* a country has, the more *RSC* they will submit. *Asylum capacity* on the other hand has a negative sign, which indicates that a one-unit increase in *Asylum Capacity* will cause a decrease in *RSC* with -1.57 multiplied by e. Before interpreting the results of *Asylum Capacity*, it is important to note that the variable measures the share of unprocessed asylum applications. Thus, the higher the share, the less capacity to protect refugees. The negative predicted effect of *Asylum Capacity* on *RSC* indicates that the smaller share of unprocessed asylum applications, the more *RSC* a state will submit. Yet, with the lack of statistical significance, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. *Former Colonial Power* also has a negative predicted sign, which indicates that if a country is a former colonial power, it is likely to submit fewer *RSC*, but with the lack of significancy, no conclusion can be drawn. *Signatory to Conventions* has a positive effect, suggesting that the more conventions signed, the more *RSC* the county will submit, however, the effect is not significant.


In model 2, all control variables are included in addition to the country level independent variables. The effect of *GDP* remains positive and significant at 1 percent level, but the effect is less substantial compared to model 1. The effects of *Asylum Capacity*, *Former Colonial Power* and *Signatory to Conventions* maintain the direction, but the effects are less substantial. Considering the control variables, the model shows significant effects of *International migrant stock* and *Liberal Democracy*. *International migrant stock* has a negative effect which is significant at 5 percent level. This implies that the larger share of foreign population in a country, the fewer *RSC* will be submitted. The effect of *Liberal Democracy* is positive, which indicates that the higher score on the Liberal Democracy index, the more *RSC* it is likely that the country will submit. The effect is significant at 10 percent level and does not reach a sufficient level for generalization. *Income inequality* has a small non-significant negative effect, the sign would indicate that the higher inequality of income, the less *RSC* is predicted to be submitted. *Women in National parliaments* have a small positive effect on *RSC*, implying that the more representation of women in parliaments, the more *RSC* will be submitted, however, the effect is not significant, and no effect must be assumed.

**Table 7.1:** Negative Binomial Regression effect on Responsibility-Sharing Commitments

<b>DV: Responsibility-Sharing Commitments</b>			
<b>Variables</b>	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
<u>Country level independent variables</u>			
<i>Log(GDP)</i>	2.009*** (0.264)	1.711*** (0.412)	1.647*** (0.423)
<i>Asylum Capacity</i>	-0.157 (0.368)	-0.121 (0.334)	-0.148 (0.373)
<i>Former Colonial Power</i>	-0.028 (0.326)	-0.206 (0.284)	-0.241 (0.289)
<i>Signatory to Conventions</i>	0.731 (0.745)	0.597 (0.675)	0.400 (0.708)
<u>Control variables</u>			
<i>International migrant stock</i>		-0.041** (0.018)	-0.040** (0.018)
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>		2.218* (1.286)	2.370* (1.316)
<i>Income Inequality</i>		-0.012 (0.021)	-0.001 (0.025)
<i>Women in national parliaments</i>		0.014 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)
<u>Regional level independent variable</u>			
<i>Log(Displacement in Region)</i>			0.341 (0.394)
<b>Mean</b>	<b>intercepts</b>	-24.653***	-22.047***
		-25.742***	
<b>N</b>	104	104	104
<b>Log Likelihood</b>	-88.263	-82.393	-82.010
<b>AIC</b>	190.526	186.785	188.021
<b>BIC</b>	209.037	215.873	219.753

*Note: The models report results from multilevel negative binomial regression analysis.  $p < 0.01 = ***$ ,  $p < 0.05 = **$ ,  $p < 0.1 = *$ . Standard Error is displayed in parenthesis.*

**Figure 7.1:** Model 3 Incidence Rate Ratios Coefficient Plot




*Note: The dots represent the incidence rate ratios. The lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Blue indicates a positive effect, while red indicates a negative effect.*

Model 3 includes all country-level independent variables, control variables and the regional level independent variable, the coefficients are visualized in figure 7.1. as incidence rate ratios. For all country-level variables, the direction of the effects remains the same as in model 1 and 2. The effect of *GDP* is less substantial than in model 1 and 2, yet still significant at 1 percent level. As illustrated in 7.2, the positive effect of *GDP* on *RSC* is first prevalent when a country has a value higher than 10 on  $\log(\text{GDP})$ . *Asylum Capacity* and *Former Colonial Powers* both have stronger effects when the regional level is included, which are still non-significant. The effect of *Signatory to Conventions* is less substantial. *International Migrant Stock* has a slight change in the effect which remains significant at 5 percent level. The effect of *Liberal democracy* is stronger, and as illustrated in figure 7.1. it is not significant with a 95 percent confidence interval but retain the significance level of 10 percent. *Income inequality* and *Women in National Parliaments* have weaker effects that remain non-significant. The regional level independent variable *Displacement in Region* has a positive sign, which implies that the more displacement in the region, the more *RSC* a country will submit, however, the effect is not significant, and no effect must be assumed. As the inclusion of the variable modifies the effects of other variables, it supports the inclusion of *Displacement in the Region* in the model.



**Figure 7.2:** Model 3: Predicted counts of RSC for independent variables



*Note: The figure corresponds to the negative binomial regression model 3*

Considering the explanatory power of the different models, the log likelihood is a measure for the goodness of fit for the models. Model 3 has the highest log likelihood value and is therefore understood as the better model to explain variation in RSC. The AIC estimates prediction errors in the models. The AIC-values indicates that model 2 is the model of highest quality. BIC tries to find the true model and indicates that model 1 is the better model. Both AIC and BIC punish

large models, therefore, based on the log likelihood, model 3, which includes all variables is assumed to have the best explanatory power.

## **7.2. Summary of results from the Negative Binomial Regression**

The goal of the multilevel cross-sectional analysis has been to make a foundation for the discussion of the second key question of this thesis: *Which determinants can explain the differences and similarities between states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing?* The effect of the theoretically expected determinants are tested with a multilevel negative binomial regression. In addition, the robustness of the results is demonstrated by including control variables. Moreover, there are no large changes in the effects of the variables from model 2 when including *Displacement in Region* in model 3, which indicates robustness of the models.

In view of determinants, the main result that can be generalized to the population is the positive effect of *GDP* on *RSC*. The significance of 1 percent level is persistent in all three models, indicating robustness of the finding that the higher *GDP* in a country, the more *RSC* a state is expected to submit. Furthermore, the control variable, *International Migrant Stock*, is significant at 5 percent level and can be generalized to the population. The negative effect is implying that the larger share of foreign population in a country, the less *RSC* a state is expected to submit, which is contradicting the expected effect based on the theory of we-identity (Johnston 2001).

Considering *Asylum Capacity*, *Former Colonial Power*, and *Signatory to Conventions*, there is no significant effects of these possible determinants, which implies that the null hypothesis of no coherence must be assumed. The same applies to the control variables of *Income Inequality* and *Women in National Parliaments*. *Liberal Democracy* is statistically significant at 10 percent level. The positive effect predicts that more democratic states will submit more *RSC*, which is in accordance with the expected effect based on the argument of promoting rule of law. However, as I use a significance level of 5 percent, the effect cannot be generalized to the population. Considering the unclear level of multicollinearity, I remain cautious about drawing

conclusions from the results. Keeping in mind that this is a first look on the commitments to international responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the GCR, further analysis is needed to confirm the findings. In terms of determinants explaining states commitments to RS these are still interesting results. The results and the empirical and theoretical implications are further discussed the following chapter.

## 8. Discussion

Refugees and the responsibilities of refugee protection continue to be unevenly distributed among states. With the ongoing situation, developing countries host 85% of the world's refugee population, and limited responsibility-sharing is keeping the international community from finding sustainable solutions for the refugees and the host communities. Earlier attempts to explain why states contribute to RS have often been limited to RS between certain countries or within specific regions. Through the Global Compact on Refugees, the call for international RS has been reaffirmed and states have made commitments through the Global Refugee Forum, offering a possibility to explore international responsibility-sharing with a comparative perspective and a wide scope of contributions. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to explore:

*What can explain states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees?*

In order to answer the research question, I first examined *What the differences and similarities between states' contributions to responsibility-sharing are*, by investigating the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum. Then I analyzed *Which determinants can states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing*. The theoretical and empirical implications of the results from the analysis will be discussed in this chapter.

### **8.1. What can explain the differences and similarities between states' contributions to responsibility-sharing?**

In *Chapter 4*, I formulated four hypotheses based on the earlier attempts to explain states' contributions to international refugee responsibility-sharing. I drew from both the interest-oriented and the norm-oriented approach. As I have more than one underlying mechanism behind several of the hypotheses, the results from the empirical analysis indicate whether the determined factor has an effect on *Responsibility-Sharing Commitments*. While for the possible causal underlying mechanisms, the results can only indicate whether the underlying

mechanisms can be rejected as possible determinants of states contributions to RS. In the following section I discuss the theoretical implications of the empirical analysis for each of the hypotheses in turn.

#### *Economic size and Asylum Capacity*

The empirical analysis shows partial support for H1: *Large states in terms of economic size and capacity will contribute more than smaller states*. The analysis finds a significant positive effect of *GDP* on *RSC*, which, in line with the hypothesis, implies that the larger economic size of the state, the more willingness to contribute. Thus, economic size can be understood as a possible determinant of states contributions to international RS. Keeping in mind that the *GDP* variable only measures the economic size of the state and not the capacity to protect refugees, the effect of *Asylum Capacity* must be considered to conclude whether the null hypothesis can be rejected. In contrast to the hypothesis, the results indicate that *Asylum Capacity* does not explain *RSC*. Hence, the hypothesis is only partially supported.

Moreover, this implies some support for the public goods theory which suggests that the benefit of security, stability and lower costs during a potential future refugee crisis is non-excludable and causes the larger states to contribute more while the smaller states free ride. Following the norm-oriented logic of the solidarity argument, the findings suggests that states' contributions may be driven by solidarity, where actions are guided by the notion of equity based on the normative thought of fairness and universalization. On the other hand, the lacking effect of *Asylum Capacity* can be seen in light of Thielemann's (2018, 70) argument that in cases of small-numbered refugee inflows, the implication of stability and security are likely to not be much of a problem, and private benefits may shape political responses. In the case of international refugee RS, a large-scale global refugee crisis is present, yet the non-excludable benefits from contributing may not be prevalent for all countries.

In terms of the internal validity, it is important to keep in mind that there is no unified framework on how to measure capacity to protect refugees. To test the argument, capacity to protect refugees is measured as *Asylum Capacity*. There is a possibility that the lacking significant effect can come from the lower defining validity of the variable. Indicating that asylum capacity may not be a useful operationalization. In addition, the focus on acceptance rates and the asylum system concerning states' contributions to RS is critiqued by Lutz et al. (2001).

### *Exposure to displacement in region*

The second hypothesis expects that *the more exposed to displacement in the region, the more states will be willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing*. The empirical analysis shows no significant effect of *Displacement in region*, even though the predicted direction is conforming to the hypothesis. This indicates that the application of Suhrke's (1998) argument, that contributions to RS are more likely to be understood as a public good when states are exposed to large scale inflow in the region, cannot be transferred to calls for international RS. In the context of the international call for RS through the Global Compact on Refugees, exposure to displacement can therefore not be said to make non-excludable benefits more prevalent, nor the common perception of risk that would make contributions an insurance rationale.

Moreover, it must be emphasized that all countries who have submitted pledges to the Global Refugee Forum are included. Thus, states hosting large numbers of refugees are included if they have submitted a pledge. The lack of significance can be caused by the fact that countries that are the most exposed to mass refugee inflow also are the countries that host the largest portion of the refugee population. These countries are supposed to be the ones who receive support from other countries that are not exposed to mass refugee inflows. In other words, these countries have already made their contribution to protect refugees and are waiting for other states to take on a share of their responsibilities. For further analysis, it can be interesting to control for the number of refugees the country is hosting relative to its capacity.

### *Former Colonial Power*

Hypothesis 3, *If a state is a former colonial power, it will be more willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing*, is not supported by the findings. Furthermore, the non-significant predicted negative effect stands in contrast to the direction of the expected effect. The findings indicate that contributions to RSC in the implementation of the GCR are not explained by state-specific security benefits as a form of joint-product giving states incentives to contribute based on historical links. On the other hand, it is possible that for a former colonial power to perceive contributions as granting state-specific security benefits, there needs to be a certain number of asylum-seekers arriving from the country whom the former colonial power has historical links with, or threat of future inflow, for the excludable benefit to be prevalent.

Concerning the argument of culpability, the lack of significance indicates that a possible sentiment of culpability towards former colonies does not make former colonial powers contribute more. A possible cause of this is that the use of former colonial powers as actors that might experience culpability is flawed. With the argument that RS can be shaped by how states perceive their political decisions, more recent political decisions might cause a stronger sentiment of culpability. Thus, another measure for actors who might act according to culpability rather than being a former colonizer could be interesting to investigate. Furthermore, as Coen (2017) note, in the US’s response to the Iraqi and Syrian crisis, states resisted to acknowledge their contributions to refugee crisis and attempted to justify limited action through debates over establishing culpability.

**Table 8.1:** Implications for the hypotheses

<b>Hypotheses</b>		
<b>Country level</b>	H1: <i>Large states, in terms of economic size and capacity, will contribute more than smaller states.</i>	Partially supported
	H3: <i>If a state is a former colonial power, it will be more willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing.</i>	Rejected
	H4: <i>The more conventions concerning international cooperation to protect refugees that a state is signatory to, the more willingness the state will have to contribute to refugee responsibility-sharing.</i>	Rejected
<b>Regional level</b>	H2: <i>The more exposed to displacement in the region, the more states will be willing to contribute to responsibility-sharing.</i>	Rejected

### *Signatory to Conventions*

The findings from the analysis do not support the fourth hypothesis, which expects that *the more agreements concerning international cooperation to protect refugees that a state is signatory to, the more willingness the state will have to contribute to refugee responsibility-sharing*. Hence, the number of conventions and agreements concerning protection of refugees that a country has signed does not determine whether states contribute to responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees.

The lack of significance supports Coen's (2019, 9) argument that the principle of RS in the international refugee regime remains weak. Hence, the logic of appropriateness might not be what drives states to contribute. It is not clear how much contribution that constitutes sufficient RS, or how little represents a violation of obligations. Thus, states may have different perceptions about what constitutes actions that are according to the logic of appropriateness in terms of RS. In other words, the states interpret their own actions based in their perceptions on appropriate RS, causing interpretations to differ between countries.

Furthermore, the socialization through signing of agreements is a linear form of norm adoption. Therefore, the results stand in line with the critique that norm adoption of refugee RS is not linear, but rather contested in terms of application and validity. The international socialization of the responsibility-sharing principle does not work like a one-way process where the actor being socialized is a passive recipient. As this thesis only tested whether a linear form of adoption of the responsibility-sharing principle is a determinant of states' contributions, it cannot be ruled out that the implementation of the norm can have an effect if investigating non-linear measures.

### **8.1.1. Summary of theoretical and empirical implications**

This thesis has investigated whether well implemented theories can explain states' behavior to refugee responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. I draw from well these theories to identify mechanisms and argue for four hypotheses. The theories are divided into interest-oriented and norm-oriented explanations according to the underlying logics. The interest-oriented explanations follow a cost-benefit logic that builds on



the self-interest of the state. The formation of an actor's preference is external to the institutional context where the actors find themselves. The norm-oriented explanations follow a norm-based logic which builds on understandings of acceptable behavior, and see actions as based on identity, priorities, and understandings of reality according to socially constructed norms, rules, and practices.

Through the testing of hypotheses, the interest-oriented explanations of public goods, exposure to displacement, insurance rationale, joint-product and culpability, and the norm-oriented explanations of solidarity and socialization of norms have been investigated. As illustrated in table 8.1., three of four hypotheses are rejected. In sum, the only hypothesis offered partial support is H1, which has two possible underlying mechanisms based on both approaches of the earlier attempts to explain contributions to RS. The public goods argument is based on states' self-interest while the solidarity argument is based on acting according to appropriateness yet keeping in mind the consequentialist logic by the thought of universalization. As mentioned in *Chapter 4*, the two underlying mechanisms are not necessarily excludable, yet as the solidarity argument may build on a consequentialist logic, this can be understood as a slight indication that states act in accordance with a cost-benefit logic.

With this I will argue that the main finding of this thesis, considering determinants explaining states contributions to responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, is the economic size of the country in terms of GDP. This is also interesting as the most common means of contributing are through *Financial* assistance, as 59 of the 105 RSC from the GRF are considered financial. With this, it might be interesting to investigate further whether the different means of responsibility-sharing contributions might be driven by different determinants and explanations.

The lack of significant results of the other possible determinants is an interesting finding, as it indicates that the tested explanations, which have previously been applied to case studies or intra-regional responsibility-sharing, may not be applicable for explaining why states contribute to international refugee responsibility-sharing, which additionally is a call from the international community. Moreover, it suggests that international cooperation to protect refugees is driven by states' consequential logic, which indicates that incentives to contribute are necessary for cooperation. Whether it is an incentive of universalization or having more to lose by not contributing.

UNHCR works towards the implementation of the responsibility-sharing principle as a norm, however, the findings are leaning towards a consequentialist logic of action. I will argue that this implies that UNHCR's use of resources to increase international refugee RS may be misguided. On the other hand, it might underline that the RS principle as a norm is weak and that a stronger system committing states to compliance might be needed for efficient RS in the area of refugee protection. The lack of sanctions makes it easier for states to limit their contributions. Moreover, it indicates a need for further investigation, which will be addressed in the conclusion.

## **8.2. Limitations**

The empirical results discussed should be considered in view of certain limitations. The internal validity of analyzing pledges might have caused bias because of the varying amount of information attached to a pledge. This can have led to pledges which in reality might be RSC to not be coded as responsibility-sharing as a result of lacking information in the pledge description. Moreover, the qualitative content analysis and manual coding for variable construction may have affected the reliability, because the same text can be interpreted differently by different readers. However, this thesis can be seen as conducting a first look at the pledges.

Furthermore, the negative binomial regression is not recommended for analyzing small samples. 104 units can be understood as a relatively small to moderate sized sample, which might have caused bias in the results. Additionally, the differing indications of whether multicollinearity is a challenge is another indication that the results should be interpreted with caution. However, as the coefficients do not have any irregular or large changes from the model only including the country-level independent variables to the models including controls and the regional level, it indicates robustness of the results. Moreover, as already discussed, the measurement of *Asylum Capacity* has a low internal validity, which might cause limitations in the analysis.

The results must be considered with caution. However, in total, the findings indicate that most of the tested explanations may not be applicable for explaining contributions to international refugee RS in the implementation of the GCR. Moreover, it indicates a need for further investigation.

## 9. Concluding remarks

The aim of this thesis was to understand what drives states' contributions to responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees. More specifically, what contributions to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees looks like and why states have made these commitments to contribute. Explaining what makes states contribute to refugee responsibility-sharing is important as the contributions to responsibility-sharing can play a significant role for the protracted situation of displaced people through creating sustainable solutions for refugees and host communities. A lot of the previous literature has been limited to geographical areas or entities and there are few studies considering a larger number of countries. I address this gap in the literature by investigating the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum and creating a variable that measures responsibility-sharing commitments. Moreover, the Global Compact on Refugees has reaffirmed the call for international responsibility-sharing and is underexplored compared to its international importance in the field. The research question answered in this thesis is the following:

*What can explain states' contributions to refugee responsibility-sharing in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees?*

As the Global Compact on Refugees is relatively new, it was necessary to explore what the contributions to RS looked like before further investigating what explains states' contributions. Using a multimethod framework, I have explored RS in the implementation of the GCR through an exploratory investigation of the *Responsibility-Sharing Commitments* to the Global Refugee Forum through a manual coding and a qualitative content analysis which generated a variable for RSC and the two dimensions of goals and means of the contributions. This was based on a wide and direct scope of responsibility-sharing.

The descriptive inspection, presented in *Chapter 3*, revealed that the Global Refugee Forum has not been used as extensively for RS as it first appears. Only 105 of the 754 pledges from states are commitments to responsibility-sharing, and the pledges were provided by 32 countries. Despite the reaffirmed call for responsibility-sharing, the distribution of RSC showed that there is still a great absence of sufficient international cooperation to protect refugees. Moreover, when submitting RSC to the GRF, states often aim to enhance (1) *Education*, (2) *Protection*

*Capacity*, and (3) *Sustainable Solutions* for refugees and host communities. The wider scope is manifested in the commitments where, in addition to *Financial* assistance and *Relocation and Pathways to third countries* which are two conventional means of contributing to RS, a substantial share of the commitments have the means of *Policy and Legal reform*, and *Material and Technical* assistance. The exploration indicated that a further examination of why states contribute rather than how was advantageous for exploring the research question at this stage of knowledge in the field.

I built the theoretical framework on both interest-oriented and norm-oriented explanations of states behavior in contributing to responsibility-sharing. To test the theoretical framework, I constructed an original dataset. The data sources used were the original coding of RSC that I conducted, data from the UNHCR Refugee Statistics Database, the United Nations Treaty Collection, Quality of Government Standard dataset 2021, and data from the United Nations Development Program. The theoretical framework was tested using a multilevel negative binomial regression.

The results of the analysis rejected three of four hypotheses. The findings showed partial support for H1: *Large states, in terms of economic size and capacity, will contribute more than smaller states*, based on the significant determinant of GDP, while Asylum Capacity showed no effect. This indicated that the theory of public goods and the logic of solidarity are possible explanations of why states contribute to RS, and a tendency toward states acting according to a cost-benefit logic. Furthermore, the findings suggested that the exposure to displacement in the region, whether the state is a former colonial power, and whether it is signatory of conventions related to international cooperation to protect, does not explain states contributions in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. However, the results must be considered with caution.

The lack of significant results is an interesting finding, as it suggests that the tested explanations, which have previously been applied to case studies or intra-regional responsibility-sharing, may not be applicable for explaining why states contribute to an international call for refugee responsibility-sharing. I have argued that on one hand, this might imply that UNHCR's use of resources to implement the principle of responsibility-sharing as a norm might be misguided. On the other hand, it underlines that the principle of responsibility-sharing remains weak in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. With this,

this thesis has contributed to the understanding of what explains states contributions to international refugee responsibility-sharing.

## **9.1. Suggestions for further research**

The results of this thesis points toward the usefulness of further investigation. This thesis has provided a first look at the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum, to investigate why states contribute to RS in the implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees. For further research on states' contributions to RS I have several suggestions.

Concerning the exploratory investigation of the commitments to the Global Refugee Forum, a qualitative approach was necessary for a first understanding of the pledges. For further research, an automatic text analysis could contribute to the exploration of the pledges to the GRF, and to understanding of how states contribute. Furthermore, based on the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum, it could prove useful to investigate whether the different means of the responsibility-sharing commitments are driven by different determinants of states' contributions. This can for example be investigated by conducting multilevel modelling where the first-level variables would be on the commitment level, and the second-level variables would be country-level independent variables. This would enable the possibility to investigate the different types of RSC coded in *Chapter 3* as individual independent variables.

For further investigation of states behavior in contributing to refugee responsibility-sharing based on an international call, it will be interesting to understand how the possible explanations not supported in this thesis would affect states contributions if controlling for whether a state is hosting large numbers of refugees. Moreover, a unified framework of the countries hosting large numbers of refugees and are in need of other states' assistance would be useful. In addition, the rejection of hypotheses resting on a norm-oriented logic of states' contributions has underlined that investigation of how much responsibility-sharing constitutes sufficient responsibility-sharing, or how little that represents a violation of obligations despite the voluntary feature of the concept will be expedient.

The validity and reliability of the results rests on qualitative aspects from the coding and quantitative methods from the analysis. However, this process has revealed that for further investigation of states contributions to RS, qualitative work could be done to explore the causal mechanisms that have been proposed. Furthermore, it could investigate the puzzling finding that there was no significant relationship for most of the important independent variables, and that the most important driver of states contributions to RS is the economic size of the state.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A: Categorization of pledges to the Global Refugee Forum

**Table A1:** Categories for the goals expressed in pledges to the Global Refugee Forum

Goal	Realm of the category	Examples of empirical indicators
Education	If the goal of the pledge is to enhance education for refugees or for the host community, the pledge is assigned the category 'education'. This can be manifested by inclusion in the national education system, securing refugees rights to education, improving the quality of education, etc.	<p>"Offer guidance counseling for refugees to access higher education in East Africa..." (Pledge ID 2114).</p> <p>"Granting tertiary education scholarship to a person per year who has been granted refugee status in Azerbaijan." (Pledge ID 4131).</p> <p>"... a project to improve learning conditions in refugee camps in Jordan, Azraq and Za'atari." (Pledge ID 4146).</p>
Jobs and livelihood	If the goal of the pledge is to enhance access to jobs and livelihoods, or access to means enhancing access to jobs and livelihoods, the pledge is assigned the category 'jobs and livelihood'.	<p>"Facilitating legal employment and access to descent employment for refugees and persons under UNHCR protection." (Pledge ID 4112).</p> <p>"Le Gouvernement s'engage à définir un cadre de collaboration entre le FNE, le BIT et le HCR, avec pour objectif prioritaire la réduction du chômage au sein des réfugiés en terre Camerounaise" (Pledge ID 1223).</p> <p>"...Facilitate access to employment for refugees in the private sector and strengthen the institutional and legal framework for access to agricultural land" (Pledge ID 1135).</p>
Statelessness	If the goal of the pledge is to improve a situation concerning statelessness, such as identifying statelessness, facilitating identification documents for refugees or granting citizenship to stateless persons. In these cases, the pledge is assigned the category 'statelessness'.	<p>"La République Centrafricaine s'engage par la présente à adhérer à la convention de 1954 relative au statut des apatrides au plus tard d'ici juin 2020..." (Pledge ID 1006).</p> <p>"Adopt a law establishing a statelessness determination procedure and the status of stateless persons" (Pledge ID 1018).</p> <p>"Develop training and awareness programs for officials to identify stateless persons" (Pledge ID 2051).</p>
Integration	If the goal of the pledge is to enhance the integration of refugees into society, the pledge is assigned 'integration'. Integration is understood as both legal and cultural integration.	<p>"...Establishment of inter-institutional boards for local integration of refugees, by theme and at the local level" (Pledge ID 2067).</p> <p>"...Strengthen the social, cultural and economic inclusion of refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons and migrants in a similar vulnerable situation, in strategic locations in Mexico ..." (2086).</p> <p>"The Government of Costa Rica hereby commits to generate mechanisms for durable solutions that guarantee the integration of stateless persons..." (Pledge ID 2158).</p>

**Table A1 (continued)**

<p>Infrastructure and use of resources</p>	<p>If the goal of the pledge is to improve infrastructure and/or use of resources, it is assigned ‘infrastructure and use of resources. The pledge can indicate a goal of either infrastructure or use of resources, or both, and will either way be assigned the mentioned goal.</p>	<p>“commits to support inclusive access to services and infrastructure for refugees and host communities alike, ... including services focused on mental health and psycho-social support, as well as the development of sustainable energy supply and natural resources management, including water supply.” (Pledge ID 4313).</p> <p>“Sustainable Energy Solutions for Humanitarian Response in Djibouti” (Pledge ID 5260)</p> <p>“Ensure sustainable use of natural resources by providing clean and renewable energy solutions in refugee and host community households, in order to discourage the use of firewood” (Pledge ID 1104).</p>
<p>Protection capacity</p>	<p>If improving protection capacity is the goal of the pledge, it is assigned protection capacity. Protection capacity is understood as the capability of protecting persons.</p>	<p>“...this pledge aims to strengthen the overall protection capacity of relevant government entities with particular focus on enhancing social protection and asylum systems through improved legal and institutional frameworks at national and local levels.” (Pledge ID 1315)</p> <p>“Training to build capacity of government and advocacy organisations to continue to protect and assist stateless persons in protracted situations” (Pledge ID 1342).</p> <p>“Improving the quality of asylum decisions via capacity building activities of the staff members of the Asylum and Legal Affairs Division of the Migration Service of Armenia” (Pledge ID 4148).</p>
<p>Self-reliance</p>	<p>If the goal of the pledge is to enhance the self-reliance of refugees or improving the conditions of refugees in a way that will make them more self-reliant, the pledge is assigned ‘self-reliance’.</p>	<p>“Increased self-reliance and entrepreneurship for hosts and refugees: increased training and development capacity to access employment” (Pledge ID 6030).</p> <p>“...to enhance refugee’s skill and productivity. In return, the refugees will be receiving compensation that would help them to sustain themselves while staying in Indonesia and use their skill as well as experience to start a new life in resettlement countries.” (Pledge ID 3029).</p> <p>“The provision of land will secure and support agriculture activities and the provision of permanent shelter to the refugees and vulnerable host community members.” (Pledge ID 1015).</p>
<p>Health</p>	<p>If the goal of the pledge is to improve health services, access to health services or the health of refugees, the pledge is assigned ‘health’.</p>	<p>“...With the aim to strengthen access to quality health services and provision of medicines, including medical equipments as well as trained medical personnel.... (Pledge ID 1148).</p> <p>“...Including refugees in national systems and providing support to ongoing and immediate needs in: i.Health; ...” (Pledge ID 1166).</p> <p>“Promote access, quality and inclusiveness of national health services for refugees and host communities” (Pledge ID 1245).</p>



**Table A1 (continued)**

Sustainable solutions	If the goal of the pledge is to achieve or work towards solutions for refugees or refugee situations that are intended to be sustainable, the pledge is assigned 'sustainable solutions'. This can be manifested through resettlement, integration, family reunion etc.	<p>“Finding a permanent solution for the recurring flood cycle that leads to displacement along the Shabelle and Juba river regions within 5 years (2020-2024), ...” (Pledge ID: 1333).</p> <p>“The United Republic of Tanzania pledges to find durable solutions to the remaining 1972 Burundian refugees.” (Pledge ID 1237).</p> <p>“Strengthening the provision of durable solutions to all displaced populations and refugee-returnees through developing an inclusive and rigorous National Durable Solutions Strategy, and reinforcing the National Durable Solutions Secretariat, including strengthening coordination mechanisms in the Federal Member States to implement impactful durable solutions interventions” (Pledge ID 1080).</p>
Repatriation	If the goal of the pledge is to work towards the repatriation of refugees, meaning the return to the country of origin, the pledge is assigned 'repatriation'.	<p>“...the Government of South Sudan pledges to create conditions for safe, dignified and sustainable returns of South Sudanese refugees by developing and adopting a national policy and framework to address housing, land and property rights, establishing inclusive peace building structures with alternative conflict resolution mechanisms...” (Pledge ID 1083).</p> <p>“Facilitation of voluntary returns for refugees previously based in Thailand, working towards repatriation for refugees from Rakhine state” (Pledge ID 3054).</p> <p>“The Government of Nepal will continue to engage with the Government of Bhutan for the repatriation of the remaining Bhutanese refugees in Nepal to their home country Bhutan in safety, honour and dignity.” (Pledge ID 3074).</p>
Other goals	If the pledge does not contain an empirical indicator, latent or manifest, for one of the mentioned categories, yet indicates a specific goal, the pledge is assigned 'other goals'. This includes, research, funding, including refugees in decision-making, climate related topics that do not fit in under 'infrastructure and use of resources', and more.	<p>“...promote green humanitarian response and support the humanitarian sector as a whole to move towards more environmentally friendly solutions and carbon neutrality...” (Pledge ID 4008).</p> <p>“Emergency.lu supplies logistics, personnel and software to give vital communication services anywhere within 12 hours and these services are made available to connect refugee communities” (Pledge ID 4079).</p> <p>“...organising a regional symposium on the impact of climate change on protection and humanitarian issues.” (Pledge ID: 1279).</p>

**Table A2: Categories for the means expressed in pledges to the Global Refugee Forum**

Means	Realm of the category	Examples of empirical indicators
Financial	<p>If the means of the contribution are based on funding, or use of money, the pledge is assigned ‘financial’. This can be financial contributions to NGOs, states, international organizations, institutions, etc, or directly to refugees, offer something for free that indicates that the state will pay for it. On the other hand, if the pledge intends to construct something with funding from an external actor, the means of the pledge is technical, not financial.</p> <p>It is important to note that the financial category do not take into account whether the pledge was an existing yearly financial contribution or an increase.</p>	<p>“... In order to achieve the above the GoN allocates an amount of N\$ 70 000 000 for the period 2019 to 2023.” (Pledge ID 1148).</p> <p>“This global funding support will maintain Canada’s existing annual level (\$12.6 million) of unearmarked funding support to UNHCR, and will extend the duration of this support to four years (2020 to 2023) for a total amount of \$50.4 million” (Pledge ID 2168).</p> <p>“...From 2020 to 2022, bring 50 million euros as a contribution to the response to the Venezuelan crisis, providing interventions to alleviate its impact...” (Pledge ID 4057).</p>
Material and technical	<p>If the means of the contribution are based on material and/or technical tools for the contribution to meet its goals, the pledge is assigned material and technical.</p>	<p>“...through programs for entrepreneurship, technical-vocational programs, training programs in life and work skills...” (Pledge ID 2143).</p> <p>“Construction of new schools for Syrian Kids to provide quality education” (Pledge ID 4047).</p> <p>“... undertakes to set up, with the collaboration of the other ministerial departments and the technical and financial support of the High Commission for Refugees: i) the office of stateless persons and refugees and to make it operational...” (Pledge ID 1044).</p>
Physical relocation and pathways to third countries	<p>If the means for reaching the goals of the pledge are based on physical relocation and/or enhancing pathways to third hosting countries, the pledge is assigned ‘physical relocation and pathways to third countries’.</p>	<p>“...Japan will accept up to 150 Syrian students to provide opportunities of higher education in Japan”. (Pledge ID 3001).</p> <p>“... provide universities and research institutions in Germany with the means to host foreign scholars at risk...” (Pledge ID 4055).</p> <p>“... Canada will resettle over 29,950 refugees, including over 10,000 refugees identified by the UNHCR...” (Pledge ID 2091).</p>

**Table A2 (Continued)**

<p>Research</p>	<p>If the means of the pledge is to contribute by conducting research, the pledge is assigned 'research'.</p>	<p>"... commits to undertake by 2020 a study publishing a qualitative study to better understand..." (Pledge ID 1051)</p> <p>"... Conduct a study on statelessness in the country by 2022 to identify aspects that can be improved in preventing, combating and eliminating statelessness..." (Pledge ID 1060).</p> <p>"...research programmes and projects in the asylum and the migration field in order to provide more knowlegde about certain aspects and topics..." (Pledge ID 4256)</p>
<p>Policy and legal reform</p>	<p>If the means of the contribution is to change, enhance, adopt, improve or develop policy and/or legal reform, the pledge is assigned 'policy and legal reform'.</p>	<p>"...supprimer la disposition de sa loi sur la nationalité qui prévoie que la déchéance de la nationalité ivoirienne d'un homme peut être étendue à son conjoint et à ses enfants mineurs..." (Pledge ID 1001).</p> <p>"...including the process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans..." (Pledge ID 1241).</p> <p>"Becoming an inclusive country for asylum-seekers and refugee workers by granting them equal access to rights" (Pledge ID 2021).</p>
<p>Other means</p>	<p>If the pledge does not contain an empirical indicator of the above-mentioned categories, but still has identifiable tool(s) of how to contribute, the pledge is assigned 'other means'.</p>	<p>"To enhance necessary cooperation with relevant parties to move forward the repatriation process of Myanmar displaced persons in a systematic and sustainable manner." (Pledge ID 3045).</p> <p>"Brazil commits to exploring modalities of private and community sponsorship to resettlement, with a view to launching a pilot initiative until 2021." (Pledge ID 2077).</p> <p>"The Kyrgyz Republic commits to intensify its work on studying the experience of other State parties to the UN Conventions of 1954 and 1961 on statelessness." (Pledge ID 3100).</p>

**Table A3: Examples of the great variation in pledge descriptions**

Pledge ID	Name of the pledge	Description of the pledge
3025	“Cooperate with UNHCR by supporting projects, continuing fund contributions and by building partnerships”	“The Government of the Philippines hereby commits to cooperate with UNHCR by supporting projects, continuing fund contributions, and by building or expanding partnerships.”
3026	“Create jobs and opportunities”	“None”
3040	“Enhance cooperation with UNHCR in handling refugees and asylum seekers”	“The Government of Indonesia hereby commits to enhance cooperation with UNHCR in handling refugees and asylum seekers.”
4032	“Civil Society Engagement in Durable Solutions”	“Though durable solutions essentially are conditioned by political engagement, civil society has an important custodian function of promoting protection, participation in and sustainability of solutions processes. Building on a strong evidence base, Denmark and Danish Refugee Council will contribute to mobilisation of civil society in regions of complex displacement. Denmark and DRC has been engaged in strategic collaboration around the mobilisation of civil society in solutions since 2015 when the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat was established in East Africa. In 2016, the collaboration expanded to the Middle East and further in 2018 to the Asia Durable Solutions Platform. These civic platforms have supported a principled and rights-based approach to solutions and ensured systematic investments in capacity building of stakeholders, data gathering and analysis, and development of solutions strategies. The existing civil society secretariats are significant contributors to development of solutions-oriented programming, advocacy and policy influencing and have mobilised increased engagement of civic stakeholders, including diaspora, in the solutions agenda. Denmark and DRC pledge to continue to mobilise civic actors to become complementary actors in the implementation of the GCF, CRRF and the envisaged solutions platforms by investing in civil society solutions secretariats in protracted displacement situations and at global level.”
4047	“Construction of new schools for Syrian Kids to provide quality education”	“Around 1.1 million school-aged Syrian under Temporary Protection (SuTP) children living in Turkey and the average schooling rate is 64% among them. According to the needs analysis, it is clear that there is a need for the construction of 1,068 new schools with 30,799 classrooms at primary, secondary and high school levels. Also the number of pre-school-age (0–5 age group) SuTP children is 560.934 in Turkey. The schooling rate of pre-school age SuTP children is 33.7%. With the construction of 220 schools built in ongoing projects carried out by the Ministry of National Education (MoNE), 5.200 classrooms with the capacity of 156.000 students are under construction. (Projects on Education for All in Times of Crisis I&II and Education Infrastructure for Resilience) In the scope of the new project, 170 pre-schools, 10 primary schools and 1 public education centre are planned to construct (Project on Education for All in Times of Crisis III) by MoNE. Thus, an additional capacity of 32,200 students will be generated. However, with the completion of all the ongoing projects related with education infrastructure, generated additional capacity for those 188,200 Syrian students in total mentioned above meets only 18% of the total need. In spite of all efforts related to the education infrastructure, the capacity need for pre-school, primary and secondary education is extremely high. Therefore, new projects and financial resources are highly needed in addition to existing projects in order to facilitate SuTP’s access to education and to provide education services in quality school environments.”

## Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics of variables from the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum

**Table B1:** Descriptive statistics of variables from the pledges to the Global Refugee Forum

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard Deviation</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Frequency among total of pledges</b>	<b>Frequency among RSC</b>
<i>Responsibility-Sharing</i>	0.857	0.351	0.000	1.000	105	-
<b>Goals</b>						
<i>Education</i>	0.896	0.306	0.000	1.000	77	17
<i>Jobs and Livelihood</i>	0.922	0.268	0.000	1.000	56	4
<i>Statelessness</i>	0.636	0.481	0.000	1.000	262	0
<i>Integration</i>	0.907	0.291	0.000	1.000	69	2
<i>Infrastructure and use of resources</i>	0.973	0.165	0.000	1.000	21	2
<i>Protection capacity</i>	0.756	0.430	0.000	1.000	177	23
<i>Self-Reliance</i>	0.965	0.183	0.000	1.000	25	1
<i>Health</i>	0.968	0.176	0.000	1.000	24	0
<i>Sustainable solutions</i>	0.930	0.255	0.000	1.000	51	31
<i>Repatriation</i>	0.971	0.169	0.000	1.000	27	4
<i>Other goals</i>	0.962	0.190	0.000	1.000	27	6
<b>Means</b>						
<i>Financial</i>	0.876	0.330	0.000	1.000	92	59
<i>Material and technical</i>	0.749	0.434	0.000	1.000	182	24
<i>Relocation and pathways to third countries</i>	0.950	0.218	0.000	1.000	36	28
<i>Research</i>	0.964	0.187	0.000	1.000	29	0
<i>Policy and legal reform</i>	0.320	0.467	0.000	1.000	496	19
<i>Other means</i>	0.993	0.083	0.000	1.000	5	0
<b>N</b>					754	

## Appendix C: Coding of Variables for Explanatory Analysis

**Table C1:** Coding of variables

Variable	Original dataset/Source	Operationalization
<b>Responsibility-Sharing Commitments (RSC)</b>	Own categorization and coding of commitments to the Global Refugee Forum.	Count variable, 0-10 Number of RSC by a country
<b>GDP per capita</b> <i>mad_gdppc</i>	Quality of Government Standard Dataset Timeseries 2021	Continuous variable Log of GDP per capita (2018)
<b>Asylum Capacity</b> <i>Applications Decisions</i>	Own calculations based on UNHCR Statistics Datasets: Asylum applications and Asylum decisions	Calculation: Total decisions- Applications/Applications  The higher the share of unprocessed applications the less capacity
<b>Exposure to Displacement</b> <i>Forcibly displaces population: Refugees and Asylum-seekers</i>	Own calculations based on UNHCR Statistics Dataset: Population	Continuous variable Log of number of refugees and asylum-seekers located in the region.
<b>Former Colonial Power</b> <i>Colonial Origin</i>	Own coding Quality of Government Standard Dataset 2021	Dichotomous variable, 0-1  1 indicates the state is a former colonial power
<b>Signatory to Conventions</b> <i>1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees</i>  <i>1966 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination</i>  <i>1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees</i>  <i>1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment</i>  <i>1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child</i>  <i>2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime</i>	Own coding United Nations Treaty Collection (1951; 1966; 1967; 1984; 1989; 2000)	Count variable, 0-6 Number of conventions signed by country

**Table C1 (Continued)**

<b>International Migrant Stock</b> <i>wdi_imig International Migrant Stock (% of population)</i>	<b>Quality of Government Standard Dataset Timeseries 2021</b>	<b>Percentage of population consisting of people born in a country other than that in which they live. Including refugees.</b>
<b>Income Inequality</b> <i>Inequality in income %</i>	UNDP: Human Development Reports	Inequality in income distribution based in data from household surveys estimated using Atkinson inequality index
<b>Women in national parliaments</b> <i>Ipy_1_sw Share of Women (Lower and Single Houses)</i>	Quality of Government Standard Dataset Timeseries 2021	Share of women in lower and single houses of parliament.

## Appendix D: Model Diagnostics

**Table D1: Variation Inflation Factor Scores**

VARIABLE	VIF-SCORE	VARIABLE	VIF-SCORE
<i>LOG(GDP)</i>	3.130	<i>LIBERAL DEMOCRACY</i>	2.284
<i>ASYLUM CAPACITY</i>	1.133	<i>INCOME INEQUALITY</i>	1.979
<i>COLONIAL POWER</i>	1.120	<i>SHARE OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS</i>	1.403
<i>CONVENTIONS</i>	1.200	<i>LOG(DISPLACEMENT IN REGION)</i>	2.038
<i>INTERNATIONAL MIGRANT STOCK</i>	1.520		

**Table D2:** Overdispersion test of the Poisson

Dispersion ratio	1.363
Pearson's Chi-Squared	126.803
p-value	0.011

*Note: the Poisson regression model include all variables*