

# Presidential Interruptions in Latin America

Concepts, Causes, and Outcomes

Leiv Marsteintredet



Dissertation submitted for the degree Philosophiae Doctor  
at the University of Bergen

October 26, 2009



## **Abstract**

This dissertation deals with executive instability in Latin American presidential regimes, a phenomenon called Presidential Interruptions. The dissertation analyses 14 cases of presidential interruptions in Latin America in the period between 1980 and 2005, and aims to enhance the understanding of presidential interruptions, analyse the causes of presidential interruptions in Latin America, and explore the outcomes of presidential interruptions in the region.

Conceptually this dissertation situates presidential interruptions as a form of executive instability between the democratic breakdown and the unscheduled change of government in parliamentary regimes. The dissertation compares directly the causes of presidential interruption with the causes of democratic breakdown and finds that while the similarities exist, the differences are stark. This finding seriously questions the frequently used analogy between the two types of instability. Furthermore, the dissertation compares the procedures for presidential interruption with the procedures for unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes, and shows that procedures of presidential interruptions indeed are similar to the procedures used in parliamentary regimes for early executive removal. The differences, on the other hand, are that in parliamentary regimes these procedures are constitutional and legitimate, whereas in presidential regimes the extent to which procedures for presidential interruptions are constitutional and legitimate can be questioned.

The causal analysis distinguishes between triggering and underlying causes of presidential interruption. Entering the debate of institutions vs. the streets, the dissertation finds that street, or vertical, challenges are the more important triggers of presidential interruptions in Latin America, whereas institutional or horizontal conflicts are more important than the vertical or street conflicts as underlying causes of presidential interruption. The distinction between triggering and underlying causes is new, and helps explain the disagreement in this debate among other scholars. Further unravelling the causes of interruptions, the dissertation points to the emergence of new cleavages and social and political groups challenging the status quo, as important causal factors explaining the occurrence of both challenges to presidents, and presidential interruptions. The dissertation uses both statistical and more qualitative analytical techniques to support this argument.

The outcomes of presidential interruptions, it is argued, depend on the principal causes for the presidential removal. The dissertation argues that a presidential interruption is a way of holding the chief executive accountable for his or her actions or omissions, and therefore should be understood as a reactive sequence. Inductively the dissertation identifies three types of interruptions, and shows through a qualitative comparative analysis that the outcomes of presidential interruptions depend on the principal cause of the interruption, and thus the type of interruption. The three types are interruptions motivated by: a presidential scandal, a president's democratic violation, and a president's policies.

## **Acknowledgments**

I have spent about four years working on this dissertation. Many people have helped me complete this work that started out as a collection of articles, but ended up as a monograph.

I want to thank my supervisor Einar Berntzen. With a keen eye for details, he has given me advice not only on this work, but also on my previous work on the Dominican Republic. Einar's comments, and our conversations, have always been very important, and his support is always comforting. Second, I need to thank Michael E. Alvarez, who has listened to my frustration with my own work more times than I can remember. Mike has always maintained an open line, and given me great advice. The results of my collaboration with both Einar and Mike are parts of Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Kathy Hochstetler, who during this process became Professor II at the Department, has been helpful with comments in various stages of this work. Mariana Llanos who I have edited a book with during my dissertation, has also been a great partner for discussion, and writing. In Tromsø, Marcus Buck has read parts of my work and commented. Others who have read and commented parts of my work are too many to mention, but clearly all members of the research group Issues of Democratisation, conference participants, and anonymous reviewers here and there, have contributed with advice, criticisms, and ideas. To all mentioned and forgotten: I have followed some of the advices I have been given, ignored other, but appreciated all.

Institutionally I want to thank the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen. The Department has generally been kind and treated me well throughout these four years. The Department of Sociology, Political Science and Social Planning at the University of Tromsø provided me kindly an office space for the last period of my dissertation. In Tromsø, Marcus has been of tremendous help. In the Dominican Republic FUNGLODE opened their library for me in the summer of 2008, and FLACSO gave me a shared office space in the summer of 2009. These have been important contacts when I have needed to work outside my own office. Trond Petersen at the University of California, Berkeley helped me get an office there for a year, and PhD students and David Collier at the Department of Political Science let me join their seminar for a semester. My stay at Berkeley was very inspiring.

Financially many have helped finance the work with the dissertation. The University has given me a salary. The Meltzer Foundation helped finance some research trips at the start of this dissertation, and has helped finance several of my conference participations. The Norwegian Research Council (together with their German counterpart DAAD) financed four workshops over two years between GIGA in Hamburg and our Department, which became the start of the book project I edited with Mariana. NRC also gave me a Leiv Eriksson scholarship, which helped finance my year at Berkeley. Fulbright Norway also gave me a scholarship for the year at Berkeley. Without economic support from these institutions, this dissertation would never have been completed.

Finally, I want to thank my wife Dixie. The last couple of years I have spent too many hours with this dissertation, and too few with her.

## Contents

ABSTRACT .....	I
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....	II
<i>Tables and Figures</i> .....	vi
<b>CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION. PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA</b>	<b>1</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	2
THE CASES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA .....	3
THE SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS AND THIS DISSERTATION .....	5
WHY PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS? .....	7
ENTERING THE DEBATES ON PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....	9
CHAPTER OUTLINE .....	12
<b>CHAPTER 2 : THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....</b>	<b>16</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	17
THE CONCEPT OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION .....	18
<i>The criteria of a presidential interruption</i> .....	20
A democratically elected president .....	21
The forceful removal of the president.....	23
The extraordinary exit of a president.....	23
Survival of the democratic regime.....	24
<i>Placing presidential interruptions in its semantic field</i> .....	25
CAUSES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....	27
<i>A summary: Institutions, the streets, performance, regime and presidential interruptions</i> .....	27
<i>Cleavages, Party Systems and Presidential Interruptions</i> .....	32
CAUSAL MODELS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....	37
<i>An integrated model of presidential interruptions</i> .....	41
LINKING CAUSES WITH OUTCOMES: IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....	45
CONCLUSIONS .....	51
<b>CHAPTER 3 : DRAWING THE SEMANTIC FIELD. WHAT PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION IS...AND IS NOT .....</b>	<b>52</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	53
TYPES OF EXECUTIVE INSTABILITY: PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION AND THE SEMANTIC FIELD .....	56
PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWNS .....	59
<i>Some theories of democratic breakdown</i> .....	62
<i>How to compare Presidential Interruptions with Democratic Breakdowns?</i> .....	65
<i>Interruptions and breakdowns compared</i> .....	69
Economic Performance Factors: Prolonged Recession and Inflation.....	72
Mobilisation of Civil Society: Anti-Government Demonstrations and General Strikes .....	73
Regime Characteristics: Level of Democracy and Past Regime History .....	75
Institutional Factors: Number of Political Parties and Seat Share of President's Party .....	76
Do the causal factors have a significantly different effect on interruptions and breakdowns?.....	79
<i>Presidential interruptions as unscheduled changes of government</i> .....	82
The procedures for interrupting presidents in Latin America .....	83
CONCLUSIONS. PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS: NEITHER DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWN NOR PARLIAMENTARY CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT.....	88
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 .....	92
<i>Coding rules for a procedural typology of governmental removal</i> .....	92
Undemocratic presidential removals.....	92
Democratic presidential removals.....	92
Fuzzy-cases, some further rules .....	93

<b>CHAPTER 4 : EMPIRICAL OVERVIEW AND DATA PRESENTATION .....</b>	<b>95</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	96
A DATASET ON POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA .....	96
<i>Central variables in my dataset.....</i>	98
Political conflicts.....	98
Other variables .....	102
<i>My dataset compared to other similar datasets .....</i>	104
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CENTRAL VARIABLES AND BASIC ANALYSES OF THE DATA: SOME	
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS .....	107
<i>News and Conflicts in the dataset .....</i>	107
<i>Controlling for large-country bias.....</i>	110
<i>Comparison Across Time: Interruptions and Conflicts in Latin America.....</i>	112
A note on validity and reliability of the data.....	119
<i>Comparison across space: Interruptions and conflicts across countries and regions.....</i>	120
<i>Comparison Across Space: Interruptions and conflicts across governments.....</i>	125
CONCLUSION .....	129
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4: .....	131
<i>Coding and Operationalisation of conflicts .....</i>	133
<i>Data for variables based on electoral results .....</i>	135
<b>CHAPTER 5 : TRIGGERING CAUSES. PRESIDENTS BETWEEN INSTITUTIONS AND</b>	
<b>THE STREETS .....</b>	<b>138</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	139
A SHORT THEORETICAL RECAP: THE INSTITUTIONAL-SOCIETAL DEBATE .....	141
HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CHALLENGES AND PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS.....	143
<i>The primacy of causes: What triggers what? .....</i>	148
Interaction between institutions and streets?.....	152
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS .....	154
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5: CASE-BASED EVIDENCE SURROUNDING THE PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS	
.....	156
<i>Presidential interruptions in Latin America: A case-based analysis .....</i>	156
The falls of the radicals in Argentina.....	156
The falls of presidents Siles Zuazo, Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa in Bolivia .....	159
The impeachment of President Collor de Melo in Brazil.....	165
The fall of president Balaguer in the Dominican Republic .....	166
The interruptions of Bucaram, Mahuad and Gutiérrez in Ecuador.....	168
Serrano's failed Autogolpe in Guatemala.....	173
The killing of a Vice-President: The impeachment of Cubas in Paraguay .....	175
The fall of Fujimori in Peru.....	176
The impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela .....	179
<b>CHAPTER 6 : THE UNDERLYING CAUSES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....</b>	<b>181</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	182
CAUSES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND CAUSES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS: A CASE FOR	
UNDERLYING CAUSES.....	184
CAUSAL ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATIONS.....	193
<i>Statistical models of presidential interruptions and challenges .....</i>	196
Institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges.....	196
Social cleavages as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges .....	201
<i>Process tracing the findings .....</i>	207
Trends of protests and challenges to presidents in Latin America.....	207
Explaining a trend towards increasing number of challenges and interruptions.....	210
Cases of interruption, new cleavages and organisations .....	213
EXPLAINING THE RESULTS.....	219
<i>Arenas of mediation .....</i>	220
<i>New visions of democracy .....</i>	222
<i>Historical experiences .....</i>	224
CONCLUSIONS .....	226

<b>CHAPTER 7 : LINKING CAUSES AND OUTCOMES. THREE TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA .....</b>	<b>228</b>
THE LACK OF ANSWERS IN TWO DEBATES: WHO CHALLENGES? WHAT ARE THE OUTCOMES?.....	231
VARIATION BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS IN LATIN AMERICA .....	234
CONSTRUCTING TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS .....	236
<i>Three types of interruptions and their cases .....</i>	<i>240</i>
The presidential scandals.....	245
Presidents violating core democratic principles.....	246
Policy interruptions.....	251
CONCLUSIONS. THREE TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS, AND A TYPOLOGY? .....	263
<b>CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUDING REMARKS.....</b>	<b>268</b>
INTRODUCTION.....	269
A SUMMARY OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS .....	269
<i>Original contributions of the dissertation .....</i>	<i>272</i>
PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH .....	275
DEMOCRACY AND PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION .....	279
<b>LIST OF REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>282</b>

## Tables and Figures

TABLE 1-1: PRESIDENTS WHOSE TERM WAS FORCEFULLY SHORTENED IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE 1978	4
TABLE 3-1: DETERMINANTS OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWNS	70
TABLE 3-2: A SUMMARY OF THE CAUSES OF BREAKDOWNS AND INTERRUPTIONS	78
TABLE 3-3: CAUSES OF DEMOCRATIC BREAKDOWNS AND INTERRUPTIONS COMPARED	80
TABLE 3-4: PROCEDURES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA	84
TABLE 4-1: COUNTRIES AND PERIODS INCLUDED IN DATASET	97
TABLE 4-2: TYPES OF POLITICAL CONFLICTS	99
TABLE 4-3: LISTS OF TYPE OF ORGANISATION AND CLEAVAGES, ACTIVE IN CONFLICTS	101
TABLE 4-4: A COMPARISON OF DATASETS	104
TABLE 4-5: PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS ANALYSED IN THE COMPARATIVE LITERATURE	106
TABLE 4-6: POLITICAL NEWS AND CONFLICTS IN DATASET	108
TABLE 4-7: NEWS AVERAGE PER YEAR	109
TABLE 4-8: INTERRUPTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC YEARS IN LATIN AMERICA	113
TABLE 4-9: COUNTRIES AND INTERRUPTIONS	121
TABLE 4-10: NUMBER OF NEWS REGISTERED AS DIFFERENT TYPES OF CONFLICTS ACROSS COUNTRIES AND SUB-REGIONS, 1980-2005	122
TABLE 4-11: CLEAVAGES AND CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA	124
TABLE 4-12: TYPES OF ORGANISATIONS IN CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA	125
TABLE 4-13: MOST CHALLENGED-RIDDEN PRESIDENTS (HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CHALLENGES)	127
TABLE 4-14: MOST CONFLICT-RIDDEN PRESIDENTS (HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL CONFLICTS)	128
TABLE 4-15: ALL PRESIDENTS AND REGISTERED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA 1980-2005	131
TABLE 5-1: CHALLENGES AND INTERRUPTIONS	144
TABLE 5-2: CHALLENGES, INTERRUPTIONS AND FAILURES	146
TABLE 5-3: A REASSESSMENT: WHAT CAME FIRST? HORIZONTAL OR VERTICAL CHALLENGES?	149
TABLE 6-1: INSTITUTIONS VS. THE STREETS AS UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INTERRUPTIONS AND CHALLENGES	199
TABLE 6-2: UNDERLYING CAUSES OF INTERRUPTIONS AND CHALLENGES	204
TABLE 7-1: CODING AND SOURCES FOR TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS	239
TABLE 7-2: CASES AND TYPES OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTION IN LATIN AMERICA	241
TABLE 7-3: PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS	250
TABLE 7-4: TWO MODELS OF POLICY INTERRUPTIONS AND POLICY CHANGE	257
TABLE 7-5: A SUMMARY OF THE THREE TYPES OF INTERRUPTIONS	263
FIGURE 2-1: INSTITUTIONALISTS' CAUSAL MODEL	39
FIGURE 2-2: NON-INSTITUTIONAL CAUSAL MODEL	40
FIGURE 2-3: A MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL INTERRUPTIONS	41
FIGURE 3-1: TYPES OF EXECUTIVE INSTABILITY	57
FIGURE 3-2: PROBABILITY OF EXECUTIVE REMOVAL IN A DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 1946-2005	61
FIGURE 4-1: NEWS AND CONFLICTS IN DATASET	111
FIGURE 4-2: NEWS AND CONFLICTS OVER TIME	114
FIGURE 4-3: LIKELIHOOD OF CHALLENGES AND REMOVALS ACROSS TIME IN LATIN AMERICA	115
FIGURE 4-4: VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL CONFLICTS ACROSS TIME IN LATIN AMERICA	116
FIGURE 4-5: DEVELOPMENT OF CONFLICTS AND CLEAVAGES IN LATIN AMERICA	118
FIGURE 4-6: LABOUR UNION, CIVIL SOCIETY (NSM), AND PEASANT ORGANISED CONFLICTS	119
FIGURE 6-1: TRENDS OF CONFLICTS AND CLEAVAGES	209



## **Chapter 1 : Introduction. Presidential Interruptions in Latin America**

## **Introduction**

In a presidential regime, the president and his administration enjoy fixed terms and unless a democratic breakdown provokes a regime change, elected presidents are secured survival until the next election. Yet in Latin America since 1980, 15 elected presidents have been forced to leave office before the constitutional end of their term (see Table 1-1). These presidencies have been interrupted.

A presidential interruption is a regime-shattering event. Interruptions often occur during periods of heightened social turmoil, deep inter-institutional conflicts, violent episodes between the police and demonstrators, in the midst of economic crises; and interruptions occur in a regime type in which one would least expect it, the presidential regime. In a period of relative regime stability for Latin America, presidential interruptions constitute a new form of instability in the region. The cases of interruptions represent the deepest regime crises since democratisation in the countries in question, it is therefore important to *understand* what this new phenomenon is, what *causes* it, and what the *consequences* are. This dissertation seeks to accomplish these tasks.

I argue that presidential interruptions share many similarities with both the democratic breakdown at the causal level and with unscheduled changes of parliamentary governments at the procedural level. Despite the similarities, the differences are also stark, and my conceptual and empirical comparisons in Chapter 3 conclude that presidential interruption constitutes a proper phenomenon somewhere between the democratic breakdown and parliamentary executive instability.

In order to explain interruptions causally, I argue for the importance of distinguishing between triggering causes and underlying causes (Chapter 2). In terms of *triggering* causes, interruptions are mainly triggered by challenges to presidents from below, what I call vertical challenges, that force a president to resign and flee the presidential palace (Chapter 5). In terms of *underlying* causes, I argue that after controlling for other factors, interruptions are caused by the emergence of new cleavages that mobilises new social and political groups that challenge the status quo of political regimes (Chapter 6). These groups put pressure on presidential administrations both from the streets with political demands, but also the legislature by organising as political parties.

The processes of challenging and interrupting presidents are not only fights for political power, but also forms of holding the chief executive accountable for his or her actions or inactions. As such, I argue that the consequences of presidential interruptions are intrinsically linked to the causes and motivations of the challenges to presidents (Chapter 7). Based on the principal motivation of a presidential challenge, I create a typology of presidential interruptions in Latin America and explore the consequences of three types of interruptions related to: a presidential Scandal, a president's Democratic violation, and a president's policies.

### ***The Cases of presidential Interruption in Latin America***

Table 1-1 lists all presidents in Latin American democracies who since 1978 either had their terms forcefully shortened, or were not able to finish their term in office at

all.<sup>1</sup> The table also includes a column indicating whether the case is categorised as a presidential interruption.

**Table 1-1: Presidents whose term was forcefully shortened in Latin America since 1978**

<b>President</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Year</b>	<b>Presidential Interruption</b>
Jaime Roldós	Ecuador	1981	No, plane accident
Antonio Guzmán	Dominican Republic	1982	No, suicide
Hernán Siles Zuazo	Bolivia	1984/85	Yes
Raúl Alfonsín	Argentina	1989	Yes
José Sarney	Brazil	1989	No, permanent electoral change
Fernando Collor de Melo	Brazil	1992	Yes
Carlos Andrés Pérez	Venezuela	1993	Yes
Jorge Serrano	Guatemala	1993	Yes
Joaquín Balaguer	Dominican Republic	1994/96	Yes
Abdalá Bucaram	Ecuador	1997	Yes
Raúl Cubas	Paraguay	1999	Yes
Jamil Mahuad	Ecuador	2000	Yes
Alberto Fujimori	Peru	2000	Yes
Hugo Banzer	Bolivia	2001	No, terminal illness
Fernando de la Rúa	Argentina	2001	Yes
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada	Bolivia	2003	Yes
Eduardo Duhalde	Argentina	2003	No, not popularly elected
Lucio Gutiérrez	Ecuador	2005	Yes
Carlos Mesa	Bolivia	2005	Yes
Manuel Zelaya	Honduras	2009	Yes*

Notes: Includes presidents who had their term shortened compared to the term that was expected at the point of them taking over the presidency, or being elected, \* The ouster of President Zelaya in Honduras occurred after the period chosen for this study, and too late to be included for a thorough analysis in this dissertation. For analyses of this case, see Llanos and Marsteintredet (2010), Alcántara Sáez (2009).

The 20 incidents cited in Table 1-1 constitute all cases of forcefully shortened presidencies in Latin American democracies since 1978. Of these 15 are considered presidential interruptions, and I will analyse thoroughly 14 of these 15 cases. Three cases are excluded as their presidencies were terminated for natural causes (Presidents Roldós, Guzmán, and Banzer). The case of Sarney in Brazil is not considered a presidential interruption since the shortening of his term, though forced upon him, was a permanent change in the electoral calendar. The Duhalde case is also excluded since Duhalde was neither popularly elected to the presidency nor was part of the

<sup>1</sup> Other presidents such as Fabian Alarcón, the successor to Abdala Bucaram in Ecuador, and Valentín Paniagua, the successor to Alberto Fujimori in Peru, have also legally had their terms shortened. However, when these took power, it was with the clear understanding that their presidencies would be caretaker presidencies and one of their primary tasks would be to hold elections at the earliest convenience for the political systems in question. Therefore their terms were not *forcefully* shortened.

constitutional line of succession to the Argentine presidency, as such he is defined as a caretaker president. Other cases are excluded for not meeting the requirement of being a democracy, for instance the case of the early exit of President Del Valle in Panama in 1988. And, finally, the early elections organised for instance in Venezuela in 1999 are excluded first of all because it constituted a potential self-interruption initiated by the president, and second of all because the incumbent continued in power.

### ***The scope of presidential interruptions and this dissertation***

I define a presidential interruption as a premature, extraordinary and forced exit of an elected president that does not entail a democratic breakdown. According to this definition, a presidential interruption occurs in *democratic* presidential regimes, and this dissertation further restricts the scope geographically to democratic presidential regimes in Latin America.

Although both are forms of executive instability, a presidential interruption is clearly different from a democratic breakdown, which often brings down the president, and always the democratic regime.<sup>2</sup> The regimes dealt with in this thesis are thus democratic, and remain so even after a presidential interruption.<sup>3</sup> I further restrict my analysis to popularly elected presidents, and presidents who became so according to the constitutionally prescribed line of succession. This dissertation therefore exclude

---

<sup>2</sup> In cases in which the president is the person bringing down the democratic regime, the president survives, but not the democratic regime. These incidents are often referred to as *autogolpes*, or self-coups.

<sup>3</sup> This dissertation will not discuss the concept of democracy, a clearly contested concept, and will follow the definition of democracy given by Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001), which focuses on contestation, participation, that the civilian elected leaders enjoy their constitutional powers, and respect for civil and political liberties. This is a procedural definition that builds on an understanding of democracy that has become rather accepted with time.

caretaker presidencies, that is presidents elected by congress from outside the constitutionally prescribed line of presidential succession.

The term presidential interruption clearly states that the dissertation deals with *presidential* regimes, which all share two traits: popular, direct, elections of both the executive and the legislative powers; and fixed terms of both directly elected institutions (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003). In a presidential regime only an impeachment of the president can normally remove a president from office between elections. A presidential interruption is therefore also different from executive instability in parliamentary regimes, the unscheduled changes of governments through the vote of no-confidence, the loss of a vote of confidence, or the (forced) call for early elections. In parliamentary regimes these types of executive instability are expected and allowed as practice in the constitutions in question. I discuss how similar and different presidential interruptions are from these two other types of executive instability in Chapter 3.

Lastly this thesis deals with democratic, presidential regimes in *Latin America*. All former Spanish and Portuguese colonies on the American continent are today presidential as defined above, and Latin America is clearly a presidential region. Why only one region? One reason is that regions are important in the study of comparative politics. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2003; 2005b) show, the study of regions is important, both due to the issue of causal heterogeneity across regions, but also to avoid simplistic assumptions of similarities within regions. In my dissertation I focus on both similarities and differences between the cases of interruptions in Latin America. So, why Latin America? First, Latin America holds the majority of

presidential regimes in the world. Siaroff (2003) counts 26 pure presidential democracies in the world, 16 of which are in Latin America.<sup>4</sup> Second, Latin America is also the region in which most presidential interruptions have occurred the last twenty-five years. Only in the Philippines with the ousting of President Estrada in 2001 has there been a similar event in a presidential democracy in a region other than Latin America (Kim and Bahry 2008; Fukuyama et al. 2005; Kasuya 2003).<sup>5</sup> A third reason for limiting the scope of the analysis to Latin America, relates to the research strategy that will be used in this thesis. With the goal of understanding presidential interruptions, a wider case-selection would limit even further the possibility of case analyses of the interruptions at hand, since there is always a trade-off between breadth and depth. Thus the benefits of including more cases in other regions, is weighted against the cost of amassing sufficient knowledge about the additional case (-s), the political systems, and cultures of these political regimes, in addition to obtaining control and oversight over potential additional causal heterogeneity. In the view of this author, the costs here outweigh the benefits.

### ***Why presidential interruptions?***

For me there are two reasons for studying presidential interruptions in Latin America.

The first relates to the importance and gravity of these events in the democracies in

---

<sup>4</sup> Bolivia is not in this group since congress until the Constitution of February 7, 2009, elected the president if the winner in the popular election does not receive at least 50% of the votes. Peru is the other exception since the country also has a prime minister that is accountable to congress. Bolivia is still clearly presidential in Siaroff's scheme, while Peru belongs to a group of what one might define as semi-presidential countries. Most analysts, nevertheless, treat Peru as pure presidential. According to the definition I gave above, both countries, however, are regarded as presidential.

<sup>5</sup> Another, related, but distinct phenomenon is the coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe. These have occurred in semi-presidential regimes that are often called competitive, or electoral authoritarian regimes, and have been connected to less than perfect elections (see e.g. Levitsky and Way 2002, 2005, 2006; Way 2005a, 2005b). Thus, these cases are outside the scope of presidential interruption as I have defined the concept.

question. The second relates to my academic curiosity and the interesting questions that are raised by the occurrence of this new form of executive instability.

A presidential interruption is a critical event in any presidential democracy, and even more so in newly established democracies. Often presidential interruptions are accompanied by high levels of political protests, increased polarisation between elites within and outside political institutions, violent clashes between police and demonstrators, and the uncertainty surrounding these incidents have in some cases put the whole democratic regime at risk. The attention on the president leading up to a presidential interruption and ever increasing the pressure on the chief executive from all sides, paralyse any other political activity at the moment. Furthermore, presidential interruptions are important events that have consequences for the regimes in which they occur. A presidential interruption, and the way it is handled, certainly has short-term consequences for the political situation in the country, who's in charge, the legitimacy for the incoming president and the regime, but may also entail long-term consequences that are not easily identified, and set precedents for future conflict-handling (Valenzuela 1992). Thus, one might even say that presidential interruptions to varying degrees are *critical junctures* for the regimes in question. It is therefore important to identify the causes, and the implications of presidential interruptions.

Presidential interruptions also constitute a relatively new phenomenon in the region, which raises the need to understand this type of executive instability. Latin America has for a long time been a region with unstable regimes and governments.

Nevertheless, presidential interruptions, as defined here, have very seldom occurred prior to the current democratic period. Most executive instability in the past has



involved changes from democracy to authoritarianism, or the other way around. Of all presidential crises between WWII and 1980, only three cases fall within the definition of a presidential interruption.<sup>6</sup> Given the fact that a presidential interruption is a new form of instability that separates executive from regime instability in presidential regimes, there is also a need for new, conceptual tools to handle these cases analytically. This requires careful conceptual analysis, which I try to provide throughout this dissertation, but especially in Chapters 3 and 7.

### ***Entering the debates on presidential interruptions***

The last five years, presidential interruptions have received some attention among scholars of comparative politics in general and Latin American politics in particular. Several comparative studies have aimed at identifying the causes of presidential interruptions (Helmke 2007; Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2005, 2007; Valenzuela 2004; Kim and Bahry 2008).<sup>7</sup> It has been argued that factors such as the regime type and institutions cause interruptions in similar ways as they affected democratic breakdowns (Linz 1990, 1994; Valenzuela 1993, 2004; Negretto 2006). Countering the institutionalist claims, Hochstetler (2006) on the other hand, argues that most presidential interruptions in South America were preceded by street protests, and that congresses, and inter-institutional conflicts, played a minor role in deposing the presidents. These street protests have often been caused by media exposed scandals implicating presidents

---

<sup>6</sup> Those are the interruptions of President Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador in 1961, and of Presidents Coimbra da Luz and Café Filho in Brazil in 1955, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: 61). However, one stark contrast between these three cases and most of the cases dealt with in this dissertation is the level of involvement of the military. Both in Ecuador in 1961 and Brazil in 1955, the military was the driving force leading the legislatures to remove the presidents, while in the great majority of the Third Wave cases, the military has played a minor role.

<sup>7</sup> For a recent review, see Pérez-Liñán (2008). There are also numerous case-studies of several of these events, especially the cases of Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil.

(Pérez-Liñán 2003a, 2007). I call this debate the institutions vs. the streets debate, and discuss it thoroughly in several chapters of this dissertation. In order to better investigate whether actors within institutions or in the streets are more important in provoking presidential interruptions, I argue that there is a need to distinguish between *underlying* and *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions (Chapter 2), and that the current literature has been too focused on triggering causes. The distinction between *underlying* and *triggering* causes exists implicitly in the old debate on the causes of democratic breakdowns, and also underpins much of the understanding and debate on the causes of interruptions. Failing to make this distinction in empirical analysis only muddies the waters, and is one of the reasons why the scholars involved in the debate fail to reach an agreement. Through comparative analysis combined with process tracing in Chapter 4, I find that street challenges, or vertical challenges as I call them in this dissertation, are more important as a *trigger* of presidential interruption than institutional, or horizontal challenges. However, when analysing the *underlying* causes of interruptions in Chapter 6, I find that the institutionalist seem to be right. Inter-institutional conflicts, or horizontal conflicts, are more important as *underlying* causes than street protests, or vertical conflicts, such as demonstrations, strikes, roadblocks, etc. In Chapter 7 I combine qualitative comparative analysis with typologies, and pursue the institutions vs. the streets debate further, and explain why in most cases the vertical challenges are more important than horizontal challenges, whereas in some other cases the vertical challenges are relatively less important.

The finding in Chapter 6 that the general level of vertical conflicts such as demonstrations, strikes and roadblocks is not related to either challenges to presidents

or interruptions could be somewhat surprising considering the current knowledge about presidential interruptions. Nevertheless, I argue that not all types of protests and conflicts are related to challenges and interruptions of presidents. Some types of vertical conflicts are rather institutionalised in the democracies in question, such as strikes organised by labour unions, and often conflicts related to salaries and working conditions are relatively more institutionalised through corporatist structures than other types of conflicts. Therefore I suggest distinguishing between different types of vertical conflicts according to which cleavages or issue dimensions that motivates the protesters. Only conflicts motivated by cleavages that are underrepresented and therefore also constitute challenges to the status quo, should one expect might constitute a threat to a president. In Chapter 6, I therefore provide the first analysis of how conflicts motivated by different cleavages, and organised by different types of organisations influence the likelihood of challenges to presidents and interruptions. I find that conflicts motivated by the traditional left-right cleavage or conflicts organised by labour unions, do not influence the likelihood of either challenges or interruptions, whereas conflicts motivated by regional or cultural/ethnic cleavages or conflicts organised by new social movements or peasant organisations indeed have a significant effect on the likelihood of interruptions and challenges to presidents.

Finally, there is even less research done on the consequences and implications of presidential interruptions in Latin America. What are the consequences of presidential interruptions for democracy, for presidentialism, and for the level of contention in the streets and congress? Do presidential interruptions solve the crises leading to challenges and interruptions? Some studies have pointed to increased levels of accountability, after all, removing a president for his or her actions or inactions is a

form of holding a president accountable, and increased congressional powers vis-à-vis the presidency (Marsteintredet 2008b; Pérez-Liñán 2005). Others have found few discernable implications, and if any, only positive implications for the regimes in question (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming). I argue that the consequences of presidential interruptions are linked to the causes of the interruption, and should not only be seen as a form of holding a president accountable, but also as reactive sequences aiming to reverse decisions or provide a change in the *status quo*.

Therefore in the search for implications of interruptions, analytical techniques assuming causal homogeneity will be hard-pressed to find significant results. In Chapter 7 I construct a typology of interruptions in order to trace the consequences of interruptions and explore the variation of these consequences across three types of interruption.

### **Chapter outline**

The next chapter, Chapter 2, discusses some theoretical considerations concerning the phenomenon of presidential interruptions, its causes and potential outcomes. I particularly focus on theories relating to cleavages and cleavage formation in democracies. This chapter also presents a heuristic, causal model of presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents, which I use to analyse the topic at hand in the following chapters. The causal model clearly distinguishes between *underlying* and *triggering* causes, and the chapter discusses how this understanding of causality underpins the institutional literature on democratic breakdown as well as the literature on presidential interruptions.

Chapter 3 combines empirical with conceptual analysis in order to map the semantic field of different types of executive instability across time and across presidential and

parliamentary regimes. Since this chapter has a clear conceptual goal, it precedes the methodological discussion that comes in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 compares presidential interruptions with democratic breakdowns, and also with unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. While there are striking similarities between interruptions and breakdowns at the causal level, the analysis also clearly shows that both phenomena are not caused by the same causes. The comparison with executive instability in parliamentary regimes shows that while presidential regimes apply similar procedures to remove presidents to the ones used to remove prime ministers, an important difference is that these procedures are not always constitutional or legitimate in presidential regimes. The chapter concludes that presidential interruptions constitute a proper phenomenon of executive instability.

In Chapter 4, I present the data on which the rest of my empirical analyses are based. Based on the Latin American Weekly Report I construct a dataset on political conflicts in Latin America, which I use for both qualitative and quantitative analysis in Chapters 5-7. Chapter 4 presents the key variables in the dataset and operationalises these. The chapter also has an appendix in which the coding rules for the key variables are spelled out. The chapter further presents the data, and compares key variables over time and across space. As such the chapter also functions as a first empirical overview of different types of conflicts, challenges and interruptions in Latin America.

Chapter 5 discusses the *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions, and is devoted to the institutions vs. the streets debate. I argue that horizontal and vertical challenges should be understood as *triggering* causes of interruptions, and chapter 5 traces which

of the vertical or horizontal challenges are the more important triggers of interruptions. I find that vertical challenges are more important than horizontal challenges as a trigger of presidential interruptions. Accompanying this chapter is a longer appendix of the qualitative process tracing of each and every interruption in Latin America since 1980. This analysis makes up the qualitative evidence used to categorise the cases of interruptions and challenges in Chapter 5 and also Chapter 7.

Chapter 6 analyses the *underlying* causes of presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents through the use of statistical techniques combined with process tracing. First, this chapter argues for the importance of studying underlying causes in the social sciences in general and in the study of interruptions in particular. Second, the chapter takes up the institutions vs. the streets debate again, but this time as underlying causes. I find that horizontal conflicts are more important in causing challenges and interruptions than vertical conflicts. Third, the chapter distinguishes between different types of conflicts based on the explicit cleavage motivating the conflict and also on the type of organisation that organises the conflict. These variables work as proxies for the emergence and salience of different cleavages in the countries studied. I find that conflicts motivated by regional (centre-periphery) and ethnic/cultural cleavages cause interruptions and challenges, the same is true for conflicts organised by new social movements or peasant organisations, whereas conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage or organised by labour unions are not related to either interruptions or challenges. Finally, I provide further qualitative evidence for this finding, and come with some qualified speculation as to why I find this pattern.

Chapter 7 is mostly dedicated to the consequences of presidential interruptions, a topic that has not been much studied in the literature so far. I argue that interruptions should be linked to the principal cause of the interruption, and provide a simple rule for identifying this cause. Based on the primary motivation for the first challenge to presidents in each interruption, I create a typology of three types of interruptions and use this typology to explain the variation in importance of vertical vs. horizontal pressure against presidents in each interruption, and also explain the variation in outcomes and consequences of interruptions. Through my inductive mapping of interruptions, I identify three types of motivations for removing presidents: a presidential scandal, a president's democratic violations, and a president's (often failed) policies. I show that the consequences of interruptions are related to the causes of interruptions, and that they vary systematically across the types of interruption.

Finally, the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the arguments put forward in this dissertation, and briefly looks beyond the scope of this dissertation to presidential regimes in other regions, and enters into a relatively normative debate of whether or not interruptions are good for democracy in Latin America.

## **Chapter 2 : Theoretical considerations**



### ***Introduction***

This chapter deals with some theoretical considerations regarding the topic of presidential interruptions. First, the chapter will discuss the concept of presidential interruptions, and relate this to other, similar social phenomena. In order to understand what a presidential interruption is, it is important to situate the concept in its semantic field. The concept of presidential interruption will be discussed and compared to democratic breakdowns, transitions to democracy and governmental interruptions in parliamentary regimes. Empirically, I deal with these issues in Chapter 3.

Second, the chapter presents a theoretical discussion on the causes of presidential interruptions. I create a model that distinguishes between *triggering* and *underlying* causes. The model identifies challenges, vertical and horizontal, as triggering causes, and points to institutions, an administration's political and economic performance, scandals, the role of democracy, and, in particular, the mobilisation of new cleavages as underlying causal factors explaining the occurrence of presidential interruptions. Empirically, I analyse the *triggering* causes in Chapter 5, and the *underlying* causes in Chapter 6.

Third, the chapter deals with the outcomes of presidential interruptions. I understand presidential interruption as one form of holding presidents accountable for their actions, and therefore link the outcomes of interruptions to the principal motivation, or cause, for the opposition to seek a president's ouster. I therefore argue that the outcomes are linked to the causes of interruption. Empirically, I analyse these issues in Chapter 7.

### ***The Concept of Presidential Interruption***

Several concepts for the same phenomenon exists in the literature today, this is not unusual for the discipline of comparative politics. Collier and Levitsky counted several hundred types of democracy with adjectives in the late 1990s, and despite their efforts at conceptual clarification, there is no reason to believe that there are fewer today (Collier and Levitsky 1997). This dissertation will use the term presidential interruption; a term used by Arturo Valenzuela in what seems to be the first treatment of the phenomenon (Valenzuela 2004), and also preferred by Negretto (2006) and Kim and Bahry (2008).<sup>8</sup> Valenzuela (2004: 7) defines interrupted presidents as “...presidents [that] failed to complete their constitutionally prescribed terms”, but also calls these presidencies failed presidencies. Kathryn Hochstetler (2006: 402) uses the term presidential falls “...to identify all the times elected presidents left office before their terms were completed, whether they resigned or were impeached or otherwise forced out of office.”<sup>9</sup> Others prefer presidential instability (“*inestabilidad presidencial*”) (Ollier 2008), whereas Pérez-Liñán (2007) prefers either the more generic presidential crisis or presidential removal, but also, presidential instability (Pérez-Liñán 2008).<sup>10</sup> A forthcoming edited book on this topic uses the term presidential breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010).

---

<sup>8</sup> Other works had already circulated on topics of the recent impeachments in Latin America, but Valenzuela was the first to deal with all interruptions and not only the impeachment, or impeachment-like, cases. See Pérez-Liñán (2003a; 2003b).

<sup>9</sup> Others such as Llanos and Margheritis (2006), and Weyland (1993) have also used the term presidential falls.

<sup>10</sup> Some also prefer constitutional crisis (Pérez-Liñán 2005), or institutional instability (Helmke 2007), but these terms normally reflect that the authors have moved up the ladder of abstraction and are discussing phenomena that are more general than a presidential interruption for instance by studying both democratic breakdown and presidential interruptions over time, or by looking at both congressional and presidential interruptions.

This dissertation uses presidential interruptions instead of concepts such as presidential instability, presidential falls, presidential crisis or presidential removals.<sup>11</sup>

The active tense of presidential interruption is preferable to the passive tense (interrupted presidencies) used by other authors, and to the term instability, since interruption better captures the fact that actions are required in order to remove a president. One of the most used assumptions in comparative politics is that politicians are power-seekers and thus seek to get elected, and re-elected (e.g. Geddes 1994). Thus, politicians are not expected to resign or leave office without any external pressure. Furthermore, I prefer interruption to removal, since interruption better captures the acuteness and level of crisis involved in these events. Interruptions also indicate that these events are not necessarily part of the normal, day-to-day politics, but rather extra-ordinary events in politics. Since I myself, by using presidential breakdown in a publication (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), have added personally to any potential conceptual confusion, I add that the concept of presidential breakdown emphasises more the causes of a president's ouster, whereas the concept of interruption also entails a focus on the succession and consequences of a president's fall. The edited book (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010) focuses more on the causes of an interruption, whereas in my dissertation I also focus on what occurs after the president's ouster and therefore prefer the concept of interruption.

Regarding the definition of a presidential interruption, however the term is coined, there is less disagreement. This dissertation defines a presidential interruption as a premature, extraordinary and forced exit of an elected president that does not lead to a

---

<sup>11</sup> To vary the language somewhat throughout this dissertation, I will sometimes use other words than interruption for the phenomenon of a presidential interruption.

democratic breakdown. This definition is in accordance with the authors cited above, but is somewhat more open. The definitions cited above refer to the “constitutionally prescribed term” and “completed term”, whereas I emphasise the premature exit of a president. The reason for this is that the length of the term might be shortened through constitutional reforms, as in the case of Balaguer in 1994, or just be shortened after external pressure as with Siles Zuazo in Bolivia. It can be argued that both completed their terms, one even completed his constitutional term (Balaguer), and would according to the definitions given above, be excluded from the sample of presidential interruptions.<sup>12</sup> Finally, I also add the condition of the presidential interruption not being accompanied, or part of, a democratic breakdown.<sup>13</sup> All in all there is a general agreement on how to define presidential interruption, even though some variations occur, and accordingly which cases are covered by the concept.<sup>14</sup>

### **The criteria of a presidential interruption**

Four criteria in this definition deserve a short discussion, and I focus on how the intention of the concept is related to the extension of the concept (see e.g. Sartori

---

<sup>12</sup> Valenzuela (2004) includes both cases, and Hochstetler (2006) excludes the Dominican case, but on account of her only treating the South American cases of presidential interruption. I thank Andrew Schrank for bringing this discrepancy between the definition of the phenomenon and the sample to my attention. For a further discussion on this topic, see Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010).

<sup>13</sup> It cannot be part of a full transition towards democracy for that matter since I insist that presidential interruptions is confined to democratically elected presidents.

<sup>14</sup> Basically the differences relate to whether to include only elected presidents (which would exclude the early exit of President Duhalde in Argentina in 2003), whether to include vice-presidents as part of the group of elected presidents (which decides the inclusion or exclusion of the early exit of President Mesa in Bolivia in 2005), whether calls for early elections are considered part of the phenomenon (inclusion or exclusion of President Siles Zuazo, among others), and whether the focus of the definition is on the completion of the constitutionally prescribed electoral term (inclusion or exclusion of President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1994). Methodological reasons for different case selections include the time-period studied, and where to put the lower threshold for considering a regime democratic (often the dilemma of including the fall of Fujimori in 2000 or not). My definition includes the case of Mesa since he was elected Vice-president, but excludes Duhalde and other interim presidents. I include the Balaguer case, but exclude the Sarney case since I insist that the interruption should be extraordinary, the change in the electoral cycle in Brazil, was permanent. I exclude the cases of accidents (Roldós), suicides (Guzmán) or illness (Banzer) since I add that the exit should be forced. Naturally, the countries included in the study and the time-period covered will also affect which interruptions to include for analysis.

1970). First of all, it is important to discuss the relationship between these criteria: in the definition given above, each criterion is necessary, and together the criteria are sufficient for a presidential interruption as understood in this thesis. The criteria thus constitute what Goertz (2006: 61) would call a conjunction of necessary conditions, and form what is called a classical concept (Collier and Mahon 1993).<sup>15</sup> The criteria or conditions of my definition are: a) a president must be democratically elected, b) the president must be forced to leave, c) the exit of the president must be extraordinary, and d) the democratic regime must survive the fall of the president.

### **A democratically elected president**

Presidential interruptions occur within democratic regimes, and this criterion separates a presidential interruption from e.g. transitions towards democracy. The change of head of state or government within a non-democratic regime can either be a transition to a democracy, or just be the continuation of the non-democratic regime. A governmental change involving the change of regime from non-democratic to democratic, is just a transition to democracy as occurred in several regimes in Latin America when the military left power to elected, civilian authorities. A transition to democracy might share some of the causes of a presidential interruption, such as economic crisis, low legitimacy (e.g. the military regime in Argentina after the War of

---

<sup>15</sup> Pérez-Liñán (2008: 108-109) sees presidential interruptions as a radial concept when analysing it in relation to presidential crises and “*coup d’états*”. Thus, the author apparently allows for variation within each concept based on substitutable indicators of the phenomena. But, what Pérez-Liñán actually does is to change the overarching concept to presidential instability, and argue that presidential instability is a radial concept, or possibly a family resemblance concept as Goertz (2006: ch. 2) understands it, that is not constituted by criteria that are necessary and jointly sufficient, but by substitutable criteria. Presidential interruption, *coup d’état*, and *autogolpe* constitute these substitutable criteria. To distinguish between different types of presidential interruptions, the author allows for variation of procedures of presidential interruptions, which in the conceptual lingo might be dubbed the indicator level. Since all interruptions must share a list of necessary and jointly sufficient criteria, I argue that the types constructed on the basis of procedures are that of classical subtypes, not radial types. For radial and family resemblance concepts, see Wittgenstein (1967), Lakoff (1987), Sartori (1984), Collier and Mahon (1993), Goertz (2006), and Marsteintredet (2007).

the Falklands), or dictatorial excesses that resemble modern-day scandals that topple presidents. Nevertheless, a transition to democracy is clearly a distinct phenomenon from a presidential interruption in that the regime type within which the incidents occur are different, and the outcomes are different since one entails a regime change, whereas the other does not. A change of head of state in a non-democratic regime is also a distinct phenomenon from a presidential interruption. Therefore, the scope of our analysis is restricted to presidential democracies in Latin America. This criterion excludes for instance the ouster of Presiden Del Valle in Panama in 1988 since Panama became a democracy in 1990.

A democratically elected president is a term that includes the vice-president elected on the same ticket as the president, and presidents who have gotten the position as successors in the constitutionally prescribed line of presidential succession. I exclude from causal analysis presidents elected by congress, or by other procedures not prescribed in the respective countries' constitutions. The reason is that these presidents are more often than not only caretaker presidents that have as their principal mission to rule the country until the next (often early) elections. Caretaker presidents are not included in the analysis in this dissertation. This leads to the exclusion of President Duhalde's shortened presidential term in Argentina,<sup>16</sup> but includes President Mesa's interrupted presidency in Bolivia.

---

<sup>16</sup> The criterion also leads to the exclusion of other shortened presidencies, such as Alarcón in Ecuador, and Paniagua in Peru. But, these caretaker presidents were not forced to shorten their presidencies, and took over the presidencies with the clear agreement of holding elections as soon as conveniently possible. Thus, these presidencies are also excluded by the criterion of a forceful removal of president.

### **The forceful removal of the president**

A president must be forcefully removed in order for the case to be considered an interruption. That excludes cases caused by natural deaths, suicides, illnesses preventing a president from completing the term, and president-initiated early election in which the incumbent can run (and win).<sup>17</sup> These are what I would define as trivial, or accidental cases, and these are not relevant for the topic at hand. Within my time-period of analysis, this criterion excludes three cases: the death of President Roldós in Ecuador due to a plane crash in 1981, the suicide of President Guzmán in the Dominican Republic in 1982, and the resignation of President Banzer in Bolivia in 2001 due to terminal cancer.<sup>18</sup> An illness or an accident cannot be predicted by the factors a social scientist normally studies in explaining social phenomena. So, even though including these cases would have increased the N of the analysis at hand, they fall outside the scope of the concept of presidential interruption.

### **The extraordinary exit of a president**

I also add the criterion that the forced exit of a president should be extraordinary. It goes without saying that this criterion excludes changes of government through ordinary elections. But, what is more important is that this criterion excludes

---

<sup>17</sup> All presidents that have called for early elections and been able to run, have won the election. In fact, in Latin American since 1980 only one incumbent president has run and lost a presidential election. This was President Mejía of the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) in the Dominican Republic in the 2004 election. So, this criterion does not exclude any potential cases of interruption.

<sup>18</sup> Kim and Bahry (2008) includes the case of Guzmán in the Dominican Republic in 1982 on account of him committing suicide during the outburst of a scandal involving his government, and especially his daughter who was a member of the government. This might be so, but there is no way of knowing this. Guzmán committed suicide in his private bathroom in the presidential palace without leaving a note behind. The reasons for his suicide are still not clear. If this case was to be included, one should also have included the case of Banzer who, during duress, resigned due to his health conditions and ongoing cancer treatment. Kim and Bahry (2008), however, mysteriously exclude this case. The level of social protests against Banzer were clearly much higher than against Guzmán at the time of them ending their presidencies (Guzmán is also still remembered in the Dominican Republic of being the “cleanest” president in the latest democratic period, which started with his presidency), thus including one on account of scandals and protests, should have led to the inclusion of the other. In this dissertation I exclude both.

permanent changes in the electoral calendar. Often through electoral or constitutional reforms, the electoral calendar is also changed. If these changes in addition to shortening the incumbent president's term also constitute permanent changes of the electoral calendar, they are not considered presidential interruptions. This criterion separates the case of President Balaguer, who got his presidential term shortened to two years in 1994, and President Sarney who got his presidential term shortened in 1988. The difference is that the reform in the Dominican Republic was extraordinary and the change in the electoral calendar only affected President Balaguer's term, whereas in Brazil the shortening of the presidential term was permanent and affected all presidents after Sarney as well as the incumbent president's term.

### **Survival of the democratic regime**

The fourth criterion is that the democratic regime survives a presidential interruption. This criterion separates a presidential interruption from a breakdown of democracy, i.e. a non-democratic take-over of the democratic government that leads to the end of the democratic regime. Again, at the causal level a democratic breakdown and a presidential interruption might share causes such as economic distress, increased conflict-level in society, etc. But, often the actors are different; a democratic breakdown often involves the military (even though the military need not take over the government). The level of military involvement in presidential interruptions need not be zero, but it is significantly lower than in democratic breakdowns. The crucial difference between a democratic breakdown and a presidential interruption, is that in a presidential interruption the democratic regime survives the interruption. This distinction that separates executive and regime instability, is also a new one for Latin America, and one which for the period under study in this dissertation leads to the



exclusion of the falls of president Aristide in Haiti in 1991 and 2004, and Fujimori's *autogolpe* in 1992.<sup>19</sup> None of the cases listed in the introductory chapter ended with a democratic breakdown, even though in some cases the survival of democracy was indeed in peril. Despite democratic breakdowns and presidential interruption being two different social phenomena, I show in the following that the study of presidential interruptions has borrowed theories from the democratic breakdown literature to explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions.

### **Placing presidential interruptions in its semantic field**

An important part of conceptualising social phenomena is to place the phenomenon in relation to other similar phenomena, and consequently, situate the concept in its semantic field (Collier et al. nd). Presidential interruptions are interesting because they are not supposed to happen given the fact that presidents are elected for fixed terms, a trait that actually defines presidentialism (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992). A presidential interruption may thus (at least in some cases) be unconstitutional and even undemocratic. In that respect the phenomenon may be compared to democratic breakdowns. Both phenomena involve executive instability, both may be unconstitutional, involve violence, military actions, etc. Nevertheless, as I pointed out above, there is one crucial difference: Whereas democratic breakdown also involves regime instability, a presidential interruption only involves executive instability.

Executive instability in presidential regimes is therefore also in a way similar to unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. In parliamentary

---

<sup>19</sup> These three cases would also have been excluded by other criteria of presidential interruptions. Haiti is a semi-presidential regime, whereas Fujimori was not interrupted, but rather abolished congress, and interrupted democracy.

regimes governmental changes occur whenever the majority in parliament so desires, and of course do not entail democratic breakdown. This feature of parliamentarism is what distinguishes parliamentary from presidential regimes. There is, however, one great difference between presidential interruptions and unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. In parliamentary regimes executive instability between elections or via the calls for early elections is clearly constitutional and even expected at times, whereas in presidential regimes, with the exception of impeachment, executive instability is normally not a constitutional option, and is clearly unexpected. This crucial difference constitutes the basis for one of Linz's main criticism's of presidential regimes (Linz 1990, 1994). Linz, however, expected critical inter-institutional conflicts to end in democratic breakdowns, and therefore presidential interruptions defy his expectations. Executive instability (even in presidential regimes) is far better than democratic instability, and may entail important consequences for presidentialism and not least of all, the understanding of how presidential regimes work during moments of crisis.

Presidential interruptions, I argue, can be placed as somewhere between the democratic breakdown, a phenomenon well known throughout Latin America's history since independence, and the unscheduled parliamentary changes of government known from political systems in Europe, and historically Western-Europe. Chapter 3 will further investigate how similar and how different the phenomenon of presidential interruption is from the historical cases of democratic breakdown in Latin America and unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes, and discuss whether one can argue that presidential interruptions constitute a new phenomenon altogether. The primary goal is to situate

the phenomenon in its semantic field through the use of various comparative techniques, and improve the understanding of this type of executive instability in presidential regimes.

### ***Causes of presidential interruptions***

An important element of comparative politics is causal explanations of social phenomena. This section focuses on institutional, economic and socio-economic, scandals, and regime-related causes of interruptions. Most space, however, will be dedicated to the role of cleavages, representation, party systems, and the role of protests motivated by underrepresented cleavages and groups in political systems. The reason is that, in my view, these factors play an important, and hitherto ignored role in producing presidential interruptions. The section concludes with a look at how several causal factors are linked, and provides a causal model of the relationship between the explanatory (*triggering* and *underlying*) and dependent variables.

### **A summary: Institutions, the streets, performance, regime and presidential interruptions**

Institutions have been at the heart of studies of the democratic regimes in Latin America since the 1990's, much of this is generated by Juan Linz's two articles that criticise the presidential systems in general, and more specifically in Latin America (Linz 1990, 1994).<sup>20</sup> Linz talked of the perils for democracy caused by presidential institutions rather than the perils for presidents. Nevertheless, the literature on

---

<sup>20</sup> For two reviews of the institutional debate, see Munck (2004) and especially Elgie (2005). Linz has also inspired a lot of students of Latin American politics before these publications as well, see Mainwaring (1998). For the latest thorough treatment of the hypotheses within this line of research, see Cheibub (2007).

democratic breakdown has many insights that are relevant for the debate on presidential interruptions.

In the above-cited articles Linz argues that the presidential system is not as good as parliamentary systems in upholding stable democratic regimes. The explanation lies in the fixed terms for presidents and congress, and the separate elections of the two institutions. According to Linz, this creates two separate, but related, problems: the rigidity of the presidential system makes solving conflicts, or crises, difficult; and the dual democratic legitimacy of the two elected institutions, which ultimately creates problems of deadlocks.<sup>21</sup> Linz argued that the rigidity and dual democratic legitimacy would make these conflicts hard to resolve within the democratic institutions, and thus make presidential systems more vulnerable to democratic breakdowns than parliamentary systems. These problems were particularly acute during minority governments. Needless to say, Linz's theory has been tested by several other authors with diverging results (e.g. Alvarez 1998; Cheibub 2002, 2007; Przeworski et al. 2000; Stepan and Skach 1994). The findings, however, generally support that presidential democracies break down more often, and live shorter lives than parliamentary democracies, but Cheibub (2007) argues that this is due to the military legacy from the previous authoritarian regime, and cannot be attributed to the presidential institutions *per se*.<sup>22</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Deadlocks have however turned out to become quite an elusive concept. Few have operationalised this variable despite being central to institutional theories of democracy for quite some time. See for instance Ames's (2001) brilliant book on deadlocks and democracy in Brazil, which does not include a definition of the concept. A few exceptions to this rule apply. See Jones (1995), Mayhew (1991), and Negretto (2006) for news-based operationalisation of deadlocks. For operationalisations based on legislative activity, see Saiegh (2004), and with better data, see Garcia Montero (2004; 2006; 2007). I provide a fuller discussion of this topic in Marsteintredet (2008a).

<sup>22</sup> Several authors have also modified Linz's arguments, mainly by stating different conditions under which inter-institutional conflicts and deadlocks were to occur (Cheibub 2002; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cheibub et al. 2004; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1990, 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and

Valenzuela (2004) basically uses Linz's (and his own previous (Valenzuela 1993, 1994)) arguments to explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions, thus applying a theory of democratic breakdown directly on presidential interruptions. Same causes, new outcome: congressionally weak presidents tend to become interrupted. Negretto (2006) follows up on Valenzuela's argument, and argues that minority presidents are interrupted when they do not control the median voter in congress. The problem with this analysis is not that it is wrong, but that Negretto does not control for extrainstitutional factors at all. Empirical evidence from the Latin American cases of presidential interruption point to popular protests being of equal or greater importance in providing the pressure required to remove a president from office (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007, 2008). One might say that the causal path provided by institutionalists, by which a presidential interruption is supposed to occur may have problems passing the test of process-tracing since the processes leading to presidential interruptions seem to be different from the ones predicted by institutionalists.<sup>23</sup>

People need reasons to protest, and protests occur for many reasons, but one of the more important reasons is probably related to an administration's performance, which often in empirical analyses means the state of the economy. There is a disagreement in the literature on the direction of the effect neoliberalism has upon social mobilisation (see e.g. Kurtz 2004; Hochstetler 2006; Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007), but few doubt that the economy and national economic models affect the level of societal mobilisation. Well-known labour union actions such as the strike, are a tactic to get

---

Mainwaring 1997; Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Linz's original and the subsequent moderated models are brilliantly summarised and analysed in Cheibub (2007).

<sup>23</sup> For process-tracing, see George and Bennett (2005).

salaries raised, and secure jobs, which ultimately also is related to the economy. A grievance model of social protests directed against governments and policies, would indicate groups protest when the economy is faltering, either due to bad economic results, or through the loss of value of citizens' money.<sup>24</sup> Presidents as heads of state and government might often be easy targets to blame in dire economic conditions. Thus, bad economic performance, which also works as a proxy for an administration's performance in general, is hypothesised to increase the likelihood of presidential challenges, and ultimately interruptions.<sup>25</sup>

In any democracy, elected officials must abide by the laws. One important difference between an authoritarian and a democratic system is that voters (at least theoretically) can hold their leaders accountable, independent institutions (are supposed to) control each other, everyone, including political leaders, is (supposed to be) equal before the law, and free speech allows for critical media. Thus if it is discovered that an elected leader, be that a president, a governor or a legislator, has committed any serious infraction of the law (or the constitution), the elected official runs the risk of losing his or her office. Thus in democratic regimes, scandals involving the president, a president's close advisors, or the government, are likely to affect the survival of presidents in office (Pérez-Liñán 2007).<sup>26</sup> There are two pre-requisites for a scandal to become a peril for the president's office: independent institutions (or horizontal accountability), and a free press. These two conditions are to an increasing degree met in Latin America during the last 25 years (Pérez-Liñán 2007: ch.4). First, a

---

<sup>24</sup> The relationship need not be linear of course, and might depend for instance on the level of economic development. It is quite possible that there is a threshold in economic, technological or educational development that must be met before economic results start affecting protest levels.

<sup>25</sup> By presidential challenge, I understand any attempt at presidential removal, see Hochstetler (2006), and Chapter 4.

<sup>26</sup> Scandals are also likely to affect ministers and chief executives' survival in office in parliamentary regimes as well (Midtbø 2007).

presidential scandal might invoke an impeachment, a procedure that requires independence between a congress and a president.<sup>27</sup> Regimes that fall into the grey zone,<sup>28</sup> all fall short of some important features of democracy. The focus has often been on elections (see especially Schedler 2002), but often these regimes lack horizontal accountability as well,<sup>29</sup> which means that congress, or the court system, is not able to check executive power. Second, it takes a free press and exposure of any presidential wrongdoing in order to create a scandal, which must be exposed during the president's term in order to affect his or her survival in office.

Thus: *“Cabe suponer que el grado de democratización del sistema afecta sustancialmente la dinámica de las crisis presidenciales...”* (Pérez-Liñán 2003b: 153). The scope of this dissertation is to deal with presidential democracies in Latin America. Nevertheless, even within democracies there is ample variation across regimes, depending somewhat on one's definition of democracy. Many have focused on what consolidates democracies and (to a lesser extent) authoritarian regimes (e.g. Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring et al. 1992), and in terms of grey zone regimes several scholars have argued that they are inherently unstable because of the contradiction between the regime's rhetoric of democracy and the otherwise authoritarian behaviour, especially during the ultimate democratic test: elections (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006). Thus, one hypothesis would be that regimes at the lower end of a democracy-authoritarianism continuum, but still

---

<sup>27</sup> This is similar, but not equal, to what Baumgartner (2003: 7-8) calls the institutional balance of power. Other factors of course also affect the process of impeachment. Baumgartner adds the constitutional and statutory provisions for impeachment, the structure of party politics, the president's popularity and other factors such as liberal media (Baumgartner 2003: 8-13).

<sup>28</sup> The grey zone includes hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002), semi-democracies (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001), and competitive (Levitsky and Way 2002) or electoral (Schedler 2002) authoritarian regimes. Consult these references for further discussions of the topic of hybrid regimes.

<sup>29</sup> This dissertation will not enter into the dispute of what horizontal accountability actually means and whether or not this concept should be part of a definition of democracy. For a discussion of this concept in the Latin American context, see Mainwaring and Welna (2003).

democratic, are more prone to presidential interruptions than more democratic regimes.<sup>30</sup> Or, given the discussion above in relation to presidential scandals, one might hypothesise that regimes at the higher end of a democracy-authoritarianism continuum are more prone to presidential interruptions.

### **Cleavages, Party Systems and Presidential Interruptions**

There is more to party systems than their numbers.<sup>31</sup> These indexes and numbers are thought to express some underlying features of party systems that might affect political regimes, such as for instance the representation or presence of social cleavages in a society (Stoll 2008). In this section I discuss what a party and a party system are in order to get at the role of the emergence of new cleavages and its importance for presidential interruptions.

Parties and party systems perform important roles in modern, indirect democracies. They inhabit political institutions, represent citizens, groups, and central cleavages, organise electoral competition, and shape a polity. One could define parties as organisations that compete for power through popular elections. Sartori offers further specification in his definition, which says that parties are “...*any political group identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office*” (Sartori 1976: 63).<sup>32</sup>

However, in this dissertation, I am more interested in parties’ representational roles,

---

<sup>30</sup> In this dissertation the threshold for inclusion was being coded as at least semi-democratic in the MBP dataset (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001). Competitive authoritarian regimes generally seen as a subtype of authoritarianism, rather than of democracy, often qualify as semi-democracies in the MBP index. For instance, Peru after 1995, Dominican Republic for some periods during “*los doce años*” of Balaguer (1966-1978), and the later Balaguer regime (1986-1996).

<sup>31</sup> Often represented by the effective number of parties, or the electoral volatility index. The effective number of parties is also called the Laakso/Taagepera index, and the electoral volatility index is called the Pedersen index. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Pedersen (1983).

<sup>32</sup> Sartori on the following page also offers an abridged version that drops the qualification of an official label, and whether elections are free or non-free.



what Sartori defines as parties' functions. Parties are supposed to express people's demands and represent the people, and by fulfilling these functions parties should form responsive governments (Sartori 1976: 27). Even though parties should serve the purpose of the whole (of society) (Sartori 1976: 25), parties have tended to represent different groups and issues in society that have given parties their identity (Mair 1997: 20). As such, parties are vehicles representing groups in society (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 3). According to Rokkan (1970: ch. 3), these identities are forged on the basis of cleavages in society, which in Europe, have been created by several critical junctures throughout centuries of history in that continent.<sup>33</sup> A social, or socio-political, cleavage can be defined as "*large-scale divisions within a society that are exogenous to the political system*" (emphasis in the original) (Stoll 2008: 1441). Lijphart (1999: 78-89) calls cleavages issue dimensions, and thus relates a socio-political cleavages to important policy issues. Further, Lijphart in line with others (Lipset and Rokkan 1967a: 6), argues that cleavages may vary in salience and importance. Rokkan (1970: 131) lists four cleavages represented by parties to different extents across Western Europe: Centre-Periphery, State-Church, Land-Industry, and Owner-Worker, which Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) famously stated had been frozen since the 1920s. Whereas Lijphart (1999: 78-89), on the other hand, operates with seven issue dimensions, some of which overlap with Lipset and Rokkan's four cleavages (in brackets): 1) socio-economic (owner-worker), 2) religious (state-church), 3) cultural-ethnic (centre-periphery), 4) urban-rural (land-industry), 5) regime support, 6) foreign policy dimension, 7) materialist-postmaterialist. Parties thus may represent groups according to which stand they take

---

<sup>33</sup> I do not want to dwell too much on the genesis of different party systems across Europe or in Latin America, but just point out that the creation of different party systems in Europe followed a very different path than the ones in Latin America, see Coppedge (1998) and Geddes (2003: ch. 4).

on central issues of conflicts, cleavages, in society. It is this representative function of parties, and party systems that is relevant in this dissertation.

Party systems can shortly be defined as “...*the set of patterned interactions in the competition among parties.*” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4). And “...*involves something more than the sum of its component (party) parts, and incorporates some element of understanding of the mode of interaction between these parties.*” (Mair 1997: 51).<sup>34</sup> Party systems are important and relevant in democracies because they might promote a centrifugal or centripetal competition, coalition building or zero-sum politics, and affect the degree to which the system is institutionalised, which is also a measure of how well groups in society are represented (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sánchez 2009).<sup>35</sup>

The dimension of party systems most relevant to our topic is the degree of roots in society of the party system. To cite Lipset and Rokkan (1967a: 5), the focus is on “...*conflicts and their translation into party systems.*” The roots in society refer to the structuring of political preferences, the representative role of parties on issue dimensions, or cleavages, and linkages between parties and society created by these dimensions, and the regularity of how people vote. One of the reasons for the freezing of the party systems in Western Europe until the 1960s was that central cleavages in the societies had found their party expressions, and that several important compromises on these dimensions had either settled the conflicts, or taken them out of the political arena. Something that also reduced the polarisation and ideological

---

<sup>34</sup> See also Sartori (1976: 43-44)

<sup>35</sup> About how to measure party systems, the best read might still be Sartori (1976: ch. 5).

intensity, if not ideological distance, in the party system, and thus helped consolidate the democracies in that region.

So, why do party systems, or the representation of central cleavages, matter for presidential interruptions? Besides the discussed relationship between the number of parties and ideological polarisation (Sartori 1976: 292; Mainwaring 1993), the point is that increased societal polarisation might lead to increased levels of social protests, or inter-institutional conflicts, which I, at least theoretically, would link to presidential interruptions. The emergence of new cleavages, representation of new groups, increased mobilisation and polarisation before WWII in Europe, and during the cold war in other regions, such as Latin America, could also be linked to several democratic breakdowns, and other regime changes. As the work of Lipset and Rokkan suggest, if salient cleavages find their party expression, the level of conflict and polarisation decreases. Thus, the degree to which the party system represents central cleavages in society is also important for the institutionalisation of conflicts in society. Democracy after all, is an attempt to institutionalise conflicts and disagreements, and solve these with non-violent means.

But, the fight for representation of new groups is conflictive. The emergence of cleavages in societies, as the result of critical junctures, and revolutions, at least in Europe, has tended to be violent, and even in some cases led to the split-up of states and to the creation of others (see, Lipset and Rokkan 1967a; Rokkan 1970: 72-144). Furthermore, in order to accomplish an institutionalisation of conflicts, all relevant groups should be represented by partisan actors in nationally elected institutions. The fight for suffrage extensions and the representation of all relevant groups is also

conflictive, a fact demonstrated by labour unions' and parties' fight for full male suffrage, and proportional representation.

It is important to mention that I will not take this model of cleavage representation based on the development of party systems in Western Europe too far onto Latin American terrain, I just point out that the emergence of new, underrepresented cleavages may entail conflicts. Party systems in Latin America have existed for a long time in several countries without clear cleavage representation. Catch-all parties, and populist parties, have been dominant in several countries, and class-based parties, and especially cultural, ethnic, religious, or region-based parties have constituted a minority, at least in the modern era we are discussing in this dissertation (Madrid 2005b; Di Tella 2004). Still the notion of group representation is at the heart of what parties are, and even though representation in Latin America has taken a very different shape from that of Western Europe, that does not mean that cleavage mobilisation and representation is impossible, or unimportant if it occurs.

I hold that several of the presidential interruptions and challenges to elected presidents can be explained by the conflicts that normally accompany the emergence of new cleavages in a society. A central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the emergence of new, salient cleavages, or important social or political groups, not represented in the party flora, will increase the likelihood of presidential interruptions, and challenges to presidents. Groups representing cleavages that have been excluded, I believe, have less reason to believe in the turn-over of executives in elections since these groups themselves never get represented at the executive level. This increases the risk that these groups will become anti-systemic, disloyal or semi-loyal, and,

ultimately, fight to remove a president, the highest embodiment of the political regime, outside the electoral arena.

The linkage between cleavages and presidential interruptions has not been explored in the literature. The effective number of parties, one measure of cleavages, figures as an explanatory variable in a statistical analysis by Kim and Bahry (2008). In two of the 14 statistical models in that article, the authors find a significant, positive connection between the effective number of parties, and presidential interruptions, but for the model they ran on the Latin American cases, they find no significant causal effects. Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 6-7) discusses how a legislative shield might prevent a presidential interruption, and Negretto (2006) discusses the policy positions of parties in congress, and the control of the median voter in congress. Both variables are affected by the nature of the party system, the number of parties, and the ideological distance between parties, but both authors aim to measure institutional rather than societal factors. Cleavages as a variable explaining presidential interruption is therefore underexplored.

### ***Causal models of presidential interruptions***

The institutional literature discussed above can be understood in two different ways. One is eloquently displayed in Cheibub's (2007: 8) book on the topic, the other is a competing understanding of Linz's (1978; 1990; 1994) original arguments.

The Cheibub model depicts a view of the Linzian theory of presidentialism and parliamentarism, in which institutions hold a primacy with respect to causes of

democratic breakdown and presidential interruptions.<sup>36</sup> Institutions are not only seen as autonomous factors in political life, but also as a primary factor that precedes other factors such as the economy, and social factors (March and Olsen 1984) and, thus, constitute *underlying* causes of democratic breakdowns and presidential interruptions.<sup>37</sup> Another model of the Linzian school of institutionalism emphasises institutions' ability to handle conflicts when they occur, no matter their cause. Here institutions are not given primacy in terms of what causes the deadlocks, democratic breakdown or presidential interruptions, but institutional factors are rather seen as *triggering* causes that, in turn, may be caused by other underlying factors that are exogenous to institutions. This view, however, still maintains that presidential regimes are not well equipped to handle political conflicts when they first occur.

Nevertheless, applied to presidential interruptions, both institutional models depict a two-step causal chain: From causal factors (institutional or otherwise), through deadlocks, to democratic breakdown or presidential interruptions (Figure 2-1).


Deadlocks is a key variable,<sup>38</sup> that is oftentimes just omitted in this causal chain, and only assumed to be the immediate cause for a breakdown or an interruption.

---

<sup>36</sup> I must add here that Cheibub also controls for a set of other factors than just institutional ones to account for presidential regimes' democratic failure. As such, in his book, he is also very much in line with the second view of Linz's thesis.


<sup>37</sup> The causal processes or paths to breakdown or interruption is the following: the separation of powers yields few incentives for coalition formation, and thus often creates minority governments. These problems are aggravated in multiparty systems, and party systems with undisciplined parties. These factors, in turn, create legislatively ineffective governments, and deadlocks, which due to the separation of powers (dual democratic legitimacy and rigidity) might end in breakdown of democracy and/or presidential interruptions.

<sup>38</sup> Deadlocks are really just a value on a variable that should be called executive-legislative relations. But in line with the general lingo on these issues, I say that deadlock is a variable, see Marsteintredet (2008a; 2009) for a discussion.

**Figure 2-1: Institutionalists' causal model**

However, a particular type of inter-institutional conflicts figures as important in the literature on presidential interruptions, namely institutional, or horizontal, challenges (Hochstetler 2006). The regular type of deadlocks, or inter-institutional conflicts, is therefore moved to the left in the model above, and constitutes an *underlying* causal factor. In the original breakdown literature, however, deadlocks were supposed to be an immediate cause, causal mechanism, or a *triggering* factor (Pierson 2003, 2004), for democratic breakdown, the same role is now played by challenges to presidents for presidential interruptions.

The competing model to the institutional explanations to presidential interruptions, argue that presidential interruptions are *triggered* by street, or vertical, challenges, and the *underlying* causes are also related to the level of protests in the streets, or vertical conflicts. I call street protests, and street challenges against presidents vertical conflicts and challenges, respectively, in order to distinguish these types of conflicts from horizontal conflicts or inter-institutional conflicts between the legislative and the executive (see also chapter 4). Vertical conflicts and challenges, are supposed to be more important than horizontal conflicts and challenges as *underlying* and *triggering* factors for presidential interruptions (Hochstetler 2006). The non-institutional account of presidential interruptions also supposes a two-step causal chain: From causal factors (institutional and otherwise), through vertical challenges, to presidential interruptions.

**Figure 2-2: Non-institutional causal model**

This model covers most of the work on presidential interruptions that do not follow the institutional account; the key difference between figures 2-1 and 2-2, is the type of challenge one expects to *trigger* a presidential interruption, but also whether horizontal or vertical conflicts are more important as *underlying* causes.

Few, if any, have tested these steps fully. Either the explanatory factors to the left in the figure are left out in order to compare the relative power of horizontal vs. vertical challenges (Hochstetler 2006), vertical challenges and protests have been ignored (Negretto 2006), or vertical challenges have been moved to the left in the statistical model (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 200; Edwards 2007). A recent contribution, however, does try to test a similar two-step model (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but given data restrictions such complex models (Heckman selection models) do not provide robust results. Furthermore, the authors do not test fully the relative weight of institutional vs. street factors as underlying causes.


That either a vertical or a horizontal challenge is required for a presidential interruption, is not very surprising. Presidents do not resign voluntarily. Nevertheless, to start with these two triggering variables to explain presidential interruptions can be illustrative given the predominance of institutionalism in the field of Latin American politics. Hochstetler's (2006) findings are important because they question the causal model depicted by institutionalists, but her analysis in part ignores the underlying causes of challenges and interruptions.



### An integrated model of presidential interruptions

The model in figure 2-3 summarises the previous discussion, and displays the relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome of interest, or dependent variable. The arrows indicate causality. *Underlying* causes such as government support in congress (or deadlocks), presidential scandals, governmental (or economic) performance, the emergence and salience of new cleavages, and level of democracy, affect the likelihood of a horizontal or vertical challenge to the president (*triggering* causes). These, in turn, affect the survival of a president in office.

Figure 2-3: A model of presidential interruptions



Notes: Arrows indicate causality. The model is inspired by Goertz's two-level models, see Goertz (2006: 237-268).

Depending on the research question, one might focus on the mid-to-right hand side of the model, skip the middle part of the model, or analyse the full model. I distinguish between what I call *underlying* and *triggering* causes. *Triggering* causes could also be understood as intervening variables, and may of course be analysed as dependent variables in causal analyses, or as causal mechanism, i.e. the mechanism or procedure by which a presidential interruption occurs. The signs +/AND/OR indicates various potential relationships between the causal factors. The + relates to an additive function between the explanatory factors in a typical regression analysis in which causes are additive. The AND/OR relates to the typical QCA approach of necessary and sufficient causation (Ragin 1987, 2000), which does not measure the relative weight of each factor.<sup>39</sup> With the arrows and connector AND at the top of the model, I do however indicate that the link between *underlying* and *triggering* causes and the outcome of interest is causal, and that the presence of at least one underlying and one triggering cause with values theoretically expected to produce the outcome, is necessary for the occurrence of an interruption.

The point of the full model is to display how I understand the relationship between different levels of causal factors, and the outcome of interest. The underlying causes will not cause a presidential interruption directly, only if they provoke a challenge will a president be removed from office. The underlying causes thus create a potential, and may increase the likelihood for the presence of either horizontal or

---

<sup>39</sup> I do not test whether or not the correct way to model interruptions is through additive causes or necessary and sufficient causes. I only display that both ways of seeing the world may fit the model depicted in Figure 2-3.

vertical challenges.<sup>40</sup> So horizontal or vertical challenges are seen as necessary causes for presidential interruption, and, thus, an interruption is a subset of presidential challenges.

I distinguish between underlying and triggering causes, and one way of thinking about the link between the two, is in terms of threshold effects or threshold effects with structural causes (Pierson 2003: 182-187, 193-195) (AND/OR). The first story would for instance be that bad economic performance over time together with emerging new cleavages mobilising as an alternative to the status quo, could push the political system on the verge of experiencing horizontal or vertical challenges. In such a situation anything, such as an unpopular economic decision, a small scandal, or any unforeseen event, might put the system over a threshold and mobilise challenges towards the president either from the streets (vertical) or from congress (horizontal), or from both. The causes might be long-term and structural, whereas the outcome would have a short time-horizon (the challenge, or the interruption). One might also think that a structural cause might quickly bring the political system close to the threshold level for challenges towards the president. In this case, such a structural change could be the the launching of neoliberal or market reforms (by surprise) (Stokes 2001), often unpopular with great parts of the societies in Latin America. The way of thinking of causality is that of syndromes of causes and complex causes together provoking the outcome, and the negative cases would be used as the control group (i.e. challenges that did not end in interruptions).

---

<sup>40</sup> This resembles how Ted Gurr (1970: 6-12) looks at variables or societal conditions that increase the potential for collective or political violence (as intervening variables), and then looks at his dependent variable's magnitude and forms of political violence.

Another way to understand the model, would be to think in terms of additive causation that increases the probability of the outcome of interest, i.e. a typical statistical approach (+). Changes in the values of the explanatory variables increase or decrease the likelihood of a challenge to the president, and subsequently an interruption. In a probabilistic world one is interested in studying what affects the likelihood of producing the outcome of interest, more than in the causal mechanisms. In this way of thinking one tests statistically the relationship between the variables and uses all instances of non-interruption as the control group. Both approaches and ways of thinking are in my view valid and complementary. While for the causal analysis of the relationship between the underlying causes and the outcomes of interest I use the standard statistical approach, I focus on qualitative comparative analysis in my analysis of the relationship between the triggering causes and interruptions, and also in linking causes with outcomes.

I argue that the model in Figure 2-3 captures most of our understanding of presidential interruptions. It is both a causal model based on my understanding of interruptions, and my reading of other contributions, but should also be understood as a stylistic and heuristic tool to facilitate understanding and analysis, and the model clearly does not represent a “true” version of reality.<sup>41</sup> Something causes a challenge that triggers an interruption. This something may be a crisis, e.g. economic or a scandal, which then creates a challenge, either vertical or horizontal, which develops into a crisis of the government. This model, which has not been spelt out in any work

---

<sup>41</sup> For instance, it seems clear that one challenge (e.g. vertical) may provoke another (e.g. horizontal), yet my model does not envision a causal relationship between the two types of challenges. I thank Flavia Freidenberg for pointing this out in reference to an interruption in Ecuador, in a personal e-mail communication.

that I have seen on this topic earlier,<sup>42</sup> is useful in addressing several research questions and debates in the current literature on presidential interruptions and adjacent topics. Where a researcher puts his or her emphasis, ultimately depends on the research question at hand. I will use the model to look at a series of questions. Based on this model I focus on the street vs. institution debate when analysing the *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions (Chapter 5). Furthermore, as discussed above, I move one step to the left in the model and refer to this debate looking at horizontal and vertical conflicts as *underlying* causes (Chapter 6). Going beyond this debate I disintegrate the variable of vertical conflicts and link it to types of cleavages to test one of the main hypothesis of the dissertation, namely that if groups mobilise on new, and emerging cleavages that are underrepresented, this mobilisation increases the risk of a presidential interruption (Chapter 6). And, finally, applying a more classical comparative approach, I link the underlying causes of interruptions to the outcomes of interruptions (Chapter 7).

### ***Linking causes with outcomes: Implications of presidential interruptions***

How, and on what, can presidential interruptions have an impact? A presidential interruption has an immediate impact on who runs the country, and at least at this level we expect it to have an immediate impact on a number of issues that the government deals with on a daily basis. But, can it have an impact that reaches further?

---

<sup>42</sup> Helmke (2007) is the one to come closest to a full-fledged model in several steps, and a test of the model, but her objective is to explain which institution falls, the presidency, congress or the supreme court, not so much why a president falls.

There have been few studies of presidential interruptions in Latin America, and the few that have discussed this topic, have mainly done so on a theoretical level (Marsteintredet 2008b), or found few consequences at all (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming). As with the causality of presidential interruptions, the question of implications or consequences can be dealt with at least in two ways. One is the statistical, assuming causal homogeneity, which would identify some consequences that on average affect some parameter in the period after a presidential interruption. Or, the other, would be to look at the different types of interruptions, see whether they differ in their implications and outcomes compared to each other.<sup>43</sup> In this dissertation I will use qualitative methods to investigate the outcomes of interruptions because I believe that the outcomes vary tremendously across the cases of interruption,<sup>44</sup> and I will link the outcomes to the principal causes of the interruption, and more in particular to the principal motivation for the challengers to attempt to oust the president.

Baumgartner wrote that “*Presidential impeachment is the equivalent of a political earthquake*” (Baumgartner 2003: 1). I argue that the political earthquakes related to presidential interruptions are of different magnitudes. It is not uncommon to distinguish between instances of the same concept. In studies of similar phenomena such as crises and democratic breakdown (O'Donnell 1988), and political violence (Gurr 1970), one important goal in addition to explaining the outcome of interest, is to

---

<sup>43</sup> Or one could compare the implications of presidential interruptions with the implications most-likely negative cases (Goertz 2006: ch. 7), in other words challenges that failed to remove the president from office.

<sup>44</sup> And also because the only statistical study done on this topic has come up with null-findings (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming), and I argue that causal heterogeneity explains why these authors find few consequences of interruptions.

explain the variation in the scope, magnitude and type of the outcome. I pursue this line of thought when analysing the outcome.

Despite the similarities between the cases of interruption, and the fact that all fall within the definition of a presidential interruption, I argue that there is a great variation between the cases that is important to analyse. At some levels the interruptions are very similar. For instance most are preceded by vertical challenges (the *triggering* causes), and a president is removed as a result of this pressure. It may be argued that all cases of interruption are a form of holding a president accountable, and clearly the fight for the presidency through elections or otherwise, is a fight for power between different actors. Moving up the ladder of abstraction, all interruptions are also government crises. And until now, in the literature, and in this chapter, I have treated presidential interruptions as being a dummy variable of which we want to explain the occurrence.<sup>45</sup>

Typologies are a common feature in comparative politics, and there are numerous examples of their use. Types and typologies of presidential interruptions are important because they facilitate the understanding of this new phenomenon in presidential regimes, and allows for investigating potentially different paths in and out of interruptions (George and Bennett 2005: ch. 11). Typologies may also improve our understanding and conceptualisation of the differences across cases within the

---

<sup>45</sup> Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 3), based on Linz (1978), creates a typology of outcomes of presidential crises depending on the destiny of the two elected branches of government and the regime. This typology, however, does not distinguish between different types of presidential interruption. Almost all of the presidential interruptions treated here fall within the same category of this typology. The goal of Pérez-Liñán (2007) is to compare interruptions with types of presidential crisis, whereas one of the goals of this dissertation is to compare different types of presidential interruptions.

overarching concept of executive instability. Typologies also help avoid conceptual stretching and too broad generalisations (Sartori 1970).

The main goal of typologies is often to explain variation within a category, concept, or phenomenon, and to create meaningful, and often qualitative, variation to be explained as a dependent variable, or to be used as an independent variable for explaining other phenomena. There are many examples in the vast literature on transitions to democracy of the use of typologies as both dependent and independent variables (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996: 57-60), and regime types have also been used as both independent and dependent variables in numerous ways and works (see, Collier and Levitsky 1997), typologies are also well-known from the literature on welfare states, normally as variation to be explained (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990), interest representation and corporatism (e.g. Schmitter 1974), (political) crises (O'Donnell 1988), and revolutions (Skocpol 1979). In the literature on presidential interruptions, all interruptions are mainly considered to be of the same type, and few have distinguished between different types of interruptions.<sup>46</sup>

The model in Figure 2-3 indicated that the underlying causes may be substitutable, or might have different weight in their explanatory powers of predicting vertical or horizontal challenges towards presidents. A statistical analysis identifies the mean effect of these variables across all cases, and marginal effects may indicate the relative importance (on average) of each variable in producing the outcome. Through a comparative analysis across all cases, we could identify which factors, and

---

<sup>46</sup> For an exception see Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008).



conjunction of factors that seem to be necessary and/or sufficient to explain our outcome.<sup>47</sup>

In my view it seems clear that the underlying causes for challenges are also related to the motivation for groups to challenge their presidents. If there is hyperinflation and groups challenge the president on account of bad economic management, the cause and motivation are related. What extraordinary event that may motivate groups of people to challenge presidents may vary from case to case across interruptions, and indicate what type of crisis the presidential interruption is a part of.<sup>48</sup> But a crisis can take many forms, and it is difficult to create exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories in a typology of political crises.<sup>49</sup> The notion of different kinds of crises creating variation in the outcome is present in O'Donnell's (1988) work on bureaucratic authoritarianism. Similarly, Gurr (1970: 9-11), albeit in a more linear vein, argues that the greater the level of the relative deprivation in society, the greater the magnitude of political violence (measured as turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war).<sup>50</sup> Both Gurr and O'Donnell argue similarly to what I think is important to

---

<sup>47</sup> An explanation of a single-case would only (in a strict sense) give us the answer to the presence or absence of causal factors, however through process-tracing one could be able to address the "how" question: How do the underlying variables affect the triggering causes?

<sup>48</sup> A presidential interruption is clearly a subtype of a presidential crisis (Pérez-Liñán 2007) or a crisis of government, but also a subtype of other types of crises.

<sup>49</sup> O'Donnell (1988: 24-31), for instance, discusses several types of crises that entail different outcomes (different types of authoritarian regimes), and ends up with a typology that clearly does not have mutually exclusive categories. O'Donnell argues that only the most profound crisis (a crisis of social, or cellular domination) creates the outcome of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime because it is the only type of crisis that threatens the state that upholds the position of the capitalist system and the dominant classes. Other types of crisis might end in authoritarian regimes, but not in a BA regime. The other types of crisis are: government crisis, regime crisis, crisis of the expansion of the political arena, and crisis of accumulation. Furthermore, the crisis of social domination or of hegemony, can combine with any of the previous types, vary in level, and occur in two variations. In the first a political party or other civilian actors attempt to found a new social order, and in the second it is the armed forces that attempt to take power from the state.

<sup>50</sup> The outcome in terms of magnitude of political violence is also affected by the coercive control of the state, and the level of institutional support for acts of political violence (Gurr 1970: ch. 8-9).

address with regard to presidential interruptions. Variation in levels, types and strength of explanatory factors will create variation in the outcome.

I understand interruptions and challenges to presidents to be instances of holding the president or the executive accountable for their actions or omissions.<sup>51</sup> As such interruptions are linked to what the challengers argue they hold their president accountable for, which is linked (loosely or closely) to objective causes of an interruption (which I expect to be the ones presented in Figure 2-3). The removal of a president, thus, entails some correction of unwanted behaviour and the motivation for presidential removals should affect the outcome. In order to investigate the outcomes or implications of interruptions, I suggest distinguishing between interruptions based on what motivated the challengers to attempt removing the president. In other words, to study the variation in outcomes, I construct a typology of interruption based on the challengers' motivations for removing the president. This is a simplifying exercise that I use instead of analysing causal pathways through for instance Boolean methods. One reason is that the latter would create  $2^5$  logical combinations, but only 14 positive instances of interruptions. The other reason is that despite the efforts to create complex pathways and map complex causes of each instance, there is no guarantee that the types of interruptions would be jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive.<sup>52</sup> The study of outcomes of interruptions is in its infancy, and I think it makes more sense with a somewhat more inductive approach to construct better theories, than a full-fledged theoretical approach with clear expectations of outcomes.

---

<sup>51</sup> I do not address here whether this is a good type or a bad type of accountability, see Schmitter (2004) and my discussion in Marsteintredet (2008b).

<sup>52</sup> In the social sciences a perfect typology is difficult to create. Fuzzy cases will always exist, and new types not considered yet may always appear.

## **Conclusions**

This chapter has presented some theoretical consideration concerning the phenomenon of presidential interruptions. First of all I argued for the importance of locating the concept in its semantic field by comparing it to other, related phenomena of executive instability such as democratic breakdowns and unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. This is a task I will take up in the next chapter. Second, this chapter presented and discussed the contributions in the field of executive and regime instability in presidential regimes. I pointed out that a central debate had been that of the “streets vs. institutions”, in my model between the causal weight of vertical vs. horizontal challenges. In Chapter 5, I revisit the “street vs. institutions” debate and focus on *triggering* causes of interruptions. In terms of the *underlying* causes to interruptions, I particularly argued for studying the dimensions of cleavages, cleavage formation, and party systems and their relations to presidential interruptions. I argue that these and other causal factors constitute a set of *underlying* causes to the more triggering events that have received much attention in the literature so far. My hypothesis is that challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions in part may be explained by the surge, and mobilisation of underrepresented new groups and cleavages that challenge the status quo of their respective political regimes. This is an underexplored dimension of presidential interruptions in Latin America. I will further pursue these thoughts in Chapter 6. Finally, I argued for the classical, comparative technique of studying differences within a group of cases that are similar in many respects. In contrast to techniques that assume causal homogeneity, I argue that there may be systematic differences between the cases of presidential interruptions when it comes to the outcomes of the phenomenon. In Chapter 7 I explore the differences between the cases of interruption.

## **Chapter 3 : Drawing the Semantic Field. What Presidential Interruption Is...and Is Not**

### ***Introduction***

Are presidential interruptions in Latin America simply contemporary expressions of democratic breakdowns?<sup>53</sup> Political conflict has not disappeared in Latin America: the presidential interruptions since the start of the third wave of democratization in 1978, the several failed coup attempts in Paraguay, Guatemala and Venezuela, as well as the successful coups in Peru and Haiti, are but some examples. Given the fact that political conflict continues to prevail, one hypothesis is that the underlying causal factors which resulted in democratic breakdown in the past are today more likely to lead to presidential interruption. Much of the literature on the topic is based on the assumption that presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are sufficiently similar to use the models of democratic breakdown to explain presidential interruptions.<sup>54</sup> On the other hand, since democracies survive presidential interruptions, could it not be the case that presidential interruptions are more similar to unscheduled changes of parliamentary governments?<sup>55</sup> Since presidential interruptions do not entail democratic breakdown, it is a form of executive rather than regime instability. Or is it rather the case that presidential interruptions constitute a new phenomenon altogether? This chapter discusses these questions and compares presidential interruptions with types of executive instability such as democratic breakdowns, and unscheduled governmental change in parliamentary regimes.

---

<sup>53</sup> This chapter is based on ideas from the following publications: The comparisons with parliamentary changes of government are based on Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008) and Marsteintredet (2008b). The statistical analyses and discussion of presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are in part based on Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010).

<sup>54</sup> For a further discussion of this topic, see Marsteintredet and Llanos (2009)

<sup>55</sup> One could also ask whether or not presidential interruptions could be special cases of transitions to democracy. This parallel, or metaphor, is not as good since transitions to democracy occur in non-democratic regimes. A presidential interruption according to the definition of the concept, occurs in regimes that are at least semi-democratic. One could, nevertheless, compare some instances of interruptions with transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, for instance the fall of Fujimori, who led what has been defined as a competitive, or electoral, authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2002).

Why compare these phenomena? One obvious reason is that several authors have based their analyses of presidential interruptions on models of democratic breakdown, placing particular emphasis upon political institutional variables as underlying causes (e.g. Negretto 2006; Valenzuela 2004). Another reason is that even though governments fall unexpectedly in Latin America, democracies survive; a fact that raises questions about one of the key differences between presidential and parliamentary regimes, namely a president's fixed terms.<sup>56</sup> A third reason is that in order to fully understand new social phenomena, one should also strive to fully understand what the phenomenon is not, in addition to what it is.<sup>57</sup> Doing this then fulfils one task of concept formation, namely to situate a new concept within its semantic field, that is, to map the constellation of related concepts and terms (Collier, La Porte, and Seawright nd: 13).<sup>58</sup>

All three phenomena compared here end the life of the government; only one spells the end of democracy. Of the two phenomena that only end the life of government, only one includes the premature end of governments as a regular, constitutional feature. All three may be shattering events for the regimes in question and grow out of deep political conflicts, but one has tended to be solved by the military and the other two by civilian forces. Thus, there are similarities and differences between the three. This chapter aims to further explore these similarities and differences. The goal of the chapter is to place presidential interruption in its semantic field by comparing interruptions with other, similar phenomena. Through this exercise I also seek to

---

<sup>56</sup> Congresses are also elected for fixed terms in presidential regimes, which constitutes another key difference between the two regime types.

<sup>57</sup> An exercise captured by Schmitter and Karl's (1991) famous essay: What Democracy is...and is not, which, obviously, is where I have taken inspiration for the title of this chapter.

<sup>58</sup> Philippe Schmitter also dedicates quite some space to placing new concepts in its context and embedding them in a wider context with other concepts, in his acceptance speech of the Mattei Dogan Prize at the IPSA World Congress in Santiago de Chile, July 15, 2009 (see Schmitter 2009).

enhance the understanding of this new form of executive instability in presidential regimes. As such this chapter could be read as a theoretical, conceptual chapter, but it also serves as a first empirical analysis of presidential interruptions.

I start this chapter by creating a typology of executive instability and relating these types to parliamentary and presidential types of regime. Then I compare presidential interruptions to the undemocratic type of executive instability, the democratic breakdown, since the analogy between the two, at least implicitly, has been central for much of the writing on the causes of presidential interruptions in Latin America. The goal of the comparison is to determine whether the causes of democratic breakdowns in Latin America resemble the causes of presidential interruptions across the period 1950-2005. I address this question via an original use of statistical analysis. First I investigate whether both phenomena share *similar* causes, and can be explained by the *same* causal model. This analysis is also a traditional causal analysis, so I spend some space discussing the empirical implications of the statistical results as well. Then, I investigate, statistically, whether the causal factors have a significantly *different* effect upon democratic breakdowns than presidential interruptions.

Since the outcomes of democratic breakdowns and presidential interruptions differ, I also compare presidential interruptions with democratic types of executive instability, in particular unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. This comparison is procedural rather than causal. One reason is that Juan Linz in his famous essays argued that presidential regimes lack procedures to solve deep political conflicts once they occur, and therefore these tend to end in democratic breakdown (Linz 1990, 1994). Another reason is simply that I lack of data for other regions than


Latin America on the topic of interest. A third reason is that since my empirical focus is Latin America, a full-fledged comparison with regimes in Europe and other regions, is outside the scope of this dissertation.

***Types of executive instability: Presidential interruption and the semantic field***

There are several procedures for removing the government across all regime types. In democratic regimes there are prototypically nine types of governmental interruption, six of which are democratic. These are outlined in Figure 3-1 below. The types are constructed to meet the requirements of being mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, to minimize within-type variation and maximize between-type variation (George and Bennett 2005: ch. 11). Very often, however, the empirical realities of social life defy social scientists' theoretical typologies, and at a low enough level of abstraction one could always find differences within types. The operationalisation of the types are based on the procedures for removing the chief executive, the coding rules are presented in the appendix to this chapter.



Figure 3-1: Types of executive instability



The figure distinguishes between the democratic and undemocratic types of executive instability or governmental removal,<sup>59</sup> and presents most, if not all, known forms of executive instability in presidential and parliamentary regimes.<sup>60</sup> The types of democratic breakdown, the coup, the assassination, and the foreign invasion can occur in both presidential and parliamentary democracies; therefore I label these procedures “regime-independent”. Although this typology distinguishes between three types of undemocratic executive instability, I will in the following collapse all into the concept of democratic breakdown in order to compare with presidential interruptions.

Among the democratic types of governmental removal, the figure identifies six different procedures, two of them related to parliamentarism, two related to presidentialism and two that are not specific to any regime type, also named “regime-

<sup>59</sup> For a somewhat similar view, see Pérez-Liñán (2003b: 150-152) who distinguishes between institutional and praetorian outcomes.

<sup>60</sup> In semi-presidential regimes (or different types of semi-presidential regimes, Shugart and Carey 1992), the president may remove the executive, and other procedures also exist. My discussion restricts itself to parliamentary and presidential regimes since many of the arguments presented here relates to this debate, and excludes semi-presidential regimes.

independent” in the figure above. In parliamentary regimes a government can be forced to resign through a vote of no-confidence,<sup>61</sup> and the government can call for early elections.<sup>62</sup> In Linz’s view, these are two flexible parliamentary procedures which make parliamentary regimes better at handling crises than (rigid) presidential regimes. In presidential regimes the only procedures to remove the president in between elections are through impeachment, and the lesser-known mechanism of declaring presidential incapacity.<sup>63</sup> The two democratic regime-independent types of government removal are the chief executive’s resignation and the popular recall. Prime Ministers as well as Presidents may tender their resignation or, which is more often the case, be forced to resign. Even though in a parliamentary regime these resignations often occur through the procedure of early elections, this is not always the case. Thus, the governmental resignation as such is not solely a presidential procedure. The popular recall is not much used, but has become more common in recent Latin American constitutions, and was used in Venezuela in 2004.<sup>64</sup> The recall is also in use in several states in the USA today, and there are historical instances of recall of parliamentarians in European parliamentary democracies (Christophersen 1969). This procedure is a regime independent tool that pertains to the relationship between voter and representative. And, in contrast to the other democratic procedures

---

<sup>61</sup> Furthermore, a government can make a legislative proposal a matter of confidence and resign if the proposal does not win a majority (see e.g. Huber 1996). For the sake of simplicity the vote of confidence is understood to fall under the type of vote of no-confidence.

<sup>62</sup> Under some constitutionally specified restrictions, the option of early election is also open in some presidential constitutions (these are in Uruguay, Peru both 1979 and 1993 Constitutions, Venezuela 1999 Constitution, and Ecuador 2008 Constitution). This, however, is often an option of last resort to be called for only after the exhaustion of the constitutionally prescribed line of succession of vice-presidents and the presidents of congress and Supreme Court. Therefore I argue that as a type of governmental interruption, this is a parliamentary procedure.

<sup>63</sup> The option of impeachment is also open in parliamentary regimes, but is almost never used since the vote of no-confidence is available. Therefore I argue that as a type of governmental *interruption*, impeachment is a presidential procedure.

<sup>64</sup> The constitutions that open for popular recall of the president are Colombia 1991, Venezuela 1999, Ecuador 2008 and Bolivia 2009. The constitution of Ecuador 1998 opened for recall of all elected representatives except the president, the new Constitution of 2008, however, opens for a recall also of the President (art. 105).

of governmental interruption, the popular recall does not involve congress; it is a procedure linking the “will of the people” directly to the “fate” of the president. Whereas impeachments and the vote of no-confidence are tools of horizontal accountability, the popular recall is a tool of vertical, societal accountability in addition to regular elections.<sup>65</sup>

### ***Presidential Interruptions and Democratic Breakdowns***

A presidential interruption is defined as an extraordinary and premature change of president without the breakdown of the democratic regime (see Chapter 2); by contrast, a democratic breakdown marks the end of the democratic constitutional order and the beginning of non-democratic rule.<sup>66</sup> Both presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns occur under regimes that are at least minimally democratic.<sup>67</sup> The outcome of a presidential interruption is obviously qualitatively different from that of a democratic breakdown, and there are also stark differences between the types of actors that are normally involved in the two phenomena. Up until the Third Wave of democratization, the military acted as the *poder moderador* and intervened in politics to interrupt or end democracy, justifying their interventions by claiming the duty to restore social order, to wage war against a real or incipient communist threat, and to protect the constitution. By contrast, in today’s world congress, civil society and street protesters are the most active and important actors for removing

---

<sup>65</sup> The popular recall as a tool of vertical accountability is additional to the ones discussed in O’Donnell (2003: 47-49), see also Smulovitz and Peruzotti (2003) in the same volume for further discussion of these topics. I discuss horizontal and vertical accountability in relation to presidential interruptions more thoroughly in Marsteintredet (2008b).

<sup>66</sup> Note that a democratic breakdown does not necessarily mean the change of the head of state and government. *Autogolpes* are clearly democratic breakdowns, but without a change of the chief executive.

<sup>67</sup> In this dissertation and for the purposes of the statistical analyses in this chapter, I define a minimally democratic regime as one that is classified as at least semi-democratic in the MBP-index of democracy in Latin America (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001).

presidents,<sup>68</sup> and it has been suggested that civil society has taken over the military's role as *poder moderador* (Hochstetler 2006: 403).


Despite these differences in the outcomes, processes, and actors involved, it may nonetheless be the case that presidential interruptions are *caused* by underlying factors similar to those that also influence the likelihood of a democratic breakdown. Predictions generated by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán's (2005a: 36) statistical models indicate that the likelihood of democratic breakdown after 1978 has not decreased or changed significantly relative to previous periods. The fact that one can observe a sharp decrease in the number of democratic breakdowns in the world after 1978 is explained not by the underlying forces specified in their statistical model but rather by the new regional context (changes in U.S. foreign policy, the orientation of the OAS,<sup>69</sup> the Catholic Church, and attitudes towards democracy). After all, while the probability of a democratic breakdown in the region has dropped to almost zero since the mid 1970s, the probability of a presidential interruption has increased over the same period and is now similar or higher than the earlier risks of a democratic breakdown (see Figure 3-2). Thus, it is not farfetched to build upon Mainwaring and Pérez Liñán's analyses and compare the causes of presidential interruptions with the causes of democratic breakdowns.

---

<sup>68</sup> The military has of course not been totally absent during the most recent period particularly in the cases of interruptions in Ecuador (see, Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010), but also in the most recent case of interruption in Honduras (Alcántara Saez 2009; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). But the military has been relatively less important.

<sup>69</sup> The OAS's present role has changed quite a bit since 1965, when the organisation legitimised a U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic that clearly thwarted potential democratic progress. For details, see Hartlyn (1998: 89). The transformed role of the OAS is linked to the adoption of Resolution 1080 (negotiated in Santiago de Chile in 1991). Speedy OAS action helped thwart the *autogolpe* in Guatemala in 1993 (Villagrán de León 1993), and dissuaded General Oviedo from attempting a coup in Paraguay in 1997 (Valenzuela 1997).

Figure 3-2: Probability of Executive Removal in a democracy in Latin America 1946-2005



Notes: Based on my own data on presidential interruptions and on changes from either democracy or semi-democracy to authoritarian regimes according to the MBP-dataset (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001). Probabilities calculated on the bases of only democratic or semi-democratic years. The Lowess smoother is used to predict probabilities (year as independent variable) and present the results.

After all, the incidents of presidential interruption experienced by several Latin American countries are the closest several of these regimes have come to a full democratic breakdown. In the comparison between the causes of the two phenomena, I build a model of democratic breakdowns on four factors (economic performance, regime characteristics, civil society mobilization, and political institutions), discuss whether these factors may conceivably contribute to presidential interruptions, and then test how well it explains the two outcomes of interest, and compare the coefficients of the explanatory variables.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> For a longer discussion of these factors, see Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010)

### **Some theories of democratic breakdown**

Studies that analyse the breakdown of democracy tend to argue that economic level, an administration's (economic) performance and the effectiveness of a democratic regime affect the risk for breakdown (Lipset 1959; Lipset et al. 1993; Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a; Przeworski et al. 2000). Przeworski et al. (2000: 117) concluded that rich democracies do not die, and that economic crises in poor countries increase the likelihood of a democratic breakdown.<sup>71</sup> Linked to economic and regime performance in general, Linz's (1978) analysed democratic breakdown through concepts such as efficacy, effectiveness, and the legitimacy of the political system. Similarly, regime performance seems to matter not only for the survival of democracy, but also for the survival of presidents, as several of the presidential interruptions occurred alongside poor economic performance.<sup>72</sup> For instance, the fall of President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador in January 2000 may be linked to the country's abysmal economic performance, its default on its international debt during the fall of 1999, its problems in defending the national currency, and just prior to his fall, Mahuad's very unpopular decision to dollarise the economy. Likewise the Argentine presidential interruptions in 1989 and 2001 occurred during harsh economic times.

While often linked to regime performance, a second factor affecting the survival of presidents is social and popular mobilisation.<sup>73</sup> Military interventions in democratic

---

<sup>71</sup> The richest democracy in the world ever to fall was Argentina in 1976 (a Latin American country, of course).

Argentina (in 2001) can also lay claim to being the richest country ever to experience a presidential breakdown. Measured in 2000 dollars, Argentina's GDP per capita in 1976 (10,200) and in 2001 (10,700) differed by only 500 dollars.

<sup>72</sup> See O'Donnell (1988: 22-24, ch. 9) for a comparative case-study of these factors during a democratic breakdown.

<sup>73</sup> I refer here to mobilisation without inferring that mobilisation is the same as polarisation. Bermeo (2003) convincingly shows in her book that polarisation among ordinary citizens seems not to be the most important factor in explaining democratic breakdown in Europe between the two World Wars or in South America during the Cold War. Bermeo mainly uses data from voting on parties, and vertical mobilisation may still be an important causal factor of democratic breakdowns. Bermeo generally does

civilian rule have often been preceded by social mobilisation and street protests;<sup>74</sup> so too have presidential interruptions been preceded by such forms of activism.

Presidential interruptions have been linked very clearly to street mobilisations and protests against presidents (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Valenzuela 2004).

Consider the image of protesters in Argentina crying “*que se vayan todos*,” demanding not only the ouster of President de la Rúa, but apparently also the ouster of an entire political elite that had failed the people. With the exception of the fall of president Balaguer in 1994-1996 (see, Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), and also the ouster of Manuel Zelaya in 2009, a common link for all other presidential interruptions is increased popular mobilisation.

The institutional design of democracy is a third factor found to affect the survival of democracy. For students of democracy and political regimes in Latin America, a dominant debate over the past 20 years has concerned the operation and performance of political institutions under presidential regimes and the question of which institutional regime results in a more stable form of democracy (Jones 1995; Linz 1994; Mainwaring 1990, 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997; Cheibub 2002, 2007; Cheibub and Limongi 2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Przeworski et al. 2000). It has long been argued that presidentialism, particularly in combination with proportional electoral systems that tend to generate minority governments and/or undisciplined

---

not look at these types of data, but in the cases of Chile and Argentina she presents data on different types of mobilisation that does not counter the argument put forth here (Bermeo 2003: 152-153, 189-194).

<sup>74</sup> See Wedge (1969) for the case of Brazil, O'Donnell (1988: 295) for the case of Argentina, Bermeo (2003: 152-153) for the case of Chile.

parties, is plagued by congressional-executive conflict which is difficult to resolve, given the fixed terms of office and separate origin of presidents and legislators.<sup>75</sup>

Using similar arguments, Valenzuela (2004) holds that the difficult combination of presidentialism and minority governments can explain the fall of presidents just as well as it can democratic breakdown (Linz 1978, 1990, 1994; Valenzuela 1993). Negretto (2006) argues that minority governments, particularly those that do not control the median voter in congress, are vulnerable to being removed, while Pérez-Liñán (2007) focuses on a president's legislative shield to explain the variation between the success and failure of impeachment of presidents in Latin America. It is evident that institutional factors are important for explaining presidential interruptions, if for no other reason than the fact that an impeachment procedure requires a qualified majority for removing a president (witness, for example, the case of President Collor de Melo in Brazil in 1992).

Linked to institutional design and regimes, one often also considers the regime characteristics and legacy as important in explaining regime instability. Much of the literature in comparative historical research focuses on how prior regime actions affect today's probability for regime survival through arguments related to various levels of path dependency (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000, 2001). Cheibub (2007) argues that the reason that presidentialism is more unstable than parliamentarism is that presidential democracies more often than parliamentary democracies are preceded by military dictatorships. This legacy is particularly pernicious for democratic stability. Likewise, one might argue that prior regime instability might affect executive stability today in presidential regimes. Given the

---

<sup>75</sup> For the Chilean case, see Valenzuela (1994), and for a contrasting view on Chile, see Faundez (1997). See e.g. Weyland (2006: 22) and Cameron (1997) for Fujimori and Peru.



fact that one can observe more than one interruption in traditionally democratically unstable countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, one could assume that regime legacy may also affect presidential interruptions.

### **How to compare Presidential Interruptions with Democratic Breakdowns?**

Following Goertz's (2006: 50-53, ch. 9) view of three-level concepts and two-level theories, the purpose here is to determine whether both presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns *are* actually caused by the following four basic-level conditions: economic performance, regime characteristics, civil society mobilization, and political institutions. In order to measure these basic-level forces concretely, I specify various combinations of secondary-level empirical indicators (two indicators for each factor).<sup>76</sup> Goertz (2006) maintains that the indicators at the secondary level are substitutable, whereas the causal factors at the basic level, from which level the hypotheses emerge, are often not substitutable. Thus, for example, poor economic performance (a basic-level causal factor) might increase the risk of presidential or democratic breakdown via secondary-level indicators such as negative growth, increased unemployment, deprivation of real salaries, hyper-inflation, etc. I use statistical tools to analyse the effects of the secondary-level indicator upon the two phenomena – presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns – first by comparing the estimated regression coefficients and t-statistics generated by the regression analyses. I can thereby infer whether the basic-level causal factors have *similar* consequences for the likelihood of presidential and democratic breakdowns. Then, I recode the dependent variables to compare the causes of breakdown and

---

<sup>76</sup> The actual indicators for each basic level condition are the result of not only theoretical expectations, but also trial and error with different specifications of variables. See Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010) for more on this process. Here I present and compare the results.

interruptions directly with a focus on whether the causal factors have a significantly *different* effect on interruptions than on breakdown.

Theoretical reasoning, data availability, and a variety of specification tests resulted in measuring the four basic-level causal factors in the following manner.<sup>77</sup> Regime economic performance is measured by a dummy variable flagging prolonged recession of at least two years based on economic growth, and a dummy variable flagging levels of yearly inflation exceeding 20%. Both measures are based on two standard indicators of economic performance. Regime characteristics are measured by the nature of the regime in the year prior to breakdown and the past history of democratic breakdowns. Civil society mobilization is measured by the number of anti-government demonstrations and the level of strike activity, both measures drawn from the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Archive.<sup>78</sup> I would hypothesise that strikes would have a more negative effect upon government survival before the Third Wave and the end of the Cold War, while anti-government demonstrations might prove to be relevant for explaining more recent presidential breakdowns. To distinguish between types of societal mobilisation and vertical protests is also in accordance with what I argue in Chapter 2. Finally, the consequences of institutional design are measured by variables such as the number of political parties (Laakso and

---

<sup>77</sup> For sources, see notes to Table 3-1.

<sup>78</sup> More reliable data on civil society mobilization are clearly available for more recent years (see the next chapters in this dissertation), but Banks's data extend across a longer time series. In addition, the dataset distinguishes between general strikes and anti-government demonstrations. The Banks variable General Strikes counts any strike of more than 1,000 industrial or service workers involving more than one employer and aimed at national authorities. The variable Anti-Government Demonstrations is defined as any peaceful gathering of more than 100 persons with the primary purpose of voicing opposition.

Taagepera 1979), and the share of legislative seats held by the party of the chief executive.<sup>79</sup>

The question raised is: Does the same causal model explain both phenomena? The *events* of interest is whether or not a president survives and whether – in the event of presidential removal – democracy survives or not. The dependent variable is therefore a limited dependent variable with three possible outcomes 1) the president survives; 2) a presidential interruption occurs; 3) a democratic breakdown occurs. In order to model statistically factors which influence the likelihood of each of these respective outcomes, there are several variants of multinomial probit and logit models available. A key consideration concerns the nature of the relationship between the three potential outcomes. Does the movement from presidential survival to presidential interruption to democratic breakdown entail increases in the “degree” of instability? If so, then ordered logit estimation is the preferred technique. A wide variety of estimations were conducted utilizing rare events logit and ordered logit.<sup>80</sup> Ultimately standard multinomial logit with corrections for heteroskedasticity (which in any case is marginal) and with robust standard errors was selected as the preferred estimation technique.<sup>81</sup>

---

<sup>79</sup> More reliable indicators for executive-legislative relations exist, such as direct measures of deadlock (Jones 1995), but again, data availability prevents the use of other indicators.

<sup>80</sup> Rare events logistic regression analysis is a statistical analysis that controls for the uneven distribution of the dependent variables, i.e. very few positive observations as compared to negative observations in the dependent variable (King and Zeng 2001b, 2001a). It particularly addresses the problems of standard logistic regression predicting positive outcomes when these are rare compared to the negative outcomes. While this technique is preferable for studying these phenomena in separate equations (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), for the present purpose the multinomial model is superior. Rare events logistics work with dichotomous dependent variables, which means that in order to study presidential interruptions I would either have to code democratic breakdowns as a non-event, which would be wrong, or exclude the case (country-year) from the analysis, which would not be desirable.

<sup>81</sup> An assumption built into the multinomial logit model is that the results generated for a given choice alternative (say, presidential breakdown) are independent of the addition of an irrelevant alternative (IIA). More specifically, the IIA assumption holds that “the relative odds of choosing [one alternative] *i* over [a different alternative] *k* are the same no matter what other alternatives are available or what the

The reason for excluding ordered logit merits a short discussion. Theoretically it is conceivable that one could order the outcomes of presidential and democratic breakdowns, the former being caused by a lower level of economic crisis, inter-institutional conflict, or civil society mobilization than the latter. For this reason, I sought to test the whether the outcomes actually could be ordered. Although most of the results generated by ordered logit and standard multinomial logit were quite similar, the ordered logit models consistently underestimated the effects of the independent variables upon the highest ordered outcome (the outcome with the value 2) *regardless* of whether this corresponded to presidential interruption or democratic breakdown. Clearly, then, the data themselves do not support an assumption that instability or the specific form of presidential removal is of a “higher degree” for democratic breakdowns than for presidential interruptions. This is an important finding in and of itself: presidential interruptions are not “light” versions of democratic breakdowns.

The comparison built on the multinomial logit model follows two steps. First I use the causal model based on theories that explain democratic breakdown to see whether this model explains both phenomena, and to investigate whether the same variables provide coefficients with the same sign and are significant for predicting both outcomes. To do this I code the limited dependent variable as 0: President survives; 1) a presidential interruption occurs; 2: a democratic breakdown occurs. This model,

---

attributes of the other alternatives are” (Train 2003: 49-50). If this assumption were proven not to hold for our data, then the results generated would be significantly less reliable. The tests conducted, however, reveal that the results generated in binomial models using both standard as well as rare events logistic regression on both phenomena do *not* change appreciably from the results generated by the multinomial logit model, which indicates that the outcomes are independent of irrelevant alternatives (Train 2003: 53).

presented in Table 3-1, investigates the causal *similarities* between presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns. Then, I recode the dependent variable and use democratic breakdowns as the base category (value 0), in order to investigate directly whether the variables affect breakdowns and interruptions in a significantly *different* manner. Since one might suspect that interruptions and breakdowns are explained by the *same* factors in a *similar* manner, this latter test is much tougher test. If a variable is significant in predicting interruptions with breakdown as base category, I can conclude that interruptions and breakdowns are caused by different factors, and consequently, that interruptions are not only the modern-day expression of a democratic breakdown.

### **Interruptions and breakdowns compared**

The panel data set contains observations of years of democracy for 19 countries spanning the years 1946-2006, generating 692 country-year observations.<sup>82</sup> Across this time and space I count 16 presidential interruptions and 25 democratic breakdowns.<sup>83</sup> The number of observations actually utilised in the estimations, however, is reduced somewhat by limitations on data availability for several of the variables. In effect, this means that the large majority of results presented below are based upon a set of 544 observations which includes 15 presidential interruptions and

---

<sup>82</sup> The country-year format has certain advantages such as increasing the sample size, but the format certainly has drawbacks as well. If Linz and Stepan's edited volumes on the breakdown of democracy have taught us anything, it is that the process of breakdown takes time and that several causes interact, creating endogeneity problems. While I try to avoid endogeneity problems as much as possible, I also admit that analyses based on country-year as the unit of analysis might be better for modelling the *timing* of breakdowns rather than identifying the full list of causes and processes of a breakdown.

<sup>83</sup> The following country-years are registered as presidential interruptions: Brazil 1955 and 1992, Ecuador 1961, 1997, 2000 and 2005, Bolivia 1985, 2003 and 2005, Argentina 1989 and 2001, Guatemala 1993, Venezuela 1993, Dominican Republic 1994 (1996), Paraguay 1999, and Peru 2000. The following country years are registered as democratic breakdowns: Argentina 1951, 1962, 1966 and 1976, Bolivia 1964 and 1980, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Costa Rica 1948, Dominican Republic 1974, Ecuador 1963 and 1970, Guatemala 1954, Haiti 1999, Panama 1963 and 1972, Nicaragua 1948 and 1968, Peru 1948, 1962, 1968 and 1992, Uruguay 1973 and Venezuela 1948.

17 democratic breakdowns. In particular it is the variable measuring inflation that restricts the data to only covering years since 1960.<sup>84</sup> Table 3-1 below presents the findings and serves as the point of reference for the discussion of the respective effects of each independent variable which follows.

**Table 3-1: Determinants of Presidential Interruptions and Democratic Breakdowns**<sup>85</sup>

<b>Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 1 Presidential Interruption (N-15)</b>		
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>t-statistics</b>
Constant	-5.2177*** (1.5672)	-3.329
Level	-.0003* (.0001)	-1.946
Prolonged Recession	1.3609** (.6570)	2.072
Past Breakdowns	.2650 (.2399)	1.105
Semi-Democracy	-.8766 (.7858)	-1.116
Number of Parties	.3906** (.1640)	2.382
Demonstrations	.4987*** (.1190)	4.191
Strikes (lagged)	-.0374 (.3149)	-.119
Inflation	-.3855 (.6957)	-.554
Post-1978	.4604 (1.1107)	.415
<b>Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 2 Democratic Breakdown (N-17)</b>		
<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>t-statistics</b>
Constant	-3.2618*** (.9991)	-3.265
Level	-.0008** (.0004)	-2.005
Prolonged Recession	.0180 (.8045)	.022
Past Breakdowns	1.3850* (.8013)	1.728
Semi-Democracy	1.7846** (.6116)	2.918
Number of Parties	.2702 (.1747)	1.546
Demonstrations	.3891* (.2021)	1.925
Strikes (lagged)	.9271** (.3881)	2.389
Inflation	1.6744** (.7653)	2.188
Post-1978	-5.5603** (2.3389)	-2.377
Pseudo R-squared	.34	
Chi squared	97.2970	
N	544	

<sup>84</sup> I also ran the model excluding the inflation variable, the overall results remained the same. For these results, consult Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010).

<sup>85</sup> Regression coefficients generated by non-linear models such as logit are log odds, and difficult to interpret in their untransformed state (although the t-statistics can be understood in the standard manner). I therefore compare the signs, level of significance and corresponding t-statistics, which all include relevant information. For reasons of comparison, I also include the marginal effects in Table 3-1.

**Table 3-1 continued****Marginal Effects Averaged Over  
Individuals**

Variable	Y = 0	Y = 1	Y = 2
Constant	.1906	-.1217	-.0689
Level	.0000	.0000	.0000
Prolonged Recession	-.0318	.0322	-.0004
Past Breakdowns	-.0358	.0055	.0304
Semi-Democracy	-.0180	-.0218	.0398
Number of Parties	-.0148	.0091	.0057
Demonstrations	-.0199	.0116	.0083
Strikes (lagged)	-.0190	-.0014	.0204
Inflation	-.0270	-.0101	.0371
Post-1978	.1087	.0141	-.1227

Notes: Standard errors in brackets. \* significant at .1 level; \*\* significant at .05 level; \*\*\* significant at .01 level. Definitions of Variables: Level: real gdp/capita; Prolonged Recession: dummy coded 1 for consecutive years of negative growth in years t-1 and t-2; Past Breakdowns: count variable for number of past breakdowns of democracy; Semi-Democracy: dummy coded 1 if semi-democracy in the previous year; Number of Parties: Laakso-Taagepera index for effective number of parties; Demonstrations: number of anti-government demonstrations, as defined by Banks (2008); Strikes (lagged one year): number of general strikes in the previous year, as defined by Banks (2008); *Inflation* is a dummy variable coded 1 if the current rate of inflation is greater than 20%; Post-1978: dummy coded one for country-years after 1978.

Sources: Level and Prolonged Recession from Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006); Inflation from World Development Indicators (WDI 2008). Past Breakdowns (Cheibub 2007); Semi-Democracy (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001); Number of Parties: Cheibub (2007), Nohlen (2005b; 2005a), electoral reports in various issues of the journal *Electoral Studies* as well as official websites of electoral authorities for data on the most recent elections, and assistance on some missing data from Anibal Pérez-Liñán (the same sources apply for the seat share of the president's party in congress/lower chamber); Anti-Government Demonstrations and General Strikes from Arthur Bank's Cross-National Time Series Data Archives (2008).

The model in Table 3-1 controls for the effect of the economic level, measured as per capita gross domestic product, and for the democratic sea change constituted by the Third Wave with a dummy variable dividing the periods before and after 1978. The model as such does not perform badly considering the Pseudo R-square of .34. By controlling for the period effect, I adopt a conservative approach which minimises any artificial inflation of the significance of the other specified variables which could result from the omission of time controls. The two control variables behave as expected. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of economic development and the likelihood that a president will survive in office – richer countries experience fewer removals of presidents. The marginal effects,

however, are negligible. The likelihood of a democratic breakdown in the post-1978 period is much lower than for the pre-1978 period, at the same time there is no period effect upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption.<sup>86</sup>

### **Economic Performance Factors: Prolonged Recession and Inflation**

Does economic performance have consequences for the likelihood of presidential removals? Prolonged recession measured dichotomously as minimum two consecutive years of negative rates of growth (lagged one year), has a positive and significant (5% level) effect on the likelihood of a presidential interruption, the same variable is positive, but has no significant effect on the likelihood of a democratic breakdown. High inflation (above 20% yearly) has a positive and significant (.05 level) effect on democratic breakdown.<sup>87</sup> By contrast, this variable proved to be negative and have no significant effect on the likelihood of a presidential interruption. The results should not come as a surprise, as problems associated with extreme rates of inflation began to affect the region in 1973 (with great intra-regional variation),<sup>88</sup> and ended effectively in 1994 with Brazil's last year of hyperinflation. After 1994, there have been ten presidential interruptions and only one democratic breakdown. The period before 1979 exhibited a much higher regional average rate of inflation

---

<sup>86</sup> This finding, which simply indicates a trend, does not contradict the findings generated by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán that the likelihood of a democratic breakdown post-1978 has not decreased, as based upon the predicted probabilities generated by their statistical model.

<sup>87</sup> There is no clear definition of what constitutes a crisis, and the results from a battery of dummy variables flagging different levels of negative growth proved to be wildly inconsistent, furthermore using economic growth as a continuous variable turned out not significant. As with inflation and other variables, an inductive approach for the best measure was used experimenting both with lags and creating dummies. The effects and significance of the variable *prolonged recession*, however, proved to be strongly robust with respect to presidential interruptions across model specifications and estimation procedures, generating t-statistics of about 2.0, depending upon model specification.

<sup>88</sup> An examination of the data reveals that 12 of the 15 observations of presidential interruption experienced rates of inflation of only 31% or lower. The three extreme observations above this level were Argentina 1989, Brazil 1992, and Bolivia 1985, with annual rates of inflation of 3,000, 1,000 and 12,000, respectively. By contrast, years of democratic breakdown were characterized by generally higher rates of inflation: eight of the 17 observations experienced inflation rates greater than 25%, with five of these above 69% and two of these around 400% (Argentina in 1976 and Chile in 1973).



than the period after 1994, with greater variation and higher maximum levels. The varying levels of inflation across different time periods are of course linked to different models of development and economic management (import substitution vs. neoliberalism), which again loosely correspond to periods of democratic breakdown and presidential interruption.

In sum, both presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are affected by economic performance in the way that theory predicts. Different indicators, however, of the same basic-level determinant seem to affect the two phenomena. Thus, presidents who want to survive should work hard to avoid recessions and high rates of inflation.

### **Mobilisation of Civil Society: Anti-Government Demonstrations and General Strikes**

Higher levels of mobilization are linked to an increase in the probability of a presidential interruption or democratic breakdown. The findings are strongly consistent with Hochstetler's (2006) observations, as the *demonstrations* variable proves to be highly significant (with a t-statistic greater than 4.0, significant at .01 level) in its positive effect upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption; on breakdowns the variable reaches a level of significance of 10%, but its effect is less robust across specifications.<sup>89</sup> The marginal effects of anti-government demonstrations on interruptions is larger than that on breakdowns, a finding that is consistent with what is known about the military intervening to end democracy.

---

<sup>89</sup> In a model excluding inflation the variable reveals a slightly weaker effect and is not significant at the .1 level.

Strike activity, lagged one year,<sup>90</sup> is positive and significant and thus influences the likelihood of a democratic breakdown (significant at .05 level), but negative and not significant for the likelihood on presidential interruptions.<sup>91</sup> Military interventions to overthrow a sitting president in Latin America have often been motivated at least in part by an effort to stop the spread of “communism”. Hence, it is not surprising that general strike activity, a powerful weapon of unions, affects the chances for democratic breakdown more strongly than do more general forms of anti-government demonstrations.<sup>92</sup> Again I find that a basic level variable affect both democratic breakdown and presidential interruption in the expected fashion, but that two different indicators are required to capture these effects.

---

<sup>90</sup> The motivation for the lag comes from reading Bermeo (2003), who in several of the cases of breakdown she studies reports a decrease in polarisation and mobilisation in the year of the breakdown compared to the one-two years prior to the breakdown. In models run with general strike activity in the current year, the variable plays no role in influencing the likelihood of either a presidential interruption or a democratic breakdown.

<sup>91</sup> But, how can *strikes* operate with a lagged effect while *demonstrations* do not? Anti-government demonstrations in the current year increase the likelihood of presidential interruption; strike activity in the previous year increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown. The difference can be explained by the fact that demonstrations tend to be more spontaneous, without a plan to overtake the government itself. In fact, following the fall of a president, there usually exists confusion concerning who should take over the reins of government. In only in one case of presidential interruption (Mahuad in Ecuador in 2000) did a group claiming to represent the protesters immediately take power, and in this case it only lasted a couple of days before the civil-military junta fell. Democratic breakdowns, on the other hand, require planning because the group toppling the president also plans to take over the government itself for some extended period. It is these differences which might explain why the mobilisation of civil society generates a more immediate effect upon presidential breakdowns than it does upon democratic breakdowns.

<sup>92</sup> In Chapter 6 I discuss how different forms of mobilisation affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions in the 1980-2005 period. Interestingly, the findings in this chapter help explain the apparent contradictions between Hochstetler’s findings in two different articles (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). In 2006 she finds that vertical challenges (she calls it street challenges) affect presidential survival, and argues that societal mobilisation in general may interrupt presidents. In 2009, she and Edwards find that general societal mobilisation does not affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions. The likely reason for this contradiction is that the variable used to measure social contention conflates demonstrations and strikes. Seeing as the latter only affect democratic breakdowns, this may have caused the variable to lose significance. I discuss these matters further in Chapter 6. See also Arce and Bellinger Jr (2007) and Kurtz (2004) for an interesting and similar debate.

### **Regime Characteristics: Level of Democracy and Past Regime History**

Democratic regimes vary with respect to the degree to which they are free and competitive both today and historically. The question is whether the nature of the existing or previous regime affects the chances that a president will be removed.

*Semi-Democracy* has a positive and strongly significant (.05 level) effect upon the likelihood of a democratic breakdown,. Interestingly, the variable semi-democracy is negative, but not significant for the outcome of interruptions (t-statistics of about -1.1). The causal mechanisms between semi-democracies and breakdowns cannot be identified via the methodology of this chapter, but one could speculate that a semi-democratic regime would be more likely to degenerate (for example via an *autogolpe*) into an authoritarian regime, as occurred in Peru in 1992. Another causal route could be a military intervention as an ostensible reaction to a deterioration of rights and freedoms (particularly under left wing governments) in the name of “saving democracy.” Often semi-democracies are not fully democratic because the chief executive is very dominant (delegative democracies, cf. O'Donnell 1994), which might make the president more liable to use repression to quell anti-government demonstrations, and stop attempts at presidential removal early, but maybe more importantly institutions such as congress and the courts are often relatively speaking weaker in these regimes and may therefore not be able to hold the president accountable.

The past history of democratic breakdowns in a country matters for the likelihood of a similar breakdown taking place in the present and future, the variable is positive and significant at the .1 level. Past breakdowns never matter for explaining presidential

interruption, but is positive, so it is more difficult to know whether this variable affects breakdowns in a significantly different way than interruptions. I have no clear explanation for this difference, but observe that several traditionally stable democracies or non-democracies such as Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, have experienced presidential interruptions. Thus, the past legacy of democratic breakdown might not matter for presidential interruptions because they are not driven by the actors that formerly had a tradition for interrupting democracy.<sup>93</sup>

In sum, regime characteristics, roughly measured as level of democracy and past democratic instability, do not affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions, but seems to affect the likelihood of a democratic breakdown in the direction one would expect.

### **Institutional Factors: Number of Political Parties and Seat Share of President's Party**

The model in Table 3-1 uses the effective number of parties as a proxy for a president's ability to govern successfully and thereby enhance the prospects for survival.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup> Another explanation may be that scandals, which have toppled several presidents (Pérez-Liñán 2007), are distributed randomly with respect to regime legacy. At any rate, given the few cases of breakdown and interruption, caution is called for when concluding on the basis of these statistical results.

<sup>94</sup> The seat share of the president's party in the lower (or single) chamber is another oft-used proxy. Due to the high correlation between *number of parties* and *head share* (.81), these two variables were never specified together in the same equation. Rather, the full model specification was estimated with each of these variables specified one at a time. None of the meaningful statistics that corresponded to the other independent variables were affected at all by the choice of specifying either the parties variable or the seat share variable. I therefore only refer to the results in table 3-1 instead of both. (None of the other variables specified in the statistical model exhibited a degree of correlation with each other greater than .3.)

The variable proves to be positive, and strongly statistically significant (at the .5 level) in the effects upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption;<sup>95</sup> by contrast, the variable is positive, but has no significant effect upon the likelihood of a democratic breakdown (but it is close, being significant at the .12 level, and a t-statistics of 1.546), which is not consistent with previous findings (Mainwaring 1993). Furthermore, the former's marginal effect is almost double the size of the latter's.<sup>96</sup>

The lack of significance in explaining democratic breakdowns may be explained by the relatively few outcomes of breakdowns, or model specifications. Nevertheless, institutions seem to play a bigger role in Latin America with respect to presidential interruptions than they do for democratic breakdowns, at least according to the analysis presented here.<sup>97</sup> One reason might simply reflect the distribution of data on the variables across time.<sup>98</sup> On the other hand the data show that democratic breakdowns before 1960 took place alongside very low effective numbers of parties and rather high presidential support, therefore the results in table 3-1 actually produces estimates of the effects of institutional factors upon democratic breakdown

---

<sup>95</sup> This is consistent with findings presented in studies where the effects of other measures of institutional factors have been tested (Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Valenzuela 2004), and with my findings in Chapter 6.

<sup>96</sup> The effects of the *president's share of seats* variable actually contrasts better between the two outcomes: it is significant at the .01 level for explaining presidential interruptions, but irrelevant for explaining democratic breakdowns (t-statistics of around -.19).

<sup>97</sup> The reason for the relatively weak effects of institutions upon democratic breakdown may be that societal mobilization driven by the left-right ideological cleavage, as measured in the model by general strikes, is probably more important than institutional factors for explaining democratic breakdown.

<sup>98</sup> The data show that the average effective number of parties has increased considerably since the mid-1980s, and this corresponds to the historical disjuncture before which democratic breakdowns were more common and following which presidential interruptions have become the norm. The consequences of this distribution are magnified by the fact that a larger number of country-years in the sample fall in the latter historical period due to more recent waves of democratization. To illustrate, the average effective number of parties pre-1979 is 3.14 and the average president's seat share is .46, while the respective numbers from 1979 onwards are 3.43 and .41. Even more telling, the data indicate that years in which presidential interruptions have occurred have been characterised by more challenging circumstances facing presidents: the average effective number of parties and president's seat share in years of presidential interruption are 4.43 and .34, respectively, while the corresponding numbers for years of democratic breakdown are only 3.05 and .5.

which are larger in significance than if I were to include all years since 1950.<sup>99</sup> In the end, the fact that institutional factors prove to be more important for explaining interruptions than democratic breakdowns is not that surprising. Given that interruptions appear to be relatively more constitutional than breakdowns, and that congress plays an important role in presidential interruptions, institutional factors *should* be more important.

Again I have identified a difference in terms of the causes of democratic breakdown and presidential interruptions. Institutional factors, measured as either the effective number of parties or the president party's share of seats in congress only seem to affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions, and not the likelihood of democratic breakdown.

**Table 3-2: A summary of the causes of breakdowns and interruptions**

<b>Basic level causal factors</b>	<b>Democratic Breakdown</b>	<b>Presidential interruption</b>
<b>Economic performance</b>	Yes, inflation positive and significant	Yes, prolonged recession positive and significant
<b>Mobilisation</b>	Yes, strikes positive and significant	Yes, anti-government demonstration, positive and significant
<b>Regime legacy</b>	Yes, semi-democracy and past breakdowns positive and significant	Semi-democracy and past Breakdowns: Not significant
<b>Institutions</b>	Not significant	Yes, number of parties (and president strength in congress) positive and significant

Table 3-2 summarises the results so far. The findings reveal that there are similarities in terms of the causes across the two phenomena. Both are affected by economic factors in the way theory predicts. Furthermore, societal mobilisation seems to affect both democratic breakdown and presidential interruption. The different time-periods

<sup>99</sup> Excluding inflation and thus including all years since 1950 makes effective number of parties lose significance, and reports t-statistics of 1.057, and level of significance of .29.

in which breakdowns and interruption have tended to occur, however, explain why different indicators turn out significant within each basic-level factor. In terms of regime characteristics and institutional factors, the difference between breakdowns and interruptions is greater. Institutions affect interruptions, but not breakdown to the same degree, and I find the opposite result with respect to regime characteristics. Despite clear similarities in terms of the causal factors at the basic level, there seems also to be differences in what explains interruptions and breakdowns. The findings can only partly support adopting models of democratic breakdown to presidential interruptions, and it is clear that presidential interruptions are at least not merely the modern expression of a democratic breakdown.

**Do the causal factors have a significantly different effect on interruptions and breakdowns?**

This question is somewhat different from the previous comparison. The previous section investigated whether the same factors caused both interruptions and breakdowns, based on a model of democratic breakdowns. The reason for testing this is that several authors have based their analyses on the analogy between breakdowns and interruptions. Whereas the previous section investigated the *similarities* in the causes of the two phenomena, this section focuses on how the causes affect interruptions and breakdowns *differently*. Now, I ask whether the causal factors in the model have a significantly *different* effect on interruptions than on breakdowns. Since I expect that the causes of interruptions and breakdowns are similar, this is a tougher test on the differences between the two outcomes than the previous analysis. Significant coefficients clearly indicate that the causes of the two outcomes are different.

In table 3-3 the same model as in table 3-1 is used, only that I have recoded the dependent variable and democratic breakdown is now the base category (value 0), whereas “president survives” is value 2. The coefficients thus do not measure whether the causal factors are significant predictors of the outcomes when compared to a country-year in which the president survives, but rather whether the causal factors are significant when compared to a country-year of democratic breakdown.

**Table 3-3: Causes of democratic breakdowns and interruptions compared**  
**Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 1 Presidential Interruption (N-15)**  
**(Democratic Breakdown as base category)**

Variable	Coefficient	t-statistics
Constant	-1.9560 (1.8421)	-1.062
Level	.0006 (.0004)	1.320
Prolonged Recession	1.3428 (1.0005)	1.342
Past Breakdowns	-1.1200 (.8292)	-1.351
Semi-Democracy	-2.6612*** (.9814)	-2.712
Number of Parties	.1204 (.2349)	.513
Demonstrations	.1096 (.2183)	.502
Strikes (lagged)	-.9646* (.4967)	-1.942
Inflation	-2.0600** (1.0155)	-2.028
Post-1978	6.0207** (2.5661)	2.346

Notes: Here I only report the results for interruptions, as the results for predicting outcome 2: president survives are identical to the ones predicting outcome 2 in table 1-1, but with the opposite signs. I do not report marginal effects. Standard errors in brackets. \* significant at .1 level; \*\* significant at .05 level; \*\*\* significant at .01 level. Sources: See notes to table 3-1.

Table 3-3 shows whether the causes of interruptions are significantly different from the causes of breakdowns, not whether the various variables are significant predictors of either or both of the phenomena. Semi-democracy is negative and significant (1% level) for presidential interruptions,<sup>100</sup> which means that the current status of the regime has a significantly different effect upon interruptions than breakdowns. The variable strikes is also negative and significant (.1 level) for interruptions.<sup>101</sup> This is a variable that was positive and significant for breakdowns, and has a significantly different effect upon interruptions. Finally, inflation is negative and significant (.05

<sup>100</sup> Recall that semi-democracy was a dummy coded 1 for semi-democracy and 0 for democracy.

<sup>101</sup> The control variable post-78 is also positive and significant (.05 level) as expected.



level) on interruption, confirming that this is a variable that has a significantly different effect upon the two outcomes of interest. What about the variables that were significant for one of the outcomes in table 3-1, but not in table 3-3? These are prolonged recession, past breakdowns, the effective number of parties and anti-government demonstrations. All naturally maintain the expected signs considering the results in table 3-1. Prolonged recession and past breakdowns reach levels of significance of about .17-.18, and may still be considered to have an almost significantly different effect upon interruptions than breakdown. Regarding the effective number of parties and anti-government demonstrations the differences are more negligible. There seems to be no significant differences in the effect on either on the two outcomes of interest, which is a finding that does not contradict the fact that both variables were significant for predicting interruptions, but not for predicting breakdowns.

The results then seem rather mixed. It is clear that different variables seem to have a significant effect on the two outcomes of interest. On the basic level the economy and social mobilisation have a significant effect on both outcomes and in the expected direction, whereas regime legacy has a significant effect on breakdowns, and institutions only on interruptions (Tables 3-1, 3-2). Table 3-3, however, compares directly the effects of the variables on both outcomes. Since the expectation would be that there would be no significant differences in the effects of the variables between the two outcomes, any significant coefficients predicting either outcome, would seriously question the analogy between interruptions and breakdowns. The results are that four variables have a significantly different effect upon the two outcomes: semi-democracy, general strikes, inflation and the post-78 control variable. Clearly then,

there is something more than the *zeitgeist* that explains the difference in outcomes between the two, and equally supported is my conclusion that interruptions are not solely the modern equivalent of a democratic breakdown. One of the more important reasons for this conclusion is not found in the statistical analyses above, but rather lies in the fact that while government changes after a presidential interruption, democracies survive.

### **Presidential interruptions as unscheduled changes of government**

I argue that presidential interruptions in some ways defy the “forecast” for Latin

American democracy, especially given institutional theories of democratic breakdown. The very fact that presidential interruptions have become more prevalent while democratic breakdowns have declined in frequency (see figure 3-2)

demonstrates that presidentialism as an institutional variety of democratic regime, like its parliamentary counterpart, possesses the capacity to handle deep political conflicts in a flexible manner (Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). This enhanced flexibility via the potential for removing presidents without destroying democracy may also function to mitigate another problem associated with presidentialism in Latin America: delegative democracy (Marsteintredet 2008b), which in O’Donnell’s words “rest[s] on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office” (O’Donnell 1994: 59). Therefore, since the analysis above demonstrates that presidential interruptions are clearly not identical to democratic breakdowns, and the outcomes clearly differ between the two, a comparison between interruptions and other types of early governmental removal further sheds light on the topic of interest.

This section compares presidential interruptions with other types of governmental change at the procedural level (see figure 3-1). The main reason for a comparison at the procedural level relates to Linz's (1990; 1994) comparison of presidential and parliamentary regimes, in which he argued that presidential regimes, due to the fixed terms and direct democratic elections of both the executive and the legislature, lack flexible procedures for solving deep political crises.

### **The procedures for interrupting presidents in Latin America**

Table 3-4 categorizes all interrupted presidencies in Third Wave Latin American democracies,<sup>102</sup> according to five of the nine procedures of governmental interruption laid out in Figure 3-1, above: coup, impeachment, declaration of incapacity/abandonment of presidency, and resignation with or without early election. Not all of the democratic procedures are envisioned constitutionally, but I find instances of the use of all these procedures in Latin America since 1980.

---

<sup>102</sup> See the appendix to this chapter for coding rules. It is important to recall that I only discuss interruptions in democracies (see chapters 1 and 2 for further discussion).

Table 3-4: Procedures of presidential interruption in Latin America

	<b>Impeachment</b>	<b>Resignation</b>	<b>Majority vote/ Incapacity/ abandoned post</b>	<b>Resignation through early presidential election</b>	<b>Coup</b>
<b>Cases</b>	Venezuela 1993, Paraguay 1999, Brazil 1992	Argentina 1989, 2001, Bolivia 2003	Ecuador 1997, 2005 (Guatemala 1993 Espina), Bolivia 2005 (lost vote of confidence)	<b>Forced</b> Bolivia 1984/85, DR 1994/96	Ecuador 2000, (Honduras 2009?)
			<b>Resignation and Post- facto congressional vote</b> Ecuador 2000*, Peru 2000*, Guatemala 1993 (Serrano)*, (Honduras 2009?)	<i>Ecuador 1998, Peru 2001, Argentina 2003, Bolivia 2005</i>	
<b>Regime form associated with procedure</b>	<b>Presidential</b>	<b>Regime- independent</b>	<b>Parliamentary</b>	<b>Parliamentary</b>	<b>Regime- independent</b>

Sources: Categorization of the cases and data are based on Latin American Weekly Report, NotiSur and NotiCen, Keesing's Record of World Events, Europa World Yearbook Online, and the cited secondary literature. Notes: The table also includes caretaker presidencies, these are all placed under transitional early elections (even though the early election called by Duhalde was clearly forced), *italic* above. Guatemala 1993 Espina is in brackets since his time as President was so short-lived that it is not regarded as a presidential interruption in this dissertation. He was however, voted out of the position by Congress only days after Serrano had left the country. Bolivia 2005 is listed twice because the interruption of Mesa's presidency is one case, the call for early election by President Rodríguez the same year constitutes a transitional early election. The debacle in Argentina 2001/02 is only counted as one case. Honduras 2009 is listed in brackets as a fuzzy case with question marks as a coup, but also as a post-facto congressional vote that the president was removed due to treason.

\* These cases are originally resignation, but followed by a post-facto vote in congress confirming the presidential interruption.

Previously the literature only predicted the undemocratic coup as the outcome of a deadlock conflict in presidential regimes,<sup>103</sup> and until recently the impeachment has generally been ruled out as unfeasible. Table 3-4 conveys a different impression: of all cases of interruption, there have been only one, potentially two (Manuel Zelaya in Honduras in 2009), successful coup during the Third Wave,<sup>104</sup> and three successful cases of impeachment. Recall the comparison between presidential interruptions and

<sup>103</sup> Another outcome has been discussed: increased presidential dominance, see O'Donnell (1994).

<sup>104</sup> There are three additional cases: the cases of Peru in 1992 and the two coups in Haiti. None of these are interruptions of presidencies, and are therefore not listed as cases in Table 3-4: Haiti is not part of my case-selection for this dissertation, and the case of Peru did not constitute a removal of the president. In addition many have considered the removal of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras on June 28, 2009 as a coup.

democratic breakdowns above: Only one of the presidential interruptions since 1980 can procedurally be considered a coup, that is the case of Mahuad in Ecuador in 2000. All other cases of presidential interruption treated in this dissertation follow other procedures than the ones that can be categorised as types of democratic breakdown. Even though causally presidential interruptions and democratic breakdown may share some similarities, interruptions do not follow the same procedures as democratic breakdowns. Interestingly, procedures of interruptions in some instances look like parliamentary types of governmental removal. There have been two cases of the lesser-known procedure of declaration of presidential incapacity (Ecuador 1997 and 2005), which only requires a regular majority to pass in Congress, President Mesa in Bolivia lost a vote of confidence in June 2005,<sup>105</sup> and Serrano's Vice-President Espina, was deposed as President through a vote in Congress just five days after Serrano had resigned.<sup>106</sup> In addition Table 3-4 distinguishes between two types of presidential resignations, one without either a congressional vote or early election as e.g. in the case of Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia in 2003, and one type of resignation through early election as e.g. in the case of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1996. I find that there have been five cases of presidential resignation without a prior congressional vote or early election during duress, but two of these five cases (Guatemala 1993, Peru 2000) have led to a congressional declaration of a president's abandonment of the presidency after the fact. The most famous of these incidents was when Congress in Peru refused to accept Alberto Fujimori's resignation via fax sent from Japan, and then proceeded to remove Fujimori as President of Peru. Finally, six

---

<sup>105</sup> He also won a vote of confidence in March 2005, see the Appendix to Chapter 5 for details.

<sup>106</sup> One could also argue that Serrano was deposed by Congress since Congress declared already on May 27, two days after Serrano's *autogolpe* that Serrano had effectively abandoned his post. I choose to code Serrano's ouster as a resignation since Congress's decree did not have any (immediate) effect on Serrano's destiny. For these and other official documents surrounding the *Serranazo*, see INCEP (1993).

cases of resignations have been organised through early elections, four of which have been early elections called by caretaker presidents, whereas two early elections have marked the end of elected presidents (Siles Zuazo in Bolivia in 1985 and Balaguer in Dominican Republic in 1996).

Linz (1990; 1994) and also Valenzuela (1993; 2004) have argued that presidential regimes lack flexible procedures for conflict resolution, and in the previous chapter I stressed that one of the ways to understand Linz (and others') criticism of presidential regimes was that the lack of flexibility in presidential regimes could lead to democratic breakdown no matter the cause of the political conflict. The problems resided in the lack of flexibility to solve conflicts between institutions or between institutions and civil society.<sup>107</sup> As mentioned above, several authors have built upon the parallel between democratic breakdowns and presidential interruptions to analyse the causes of interruptions (e.g. Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995; Valenzuela 2004). Table 3-4, which categorises the presidential interruptions according to their procedure, seriously questions Linz and Valenzuela's arguments. Constitutionally Linz is correct: when it comes to the separate origin and survival of congress and presidents in presidential regimes, there is little room for flexibility in Latin American constitutions.<sup>108</sup> However, in practice, political actors within presidential regimes seem to understand their constitutions in a flexible manner when the crisis is sufficiently deep and leads to an interruption of the presidency.

---

<sup>107</sup> A stricter institutionalist view is to argue that the conflicts that topple presidential democracies also originate in the institutions.

<sup>108</sup> Some exceptions to the "rigid" presidential constitutions in Latin America are listed in Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008).

The use of early elections to unseat elected presidents or to shorten the term for caretaker presidents is clearly used as a flexible way to get out of the crisis that led to the presidential interruption.<sup>109</sup> The use of majority votes, instead of impeachments, to remove presidents is also clearly a flexible feature to solve a crisis within the presidential regimes in Latin America that was not expected by the critics of presidentialism. In Ecuador, Congress has removed presidents twice by majority votes declaring that the president has abandoned his post or that the president is incapacitated; in Bolivia Congress voted President Mesa out of office when he tried to muster congressional support with a vote of confidence; and in Guatemala in 1993 Congress removed President Espina, who briefly took over after Serrano, through a simple congressional vote. Using other procedures than impeachment lowers the requirements to removing the president by democratic means, since when other procedures are chosen only a regular or absolute majority is needed.<sup>110</sup> In addition, congresses have also confirmed presidential interruptions after the fact in order to give the prior ouster of presidents more democratic legitimacy. This occurred in Ecuador in 2000 after the failed civil-military coup, with Fujimori in Peru in 2000, in Guatemala in 1993 with Serrano, and most recently with Zelaya in Honduras after he had been sent to Costa Rica. Finally, in Venezuela in 1993 after the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez, in Guatemala the same year after the removal of both Serrano and Espina, in Ecuador in 1997 after the congressional declaration of Bucaram as crazy, and after the ousters of de la Rúa and Rodríguez Saá in Argentina, Congress sat down to elect the caretaker presidents.

---

<sup>109</sup> Recall the former Israeli Prime Minister Sharon's words from November 2005 after it became clear that the Labour-Likud coalition would not survive an ongoing political crisis: *"As soon as it became clear that the existing political framework was falling apart, I came to the conclusion that the best thing for the country is to hold new elections as soon as possible."* Cited from BBC World's webpages on November 17, 2005. [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle\\_east/4444630.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4444630.stm).

<sup>110</sup> For rules of impeachment of presidents in Latin America, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: 140-141).

It is clear from Table 3-4 that in the majority of presidential interruptions procedures other than the one prescribed for early executive removal in presidential regimes, are chosen. The procedures chosen clearly highlight the similarities between parliamentary procedures for executive removal and the interruption of presidencies in Latin America. Most of these interruptions have followed obscure constitutional procedures that have been interpreted creatively (such as declaring a president mentally incapable of holding office), while others have been ad-hoc and invented then and there (such as the calls for early election in the cases of the Dominican Republic and Peru), few cases have been blatantly unconstitutional (maybe the only case being the failed coup against President Mahuad in Ecuador). Congressional and popular action seems to drive the procedures of interruption, not military action, a fact that also distinguishes interruptions from breakdowns. Finally, given the fact that the democratic regimes continue and the only change is that of the executive, presidential interruptions share many traits with unscheduled changes of parliamentary governments, maybe more so than with democratic breakdowns.

***Conclusions. Presidential interruptions: Neither democratic breakdown nor parliamentary change of government***

Are presidential interruptions then just special cases of the parliamentary types of unscheduled executive removal? Or, given the argument held by many that interruptions of presidents are unconstitutional,<sup>111</sup> are interruptions similar to democratic breakdowns just falling short of ending democracy due to the change in the international *zeitgeist*? For a couple of reasons, my answer to these questions are

---

<sup>111</sup> These arguments often come from the ousted presidents themselves. See for instance Bucaram's book entitled "Golpe de Estado"(Bucaram Ortiz 1998).



no. In my view, presidential interruptions constitute a proper phenomenon that shares traits with both democratic breakdowns and unscheduled parliamentary changes of government. One might say that the phenomenon could be placed somewhere between these two “traditional” forms of executive removal, one being clearly undemocratic and unconstitutional, the other being democratic and constitutional.

First of all, compared to breakdowns, my causal analysis demonstrates that despite some similarities, interruptions are not merely new forms of breakdowns caused by the same factors in a time in which coups and full-fledged democratic breakdowns are non-starters due to a changed international environment. Secondly, an interruption as the phenomenon is defined, does not end democracy.

Compared to unscheduled parliamentary changes of government, the similarities are actually more striking. Yet, one cannot ignore the differences. Interruptions occur in presidential regimes, and these regimes should theoretically follow a different logic than that of parliamentarism. The popular expectations are that the president completes the full electoral term unless the president is impeached. A declaration of a president having abandoned the office is controversial even though it may be defended as being within the limits of the constitution. One clear difference between parliamentary executive removals and presidential interruptions is thus the degree to which the procedures are understood to be legitimate, and in some instances, even constitutional. Another difference is the level of social and political tension. Presidential interruptions seem to be surrounded by higher levels of popular mobilisation and political tension at the elite level than unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. Another insight into Linz’s perils of

presidentialism gained from this comparison was that presidential institutions, contrary to his claims, seem to prove themselves capable of adopting flexible procedures to deal with deadlocks and other political crises.

Interruptions of presidencies thus constitute a proper phenomenon, but one that shares some traits with both democratic breakdown (at least causally) and parliamentary types of government removal (at least procedurally): Clearly more democratic, and less violent and problematic than democratic breakdowns, which marred the region prior to the Third Wave of Democratisation, yet also more questionable constitutionally in light of democratic theory than its parliamentary counterparts. Given the fact that presidential interruptions clearly are not only modern forms of democratic breakdowns, one should not, by fiat, assume that the outcomes of interruptions are pernicious for democracy. Likewise, interruptions are more critical events with greater consequences for democracy and the regime than unscheduled government changes in parliamentary regimes, in part since Latin American democracies are younger and less institutionalised than their Western-European counterparts, but also because interruptions are not supposed to happen in presidential regimes.

Finally, through a careful comparison of interruptions with other related phenomena this chapter has demonstrated the need for building models and interpretations of presidential interruptions based on the phenomenon itself, and not only borrowing from work analysing similar phenomena. The conceptual comparison showed that interruptions are not identical to either breakdowns or parliamentary procedures for governmental change, but the analysis of the procedures of interruptions also showed

that not all interruptions are identical, and that there may be interesting variation among the cases that is worth exploring further. The next chapters will deal with presidential interruptions in Latin America, the causes of interruptions (Chapters 5 and 6), and the variation between interruptions and the implications for presidential democracies in the region (Chapter 7).

### ***Appendix to Chapter 3***

#### **Coding rules for a procedural typology of governmental removal**

##### **Undemocratic presidential removals**

1) The undemocratic procedures for governmental removals are the foreign invasion, the assassination of a chief executive and the coup. Here, the focus is on the coup. A coup is a termination of the presidency (and often other democratic institutions) by the use of violence often supported by military force. A coup is considered to be successful if the president is forcefully and permanently ejected from office, even though the coup makers are unable to stay in power, and democracy as such survives. In this sense the military coup that ejected Mahuad from office in Ecuador in 2000 is successful since Mahuad was not able to return to power after the coup, while the coup attempt in Venezuela 2002 was unsuccessful since Chávez returned to power after only 48 hours.

##### **Democratic presidential removals**

2) An impeachment is the legal procedure in which the legislature, in some cases together with the Supreme Court, through a vote that requires a supermajority, can remove the president. Even though impeachments may often be used politically, it is a legal procedure because the president stands accused of some serious violation of the law. Often congress's use of impeachment is also restricted to some specific types of felonies (as e.g. high treason). I categorize an interruption as impeachment, if an impeachment procedure is initiated in the legislature even if the president should resign before the final vote in congress takes place, as was the case with Cubas in Paraguay in 1999.

3) The declaration of presidential incapacity is a vote in congress that unseats the president through a declaration that the president is either physically or mentally unable to rule the country. Another variant of this type of removal is for congress to declare that the president has abandoned his office. If this vote only requires a plurality or an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) to unseat the president, I argue that the declaration of presidential incapacity is procedurally equivalent to the parliamentary vote of no-confidence. The motive for the vote of no-confidence may vary from case to case, but the defining criterion is that only an absolute majority is required to remove the president. A vote taken after a presidential resignation (as in the case of Fujimori in Peru in 2000), does not qualify as an equivalent of the vote of no-confidence.

4) A presidential resignation is a situation in which a president, during popular protests, duress or the loss of congressional support, resigns without a previous impeachment procedure or a congressional vote that unseats the president.

5) A presidential resignation can also happen through the call for an early election, which is a presidential and/or legislative election that is called prematurely compared to the regular electoral calendar. An early election can be called either by the president, the congress or the Supreme Court.

6) A popular recall is a formal constitutional recall of the president by electoral means before the end of the presidential term.

### **Fuzzy-cases, some further rules**

Several of the interrupted presidencies are difficult to categorize within a single category: they are fuzzy cases. Most cases across our different types of presidential interruption, share the traits of street protests, strikes, and high levels of popular mobilization. Some cases involve a military coup attempt and strong, direct popular

protests (as in the case of Mahuad in Ecuador in 2000). Other cases might involve impeachment procedures and popular protests (as in the case of Cubas in Paraguay in 1999). In order to categorize such cases I focus on the procedure that finally removed the president (see Table 3-4 which separates votes taken before or after the president was removed). If a president resigns in the midst of popular protests, but is not physically forced out of office and there is no previous legislative vote against the president, I categorize the case as a presidential resignation. In the case of Mahuad in Ecuador, there was both a civil-military coup attempt, direct popular pressure, and a *post-facto* legislative vote to depose the president. In keeping with my criteria the case is classified as a successful coup since the civilian-military coup-makers used physical force to remove and permanently end Mahuad's presidency. In the case of Cubas in Paraguay the impeachment process had come sufficiently far as to be considered a case of impeachment, even though the final vote in congress was never held.

## **Chapter 4 : Empirical Overview and Data Presentation**

### ***Introduction***

The idea of this chapter is to present and discuss the data that makes up the basis for the analyses of the next two chapters, and give an empirical introduction to central variables and cases to be analysed in the following chapters. The chapter thus combines empirical analysis with some methodological considerations. The first part is more methodological and gives a short introduction to the dataset I have developed on the basis of Latin American Weekly Report, in addition to presenting and discussing the measurement of some of the central variables. More details on coding of variables, sources, etc. can be found in the appendix to this chapter. The second part presents a series of descriptive data of the content of the dataset. This empirical section aims to give comparative presentations and insight into the cases at hand, and into the variation of central variables across time and space. First I focus on variation over time, and second I focus on variation across space (countries, regions and governments).

### ***A dataset on political conflicts and presidential interruptions in Latin America***

In order to investigate what causes presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents, I constructed a dataset on political conflicts. The basis for the dataset on political conflicts in Latin America is the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR),<sup>112</sup> which reports political and economic “events” and news for interested parties such as business sectors, politicians, and academics. LAWR is published from London, and has been used for similar purposes by other authors especially the last few years (Helmke 2007; Hochstetler 2006; Jones 1995; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007). The

---

<sup>112</sup> All references to LAWR in text refers to year and number that year, for instance LAWR: 97-05, refers to LAWR number 5 in 1997.



unique elements with LAWR that is attractive is that LAWR offers a long time-series of data, since 1980, LAWR is regionally sensitive, and offers high quality reports with good insight into each country and event covered. My dataset based on LAWR subsequently covers all democratic and semi-democratic years for any Latin American country since 1980 till the end of 2005.<sup>113</sup> The countries and years are listed below in Table 4-1. The basis for the dataset is all political news with politics as primary or secondary topic in these democratic years. All these news-items are registered in the database with a short, one-to-two line summary.<sup>114</sup> Some of these news are also coded as a political conflict, and thus enter as count variables into my statistical analyses in chapter 6.

**Table 4-1: Countries and periods included in dataset**

<b>Countries and first democratic year:</b>	
Argentina	1983
Bolivia	1982
Brazil	1985
Chile	1990
Colombia	1980
Costa Rica	1980
Dominican Republic	1980
Ecuador	1980
El Salvador	1984
Guatemala	1986
Honduras	1982
Mexico	1988
Nicaragua	1984
Panama	1990
Paraguay	1989
Peru	1980
Uruguay	1985
Venezuela	1980

<sup>113</sup> With Latin American I here mean countries south of Rio Grande with an Ibero-american colonial legacy. This excludes countries such as Haiti, Belize, Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana, in addition to other smaller island states in the Caribbean. Democratic and semi-democratic years are defined according to the coding of Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001). I have also collected data on Haiti in semi-democratic and democratic years since 1980, but the country is not dealt with in this dissertation. Cuba is not included in the dataset since the country is not democratic or semi-democratic for any of the years analysed.

<sup>114</sup> Available from the author in Excel or Filemaker format.

### **Central variables in my dataset**

The dataset of course records any presidential interruption, the phenomenon of interest in this dissertation, in addition the dataset covers set of variables related to political conflicts.

### **Political conflicts**

In the dataset I register as political conflicts all registered conflicts in LAWR, in which the content is of national, political interest, that is in which groups express a disagreement with or present political demands to nationally elected politicians. Regional or local conflicts, which anyway tend not to be reported in LAWR, are excluded from the dataset, so are conflicts or protests directed directly at private companies, or foreign states. Conflicts occurring in one region of a country, and conflicts relating to foreign states, or international organisations, may still be recorded as long as the topic of the conflict relates to the national level, and the state's relation to foreign companies, organisations, or states.

### ***Horizontal and vertical conflicts and challenges***

In order to investigate the “institutions vs. streets” debate, I divide political conflicts into two dimensions, each with two types. Thus a political conflict is registered as belonging to one of four types. The first dimension regards the aim of the conflict: whether one of the parties aims at removing the president (challenges),<sup>115</sup> and whether the conflicts are political in nature (but in which no actor expressly seeks to remove the president) (regular conflicts).<sup>116</sup> The second dimension relates to the central actors of the conflict: whether the conflict is inter-institutional (horizontal), e.g. between

---

<sup>115</sup> These are called challenges by Hochstetler (2006), and presidential crisis by Pérez-Liñán (2007). I use challenges here, but what Hochstetler calls street challenges, I call vertical challenges.

<sup>116</sup> I call these conflicts that excludes challenges for conflicts or regular conflicts for the lack of a better term. Admittedly, this might be somewhat confusing that some types of the overarching concept of conflicts also are called conflicts. See Table 4-2.

congress and the president, or the conflict is vertical, i.e. conflicts with actors from civil society acting outside institutions, e.g. street protests, strikes, demonstrations, riots, etc. I base my coding on horizontal conflicts on the coding scheme in Jones (1995: 41-43, n. 8-10) with some important modifications.<sup>117</sup> Jones for instance does not distinguish between challenges and other conflicts. The four types conflicts are summarised in table 4-2.

**Table 4-2: Types of political conflicts**

		<b>Aim</b>
	Other aims (policy or office related)	Removal of presidents
<b>Arena</b>		
Horizontal	Horizontal conflicts (Deadlocks)	Horizontal challenges
Vertical	Vertical conflicts (e.g. street protests)	Vertical challenges

In relation to the "institutions vs. the streets" debate (see Chapter 2), institutionalists expect that either institutions work as *underlying* causes for interruptions (horizontal conflicts, deadlocks), or as *triggering* causes (horizontal challenges), whereas the non-institutional causal model would expect vertical conflicts to be an *underlying* cause for interruptions, or vertical challenges would be a *triggering* cause.

### ***Cleavages and organisers of conflicts***

As the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) indicated, I believe that for vertical and horizontal conflicts the cleavage mobilising the actions is important. In particular, I argued that conflicts mobilised by new, emerging cleavages (that hitherto was under- or unrepresented) could increase the likelihood for challenges to and interruptions of the presidents. There are many ways to measure the number, type and importance of cleavages. One such measure is for instance the effective number of parties (Laakso

<sup>117</sup> See the appendix for further operationalisation and coding rules of vertical and horizontal conflicts and challenges.

and Taagepera 1979), and to measure the stability of party systems, and by extension the cleavages one may use electoral volatility as a measure (Pedersen 1983). One of the problems with the use of party system data to measure the number or type of cleavages is that they presuppose programmatic parties. The extent to which parties in Latin America are programmatic vary across countries, time and party systems. The second problem is that I study events and developments that occur relatively quickly. By relatively quickly I mean within one electoral period. This means that the emergence of a new cleavage in a country at point  $t$  may not be registered in the election at point  $t-1$ , and thus would not be registered by changes in the Laakso/Taagepera or Pedersen indexes until after the fact.<sup>118</sup> The third problem is that these measures are anyway better suited for counting the number of cleavages rather than looking at the content or type of cleavages, and I am more interested in the latter. Thus for my purpose party system measures are not suitable for measuring cleavages. Historical analyses can also be used to analyse the emergence of new cleavages (e.g. Coppedge 1998; Di Tella 2004; Lipset and Rokkan 1967a, 1967b; Rokkan 1968). While there is little wrong with this approach, and indeed historical analyses clearly could only enrich and deepen my own analyses, my attention is to current events and recent changes. Often such historical analyses are better equipped for explaining stable patterns than changes, it is no surprise, therefore that Lipset and Rokkan mentioned a freezing of party system hypothesis.

For my purpose, however, I believe that coding each conflict according to what the expressed motivation for the conflict is, is the best measure. By expressed motivation I understand cleavage. Furthermore, as Stoll mentions, there is an inherent dilemma in

---

<sup>118</sup> Stoll (2008) provides a further discussion of measuring cleavages.

measuring social cleavages: should one count issue diversity, or group diversity (Stoll 2008: 1443-1444)? Therefore for each conflict I also register which actors are most dominant. This variable in part overlaps with the cleavage variable, for instance the classical left-right cleavage is most often organised by unions, and as such the variable also works as a reliability test on my data collection and a validity test of my variables. I will run statistical analyses using both these measures in chapter 6. In table 4-3 I list all cleavages used for coding conflicts, and all types of organisations that were the primary organisers of registered conflicts in LAWR.

**Table 4-3: Lists of type of organisation and cleavages, active in conflicts**

<b>Organisation:</b>	<b>Cleavages/issue dimensions:</b>
Civil society organisation (environment and cultural/ethnic based)	Centre-periphery (cultural)
Labour union-business organisation	International Centre-periphery
Political party (horizontal conflicts)	Peasant-consumer (economical) if distinguished from Centre-periphery (national)
Students	Left-right (economic, and socio-economic), labour-industry.
Peasant-farmer unions	Ethnic (cultural): indigenous vs. latin/Spanish/catholic
Terrorist-guerrilla organisations	Terrorist, civil war or guerrilla-related
Military	
Residual category, undefinable	Residual category, case-or country specific, or undefinable

The cleavages or issue dimensions follow classical thoughts on cleavages in political societies (Lijphart 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967a), but I have made some regional adjustments. I have for instance registered an international centre-periphery dimension, which relates to conflicts and protests directed at the central government on the issue of international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The centre-periphery dimension is understood to be cultural, whereas the peasant-consumer is more related to the economy (primary vs. secondary economy, Lipset and Rokkan 1967a: 14-16). The left-right is a classical issue dimension related to owners vs. workers on topics such as salaries, working conditions, unemployment levels, etc. Finally, an important dimension relates to

ethnicity, roughly understood as indigenous vs. Spanish-Catholic population. I also operated with a cleavage related to terrorism, civil war or guerrilla activity,<sup>119</sup> and separated out conflicts that were reported in LAWR, but that I could not categorise.

Concerning which organisation was the primary organiser of the conflict registered, I use a category for unions and business organisations,<sup>120</sup> political parties is another type, this category basically covers all horizontal conflicts, students is another group, peasant/farmer unions, and a broader category covering civil society organisations that are not labour or farmer unions. This latter category covers basically environmental organisations, movements such as Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil,<sup>121</sup> and ethnically or culturally defined organisations. I also registered whether civilian conflicts were organised by the military, for instance the protests in Argentina during Alfonsín against the trials of the military under the authoritarian regime, and whether terrorist or guerrilla organisations organised civilian protests in favour of their cause.<sup>122</sup>

### **Other variables**

I also register some other variables on the basis of LAWR, the two most important being internal splits in a presidential administration on account of internal conflicts,

---

<sup>119</sup> I did not count terrorist or guerrilla attacks, but rather civilian protests related to the matter of terrorism or guerrilla warfare. For instance a pro peace demonstration in Bogotá would be counted, but not a FARC vs. Colombian military shoot-out.

<sup>120</sup> Which basically means unions since business organisations, with some exceptions, regularly do not mobilise people to protest in the streets.

<sup>121</sup> Which could have been coded as a farmers' union as well.

<sup>122</sup> These two latter, like the cleavage related to terrorism, civil war or a guerrilla, were in the end excluded from the analyses because there were few civilian conflicts registered on these issues, the conflicts were period-specific for a country, and when included in statistical analyses they turned out to have no effect, and the inclusion/exclusion of these variables did not affect the other variables. In the analyses in Chapter 6 I also exclude conflicts that I was not able to code as belonging to a cleavage or an organisation. These were few, and have little theoretical relevance anyway, and excluding them did not affect any overall results of any analysis in Chapter 6.

and presidential scandals. Internal splits as a variable is a count variable for each time a government minister quits or is forced to leave the government due to an expressed conflict with the president.<sup>123</sup> Scandals I use as a dummy variable for any year a president is involved in a media exposed scandal, or close relatives to the president, close advisors in the administration or the president's party are involved in a media exposed scandal in a way that implicates the president. Both these variables have been found to have an effect on interruptions and challenges (Hochstetler 2006; Marsteintredet and Llanos 2009; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010; Pérez-Liñán 2007), and thus will be controlled for in the statistical analyses in Chapter 6.

As for the other independent variables, data used in the previous chapter and in Chapter 6 are gathered from open sources such as Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2006) and World Development Indicators (WDI 2008) for economic data. For electoral and party system data, I have used the edited volume of Dieter Nohlen (Nohlen 2005b, 2005a), with updates from official electoral webpages, and the journal *Electoral Studies* for the respective countries.<sup>124</sup> Chapter 3 also used some data from Cheibub's PPP dataset and fill in some country-years with data provided to me by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán for political parties and other regime variables for the period prior to 1980 (Cheibub 2006, 2007), and Banks data for conflicts before 1980 (Banks 2008), but in chapter 6 my conflict data comes from LAWR.

---

<sup>123</sup> Varies between 0 and 3 in my dataset.

<sup>124</sup> More details on sources for electoral and party data can be found in the appendix to this chapter.

### My dataset compared to other similar datasets

As mentioned in the introduction, other authors have gathered data on similar issues.

How does my dataset compare to other datasets? Table 4-4 gives an overview.

**Table 4-4: A comparison of datasets**

Author	Period	Countries/ regions	Conflict variables	Other conflict- related variables
Marsteintredet	1980-2005	Latin America	Horizontal and vertical, challenges and regular conflicts	Cleavages, Scandals, internal splits in adm. Organisations
Hochstetler	1980-2003	South America	Horizontal challenges and vertical challenges	Scandals, deaths in protests, type of policing. Type of actor, Level of violence, strike vs. protests.
Pérez-Liñán	1990-2004	Latin America	Vertical challenges	Level of horizontal challenges: Separates between accusation and crisis* Number of organisations protesting
Negretto (Jones)	1978-2003 (1984-1994)	Latin America	Horizontal conflicts and challenges	
Helmke	1995-2005	Countries covered by Latinobarometro	Institutional crisis	Legitimacy/popularity of institutions

Notes and sources: All datasets based on Latin American Weekly Report. Jones (1995) and Negretto (2006) reported together, since Negretto updates Jones's data. Hochstetler has also communicated to me of additional variables included in her dataset in addition to what is published in Hochstetler (2006), these are included in table 4-4, and she uses Keesings Record of World Events for a cross-regional analysis (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). Pérez-Liñán dataset is used in Pérez-Liñán (2007).

\* As dependent variables, not as explanatory variables.

Negretto (2006), following Jones (1995),<sup>125</sup> focuses on horizontal conflicts, particularly the ones that have been called deadlocks, in the literature. That is conflicts between congress and presidents that negatively affect the normal workings of both institutions, for instance the production of laws. Negretto builds on the institutional literature on regimes and inter-institutional relations especially in

<sup>125</sup> Jones originally created his dataset to test what creates deadlocks in Latin America. Sadly this is only a small part of his book (Jones 1995: 41-53), and the question he raised has remained largely untested for the Latin American region until Negretto's study.



presidential regimes,<sup>126</sup> and studies how these factors affect presidential interruptions, but he does not distinguish between two types of horizontal conflicts that I identify in table 4-2, or between *underlying* and *triggering* causes. Hochstetler (2006), in a discussion challenging the institutional literature for its causal model of presidential interruptions, is interested in challenges from the streets, what I call vertical challenges, in particular in contrast to horizontal challenges. In her article she does not focus on regular horizontal or vertical conflicts. Pérez-Liñán (2007) primarily focuses on presidential scandals and impeachments of presidents in Latin America, but collects data on challenges to the president, and other inter-institutional, or horizontal, conflicts, for one chapter of the book, and uses the data as dependent variables to be explained by a set of institutional and other variables. The data also cover a shorter time-period than the remaining authors.

Table 4-4 shows that the dataset I have created is the most complete of all in terms of the countries and period covered and in terms of types of conflicts. However, what really distinguishes my dataset from the others is first of all my focus on both horizontal and vertical conflicts, and horizontal and vertical challenges, and second of all my focus on cleavages, or issue dimensions of each and every conflict, in addition to the type of organisers of the conflict. As I lay out in Chapter 2, I believe these are dimension that may be important to take into account when explaining presidential interruptions.

All of the above-cited works analyse presidential interruptions as a phenomenon to explain, however, there are also some differences between which cases of presidential

---

<sup>126</sup> Negretto only uses institutional variables to explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions, in my view, a clear weakness of his analysis.

interruptions that the authors analyse, see Table 4-5. One natural reason is that the authors analyse different time-periods. None of the cited works analyse the interruptions of Presidents Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador in 2005 and Carlos Mesa in Bolivia the same year. Hochstetler (2006) only deals with elected presidents in South America, which excludes the Dominican and Guatemalan cases, and would also have excluded the fall of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia in 2005 since Mesa originally was Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada's Vice-President.

**Table 4-5: Presidential interruptions analysed in the comparative literature**

<b>President interrupted</b>	<b>Authors including case</b>	<b>Authors excluding case</b>
Siles Suazo, Bolivia 1984	Marsteintredet, Negretto	Hochstetler*, Pérez-Liñán
Alfonsín, Argentina 1989	Marteintredet, Negretto, Hochstetler	Pérez-Liñán
Collor de Melo, Brazil 1992	All	
Serrano, Guatemala 1993	Marsteintredet, Negretto, Pérez-Liñán	Hochstetler
Pérez, Venezuela, 1993	All	
Balaguer, Dominican Republic 1994	Marsteintredet, Negretto,	Hochstetler, Pérez-Liñán**
Bucaram, Ecuador 1997	All	
Cubas, Paraguay, 1999	All	
Mahuad, Ecuador 2000	All	
Fujimori, Perú 2000***	All	
De la Rúa, Argentina 2001****	All	
Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia 2003	All	
Gutiérrez, Ecuador 2005	Marsteintredet	Pérez-Liñán, Hochstetler, Negretto
Mesa, Bolivia 2005	Marsteintredet	Pérez-Liñán, Hochstetler, Negretto
Zelaya, Honduras 2009		All

Notes: This table also includes authors not using data from LAWR. \*Not known for what reason, potentially coded as non-elected president. \*\* Included in the author's Boolean analysis as a crisis, but not as a positive case of interruption, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 7). The exclusion is due to the fuzzy nature of the fall of Balaguer (e-mail communication with Pérez-Liñán). \*\*\*But in a recent work Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) exclude this case on account of Peru not being democratic at the time. \*\*\*\* Pérez-Liñán counts the Argentinean debacle as the fall of two presidents, de la Rúa and Rodríguez Saa.

Despite some variations,<sup>127</sup> there is a general agreement on most cases to include.

Other authors have included the falls of Aristide in Haiti in 1991 and 2004 (e.g. Valenzuela 2004). This case is often excluded either on account of the democracy

<sup>127</sup> There is more variation between the authors than the table presents, but not significantly more. For instance Negretto includes premature closures of congress as well, which makes him include the closure of congress in Venezuela and the early elections called by Chávez in 2000.

criterion (see Chapter 2) or on account of Haiti being semi-presidential and thus not relevant for many of the discussions regarding presidential interruption.

Table 4-5 also shows that I include more cases of presidential interruption for analyses than do the other authors, due to my longer time-frame. Thus, my dataset in this comparison to the others, covers more variables of interest, longer time-periods, and more cases than the other datasets on the topic of presidential interruptions discussed in this section.

### ***Descriptive statistics of central variables and basic analyses of the data: some methodological considerations***

The following sections focus on the content of the dataset, presenting overviews of central variables that I have created from LAWR. The goal is to give a general idea of the nature and number of conflicts of all types across time and space. I start by presenting the number of political news registered in my dataset. Political news is the basic unit in this dataset, and is a superset of political conflicts. Second, I present the number and types of conflicts compared over time and space.

### **News and Conflicts in the dataset**

Table 4-6 shows how many news have been registered in the dataset compared to the number of conflicts (of any type) registered.<sup>128</sup>

---

<sup>128</sup> In the full dataset including Haiti and democratic periods before the full democratic years, the number of news increases to 7917 news.

**Table 4-6: Political news and conflicts in dataset**

Category	Number
All political news	7716
In brief/News updates	754
All conflicts	1445

Notes: Based on personal dataset from LAWR.

The Latin American Weekly Report distinguishes, in certain periods of the 1980-2005 period between full stories and “In Brief” or short news updates. Table 4-6 shows that about 10% of the news items I registered come from these shorter stories.<sup>129</sup> For the construction of the conflict variables used for later analyses, I include all conflicts even though they are only registered in “In Brief” news. The argument for including conflicts from “In Brief” news is that conflicts in this section also should be included if they fall within the definition of the conflicts I am registering. Secondly, including the “In Brief” news helps prevent some of the large country and South America bias in the Latin American Weekly Report.<sup>130</sup> Since the 1990’s Central America was less well covered than South America in LAWR, thus one might think that LAWR’s scarce coverage of these countries could present a validity problem for the data for this sub-region. Including the short “In Brief” news help mitigate this problem. Furthermore, since the focus of this dissertation is on events of national political conflict, I believe that most relevant conflicts are included LAWR even for the smaller Central American countries. The problem is therefore not the under-representation of conflicts in the Central American region, but rather the over-representation of conflicts relative to other political news for these countries.

<sup>129</sup> I also made an attempt to flag conflicts that were the continuation of previous conflicts, but it was difficult to be consistent in the coding. I therefore ignore whether conflicts may be considered totally new, or just the continuation of previous conflicts. The reason for including the continuation of a conflict as a separate conflict is that the more times a conflict is reported, the higher the intensity or the seriousness of the conflict. Thus including all conflicts, even though there is little to no development in the conflict from week to week, helps me construct a continuous variable that captures the level of conflicts in a country during a certain time period. Furthermore, including the continuation of a conflict does not have any negative effects in terms of constructing dummy variables or ordinal variables to capture different elements of conflicts.

<sup>130</sup> This bias made Hochstetler (2006) focus only on South American cases in her article.

Table 4-7: News average per year

Country	News annual average	Conflicts annual average	Proportion of Conflicts to news
Argentina	34.26	6.26	0.18
Bolivia	22.33	6.50	0.29
Brazil	43.86	7.52	0.17
Chile	18.63	1.25	0.07
Colombia	32.31	2.00	0.06
Costa Rica	4.16	0.84	0.20
Dominican Republic	7.88	1.83	0.23
Ecuador	22.92	7.62	0.33
El Salvador	8.76	0.95	0.11
Guatemala	9.84	1.79	0.18
Honduras	6.41	1.05	0.16
Mexico	37.61	3.44	0.09
Nicaragua	13.05	2.64	0.20
Panama	6.14	1.50	0.24
Paraguay	17.24	4.29	0.25
Peru	28.46	4.38	0.15
Uruguay	11.38	1.57	0.14
Venezuela	22.85	4.31	0.19
South America	25.84	4.69	0.18
Central America and Caribbean	11.09	1.71	0.15
<b>Latin America</b>	19.4	3.28	0.17

Notes: Conflicts include all types of conflicts in Table 4-2. Central America and the Caribbean are all countries from Panama to Mexico, in addition to the Dominican Republic.

Table 4-7 lists the average of news items per year in each country in the dataset, in addition to the average of conflicts per year, and yearly average of the proportion of conflicts to news in a year. The overall average per country per year is 19.4 news items, and 3.28 conflicts. The table shows that the Central American countries (excluding Mexico) and the Dominican Republic get less news reported than all other countries. Costa Rica, the longest-living democracy in Latin America, and maybe the most stable country in the region even today, is the least covered country with on average 4.16 news items per year. Brazil, by far the largest country in extension and population, has an annual average of 43.86 news, followed by Mexico with 37.61 news. The bottom of the table also reports the sub-regional comparisons of Central

America and South America, which shows that there are more than twice as many news reported per year in the South American countries compared to the Central American countries (including Mexico).


The annual average of conflicts shows that countries with many news registered also report, on average, more conflicts, see for instance Brazil 7.52 conflicts on average per year. Nevertheless, this category also presents some interesting findings that are in accordance with the general knowledge of the region, thus validating my coding and the variable. Even when the number of news registered is not controlled for, countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia, typically identified with many political conflicts, score among the highest on this category. The column to the right presents the average proportion of conflicts to news in a country. Again Ecuador and Bolivia have the highest levels of conflicts reported, followed by Paraguay, and somewhat surprisingly Panama. Panama's and also Costa Rica's high scores are probably a result of the over-representation of conflicts to news from these countries compared to other countries, a problem I discussed above. Despite these odd findings, some of the other numbers reported for countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil as high-conflict countries, and for instance Chile as a low-conflict country, fit well with a general perception of political life in these countries and thus yields credibility to the collection of data (reliability) and also to the variables constructed (validity).

### **Controlling for large-country bias**

In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6, however, I will follow Jones's (1995) advice and exclude any country-year with fewer news than six per year. This corrects some of the Central American bias that is created by the lack of coverage in some years in

this region. Figure 4-1, below, is based on the numbers reported in Table 4-7, and shows a clear picture of the number of annual mean of news and conflicts in the countries included in the study.

Figure 4-1: News and conflicts in dataset



Source: Personal dataset based on LAWR.

Another way to control for the large-country bias would be to create variables based on the proportion of conflict to news in a country-year (see the far-right column in Table 4.7). In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6, I generally decide against doing this for two reasons: First of all, all observations of different types of conflicts in country-years with challenges and interruptions are truncated. This means that any conflicts registered after February 5 in 1997 in Ecuador, the day President Bucaram was removed, are not included in the observations made for that country-year. This is to avoid the problem of potential reverse causation. However, if the same technique

was applied to measures of the proportion of conflicts to news, a variable that may vary between 0 and 1, but with a mean below .2 (standard deviation of .15) for all conflicts, the variable would show extreme values in the country-year with interruptions or challenges (often getting close to .8). Therefore in order to use the variable of the proportion of conflicts, I would have to use the full country-year as the unit of observation in a year of interruption or challenges. This would open for the problem of reverse causation. The other reason is that I in Chapter 6 will use panel regression techniques that also take into consideration the variation within units, in this case countries, over time, and thus, diminish the problem of the large-country bias (Kennedy 2003: 302).<sup>131</sup> Therefore the conflict variables used in the analyses in Chapter 6 are based on the number of conflicts, not the proportion of conflicts to news, and I correct for the large-country bias in LAWR by excluding all country-years with fewer than six news per year.

### **Comparison Across Time: Interruptions and Conflicts in Latin America**

The above sections have focused on methodological considerations. The following sections will focus on variation over time and across countries and regions of central variables: interruptions and conflicts. This section focuses on comparisons over time, the next compares countries and regions. First I discuss interruptions, then conflicts in general, and finally I specify different types of conflicts.

Table 4-8 below displays the timing of presidential interruptions, controlling for the number of democratic years in each decade. The table shows that only two

---

<sup>131</sup> I have also ran all models presented in Chapter 6 with conflict variables based on the proportion of conflicts to news instead of the number of conflicts. The results from these analyses only confirm the results presented in Chapter 6. These results and analyses are available from the author.



interruptions occurred during the 1980s, six in the 1990s, and six more between 2000 and 2005.

**Table 4-8: Interruptions and democratic years in Latin America**

	1980s	1990s	2000-2006
<b>Interruptions</b>	2	6	6
<b>Democratic years</b>	112	181	125
<b>Interruptions per democratic year</b>	.018	.033	.048

Notes: Democratic years based on Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001) dataset on regimes in Latin America. These figures do not include the ouster of Manuel Zelaya in 2009.


Considering that the 1980s generally has been dubbed the lost decade for Latin America in terms of economic and social development, it may be surprising that this decade only saw two presidential interruptions, and no democratic breakdowns. Inflation was at its highest during this period, reaching peak levels in Bolivia in 1985 and Nicaragua in 1988 higher than 10,000% a year, and growth was at its lowest in the whole period under consideration in this dissertation (WDI 2008). There is an increase over time of interruptions even when controlled for democratic years, but it is not a very strong one. It increases from 1.8% interruptions per democratic year in the 1980's to 4.8% during the 2000s (ending after 2006).<sup>132</sup> Figure 4-2 shows the average of news and conflicts in a democratic country per year, thus the figure controls for the increasing number of democratic countries over time in Latin America. In 1980 only six countries were included in the dataset, whereas ten years later all 18 countries were considered democratic. Figure 4-2 shows that in terms of conflicts, the average number shows no clear trend over time. Regressing the sum of conflicts on years gives a positive, but not significant relationship.<sup>133</sup> So there has


<sup>132</sup> There has been one more interruption in this decade: Honduras on June 28 2009 with the ouster of Manuel Zelaya, summing the number of interrupted presidencies to 7 for this decade, one more than in the 1990s.

<sup>133</sup> The b-coefficient is 0.10, t-stat of 1.23 from a standard OLS regression.

been a slight increase in presidential interruptions since the 1980's, and a slight, but non-significant, increase in political conflicts as well.

Figure 4-2: News and Conflicts over time




**Figure 4-3: Likelihood of challenges and removals across time in Latin America**

Notes: The graphs show the likelihood of either event occurring in a democratic country in Latin America during a year. This figure and several of the next figures in this chapter and Chapter 6 present running averages calculated with a lowess smoother in Stata 10.1 (stata command `lowess`). Stata calculates a weighted regression using years as the x-variable. The graphs can be read as running averages, and as displaying real values (where applicable) despite being calculations from a regression analysis. I use the lowess smoother basically because it makes graphs that display time-trends over many units (countries) well. All lowess calculated graphs show changes somewhat later than real changes due to the calculation of a locally weighted regression.

Figure 4-3 demonstrates that there is a low probability of a presidential interruption at any time, but that, as Table 4-8 above indicates, there is an increasing risk of it occurring. The likelihood of a vertical or horizontal challenge in a democracy has also increased over time, and that vertical challenges is now as frequent as horizontal challenges. Vertical, or street, challenges were few and far between, almost as seldom as interruptions in the early 1990s, at that time we see that vertical challenges to presidents increase reaching the levels of horizontal challenges in 2005, the last year covered in my dataset.

Figure 4-4: Vertical and horizontal conflicts across time in Latin America



Notes: The actual number of conflicts in this or the subsequent graphs is not that important. There will always be conflicts not reported in LAWR. The real value of the figures is comparative, and the trends displayed.

Figure 4-4, above, shows that general vertical conflicts, excluding challenges, decline steadily till about the mid 1990s, and increases again to about 1980s levels. The increase in vertical conflicts occurs at about the same time as the increase in the likelihood of a vertical challenge (see Figure 4.3), that is from the mid 1990s. There are probably many reasons for the decrease in vertical conflicts, one is that Bolivia, a country with many vertical conflicts registered, was one of only 6-7 democracies in the early period and had a relatively higher weight than in later periods. Another reason is probably that unions grow weaker over time in this period as neo-liberal reforms get implemented in more and more countries. The implementation of these

reforms met tough reactions at the outset, but may have weakened unions over time.<sup>134</sup>

Figure 4-4 also shows that the number of horizontal conflicts, excluding challenges, increases over time, peaking around the mid 1990s. Thereafter the number of horizontal conflicts stabilises. One reason for the early increase in horizontal conflicts might be that as democracies in the region have become more stable, congress has become stronger and more self-confident in picking policy battles with the presidency (Pérez-Liñán 2005). Congresses across the region have also become more professionalised, many have received support financially and technically, from international organisations and banks, which also may have strengthened congresses and their comparative power relative to the president's.

Figure 4-5 (next page) contrasts the number of conflicts on average per country per year on the classical left-right cleavage with conflicts on regional and ethnic cleavages.<sup>135</sup> The graph demonstrates that the number of conflicts on left-right issue increased somewhat in the eighties, was stable since 1990 until about the mid 1990s, and since then has decreased steadily. Regional and ethnic cleavages show the reverse development, stable, but increasing, till the mid 1990s and since then a rapid increase. This latter rapid increase may explain the recent increase in vertical conflicts overall since the latter part of the 1990s (see Figure 4-4). Conflicts mobilising on these types of cleavages were more dominant than the traditional left-right conflicts by 2005 according to my data from LAWR.

---

<sup>134</sup> I discuss these issues further in Chapter 6.

<sup>135</sup> Regional and ethnic cleavages in Figure 4-6 includes the two centre-periphery cleavages, the peasant-consumer cleavage and the ethnic cleavage (see table 4-3). Due to variations across countries these are merged here, and in the subsequent analyses as well.

Figure 4-5: Development of conflicts and cleavages in Latin America





Figure 4-6 (next page) focuses on the organisers of conflicts in Latin America (see table 4-3), and contrasts labour union conflicts with conflicts primarily involving civil society or new social movements, and peasant or farmer organisations. Actors and cleavages will often correlate strongly, but there is not a perfect match.<sup>136</sup> Figure 4-6 confirms the impression from the previous figures that the left-right dimension is decreasing in level and importance in Latin America. The fall in union action seems to be greater than the fall in importance of the left-right dimension, falling steadily since the mid 1980s. On the other hand, one can see that conflicts organised by peasant organisations and civil society organisations have been increasing since the start of my dataset, but in an accelerating fashion since about the mid 1990s. Civil society and peasant organisations both now organise as many conflicts or protests as labour unions across the region.

<sup>136</sup> For instance, labour union conflicts and left-right conflicts correlate at .64.

Figure 4-6: Labour union, civil society (NSM), and peasant organised conflicts



Notes: Number of conflicts involving labour unions, peasant-farmers, or civil society (New Social Movements) in a country year.

### A note on validity and reliability of the data

The trends that I show here might be biased by the dataset, or by my coding.

However, in at least two cases, Peru and Bolivia, with much more fine-grained national data, the same trends are demonstrated. Arce (2008: 42) shows with data from Peru that while strike actions (equivalent to my conflicts organised by labour unions, and conflicts mobilised by the traditional left-right cleavage) decreased or maintained the same level from 1995-2004, other types of protests more than doubled in the same period. As a support for my claim in this chapter, the biggest one-year increase in “other types of protests” was from 1999-2000, the latter year was the year of Fujimori’s fall.<sup>137</sup> A study in Bolivia on social conflicts shows much of the same trend, thus also validating in this case my own data (see Laserna et al. 2006). There is

<sup>137</sup> The division between strikes and other protests in Arce (2008) coincides with the distinction on types of contention in the Banks data that I used in chapter 3.

a clear downward trend in labour and worker related conflicts in the period 1994-2005 compared to the 1970-1993 period, and in the same period non-labour conflicts increase and constitute almost 50% of all registered conflicts in the latter period (Laserna, Ortego, and Chacón 2006: 93). Data from Banks (2008) show the same declining trend in the number of strikes on average for the whole of Latin America, and a similar rise in anti-government demonstrations (a variable that conflates regular conflicts and challenges). Therefore, I have no reason to believe that the trends I show with my data should be either biased, or have problems in terms of validity and reliability.

### **Comparison across space: Interruptions and conflicts across countries and regions**

In a region and continent as large as Latin America there are of course extreme variations. The figures above have overshadowed this variation by presenting averages for the whole region to present variation and trends across time.

This section, however, will focus on the same variables and compare their values across countries and regions. I also compare regions because empirically South America has been pointed to as an exception with respect to presidential interruptions (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009).<sup>138</sup>

Table 4-9 shows that ten countries have experienced a presidential interruption.<sup>139</sup>

Three of these are in Central America or the Caribbean, and seven in South America,

---

<sup>138</sup> I must add here that since these lines were written, President Zelaya in Honduras has been removed on June 28, 2009, and president Colom in Guatemala was challenged in May of 2009. Even though the Central-South American divide seems to be smaller than presented in these pages, it, nevertheless, still exists.

<sup>139</sup> Note that in this table I include the interruption of Zelaya.



constituting, respectively 38% and 70% of the countries in each sub-region, and 56% of all countries in Latin America.

**Table 4-9: Countries and interruptions**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Interruption</b>	<b>Number of interruptions</b>
Argentina	Yes	2
Bolivia	Yes	3
Brazil	Yes	1
Chile	No	0
Colombia	No	0
Costa Rica	No	0
Dominican Republic	Yes	1
Ecuador	Yes	3
El Salvador	No	0
Guatemala	Yes	1
Honduras	Yes	1
Mexico	No	0
Nicaragua	No	0
Panama	No	0
Paraguay	Yes	1
Peru	Yes	1
Uruguay	No	0
Venezuela	Yes	1
South America	Yes	12
Central America and Caribbean	Yes	3

There is, therefore, still a geographical divide between South and Central America and the Caribbean with respect to interruptions of presidents. The following table, Table 4-10 (next page), presents the various types of conflicts across countries and sub-regions in Latin America, and this table also confirms a regional divide.<sup>140</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Since these data are based on my dataset from LAWR, no conflict after 2005 is registered.

**Table 4-10: Number of news registered as different types of conflicts across countries and sub-regions, 1980-2005**

Country	Horizontal challenges	Vertical Challenges	Horizontal conflicts	Vertical conflicts
Argentina	0	3 (2)	66	75
Bolivia	9 (5)	7 (3)	31	108
Brazil	10 (3)	2 (2)	83	64
Chile	0	0	14	6
Colombia	6 (3)	0	13	32
Costa Rica	0	0	12	9
Dominican Republic	0	0	12	32
Ecuador	12 (7)	12 (3)	93	80
El Salvador	0	0	7	13
Guatemala	0	2 (1)	9	17
Honduras	0	0	5	18
Mexico	0	0	47	15
Nicaragua	2 (2)	0	42	14
Panama	0	0	11	10
Paraguay	23 (7)	3 (3)	18	29
Peru	2 (1)	2 (2)	29	71
Uruguay	0	0	11	20
Venezuela	6 (2)	21 (5)	36	48
<b>Region</b>				
South America (N-224)	68 (28)	50(20)	394	533
Central America (N-170)	2 (2)	2 (1)	145	128
<b>Total</b>	<b>70 (30)</b>	<b>52 (21)</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>661</b>

Notes: The table displays the number of news registered as either type of conflict. The number of actual challenges in a country is inflated since several challenges here are not unique (compare with table 5-2, next chapter), and do not represent perfectly the variable “challenges” used for statistical analyses in Chapter 6. The table shows sum of conflicts in a country during completely democratic years, number of country/years with challenges in brackets (even this number is also somewhat inflated compared to Table 5-2, next chapter).

The table clearly demonstrates that there are many fewer horizontal challenges and especially fewer vertical challenges in Central America than in South America. As pointed out in Chapter 2, unless someone actually challenges a president it is unlikely that he or she will fall. In Central America there are only two news items registered as horizontal, and two news items registered vertical challenges registered over 170 country years compared to 70 and 52 in South America over 224 country years. These numbers refer to only two country-years of horizontal challenges, and one country-year of vertical challenges in Central America (in brackets), and 28 and 20 for South America, respectively. Merging vertical and horizontal challenges, I get that of the 30

unique country-years with horizontal challenges and the 21 unique country-years of vertical challenges, there are 40 unique country-years of challenges that will be used in the statistical analyses in Chapter 6. In other words in eleven country-years there are simultaneous vertical and horizontal challenges against a president.

The table also displays which countries have fallen prey to Linz's perils of presidentialism in terms of frequent deadlocks and horizontal conflicts in general. Ecuador is the number one country with 93 news items registered as horizontal conflicts since 1980, and 13 registered news items registered as horizontal challenges between congress. Paraguay also fell into this pattern with horizontal challenges to every president since President Cubas. In both countries there have been horizontal challenges in seven different years. Brazil seems to score high as well, but with regard to horizontal challenges to the president, eight of the ten registered are from the relatively protracted impeachment process of president Collor de Melo in 1992. The table also confirms that Bolivia, as the literature holds, is the country with most vertical conflicts, followed by Ecuador. Curiously Venezuela is the country with most registered vertical challenges, which stems from the conflict-ridden presidencies of Pérez, Caldera, and Chávez. In total there have been more country years with horizontal than vertical challenges, but remember that vertical challenges are now as likely as horizontal challenges (Figure 4-3).

What about cleavages and actors across countries and regions? Table 4-11 (next page) conveys a simplified picture in which the right-left cleavage is contrasted to regional and ethnic cleavages.

**Table 4-11: Cleavages and conflicts in Latin America**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Left-Right (economic) cleavage</b>	<b>Regional and ethnic cleavage</b>
Argentina	108	2
Bolivia	62	54
Brazil	83	27
Chile	7	1
Colombia	15	8
Costa Rica	17	1
Dominican Republic	30	1
Ecuador	98	14
El Salvador	13	0
Guatemala	15	2
Haiti	2	0
Honduras	8	7
Mexico	38	7
Nicaragua	12	2
Panama	8	1
Paraguay	14	16
Peru	59	11
Uruguay	23	1
Venezuela	47	1
South America	516	135
Central America	143	21
Total	659	156

Notes: Regional, ethnic cleavage includes conflicts which primary cleavage was centre-periphery, international centre-periphery, peasant-consumer and ethnic conflicts (Table 4-3).

What is evident from this table is that left-right conflicts dominate, this is not surprising as many of the vertical conflicts are strikes, furthermore, on a more impressionistic basis, many of the protests one comes across in LAWR relates to price hikes, and (end of) subsidies of foodstuff and fuel. Finally, many of the horizontal conflicts also concern typical left-right or economic issues. Table 4-12, below, portrays much of the same picture as Table 4-11, but with the type of organisations active in conflicts. Again, I distinguish between a broad category including Civil society and new social movements, labour-business organisations, political parties (mainly horizontal conflicts), student protests, and peasants/farmers' organisations.

**Table 4-12: Types of organisations in conflicts in Latin America**

Country	Civil Society/ New Social Movements	Labour- business	Political parties	Students/ teachers	Peasant- Farmers
Argentina	12	34	67	0	3
Bolivia	9	60	45	0	27
Brazil	1	40	110	0	19
Chile	1	5	14	0	0
Colombia	2	19	22	3	5
Costa Rica	0	7	13	0	0
Dominican Republic	1	19	13	3	1
Ecuador	18	43	110	4	0
El Salvador	0	13	6	0	0
Guatemala	1	9	13	1	2
Honduras	3	6	5	1	5
Mexico	2	7	47	0	4
Nicaragua	0	7	45	2	0
Panama	0	6	13	0	0
Paraguay	1	4	44	1	16
Peru	4	48	36	2	5
Uruguay	0	15	15	0	1
Venezuela	12	28	42	12	1
South America (N-960)	60	296	505	22	77
Central America (N-255)	7	74	155	7	12
Total	67	370	660	29	89

Notes: Sum of all conflicts does not sum up to correct total number as some categories are left out. Also the total sums do not match that of table 4-11 since table 4-12 includes more types of conflicts.

Labour-business and political parties dominate as the main actors in political conflicts, which is congruent with the picture from table 4-11. The table also brings out the fact that countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina have organisations outside the labour organisations and political parties that are active.

### **Comparison Across Space: Interruptions and conflicts across governments**

The dataset presented above can also be used in country-government format. There are advantages and disadvantages with both formats. The country-year format yields a higher N, which increases the probability of significant results in statistical analyses by decreasing the standard error. A country-government format is the best option

when your interest is in institutional variables since governments and other institutional variables change values at the same time, but economic and socioeconomic variables are coded on a calendar-year basis and thus do not fit a country-government format. If the researcher is more interested in structural or economic conditions, a country-year format might be better because all variables and units follow the calendar year. The decision of which format to use for statistical analysis basically follows the logic of picking the format that the researcher believes to be the most valid for the research question at hand. In the following chapter I will use the country-year format, but here I present the data in a country-government format to provide a broader picture of the data.

In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6 (and in Chapter 3) I use the country-year format instead of the country-government format since I include socioeconomic variables. Another reason is that since the part of what I am trying to measure with my conflict data, for instance the emergence of new cleavages, may appear rather quickly, using the country-government format may not capture the relevant changes in the data, and average out many important developments across the full period of a government.

The purpose of this section is, however, just to present the data across governments and, thus, compare between another unit of analysis than countries/region and time, presented above. I have already presented which presidencies have been interrupted. My data from 1980-2005 cover 107 presidencies or governments (see Table 4-16, Appendix to this chapter), and in order to present some of the data in the text here, only the 15 most conflict-ridden presidencies and the five least conflict-ridden

presidencies are included. Table 4-13 shows the 14 most challenged presidencies since 1980.

**Table 4-13: Most challenged-ridden presidents (horizontal and vertical challenges)**

<b>Government</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Horizontal challenges</b>	<b>Horizontal conflicts</b>	<b>Vertical challenges</b>	<b>Vertical conflicts</b>
González Macchi	Paraguay	<b>11</b>	7	2	11
Cubas*	Paraguay	<b>9</b>	2	1	0
Collor de Melo*	Brazil	<b>8</b>	16	1	2
Pérez*	Venezuela	<b>6</b>	11	4	13
Gutiérrez*	Ecuador	<b>6</b>	8	3	4
Siles Zuazo*	Bolivia	<b>4</b>	3	2	21
Samper	Colombia	<b>4</b>	4	0	6
Chávez 2	Venezuela	0	4	<b>17</b>	9
Mahud*	Ecuador	0	8	<b>5</b>	8
Sánchez de Lozada 2*	Bolivia	2	1	<b>4</b>	6
Duhalde**	Argentina	0	4	<b>2</b>	6
Noboa	Ecuador	0	12	<b>2</b>	9
Palacio	Ecuador	0	4	<b>2</b>	3
de la Rúa*	Argentina	0	11	<b>1</b>	9

Notes: \* Interrupted presidents; \*\* Caretaker presidents (forced to resign). Challenge-ridden based on 8 most horizontal challenges, and 7 most vertical challenges (in bold). The presidencies are listed in that order. The number of challenges in this table reflects the number of news items registered as a challenge. See Table 4-10.

Table 4-13 shows that of the 14 most challenged presidents, only one president (Samper, Colombia) comes from a country that has not experienced a presidential interruption. Eight of the 14 presidents listed were interrupted, and Duhalde (Argentina) was forced to call early elections as a caretaker president. González Macchi (Paraguay) and Samper (Colombia) both experienced impeachment procedures against them, the Chávez 2 administration experienced a failed coup attempt, whereas Noboa and Palacio (both Ecuador) took over from interrupted presidents, as did also González Macchi in Paraguay.

**Table 4-14: Most conflict-ridden presidents (horizontal and vertical conflicts)**

Government	Country	Horizontal challenges	Horizontal conflicts	Vertical Challenges	Vertical Conflicts
Durán	Ecuador	0	<b>32</b>	0	25
Cardoso 1	Brazil	0	<b>28</b>	0	12
Zedillo	Mexico	0	<b>25</b>	0	2
Chamorro	Nicaragua	1	<b>24</b>	0	7
Menem 2	Argentina	0	<b>23</b>	0	17
Fox	Mexico	0	<b>21</b>	0	8
Menem 1	Argentina	0	<b>17</b>	0	19
Bolaños	Nicaragua	1	<b>17</b>	0	3
Sánchez de Lozada	Bolivia	0	5	0	<b>26</b>
Sarney	Brazil	0	12	1	<b>23</b>
García	Peru	0	3	0	<b>23</b>
Siles Zuazo*	Bolivia	4	3	2	<b>21</b>
Lula	Brazil	1	10	0	<b>20</b>
Belaúnde	Peru	0	7	0	<b>20</b>
Paz Estenssoro	Bolivia	0	4	0	<b>18</b>

Notes: \* Interrupted presidents. Conflict-ridden based on the 8 governments with most horizontal conflicts and 7 most vertical conflicts (in Bold). Some cases overlap.

Table 4-14 shows the 15 most conflict-ridden presidents,<sup>141</sup> and demonstrates that conflict-ridden and challenge-ridden (Table 4-13) are two different dimensions. This fact is also a support for my idea of distinguishing between *underlying* causes (where regular conflicts appear), and *triggering* causes (where challenges appear), see Chapter 2. Only one president, Siles Zuazo, Bolivia, appear in both tables.<sup>142</sup> Siles Zuazo was the first president to be interrupted and the only one to confront very high levels of vertical conflicts in the streets. Vertical conflicts, as I pointed out above, are driven by strikes and union actions, and Siles was driven out in part by unions at a time before the neo-liberal reforms would weaken unions in several countries.<sup>143</sup>

The correlation between the conflicts and challenges is not higher than .16, whereas horizontal and vertical conflicts correlate at .45. This may or may not indicate that

<sup>141</sup> I include 15 presidents here since Menem 1 and Bolaños experienced the same number of horizontal conflicts.

<sup>142</sup> Sánchez de Lozada also appears in both, but in table 4-13 he appears for his second administration, in table 4-14 for his first administration.

<sup>143</sup> What is more, Siles also attempted to run the government in part with the unions, and gave the unions *co-responsibility* over important factories at the time. A political move that did not help Siles's survival in office.



governments deadlocked by horizontal conflicts foster vertical conflicts, or that vertical conflicts create more horizontal conflicts. Further case-studies may tap into the relationship between the different types of conflicts.

Not surprisingly, an Ecuadorean president figures as the one with most horizontal conflicts, this is President Durán (also with the president with second-most number of vertical conflict). The first Cardoso government is number two. Cardoso's conflicts were caused by his attempts to reform the constitution and win control over hyperinflation, both very conflictive issues that Cardoso succeeded with. As can be appreciated by the Cardoso example, horizontal conflicts and deadlocks do not necessarily mean that a president is unsuccessful in implementing the agenda. If I were to guess, however, I would still believe horizontal conflicts, as measured here, should correlate with a president's ability to implement his or her desired political agenda.

### ***Conclusion***

This chapter has presented the dataset that will make up part of the evidence used in this dissertation to further analyse presidential interruptions in Latin America. The focus has been on different types of conflicts, which I have registered from LAWR, and their variation across time and space. To display various facets of the data, years, governments, countries and regions have been used as the unit of analysis. The presentation of data demonstrated that there has been a slight increase over time in the number of presidential interruptions, and that at the same time, presidents are more challenged by the streets than ever before, while inter-institutional challenges have remained at much the same level over time. Furthermore, the data showed that new

cleavages have grown in importance and in real numbers. Regional and ethnic conflicts started to gain importance in the mid 1990s, so did new actors in civil society and peasant organisations. From the late nineties there was a clear decrease in the conflicts related to the traditional left-right cleavage, whereas union actions have been decreasing over the whole time period under scrutiny here. Comparing across nations and regions, there was clear evidence of the South American exceptionalism, not only in interruptions, but also in terms of horizontal and vertical challenges. In terms of cleavages and organisations, countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Brazil represented much of the increasing trend over time with regard to conflicts related to geography and culture. What is also interesting is that there does not seem to be a relationship between the general level of conflicts and the challenges to, or falls of presidents. I discuss this topic further in Chapter 6. Conflicts as such, it seems, do not create interruptions, whereas when congress or actors from civil society (broadly understood) challenge a president, they seem to succeed from time to time. What is not clear, however, harking back to the perennial debate on institutions started by Linz (1978; 1990; 1994) is what is the more important *triggering* cause: horizontal (congressional) or vertical (street) challenges? The next chapter will discuss this question.

**Appendix to Chapter 4:****Table 4-15: All presidents and registered conflicts in Latin America 1980-2005**

<b>Government</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Horizontal Challenges</b>	<b>Horizontal Conflicts</b>	<b>Vertical Challenges</b>	<b>Vertical Conflicts</b>
Alfonsín*	Argentina	0	10	1	15
Menem 1	Argentina	0	17	0	19
Menem 2	Argentina	0	23	0	17
de la Rúa*	Argentina	0	11	1	9
Duhalde**	Argentina	0	4	2	6
Kirchner	Argentina	0	1	0	9
Siles Zuazo*	Bolivia	4	3	2	21
Paz Estenssoro	Bolivia	0	4	0	18
Paz Zamora	Bolivia	1	3	0	10
Sánchez de Lozada	Bolivia	0	5	0	26
Banzer	Bolivia	0	0	0	9
Quiroga	Bolivia	0	0	0	5
Sánchez de Lozada 2*	Bolivia	2	1	4	6
Mesa*	Bolivia	2	10	1	12
Rodríguez**	Bolivia	0	5	0	1
Sarney	Brazil	0	12	1	23
Collor de Melo*	Brazil	8	16	1	2
Franco	Brazil	0	8	0	2
Cardoso 1	Brazil	0	28	0	12
Cardoso 2	Brazil	1	9	0	5
Lula	Brazil	1	10	0	20
Aylwin	Chile	0	5	0	2
Frei	Chile	0	6	0	3
Lagos	Chile	0	3	0	1
Turbay	Colombia	0	1	0	5
Betancur	Colombia	0	0	0	2
Barco	Colombia	0	1	0	12
Gaviria	Colombia	0	3	0	3
Samper	Colombia	4	4	0	6
Pastrana	Colombia	2	2	0	4
Uribe	Colombia	0	2	0	0
Carazo	Costa Rica	0	0	0	0
Monge	Costa Rica	0	0	0	1
Arias	Costa Rica	0	3	0	1
Calderón	Costa Rica	0	2	0	2
Figueres	Costa Rica	0	5	0	1
Pacheco	Costa Rica	0	1	0	4
Gúzman	Dominican Republic	0	3	0	7
Jorge	Dominican Republic	0	2	0	6
Balaguer	Dominican Republic	0	1	0	6
Balaguer 2	Dominican Republic	0	2	0	4
Balaguer 3*	Dominican Republic	0	1	0	5
Fernández	Dominican Republic	0	1	0	0
Mejía	Dominican Republic	0	2	0	3
Fernández 2	Dominican Republic	0	0	0	1
Roldós	Ecuador	1	4	0	5

## Chapter 4: Empirical Overview and Data Presentation

Hurtado	Ecuador	1	2	0	5
Febres Cordero	Ecuador	1	7	0	5
Borja	Ecuador	2	9	0	10
Durán	Ecuador	0	32	0	25
Bucaram*	Ecuador	2	2	0	5
Alarcón**	Ecuador	0	5	0	1
Mahuad*	Ecuador	0	8	5	8
Noboa	Ecuador	0	12	2	9
Gutiérrez*	Ecuador	5	8	3	4
Palacio	Ecuador	0	4	2	3
Duarte	El Salvador	0	3	0	12
Cristiani	El Salvador	0	0	0	0
Calderón Sol	El Salvador	0	2	0	1
Flores	El Salvador	0	2	0	0
Saca	El Salvador	0	0	0	0
Cerezo	Guatemala	0	0	0	9
Serrano*	Guatemala	0	0	1	1
De León Carpio**	Guatemala	0	7	0	3
Arzú	Guatemala	0	0	0	0
Portillo	Guatemala	0	1	0	2
Berger	Guatemala	0	1	0	2
Suazo	Honduras	0	2	0	5
Azcona	Honduras	0	0	0	4
Callejas	Honduras	0	0	0	5
Reina	Honduras	0	2	0	2
Maduro	Honduras	0	0	0	2
Salinas	Mexico	0	1	0	5
Zedillo	Mexico	0	25	0	2
Fox	Mexico	0	21	0	8
Ortega	Nicaragua	0	0	0	1
Chamorro	Nicaragua	1	24	0	7
Alemán	Nicaragua	0	1	0	3
Bolaños	Nicaragua	1	17	0	3
Endara	Panama	0	8	0	4
Pérez Balladares	Panama	0	3	0	2
Moscoso	Panama	0	0	0	3
Rodríguez Pedotti	Panama	0	3	0	0
Wasmosy	Paraguay	1	5	0	7
Cubas*	Paraguay	9	2	1	0
González Macchi	Paraguay	11	7	2	11
Duarte	Paraguay	2	1	0	11
Beláunde	Peru	0	7	0	20
García	Peru	0	3	0	23
Fujimori	Peru	1	8	0	6
Fujimori 2	Peru	0	1	0	2
Fujimori 3	Peru	0	2	0	8
Fujimori 4*	Peru	0	3	1	1
Paniagua**	Peru	0	0	0	0
Toledo	Peru	0	6	1	12
Sanguinetti	Uruguay	0	6	0	6
Lacalle	Uruguay	0	3	0	8
Sanguinetti 2	Uruguay	0	0	0	2
Battle	Uruguay	0	2	0	3

Vásquez	Uruguay	0	0	0	1
Herrera	Venezuela	0	2	0	5
Luschinski	Venezuela	0	1	0	5
Pérez*	Venezuela	6	11	4	13
Velásquez	Venezuela	0	1	0	0
Caldera	Venezuela	0	10	0	14
Chávez	Venezuela	1	7	0	1
Chávez 2	Venezuela	0	4	17	9
Total	107/19	70	538	52	660

Notes: \* Interrupted presidency, \*\* caretaker president. President Majluta of the Dominican Republic is excluded as he served only 43 days during mid-1982.

### Coding and Operationalisation of conflicts

Recall that I distinguish between challenges and other conflicts that do not aim to remove the president, these I call (for the lack of a better term) regular conflicts, and that I distinguish between horizontal and vertical types of conflicts and challenges.

#### Horizontal conflicts and challenges:

The operationalisation of this variable is based on Jones (1995).<sup>144</sup> Some changes from Jones's original contribution are made: I code all years from 1980 even though the format of LAWR was changed in 1984. This in order to get a time-series as long as possible. Jones (1995) only included presidential years for which a minimum of six articles of politics were written. I collect evidence on all country-years, but control for the bias of a limited coverage of some countries using the same threshold as Jones (1995) in my statistical analysis in Chapter 6.

All horizontal conflicts are political in nature, and inter-institutional at the national level. That means that horizontal conflicts (both challenges and regular conflicts) relate to conflicts between Congress and the Presidency. I distinguish between two types of horizontal conflicts:

- 1) **Horizontal challenges** are conflicts that have as the expressed aim to depose the president. Coding: These are the news items in LAWR including the

<sup>144</sup> See also Negretto (2006).

following as primary or secondary subject: The legislature threatened to remove (or removed) the president from office in between elections or credibly threatened or actually engaged in the censure or impeachment of the president.

- 2) **Horizontal conflicts** are general conflicts between the presidency and congress (excluding challenges). Coding: These are the articles that have as a primary or secondary subject one of the following themes: 1) the Legislature defeated/was going to defeat, delayed/going to delay, blocked/going to block, modified/was modifying in a significant manner a bill proposed or strongly supported by the president; 2) The president was going to veto or vetoed a bill passed by the legislature, or made a credible threat of such a veto; 3) the legislature credibly threatened or actually engaged in the censure or impeachment of a government minister; 4) There was a general conflict between the president and the legislature or there were generic problems which the president was having with the legislature (and vice versa).

**Vertical conflict and challenges:** A vertical conflict must be political in its nature, and must be directed against politicians at the national level (even though it might start at a sub-national level, it will only count as a conflict when it is raised to a national level and directed towards the political system in the nation or the government).

If there is a strike, protest in the streets with political aims directed at the national levels and elected authorities, and it is registered in LAWR, it is a vertical conflict. Types of conflicts may include, but not exclusively, strikes, *piquetes*, *cacerolazos*,

and other similar protests. (Protests directed at a Trans-National Company are not registered as a political conflict, a protest against the US president is not included as long as it is not at the same time directed at the national political system or national politicians as well)

The vertical conflicts are separated and coded according to two types:

- 1) **Vertical challenges** are conflicts that have as the expressed aim to depose the president. Coding: These are the articles that include the following as a primary or secondary subject: A strike, riot, protest, demonstration, etc. that LAWR reports expresses the goal of deposing the president.
- 2) **Vertical conflicts** that are political in their nature, but have other goals than to remove the president. Coding: These are the articles that include the following as a primary or secondary subject: A strike, riot, protest, demonstration, etc. that LAWR reports expresses some type of political demand, critique, political message at politicians at the national level.

### **Data for variables based on electoral results**

Below I cite all sources conferred to construct the variables based on electoral support. These come in addition to Nohlen's (2005b; 2005a) edited work and the country chapters in those two volumes. I only use other sources than Nohlen for the most recent electoral results, or if there are reported missing data in Nohlen. Furthermore, some of the source listed below were only used for validation of results in Nohlen, or in the other sources.

Argentina: Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior:

[http://www.resultados2007.gov.ar/paginas/f\\_top.htm](http://www.resultados2007.gov.ar/paginas/f_top.htm)

Election resources on the internet:

<http://www.electionresources.org/ar/deputies.php?election=2005>

Adam Carr's electoral archive: <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/a/argentina/>

Bolivia: Sources: Singer (2007); Georgetown's PDDBA database:

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/pres05.html>.

Brazil: Jairo Nicolau's pages: Banco do dados eleitorais do Brasil 1982-2002,

<http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br/database/deb/port/>. Wikipedia:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian\\_general\\_election\\_2006](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_general_election_2006). Election resources on

the internet: <http://electionresources.org/br/deputies.php?election=2006>.

Chile: Tribunal Calificador de Chile <http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/>;

[http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/ficha\\_noticia.php?noticia\\_id=72](http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/ficha_noticia.php?noticia_id=72). Biblioteca

Nacional de Chile: <http://www.bcn.cl/elecciones/pdf/DIPU2005TRICON.pdf>; and

Heath (2007).

Colombia: Wikipedia:

[http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones\\_presidenciales\\_de\\_Colombia\\_%282006%29](http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Colombia_%282006%29);

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_Colombia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Colombia);

Costa Rica:

Tribunal Supremo Electoral: <http://www.tse.go.cr/>; Asamblea Nacional:

<http://www.asamblea.go.cr/>

Dominican Republic: Junta Central Electoral: [www.jce.do](http://www.jce.do), Wikipedia:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_the\\_Dominican\\_Republic](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_Dominican_Republic);

Ecuador: Conaghan (2007).

Guatemala: Georgetown Electoral database:

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/congre2007.html>



<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/presi2007.html>

Wikipedia: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan\\_general\\_election%2C\\_2007](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_general_election%2C_2007)

Honduras: Tribunal Supremo Electora [www.tse.hn](http://www.tse.hn). Wikipedia

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Honduras](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Honduras); IPU:

<http://www.ipu.org/parline%2De/reports/2139.htm>; Taylor-Robinson (2007).

Mexico: IFE: <http://www.ife.org.mx/>. And, Adam Carr's electoral webpage:

<http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/m/mexico/mexico20063.txt>.

Nicaragua: Lean (2007).

Paraguay: Justicia Electora, República de Paraguay <http://www.tsje.gov.py/>

(accessed May 19, 2008)

Peru: Schmidt (2007).

El Salvador: Wikipedia: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics\\_of\\_El\\_Salvador](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_El_Salvador)

Venezuela: CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral):

[http://www.cne.gov.ve/divulgacionPresidencial/resultado\\_nacional.php](http://www.cne.gov.ve/divulgacionPresidencial/resultado_nacional.php); Wikipedia:

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections\\_in\\_Venezuela](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Venezuela); Georgetown:

<http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Venezuela/pres06.html>

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan\\_parliamentary\\_election%2C\\_2005](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_parliamentary_election%2C_2005)

All web-pages accessed December 18, 2007 - January 18, 2008, unless otherwise specified.

## **Chapter 5 : Triggering Causes. Presidents between Institutions and the Streets**

### ***Introduction***

This chapter compares the cases of presidential interruption following to some extent the Method of Agreement (Mill 1868), an admittedly weak method for causal analysis, in which the goal is to find the similar cause to a similar outcome across different cases.<sup>145</sup> The method will be combined with process tracing to study the *triggering* causes displayed in Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2, and to revisit a debate that has been prominent in the studies of presidential interruptions: What triggers presidential interruptions: Street (vertical) or institutional (horizontal) challenges?

The cases analysed in this chapter are selected depending on their value on the dependent variable, as the cases all share the same value: presidential interruption. Without going into the list of pitfalls of selecting on the dependent variable (Collier 1995; Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990, 2003), I hasten to say that the goal of this chapter is not to identify, or causally explain fully presidential interruption, rather to discuss a debate in the literature. Furthermore, this chapter combines the Method of Agreement with process tracing in order to approach a question that has been central to the debate on presidential interruptions. Process tracing as a technique, focuses on identifying causal processes, chains and mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 205), and is a case-study technique that does not build on the experiment as an ideal for the social sciences. The method builds on what the same authors call the method of congruence, a somewhat weaker investigative logic that juxtaposes various theories and in a case study evaluates which theory is congruent with the evidence at hand. Both, however, are convenient methods when testing more general theories and their

---

<sup>145</sup> But, for a strong defence of this logic of inquiry when combined with multi-level analysis, see Przeworski and Teune (1970), and the method they name Most Different Systems Design.

explanatory power in a case study or, as the authors advocate, to produce new theories.

This chapter revisits the institution vs. street challenge debate by focusing on two issues: the interaction between institutional and societal factors,<sup>146</sup> and the causal order of the two factors. The evidence from analyses so far is that both vertical (street), and horizontal (institutional) challenges have been important in removing presidents, but with the street being the more prominent or important of the two (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Morgenstern et al. 2008). By looking at whether vertical or horizontal challenges appeared first, this chapter aims to study the question of whether congress only acts against presidents by reacting to public pressure, or whether it is the other way around: that the streets are mobilised when actors in civil society see that a president is weak vis-à-vis congress.

The empirical evidence from this chapter comes from my dataset based on LAWR, and from a case-based analysis of all presidential interruptions in Latin America since 1980.<sup>147</sup> The case-based analysis is gathered in the appendix to this chapter instead of presenting it in this chapter in order to not interrupt the reader from the ongoing argument. All the details in those accounts are not necessary to follow my arguments, but may be consulted for a full account of the interruptions and a full list of references. The goal of this chapter is to identify which actor, congress or the street, was first in demanding the resignation of the president, and to study the interaction

---

<sup>146</sup> Institutional and street challenges are what I refer to, respectively, as horizontal and vertical challenges.

<sup>147</sup> I also base much of my evidence on case-chapters of presidential interruptions to be published in an edited volume on presidential interruptions in Latin America (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), secondary sources in the form of academic books and articles are listed in the list of references and cited throughout, and I have used Latin America Data Base which publishes NotiSur and NotiCen for additional journalistic accounts of the events, see LADB (2009): <http://ladb.unm.edu/>.

between the two political arenas in order to address the institutions vs. street debate. Finally, the analysis serves to identify the *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions.

***A short theoretical recap: the institutional-societal debate***

It should come as no surprise that institutions could be important in removing a democratically elected president. After all, in presidential democracies congress, sometimes together with judicial bodies, is the institution with the right to remove a president in case the president is involved in impeachment-qualifying behaviour.<sup>148</sup> More surprising, however, might be the role of civil society and street actions in the removal of presidents. Non-institutional actors clearly have no formal or legal role in the premature removal of presidents, or executives in other regimes, from office. On the other hand, a president is not likely to resign from office without the presence of external pressures, be that congressional, street-based or military. Politicians, after all, are interested in being elected and re-elected, and are office-seekers (e.g. Geddes 1994: 7-11). Much of political science is based upon this assumption. Whether it is congress or the streets that trigger a presidential interruption is therefore only interesting in terms of the academic debate regarding the importance of institutions for democracy. *Underlying* causes are in my view, more interesting in terms of getting to the real issues of the phenomenon, and Chapter 6 and partly Chapter 7 discuss these underlying causes.

---

<sup>148</sup> For requirements on impeachments, see Pérez Liñán (2007: 140-141).

Linz (1978; 1990; 1994) started a debate on presidential regimes that still has not ended, at least with respect to Latin America.<sup>149</sup> His original argument was that, due to presidentialism's fixed terms and direct elections of the executive and legislative, the regime type would suffer deadlock problems. The fixed terms created rigidity for the institutions, which would make crisis and conflict resolutions more difficult, whereas the direct elections of the executive and legislative would give both president and congress direct, and dual, democratic legitimacy, thus, in case of conflicts between the institutions, it would not be clear who would prevail.<sup>150</sup> Since democratic breakdowns do not occur that frequently in Latin America in recent years, several scholars have changed the dependent variable to presidential interruptions and restarted the debate (e.g. Valenzuela 2004). It was early acknowledged, however, that institutions were at least not the only factor causing the interruptions (Hochstetler 2006), but pure institutional analyses also appeared (Negretto 2006). Hochstetler argued that it was not the institutions, but rather challenges from the streets that interrupted presidencies, and therefore that the mechanisms that have ousted presidents have not been the ones identified by Linz as the perils of presidentialism. Pérez-Liñán (2007) also highlighted street mobilisation as important, and thus with a new, but related, dependent variable, Linz's, sometimes persuasive, arguments did not find empirical support.<sup>151</sup> Defenders of the institutional paradigm, however, have later argued that street challenges alone have not been sufficient to remove presidents (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008), and that institutional

---

<sup>149</sup> For a review, see Elgie (2005).

<sup>150</sup> Other problems were also related to presidentialism, such as lack of incentives for coalition building, the polarisation during elections due to the personal election of the chief executive, weak parties and a myth of strong leadership, see Linz (1994). O'Donnell (1994) later also argued that despite weak leadership, the personal election of presidents helped create strong, decree-happy presidents, which made up a new species of regime, the delegative democracy.

<sup>151</sup> Furthermore it was pointed to the fact that democracies did not break down after presidential interruptions and that procedures chosen for removing presidents were inspired from or equivalent to parliamentary procedures (Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008).

challenges also play an important role. Several case-studies also focus on the role of institutions (e.g. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010; Llanos Forthcoming 2010).

None of the above, however, authors distinguish between what I define as *underlying* and *triggering* causes. I believe that in order to provide good answers to the debate regarding institutions vs. the streets and presidential interruptions, such a distinction is important. In the following pages, I analyse the *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions focusing on vertical vs. horizontal challenges to presidents, in the next chapter I discuss *underlying* causes to interruptions.

### ***Horizontal and vertical challenges and presidential interruptions***

Between 1985 and 2005 there have been 14 interrupted presidents in Latin America,<sup>152</sup> three successful coups including two in semi-presidential Haiti, and several failed coup attempts. My dataset registers 51 country-years with presidential challenges, either horizontal or vertical, during democratic years (see Table 4-10), 40 of these are unique country-years that will be used in the statistical analysis in Chapter 6. Several of these challenges, however, certainly pertain to the same “event”, as for instance the challenges to Bucaram in both 1996 and 1997, and in Table 5-2 below, I operate with 37 registered challenges.

---

<sup>152</sup> Since my dataset ends in 2005 and the analysis ends that year, I exclude from the analysis any challenge and interruption occurring after this year.

Table 5-1: Challenges and interruptions

	Vertical challenge	No vertical challenge
<b>Horizontal Challenge</b>	Siles Zuazo, Bolivia 1984/85 Mesa, Bolivia 2005, Collor de Melo, Brazil, 1992, Bucaram, 1997, Ecuador, Gutiérrez, Ecuador, 2005, Cubas, Paraguay, 1999, Pérez, Venezuela, 1993	
<b>No horizontal challenge</b>	Alfonsín, Argentina 1989, De la Rúa, 2001, Argentina, Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia 2003, Mahuad, 2000, Ecuador, Serrano, Guatemala, 1993?, Fujimori 2000, Peru?	Balaguer, Dom.Rep. 1994/96

Notes: ? refers to fuzzy cases in these categories. Based on dataset from LAWR, and secondary sources, for further details, see the Appendix to this chapter.

Table 5-1 summarises the interrupted presidencies, and presents whether the interruptions were preceded by either vertical or horizontal challenges.<sup>153</sup> The table clearly indicates that vertical and horizontal challenges seem to affect the survival of presidents, and *trigger* interruptions. The table also displays that six presidencies were prematurely terminated after only vertical challenges, seven after both vertical and horizontal challenges, and no interruption was triggered by a horizontal challenge alone. As such, my data confirm Hochstetler's (2006) findings. Finally, one presidency ended prematurely without any vertical or horizontal challenge, this is the fall of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer, whose membership in the category of presidential interruption can be questioned (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), was indeed challenged, but not by congress or actors in the streets (see chapter 7 for further discussion).<sup>154</sup> Two cases are registered as fuzzy cases, these are the

<sup>153</sup> As a reminder: By challenges I refer to anti-government protests in the streets that states the demand of presidential removal as the primary motivation for the protests, and congressional attempts to remove the president as for instance a motion to start impeachment procedures. The latter is somewhat broader than both Hochstetler and Pérez-Liñán who both insist on impeachment or impeachment-like procedures to have been initiated.

<sup>154</sup> The principal reasons for questioning Balaguer's fall as a presidential interruption is that Balaguer completed his constitutionally altered term, and that by being fraudulently elected his regime should not qualify as a democracy. Furthermore, the case appears in the cell with no challenges, which goes against the theoretical expectations of presidential interruptions.



cases of Serrano and Fujimori, but both are registered as only being preceded by vertical challenges. Serrano is fuzzy because there were no challenges registered before his *autogolpe*, and after the *autogolpe* till his ouster, the most important challenge came from elites outside the institutions, namely CACIF, the military, and from international organisations and foreign countries. In the case of Fujimori, the vertical challenge was *La marcha de los cuatro suyos* on July 28, and another challenge is registered in September. These, however, could not have *triggered* Fujimori's resignation as late as November. Congress also comes close challenging Fujimori, but never officially did. In Peru, international pressure was also mounting for reforming the Peruvian democracy, and shortening Fujimori's presidency. To conclude, table 5-1 supports Hochstetler's arguments: In terms of *triggering* causes, vertical challenges are more important than horizontal challenges as *triggers* for presidential interruptions.

**Table 5-2: Challenges, interruptions and failures**

	Street based	Street and Institutions	Institutions	None
<b>Interrupted</b>	Alfonsín, 1989, De la Rúa, 2001, Argentina, Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia 2003, Mahuad, 2000, Ecuador, Serrano, Guatemala, 1993? Fujimori 2000, Peru?	Siles Zuazo, Bolivia 1984/85, Mesa, Bolivia 2005, Collor de Melo, Brazil, 1992, Bucaram, 1997, Ecuador, Gutiérrez, Ecuador, 2005, Cubas, Paraguay, 1999, Pérez, Venezuela, 1993		Balaguer, Dom.Rep. 1994/96
<b>Failed challenge</b>	Sarney, 1987, Brazil, Chávez, 2002/03, 04, Venezuela, Noboa, Ecuador, 2000	Gonzalez Macchi, 2001, Paraguay	Paz Zamora, 1990, Bolivia, Cardoso (2), Brazil, 1999, Lula, Brazil, 2005, Samper, Colombia, 1996, 97, Pastrana, Colombia 2000, Roldós, Ecuador 1980, Hurtado, Ecuador 1982, Febres Cordero, Ecuador 1987, Borja, Ecuador 1990, 1992, Chamorro, Nicaragua 1995, Bolaños, Nicaragua, 2004, Wasmosy, Paraguay 1994, Gonzalez Macchi, 2000, 2002/03, Duarte, Paraguay 2005, Fujimori, Peru 1991, (Toledo, Peru 2005)	-
<b>N: 14/37</b>	6/10	7/8	0/19	1/?

Notes: Toledo 2005 not registered in LAWR based dataset, but added from Keesing's Record of World Events Volume 51, May, 2005 Peru, Page 46617 (Keesings 2009), and is therefore in brackets. I exclude caretaker presidents. Question marks refer to fuzzy cases. One caretaker president has been challenged, Duhalde in Argentina in 2003. If years separated by forward slash, then the challenge is counted as one that occurs in both years, if years separated by comma the challenges are separate events.

Table 5-2 compares successful with non-successful challenges of presidents in Latin America. All in all, for this analysis I register 37 challenges to presidents in the region,<sup>155</sup> 14 of which have been successful. The ratios of failed to successful

<sup>155</sup> In this count I merge several challenges that belong to the same "event" even though they may occur in two different years in the dataset, and challenges that occurred at the same time are counted as one, not two. These factors explain the difference between the 40 registered country-years with challenges reported in the previous pages and the 37 reported here. In the statistical analysis in the next chapter I use all country-years with registered challenges, for the qualitative comparative analysis in

challenges in Table 5-2 strengthens the impression given in Table 5-1 above. Seven out of eight simultaneous vertical and horizontal challenges ended in presidential interruptions, six out of ten vertical challenges ended in presidential interruptions and zero out of 19 horizontal challenges ended in a presidential interruption. The data also seem to indicate that when there is interaction between horizontal and vertical challenges, presidents are in peril. There is only one case of a failed simultaneous vertical and horizontal challenge, and that is a challenge against President González Macchi in Paraguay in September of 2001. It also seems quite clear that institutions alone are incapable of removing presidents. Finally, Table 5-2 also indicates that vertical challenges alone also display a relatively high success rate with six out of ten challenges ending in interruptions.

Despite some variation between authors on which cases to include,<sup>156</sup> Table 5-2, which compared to Table 5-1 also includes negative, or failed cases, further supports previous research that has argued that particularly non-institutional factors help explain presidential interruptions in Latin America and elsewhere (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008). What can one conclude on the basis of my data with respect to the institutions vs. the streets debate? So far, the cited literature have been correct in pointing out that particularly challenges including actors from civil society seem to be important in bringing about presidential interruptions. The data also indicate that institutions may be important as

---

this chapter, I am not confined to cells in a data matrix created by countries and years, and report only the 37 independent challenges.

<sup>156</sup> Compare with Hochstetler (2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but also with Pérez-Liñán (2007). I am more lenient in including horizontal challenges, but apparently more restrictive in including vertical challenges than the cited literature. The latter might be due to my conscious coding of general level of contention and other types of protests as well, thus only including protests that LAWR reported were demanding as a principal objective the removal of the president. My higher number of congressional challenges might be due to my including all proposals of impeachments, and also proposals of other forms of removing the president. Or, it might be due to my detailed and careful reading of LAWR.

a *triggering* factor. In several statistical studies both horizontal and vertical challenges turn out significant, and my data support this view. The evidence from my data, and my account in the appendix to this chapter, suggest that interaction between the two arenas for presidential challenges clearly is the most efficient way for civilian actors to remove their president. Furthermore, as Hochstetler (2006) points out, institutions alone do not trigger interruptions. No president has been interrupted purely on the basis of a horizontal challenge. However, I would add that my conclusions are restricted to vertical vs. horizontal challenges as *triggering* causes, I discuss the *underlying* causes in chapter 6. The cited authors, however, have not made the distinction between *triggering* and *underlying* causes, and have therefore muddied the waters, which again has made it more difficult to reach an agreement on the issue at hand. In terms of triggering causes, the conclusion seems clear so far. The questions that remain to be answered are which of the challenges tend to appear prior to the other.

### **The primacy of causes: What triggers what?**

Based on the case analysis outlined in the appendix, it is possible to indicate some answers with respect to the primacy of triggering causes. However, in some cases it has been virtually impossible for this author to identify which arena was first to demand the presidential ouster, as the two seem to have acted simultaneously. Each of these cases merits an in-depth case-study in order to identify all details of the cases, something that sadly is far beyond the capacities of this author.

**Table 5-3: A reassessment: What came first? Horizontal or vertical challenges?**

Simultaneous challenges	Horizontal challenge first	Vertical challenge first (or no horizontal challenge)	No horizontal or vertical challenges
Bolivia 1984/85, Ecuador 1997, Ecuador 2005, Venezuela 1993	Brazil 1992, Paraguay 1999,	(Argentina 1989, Argentina 2001), (Bolivia 2003), Bolivia 2005, (Guatemala 1993?), (Ecuador 2000) (Peru 2000)?	Dominican Republic 1994

Notes: Question marks refer to the fuzzyness of the cases. Guatemala 1993 because elites in business and the army seem to have been more important than vertical challenges, and protests seem to have gathered strength only after June 1 when Serrano was ousted, to oust Espina as well. Peru 2000 due to the long time lag between the challenge of Fujimori (*La marcha de los cuatro suyos*), in late July 2000 and his flight to Japan in November the same year.

Table 5-3 is based on, and sums up, my case-based analysis, spelled out in the appendix to this chapter. In four cases I could not distinguish which actor challenged first, these cases are the challenges against Siles Zuazo in Bolivia, Bucaram and Gutiérrez in Ecuador, and Pérez in Venezuela. Congress clearly was the first challenger in two cases (Collor de Melo in Brazil, and Cubas in Paraguay), in seven cases vertical challenges were either prior to (one case) or the only type of challenge to the president (six cases), and finally in the Dominican case there were no explicit vertical or horizontal challenges. Still, the two cases of Fujimori's fall in Peru in 2000, and Serrano's fall in Guatemala in 1993 are fuzzy with respect to these categories, and hard to place correctly.<sup>157</sup>

The cases where horizontal challenges appear first are recognised by various attempts or one continuing attempt, to remove the president by congress. In the Brazilian case, congress investigated and pushed the Collorgate case for several months until street protests challenged the president just prior to the vote in congress. In Paraguay, the killing of Argaña and vertical challenges sped up the process of impeachment of

<sup>157</sup> If coded differently, Serrano could be categorised as both a vertical and horizontal challenge. However, for the Serrano case it might be confusing to decide what to explain: Serrano's *autogolpe*, or its failure?

Cubas, which had been going on in congress for some time. This set of cases fit well with the argument of scandals as *underlying* causes (Pérez-Liñán 2007).

In the cases where vertical challenges appear first, Congress plays a different role. If congress acts at all, it rather *reacts* to what has occurred in the streets. Sánchez de Lozada was removed after more than 20 persons were killed in the protests demanding his ouster. In three other cases Congress did not act, much due to the presidents acting more quickly than congress and resigning before congress was able to impeach or attempt a removal of the president. Alfonsín took most people by surprise and resigned after widespread protests and lootings in the streets. De la Rúa resigned before congress acted after the scandalous killings of protesters in the streets, and Fujimori faxed his resignation from Japan, taking everyone by surprise.<sup>158</sup>

Mahuad, however, was the victim of a coup from below and the military. In the case of Mesa, vertical challenges made him ask Congress twice for a vote of confidence. He succeeded the first time, but not the second time. In this set of cases, vertical challenges “from the streets” lead directly to presidential action, which is to resign. The interruptions therefore may take observers and the societies in which they occur, more by surprise. This set of cases also fit better with Hochstetler’s (2006) argument of street (vertical) challenges being more important than institutional (horizontal) challenges.

In the simultaneous challenges, I have not been able to clearly state from where the challenge came first. The case of Bucaram, although registered as a simultaneous challenge, follows to some degree the same path as the cases of only vertical

---

<sup>158</sup> But as mentioned this is a fuzzy case. Fujimori resigned two months after the last street challenge that I coded in my dataset. It is therefore doubtful that Fujimori’s resignation was triggered by the vertical challenge.

challenges first. The vertical challenge against Bucaram on February 4 pushed congress to oust Bucaram on February 5.<sup>159</sup> In this case, however, congress acted before the president.

The case of Pérez in Venezuela potentially is closer to the cases of horizontal challenges first, since Congress had been trying to impeach Pérez for some time, and found its perfect excuse to impeach the President in November 1992 when the RECADI scandal was exposed. However, Pérez had also been challenged from the streets for some time as well, and this continued during the impeachment proceedings in the Supreme Court and the Senate in the first months of 1993. In Bolivia with Siles Zuazo and in Ecuador with Gutiérrez, congress had been trying and failing for some time to remove the presidents, both their vice-presidents had stated they wanted to take over, and challenges from the streets occurred frequently.

Finally there are some cases that are not clearly preceded by horizontal or vertical challenges. These are cases not explained by the theories and studies of presidential interruptions so far. In the fuzzy cases of Serrano in Guatemala, congressional action, and inaction, caused Serrano to close Congress, whereas the ensuing elite action, supported by some street protesters, outside regular institutions, against Serrano's move, caused Serrano's ouster. In the case of Fujimori, the vertical challenge appeared in late July, whereas Fujimori resigned in November, after having shortened his presidency in a decision made in September. Here it may be doubted that the challenge triggered Fujimori's resignation. Both these cases are thus registered as

---

<sup>159</sup> The killing of a protester in an anti-government demonstration in January also helped spur the challenge on February 4 (LAWR: 97-05).

fuzzy cases, but within the set of cases preceded by vertical challenges. In the Dominican case, no horizontal or vertical challenge is registered at all.

Thus, to fully account for these presidential interruptions, one must also include other factors than vertical and horizontal challenges.

Compared to Tables 5-1 and 5-2, Table 5-3 further supports the importance of vertical challenges, by adding evidence regarding the primacy of the triggering causes.

Vertical challenges appear first in seven of the 14 interruptions, horizontal challenges appear first twice, and in four cases the challenges appeared simultaneously. Since causes must appear before outcomes, sequencing the challenges thus constitutes another small step towards furthering the current state of knowledge in the debate of institutions vs. the streets. In sum, I conclude that the streets are clearly more important than institutions as *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions.

### **Interaction between institutions and streets?**

A pertinent question to ask is what the patterns of interaction between the vertical and horizontal challenges are. Another goal for this chapter was to study the potential interaction between congress and the streets, and this is clearly linked to the sequencing of causes that I displayed in table 5-3. My data, however, are not good enough to come up with any smoking guns of the congressional opposition calling the shots in street challenges, or civil society leaders guiding congress-members in voting on the president's survival. Only a series of case-studies with extensive field research could come up with this kind of evidence, if it exists at all.



Nevertheless, the tables themselves indicate some kind of interaction, given the fact that both types of challenges have preceded seven out of 14 interruptions. The timing of the vertical challenges in the cases where congress was first to challenge the president, and in the simultaneous challenges, is also congruent with the hypothesis of interaction between the two arenas of challenges. In Ecuador (2005), Brazil and Venezuela, vertical challenges appeared when congress or the Supreme Court was about to take the crucial votes regarding the president's survival. Furthermore, in other cases, it has at least been speculated that party leaders actually encouraged the street protests against the presidents.<sup>160</sup> And in the cases of Sánchez and Mesa in Bolivia, it is hard to ignore the fact that coca leader Evo Morales was also the leader of MAS in congress and led attacks both in the streets and in congress against both presidents. Also in the cases without clear horizontal or vertical challenges, a convergence of factors seems to be required for a successful removal of the president. Local opposition aided by international pressure helped oust Serrano and Balaguer.

I think the link and causal mechanism between the two arenas is one that also calls attention to the importance of vertical challenges, and pressure from below. To take one example: In the case of Ecuador and Gutiérrez, Congress failed to get enough votes for its impeachment drive in December of 2004 due to the president's persuasive powers.<sup>161</sup> Febrés Cordero had earlier stated that congress would need the people's help to oust the president (LAWR: 04-21).<sup>162</sup> The reason is simple. A president always has many resources at his or her disposal in order to get support in congress, with popular resentment with congressional-presidential collusion, these

---

<sup>160</sup> These speculations have been discussed especially in the literature on the Argentine interruptions (Malamud 2006).

<sup>161</sup> I write more on presidents' persuasive powers in Marsteintredet (2008a).

<sup>162</sup> This occurred prior to all three presidential interruptions in Ecuador, see Appendix to this chapter.

powers are weakened and congress stands a better chance of obtaining the required majority. In these cases the vertical challenges speed up an already initiated process by demonstrating a president's unpopularity not only in the polls, but also in the streets. Vertical challenges create a sense of urgency upon congress to finally act, and as mentioned, it helps convince wavering congress-members, who have not yet decided whether or not to oust the president, to join the opposition. In all of the cases that also include horizontal challenges, vertical challenges work to make the opposition to the president more cohesive, and muster enough votes in congress to remove the president.

### ***Summary and concluding remarks***

This chapter adds new insight into the institutions vs. the streets debate regarding presidential interruptions by analysing these factors as *triggering* causes. The chapter's appendix also provides a summary based on the first complete case-based comparison of all presidential interruptions in Latin America. The focus in the comparison was solely on the actions in the street and institutions as *triggering* causes. I will discuss the *underlying* causes of presidential interruptions in Chapter 6.

In sum, I find that Hochstetler's argument is supported also by my data. First, I basically replicated Hochstetler's analysis in tables 5-1 and 5-2, and found support for her arguments based on my own data that clearly distinguished between challenges as *triggering* causes and regular horizontal and vertical conflicts as *underlying* causes. Second, by studying which actor (street or congress) acted first and pointing to possible interaction between vertical and horizontal challenges, I added new evidence to the current debate. My evidence basically strengthened the view that vertical

challenges are more important than horizontal challenges as *triggering* causes of presidential interruptions. However, I added that I constrict my conclusions only to *triggering* causes of interruptions. In the next chapter, I briefly also revisit this debate in terms of institutions vs. the streets as *underlying* causes.

## ***Appendix to Chapter 5: Case-based evidence surrounding the presidential interruptions***

### **Presidential interruptions in Latin America: A case-based analysis**

This appendix discusses and analyses all presidential interruptions according to the countries' alphabetic order, starting with the falls of Alfonsín and de la Rúa of the Radical party in Argentina, and ending with the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez of the traditional Acción Democrática in Venezuela. The focus is on horizontal and vertical conflicts and, in particular, challenges, but I also briefly discuss some of the other factors mentioned as potential underlying causes of presidential interruptions in Chapter 2 and Figure 2-3. The empirical analysis and material presented in these pages also form the basis for the qualitative analyses in this chapter, and in Chapter 7, and is mainly based on the same source as my dataset which I presented in Chapter 4, and use for statistical analysis in Chapter 6.

### **The falls of the radicals in Argentina**

The presidential interruptions in Argentina are probably the most analysed of all interruptions in the region (e.g. Auyero 2007; Calvo and Murillo 2005; Llanos 2007; Malamud 2006, 2008; Schamis 2002; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995), especially the fall of President de la Rúa in 2001.

Alfonsín led the first democratic government in Argentina since the early 1970's and managed to preside over democratic elections in April 1989, which gave Menem from the peronist opposition the presidency. The transition period was scheduled for seven

months, at the same time as a deep economic crisis marred the country.<sup>163</sup> Alfonsín therefore wanted to work early with the Menem team to deal with the economy during this transition period, but already a week after the election it was reported that Alfonsín due to his failure to deal with the economic crisis, was ready to hand power over to Menem early (LAWR: 89-21). At first, however, Menem's team did not accept this idea.<sup>164</sup> Just thereafter, on May 23, as a reaction to the economic problems, the social uproar with looting began and lasted until June 2 when a state of siege began taking real effect.<sup>165</sup> There were no demands in congress for Alfonsín's resignation, or any other horizontal conflicts registered during this period. This is not to say that elite behaviour did not form part of either the vertical conflict and challenge, or Alfonsín's decision to retire early. Long before the transition was to take place, Menem had picked his new government team and presented publicly parts of his economic plan. These actions are believed to have uneased the markets and further exacerbated the economic problems at the time. Thus one might also sustain the idea that the Peronists played a game to remove Alfonsín early. The union CGT, a close partner of the Peronist party at the time, finally demanded Alfonsín's early retirement and threatened with taking to the streets (LAWR: 89-24; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995: 232). Alfonsín himself said that the social upheaval gave him no other choice than to accelerate the transfer of power (Alfonsín 2004: 141, 147). On June 12, Alfonsín surprised Menem and his team by declaring that he would step down on June 30, and not on July 30 as previously agreed. Thus in the case of the fall of Alfonsín, high political contention in the streets, a vertical challenge, and potentially elite pressure can be attributed as *triggers* in this case.

---

<sup>163</sup> Inflation reached 3,000% and growth was -7% in 1989 (WDI 2008).

<sup>164</sup> See also Alfonsín's own account (Alfonsín 2004: 140-154).

<sup>165</sup> One might question whether there was a clear motivation among the protesters to remove Alfonsín, I nevertheless, register these protests and lootings as a challenge to Alfonsín,

In 2001 a radical president was again interrupted, this time president de la Rúa leading a coalition government (Alianza) together with the relative newcomer FREPASO (Frente País Solidario). Again the interruption was preceded by looting and social upheaval (Auyero 2007), a vertical challenge, and an economic crisis.<sup>166</sup> As Alfonsín, De la Rúa clearly had problems with congress (Calvo and Murillo 2005), he led a minority coalition government with a PJ (Partido Justicialista, the Peronists) controlled senate. I have registered that horizontal conflicts with congress increased in 2000 and 2001, and reached higher levels than during Alfonsín's rule. Furthermore, the level of social contention in number of vertical conflicts registered in my dataset reached sustained levels not seen since the late 1980s. Congress, however, never challenged de la Rúa or demanded his resignation, its role was more important in the aftermath of the president's resignation (Schamis 2002).<sup>167</sup> It was the social protests demanding the president's resignation with the cry "*Que se vayan todos*" and the violent handling of these vertical challenges ending with more than 20 deaths that triggered de la Rúa's ouster in December of 2001. The people protested against the economic recession and bad decisions on part of the government, one of which had denied people access to their bank accounts. But, the vertical challenges came only after the government had been weakened internally with Vice-President Alvarez's (FREPASO) resignation in the fall of 2000 after the outburst of allegations that members of the Radical Party had bribed various PJ senators to support a labour reform. His resignation came after de la Rúa had promoted several of the politicians who were suspected of bribing the senators, instead of following Alvarez's advice to

---

<sup>166</sup> Inflation, a problem of the 1980's and first half of the 1990's in Latin America was under control, but 2001 was the third consecutive year of negative growth in the country.

<sup>167</sup> It seems clear, though, that the Argentine governors played a more dubious role prior to de la Rúa's ouster (Malamud 2006).

do a house cleaning in the administration. In March of 2001 the coalition split yet again after four ministers resigned in protest over the administration's own economic policies, and later in June the Alianza lost several FREPASO congress members to the opposition. De la Rúa also struggled with congress, and the opposition PJ created problems for the administration on several economic issues by increasing expenditures in the 2001 budget, and rescinding on the economic czar Cavallo's discretionary powers in the fall of 2001.<sup>168</sup> To these problems came a bad electoral result in the fall of 2001, which deprived the Alianza of a plurality in the Lower Chamber and led to the election of Ramón Puerta of the Peronist party as president of the Senate and second in line after president de la Rúa. Congress did not challenge de la Rúa, but the streets did, on the other hand, before that congress did help stumble the administration's dealing with the economy, which again created the vertical challenges. With a country in upheaval, the tragic killing of demonstrators in the streets, another Radical president was left with no other option than to resign and leave the presidency to the peronists.

### **The falls of presidents Siles Zuazo, Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa in Bolivia**

Together with Ecuador, Bolivia is the country that experienced most presidential interruptions during the period under scrutiny here, with three interruptions. Siles Zuazo was forced to call early elections in 1984 and organise these in 1985, Sánchez de Lozada in his second term as president, was convinced by international leaders to leave the presidency after a vertical challenge had ended with the killing of over 20

---

<sup>168</sup> The choice of former economy minister under Menem, Domingo Cavallo, as a "market reassuring" economy minister under de la Rúa also created internal ruffles in the administration, especially with the FREPASO members of the coalition.

people. Mesa, Sánchez's Vice President, resigned in 2005 after offering his resignation to Congress for the second time due to continued vertical challenges.

President Siles Zuazo of the left-wing UDP (Unidad Democrática Popular) came to power in 1982 leading a coalition government with MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria) as the other dominant partner. During his first two years as president Siles was challenged by congress twice (once in 1983, once in 1984), experienced several splits in his coalition, sustained two coup attempts, one of which involved his own kidnapping, was victim of high levels of political protests, twice the levels of Paz Estenssoro who would take over as president in 1985, and in 1984 and 1985 strikes and protests led by the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana) and the CSUTCB (Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) demanded his resignation. As far as the level of social and political contention goes, Bolivia probably scores higher than all other countries in the region, and Siles Zuazo was no exception to this pattern. In my view, horizontal and vertical challenges both played a crucial role in triggering Siles's resignation. Already in November 1983 Vice-President Paz Zamora of MIR colluded with Hugo Banzer of ADN (Acción Democrática Nacionalista) and Víctor Paz Estenssoro (MNR – Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario) to demand Siles's resignation after his administration had submitted a package to congress devaluating the peso, increasing prices on petrol with 200% and scrapping food subsidies (LAWR: 83-46). This created immediate strike reactions, and congress declared the package unconstitutional. In September 1984, the opposition again planted the idea of impeaching the president due to allegations of him arranging a meeting between his government's anti-drug team and known drug traffickers. This challenge did not succeed, but the opposition did not



stop at that. In November 1984, Paz Estenssorro asked Siles to give up his powers to the Supreme Court president, while the MNRI (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario de Izquierda) was planning to submit a motion in congress to remove Siles on a technicality.<sup>169</sup> At the same time the COB challenged Siles from below on his economic policies. Siles's decision to call for early elections came some days after this and probably prevented a formal impeachment attempt. Siles made the decision in the midst of extremely high levels of social contention, frequent strikes, economic crisis and rumours of imminent coups. Again in March of 1985 after more months of strikes and protests, and further splits in the coalition, did the COB and other unions stage a protest in front of the presidential palace to demand Siles's resignation. These latter challenges, however, had the opposite effect as they only postponed the already scheduled early elections. The interruption of Siles was preceded by clear vertical and horizontal challenges, and high levels of social contention in addition to the internal disintegration of the administration. Congress did not vote Siles out, but spurred by disagreements over economic policies, the vertical challenges from the unions and horizontal challenges from congress together *triggered* the fall of Siles.

While the fall of Siles constituted the start of Bolivia's "pacted democracy", the fall of Sánchez de Lozada brought "pacted democracy" to its end.<sup>170</sup> The fall of Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 came after the 2002 election gave good results for two new parties, MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) representing the politically ignored indigenous

---

<sup>169</sup> The argument was that since Siles had been elected originally in 1980 for four years, his term was in reality already over.

<sup>170</sup> Gamarra (1997) coined the term pacted democracy for the political regime in Bolivia since 1985. The term referred to the agreements and deals reached between the three dominant parties, MNR, MIR, and ADN over the negotiations of the presidency in the aftermaths of presidential elections. These negotiations were the results of the peculiar election formula in Bolivia that gave Congress the right to pick the president among the top three, and later top two, candidates in the presidential elections. Gamarra, among others (Jones 1995), argued these pacts led to less inter-institutional conflicts.

population (Madrid 2005a, 2005b), and the populist NFR (Nueva Fuerza Republicana) both getting about 20% of the seats in Congress' Lower Chamber (Singer and Morrison 2004). Sánchez nevertheless was able to create a majority coalition that included his own MNR, MIR, ADN and UCS (Unidad Cívica Solidaridad). Yet in 2003 the coalition experienced both vertical challenges, and the highest level of vertical conflicts since 1996 according to my data from LAWR, and as is known, the government fell after the fatal vertical challenges in October 2003 that left more than 20 people dead. The president, after international mediation, resigned and left the country. Already from the start Sánchez met demands for a constituent assembly from the new parties. This demand was avoided with the inclusion of MIR instead of NFR in the coalition. Other issues, however, would mark Sánchez's short second presidency, like the decision to export natural gas through Chilean ports,<sup>171</sup> and an economic package that hinged on U.S. support, which again depended on the coca eradication efforts of the administration. Already in February 2003 protesters in the streets put the first demands of a shortened Sánchez presidency forward after bloody riots in La Paz, spurred by increased taxes in the budget. This vertical challenge came one month after bloody clashes between the government forces and coca farmers protesting against the government's coca eradication efforts. The coca farmers were joined by unions and workers, and argued already then that if demands were not met, they would demand the resignation of the president. Later in January 2003 Morales also asked for Sánchez's ouster and the resignation of six more ministers. As a result of the La Paz riots, impeachment was also considered, but not attempted, against the president for the government's violent handling of the protests. A reshuffling of the cabinet and the withdrawal of the controversial tax issue saved

---

<sup>171</sup> Highly controversial since the port was in an area of Chile that the country won from Bolivia in the Pacific War in 1879.

Sánchez in this instance. Vertical challenges continued, however, especially in the Chapare region over the economic and coca issues. And in September 2003, challengers in the streets and Evo Morales demanded Sánchez's resignation again, this time on account of gas exports, after Quispe and the CSUTCB had struck and organised road blocks for three continuing weeks already. Again, protests turned bloody and 26 were reported killed in the protests in El Alto (Buitrago Forthcoming 2010), and the initial demands for halting gas exports were superseded by demands of Sánchez's resignation. Vice-President Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for the government, and then NFR withdrew from the coalition and supported the street challengers, and MIR together with NFR demanded a referendum on the gas issue. Even though the OAS initially supported President Sánchez, the president had already lost his administration. Congress was not important in the fall of Sánchez, and there were few direct horizontal conflicts with congress during his presidency.<sup>172</sup> Vertical challenges were all the more important.

The fall of Mesa in 2005 came as a direct result of Congress accepting Mesa's second resignation, or petition of a vote of confidence, in a matter of months. Upon taking over as president after Sánchez de Lozada, Mesa took an above-partisan line for his government reading the moment to be very anti-partisan, at least anti-traditional parties. He got a truce on several issues from MAS and the main unions that had toppled his predecessor, and Mesa yielded to several of the opposition's demands, for instance with regard to the taxing of the gas companies, and agreed to hold a referendum regarding the nationalisation of the gas industry in the country. Though Mesa tried to meet the opposition in congress and the streets halfway, vertical

---

<sup>172</sup> Sánchez de Lozada led a majority coalition government.

conflicts continued at high levels, and horizontal conflicts increased to record levels for Bolivia in my dataset.<sup>173</sup> Protests in the streets now came not only from the new left, but also from regionalists and especially the richer Santa Cruz region that demanded more autonomy and lobbied against the tax increases promised by Mesa. In March of 2005 after having had four of his ministers censured by Congress in January, Mesa offered his resignation to Congress gambling on winning a form of vote of confidence. By trying to get Congress and especially MAS and Evo Morales to reject his resignation, Mesa hoped to quell escalating vertical challenges and protests in several departments of the country. Congress unanimously rejected his resignation, but this did not end the roadblocks, and conflicts with Congress escalated over the highly important hydrocarbons law. Congress passed a heavily amended law, which Mesa hesitated promulgating or vetoing. In the midst of vertical challenges and horizontal conflicts, Mesa again sent his resignation to Congress. This time around Morales and the opposition accepted Mesa's offer, and Mesa resigned.<sup>174</sup> Prior to this Jaime Solares, head of the COB, had also asked for Mesa's resignation (NotiSur 2005a). Congress formally accepted Mesa's resignation through a vote, without directly challenging Mesa. Vertical conflicts and challenges were constant throughout 2005 in Bolivia, with regionalist claims adding to the new left and Morales's demands regarding the hydrocarbon industry adding to pressure from Congress against the President on the same issues. As such, whereas vertical challenges appeared first

---

<sup>173</sup> The increased levels of deadlocks might be due to the fact that even though MIR and NFR stayed in the coalition under Mesa, MNR, Sánchez's party, withdrew and partly blamed Mesa for Sánchez's fall. Thus Mesa's coalition did not enjoy a majority in congress.

<sup>174</sup> Just prior to Mesa's resignation, Morales (MAS) and the president of the CEPB (Confederación de Empresarios Privados en Bolivia) surprisingly agreed on one issue, the demand for Mesa's resignation (LAWR: 05-22). Whether one should categorise Morales's demand for Mesa's resignation as a vertical challenge or a horizontal challenge, is a difficult decision given the fact that Morales led both his party in Congress, but also his party as a social movement in the streets.

against Mesa, it was the interaction between forces inside and outside of congress that *triggered* Mesa's early exit from the Bolivian presidency.

### **The impeachment of President Collor de Melo in Brazil**

Collor de Melo was elected as a political outsider to the presidency in 1989 heading the party he formed that same year, the PRN (Partido de Reconstrução Nacional), as his electoral vehicle. His sudden rise and outsider-status, also helped bring Collor down when the president's brother in May 1992 accused him of being involved in a corruption scheme orchestrated by his former campaign manager, Paulo César Farias, as he in the end was left without political allies (Weyland 1993). According to my data, the level of general street contention or deadlocks were not higher than during the Sarney presidency, but compared to other countries in the region deadlocks in Brazil have tended to be pervasive much due to factors related to the federal- and party systems (e.g. Ames 2001). During his presidency Collor more than Sarney before him, struggled with hyperinflation, which oscillated between 400 and 1,200% yearly between 1989 and 1993 (WDI 2008), and Collor was in frequent conflict with congress over economic policies, wage hikes, and pensions, in addition to being hit by several scandals involving his cabinet members. The conflicts with congress and the bad economy also forced Collor to change his economic team and make failed attempts to broaden his coalition. When the scandal burst in the media, congress was early on the case and started investigating the scandal. At first Collor was kept out of the investigation, but new media exposures, and congress' own investigation, implicated both him and his wife in the report presented in August 1992. From June till the local elections in October, the scandal dominated the media (and the LAWR reports), but it was not until late September that a vertical challenge

appeared. The protests were timed with the scheduled vote in congress, which for the opponents of Collor, it was important to hold before the elections. On September 29, the Lower Chamber voted 441 to 38 votes to suspend Collor for 180 days.<sup>175</sup>

Congress challenged the president before the demonstrations and the vertical challenge. The vertical challenge and Collor's unpopularity, clearly made it easier for Congress to vote against Collor.<sup>176</sup> One cannot know whether congress would have voted the president out of office in the absence of the vertical challenge, but it seems clear that the popular pressure increased as a reaction to the ongoing congressional investigation and media exposés, rather than the other way around.

### **The fall of president Balaguer in the Dominican Republic**

It can be questioned whether the fall of president Balaguer in the Dominican Republic can be defined as a presidential interruption at all (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010).<sup>177</sup> Yet as an incident that breaks with the fixed terms, and the general understanding of presidential regimes, it is, nonetheless, relevant for the discussion at hand, and more importantly, the case satisfies my definition of a presidential interruption. Balaguer fraudulently won the presidential elections of May 1994, but the fraud was discovered and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the opposition. The international observers therefore had no other choice but to condemn Balaguer's victory. Three months later after local and international pressures, Balaguer was forced to agree on a constitutional pact that shortened his (fraudulently won)

---

<sup>175</sup> And later in December the Senate voted 67 to three to go on with the impeachment charges. Collor, however, had tendered his resignation just prior to the senatorial vote.

<sup>176</sup> Early in 1992 only 8% of the population said they supported Collor (LAWR: 92-01).

<sup>177</sup> The reasons are that the regime potentially should not be regarded as democratic given the electoral fraud. Secondly, Balaguer was given two years in power rather than being deprived of two years since he had fraudulently won the elections. And, thirdly, he completed his, altered, term.

presidential term by two years.<sup>178</sup> Balaguer, however, was not forced out by vertical challenges, as these were absent throughout the whole 3 month long debacle, political tension, however was high throughout this period (Graham 2008). Despite a congressional vote to shorten his presidency, Balaguer was not forced out by a horizontal challenge either. The main factor explaining Balaguer's fall, was U.S., OAS, and international pressure on Balaguer to resign (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010). Local negotiations led to the compromise of giving Balaguer two years instead of having to resign immediately.<sup>179</sup> Though the U.S. had initially sought new elections, the country was pleased with a peaceful solution. Congress certainly did vote Balaguer out of office, but cannot be claimed to have played a large role in the process. The main opposition party that was victims of the fraud, the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano), actually ended up abstaining from voting on the constitutional reform that shortened Balaguer's term,<sup>180</sup> whereas Balaguer's party, the PRSC (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano), together with the PLD (Partido de la Liberación Dominicana) voted in favour of the reform. The only reason why PRSC would vote in favour of the reform was the external pressure from the U.S. Thus the fall of Balaguer is a case that is not triggered by vertical or horizontal challenges, and therefore cannot be explained in the nexus between institutions and the streets.

---

<sup>178</sup> For details, see Hartlyn (1994; 1998) and Díaz Santana (1996).

<sup>179</sup> Another reason for Balaguer getting two years instead of being removed immediately is that the opposition was split. The Balaguer case shares many similarities with the colour revolutions in Eastern Europe. One important difference, however, is that while the Dominican opposition to Balaguer was split between the PRD and the PLD, the opposition in the successful colour revolution was united (Bunce and Wolchik 2009). Another reason for Balaguer's deal, is also that the PRD insisted on a constitutional formula, but lacked the votes to implement the one they favoured and to veto one the party would not favour.

<sup>180</sup> The PRD had negotiated an 18 month term for Balaguer, not a full two year term, and was fooled by the PRSC in the hectic moments leading up to the vote in congress. Therefore the party abstained from voting over the reform.

### **The interruptions of Bucaram, Mahuad and Gutiérrez in Ecuador**

Ecuador is the country that in my dataset most clearly demonstrates the perils of presidentialism. Throughout the 25 years that this study covers, Ecuador is the country with most registered horizontal conflicts. Congress time and again censured and removed ministers long before the level of social protests and contention began to rise in the early nineties (Mejía Acosta 2006), and five times between 1980 and 1992 congress attempted to remove the president (without success). The increase in vertical conflicts registered in my dataset in the early nineties and escalating from the mid-nineties, is related to the mobilisation of the indigenous movement, CONAIE (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador) (Zamosc 2007). Despite many horizontal challenges, and inter-institutional conflicts, no president was removed until Abdalá Bucaram who became president in the fall of 1996, was removed by congress on February 6, 1997. Although unpopular before the launch of his economic plan in December, the first deadlocks started to appear right after Bucaram presented his plan, which was very much modelled on Menem's economic package when he became president.<sup>181</sup> The plan united congress against it, and organisations in civil society united against the plan's price hikes and tax increases. In mid-January, after a teacher and student strike, a national protest against Bucaram's economic plan and team was called for February 5, 1997.<sup>182</sup> The protest was originally not intended to remove Bucaram, but was directed against his economic plan (e.g. Pachano 1997: 249), but turned into a vertical challenge after, among others, former presidents Borja and Hurtado called for the ouster of Bucaram. The

---

<sup>181</sup> Domingo Cavallo was called in by Bucaram to design the plan. Cavallo was for several years the finance minister of Menem, and later for a shorter period of President de la Rúa, and one of the designers of Menem's economic package back in 1989. An important part of Bucaram's package was the pegging of the *Sucre* to the US dollar.

<sup>182</sup> Protesters originally called for the reversal of the economic measures, elimination of the increase in fuel prices, the firing of the ministers of education, energy and the *procurador general*, the opposition to the convertibility plan and labour flexibilisation, and respect for the 1995 plebiscite against the privatisation of IESS (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social) (Luna 1997: 207-208).



overwhelming protests on February 5 led congress the next day to vote Bucaram out of office by declaring him mentally incapacitated, a procedure that only required an absolute majority in congress. After some help of persuasion from the army, Bucaram two days later left the presidential palace. In the case of Bucaram, a series of scandals and an apparent failure on his part to be able to govern (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 24-29), together with an extremely unpopular economic package, made people take to the streets to demand his ouster. Congress was clearly important since it voted to remove Bucaram, but did this in reaction to the popular mobilisation the day before, in contrast to Collor's impeachment where congress acted first and people mobilised thereafter.<sup>183</sup>

Jamil Mahuad was elected president in 1998 and removed through a civil-military coup in January of 2000. The coup was short-lived since the coup makers did not manage to stay in power, but for Mahuad it marked the end of the road as president. 1999 was a bad year economically with a negative growth of 6% and the Sucre depreciated substantially against the dollar. In his State of the Nation speech to Congress on January 15, 2000, Mahuad characterised 1999 for the most dramatic year in the 20<sup>th</sup> century for Ecuador (Hernández et al. 2000: 224). Congress and Mahuad fought many battles, especially with regard to the economy and measures to please the IMF, and the horizontal and vertical conflicts reached levels not seen since 1994 (according to my dataset). There were no challenges to the president in 1999, but former President Borja did ask for Mahuad's resignation already in mid 1999 (LAWR: 99-27) due to his unpopularity and his inability to deal with the economy, and earlier in the year protests had forced the resignation of Fidel Jaramillo,

---

<sup>183</sup> For an interesting parallel account to Weyland's (1993) account of the rise and fall of Collor, see Pachano (1997) for the rise and fall of Abdalá Bucaram.

Mahuad's finance minister. So when Mahuad on January 9 of 2000 declared a state of (economic) emergency and decided to dollarise the economy as an answer to the Sucre's depreciation against the dollar, economic retraction and crisis, protests spurred immediately. The CONAIE demanded the ouster of all institutions, and set up "parliaments" to take over. Congress, which had for quite some time created problems for Mahuad's economic plans, did not trigger Mahuad's ouster. CONAIE, which only had grown in importance since the early 1990's, allied with mid-rank military officers to topple Mahuad. On January 21, before 10 in the morning more than 1,000 persons occupied congress, and declared the closure of the three powers of state. International actors, like the OAS, condemned the coup and asked for constitutional and democratic solutions. The military leadership then condemned the coup attempt themselves, but, nevertheless, asked for Mahuad's resignation to meet the demands of the people. Mahuad resigned, and two successive government juntas ruled for some hours. The last junta was headed by the head of the army, General Mendoza, who surprised everybody by resigning after just a couple of hours, stating that his mission was completed as vice-president Noboa was in Quito and ready to take over power. The next day, congress convened, condemned the coup, but ratified Mahuad's ouster by declaring his abandonment of power, and ratified Vice-President Noboa as President. More clearly than in the case of Bucaram, vertical challenges *triggered* Mahuad's fall, and this time congress only acted after Mahuad had *de facto* been removed from power.<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>184</sup> Another way of seeing this is to argue that congress created so many problems through gridlocking the government in economic and other matters, and thus worsened the economic crisis, which finally led to the challenge that ousted Mahuad. For more on congress' role in the interruption of Ecuadorean presidents, see Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich (Forthcoming 2010).

Lucio Gutiérrez was one of the leading military coup makers against Mahuad in 2000, but after some time in jail, as Hugo Chávez had before him, he came back and won the presidency through democratic elections. Gustavo Noboa, Mahuad's vice-president, ruled until elections were held in 2002, and Gutiérrez took over on January 15, 2003. Gutiérrez, supported by the indigenous Pachakutik party, and the leftist MPD (Movimiento Popular Democrático), won the elections as the candidate of the PSP (Partido Sociedad Patriótica). There were very few horizontal and vertical conflicts registered in my dataset for his first year in power, but Gutiérrez's coalition of indigenous and leftist forces split in August 2003 when Pachakutik left the government. Pachakutik called Gutiérrez a traitor for having followed neo-liberal policies and sought agreements with the IMF. And, in mid 2004, Gutiérrez was challenged from the streets, and congress also started considering how to impeach or remove the president. Furthermore, Gutiérrez's vice-president, Alfredo Palacio, shook the boat and said he was ready to take over in case Gutiérrez was ousted (LAWR: 04-17). Febrés Cordero, leader of the PSC (Partido Social Cristiano) and former president stated that congress would need the people's help to remove Gutiérrez (as had been necessary in the cases of Bucaram and Mahuad). Congress, however, lacked the votes to impeach the president, and the attempts failed on procedural issues and on what charge one should attempt to remove Gutiérrez (LAWR: 04-21).<sup>185</sup> CONAIE also challenged the president through organising an uprising against Gutiérrez, which failed, and also marked the weakening of that organisation (Zamosc 2007: 14-15). Gutiérrez was also weakened already from the start of his presidency, due to scandals related to the funding of his campaign (LAWR: 04-22; Saad Herrería 2005: 39-41),

---

<sup>185</sup> Pachakutik wanted Gutiérrez tried for treason, Febrés Cordero and the PSC wanted to declare that he had abandoned his post since he left the country for a EU-Latin America summit without congress' approval, and DP (Democracia Popular) and ID (Izquierda Democrática) wanted him removed because of ineptitude, i.e. charges similar to the one against Bucaram.

and in order to shield his presidency from the impeachment threat, Gutiérrez sought a deal with non other than the PRE (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana), Abdalá Bucaram's party. As a part of that deal, the return of Abdalá Bucaram seemed to be included and Gutiérrez met with Bucaram in Panamá where Bucaram was exiled after having been convicted (*in absentia*) for corruption in Ecuador. Febrés Cordero and the PSC and the Pacakutik immediately (in September 2004) again threatened with impeachment. To uphold the deal with the PRE, Gutiérrez had to make Bucaram's conviction disappear. Therefore, Gutiérrez sought to reform and remove the Supreme Court and replace it with a more politically compliant one. At first, in October 2004, he sought mere reforms to depoliticise the Supreme Court, which failed to be supported by congress. Then, after his party only received about 5% of the votes in the local elections in October, Gutiérrez barely survived an impeachment vote as the PSC, Pachakutik, ID and MPD lacked three votes to start the impeachment procedures.<sup>186</sup> With a newly won majority Gutiérrez and congress quickly moved to remove the Supreme Court in December 2004, and replace the court with new, more pliant members, and in January 2005, despite the lack of quorum, Gutiérrez's supporters elected a new leadership of congress. Both moves were largely believed to help Gutiérrez get Bucaram back to the country. Even though the new majority and Supreme Court were less pliant and robust than Gutiérrez had expected, and street protests picked up during the first months of 2005,<sup>187</sup> Bucaram was allowed to return as the new Supreme Court annulled all court actions against Bucaram in late March. As vertical challenges increased in number and level, Gutiérrez in a desperate attempt

---

<sup>186</sup> Rumours of corruption and buying of legislators surrounded this vote, as one member from each of the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik voted with Gutiérrez, thus leaving the opposition with only 48 of the 51 votes required (NotiSur 2004).

<sup>187</sup> From LAWR I did not register any street challenges before April 2005, but NotiSur reports of street challenges in February that year. These were only registered as street protests in my dataset (see NotiSur 2005b).

to stay in power, removed the new Supreme Court, and called for a state of emergency, banning street protests in Quito. In the end, this did not help him as protests mounted in several cities in the country, all challenging the president, culminating on April 19 and 20. Congress then reacted on April 22, and with 60 votes declared that the president had abandoned his post and failed to perform his duties as president, and the army declared it had withdrawn its support for the president in order to ensure public safety. In sum, the rally to remove Gutiérrez already in 2004 organised in Congress and by CONAIE in the streets, in December the same year the challenges re-emerged, but failed due to internal disagreements and lack of cohesiveness in Congress. Finally vertical challenges spurred the opposition in Congress into action again. The vertical challenges removed the president's legislative shield, and together with the horizontal challenge *triggered* Gutiérrez's ouster.

### **Serrano's failed Autogolpe in Guatemala**

Serrano's fall in Guatemala in May 1993 is a special case as it is the case of a failed *autogolpe*. Had Serrano succeeded he would, like Fujimori a year before, have ended the young democracy in Guatemala. He failed, and was removed, thus his case constitutes an interrupted presidency. Although in 1992 both Nobel Peace Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú and the Human Rights *Ombudsman* Ramiro de León Carpio had warned that a coup could occur in Guatemala (LAWR: 92-18, 92-21, 92-38), people were taken by surprise when Serrano declared his *autogolpe* on May 25, 1993. Serrano stated his move was necessary to cleanse the institutions of the country from corruption.<sup>188</sup> LAWR did not report of any challenges to the president before the

---

<sup>188</sup> For his speech in defence of his *autogolpe*, see INCEP (1993: 33-40)

*autogolpe*, and only of very few horizontal or vertical conflicts. Still, Serrano's move had been preceded by strong reactions to rises in the electricity rates, leaving several dead after demonstrations, and bringing the president on the brink of declaring a state of emergency (LAWR: 93-21). Just before Serrano's move, he was threatened by impeachment as Rodrigo Rosales of Acción Civica was ready to present a list of 5,000 signatures to congress demanding Serrano's ouster (LAWR: 93-22).<sup>189</sup> And it is believed that Serrano's problems with congress was what triggered his *autogolpe* (Christensen Bjune and Petersen Forthcoming 2010; Villagrán de León 1993; Beltranena de Padilla 2009). Serrano, however, had failed to consult the move sufficiently with the army, and another powerful institution in the country, CACIF (Comité Coordinadora de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras). The latter, in the face of increasing international pressure against the coup, saw it in its best interest to attempt to stop the coup. Popular protests in the streets also increased against the coup and turned into a challenge against Serrano, and civil society united to lay plans for the ouster of Serrano. Through several attempts to unite, the *Instancia Nacional de Consenso* emerged as a forum joining unions, business, civil society organisations and parties in opposition to Serrano. When international reactions became clear (INCEP 1993), and it finally became clear that both CACIF and the army would not support Serrano, Serrano withdrew from power on June 1, and after a failed attempt by his Vice-President Espina to take power, Congress elected Human Rights *Ombudsman* Ramiro de León Capiro suggested by the *Instancia*, as president. Although challenges did occur against the coup, the available accounts of its failure focus more on the elite behaviour within civil society than the movements in the streets. International reactions, the military

---

<sup>189</sup> Not registered as a challenge as nothing more came out of this other than some media attention surrounding the handing over of these signatures to Congress.

leadership, new democratic institutions and leaders of organisations in civil society all seem to have played important roles to return the regime back to democracy during the weeks of uncertainty in late May-early June. Congress, on the other hand, did not play any important role at all, some congress members supported the coup, and congress as an institution did not defend itself when Serrano dissolved it. The lack of clear challenges makes me describe the case as fuzzy with respect to whether it was the institutions or the streets that challenged Serrano. Ironically, de León Carpio would spend much of the rest of his presidency trying to clean congress of corrupt elements and remove all legislators, which was what Serrano had failed to do.

### **The killing of a Vice-President: The impeachment of Cubas in Paraguay**

Paraguay is the country with most congressional attempts at presidential interruptions registered in my dataset, and considering that the country only entered the dataset in 1990, this demonstrates a high level of contention between the two elected institutions. In 1994 Argaña attempted to impeach president Wasmosy, but the motion was stopped on a technicality (LAWR: 94-47, 94-48). In August-September of 1998, following President Cubas's decision to commute former coup general Oviedo's prison sentence, congress attempted to impeach the president.<sup>190</sup> Oviedo had originally sought the presidential nomination, but even though he was declared winner of the primaries in the Colorado party, he was prevented from running. Cubas ran in his stead with Argaña as vice-presidential candidate.<sup>191</sup> Owing his presidency to

---

<sup>190</sup> For Oviedo's coup, see Valenzuela (1997). Originally General Oviedo had been a strong supporter of Wasmosy when Wasmosy lost to Argaña in the primaries of the Colorado party in 1992/93. After internal quarreling in the party, Wasmosy with Oviedo's support, got the presidential nomination of the Colorado party and won the presidency.

<sup>191</sup> Originally Oviedo had appointed Cubas as his Vice-presidential candidate, and when Oviedo could not run, Cubas took over the presidential candidacy with the loser of the primaries, Argaña, as vice-presidential candidate.

Oviedo, Cubas promised to pardon Oviedo, but by doing so he provoked an impeachment attempt against him. The Supreme Court, however, turned down Cubas's Decree 117 that freed Oviedo, and Cubas said he did not accept the Supreme Court's ruling. Congress thus moved to impeach the president again, taking up the charges of August, 1998, but uncertainty reigned whether the opposition had sufficient votes to successfully remove Cubas. Congress then moved to change some internal rules in order to achieve a majority, and when it was certain it had sufficient votes, it set the date for the impeachment trial (Abente-Brun 1999). A week later, on March 23, Vice-President Argaña was murdered, and vertical challenges to Cubas emerged between the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of March. Congress then on March 24 sped up the impeachment proceedings after having obtained the required 2/3 majority, and also attempted via international mediators, to persuade Cubas to resign as soon as possible. After losing both in the streets and in congress, Cubas decided to flee the country on Sunday, March 28, a day before the scheduled vote in the Senate which would have removed him as president. Thus, Congress clearly began this battle against president Cubas, and, according to Abente-Brun (1999), had gathered sufficient votes for a successful impeachment attempt before the killing of Argaña.<sup>192</sup> Both vertical and horizontal challenges after the killing of Argaña, nevertheless, made congressional opposition to Cubas more cohesive, and *triggered* Cubas's ouster.

### **The fall of Fujimori in Peru**

Fujimori was elected president in 1990 after beating the world-famous author Mario Vargas Llosa in the second round of the presidential election that year. If the election of the outsider and populist Fujimori was surprising and controversial, his 10 years in

---

<sup>192</sup> This slight impeachment majority could of course have been turned around by the president's persuasive powers as was the case with Gutiérrez.



power would be even more controversial and create considerable international attention.<sup>193</sup> In a short time after his election Fujimori ended the war with Sendero Luminoso, balanced the budget, got control of the hyperinflation created under his predecessor Alan García (APRA – Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), and created macro-economic growth (Cheibub 2006; WDI 2008). After Congress had considered removing Fujimori in December 1991 and censured several of his ministers, Fujimori in April of 1992 closed congress and the judiciary in an *autogolpe*. After the return to some sort of democratic rule, Fujimori was re-elected in 1995, and after much politico-judicial manoeuvring he was able to run for a third term in 2000, an election he won after his opponent Alejandro Toledo of Perú Posible withdrew from the second round. Fujimori's fall was preceded by a regime scandal, which demonstrated the high level of corruption in the regime installed by Fujimori. The Vladivideos, after the leader of SIN (Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional) Vladimiro Montesinos, showed how the Fujimori side had been buying members of congress to win a majority (see especially Cameron 2006). Already facing problems of low popularity, and meeting international pressure to democratise, the Vladivideos and the popular pressure created by them, made Fujimori agree on early elections as a way out of the crisis. The highly unpopular Montesinos fled the country, and the OAS was present to help Fujimori redesign and improve democracy in the country. However, already before the videos were made public in September, Fujimori met resistance. In June congress discussed how to remove Fujimori, a futile attempt since Fujimori still enjoyed a majority. The regime, however, quickly dissolved from that moment as congressional and societal protests increased in numbers and intensity. In

---

<sup>193</sup> And, also considerable academic attention: Fujimori's rise and fall is analysed heavily (Weyland 2006). See e.g. Carrión (2006), and Cameron and Mauceri (1997), in addition to numerous works on populism and competitive or electoral authoritarianism using Fujimori and his regime as an important case.

July when Fujimori was sworn in, 100,000 were gathered in Lima to challenge Fujimori (*La marcha de los cuatro suyos* organised by Toledo), and Fujimori had to shout his inauguration speech due to booing in congress (LAWR: 00-30). In September the Vladivideo of congressman Kouri being bribed was released, and Fujimori announced early elections and sought to remove Montesinos. Later the same month Fujimori lost his majority, Congress voted to disband SIN and unions asked for Fujimori's immediate resignation (LAWR: 00-39). After some disagreements, a new election for April 2001 was agreed upon in October. In November, however, the congressional majority removes the president of Congress, Martha Hildebrandt, a staunch Fujimori supporter, and there is talk of removing Fujimori on account of him lacking the moral capacity to rule the country (LAWR: 00-43). A week thereafter, on November 20, Fujimori, during a trip to Japan, faxed his resignation to Congress. Congress did not accept the resignation, and, instead, the next day Congress declared the presidency vacant and abandoned due to Fujimori's moral incapacity. There was never any horizontal challenge towards the president, Fujimori in any case pre-empted any such decision by his resignation. There was indeed an increasing congressional opposition to Fujimori, which started simultaneously with the vertical challenge at Fujimori's inauguration for his third term. On the other hand, there were not any vertical challenges registered in the immediate period before Fujimori's resignation, and it is therefore doubtful that a challenge actually *triggered* his ouster. In the period between July and mid-November, increasing congressional pressures is what I have registered from the accounts in LAWR.

### **The impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela**

Carlos Andrés Pérez (hereafter: CAP) returned to the presidency of Venezuela in 1989 for AD (Acción Democrática), after having been a successful president in the 1970's, during a period of oil-price bonanza for the oil-exporting country. The fall of CAP has generally been linked with the fall of the Punto Fijo democracy installed in 1958, the breakdown of the Venezuelan party system, and the rise of Hugo Chávez (Lalander Forthcoming 2010). There were extremely few horizontal conflicts registered before CAP took over power, and only a few vertical conflicts registered during the last couple of years of his predecessor's presidency, president Lusinski. In 1989 CAP took over a country in bad economic shape with 8% negative growth and a yearly inflation of 88% (WDI 2008). Like Menem and Fujimori, CAP quickly broke with his campaign promises and launched vast neo-liberal reforms (Stokes 2001), dubbed locally as *El gran viraje*. In February 1989 CAP presented his package, and immediate protests and vertical challenges ensued. Congress marked its disapproval of CAP's proposal by voting other projects down, and what has been known as the Caracazo erupted (LAWR: 89-10).<sup>194</sup> Social protests continued also in 1990 and Congress was more defiant than under his predecessors. In 1992 CAP also had to endure two coup attempts in February (led by Hugo Chávez) and in November (led by a group of generals), but survived them both. The same year also saw an increase (again) in horizontal and vertical conflicts, and challenges appeared as early as March 1992 after CAP had been forced to reshuffle his cabinet. *Cacerolazos* and protesters in the streets demanded his resignation, and Congress considered shortening his term with one year (LAWR: 92-11, 92-12), a motion that was finally defeated in August 1992. It was not until November 8 that the scandal that would cause CAP's impeachment, became public. At that time it became known that just before

---

<sup>194</sup> For the Caracazo, see e.g. López Maya (2003).

abolishing RECADI (Oficina del Régimen de Cambios Diferenciales) in February 1989, approximately 250 million Bolivares had been exchanged for US dollars from a presidential fund (Lalander Forthcoming 2010). Only four days before this became public, the Senate had again attempted to shorten CAP's term, this time passing a proposal with a majority vote to that effect (NotiSur 1992; LAWR: 92-45). This was rejected by CAP, but after the RECADI scandal burst, the Senate decided to go ahead with impeachment proceedings instead (LAWR: 92-47), the November coup failed, and AD did horribly at the local and regional elections. The AD then started discussing whether or not to continue (half-heartedly) supporting CAP or abandon him. In March 1993, the attorney general decided to send the CAP case to the Supreme Court and students led on in a vertical challenge against the president (LAWR: 93-13). On May 20 the Supreme Court decided that there was sufficient evidence to try CAP, and the day after Senate decided to remove the president's immunity, which automatically suspended CAP from his office, and ended his presidency. On August 31 congress finally voted to remove the president from office justifying the decision by saying that the constitution only allowed for a maximum 90 days leave of absence (NotiSur 1993). Congress started the process of finding an end to CAP's presidency in March 1992 at the same time as vertical challenges were noted in the streets. From the outburst of the embezzlement crisis, congress was first in its demand for CAP's ouster. Protests ensued throughout that year and the next, and Congress continued challenging CAP until finding the perfect excuse with the mismanagement of funds and embezzlement. There were no vertical challenges when the Senate held its final vote, as there were no challenges when Fujimori fled Peru. Yet both congress's insistence on removing CAP together with the vertical challenges and general societal pressures seem to have *triggered* the impeachment of CAP.

## **Chapter 6 : The Underlying Causes of presidential interruptions**

### ***Introduction***

The research on presidential interruptions has only recently begun to deal with the *underlying* causes of presidential interruptions. Partly distorted by the institutionalist vs. street debate discussed in chapter 5, few scholars have moved beyond triggering causes of presidential interruptions. Only recently some authors have focused on underlying, and structural causes such as economic and social factors, level of democracy, and neoliberal policies (Alvarez and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010; Edwards 2007; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008).

This chapter focuses on the underlying causes of presidential interruptions and move beyond *triggering* causes such as horizontal challenges, votes in congress and vertical challenges. In the subsequent statistical analysis, I have two goals. First, I further discuss the debate of institutions vs. the streets, but this time I focus on horizontal and vertical conflicts as *underlying* causes, and not as *triggering* causes.<sup>195</sup> The results are quite the opposite from the ones in Chapter 5, since I find that horizontal conflicts, in the literature generally referred to as deadlocks, is a significant predictor of interruptions and challenges, whereas general vertical conflicts, i.e. strikes, demonstrations, *cacerolazos*, roadblocks, etc. is not significant. Recall that in chapter 5 I found that vertical *challenges* were more important than horizontal *challenges* in *triggering* interruptions.

Since these results are quite contradictory to our general knowledge of interruptions and challenges to presidents, I further unravel the variable of general conflicts, excluding challenges, into different types of conflicts depending on which cleavage

---

<sup>195</sup> Recall the distinction I made in Chapter 4 between challenges, i.e. conflicts with the expressed goal of presidential removal, and other, regular conflicts with political and social content.

motivated the conflict, and which organisation was the primary organiser of the conflict. These variables of conflicts are proxies that aim to measure the emergence, and importance of different cleavages in the countries being studied. The second goal is therefore to analyse what types of societal mobilisation explain presidential interruptions. My focus is on conflicts mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages, and my statistical analyses support the hypothesis that conflicts mobilised on new, and emerging cleavages have a significant and positive relationship with the dependent variables interruptions and challenges. Furthermore, I find that conflicts mobilised by the traditional left-right cleavage does not explain interruptions or challenges, and that this explains why vertical conflicts turned out to be insignificant. To substantiate these results I perform some comparative process tracing and link my findings to other important, and much discussed developments in Latin America, such as the rise of the new left(-s), indigenous parties, and a discussion of whether or not civil society is weakened in the region.

This chapter continues as follows. First, I make a detour arguing for why it is important to study *underlying* causes, and situate the causes of presidential interruption within a broader context of causality in the social sciences in general. Second, I use statistical to analyse which underlying factors cause challenges and interruptions. The first part of this section revisits the institutions vs. the streets debate at the level of underlying causes, the second looks beyond this debate and focuses on the emergence of new cleavages as a causal factor. In the final part of this section, I use process tracing to link my findings to recent developments in countries in Latin America that have experienced interruptions, and substantiate my findings. In the third, and final, section, I provide some tentative explanations as to why groups

representing new and emerging cleavages attempt to remove democratically elected presidents prematurely. I focus on three factors: access to arenas of mediation, understandings of democracy, and political history.

***Causes in the social sciences and causes of presidential interruptions: A case for underlying causes***

Why study underlying causes? This question motivates this section of the chapter. I argue that it is important to analyse underlying causes to avoid the “immediacy trap”, endogeneity problems, and shallow explanations. And I show that several of the studies on presidential interruptions fall prey to these problems.

“Statistical Models are incomplete by themselves...since they ultimately have to rely on intuitions about plausible causal *mechanisms*.” (Elster 2007: 8). These words from Elster highlight one of the great schisms in comparative politics (and probably the social sciences). Statistical models point to explanatory factors that on average increase or decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of our dependent variable (or the increase or decrease in the level of our dependent variable), after controlling for the effect of other explanatory variables.<sup>196</sup> The explanatory factors in statistical models are somewhat distanced from the dependent variable,<sup>197</sup> and generally do not refer to the mechanisms by which the outcome of interest are produced. Thus, statistical models often leave a black box that is only treated by (qualified) speculations of how the significant explanatory variables might actually go about to produce the outcome of interest. To properly demonstrate that the significant results in our statistical

---

<sup>196</sup> For a short presentation of causality in case-based vs. population-based social science, see e.g. Mahoney (2008)

<sup>197</sup> In time since *explanans* should occur prior to the *explanandum*, but also in terms of constituting distinct factors so as to avoid tautologies, or self-evident explanations.



models are more than mere correlations (even when controlled for other factors), this black box should be opened. In general there are two ways to “open” this black box. One can either point to some general laws of human and social behaviour (Hempel 1942), or one can try to pinpoint a causal chain and trace the processes between the *explanans* and *explanandum* (Elster 1989, 2007; George and Bennett 2005).<sup>198</sup> The latter strategy, although guided by theory, is much more empirically oriented than the first strategy.<sup>199</sup> Opening the black box helps explain *why* questions, and also *how* questions, related to the *because* or *how much* statement that follows for instance a statistical model (Mooney Marini and Singer 1988: 364-366), and helps to accept the causal statements in statistical analyses. Process tracing, however, focuses on a set of explanatory variables that are much closer to the dependent variable, and factors that point to the mechanism(-s) that produce the outcome of interest. As may have become clear from the above description, the causal chain explanations complement statistical analyses, or vice-versa.<sup>200</sup>

Pierson (2003; 2004) discusses a related, yet different topic of how important social processes take a long time to develop and by focusing only on immediate, *triggering* factors, social scientists lose a big part of the causal picture. Cumulative causes, threshold effects, and causal chains might develop over a long time to produce certain social phenomena such as revolutions, distinct party systems, democracy, etc. Think only of Stein Rokkan’s various descriptions of the development of party systems and

---

<sup>198</sup> George and Bennett use the concept of process tracing for what Elster (1989) calls causal mechanism, but which he later (Elster 2007: 32) calls causal chains. The latter concept is more in line with George and Bennet’s understanding of process tracing.

<sup>199</sup> To avoid referring to opaque general laws, Elster (2007: 36-37) suggests focusing on what he now understands as causal mechanisms, which refer to generally occurring patterns that often may find their explanations in psychological human mechanisms.

<sup>200</sup> See Gerring (2007), who argues that case-selection mechanisms should complement findings in more broader analyses, and follow from how your case is identified compared to other cases.

cleavages in Europe, in which the starting point of his analyses is situated about 1,000 years ago (e.g. Rokkan 1968; Rokkan et al. 1975). Pierson's argument counters what might be seen as a trend in comparative politics of focusing too much on immediate, and triggering causes, instead of long-term developments (Pierson 2004). Following Przeworski and Teune (1970), I would argue that the strength of statistical analyses, and in part studies following the classical comparative logic, is highest when one can show statistically significant correlation in the most challenging of circumstances. For Przeworski and Teune this meant studying causal factors and their effects on the dependent variable of interest in the most diverse circumstances possible, their logic of Most Different Systems Design.<sup>201</sup> If the relationship between the variables is significant across a variety of different cultures, regions, etc. it is stronger than if you only study them in systems that do not differ that much.<sup>202</sup> The analogy to Pierson is that Przeworski and Teune's view would translate into studying explanatory factors that might have occurred a long time before the outcome of interest occurred.

I will not follow Rokkan's *longue durée* historical analysis, but I agree with Pierson's critique, and would like to add that it is especially relevant for statistical studies that focus on explanatory variables that are very close to the *explanandum*. In these cases, statistical analyses often resort to "shallow" explanations that are near tautological, over *underlying*, and (often) structural causes (Pierson 2003: 199). This often occurs when statistical analyses focus on independent variables (processes or events) close to

---

<sup>201</sup> This view is contrary to the conclusion of John Stuart Mill, and most of the writing on comparative logic today, of his two methods of comparative logic (Mill 1868; Ragin 1987). The general conclusion is that the Indirect Method of Difference (Most Similar Systems Design) is a stronger investigative method than the Method of Agreement (Most Different Systems Design), since it is more similar to the experiment. Przeworski and Teune, however, argue for combining Most Different Systems Design with multi-level analysis, which in their view, strengthens their preferred investigative method.

<sup>202</sup> The reader might here argue that I do not follow up on Przeworski and Teune's argument as I only study cases of Latin America. For the reasons for the limitation of geographical scope, see the Introduction.

the dependent variable in time (what I call the *immediacy trap*), or close conceptually (almost full tautologies), in order to generate statistically significant correlations between the independent and dependent variables.<sup>203</sup> These variables are much more interesting to study as causal mechanisms and approach with “how” and “why” questions relating to the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables, rather than “how much” the explanatory variable correlates with the dependent variable. Therefore, these variables that constitute causal mechanisms are better studied with process tracing than statistical or comparative analysis.

The reason I find the lack of distance between the *explanans* and *explanandum* a particular problem in statistical analysis, is that it breaks with what I deem to be the strength of regression analysis, namely finding statistically significant correlations between variables that are of a different nature (from social structure to event outcomes), separated in time, or hold up in a variety of different social settings. Process tracing, on the other hand, aims to answer the “how” question in political science, whereas the question of which variables cause the outcome of interest is not that interesting. In my view, looking at triggering causes through statistical analysis is like trying to answer the “how” question by saying “because” or “how much”. In the case of presidential interruptions, it is not that interesting to know the size of the effect of challenges upon interruptions, but rather why challenges occur, how challenges are mobilised, how they reach their critical mass to topple a president, who are the challengers, etc.

---

<sup>203</sup> Mahoney et al. (2009) have recently argued the opposite, namely that for instance in a chain of necessary and sufficient causes, it is often the cause most proximate to the *explanandum* that is “more” important. However, this argument comes close to being absurd when made for a series of necessary causes (see, p. 130-131, Figure 9). First of all, opening up for degrees of necessity in necessary causes, is conceptually confusing. Second, if a cause is necessary, the absence of that cause is sufficient for the non-occurrence of the outcome of interest (Ragin 1987: 98-99). I also find it hard to reconcile the view of causality in Mahoney et al. (2009) and Mahoney (2008).

This debate is relevant for the current literature on presidential interruptions. Much focus has been directed towards the immediate, triggering causes of presidential interruptions, which I discussed in chapter 5. Thus, the conclusions have been that especially street challenges endanger presidential survival (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but that the opposition in congress may play a pivotal, or triggering, role (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2007, 2008). This debate is interesting only in so far as it addresses the topic of the perils of presidentialism (Linz 1990, 1994; Valenzuela 1993, 2004). If street, or vertical, challenges, indeed constitute the biggest perils for presidential survival (as my Chapter 5 also indicates), then the causal *processes* indicated by Linz (Cheibub 2007; Linz 1990, 1994) are not at play, and hence presidential interruptions cannot be *triggered* by the (institutional) perils of presidentialism (at least not directly). Yet, as causal explanations, they only point to the commonalities immediately prior to an interruption, and offer what one might call a shallow explanation of a presidential interruption. The fact that it takes either congressional action (through a vote that requires varying degrees of majority) or upheavals in the streets to unseat a president, is hardly surprising, and on its own, this explanation only points to the procedures (e.g. impeachments), or triggering factors (the president had to flee to avoid the storming of the presidential palace), while it devotes little attention to the *underlying* factors that provoked the congressional or street actions.<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, if one departs from the assumption that all politicians seek power through elections, and re-elections (where possible), a challenge is more a prerequisite, procedure, or a causal

---

<sup>204</sup> Furthermore, a vertical or horizontal challenge is not inclusive enough as challenges go. A president may be challenged by international actors (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010) or by elites that not necessarily hold positions in congress (for instance the business organisation CACIF in Guatemala in 1993, see Christensen Bjune and Petersen (Forthcoming 2010), and potentially COHEP in the case of Zelaya in Honduras in 2009). I discuss this further in chapter 7.

mechanism, for a presidential interruption than a proper cause. Thus, using challenges as an independent variable in a statistical analysis almost amounts to tautological explanations, instead of causal explanations. In statistical analysis, this problem can be avoided by either using selection models, thus arguing that interruptions only occur as a result of challenges, to identify what causes challenges, and what causes challenges to succeed (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), or one could argue that challenges and interruptions are part of an overarching phenomenon that one might call presidential crisis (a term preferred by Pérez-Liñán in a relatively similar fashion), and thus use ordered or multinomial probit or logit models to distinguish what differences there might be between these two levels of crisis.<sup>205</sup> I am not saying that studying challenges as an independent variable is not interesting, only that the answers that should come out of these studies is not the size, and level of significance, of a coefficient, but rather answers that relate to “why” and “how” questions.

Some of the institutional independent variables used to explain interruptions, also fall prey to the same fallacies. Take for instance the legislative shield of presidents (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 144-147), which is defined as the difference between the proportion of congress (or chamber) members loyal to the president minus the proportion of votes required to prevent an impeachment. This variable explains in part the success or failure of presidents to survive an impeachment attempt. But to say this is just to say that if the president has sufficient support in congress to survive an impeachment attempt, he or she will! Or, to say that the president was successfully impeached because the opposition managed to garner sufficient votes in congress to pass the threshold for successful impeachment as set by the constitution. As causal

---

<sup>205</sup> See my discussion and analysis in chapter 3.

explanations go, this is not very enlightening.<sup>206</sup> In addition, several of the institutional analyses only include institutional variables (some also include protest variables) (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Negretto 2006), ignoring structural variables such as growth, level of the economy, etc. which I have argued for might be important. The cited analyses might therefore have serious omitted variable bias.

A paper by Helmke (2007) falls in the same *immediacy* trap as she in her complex strategic model of interbranch conflicts finds, among other things, that the level of public support for an institution is related to the probability of an attack on this institution's survival. This translates into the point that unpopular presidents are more likely to be challenged by other institutions, which is not at all surprising. Popular presidents will not fall as a result of a street based challenge merely because it will become incredibly difficult to muster street, or institutional, support against the president. If a popular president is to fall, it is very likely that either the military must take power, or there must be an international intervention in that country.<sup>207</sup>

In my view, the variables of interest are the ones that lie at a distance from the outcome, and, thus, are exogenous in causal models. The problem with using

---

<sup>206</sup> The author clearly admits to this (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 145), therefore the author seeks to explain what affects the size of the legislative shield. But here the author also makes the same "mistake" as he studies how presidential style of leadership affects the legislative shield. An isolationist strategy and a strategy of confrontation lower the legislative shield. But could it not be that the president was forced to adopt an isolationist strategy due to prior congressional actions? Or, could the coding of that variable be affected by the general relationship between congress and president? I.e. a president follows a strategy of isolation if congress is recalcitrant. In other words, the variable may be endogenous.

<sup>207</sup> The only potentially popular president to fall was Serrano in 1993. He was clearly more popular than congress, and just prior to the *autogolpe* Serrano's party had performed well in the local elections, which goes against Helmke's general finding, but Serrano was highly unpopular with the army and the business sector. With the army due to his acceptance of Belize as an independent state and his wish for peace with the insurgents (and even accepting the guerrilla as a legitimate opponent), with the business sector due to his eagerness of allowing an international bid for the privatisation of the electricity sector in the country (based on interviews with Arellano Rojas 2009; Beltranena de Padilla 2009; Beltranena 2009; Gramajo 2009; Urrutia 2009).

president's popularity (Helmke 2007), a president's legislative shield (Pérez-Liñán 2007), and challenges (Hochstetler 2006), as independent variables is that all are likely to be endogenous in the causal models used. Challenges also constitute a superset of interruptions, and, thus, part of the same overarching phenomenon (e.g. a presidential crisis). To avoid these problems, an interesting institutional variable could be a president's support in congress when elected. In other words to investigate whether or not presidents elected with a minority support in congress are more prone to deadlock/interruption/breakdown than majority presidents.<sup>208</sup> This means, given a set of conditions at the starting point of a presidency, how likely is it that a president might fall? This serves to distance the query for causal factors from the dependent variable and focuses on a variable that is exogenous for politicians when elections are over. In other words, studying *underlying* causes helps avoid endogeneity problems.

A more policy-oriented reason for focusing on *underlying* causes is that it is more interesting for policy makers to know how to prevent challenges and interruptions from occurring, than to know that if a president is challenged it is important to quell demonstrations without using violence. It is also more interesting for policy makers to know if the president's position vis-à-vis congress upon taking office might affect his or her probability of being deadlocked by congress, or surviving in power, than to know that if a challenge has occurred, granted, the support a president enjoys in congress is important.<sup>209</sup> If one is to give advice to policy makers, and especially given the fact that a president does not fall if he or she is not challenged, one would like to be able to say that given such and such conditions the president is more or less likely to be challenged. And, not only state that given a challenge, it would help if the

---

<sup>208</sup> I avoid using coalitions as a variable as this is a variable that also may be endogenous.

<sup>209</sup> I thus argue for the importance of focusing on causes that come early in the theoretical causal chain. This contrasts with Mahoney et al.'s view on these matters (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009).

president were popular.<sup>210</sup> In sum, to study *underlying* causes makes sense methodologically, and in terms of policy advice.

My point is that one must move beyond the immediate, *triggering* causes, be that horizontal or vertical challenges, and move beyond defending or attacking the institutional view and the more specific Linzian understanding of presidentialism, in order to more fully comprehend the logic behind presidential interruptions and challenges. Despite the focus on institutions vs. the streets, there has been some attention lately devoted to models that include underlying, and structural variables. Neo-liberal policies have been found to increase the likelihood of presidential interruptions (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), negative economic conditions seem to have a similar effect (Kim and Bahry 2008),<sup>211</sup> and scandals are sometimes found and sometimes not, to affect presidential survival (Hochstetler 2006; Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008). Whereas vertical challenges clearly *trigger* interruptions, the level of societal contention as an *underlying* cause, despite much attention, however has, surprisingly, found little statistical support (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). By splitting up the variable of vertical conflicts, I found in Chapter 3 that anti-government demonstrations, but not strikes, potentially cause interruptions.<sup>212</sup> I follow up on this idea in the next sections that further focus on the underlying causes of challenges and interruptions.

---

<sup>210</sup> The last comes from Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) finding that challenges that end in violence are more likely to succeed. This, however, is maybe due to a flaw in their selection model (one of them at least) as they group both horizontal and vertical challenges together as the selection variable. Only vertical challenges are likely to lead to deaths as presidents very rarely kill members of congress when they are preparing an impeachment. The one that comes closest to something similar is president Cubas who maybe ordered, or at least knew about, the killing of his vice-president.

<sup>211</sup> A problem with the Kim and Bahry article is, however, that they conflate presidential interruptions with democratic breakdowns, and that they include semi-presidential regimes, a regime-type that operates under a different logic than presidential regimes (Sartori 1994).

<sup>212</sup> This is also supported by the findings by Kim and Bahry (2008). We both use Banks data on anti-government demonstrations, clearly the best source for such a long time-series (my Chapter 3) or for



### ***Causal analyses and interpretations***

My dataset is a panel dataset with years as the time variable, and countries as the panel variable. Panel data have four advantages over cross-section data. First of all, it can deal with heterogeneity in the panel units (countries in my case); a panel dataset can analyse more information and variation in the data because it combines variation over time within units and variation across units; since panel data have variation over time it can address more questions and issues than cross-section data; and finally (although not relevant in this case), panel data allow for better analysis of dynamic adjustments (Kennedy 2003: 302). There are basically three ways of dealing with panel data, either to use fixed effects or random effects estimators, or to pool the data and use regular regression.<sup>213</sup> Regular OLS regression on panel data may be biased since the omitted variables, caught in the intercept, may vary for each unit. A regular OLS only works with one intercept for all cross-sectional units. Fixed effects, however, allow for different intercepts for all cross-sectional units, and thus deal with this problem, but raise other issues. Fixed effects only uses the variation over time within each unit, and only variables that vary sufficiently over time can be used in these models. Furthermore, one loses several degrees of freedom since the fixed effects implicitly use one dummy variable for each cross-section unit to deal with the heterogeneity across individuals (or countries in this case). The random effects model analyses the different intercepts, or heterogeneity across cases, as random (and normally distributed), and can use time-invariant variables. The random effects model is thus more efficient, and uses more information in the data than both fixed effects

---

cross-regional comparisons (Kim and Bahry), but a variable that probably conflates the distinction between challenges (protests that aim to remove presidents) and more “regular” anti-government demonstrations.

<sup>213</sup> The following is based on Kennedy (2003: 300-318), see also Wooldridge (2006) for another presentation.

and pooled regression, but is fraught with another problem. Whereas fixed effects models allow for arbitrary correlation between the country specific unobserved variables and the independent variables in the model, random effects must assume that all unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the independent variables (Wooldridge 2006: 497). This is a major drawback for the random effects model, which leads several econometricians to argue that fixed effects is to be preferred over random effects models.

In my case, however, random effects is the better choice between the two for one important reason. My dependent variables, *challenges to presidents* and *presidential interruptions*, are both dummy variables and do not vary over time in all countries. By using fixed effects models I would lose all observations in countries with no variation on the dependent variables. Furthermore, there does not exist any true fixed effects probit or logit models. A conditional fixed effects model for panel logit analyses exists that works similar to the fixed effects, but with the same drawbacks as any other fixed effects model (Wooldridge 2002: 491-492).<sup>214</sup> In the choice between probit and logit panel analyses, I will use probit analyses, since the logit random effects model is not as attractive as the probit due to a lack of available simple estimators for the logit model.<sup>215</sup>

---

<sup>214</sup> Another problem for me is that since there is no fixed effect estimations for logit or probit panel data analyses, the Hausman test cannot be used to test the assumption of zero correlation between the unobserved variables and the independent variables.

<sup>215</sup> Furthermore, the probit model can measure the relative importance of the unobserved effects (which also measures the correlation between the composite latent error for any two time periods) (Wooldridge 2006: 486, 490). The latter is also a test for the whether or not a pooled estimators can be used since it measures the panel-level variance (StataCorp 2007: 367-368), which helped me pick models for robustness tests with statistical techniques only applicable on pooled data, see next footnote.

To address the problem with random effects models, and especially the untestable assumption of zero correlation between the unobserved variables and the independent variables in the model, I will use the generalized estimating equations (GEE), also called the population averaged model, or the Chamberlain's random effects probit model (Wooldridge 2006: 486-490). The GEE model averages the effects of the independent variables across the distribution of the unobserved variables, and therefore relaxes the assumption of zero correlation between the unobservables and the independent variables one finds in the random effects model. The GEE also allows for serial correlation of variables over time within units, and allows robust standard errors that control for this correlation.

Finally, the last problem to address before taking on the analysis is the skewed distribution of the dependent variable. There are very few positive instances (only 14 in the case of presidential interruptions, 40 for challenges) compared to negative instances of the dependent variables. This often creates the problem of explaining and predicting these events. Pooled logistic analysis will normally underestimate the occurrence of such rare events (King and Zeng 2001b, 2001a). King and Zeng thus created a correction for these problems with the Rare Events logistic regression. This technique only works with pooled data, and thus much information from the panel data is not analysed. Despite the fact that Rare Events logistic regression also allows for robust standard errors clustering on countries, i.e. I do not have to assume that observations within countries are independent across observations, I prefer using the

GEE analysis since it also allows robust standard errors, and exploits more information in the data.<sup>216</sup>

### **Statistical models of presidential interruptions and challenges**

This section presents the statistical results. The results are presented in two different tables. The first table analyses the institutions vs. the streets debate as underlying causes. In other words instead of using vertical and horizontal challenges as independent variables, I focus on vertical and horizontal conflicts and exclude challenges. The second table distinguishes between different types of regular conflicts, excluding challenges, based on which cleavages motivate the conflict, and who organises the conflict, both variables are proxies for the importance and salience of different cleavages and the effect of their emergence on challenges and interruptions. The difference from the first to the second group of models is that in the second the conflicts are split up according to the cleavages the conflicts represent, or according to what type of organisation has organised the conflict. The models in this table test my hypothesis that conflicts motivated by new, and emerging cleavages increase the likelihood of an interruption or a presidential challenge.

### **Institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges**

The first models test whether the general level of contention in the streets has an effect on challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions after controlling for

---

<sup>216</sup> To test robustness of my models, I ran all models in the tables below with standard Random Effects, GEE and Rare Events Logistic regression (only on models with panel-level variance close to zero). The results in the tables below were all robust across these three techniques. do files, data, and output available from the author. All models are run with the following stata commands on Stata/IC 10.1. Generalized Estimating equations `xtprobit, psvce(robust)`(equivalent to `xtgee...`, `family(binomial) link(probit) corr(exchangeable)`).

other explanatory factors, and thus refers to the street vs. institution debate (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Valenzuela 2004). In the previous chapter I found that vertical challenges were more important for *triggering* interruptions than horizontal challenges. However, in line with my arguments above, and the model in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-3), in terms of statistical or comparative analysis of interruptions and challenges, one should focus on the *underlying* causes.

All results in Table 6-1 and 6-2 should be interpreted with caution considering the few positive instances of the dependent variables, especially true for models on presidential interruptions. To partially control for these problems I also run models on challenges to presidents,<sup>217</sup> and I provide an extensive comparative process tracing analysis after the statistical analysis to substantiate my findings.

All models in both tables control for the following factors, which I summarise here. With regard to economic variables, I control for economic growth measured as change in GDP/Capita (lagged one year), and yearly inflation. Economic growth, as expected from the results in Chapter 3 and theory, has a consistently negative and significant effect on interruptions and challenges across all models. Inflation, on the other hand, has no effect on either interruptions or challenges. To control for regime-type within my semi- and full democracies, I tested whether variation in level of democracy could have any effect. Clearly some of the cases of interruption have occurred in semi-democracies on the lower end of the scale (e.g. the cases of Peru, Guatemala, and Dominican Republic), on the other hand an interruption or challenge

---

<sup>217</sup> I tried to use Heckman selection models, which would probably have been the best fit for my causal model displayed in Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2. However, due to data restrictions in my data material, these analyses proved to be very unstable and not robust, a problem also reported in a more global study in which these models were used (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009).

require the right to opposition, which should be more developed in more institutionalised democracies. I used the Polity index,<sup>218</sup> and find that there does not seem to be any relationship between the level of democracy (within semi- to full democracies) and either interruptions or challenges. Internal problems in the administration, and coalition breakdowns, might weaken the president sufficiently to make him or her fall (Llanos Forthcoming 2010; Marsteintredet and Llanos 2009; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010). I capture internal problems in a presidential administration with a count variable that registers every time a minister leaves the government after an expressed conflict with the president.<sup>219</sup> This variable is positive and significant in the models tested here, which indicates that internal problems within presidential administrations increase the likelihood of an interruption and a challenge to presidents. I also control for corruption scandals involving the president or his close family or advisers, an important factor in several cases of presidential interruptions (Pérez-Liñán 2007). However, as expected, this variable does not reach standard levels of significance in the models with interruption as the dependent variable, but is clearly significant and positive for predicting challenges to presidents (see also Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008). Only three cases of presidential interruptions are clearly related to a corruption scandal, and given that corruption scandals have hit several presidents throughout my period of analysis (1980-2005), the “batting average” for this variable is rather low.

---

<sup>218</sup> I lag this variable one year since the actual challenge or interruption in a year might affect the democracy score in a country.

<sup>219</sup> The variable excludes any conflict related to interruptions and challenges.

**Table 6-1: Institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges**

Models	Model 1: Interruptions	Model 2: Challenges	Model 3: Interruptions	Model 4: Challenges
President's support in legislature	-.015 (.006)**	-.003 (.006)	-	-
Horizontal conflicts (Deadlocks)	-	-	.048 (.030)	.049 (.030)*
Vertical conflicts	.045 (.071)	.017 (.048)	.005 (.092)	.005 (.055)
Growth (lagged)	-.041 (.018)**	-.053 (.014)***	-.033 (.017)**	-.056 (.014)***
Inflation (natural logarithm)	-.051 (.065)	-.032 (.061)	-.019 (.064)	-.026 (.058)
Polity index (lagged)	-.019 (.043)	.032 (.048)	-.000 (.040)	.033 (.048)
Internal splits	.3414 (.196)**	.388 (.220)*	.432 (.212)**	.368 (.201)*
Corruption (dummy)	.550 (.395)	.672 (.275)**	.531 (.401)	.642 (.263)***
Constant	-1.033 (.536)*	-1.253 (.318)***	-1.862 (.394)***	-1.485 (.395)***
N (country years)	307	307	314	314

Notes: All models are population averaged probit models. Robust standard errors clustering on country in brackets. I.e. controlling for non-independent observations within units (countries). Levels of significance: \* < .10; \*\* < .05; \*\*\* < .01. The divergence in N between the models is caused by some observations in which president's support in congress was unobtainable, or not valid for the full year. The missing observations are the first years of democracy in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and the first four years in Panama. Observations of conflicts in all years of challenges and interruptions are truncated to the period prior to the challenge and interruption that year.

Sources: Economic variables from the World Bank (WDI 2008); President's support and effective number of parties from Nohlen (2005b; 2005a), and updated with official webpages from respective countries and electoral reports in Electoral Studies. Deadlocks, vertical conflicts, internal splits and corruption from personal dataset based on LAWR. The Polity index can be found here: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>, see also Jagers and Gurr (1995).

It is beyond doubt that vertical challenges are the most important triggering factor for presidential interruptions (see Chapter 5, Hochstetler 2006). However, as discussed above, this is only one part of the story, and in my view, the less interesting part. The models in 6-1 addresses the institutions vs. the streets debate as *underlying* causes and address the questions of whether vertical conflicts, or the general level of contention (street protests, demonstrations, strikes) affects the survival of presidents; whether the president's support in congress when elected (a proxy for horizontal conflicts/deadlocks) affect the survival of presidents; and finally, whether horizontal

conflicts or deadlocks affect the survival of presidents.<sup>220</sup> Since there is a difference between “institutions and events” (Marsteintredet 2008a; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), I include both president’s support in congress (institutions) and horizontal conflicts (events), to look at how the relations between congress and the president affect challenges and interruptions. Since they are supposed to measure the same phenomenon, the variables are not run in the same model.

It does not matter whether I control for the relations between congress and president as institutions (Models 1 and 2), or events (Models 3 and 4), vertical conflicts do not have a significant effect upon either challenges or interruptions. The proxy for horizontal conflicts, the president’s support in congress when elected, has, as expected (Valenzuela 2004), a negative and significant (at .05 level) effect on interruptions (Model 1), but not on challenges (Model 2), after controlling for the other causal factors. The results, however, from Models 1 and 2 only partially addresses the streets vs. institution debate since one of these variables indicates an institutional situation within which interruptions may or may not occur, and the other indicates an event. President’s support in congress is only a proxy for the variable of inter-institutional or horizontal conflicts.

When I substitute president’s support in congress when elected by my measure of horizontal conflicts (Models 3 and 4), I provide the first test of the relative explanatory power of vertical and horizontal conflicts as *underlying* causes of interruptions and challenges to presidents. When controlling for horizontal conflicts,

---

<sup>220</sup> It is important to note here that horizontal conflicts do not include horizontal challenges to presidents, and that vertical conflicts do not include vertical challenges to presidents. Both horizontal and vertical conflicts are count variables, and I control for the problem of greater coverage of larger countries by excluding any country-year with less than six news registered in a country-year.



the variable vertical conflicts is not significant in any of the two models. The variable horizontal conflicts, on the other hand, is positive as expected, and significant at .11 and .10 levels of significance for interruptions, and challenges, respectively. Thus it seems that the level of contention in the streets (strikes, demonstrations, piquetes, protests, etc.) does not affect the survival of presidents, and that this variable only is significant when we understand it as a *trigger*, i.e. as challenges, and not as an underlying cause. The reverse is true for horizontal conflicts. Horizontal challenges are not as important as a *trigger* for interruptions, but horizontal conflicts, or deadlocks, are positive and significant at conventional levels when analysed as an *underlying* cause of interruptions and challenges.

The findings in Table 6-1 with respect to vertical conflicts is also in accordance with my findings in Chapter 3 that indicated that only anti-government demonstrations (and not strikes) affected presidential survival. If this is the case, and it clearly seems so, then a variable that includes several types of contention, including strikes, is not what pins down what is going on prior to interruptions, and challenges. If my theoretical and empirical discussions above, are correct, vertical (and horizontal) conflicts as a variable should be disaggregated according to the type of cleavage that mobilise the conflict, and also according what type of organisations are dominant in the conflict.

### **Social cleavages as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges**

Table 6-2, next page, moves beyond the institution vs. streets debate, and focuses further on the emergence of social cleavages as *underlying* causes of presidential interruptions. Basically all the same control variables are used in Table 6-2 as in

Table 6-1, and are commented above.<sup>221</sup> The main difference between the models in Table 6-1 and 6-2 is that the variables of conflicts are split according to cleavages and organisers of conflicts in Table 6-2. These variables are proxies for the importance of different types of cleavages in the countries being studied. In Models 1 and 2 in Table 6-2, I distinguish between conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage and conflicts motivated by regional and ethnically based cleavages. In Models 3 and 4 I code conflicts according to whether they are organised by parties (basically the same as horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1), labour unions, or new social movements and peasant organisations. Since who organises a conflict aims at measuring the same as the expressed cleavage in the conflict, namely the importance and salience of different cleavages in society, Models 3 and 4 can also be read as a validity test of the results of Models 1 and 2. To further emphasise that I am trying to capture the *emergence* of cleavages, and that I regard this to constitute an *underlying* cause, the variables of types of conflicts according to either cleavages or organisers, represent moving, weighted, averages of the prior and current year.<sup>222</sup> Using moving averages instead of only the current year's value of the variables, better captures that I want to get at processes that are not instant, but develop over some time, and it helps, to a certain degree, to capture a dynamic process.

The conflicts were first coded according to the dominant cleavage expressed in LAWR. I used one variable for the traditional left-right cleavage, normally expressed by (traditional) unions, through strikes, demands for higher wages, etc.<sup>223</sup> And, I used

---

<sup>221</sup> The only minor variation in the following models are that Growth is only significant at .13 level in Model 3, Table 6-2, and Internal splits is only significant at the .12 level in Model 4 in the same table.

<sup>222</sup> Current year has weight 2, and past year has weight 1.

<sup>223</sup> I exclude all conflicts I could not determine the cleavage of, the same is valid for all conflicts I could not determine who organised. Mostly, LAWR was very clear about who the organisers were and

one variable for cleavages generally not previously represented in the party systems in Latin America, namely conflicts based on either one of three cleavages: The variable regional and ethnic conflicts include conflicts with centre-periphery, international centre-periphery, and peasant-consumer conflicts, and finally conflicts with a clear cultural, or ethnic-based, cleavage (see Table 4-3). These four types of cleavages were merged into one variable for three reasons: First, they generally represent a new cleavage in the countries where they appear; second, since I deal with 18 countries, and new cleavages that appear vary from country to country, collapsing some of these makes my variable is more generalisable; and third, three of these cleavage pertain to the same dimension of centre-periphery or urban-rural cleavages. For the type of organisation orchestrating the conflict, I distinguish between conflicts organised by political parties, by labour unions and by new social movements and peasant organisations (see chapter 4 for details).

---

what the motive for the conflict was. I also exclude all conflict motivated by the other cleavages and organised by other groups than the ones included in Table 6-2. One reason is that these are few and far between, another is that some are only relevant for a shorter time-period in a country (military as organisers of conflicts in Argentina prior to 1989 for instance). A third reason is that I have no theoretical expectation of any of these conflicts affecting the survival of presidents.

**Table 6-2: Underlying causes of interruptions and challenges**

Models	Model 1: Cleavages and Interruptions	Model 2: Cleavages and Challenges	Model 3: Organisation and Interruptions	Model 4: Organisation and Challenges
Regional and ethnic conflicts (MA)	.210 (.117)*	.294 (.052)***	-	-
Left-Right conflicts (MA)	.015 (.047)	-.081 (.056)	-	-
Peasants and NSM conflicts (MA)	-	-	.196 (.120)*	.339 (.113)***
Union conflicts (MA)	-	-	-.054 (.081)	-.034 (.085)
Political party conflicts (MA)	-	-	.079 (.044)*	.105 (.037)***
President's support in congress	-.013 (.00*)	-.004 (.007)	-	-
Growth (lagged)	-.048 (.022)**	-.064 (.016)***	-.031 (.018)*	-.051 (.011)***
Inflation (natural logarithm)	-.034 (.065)	.012 (.071)	.005 (.083)	.012 (.066)
Polity index (lagged)	-.038 (.040)	.031 (.049)	-.016 (.040)	.019 (.048)
Internal splits	.419 (.158)***	.469 (.230)**	.444 (.191)**	.378 (.220)*
Corruption (dummy)	.608 (.391)	.722 (.283)***	.464 (.446)	.599 (.289)**
Constant	-1.130 (.648)*	-1.353 (.395)***	-1.97 (.483)***	-1.810 (.385)***
N (country-years)	307	307	314	314

Notes: All models are population averaged probit models. Robust standard errors clustering on country in brackets. I.e. controlling for non-independent observations within units (countries). Levels of significance: \* < .10; \*\* < .05; \*\*\* < .01. NSM: New Social Movements. MA: Moving, weighted, average of two years, prior and current year.

Sources: See table 6-1. All types of conflicts from my dataset from LAWR. All of the conflict variables count the number of such conflicts in a country-year. Observations of conflicts in all years of challenges and interruptions are truncated to the period prior to the challenge and interruption that year.

The models in Table 6-2 aim to capture the effect of conflicts mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages on presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents.

The interesting parts of Table 6-2 are the variables that constituted vertical and horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1. The variable Left-Right conflicts is actually negative, but not significantly different from zero in Models 1 and 2. This is potentially a surprising finding. However, remember from the analysis in Table 3-1, Chapter 3, that the variable strikes from the Banks dataset was negative (but not significant) in that analysis. However, the other type of conflicts, the regional and

ethnically motivated conflicts, is positive, and significant at the .1 level in Model 1 predicting presidential interruptions. In Model 2 with challenges as dependent variable, regional and ethnic conflicts maintains the positive sign, and is significant at the .01 level. This means that conflicts mobilised around regional and ethnic cleavages, and by leaders often challenging the status quo, is positively and significantly affecting presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents. Thus, it is not all types of contention, but rather, as discussed above, new cleavages emerging that challenges the president, the regime and the status quo that seem to affect the likelihood of a presidential interruption and a challenge to the president. Given the fact that conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage had a negative effect, while conflicts motivated by the regional and ethnic cleavages had a positive effect, it seems likely that when these variables are merged into one the effects of these two variables would be equalled out. This also explains the somewhat contradictory finding that vertical challenges were important triggers for interruptions, whereas vertical conflicts were not significant as an underlying cause of interruptions.

To further test the notion of new emerging political actors mobilising on new cleavages, I look at who organises the vertical and horizontal conflicts. Here I separate between political party conflicts, which is much the same variable as the horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1, labour union-conflicts, which is almost a perfect correlation with strikes, from non-union conflicts mobilised by peasants or New Social Movements. This is a different measure of the same relationship as I try to capture with the variables covering different types of social cleavages. Models 3 and 4 in Table 6-2 confirm the results in Models 1 and 2. The variable of conflicts organised by Labour union is negative, but not a significant predictor of either

presidential interruptions (Model 3) or challenges to presidents (Model 4). The variable NSM and peasant conflicts, which aim to capture conflicts mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages, is positive and significant at the .1 level in Model 3 with presidential interruptions as dependent variable, and positive and significant at the .01 level in Model 4 with challenges to presidents as dependent variable. The variable Political party organised conflicts is positive in both models, as was horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1, and significant at the .1 and .01 level in Models 3 and 4, respectively. These results strengthen my confidence in the findings related to the conflicts motivated by regional and ethnic cleavages in Models 1 and 2. Again I find that it is particularly one type of vertical conflicts, or general level of social contention, namely conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant organisations that increase the likelihood of a challenge to the president and a presidential interruption.

To conclude, my statistical models support the idea that presidential interruptions seem to be linked to new, and emerging, political groups representing new cleavages that challenge the status quo of political regimes. These groups may have a lower threshold for creating protests that destabilise governments and presidents than more traditional interest groups such as labour unions, which represent the traditional left-right cleavage. I therefore conclude that, after controlling for other underlying causes, the emergence of new cleavages represented by new political groups in congress and in civil society is one of the more important underlying causes of presidential interruptions in Latin America. One should, however, be careful with over-interpreting the statistical results given the many assumptions linked to such types of analyses, and the few cases of interruption and challenges. On the other hand, the

empirical discussions using more qualitative techniques support the findings in the statistical analyses.<sup>224</sup> Nevertheless, the next section seeks to substantiate my findings with more descriptive, and qualitative data. In other words, I attempt to open up the black box by linking conflicts motivated by regional and ethnic cleavages, and organised by new groups to the cases of challenges and interruptions in Latin America new political organisations in the party system and in the civil society.

### **Process tracing the findings**

This part provides some additional evidence and substantiates my findings with more qualitative data and analysis. The goal is to link challenges and interruptions of presidents with the emergence of new cleavages, or new types of organisations in the democracies of the region. First I look at and explain the general trends in the data, and then I analyse the cases of interruption.

### **Trends of protests and challenges to presidents in Latin America**

There are clear indications of a trend in Latin America that has led to an increased representation of leftist parties (of various denominations), indigenous parties, increasing party system instability and fractionalisation, and that new cleavages have become represented in various party systems (Arditi 2008; Birnir and Van Cott 2007; Castañeda 2006; Doyle 2009; Madrid 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Sánchez 2008, 2009; Van Cott 2005a, 2005b; Yashar 1999; Zamosc 2007). A debate has also run in the pages of World Politics of whether neoliberalism has weakened participation and, consequently, democracy in Latin America, or strengthened participation and

---

<sup>224</sup> As mentioned above, I also tried to be very careful in terms of meeting the assumptions in the models. Tests using other types of analysis, such as the Rare Events logistic regression, and alternative measures of conflicts, such as the proportion of conflict to news, all indicate that my results are robust across different statistical techniques.

democracy (Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007; Kurtz 2004).<sup>225</sup> On the one hand, unions and peasant movements seem to have been weakened, and thus democracy outside electoral institutions is weakened. On the other hand, the literature on presidential interruptions focus time and again on how popular challenges and protests increase the likelihood of a presidential interruption (e.g. Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), and how this increases accountability to some extent (Marsteintredet 2008b). While there is some truth, probably, to all claims, the above-mentioned authors forget to distinguish between different types of social contention, and therefore come up with diverging results. My data show that while there is clearly a decline in union activity and strikes, new social movements and other organisations in civil society not based on the tradition left-right cleavage, have increased their protest activity (see Figures 4-5, 4-6). In the regression analyses in Table 6-2 I also showed that the distinction between different types of societal contention was important for explaining interruptions and challenges to presidents.

Figure 6-1 shows how the increase in challenges noted in Chapter 4 is caused mainly by an increase in vertical challenges to presidents in Latin America since the start of the 1990s. From 1999 there is not one year till the end of my dataset in 2005 in which there has not been at least two separate challenges to presidents in the region.<sup>226</sup> In the 1990-1999 period there was between one and two challenges per year, and until 1990 there was between zero and one challenge each year for the whole region.


---

<sup>225</sup> A recent article argues that the relationship between economic reforms and democracy takes the form of a J-curve. In other words, economic reforms initially are detrimental to democracy, but has a positive effect in the longer run (Gans-Morse and Nichter 2008), which confirms Przeworski's (1991: 136-187) early analysis of the topic.

<sup>226</sup> There seems to have been a dip in the number of challenges after 2005, but in 2009 there are at least two challenges in two countries. Against President Colom in Guatemala in relation to the Rosemberg case, in Honduras where Zelaya was deposed (and also challenges against his successor, Micheletti). In Argentina, political leaders asked in the media for Christina Fernandez's resignation due to a bad mid-term election, and in Paraguay President Lugo has been challenged for having fathered two children when he was a Catholic Priest.



Figure 6-1: Trends of conflicts and cleavages



Source: Personal dataset based on LAWR 1980-2005.

Figure 6-1 also supports the evidence from Table 6-2 by showing that at the same time as vertical challenges increase, there is an increase in both regional and ethnic conflicts registered and also an increase in conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant organisations. So far so good, but clearly the regional trends I show are probably driven by a few countries in the sample. This is true, but this fact is not a weakness for my statistical analysis, it only shows that one should be careful when making inferences about the results. It is clear, however, that the variables I focused on fit as explanatory variables for some cases of interruption better than for others. Compared to other explanatory models of interruptions, mine cover more cases than the others. Pérez-Liñán's (2007) analysis of impeachments and scandals only covers three-four cases of interruptions, Hochstetler's (2006) focuses on vertical challenges, but is more occupied with triggering causes, Negretto (2006) only

includes institutional variables, and Helmke's (2007) key variable of institutional legitimacy or popularity is in my view endogenous.

### **Explaining a trend towards increasing number of challenges and interruptions**

But, why is there an increasing trend of challenges, and interruptions linked to new cleavages only from the mid 1990s? This trend is noted by other scholars (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but not explained so far in the literature. Why not earlier? And, why were there so few challenges immediately after democratisation in the respective countries in this study?

I believe my key variables of emerging new cleavages hold some part of the answer to this puzzle. According to Birnir and Van Cott's (2007) reading of Lipset and Rokkan's thesis of the freezing of party systems after the full extension of the suffrage, the party systems in Latin America should have been settled soon after democratisation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967a, 1967b). And, executive instability should occur prior to the freezing of the party systems, in other words, immediately after the introduction full suffrage, that would open for representation of new, hitherto unrepresented, groups. In Latin America this was not the case, yet the belated instability in party systems, executives, and the increase in challenges do not contradict Lipset and Rokkan's party system hypothesis, as Birnir and Van Cott argue. The reason for the delayed developments in terms of cleavages, and also challenges and interruptions in Latin America lies in a prerequisite for a presidential interruption, namely the process of democratisation.

The process of democratisation in Latin America since 1978 has facilitated a host of important changes in the region that I maintain are prerequisites to presidential interruptions. The stability of minimal or electoral democracies in the region, has given new groups opportunity and time to organise, compete and even win both local and national elections. Many of the social movements cum parties, or old parties of the left that previously were prevented from taking power, are now in power.<sup>227</sup> The surge of new cleavages and new parties that challenge the status quo often create conflicts. This is not new or original for Latin America, what is unique in the Latin American experience is that many of these groups did not win power immediately after being able to organise and participate fully in elections. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 in chapter 4 indicated that it took until the mid-1990s for conflicts related to non-left-right cleavages to become more important, and the so-called leftist wave took hold towards the end of the 1990s.<sup>228</sup>

A relatively long period of restricted democracy facilitated the fight for full participation in Western Europe. In Latin America, full participation was secured in all countries with the Third Wave transitions to democracy, countries that in previous democratic spells restricted participation to the literate part of the population, or on the basis of gender, land ownership or income, now opened for full participation for all citizens (see Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994). The period before full suffrage,

---

<sup>227</sup> Since Hugo Chávez became president in Venezuela in 1999, and Ricardo Lagos became president in Chile in 2000, however, the left has won power in a number of countries. Lula for PT in Brazil became president on January 1, 2003; Nestor Kirchner took the PJ to the left in 2003, and was succeeded by his wife Christina in 2007; Tabaré Vázquez (Frente Amplio) became president in Uruguay in 2004; Evo Morales (MAS) won the presidency at the end of 2005 in Bolivia; Michelle Bachelet took over the presidency in Chile in 2006, Rafael Correa won the Ecuadorean presidency in 2006; Daniel Ortega gained the presidency of Nicaragua in 2006; Fernando Lugo became the first non-Colorado president in Paraguay in 2008; and, finally, in 2009 Mario Funes of the former revolutionary guerrilla organisation FMLN won the presidency in El Salvador.

<sup>228</sup> Some presidents on the left held power prior to this wave as well. Presidents Guzmán and Jorge Blanco in Dominican Republic 1978-1986, Alan García in Peru 1985-1990, and Siles Zuazo in Bolivia 1982-1985 are some examples.

however, was dominated by clear authoritarian regimes, not restricted democracies as in Europe.<sup>229</sup> In Western Europe democratisation was a slow affair that developed in regimes that were relatively open to contestation and critique. Leftist parties and unions were relatively free to organise, so that when the struggle universal (male) suffrage was won, labour parties were ready with a political party “package” to sell to their constituencies. In Latin America, however, leftist parties, unions and especially their leaders had been persecuted under the previous dictatorial regime. Many were killed and many were driven into exile. Even though parties on the left generally were able to participate in the founding elections, they were much less prepared than their Western European counterparts that had organised and fought over a long time for their rights to compete in elections, become represented at the national level, and have their core, labour, supporters vote for them in elections. The situation for underrepresented indigenous groups was not much better at the time of democratisation. Furthermore, the core of their supporters generally has had less experience with political participation than their labour counterparts. It is therefore no surprise that both leftist parties and parties mobilising on the basis of ethnic or cultural cleavages were not ready to fill the political space with party alternatives at the moment of the transition to democracy.

Thus, the increasing trend of party system fragmentation that one observes in Latin America since the moment of democratisation, and the belated mobilisation of new cleavages should come as no surprise even though it contrasts with the Western European experience. The different regime legacies prior to the latest extension of the suffrage, explain why the mobilisation of new cleavages that has led to more

---

<sup>229</sup> This important difference between the extension of suffrage in Western Europe and Latin America, a non-appreciated difference that in my view has led to the unfair or unfounded criticism of Lipset and Rokkan’s thesis.

challenges and interruptions in some countries in Latin America did not occur immediately after democratisation as one interpretation of the Lipset and Rokkan freezing of party system hypothesis would suggest (Birnir and Van Cott 2007), and the regime legacy in Latin America explains the trend of the increase in number of challenges and interruptions.

### **Cases of interruption, new cleavages and organisations**

This section links the mobilisation of new cleavages, new organisations, challenges and interruptions in a set of cases in Latin America. As mentioned, the key variables in the explanatory model does not explain all cases equally well, but the following should demonstrate that the key variables have explanatory value in a number of the cases of interruption. In cases such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, and Peru, interruptions can be linked to the rise of new cleavages. Furthermore, in the same countries one can observe that challenges go from being horizontal to vertical, the latter constituting a greater peril to presidents than the former.

In Bolivia there was only one vertical challenge before the year 1999 when Evo Morales first was represented in congress, namely against Siles Zuazo in 1984/85. After 1997 when ASP (Asamblea Soberano del Pueblo) won 3.7% of the national vote, the highest proportion at the time for an indigenous party, and after Morales's successful arrival on the national political scene, Sánchez de Lozada was challenged twice, and Mesa once in only two years. The challenges were successful. Evo Morales, his new party MAS, Felipe Quispe and his party MIP, and the farmer organisation CSUTCB (led by Quispe) were all active and important in the challenges to both Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa. These new organisations also represented

newly mobilised cleavages that previously had only been latent, pertaining to cultural/ethnic traits, or on centre-periphery related issues.

In Ecuador a similar development as the one in Bolivia may be observed. All challenges in the 1980s were horizontal, i.e. institution-based, but from the mid 1990s vertical challenges also appear. The escalation of vertical conflicts and challenges since the mid 1990s is clearly linked to the strengthening of the CONAIE (Zamosc 2007).<sup>230</sup> The challenge against Bucaram in 1997 was both horizontal and vertical, as Congress challenged Bucaram spurred by street actions organised by the CONAIE and Pachakutik. Two challenges in 2000 (against Mahuad and Noboa) were also vertical challenges organised by the CONAIE, the same goes for the challenge against Gutiérrez in 2005. The CONAIE clearly participated in the coup against Mahuad, and attempted to form a new government after his ouster. In 2005 the organisation was weakened, but had a year earlier challenged president Gutiérrez, and was present in the continued challenges to the president. However, an analysis from a Latinobarómetro survey taken in August of 2005, showed that having indigenous mother tongue was a positive, and significant predictor of protest participation (Edwards 2009). The indigenous party Pachakutik also played a role in Congress by voting Gutiérrez out of office.

Parties such as MAS in Bolivia, Pachakutik in Ecuador were very successful at the national level, and even in Venezuela and Colombia, where the indigenous population constitute a minuscule minority, did indigenous parties have moderate success (Van Cott 2005b: 175-211). While some of these parties clearly evoked a leftist rhetoric,

---

<sup>230</sup> Various indigenous movements merged and formed CONAIE in 1986 (see, <http://www.conaie.org/>).

they mobilised along ethnic lines, thereby waking up a latent cleavage of ethnic politics, which also merged with cleavages related to regional issues, in particular in Bolivia (Centellas 2009; Pape 2009). In Ecuador and Bolivia, the ethnic parties sprung out of movements in civil society that fought for indigenous (and peasant) democratic rights and other demands. While gaining representation in national congresses, the parties maintained their links to the effective organisations, putting double pressure on the rulers to meet their various demands. Prior to the latest democratic period, Latin American party systems have not been divided along ethnic lines (Coppedge 1998; Madrid 2005a), thus these movements manifested new cleavages. Therefore, the rise of ethnic parties has also contributed to an increase in party system fragmentation and electoral volatility in the region (Birnie and Van Cott 2007; Madrid 2005a).<sup>231</sup> A more fragmented party system of high volatility has generally been linked to problems of governability (Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Wolinetz 2006).

In Venezuela and Argentina no indigenous or clearly regional cleavages mobilised the people against Pérez and de la Rúa. Both countries, however, can be categorised as having labour-mobilising party systems in which the “labour” party implemented neo-liberal reforms (Roberts 2002).<sup>232</sup> In both countries, challenges might be said to come from the left, but not the “left” constituted by the traditional AD in Venezuela or PJ in Argentina. In Venezuela, there were two coup-attempts in 1992, one of them led by the new “leftist” leader Hugo Chávez,<sup>233</sup> in 1993 a vertical challenge not led by

---

<sup>231</sup> Aided by the rise of leftist parties since leftist parties generally have offered a larger number of electoral alternatives than the right (Coppedge 1997).

<sup>232</sup> The parties are of course, Acción Democrática in Venezuela, and Partido Justicialista in Argentina, the presidents are Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela and Carlos Menem in Argentina.

<sup>233</sup> Chávez represents what some have dubbed the new and populist left (contrasted with an older and moderate left) (Castañeda 2006).

the traditional union CTV (linked to Pérez's party AD) and the institutionally anchored impeachment attempt drove Carlos Andrés Pérez out of power. Before 1992 there had been no challenges in Venezuela. The increase in vertical conflicts and challenges during Pérez's presidency is not related to the principal union, the CTV. Even though the CTV lobbied and organised strikes against the neo-liberal reforms of the Pérez led administration (Ellner 2005), the CTV did not challenge Pérez. Other protesters participated in the *Caracazo*, and the increase in vertical conflicts and the intensity of vertical conflicts in Venezuela during Pérez's presidency is not related to unions and strikes, but to new movements and related to demands of constitutional and democratic reforms in addition to the repudiation of violations of human rights (especially after the *Caracazo*) (López Maya and Lander 2005). Chávez became president in 1998 in Venezuela, and has since then incarnated a new cleavage in the country, which later led to two street-based vertical challenges in 2002/03, and 2004. These, however, were led by the traditional labour union CTV in an unholy alliance with the business organisation Fedecámaras, but the cleavage was new, and clearly strong enough to unite these two traditional opponents (Ellner 2005).

In Argentina, there had been only one vertical challenge before the rise of the *piquetero* protests (Wolff 2007) and the challenges against de la Rúa in 2001. Alfonsín was challenged and removed early in 1989. The vertical challenge in 1989 cannot be attributed to the traditional labour union CGT, but I have not registered that challenge as belonging to any particular cleavage or being organised by a particular organisation. In 2001, however, unemployed and disgruntled people organised the *piquetero* movement(-s), which mobilised against neo-liberal reforms, deteriorating living standards, and a deep economic crisis under de la Rúa, and later continued the



mobilisation against Duhalde in 2003, which forced him to resign early. Again, the union linked to the tradition “labour” party, in this case the CGT and the PJ, was not the principal actor in the challenges against president de la Rúa (or Alfonsín), but new movements mobilised in the wake of increasingly deteriorating socio-economic conditions.

In Peru, although not related to a surge of a new left or indigenous cleavages, President Fujimori became the focus for the creation of a new cleavage in that country when he decided to run for a third electoral term in the election of 2000. The Peruvian party system had totally changed its nature after Fujimori came to power in 1990 and especially after the reconstitution of the regime in 1993 with a new constitution and the elections of 1995 (Levitsky 1999). The opposition in Peru united in support of Alejandro Toledo and his party Perú Posible, and after withdrawing from the second round in the presidential election, the movement against Fujimori organised the first vertical challenge against any president in Peru since democratisation in 1980. Fujimori as Chávez before him, became the focus for a new cleavage that mobilised a new party and organisations in civil society against the president.

The vertical challenges and interruptions in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, constitute two thirds of the vertical challenges in Latin America recorded in my dataset from LAWR and nine of the 14 interruptions. Furthermore, only two vertical challenges (in Bolivia in 1984/85, and in Argentina 1989) occurred before the surge of new left or indigenous movements in these four countries. Furthermore, these new leftist and indigenous movements have played an important role in these challenges. It seems to me that there is a correlation between the so-called new left or

indigenous parties, and vertical challenges. Vertical challenges, which is the more important trigger for presidential interruptions, have accompanied the mobilisation of new groups representing new cleavages in a subset of countries in Latin America, and in all these countries presidencies have been interrupted.

What about labour unions? The only case in which labour unions have played a major role, is in the case of the fall of Siles Zuazo. However, even in this case, their actions actually delayed the early election already called for (LAWR: 85-13). In the case of the fall of Alfonsín, the unions finally demanded the president's resignation, but at that time Alfonsín had already decided to resign, and unions were not a protagonists in the looting that made Alfonsín speed up even more the handing over of power to President-elect Menem. Traditional labour unions of course also played a role in Bolivia during the 2000s as well, but their role seemed to have been secondary to the one played by new movements and other cleavages than the tradition left-right cleavage. Finally, union-based challenges have been few and far between, and generally not been a threat to presidents.

Thus, what is clear from a look at the challenges to presidents, is that the debate on participation in Latin American democracies, should focus more on distinguishing between distinct types of participation based on types of actors and cleavages that mobilise people. If not, two opposite trends (decrease in union actions, increase in mobilisation of new groups) will even each other out, and the answer to these questions will be flawed. This potentially explains why some scholars talk about the deterioration of civil society and democracy based on data on mobilisation (Kurtz 2004), the deterioration of class-based cleavages due to neo-liberal policies (Roberts

2002), whereas others based on similar data focus on a re-mobilisation and potential deepening of participatory democracy (Arce 2008; Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007; Hochstetler 2006). According to my data, both strands are correct. There is a decrease in traditional left-right labour union mobilisation, and an increase in conflicts or protests focused around new regional and ethnic cleavages that are organised by new organisations and movements in civil society. Only the latter, however, cause challenges and interruptions.

### ***Explaining the results***

The previous section argued first statistically that there is a positive relation between conflicts mobilised by regional and ethnic cleavages and challenges and interruption, and, secondly, provided some qualitative and descriptive data to support the statistical findings. This section aims to explain the results by providing some further qualified speculation on the matters at hand. Why does a rise in new cleavages, and new political organisations inside and outside political institutions linked to the new left (and not the old) and ethnically based parties and organisations, entail more challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions? I provide some tentative answers in the three parts that follow, and suggest more research into this and related questions. First, these new organisations operate outside the arenas of mediation between civil society and political institutions; second, they advocate a new view on democracy, emphasising a more direct form of political participation, and popular sovereignty as Coppedge (2003) argues for in the case of Venezuela; and third, since the groups in question are rather young, they lack the historical experience of exclusion and persecution under prior authoritarian spells that other political groups on the left to have experienced and learnt from.

### **Arenas of mediation**

Unions have traditionally had access to certain arenas of mediation and intermediation with politicians and business leaders, through which they have been able to raise their demands for better pay, more job security, pensions, etc. This system, called corporatism (Schmitter 1974), clearly varies between countries, and this is clearly also true for Latin America as a region as well. Roberts (2002) and Murillo and Schrank (2005) differentiate between labour mobilising party systems and regimes, and populist or elitist party systems and regimes, and unions have clearly had different alliances with nominally leftist parties across the region (Murillo 2001). Furthermore, Roberts (2002) argues that neoliberalism has undermined the mediating role of the corporate channel, and eroded class based cleavages. The common goal of corporate systems, however, is to institutionalise inherent conflicts between different interests, organisations and stakeholders in society. Despite weakened unions, and the weakening of their channels of mediation, unions have had some access to these channels even after the introduction of neoliberalism, and labour rights have even improved in some countries in Latin America (Murillo and Schrank 2005: 975). Still, my data from LAWR demonstrate that union based conflicts is down (at least until 2005), and that labour union mobilisation does not affect the likelihood of challenges or interruptions. New emerging actors, on the other hand, have increased their mobilisation according to my data.<sup>234</sup> The new left in Venezuela, excluded from the

---

<sup>234</sup> The pattern I describe more in general about the decline of traditional union action on account of neoliberal reform, and the subsequent mobilisation of new social actors is also confirmed in a recent case-study of Bolivia (Haarstad and Andersson Forthcoming). The authors argue that it was the implementation of neoliberal reforms that actually created political space for indigenous communities, and politicised them. For more on the effect of neoliberal reforms on political practices in Bolivia, see Haarstad (2009).

tight alliance between CTV and AD, is one example; Morales's coca farmers,<sup>235</sup> excluded from mediating drug policy with the Bolivian governments, is another example; and CONAIE, the indigenous federation in Ecuador, did not enjoy any special status in terms of mediation regarding their demands on the government. Furthermore, the *piquetero* movement in Argentina was in part joined by disgruntled workers that had lost their jobs, and not connected to the traditional union CGT (or its later off-shots) in Argentina. Finally, the anti-Fujimori movements in Peru clearly did not enjoy access to the state, either.

These were the main actors behind several of the presidential interruptions in these countries. Without access to a mediating arena, direct actions in the street seemed to be the rational action to take to make their varying demands heard, be that on anti-drug policy, issues of ownership of national resources, economic support for unemployed, indigenous rights, or demands for democratisation. The level of street contention created by these groups through unorthodox actions such as *cacerolazos*, *piquetes*, road blocks, marches, hunger strikes, and so on, was thus more direct, and expressed demands that were harder to satisfy than those of traditional unions, which could be met with wage increases, be negotiated through corporative channels, or through the cooptation of union leaders by the leaders of business or government.<sup>236</sup> That these new groups and cleavages were excluded from (admittedly weak or weakening) arenas of mediation may have played a role in their decision to take direct actions to present both demands for political change, and to challenge their presidents.

---

<sup>235</sup> Though in Bolivia Felipe Quispe, the leader of MIP won control over the CSUTCB, which is a more traditional peasant union.

<sup>236</sup> Wolff (2007), however, argues that one weakness of the indigenous movement in Ecuador and the *piquetero* movement in Argentina is precisely that they have been easy to tame through clientelist integration or cooptation.

### **New visions of democracy**

Another potential explanatory factor is related to what Castañeda would call the “wrong” left (Castañeda 2006). The “new” left expresses different views on democracy and argues that the old democracy,<sup>237</sup> and its actors (parties) and institutions (Congress, Supreme Court, Presidency and party system) have failed. Coppedge (2003) argues that Venezuelan democracy under Chávez has taken a turn from liberal democracy towards a model of popular sovereignty that clearly resembles the delegative model of democracy (O'Donnell 1994).<sup>238</sup> Likewise in Bolivia and Ecuador, new leaders have argued for changing the political system totally, cleansing it of previous corrupt leaders and parties, and implementing new constitutions in order to reach those goals. The MAS, Evo Morales’s party, called for the elimination of old party practices, which involved the so-called “pacted democracy” in the country, and for a bigger role for movements in the political system (Gamarra 2008: 125-127, 134-135). Rafael Correa after he came to power, although clearly not representing the CONAIE or the Pachakutik, went into direct confrontation with Congress to elect a new Congress and write a new Constitution. And CONAIE, through its participation in the coup against Jamil Mahuad, also demonstrated that its view of democracy was not that of a liberal democracy, but rather that of a direct democracy in which all actions are valid as long as there is a belief that a majority supports their actions. Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Chávez in Venezuela, have passed new constitutions more to the liking of their political views.<sup>239</sup> All three constitutions

---

<sup>237</sup> The new left would be constituted by self-proclaimed groups on the left that did not exist at the moment of democratisation. For instance Hugo Chávez’s MVR, Morales and Quispe’s parties, Pachakutik in Ecuador, etc.

<sup>238</sup> Coppedge (2003: 165) quotes Chávez on the following: “*we will advance in the construction of a true democracy, of a true political, economic, and social system which we will build because they destroyed it during these last years...*”.

<sup>239</sup> Accompanying this new view of democracy to replace the old, and in their view, failed model of democracy, is a new view of the economic order. While the falls of Siles Zuazo and Alfonsín in the eighties were the precursors of the neoliberal reforms and the movement away from the ISI (Import-

include more forms of direct democracy, such as the recall of presidents. These reforms have also passed through referenda, often after referenda on the question of deciding to elect a Constituent Assembly or deciding on the need for a constitutional reform, a tool of direct democracy.<sup>240</sup> Clearly these reforms have occurred after the fact, i.e. after the interruptions in the countries in question, but the reforms have been driven forward partly by the same actors that challenged the presidents in these countries in the past.

Thus, the new social movements and parties representing new cleavages challenging the status quo outside old and weakened systems of mediation, also express a new form of democracy that is more direct, and reject the old and indirect form of democracy as well as the main protagonists of these old democracies. These groups in these three countries, in addition to the Argentine case of presidential interruptions (De la Rúa and to a certain degree also Duhalde) view the presidential interruptions as victories for a new time-order, and milestones on the route towards another type of democracy. Protesting and pushing to remove presidents is a natural form of political action if your view of democracy emphasises popular sovereignty as the most important criterion of democracy. It is therefore no surprise that within the leftist wave in Latin America, the countries in which new parties representing the “new” left have taken power, have experienced presidential interruptions. These are Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia. In other countries in which leftist parties have taken over power, such as Uruguay (Frente Amplio), Brazil (PT), Nicaragua (FSLN-Frente Sandinista

---

Substitution Industrialisation) model, implemented by Paz Estenssoro and Carlos Menem, and possibly to a certain degree helped the initiation of these plans, the falls of de la Rúa, Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos Andrés Pérez, and Abdala Bucaram, Jamil Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez were executed by the hands of groups seeking to reverse the neoliberal reforms, and to varying degrees have also done so. More on this in Chapter 7.

<sup>240</sup> In Ecuador the referendum has also been used earlier as many as four times in connection with interruptions and constitutional reform (Breuer 2008: 64).

de Liberación Nacional), Chile (PS and Concertación), there have been no interruptions. The exception to this pattern is Argentina, in which the PJ has changed from being a party for the workers with fascist leanings in the early days, to Menem jumping on neoliberalism, and finally towards a more leftist leaning under the Kirchners. And also to a certain extent Paraguay where President Lugo clearly representing a new “left” in that country, won the presidency in 2008. In Paraguay, however, challenges have been frequent since the fall of Cubas in 1999.

### **Historical experiences**

One could expect that unions, given the increased economic inequality caused by neoliberalism and the weakening of the arenas of mediation, would come in more direct conflict with the political system. However, I believe there may be historical reasons for unions and the “traditional” left being more cautious in terms of destabilising presidents. In the Southern Cone breakdowns of the democratic regimes, caused the left, union and parties, to be persecuted, killed, arrested, and forced into exile. There was a clear political learning on the part of the left with regard to failed policies, and political tactics, and a clear notion of “never again” (see the edited volume, McCoy 2000). The left was also severely persecuted in other authoritarian regimes, Guatemala is one example, among several others. This history, I think may have made unions and traditional leftist parties less inclined to promote actions that could destabilise governments given that conflict-ridden presidents in the past was the precursor for the military to intervene as the *poder moderador*.

The new groups emerging on the left, and indigenous groups, even though persecuted in the past, do not have that same inclination. These organisations did not exist under



the previous authoritarian spells, and indigenous peoples may have been equally persecuted or ignored in previous democratic regimes, thus the memories of a contrast between democratic and authoritarian regimes in the past may be less pronounced.

Furthermore, these groups continued to be ignored after the start of the latest democratic period, making them less inclined to support the current rules of the game. In the traditional left the organisational links and personal continuities from the last to the current democratic period is more pronounced.

These factors are clearly only qualified speculation and provide only tentative answers to the patterns found in the analyses above, but evidence from surveys in Guatemala at least, indicate that there might be something to the variable historical experiences. Booth (2000: 79) reported that persons having experienced less political violence in the past, were more inclined than others to support political actions of civil obedience and confrontational tactics. If these results can be generalised, it can account for the difference in political strategies between new social movements and unions with longer political trajectories. Booth also found that the indigenous population to a significantly higher degree than the ladino population supported civil disobedience and confrontational tactics, and the indigenous population had a significantly higher fear of participating in traditional political activities such as running for office than the ladino population (Booth 2000: 76-77). A recent study of contentious political participation in Ecuador, also shows that people with indigenous mother tongue, and members of civil society organisations are more likely to engage in political protests (Edwards 2009). Again, if these results are valid for indigenous populations in other countries, these results support my argument above, and at least do not contradict the findings in this chapter.

## **Conclusions**

This rather long chapter has aimed at finding the underlying, causes of presidential interruptions (and challenges to presidents). The first sections highlighted that causal analyses of presidential interruptions have so far been rather narrow in their focus and have studied the causal mechanisms or *triggers* of interruptions instead of the *underlying* causes of the phenomenon of interest. I linked the debate on presidential interruptions to causality in the social sciences in general, before I took on the statistical analysis. The statistical analyses demonstrated first, that in relation to the institutions vs. the streets debate as *underlying* causes vertical conflicts, or the level of contention in the streets do not cause interruptions, and that horizontal conflicts, or deadlocks, were positive and significant predictors of interruptions and to a lesser degree, challenges. Secondly, the statistical analyses showed that vertical conflicts mobilising on new cleavages related to regional and ethnic issues, or conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant unions, caused interruptions and challenges. I supplemented the findings in the statistical analyses with examples that these actors were important in the toppling of presidents as well as in creating vertical challenges in particular. Finally, the chapter ended with some qualified speculation as to why these new political movements representing new cleavages might be more inclined to attempt to remove presidents than for instance traditional labour unions. I argued that there could be three explanations for the pattern discovered in this chapter. The first reason was that new political actors have less access to established, albeit weakened, arenas of mediation in the countries where they emerged. Secondly, I argued that their view of democracy was in line with more confrontational actions and direct democracy, and that attempting to remove presidents within this view,

clearly could be defended democratically. Thirdly, I argued that the different historical experiences between the “old” left and the unions on the one hand, and new political movements on the other, could make unions and the “old” left less inclined to take actions that could destabilise the current presidents, whereas for the new political actors the memories of past failures of democracy would not be that pronounced.

This chapter thus demonstrated that only some vertical conflicts as *underlying* causes matter for challenges and interruptions, after controlling for other factors. The vertical conflicts that matter are those mobilised by new cleavages and are organised by new political actors operating at least just as much outside as within political institutions.

## **Chapter 7 : Linking Causes and Outcomes. Three Types of Presidential Interruption in Latin America**

## ***Introduction***<sup>241</sup>

Are all presidential interruptions equal in terms of causes and outcomes? Do presidential interruptions differ in any systematic manner? These are central questions to be raised in this chapter that mostly focuses on outcomes of presidential interruptions in Latin America. The literature on presidential interruptions in Latin America has basically treated the phenomenon as being the same across all cases of premature exits of presidents in the region, and with the exception of the latter part of Chapter 3, this dissertation has done the same. Treating all cases of presidential interruptions as the same value on the dependent variable makes sense in many circumstances. For one, it facilitates statistical and causal analysis, using e.g. presidents' completed terms in office as a control group. Secondly, it facilitates comparisons of this new form of executive instability with previous forms of instability in the region, such as democratic breakdowns. The same arguments are valid for treating all interruptions as equal when interruptions are treated as an independent variable.

All cases of interruptions are caused by popular and/or elite opposition to actions taken by a president and the administration. Yet, analysing the cases of presidential interruptions, one is struck by the great internal variation among the cases both in terms of what caused the presidential challenge in each case, and in terms of the different aftermaths or outcomes of the presidential interruptions. While the analyses using the statistical approach have taught us a great deal about the phenomenon in question, other approaches may be complementary and even make important contributions to the two most prominent debates regarding presidential interruptions

---

<sup>241</sup> Parts of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science Association in Toronto, Canada, September 3-6, 2009.

in Latin America. In the first debate presidential interruptions operate as a dependent variable: Whether institutions or actors in the “streets” are more important for causing the early exits of elected presidents. In Chapter 5 I found that the streets were more important as *triggers*, whereas in Chapter 6 I found that institutions were more important as *underlying* causes of interruptions. In this chapter I discuss why the streets (in general) are more important in some cases, and other arenas in other cases. In the second debate, presidential interruptions operate as an independent variable. This debate discusses whether presidential interruptions entail positive or negative implications for presidential democracy, and related to this, whether or not presidential interruptions solve the ongoing crisis of the political system at the time. Analyses treating all cases of interruptions as being the same provide answers of the average effect of causal factors on presidential interruptions, and the average effect of presidential interruptions on a set of dependent variables. However, to properly address these questions, a differentiation between presidential interruptions may be called for in addition to the approach I have used above.

The goal of this chapter is to map the cases of interruptions, explore and systematise the differences between the cases in order to address the two debates mentioned above. Taking as point of departure the actors’ motivation or reasons for an oppositional reaction that challenges the president, I argue that presidential interruptions in Latin America fall into basically one of three types. One type of interruption is the personal presidential scandals: presidents removed due to reactions against a president’s illegal behaviour. Another type of presidential interruptions is linked to reactions against a president’s behaviour that constitutes a breach of the constitutional order, and core democratic principles. A third type of presidential

interruptions is related to the public reactions to policy-issues, and a president's policy decisions, rather than illegal or anti-democratic behaviour. These three types of presidential interruptions also entail three different paths during and after the interruption. First of all, the importance of different actors varies across the types of interruption. Second, whereas others have found few discernable implications of presidential interruptions, I argue that the consequences depend on the type of interruption.

The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I discuss typologies in relation to the topic of presidential interruptions in Latin America. Second, I present why and how I code the cases according to the opposition's motivation for challenging the president. Third, I analyse the cases with a special focus on the implications of the interruptions, but also on the central actors challenging the president. Fourth, I summarise my analysis and ask whether this inductive grouping of the cases of interruptions can be seen as a potential typology of presidential interruptions.

***The lack of answers in two debates: Who challenges? What are the outcomes?***

A presidential interruption is defined by a premature, extraordinary and forced exit of an elected president that does not lead to a democratic breakdown (see Chapter 2), and all cases satisfy this definition. With the sole exception of the fall of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic, the interruptions also have in common that they are triggered by vertical or horizontal challenges to a president's actions or inactions. According to my definition, fourteen cases qualify as presidential interruptions since the start of the Third Wave in Latin America (see table 1-1 in the Introduction).

An important part of concept-formation and typologies is to relate the phenomenon at hand to other, similar phenomena (Collier, La Porte, and Seawright nd), this was the goal of chapter 3 in this dissertation (see also, Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008; Mustapic 2005; Pérez-Liñán 2007: 61; 2008). In that chapter I compared presidential interruptions with democratic breakdowns, and parliamentary changes of government, and made some procedural distinctions between types of interruption. The procedures chosen at the point of a president's early exit, however, might be fortuitous, and procedures do not seem to be the crucial distinguishing factor between the cases of interruption.<sup>242</sup> Another strategy has been to move up the ladder of abstraction and explain which cases of inter-institutional conflict the president seems to win, and which the military, congress or the supreme court seem to win (Pérez-Liñán 2005; Helmke 2007).

Despite these distinctions, the literature generally treats presidential interruptions as sharing the same value on the dependent variable, and few have offered systematic analyses of the variation among the cases of interruption.<sup>243</sup> The reason is that the cases studied all satisfy the definition given above, and that treating them all equally facilitates causal analyses. A further distinction among subtypes of presidential interruption would, given the relatively few instances of the phenomenon, make comparative statistical analyses at the macro level, very difficult.

---

<sup>242</sup> The procedures of interruption are important, however, when used to analyse the validity of Linz's and Valenzuela's argument on presidentialism as the above-cited authors do. The international reactions to the removal of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras also indicate the importance of procedures. A military removal and forced exile of a president in pyjamas, seems to draw the line between what the international community defines as an interruption and a coup.

<sup>243</sup> A caveat here is made for the work of Pérez-Liñán who mainly studies a subgroup of presidential interruptions, the presidential scandals, and includes analyses that point to different pathways to presidential interruptions. These, however, are not fully explored in his analysis.



The greater debate in terms of causes has been whether or not it is the challenges from the “streets” or institutions that are to blame for a president’s early exit (see Chapters 5 and 6, Valenzuela 2004; Hochstetler 2006; Negretto 2006; Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010), a debate centred around Linz’s (1990; 1994) contributions on the perils of presidentialism. In an effort to analyse the merits of the institutions vs. the streets, I found it useful to distinguish between triggering and underlying causes of interruption (see Chapters 5 and 6). This distinction has not been made in the literature, and might be one of the reasons for the disagreements in the debate. In this chapter, however, I compare only the cases of interruption and look at the relative importance of horizontal and vertical challenges in interrupting the president and explain why this varies systematically across cases.

In terms of the consequences and outcomes of presidential interruptions, less is known, but a debate about the desirability and implications of presidential interruptions has, nevertheless, ensued. Analysing presidential interruptions through the lenses of the perils of presidentialism, Valenzuela (2004) clearly sees presidential interruptions as a problem for presidential democracies. Others have argued the opposite, namely that presidential interruptions seem to counter the perils of presidentialism since the regimes in question have managed to find *salidas* to serious political conflicts (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). Distinguishing between the above-mentioned pessimistic and optimistic views of presidential interruptions, Hochstetler and Samuels (Forthcoming) argue that the consequences are few, and

reequilibration seems to be the trend.<sup>244</sup> Finally, others focus on a strengthened congress vis-à-vis the presidency (Pérez-Liñán 2005), and that presidential interruptions may increase the levels of both horizontal and vertical accountability (Marsteintredet 2008b).

The above-cited comparative analyses do not distinguish between the cases of presidential interruptions, i.e. all units are considered identical. Furthermore, the comparative analyses all assume causal homogeneity, i.e. that the explanatory variables have the same effect on the dependent variable across all cases or across units of time.<sup>245</sup> If, however, one can identify different causal patterns among subgroups, or subtypes of the phenomenon to be explained, the effect of assuming causal homogeneity is that these systematic differences are averaged out, and the results may be misleading, and biased. This, I claim, may be a problem that is particularly relevant for the two debates mentioned above. Furthermore given the few cases of interruptions in Latin America, as I mentioned in relation to my own statistical analysis in the previous chapter, caution is warranted when using statistical techniques, since any misspecification and errors may seriously affect the analysis.

### ***Variation between presidential interruptions in Latin America***

Even though all cases satisfy the definition of the phenomenon, a cursory review makes it clear that there is great variation between the cases of presidential interruption. In the cases of presidents Alfonsín in Argentina, Bucaram in Ecuador, and Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia, vertical conflicts and challenges are factors

---

<sup>244</sup> This is maybe not surprising since reequilibration of democratic regimes is part of the definition of the concept of presidential interruptions, while similar phenomena such as coups that end democracy are excluded from the concept.

<sup>245</sup> For a discussion and definitions of causal homogeneity in the social sciences, see the Brady and Collier vs. KKV debate (Brady and Collier 2004; King et al. 1994).

difficult to ignore. However, in the case of Balaguer there were no vertical or horizontal challenges or conflicts (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), and in the case of Fujimori the greatest vertical challenge and demonstration against the president occurred in late July (*La marcha de los cuatro suyos*) (LAWR: 00-30), while Fujimori fled to Japan months later in November 2000 (shortly after having lost the majority in Congress). In Guatemala in 1993 business elites and international pressure seem to have been just as important as pressure in the streets and congress in the ouster of presidents Serrano and Espina. Likewise, in terms of the outcomes of presidential interruptions, the variation is equally clear. The impeachment of President Cubas was interpreted as an important step in the democratisation of Paraguay (Abente-Brun 1999), and Schamis (2002) argues that the military absence during the crisis in Argentina in 2001-02 was an important step in that country's consolidation of democracy. Few would argue that the early exits of presidents such as Fujimori and Balaguer harmed democratic regime development in Peru and Dominican Republic, respectively. On the other hand, recent military actions in Honduras against President Zelaya, and the coup that removed president Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador, clearly suggest that the implications of presidential interruptions vary from case to case. More indirectly, presidential interruptions have also been linked to concepts such as crisis of democratic representation (Mainwaring et al. 2006), and democratic erosion (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a). Another interesting variation across cases is that some interruptions are followed by more challenges, crises and interruptions (Ecuador, Bolivia), whereas after other interruptions, street or congressional opposition die out, and the interruption seems to be an isolated event (e.g. Dominican Republic, Brazil). That there is variation across cases is therefore beyond doubt. The

questions I raise, however, is whether these variations are systematic, and how one can explain the variation.

### ***Constructing types of presidential interruptions***

Presidential interruptions are opposition-driven processes; therefore I believe that in order to investigate the implications and consequences of interruptions, it is important to link these with the main causes of the opposition to the presidents in question. I argue for this approach in Chapter two. The mobilisation of a challenge to a president is motivated by a reaction to some sort of presidential behaviour, which the opposition argues qualifies the demands for the president's ouster and a change in the *status quo*. As such, I understand presidential interruptions as corrective measures that, first and foremost, aim to end some type of unwanted behaviour and/or hold someone accountable for that behaviour.<sup>246</sup> Therefore the theoretical expectations in terms of implications and consequences for the presidential regimes in question, are related to the motivation of the interruption. In other words, by extension, if one accepts that an opposition's motivation at least is remotely related to one or more of the main causes of the interruption, then the outcomes are linked to the causes of interruptions.

In the following I therefore group the cases of interruption based on the type of presidential behaviour that first motivated the opposition to demand the president's ouster.<sup>247</sup> I also hasten to add, that I code the cases not based on mere causality, but on what has been registered in LAWR as the opposition's principal motivation for

---

<sup>246</sup> Another way to put this would be to use the lingo of path dependent scholars. In that sense, a presidential interruption is the result of a reactive sequence set in motion by an antecedent event, for instance a scandal. See Mahoney (2000).

<sup>247</sup> See Table 5-3 in Chapter 5 for a similar distinction between the cases of interruption.

seeking the president's removal. From an inductive analysis of the similarities and differences in the principal motivation of the presidential challenge (Table 7-1), I group the cases of interruption into types (Table 7-2). The reason for this approach is that I believe that what is used as motivation or arguments for removing a president, is important for how an interruption "pans out", and what the consequences are. Furthermore, given the fact that the presidential interruptions are the results of a complex set of causes, a clear-cut coding based on notions of the "most important" cause, or the single triggering, or underlying, cause, would be difficult to defend.

As mentioned above, causes of interruption may be described as a perfect storm of a variety of factors,<sup>248</sup> and in many cases there is a variety of motivating factors for challenging a president. I will discuss the consequences of this in terms of fuzzy cases and mixed members below. Nevertheless, to code the cases of interruption into types of interruption, I insist on a simplifying rule that codes interruptions according to the first registered challenge, for four reasons. First of all, a clear rule makes discriminating between cases easier. By focusing on the first registered challenge in LAWR that can be connected to the removal of the president, coding becomes clearer, and I can refer to a clear source for the coding, which is also replicable, and verifiable (see Table 7-1). This does not deny the fact that there are clearly mixed members of the types of interruption, and within-type variation.<sup>249</sup> Second, it makes sense to focus on the opposition's motivation for the first challenge. In the cases of interruption, the first challenge to the president has often started a chain of factors ("the perfect storm") that further destabilised the president and the administration. Therefore, the subsequent factors that later became additional motivations for the opposition to

---

<sup>248</sup> The term "perfect storm" is coined by Mejia Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich (Forthcoming 2010).

<sup>249</sup> As George and Bennett (2005: 238, n.11) remind us, unless types are so finely grained that there is one type for each case, there will always be variation at some level even within types.

challenge the president, may be endogenous to the process of presidential interruption, and be caused in turn by the process started by the first serious challenge to the president in question. Third, even though some cases are fuzzy members, one could argue that even according to that logic, a case would often be more a member of one type than of another (Ragin 2000).<sup>250</sup> In my view, the first challenge towards a president is the one that has most weight in defining the membership of a case, and therefore categorises cases within one type, even cases with mixed membership. The first challenge, as I argue at the end of Chapter 2, is important for the causal path that interruptions take. Finally, a challenge to all coding of qualitative phenomena is to make objective rules to avoid doubts about the coding. A clear rule involving the first challenge to the president reported in LAWR, is as transparent, replicable, and objective a rule as can be made in terms of distinguishing between qualitative types of a phenomenon.

---

<sup>250</sup> Only in the case in which membership gets the score 0.5 would a case not belong more to one type than another. I will, however, not quantify fuzzy or mixed memberships here, only admit that several of my cases are mixed members of several types of interruption.

**Table 7-1: Coding and Sources for types of Presidential Interruptions**

<b>President</b>	<b>First challenge</b>	<b>Issues</b>	<b>Source</b>
Siles Zuazo	Strike (COB) and congress, vertical and horizontal	Economic policies, hyperinflation	LAWR 84-45
Raúl Alfonsín	Looting in the streets, vertical	Economy, hyperinflation	LAWR 89-22
Collor de Melo	Threat of impeachment, horizontal	Campaign financing scandal	LAWR 92-25
Carlos Andrés Pérez	Street demonstrations, <i>cacerolazos</i> , vertical	Economy, against neoliberal reforms and new cabinet, then exchange scandal	LAWR 92-12, 92-47
Jorge Serrano	Street demonstrations, USA, OAS, CACIF	Against <i>autogolpe</i>	LAWR 93-22
Joaquín Balaguer	USA, PRD announced demands	Against electoral fraud	LAWR 94-27
Abdalá Bucaram	Street protests, strikes, opposition in Congress, vertical and horizontal	Economy, against austerity programme, price hikes	LAWR 97-05
Raúl Cubas	Congressional impeachment attempt(-s), horizontal	Release of General Oviedo (later murder of VP Argaña)	LAWR 98-33, 99-07
Jamil Mahuad	FP organised, protests, vertical	Economy: New tax measures (later also dollarisation of economy)	LAWR 99-45
Alberto Fujimori	Street demonstration, vertical	Rejection of Fujimori's electoral mandate	LAWR 00-30
Fernando de la Rúa	Street protests, lootings, <i>cacerolazos</i> , vertical	Economy, IMF, bank deposit freeze	LAWR 02-01
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada	Peasant protest, roadblocks, and strike, vertical	Policy: First budget, tax shock, then to stop gas export to the USA	LAWR 03-07, 03-38
Lucio Gutiérrez	Demonstrations and impeachment attempts, vertical and horizontal	Policy: First economy, IMF deal, social policies, then Supreme Court removal, return of Bucaram.	LAWR 04-01, 05/14
Carlos Mesa	Peasant protests, roadblocks, autonomist protest, vertical	Policy: New hydrocarbon law	LAWR 05-21

Notes: FP: Frente Patriótico, OAS: Organisation of American States, CACIF: Comité Coordinador de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras, PRD: Partido Revolucionario Dominicano, COB: Central Obrero Boliviano, IMF: International Monetary Fund. Source: Latin American Weekly Report, referenced as year-number. Other sources cited in the text below validate the coding based on LAWR. See also the Appendix to Chapter 5 for further references and analyses.

Based on empirical evidence of what initially motivated the oppositional reaction to the president and its demands for the presidents early exit (see Table 7-1, above), presidential interruptions in Latin America fall into three types: 1) Presidential scandals, that is media-exposed scandals involving the president, the president's administration and/or party, or close family members or advisors (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 65); 2) A president's violation of the democratic order. Since violations of civil

liberties and human rights often occur in several of the regimes being studied here, the focus is on violations of the core democratic principles of contestation and participation (Dahl 1971); 3) A president's policy decisions, in which challenges initially are based on disagreements or disgruntlement with an administration's current policies.

These three criteria also correspond roughly to three of the five underlying causes depicted in the causal model of presidential interruptions presented in chapter two (Figure 2-3): Scandals, economic and policy performance, and level of democracy.<sup>251</sup> The types created on the basis of my coding rule above, and the typology that follows are intended to discover distinct causal paths, and outcomes (George and Bennett 2005: 262).

### **Three types of interruptions and their cases**

In the discussion of the cases my focus is on two questions. Which actors were the driving forces behind the presidential interruptions in each case (and why)? And, more importantly, what were the outcomes or implications of the presidential interruptions (and why)? I believe the answers to these two queries depend on the type of interruption. First, however, the cases are organised according to types in Table 7-2, following the rules laid out above, and the definition of first challenges presented in Table 7-1. Below, I argue briefly for the categorisation of the cases, discuss fuzzy cases and whether there should only be two types of interruption instead of three.

---

<sup>251</sup> I exclude the institutional factor of minority governments since this is a factor that is common to almost all interruptions (Valenzuela 2004), and therefore does not distinguish between the cases, and the variable of the mobilisation of new cleavages since this is a factor that does not involve a president's actions, but rather *who* challenges.



**Table 7-2: Cases and types of presidential interruption in Latin America**

<b>Presidential scandals</b>	<b>Democratic violations</b>
Collor de Melo, Brazil, 1992	Jorge Serrano, Guatemala, 1993
Raúl Cubas, Paraguay, 1999	Joaquín Balaguer, Dominican Republic, 1994/96
	Alberto Fujimori, Peru, 2000
<b>Policy interruptions</b>	
Siles Zuazo, Bolivia, 1984/85	Fernando de la Rúa, Argentina, 2001
Raúl Alfonsín, Argentina, 1989	Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia, 2003
Carlos Andrés Pérez, Venezuela, 1993	Lucio Gutiérrez, Ecuador, 2005
Abdala Bucaram, Ecuador, 1997	Carlos Mesa, Bolivia, 2005
Jamil Mahuad, Ecuador, 2000	

Notes: Based on Table 7-1.

The placement of most of the cases above based on the motivation for the first challenge to the presidents in question, should be uncontroversial, and adds some degree of construct validity to my coding rules (Adcock and Collier 2001: 542-543). Some cases, however, are fuzzy or mixed-members, and will merit some discussion. The two presidential scandals are relatively straightforward. In the case of Collor de Melo in Brazil, popular reactions and the impeachment were beyond doubt motivated by the corruption scheme involving the president and his campaign manager (Cheibub Figueiredo Forthcoming 2010; Weyland 1993).<sup>252</sup> The case of Cubas in Paraguay is somewhat less clear, congress having attempted to remove Cubas at an earlier stage (LAWR: 98-33). As such the impeachment trial following the murder of Vice-President Argaña was not the first attempt at his removal. However, the prior attempt to remove the president was also motivated by an abuse, or scandal: the release of

<sup>252</sup> It can also be argued that the case of Collor is just as much a case of policy-interruption and failure, and that the discontentment with hyperinflation also inflated the reactions against Collor after the exposé of Collorgate. Inflation was between 400% and 2,700% yearly in the period 1990-1992. The year of Collor's impeachment, inflation reached 900% (WDI 2008). In other words, had his Collor-plans been successful in combating hyperinflation, Collor might have survived the Collorgate. I do not argue against that. The case of Collor is indeed a mixed member of a scandal and a policy-interruption. However, given my coding rules, the case is clearly a case of a scandal. Hyperinflation undoubtedly undermined support for Collor, and affected his legislative shield, but the monthly level of inflation was stable around 20-25% from October 1991 (CEPAL 2008), and despite some short-lived successes of controlling inflation, Collor had fought the issue of inflation since taking power in 1990. The first challenge to Collor, however, only came after the exposé of Collorgate. Furthermore, inflation is not found to be a significant predictor of presidential interruption in the statistical analyses in Chapters 3 and 6.

former coup maker General Oviedo. One could also argue that the case of Cubas should rather be a case of democratic violation than a case of a scandal given the fact that the President released a former coup-maker, and was considered responsible for the killing of his own Vice-President. Despite the fact that the survival of the democratic regime clearly was at stake in Paraguay in 1998-99, I focus on violations of the core democratic principles of contestation and participation, and therefore the case of Cubas is considered a scandal and not a violation of democratic principles. However, this case also shows that interruptions that take the form of either presidential scandals or violations of democratic principles, may be hard to distinguish. I discuss this further below. The most surprising within this type of interruptions is probably that Venezuela is not in the category. I return to this below.

There are three cases of presidents interrupted due to opposition generated by a president's violation of core democratic principles. They have further in common that the presidents attempted to illegally and undemocratically extend their terms as presidents, and that these actions created opposition both within and outside the regimes in question. Fujimori got the Supreme Court to agree on a dubious interpretation of the Constitution, which allowed him to run for a third term in 2000. The election was then organised in a manner that did not satisfy democratic standards (OAS 2000). Protests ensued in July against the stealing of the election. And, when the corruption scandal later burst, Fujimori fled to Japan. Occurring prior to the exposé of the scandal involving the *Vladivideos* the violation of the democratic order started the chain of factors leading to his demise. Thus the opposition and the

challenges to Fujimori were motivated by demands to restore democracy.<sup>253</sup> But clearly the case of Fujimori is, as the case of Cubas, another case of fuzzy membership between the types of scandals and democratic violations. The case of Serrano is more clear-cut. The *autogolpe* organised on May 25, 1993, was a clear authoritarian move that started the protests against his actions, and the demands for his ouster. In the case of Balaguer, the fraudulent elections in May 1994, which gave him four more years in power, led to the partisan protests and international pressure and mediation that shortened his term by two years.

The cases of policy interruptions all have in common that the protests leading to the interruptions of these presidents were motivated by policy demands in addition to demands for the removal of the president. The most surprising case in this category is probably the case of Carlos Andrés Pérez. He fell as a result of an impeachment after taking personal advantage of the exchange system RECADI just before his new policies abolished it. Before this scandal burst in November of 1992, Congress had attempted to remove Pérez several times, he had survived two coup attempts, and protests in the streets had demanded reversals of his neo-liberal reforms in addition to Pérez's ouster. Thus the protests and challenges initially included political demands that turned into demands for the removal of the president. The scandal and impeachment were not the first in a chain of attacks on the president, rather their culmination. The RECADI-scandal, and the subsequent horizontal challenges, however, clearly contributed greatly to the ouster of President Pérez. The exposure of the scandal, however, may have been provoked by the president's unpopularity due to

---

<sup>253</sup> The *Vladivideos* was also a scandal of a different nature than in Brazil, as it exposed the corrupt nature of the regime created by Fujimori and his close collaborators and not only exposed the president as being corrupt. For a discussion of regime causes vs. the *Vladivideos* in the case of Fujimori's fall in 2000, see Cameron (2006) and McClintock (2006).

Pérez's policy decisions, and as such be endogenous to the initial policy-related challenges to the president since the exposé of the scandal occurred after the initial demands for the president's removal. In the two Argentine cases political demands and protests against failed economic policies led to the early exits of Presidents Alfonsín in 1989 and de la Rúa in 2001. In the case of President Siles Zuazo in Bolivia, the pressure outside Congress from the unions was clearly politically motivated, since the COB pressured the president for equal representation on the board of state industries, and also demanded half of the posts in the administration. Parties to the right of Siles's administration (and within Siles's administration) fought every concession Siles ceded to the unions. For Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada the demands for his ouster first began with protests against tax hikes in the budget, and continued with other policy issues such as the gas war that ensued after the president's decision to export gas through Chilean ports, the economic programme in general and the coca eradication programme in particular. For Carlos Mesa, the same political problems continued, and although he attempted to appease the opposition, it was not enough to survive the full term. The Ecuadorean cases follow a similar pattern, and even though Bucaram was the "crazy" president, and was immersed in scandalous behaviour (Pérez-Liñán 2007), it was a political protest against his new economic policies involving price hikes that toppled him on February 5, 1997. Mahuad also fell as a result of contested economic policies, and particularly the reaction against the new economic measures taken in January 2000. Gutiérrez, on the other hand, seemed to be doomed from the day that he betrayed his partner, Pachakutik, and his promises of new policies, and instead decided to follow a more neoliberal path. Towards the end of his presidency the democratic regime was at stake, and even right after being elected Gutiérrez's presidency was tainted by a

campaign financing scandal. Nevertheless the first demands for his ouster were motivated by policy decisions, in particular reactions against the president's economic policies.

### **The presidential scandals**

Both in Brazil and in Paraguay the actors driving the impeachment procedures were elites in congress, but actions in congress were supported by popular pressure in the streets. The vertical challenges against Presidents Collor de Melo and Cubas were rather concentrated in time, and began after congress had started moving along the impeachment procedures against the presidents. In Paraguay, the vertical challenges appeared as an instant reaction to the murder of Argaña, but Congress had at that time already worked on several impeachment attempts against Cubas, and in Brazil the commission inquiring into the Collorgate case was already at work when the first vertical challenge against Collor appeared.

In terms of consequences, the street protests were short and concentrated before the impeachments, and died out instantly after the impeachments. The goal of the protests had been reached, the oppositions' battle had been won, and there were no longer any reasons to continue the protests in either country. Whereas street protests were concentrated around the impeachment proceedings in congress, a more long-lasting consequence for the presidential democracies in question may be increased levels of horizontal controls over the presidency. This has been clearly stated by observers of the Brazilian case (Cheibub Figueredo Forthcoming 2010; Stokes 2001), despite dim early evaluations of the fall of Collor de Melo (Weyland 1993). Given the fact that the case of Collor indeed could be understood as a mixed-member case between a scandal

and a policy interruption, one might expect changes in the policy arena as well. There is indeed a short reversal towards more statist solutions after the impeachment of Collor (Weyland 2002: 210), which supports a placement of the case as a policy interruption, but it is the continuation or moderate changes of Collor's market reforms both under Franco and Cardoso that best describe the developments after Collor (Weyland 2002: 135; Stokes 2001: 14). The changes in Brazil are of a different nature than the ones following after policy interruptions, and as Weyland (2002: 135) argues: "...while failing politically, Collor did help to reshape Brazil's economic agenda irreversibly".<sup>254</sup> In Paraguay, all presidents since Cubas have been challenged by congress on account of what can be defined as scandalous presidential behaviour. In Brazil congress has investigated cases of corruption involving both successors to Collor or their close collaborators. Thus, congress seems to have strengthened its role vis-à-vis the president as a result of the successful impeachments in these two countries. Interruptions motivated by presidential scandals, however, do not entail implications for presidentialism as a regime type, or for the regime's level of democracy.

### **Presidents violating core democratic principles**

If a president violates the democratic rules of the game, either the president leaves power (the case of Serrano), or democracy ends (the case of Fujimori). As with scandals, the main actors operating to remove the president are elites, supported by popular pressure. What is interesting to note, however, is the much greater involvement by international actors than in other types of presidential interruptions, particularly in pressing for a solution that involves the removal of the president. The

---

<sup>254</sup> The most important difference between the economic policies before and after Collor, is that while Collor failed to control hyperinflation, Cardoso succeeded.

type of interruption in question explains their participation in these crises. With democracy as the most dominant game in the Latin American town, the end of the cold war, resolution 1080 of the OAS, international actors make their voices heard when democracies are in peril (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a). The already very precarious democratic regimes were in peril in Guatemala, Dominican Republic, and Peru prior to the interruptions in these countries. In Guatemala, international reactions were swift and clear against Serrano's *autogolpe*,<sup>255</sup> helping and convincing national actors to stand firm against Serrano, and convincing notorious anti-democratic actors such as the CACIF and the army to oppose Serrano's move (Booth 2000; Villagrán de León 1993).<sup>256</sup> In the Dominican Republic the US and the OAS were the most important factors explaining Balaguer's early exit through a constitutional deal with the opposition (Graham 2008; Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010; Hartlyn 1998). Without this pressure, Balaguer would surely have stayed on as president until 1998. In Peru, the OAS were present in the country to negotiate between Fujimori and the opposition after the opposition-boycotted elections, and the U.S. had increased its pressure for democratic reforms prior to the elections in 2000 (Palmer 2006: 237), but international actors played a minor role compared to the cases of Serrano and Balaguer. However, the international presence and pressure was probably more important in Peru than in the cases of other types of interruption.

---

<sup>255</sup> For a detailed list of international reactions to Serrano's coup, see INCEP (1993).

<sup>256</sup> Serrano not only misread the internal situation in the country (he believed he had strong support for his moves), but also the different situation of Guatemala and Peru. Guatemala, a much smaller country than Peru, and much closer to the USA, was in a relatively speaking, much weaker position to end democracy than as Peru a year earlier. The increased linkage and leverage the USA had with Guatemala compared to Peru (Levitsky and Way 2006), probably also played an important role. However, judging so far by the case of Zelaya's ouster in Honduras, linkage and leverage seem to be more effective when elites are split on the matter of contention. In Honduras, the elites have so far remained united in opposition to Zelaya and the international pressure.

One might argue against this type that there was indeed international presence in other interruptions as well. Granted, in Paraguay in 1999, Brazil and Mercosur negotiated to prevent a further escalation of the crisis in the country, but only *after* the murder of Argaña and Congress's subsequent initiation of impeachment proceedings against President Cubas. The same can be observed in the case of Gonzálo Sánchez de Lozada, in which Argentina and Brazil intervened to secure a "peaceful solution" *after* he had been challenged in the streets, and the security forces' killing of demonstrators had made the situation spiral out of control (LAWR: 03-41). In this way, neighbouring countries have facilitated peaceful solutions by offering asylum for ousted presidents also in other cases.<sup>257</sup> The diplomatic solution in Paraguay was to offer Cubas asylum in Brazil, and in Bolivia to facilitate Sánchez de Lozada's exit out of the country. In the cases of Serrano and Balaguer, on the other hand, USA and the OAS *demand*ed the presidents' ouster,<sup>258</sup> and even in the case of Peru the OAS and the USA demanded reforms after Fujimori's "election" in 2000, and made unveiled threats as to the consequences if these were not met (LAWR: 00-26).<sup>259</sup> Therefore, in the cases of presidential violation of the democratic order, the international community is one of the first actors to push for the removal of the president, thus appearing on the scene *prior* to or at the same time as the first challenge to the president as coded in Table 7-1, above. In the other cases, international actors appear *after* the first challenge to negotiate and facilitate a solution (be that an interruption, or not).

---

<sup>257</sup> For instance Panama by receiving Abdalá Bucaram, and the Dominican Republic that received Carlos Andrés Pérez. By contrast, in the case of Zelaya, the international community immediately insisted on the return of the president to his home country.

<sup>258</sup> In Bolivia in 2003, two days before Sánchez de Lozada's resignation the OAS still argued that his resignation would be unconstitutional.

<sup>259</sup> The U.S. Congress also blocked 1.3 billion USD in funding for an anti-drug package, thus informally imposing sanctions on Peru (LAWR: 00-28).



In addition to the greater involvement of international actors, this type of interruptions can also explain why these presidents were not impeached despite impeachment-qualifying behaviour. The reason is that this type of presidential interruption is more likely to occur within regimes in which the degree of democracy is already in question.<sup>260</sup> The interruptions in Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Peru constitute the lowest scores on the Polity index for any country-year with a presidential interruption. Guatemala registered a 3 on the combined Polity-scale, the Dominican Republic 5, and Peru 1.<sup>261</sup> In these regimes lingering between delegative democracy (O'Donnell 1994) and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002), presidential powers tend to be comparatively stronger, and institutional autonomy relatively weaker, than in more institutionalised democracies. Therefore the institutions that should hold a president accountable for his or her actions, were not strong, or independent enough to do so. In the Dominican Republic, Congress was not, and has never been, strong enough to hold a president accountable for his actions even on minor issues (Marsteintredet 2009: chs. 4, 6), and the Supreme Court was politicised and under presidential control until 1996. In Peru, Congress and the Supreme Court lost power in the 1993 Constitution implemented by Fujimori, and both institutions were packed with his supporters (Mauceri 2006: 45-46).<sup>262</sup> In Guatemala, on the other hand, Congress was a relatively stronger actor, but highly discredited due to widespread rumours of corruption. In fact it was Congress's opposition to the President, and legislators' demands for bribes to support the president, that were the immediate causes of the *autogolpe* (Beltranena de Padilla 2009). The Supreme Court, however, was politicised (Alvarez Aragón 1999). The President of the Supreme Court at the

---

<sup>260</sup> Which leads some to exclude these cases from their analysis, see Hochstetler and Edwards (2009).

<sup>261</sup> The polity data can be found at: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>, see also Jagers and Gurr (1995).

<sup>262</sup> Fujimori lost his majority in Congress right before fleeing to Japan, and his resignation may have prevented an impeachment attempt.

time, Juan José Rodil Peralta, won his position after a deal with President Serrano, and was more known for his corrupt behaviour than anything else (Hernández 1992). Thus the controlling institutions, as is expected in weakly institutionalised democracies, were either too weak and/or discredited to take action against the president. Thus, the elites confronting the presidents were not acting within these institutions.

The outcomes of these interruptions relate more to the level of democracy than to presidentialism as a regime form. The regimes in question were borderline electoral authoritarian, and the outcomes improved the level of democracy in the regimes.<sup>263</sup> Furthermore, linked to the interruptions, constitutional reforms to remove “democratic” problems in the constitutions were implemented. Though constitutional reforms and entirely new constitutions have been written at numerous junctures in other countries as well, the reforms after the interruptions within this type are directly linked to the interruptions, and their causes.

**Table 7-3: Presidential interruptions and constitutional reforms**

<b>Countries</b>	<b>Guatemala</b>	<b>Dominican Republic</b>	<b>Peru</b>
<b>Reforms</b>	In 1995: Increased control of president, relations congress-president, new elections of congress and Supreme Court (arts. 157-158, 160-164, 165e,j, 173, and 184)	In 1994: Ban on immediate re-election, professionalisation of Supreme Court, separation of elections (arts. 49, 64, 121-122)	Ban on re-election (art 112). In 2002: Decentralisation (arts. 188-190)

Sources: Political Database of the Americas (PDBA 2009): <http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/constudies.html>; Nolte (2008)

<sup>263</sup> Guatemala went from 3 to 8 from 1993-1995 on Polity’s combined democracy scale, Dominican Republic from 5 to 8 from 1994-1996, and Peru from 1 to 9 from 1999-2001. As a comparison, the fuzzy case of Paraguay, which it may be argued is a case of a violation of the democratic order, scored a 7 on the combined Polity scale in 1999, and maintained that value for the years 2000 and 2001.

The reforms are closely connected to what has been perceived as the democratic problem causing the interruption. In both the Dominican Republic and Peru the re-election of authoritarian-minded presidents was clearly perceived as a problematic factor, and subsequently banned. In Peru, several of the centralising reforms Fujimori implemented in 1993 were reversed two years after Fujimori left power. In Guatemala, the constitutional reforms strengthened the control over the presidency to prevent the potential for a constitutional excuse for future *autogolpes*. Furthermore, the reforms became an elegant solution for the calling of early elections and renewing the corrupt Congress and Supreme Court (Arellano Rojas 2009). Constitutional reforms are regular and even frequent in some Latin American countries, but in the three countries in question, there have been very few reforms during the last democratic spell. The one in Guatemala is the only one since democratisation, in the Dominican Republic it was the first since 1966, and in Peru the reforms in 2000 and 2002 were the first since Fujimori's constitutional renewal in 1993. There should be no doubt then, considering the substance and the timing (and low frequency) of reforms in these countries that these worked to amend previous democratic problems and secure a transition towards more democracy.<sup>264</sup>

### **Policy interruptions**

The previous two types of interruptions are triggered by behaviour that warrants an impeachment, and challenges to these presidents have all been motivated by this behaviour. These interruptions are thus events that qualify for executive removals in any type of regime. It will become clear that several of the presidents in the group of policy interruptions also committed crimes that could qualify for impeachment. The

---

<sup>264</sup> Constitutional reforms in connection with full transitions to democracy is also quite regular, and is important for the consolidation of new democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996: 81-83).

difference is that in the two types of interruption presented above, this behaviour motivated the first challenge to the president, whereas in the cases that follow, the impeachment-qualifying behaviour occurred as a result of the challenge to the president (for instance in the violent handling of protesters in Argentina in 2001, and Bolivia in 2003, among other cases).<sup>265</sup>

The policy interruption, which is empirically the most important group with nine cases, is clearly different from the other two types. No constitutional ground exists for the early removal of presidents on account of policy differences in presidential systems. This group of cases thus affects both presidentialism, by relaxing the fixed terms, and democracy as such by removing presidents on dubious constitutional or even unconstitutional grounds and procedures.

As a contrast to the other two types of interruptions, the vertical challenges and conflicts are relatively more important for policy interruptions. The reason is connected to the lack of constitutional grounds to remove a president. Whereas in the two previous types of interruption, the cause for the interruption immediately trigger either institutional or international reactions, failed, or unpopular economic (or other) policies do not. This also explains why for instance in Ecuador, congressional elites and former presidents Borja, Hurtado and Febrés Cordero urged people to take to the streets to help them oust presidents Bucaram. Mahuad and Gutiérrez (LAWR, 97-05, 99-27, 04-21; Pachano 1997: 249). Lacking a constitutional rationale for a presidential removal, popular pressure creates a generalised sense of an ungovernable situation that helps put pressure and strains on the administration, and convinces the

---

<sup>265</sup> And, as Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) argue, the police and military handling probably contributed to these presidents' downfall.

other institutions such as congress or the supreme court to act against the president. In Argentina, Alfonsín himself said that his decision to resign early was clearly connected to the looting and social upheaval in the last week of May 1989 (Alfonsín 2004: 140-154), and in the case of de la Rúa the pictures of looting and protesters crying “*¡Que se vayan todos!*” were broadcast across the world.<sup>266</sup> Likewise, in Ecuador, Bucaram’s ouster was preceded by a vertical challenge that also called for the reversal of several economic measures the day before Congress declared Bucaram mentally incapacitated (Luna 1997: 207-208). The same pattern of generalised popular protests with political demands in addition to demands of presidential removals can be found in the two other cases of interruptions in Ecuador, the three cases in Bolivia, and in the case of Pérez’s impeachment in Venezuela.

The popular pressure in these cases, however, is not confined to the removal of presidents, but rather popular protests start with political demands, and only after some time, develop into demands for presidential removals. The removal of the president in these cases only satisfies *one* of the demands of the opposition. The political demands are not immediately satisfied, or easy to satisfy at all. Therefore, in the aftermath of presidential interruptions of this type, the high level of conflict continues, and may even lead to more challenges and interruptions.<sup>267</sup> These interruptions are part of processes of social change. The successors of the interrupted presidents immediately meet demands of policy changes, and of fixing whatever is defined to be wrong at the moment.

---

<sup>266</sup> See Ayuero (2007) for an analysis of the 2001 looting, in particular.

<sup>267</sup> Upon evaluating the level of conflicts after the interruptions I here include both challenges and regular conflicts since I am interested in the more general level of contention.

In Argentina, a count of political street protests registered in LAWR shows a higher number of these protests in 1990 than the preceding years, also horizontal conflicts continued at the same level throughout 1990 (see also Corrales 1997). Not until 1991 when hyperinflation, one of the principal causes of the fall of Alfonsín, was brought under control did the levels of conflicts in the streets and in congress go down (see also Weyland 2002: 126-127).<sup>268</sup> In Bolivia, after Siles Zuazo's early exit in 1985, one can find some of the same pattern, vertical conflicts and strikes continued at a high level even after inflation was brought under control in 1986-1987. In Venezuela, according to my registration in LAWR, the protests and pressures on both successors to President Pérez (first Ramón Velasquez as caretaker, and then Rafael Caldera), and the level of street protests against the deteriorating economic conditions increased every year until the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998.

In the interruptions in Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005), and the more recent interruptions in Bolivia (2003, 2005) and Argentina (2001), not only did the level of conflict remain high after the interruptions of the presidents, but more interruptions and challenges followed.<sup>269</sup> In Ecuador, Bucaram was toppled after the initiation of his economic policies built on Menem's model of reforms and with Domingo Cavallo as his advisor. The conflicts regarding economic policies led by newly mobilised indigenous groups continued into the Mahuad presidency and signalled the downfall of him as well (Zamosc 2007). In 2000 Lucio Gutiérrez allied himself with the

---

<sup>268</sup> Inflation reached levels of over 3,000% in 1989, 2,000% in 1990, and only 133% in 1991, and from then on it continued to decrease further (WDI 2008).

<sup>269</sup> Here I must qualify the case of Argentina. My definition excludes the early exit of President Duhalde as a presidential interruption since he was a caretaker president. However, also Duhalde left the presidency early by way of an early election he was forced to organise due to popular pressures against his presidency. Whether or not the case qualifies as an interruption is not important for the arguments here. It does, however, demonstrate that the level of conflict did not go down after the ouster of President de la Rúa in December of 2001. Several authors treat the Duhalde case as an interruption, see e.g. Llanos (Forthcoming 2010) and Hochstetler and Samuels (Forthcoming).

indigenous movement to topple Mahuad, and in the 2002 elections went to the polls in alliance with the indigenous party Pachakutik. Nevertheless, Gutiérrez's continuation of his toppled predecessors' policies earned him strong opposition in Congress and the streets, which ultimately led to his ouster. In Bolivia, the gas export issue generated enough opposition against Sánchez to oust him from the presidency, and despite Mesa trying to ameliorate the relations with the strong opposition led by Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales, congressional and street pressure against him was no lower than against Sánchez de Lozada. In 2005 Mesa, unable to satisfy the opposition's political demands, fell as well. In Argentina, the economic crisis led to de la Rúa's early exit, but the *piquetero* movement continued its pressure from the streets against Duhalde, who as Mesa, tried to satisfy the political demands he was confronted with. Pressure from congress and the streets, however, did not end, but rather ended the presidency of Duhalde early, in April 2003.

To conclude, even though presidential interruptions indeed are "corrective" measures of prior undesired behaviour of presidents, they fail to solve the ongoing political crisis when the demands of the opposition are broader than only the removal of the president. This explains why in some cases of interruption protests in congress and the streets continue, while in other cases these die out immediately after presidential interruptions. Protests and pressure against presidents will continue until the additional policy-related demands are confronted or dealt with by the incoming administrations. Failure to meet these demands will in all likelihood increase the risk for another interruption. Whereas in the two other types of presidential interruptions, the principal demand of the opposition is already met with the removal of the

president, in the policy interruption, the presidential interruption is only part of the solution.

***Policy change and policy-interruptions***

Another aspect sets this group of interrupted presidencies apart from the others: the vast policy changes that seem to follow in their aftermath.<sup>270</sup> And, as Elster (1989: 163) reminds us: “*There are two mistakes governments can and do make in a disequilibrium situation: to concede too little or too much.*”<sup>271</sup> Analysing the levels of success of the interrupted presidents’ successors within this type of interruption, the more successful presidents are not the ones that makes the mistake of conceding too little to the opposition, but rather the ones that do too much (or just enough).

There are two models for policy changes to be observed in the aftermath of presidential interruptions of this type (see Table 7-4). One immediate and vast, and one where only minor changes are implemented first, followed by repeated interruptions, and then vast changes.<sup>272</sup>

---

<sup>270</sup> I am not saying that the interruption necessarily helps the implementation of all details of vast policy changes, such as neoliberal reforms (for a wider discussion on this, see Corrales 1997), rather that it may help the initial presentation and launching of such changes. This argument seems to be in line with Weyland’s (2002) more general argument on market reform. However, Weyland as well as Corrales, focus more on economic crises. My argument relates more to political crises, and one particular type of presidential interruptions.

<sup>271</sup> And, then Elster (1989: 163) adds: “*Often, they do the former out of fear of doing the latter.*”

<sup>272</sup> Due to the timing of these interruptions, the two models also indicate policy changes in two separate directions: from heterodox, or import substitution industrialisation policies, towards neoliberalism in the early cases, and from neoliberal towards post-neoliberal policies in the latter cases.



Table 7-4: Two models of policy interruptions and policy change.

	<b>Interrupted president and successor</b>	<b>Direction</b>
<b>Immediate and vast</b>	Alfonsín → <b>Menem</b> Siles Zuazo → <b>Paz Estenssoro</b>	From ISI to neoliberalism
<b>Minor changes, repeated interruptions</b>	CAP → <i>Caldera</i> → <b>Chávez</b> Bucaram → Mahuad → Gutiérrez → <b>Correa</b> Sánchez de Lozada → <i>Mesa</i> → <b>Morales</b> De la Rúa → <i>Duhalde</i> → <b>Kirchner</b>	From Neoliberalism to post-liberalism, and new perspectives on democratic regimes in new constitutions

Notes: **Bold** indicates vast changes, *italic* indicates minor changes. The concept post-liberalism is from Arditi (2008), and is used for lack of a better word.

The immediate and vast changes describe well the changes after the two first presidential interruptions in Latin America, in Bolivia in 1985, and in Argentina in 1989.<sup>273</sup> In Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro initiated the period of pacted democracy in 1985 with decree 21060, which changed the economic course of that country, and signified a sudden break with his interrupted predecessor's policies. It is not inconceivable that the political and economic crisis and the total failure of the previous model helped muster support within the established political parties for this radical change. In Argentina, Menem in July of 1989 launched his neoliberal reforms helped by advisors from Bunge and Born, and market-reform friendly Alvaro Alsogaray from the centrist UCeDé (Unión del Centro Democrático) (Weyland 2002: 112-115, 120-121). Again the previous failure of Alfonsín in dealing with the economy facilitated an initial tacit support from the political parties and the CGT at the time (Levitsky and Way 1998). In the period between Menem's takeover in July till the inauguration of the new congress in December, the Radical party helped the passing of reforms by providing quorum in Congress and by not voting against Menem's measures.<sup>274</sup>

<sup>273</sup> Another element that differentiates the early from the late cases of policy interruptions is the apparent policy motivation of the challenge to the president. In the early cases the challenges are motivated by an uproar against failed attempts to stem and control hyperinflation, whereas in the latter cases the uproar has been reactions to the social consequences of neoliberalism. I thank Simone R. Bohn for bringing this to my attention.

<sup>274</sup> Alfonsín (2004: 145) himself argues that his prior failure to complete his term and deal with the economy indeed helped Menem implement what Alfonsín defines as reactionary policies.

I am not saying that interruptions caused changes in economic policies, different forms of neoliberal reforms occurred in most countries throughout Latin American in the eighties and nineties (see Stokes 2001: 3). However, I do think they may alleviate reactions to the neoliberal reforms that are the results of surprising policy switches. A cursory comparison of the three “most stunning” switches, support this notion (Stokes 2001: 45) The relative success of Menem and Paz Estenssoro stands in sharp contrast to the fate of President Pérez and his introduction of neoliberal reforms in 1989 in Venezuela. President Pérez’s *gran viraje* was met with the *Caracazo*, the great demonstration that ended in terrible violence. As such it seems that a prior crisis facilitates at least the initial presentation of neoliberal reforms. Menem’s relative success also contrasts with Fujimori’s “successful” neoliberal shock treatment, to the extent that Fujimori’s surprising policy switch created so much opposition in Congress that Fujimori in April 1992 decided to close it.<sup>275</sup> Both Fujimori and Menem were reelected, but only Fujimori had to close congress and turn autocratic to do so.

Despite continued pressure from congress and the streets Menem and Paz Estenssoro survived in office, and Menem even managed to reform the constitution and win a second term in office. On this count, the destiny of these two presidents contrasts with that of the ones that did not meet, or only came with half-hearted responses to, the demands that had accompanied the challenges to their predecessors. In the case of Venezuela, President Caldera initially reversed many of the economic policies of Pérez (Weyland 2002: 210). But about halfway through his presidential term, Caldera ditched his more heterodox approach to the economy, sought the support of the IMF and re-introduced several of the reforms his predecessor Pérez had introduced in 1989

---

<sup>275</sup> This move, on the other hand, was not unpopular at the time, and the results of the shock treatment were well received among most classes. Fujimori’s problems at the time was with competing elites, see Stokes (2001: 130-133).

(Weyland 2002: 218-219, 225-227).<sup>276</sup> Caldera failed to stem the social changes going on in Venezuela, and Chávez won the election in 1998. Chávez, on the other hand, soon implemented not only vast changes in the economic policies over the years, but also reformed the political regime through a Constituent Assembly and the writing of a new Constitution. The level of conflict in society did not recede, however, and in 2002 Chávez barely survived a coup, and attempts continued in the streets and via the constitution to remove Chávez through a recall referendum.

In Ecuador, Bucaram's successors continued with what the opposition defined as internationally supported neoliberal reforms. The lack of policy change spelled the demise of not only Mahuad, but also Gutiérrez after him. Correa elected in 2006, later changed the course of the economic policies demanded from the outset of the rise of the indigenous movements in the country, organised elections for a Constituent Assembly in September 2007, held a referendum on the Constitution a year later, and new congressional and presidential elections in April 2009. During this process Correa also followed Chávez in closing Congress upon the election of the Constituent Assembly.

Mesa conceded somewhat to the pressure on the gas issue by holding a referendum in July 2004 on increased taxes for international companies extracting natural gas in the country, but fell prey to what Elster called "*doing too little*", and, ultimately, lost a vote of confidence in Congress and resigned from the presidency in June of 2005. Evo Morales, elected in December of 2005, promised and delivered vast political changes by among other things nationalising the gas industry on May 1, 2006. In his efforts to

---

<sup>276</sup> Some of the same pendulum effect can be observed in Brazil, but to a much lesser extent than in Venezuela (Weyland 2002: 212-213).

found a new Bolivian State and regime, a Constituent Assembly was elected in 2006, and after a tumultuous and protracted process, a referendum over the new Constitution was held in January 2009. One observer has called this Bolivia's third revolution (Dunkerley 2007).

In Argentina, Duhalde, the peronist successor of the Radical de la Rúa, also aimed to reverse some of the failed policies of his predecessors. He implemented some emergency social policies, and clearly dissociated himself from the economic policies recommended by the World Bank. Yet, the changes were not sufficient to stave off continued pressure from below and in congress, and Duhalde was forced to hold early elections. The election of Kirchner in 2003, however, did mark the beginning of a clear move towards the left and new economic policies with more state intervention (Levitsky 2008: 109-110).

It is early to judge, especially the presidencies of Morales and Correa, but a pattern of the above analysis of policy interruption is clear. All policy interruptions are followed by rather vast policy changes, and this outcome is not found in the other types of presidential interruptions. Furthermore, despite continued political protests, the presidents who do "too much" after a presidential interruption tend to survive. Due to the previous discredit of the president, his or her policies, and the political or economic crisis in general, bold policy moves seem to be facilitated. Presidents who, on the other hand, linger on with failed policies (e.g. in Ecuador), or only make half-hearted attempts to please both the pressure from below, and international lenders at the same time (Mesa, Bolivia), experience that their survival is as much at risk as that of their fallen predecessors.

In sum, policy-interrupted presidents have implications for *presidentialism* by relaxing the fixed terms in a manner not constitutionally permitted in presidential regimes, for *democracy* by being constitutionally and democratically questionable incidents, and, on the face of it, for *policy* since these interruptions are followed by vast policy changes.

### **Two or three types of interruptions?**<sup>277</sup>

Two of the three types of interruption are primarily motivated by what I would define as a president's impeachment-qualifying behaviour which motivate challenges to presidents:<sup>278</sup> the scandals, in which the president violates the law, for instance through corrupt behaviour, and violations of core democratic principles. Both types may also be defined as scandals involving the presidents. Furthermore, both types of interruption have in common that the challenges to the presidents are confined to the removal of the president, and that the social and political turmoil die out immediately after the presidential interruption. The two cases of scandals were also considered fuzzy cases, Collor between scandals and policy interruption, and Cubas between scandal and democratic violation. The case of Pérez in Venezuela, which by many is defined as a scandal, was also a fuzzy case that I code as a policy interruption. Therefore, one could argue that the set of scandals is empty.<sup>279</sup> Should scandals and democratic violations be analysed as being the same type of interruption? Or, should

---

<sup>277</sup> This section has benefited from comments and criticisms made by Kathryn Hochstetler of a previous version of this manuscript.

<sup>278</sup> Again I insist on the difference between impeachment-qualifying behaviour that motivated the first challenge to presidents, and impeachment-qualifying behaviour that come as a result of a challenge to presidents.

<sup>279</sup> One could even argue for the use of Boolean minimation, which would make scandal as a motivating factor for successful challenges redundant (Ragin 1987: 93-95)

scandals be excluded as an independent type of interruption? My answer to both questions is *no*.

I believe that despite being close cousins, there is sufficient variation between the cases of scandals and democracy violation interruptions for them to be treated as distinct. First of all, democratic violations tend to occur in regimes that are semi-democratic at best, and the nature of the regime affects the logic of the interruption. The nature of the “scandal” is also one that induces international actors to actually demand or pressure for a presidential removal, and not only, as in other cases, intervene to secure a peaceful outcome. Furthermore, the outcomes of interruptions linked to democratic violations are different: only in these cases can one register a significant change in the democratic level, and with the exception of the constitutional reforms in Ecuador in 1998, only in these cases can one observe constitutional reforms linked to interruptions. Therefore, the distinct outcomes of scandals and democratic violations validate maintaining both types (Adcock and Collier 2001).

In relation to the second question, I think that previous contributions in the field focusing on scandals validate including the scandals as a proper type (Baumgartner and Kada 2003; Pérez-Liñán 2007). The type is also clearly defined by the use of the procedure of impeachments (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). Nevertheless, since scandals always seem accompanied by other factors, the question draws attention to the causal complexities behind each and every interruption, and also indicates that scandals, which I in my Chapter 2 argued was an *underlying* cause, maybe are endogenous to challenges to presidents, and are exposed only as the result of the other *underlying* factors.

### **Conclusions. Three types of presidential interruptions, and a typology?**

Above, I argued that the cases of presidential interruptions in Latin America fall into three types. In table 7-5, below, I summarise the commonalities within and differences between the types of interruptions.

**Table 7-5: A summary of the three types of interruptions**

	President	Location of primary challengers		Related constitutional reforms	Significant changes in democratic level	Posterior Policy switches	Continued turmoil	More interruptions
		Institution (International)	Street					
Scandals	Collor de Melo	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
	Cubas	Y	N	N	N	N	N	N
Violations of democracy	Serrano	Y (I)	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Balaguer	Y (I)	N	Y	Y	N	N	N
	Fujimori	Y (I .5)	Y (.5)	Y	Y	N	N	N
Policy Interruptions	Siles	Y (.5)	Y (.5)	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Zuazo							
	Alfonsín	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Pérez	N	Y	N	N	N (.5)	Y	N
	Bucaram	Y (.5)	Y (.5)	Y	N	N	Y	Y
	Mahuad	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	Y
	De la Rúa	N	Y	N	N	N (.5)	Y	Y
	Duhalde	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N
	Sánchez de Lozada	N	Y	N	N	N (.5)	Y	Y
	Gutiérrez	Y (.5)	Y (.5)	N	N	Y	Y	N
Mesa	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y	N	

Sources: Stokes (2001), Weyland (2002), Nolte (2008) my dataset in LAWR, and the Political Database of the Americas (PDBA 2009). I in brackets means international challenge. The value .5 indicates a fuzzy case, and partial value on that variable.

Table 7-5 summarises with a focus on the factors considered above and provides a structured comparison of the cases of interruption. The cases are organised according to type following Table 7-2, above, and are also in accordance with the coding in Table 5-3 in Chapter 5. It should be clear from the discussion above that the importance of the streets vs. institutional actors, and the implications of interruptions depend on the type of interruption. All presidents removed on account of scandals and democratic violations were primarily (and initially) challenged by national or international institutions. The only exception is Peru, where the march on July 28 was the first clear challenge to the president, and the international pressures were more empty threats than real challenges. Challenges from the streets were more prominent in six of the nine policy interruptions, or equally important as institutional challenges in the remaining three interruptions. These differences across the cases of interruptions have been largely ignored since all cases of interruptions mainly have been treated as being equal in terms of their causes and consequences. Congress, supported by popular protests and outrage, plays a crucial role in presidential scandals. When presidents violate core democratic principles, international actors also enter the arena negotiating with national elites, while popular protests in the streets, though clearly important, seem to play a relatively minor role. On the other hand, it is impossible to explain the cases of policy-interrupted presidents without referring to the vertical challenges including popular outrage, protests, lootings, etc. in the streets. In these cases, Congress and other institutional actors, rather play catch-up with whatever is going on outside their offices. The reasons for these differences seem to be related to the main cause or motivation for opposition to the president.



In terms of the outcomes of presidential interruptions, I also argue that there are systematic differences across the types of interruptions. The scandals dealt with through impeachment proceedings show that congress can hold presidents accountable despite previously held beliefs that impeachments are too cumbersome to be used (Linz 1994). Apart from this implication, this type of interruption seems to have few other implications for presidentialism, democracy or policy. Interruptions of presidents having violated democratic principles entail important, positive implications for the democracies in question, and can be linked to subsequent constitutional reforms. Only in the case of Ecuador in 1998 have I registered another constitutional reform directly linked to the interruption of a president. Despite constitutional reforms in the aftermath of the presidential ouster, there are few implications for presidentialism as a regime type, or the course of important policies. In contrast to the two above-mentioned types of presidential interruptions, to remove a president when the uproar against the chief executive is motivated by displeasure with the administration's policies, does not automatically resolve the situation. Therefore, protests tend to continue even after the interruptions, and unless policy switches occur, more interruptions may follow. In none of the other types of interruptions did I register continued turmoil, challenges or interruptions. Policy interruptions thus affect presidentialism as a regime type by removing presidents for reasons not grounded in the constitution, democracy (but not in a uniform or predictable manner), and policy.

Do the types of interruption constitute a typology of presidential interruptions? A type should share a combination of features that distinguishes it from other types of the same overarching phenomenon, and the types of a typology should ideally be

mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (George and Bennett 2005: 237-238). A good typology indicates a meaningful difference among types that may be explained as an outcome, or that may be used to explain other outcomes. The suggested types of presidential interruption may fall short of being jointly exhaustive, and maybe also of being mutually exclusive, but these are two ideal goals that are difficult to fully satisfy within the social sciences. Nevertheless, I think that the differences between the types of interruptions are meaningful, and Table 7-5 also indicates that, although falling short of creating mutually exclusive types, the patterns are evident enough to argue that the types discriminate well on a number of independent factors.

In terms of the two debates mentioned above, the suggested types help distinguish and explain why in some cases the challenges to presidents come from the streets, and in other cases from institutions nationally or internationally, and why in some cases the political and social turmoil continue after the interruption whereas in other cases the nightmare ends with the interruption. The explanations of these patterns also validate the typology.

In Chapter 2 I argued that outcomes of interruption would probably be linked to or depend on the causes of interruptions, and, since interruptions are forms of holding presidents accountable, that the outcomes would be a reactive sequence related to prior incidents. All interruptions seem to be followed by some sort of reactive sequence, but the prior incidents vary and thus the nature of the reactive sequence varies too. Granted, each case is preceded by a set of complex causes, but by simplifying this picture and focusing on the principal and explicit motivation of the challenges to the interrupted presidents, I have shown that the outcomes indeed

depend on a proxy for the most important cause of the interruption. Furthermore, one can discern a pattern of reactive sequences after interruptions that are related to this cause. Policy-interrupted presidencies seem to be followed by switches in policy, interruptions after democratic violations induce constitutional reforms to “fix” the democratic problem, and impeachments may have few consequences, but one consequence may potentially be increased controls of presidents to contain potential future agency loss.

No matter whether or not this relatively inductive exercise of creating types of presidential interruptions will survive as a typology, the exercise has highlighted that the outcomes of presidential interruptions are not uniform across all cases, and that the importance of the different actors in these processes also vary across cases. Furthermore, these differences seem to be systematic and have so far been overlooked in existing analyses. Therefore, this exercise of focusing on different causes of interruptions and different outcomes of the same phenomenon, represents a nuanced contribution to the debates regarding this new form of executive instability in Latin America.

## **Chapter 8 : Concluding Remarks**

### ***Introduction***

This dissertation has dealt with the new phenomenon of executive instability in presidential regimes in Latin America that I have called presidential interruptions. I approached the topic through the use of conceptual, and causal analysis applying qualitative, comparative and case-study analytical techniques, and quantitative, statistical techniques. The main data material for the dissertation came from a dataset on political conflicts in democratic countries in Latin America I created based on reading the Latin American Weekly Report, in addition to open data sources, secondary sources such as academic articles and books, and some interviews (Chapter 4).

The concluding chapter first gives a summary of the dissertation and the main findings, then it focuses on the original contributions of the dissertation, and it continues with some notions of what might become further areas of research, and ends with some thoughts of what interruptions mean for democracy.

### ***A summary of the empirical findings***

The goals were to first of all broaden the *understanding* of the phenomenon of executive instability in presidential regimes. I accomplished this through a comparison of the causes and procedures of presidential interruptions with other forms of executive instability such as the democratic breakdown and unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes (Chapter 3).

The second goal of this dissertation was to analyse the *causes* of presidential interruptions, i.e. why interruptions occur. To approach this task I distinguished

between *triggering* and *underlying* causes (Chapter 2), and analysed these separately. The reasons for separating these types of causes analytically were that such a model better captures the theoretical understanding of presidential interruption, and that it enabled me to enter the debate on institutions vs. the streets and presidential interruptions. I dealt with the *triggering* causes applying standard qualitative comparative techniques combined with process tracing, focusing primarily on which of the horizontal and vertical challenges were the primary trigger of interruptions. In Chapter 5 I found that vertical challenges, as expected (Hochstetler 2006), were more important than horizontal challenges in interrupting the executive branch. Moving on to the *underlying* causes I found that when controlling for the effect of horizontal conflicts, or deadlocks, among a series of other variables, vertical conflicts, or the general level of social contention, did not turn out as a significant causal variable for either interruptions or challenges (Chapter 6). On the other hand, horizontal conflicts, or executive-legislative relations, did have a significant effect on both interruptions and challenges.

However, that the level of street protests, *cacerolazos*, roadblocks, or demonstrations should have no effect on the likelihood of interruptions or challenges, seemed counterintuitive. My theoretical expectations were that only if conflicts were motivated by new and emerging cleavages challenging the status quo, or organised by new social movements or newly mobilised groups, would they have an effect on the interruptions and challenges. In keeping with my analysis in Chapter 3, based on different data, I found that conflicts mobilised on the traditional left-right cleavage, or organised by labour unions do not affect the likelihood of either an interruption or a challenge to the president. This negative finding of the most dominant type of

conflicts originating in the “streets” explains why other scholars have concluded that the general level of contention in the streets is not causally related to interruptions or challenges (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). My findings using a variable on conflicts motivated by regional and ethnic/cultural cleavages did confirm my theoretical expectations, since it turned out to be positively and significantly related to both interruptions and challenges. As a validity test, I ran the same model with conflicts divided into who organised the conflicts, and the results only confirmed previous findings. Conflicts organised by labour unions do not cause interruptions or challenges, whereas conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant organisations are causally related to interruptions and challenges.

The third goal was to explore the *outcomes* or *consequences* of presidential interruptions. In order to properly explore this topic, I argued for linking the outcomes to the causes of interruption. Since interruptions first of all are opposition-driven events, the way the opposition coins the arguments for removing the president is important for how the process pans out. Second, since interruptions, I argue, are forms of holding a president accountable, they might be considered reactive sequences. Therefore, outcomes are linked to causes. To simplify the complicated causal processes preceding interruptions, in Chapter 7 I focused on the motivation of the first challenge to remove the president. On this basis, I found basically three types of motivations for removing presidents: scandals, democratic violations, and policy. I found that there were few discernable consequences for presidential democracies after presidents interrupted due to scandals, but that congresses’ later impeachment attempts against the presidential successors in both Brazil and Paraguay may indicate increased levels of accountability. After interruptions caused by democratic

violations, I found, not surprisingly, that the levels of democracy increased considerably, but also that constitutional reforms to prevent further presidential democratic violations were taken. These cases included the interruptions in Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Peru. The last group of policy interruptions were all followed by, if not helped cause, vast policy changes in the countries in question. In the cases in countries that had not implemented neoliberal reforms at the time of interruption, interruptions, were, in part, caused by protests against economic crises involving hyperinflation. Immediately after the change in the executive branch in Bolivia in 1985 and Argentina in 1989, neoliberal reforms followed suit. In the cases of interruption that occurred after the implementation of neoliberal reforms, different degrees of reversals of these have so far been the end results. These are the cases of interruption in Argentina in 2001 (and 2003), Bolivia in 2003 and 2005, and Ecuador in 1997, 2000, and 2005.

### **Original contributions of the dissertation**

One of my more personal goals has been to provide an *original* contribution to the topic of executive instability in presidential regimes and contribute with not only systematic evidence on important causal variables explaining the phenomenon, but in particular to provide ideas for new approaches and comprehensions of the topic at hand. In order to contribute with some original ideas on the topic of interruptions I tried to combine various analytical techniques, in particular qualitative comparative analysis and quantitative analysis, I tried to use quantitative analysis for other purposes than what it normally is used for, I attempted to make some original comparisons across time and space, and finally, I sought to analyse interruptions as being complex and not only focus on the similarities across these cases, but also to



fully analyse the differences between them. In doing so I hope not to have contradicted my analyses in which I simplistically treat all interruptions as being identical.

In my dissertation I have provided the first comparison of the causes of interruptions and democratic breakdowns, thereby looking into the analogy between the two phenomena that has been important for much of the theorising and analyses on presidential interruptions. The goal was to use empirical analysis to conceptually clarify what a presidential interruption is, and is not, in addition to increasing the understanding of the phenomenon through comparative techniques. Chapter 3 clearly shows that while there are similarities, there are also stark differences between the two, even at the causal level. The conceptual clarification in this chapter has also consequences for how one should go about theorising the events of interruptions. Chapter 3 also provided an original contribution in the form of a comparison at the procedural level between presidential interruptions and unscheduled changes of executives in parliamentary regimes. It was demonstrated here that procedures in presidential regimes for interrupting presidents indeed are similar and equivalent to such procedures in parliamentary regimes. This chapter is the first comparison between different types of executive instability that involves presidential interruptions as one type of executive instability.

Methodologically I hope to have demonstrated why it is a good idea to disaggregate variables and concepts in order to improve conceptual and causal analysis. Often in comparative politics variables that conflate various dimensions are used for causal and other types of analysis. This approach often hides more than it reveals. Through

most of my dissertation I used the technique of disaggregating variables, which has enabled me to contribute with several new findings in my area of research. In Chapter 2 I displayed a theoretical model that disaggregated different types of causes: *triggering* and *underlying* causes. In Chapter 3, I looked at different procedures for interrupting presidents to compare interruptions to procedures for executive removal in other types of regime. In Chapters 5 and 6 I proceeded to analyse empirically the two levels of causality, first the *triggering* causes, and then the *underlying* causes. This approach helped me to get nuanced answers concerning the institutions vs. the streets debate, and also understand why there seems to be a disagreement among scholars on this issue. Theoretically in Chapter 2, and empirically in Chapter 6, I disaggregated the variable of general conflicts according to the type of cleavages that motivated the conflict, and which organisations orchestrated the conflict. Disaggregating the variable of general conflicts enabled me to find that conflicts mobilised on the traditional left-right cleavage did not affect the likelihood of challenges or interruptions, but that conflicts mobilised by new, emerging cleavages, in Latin America regional and ethnic cleavages, or organised by new social movements, or peasant unions, increased the likelihood of both. The conundrum of why vertical challenges triggered interruptions, while vertical conflicts did not cause interruptions, was only possible to solve by disaggregating a conflated variable used in causal analysis by other scholars. Finally, building on the motivations for challenging presidents, I disaggregated the concept of presidential interruptions in order to pursue an analysis of the consequences of interruptions. This enabled me to show what the consequences of interruptions are, that they vary across the cases in Latin America, and that this variation depends on the causes of interruption, and

thereby explain why other scholars only have come up with basically null-findings on this same topic (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming).

Another original contribution stems from my findings related to the institutions vs. the streets debate, where I hope to have come up with clear and concise answers in an area in which other researchers have conflated variables and different types of causes. My goal was to enter this debate, like Cheibub (2007) did for the regime and democracy debate, and provide the first full analysis of every step of the causal chain theorised to lead to interruptions. Disentangling the theoretical causal chain was the original theoretical idea that led to my original empirical contribution: the streets are more important than institutions as *triggering* causes, as *underlying* causes institutions are more important than the streets at the general level. Disaggregating the variable of general conflicts, I showed that contention in the streets affect the likelihood of interruptions and challenges if mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages, or organised by new social movements or peasant unions. My analysis is surely not the last word in this debate, but I believe my contribution has been the most thorough and complete so far.

### ***Presidential interruptions and further research***

The phenomenon of presidential interruptions as I have defined it is indeed a Latin American occurrence. The only incident outside Latin America is the impeachment of President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 (Fukuyama, Dressel, and Chang 2005; Kada 2003). If one also includes semi-presidential regimes, three more cases would

be added. The interruptions of President Wahid in Indonesia in 2001,<sup>280</sup> President Zafy in Madagascar in 1996 (Keesings 2009: 41254; Kim and Bahry 2008), and President Shevardnadze in Georgia in 2003 (McFaul 2005).<sup>281</sup> Still, there are only four cases of interruptions of presidents outside Latin America that satisfy the definition I used in this dissertation. There exists only two contributions comparing interruptions in Latin America with interruptions in other places (see, Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008), both are quantitative works, but in view of the relative paucity of other cases of interruption outside Latin America,<sup>282</sup> these methods give relatively limited insight into the uniqueness of the Latin American experience.

Inspired by my approach in Chapter 3, I would rather suggest conducting more qualitative comparative analyses between cases of interruption in Latin America and similar phenomena across time and space. If one would use the types of interruption I constructed in Chapter 7, I think cross-regional comparisons would be easier to conduct. How similar or different are interruptions of presidents after democratic violations in Latin America from the cases of the coloured revolutions in post-communist countries? All cases initially lead towards improved levels of democracy, all involve removing a less than fully democratic president. Are the requirements for a successful interruption of not fully democratic presidents in Latin America, the same as in Eastern Europe? How do different international and geographical contexts affect interruptions of presidents having violated core democratic principles in Latin

---

<sup>280</sup> Wahid was not formally elected, but rather the selected successor to President Suharto (Fukuyama, Dressel, and Chang 2005). Polity considers Indonesia a democracy since Wahid's selection in 1999, so I include the case.

<sup>281</sup> I do not include the Orange Revolution in Ukraine since President Kutchma decided not to run in that election. One could view Prime Minister Yanukovitch as the incumbent, and include the case, but I decided not to.

<sup>282</sup> Kim and Bahry include more cases of interruption outside Latin America but only because they conflate interruptions and democratic breakdowns (after being very careful not to conflate interruptions and transitions to democracy), and include semi-presidential regimes in their case-selection.

America and post-communist Europe? Baumgartner and Kada (2003) have already successfully applied such an approach in the study of presidential scandals and impeachments, and I think it would be useful to compare the cases of presidential interruptions due to democracy violations with similar cases in other regions.

What about policy-interruptions? None of the four cases of presidential interruption outside Latin America seems to be cases of policy interruption (see, Fukuyama, Dressel, and Chang 2005; Kasuya 2003; Allen 2003; McFaul 2005). As such, this type of interruption seems to be unique for Latin America. While scandals and democratic violations cause the removal of presidents in other regions, policy failures or disagreements, so far, have not. Given the fact that policy disagreements only can be considered grounds for removing the executive in parliamentary regimes, provided a majority supports such a motion, maybe the interruptions of this type are the cases one should compare with parliamentary challenges and failures? Recent cases for comparison might be the resignation of Prime Minister Haarde in Iceland after the economic meltdown in that country. Since policy interruptions in many cases entail the emergence of new cleavages, the reason for Latin, or rather South, America's uniqueness in this regard might be that the presidential and semi-presidential regimes in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and post-communist Europe are younger and less institutionalised, which would make it more difficult for an opposition based on new cleavages to emerge.<sup>283</sup> Further cross-regional research into the nexus between the nature of the regime and presidential interruptions with regard to the level of democracy, and the nexus between the institutional configuration (presidentialism vs.

---

<sup>283</sup> This would explain why Hochstetler and Edwards (2009: 47-49) find, to their surprise, that level of democracy (measured by Polity IV) has a positive effect on interruptions and challenges.

semi-presidentialism) and interruptions, could be very interesting and shed further light on different types and causes of presidential interruption.

Finally, several of the cases of policy interruption were linked to the emergence of new cleavages (Chapter 6). At least the interruptions in Ecuador, the two most recent interruptions in Bolivia, and the one in Venezuela fit this pattern. Could one also compare interruptions with executive instability across space *and* time? This would require difficult conceptual balancing exercises, but the more challenging the comparison, the potentially more rewarding the outcome. In an article, I tentatively suggested that interruptions in Latin America could lead to para-constitutional practices in the same way that the implementation of parliamentarism for a long time was only para-constitutional in several European countries (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). In line with such types of comparison, could one also compare the rise of new cleavages in the relatively young democracies in Latin America with the instability in the early days of full democracy in Europe? The early years of democracy after the extension of full suffrage in Europe were characterised by high levels of executive instability, but also by the emergence, manifestation, and representation of new cleavages in national political institutions. The regimes and the time-periods are clearly different, but both processes seem in some way linked to recent efforts at democratisation in young democracies. Questions that could be raised and maybe answered through such comparisons are: What are the links between democratisation and executive instability? What systems, or institutional arrangements, fall prey to executive instability due to the emergence of new cleavages? And, what systems manage to incorporate these new cleavages and institutionalise the conflicts that follow the mobilisation of them?

### ***Democracy and Presidential interruption***

Another great debate related to presidential interruptions in Latin America is whether or not these are good for democracy, or less normatively, what do they mean for democracy, democratic stability, or democratic quality? I have argued that the cases of interruptions are cases of holding the president accountable for actions or omissions, regardless of whether this type of accountability is spasmodic, intermittent, or regular. If it is, or rather was, the case that presidents in Latin America tilted more towards being delegative, than being immobile, then increased levels of accountability is a good thing. The ideal outcome for democracy would of course be that all presidents are able to complete their terms because they behave as in the fictitious Cardamom's Town created by Torbjørn Egner, where everyone "is nice and kind to each other". Then holding presidents accountable would never go to the extreme and a presidential interruption would be out of the question. However, it is more interesting, and realistic, to look at the question of what is the best outcome given a presidential crisis.

Given the presidential crisis leading to the interruption in each case, do better outcomes exist? During a presidential crisis, four outcomes are possible within the democratic framework: 1) The president is removed; 2) congress (and/or other institutions) is removed, 3) Both institutions are removed,<sup>284</sup> 4) Both (or all) institutions survive. In my Chapter 7, I also touched on this question arguing that interruptions, Outcome 1, due to presidential scandals, and a president's democratic violations, were clearly positive for democracy. The crisis has occurred due to a

---

<sup>284</sup> I exclude here any solution that ends democracy, such as a military coup that closes all democratic institutions.

president's involvement in a scandal or undemocratic behaviour, and the three other alternatives are clearly worse in light of democratic theory than removing the president.

What about policy interrupted presidents? On principle, and in practice, I would argue that closing congress, Outcome 2, is always a worse option than removing the president. Experience from Latin America shows that this leads either to the breakdown of democracy (Peru and Fujimori in 1992), or to increased levels of presidential dominance that may harm democracy (Venezuela and Chávez since 1999) (Corrales 2009). Outcome 3 may be ideal since one could assume that both congress and the presidency share the responsibility of the presidential crisis. The outcome is not very likely, however, since such an outcome almost by definition implies a change from a presidential to a parliamentary regime. Interruptions that have been followed by calls for early legislative and presidential elections are the ones that come closest to this outcome.

Therefore, the only other alternative that might be better than a presidential interruption, given a presidential crisis on policy issues, is that both institutions survive, Outcome 4. Under what circumstances is this outcome better than an interruption of the presidency? In principle, Outcome 4, the survival of both institutions, is better than an interruption under all circumstances, given the dubious constitutionality of presidential interruptions by other procedures than impeachment. In practice, however, it is not that easy. Presidential crises also entail political stalemates, political tensions, and increased polarisation, which need resolving. An interruption might be the quickest, and less violent, way out of the crisis, and as such,



potentially, a better solution than keeping both institutions intact. Considering the history of democratic instability in region, a presidential interruption is clearly a good outcome. On the other hand, if democracy is the institutionalisation of the peaceful solution of conflicts in a polity, then solving conflicts by breaking, or rather bending, the rules constitutes the failure of institutionalised democracy. Furthermore, the failure to solve a matter before it is pushed to extremes when presidential removal seems the better option is also a fiasco on the part of the political elites and democracy itself.

I have been thinking about these questions the last 3-4 years, and I cannot come up with any clear answers as to whether or not interruptions are good or bad for democracy in general, or in principle. The answer one arrives at depends very much on the counterfactual, or frame of comparison. If the counterfactual is democratic breakdown, then interruption of a president is a relatively good outcome, if the counterfactual is one of the four outcomes possible in a democracy that I sketched above, the answer is not that clear. I think that by distinguishing between different types of interruptions as I suggested in Chapter 7, I have pushed the debate somewhat further by being able to single out some cases of interruption that clearly entails positive consequences for democracy, and explain why they are good for democracy. I can only hope that my own work in this dissertation can spur further comparative research in order to increase our understanding of the causes and outcomes of the phenomenon of presidential interruptions.

## List of references

- Abente-Brun, Diego. 1999. "People power" in Paraguay. *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3):93-100.
- Adcock, Robert, and David Collier. 2001. Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. *American Political Science Review* 95 (3):529-546.
- Alcántara Saez, Manuel. 2009. Centroamérica: viejo escenario en tiempos nuevos de crisis. *Política Exterior* 131:1-10.
- Alfonsín, Raúl. 2004. *Memoria política. Transición a la democracia y derechos humanos*. Buenos Aires: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
- Allen, Philip M. 2003. Impeachment as Parliamentary Coup d'État. In *Checking Executive Power. Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective*, edited by J. C. Baumgartner and N. Kada. Westport: Praeger, 81-94.
- Alvarez Aragón, Rosa María. 1999. Los tropiezos de la democracia: Guatemala 1991-1993. *Política y Sociedad* 37:65-76.
- Alvarez, Michael E. 1998. Presidentialism and parliamentarism: Which works? Which lasts? PhD-dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago.
- Alvarez, Michael E., and Leiv Marsteintredet. Forthcoming 2010. Presidential and Democratic Breakdowns in Latin America: Similar Causes, Different Outcomes. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,
- Ames, Barry. 2001. *The deadlock of democracy in Brazil, Interests, identities, and institutions in comparative politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

- Arce, Moises. 2008. The Repoliticization of Collective Action After Neoliberalism in Peru. *Latin American Politics and Society* 50 (3):37-62.
- Arce, Moises, and Paul T. Bellinger Jr. 2007. Low-Intensity Democracy Revisited. The Effects of Economic Liberalization on Political Activity in Latin America. *World Politics* 60:97-121.
- Arditi, Benjamin. 2008. Arguments about the Left Turns in Latin America. A Post-Liberal Politics? *Latin American Research Review* 43 (3):59-81.
- Arellano Rojas, Gabriel. 2009. Personal Interview (02/04-2009). Guatemala City.
- Auyero, Javier. 2007. *Routine Politics and Violence in Argentina, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Banks, Arthur. 2008. Arthur Banks' Cross-National Time Series Data Archives: Databanks International.
- Baumgartner, Jody C. 2003. Introduction: Comparative Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective. In *Checking Executive Power. Presidential Impeachment*, edited by J. C. Baumgartner and N. Kada. Westport: Praeger, 1-20.
- Baumgartner, Jody C., and Naoko Kada, eds. 2003. *Checking Executive Power. Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective*. Westport: Praeger.
- Beltranena de Padilla, María Luisa. 2009. Personal Interview (01/04-2009). Guatemala City.
- Beltranena, Francisco. 2009. Personal Interview (02/04-2009). Guatemala City.
- Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times. The Citiernry and the Breakdown of Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Birnir, Jóhanna Kristín, and Donna Lee Van Cott. 2007. Disunity in Diversity. Party System Fragmentation and the Dynamic Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity on Latin American Legislatures. *Latin American Research Review* 42 (1):99-125.
- Booth, John A. 2000. Global Forces and Regime Change: Guatemala in the Central American Context. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42 (4):59-87.
- Brady, Henry E., and David Collier, eds. 2004. *Rethinking social inquiry: diverse tools, shared standards*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Breuer, Anita. 2008. Policymaking by Referendum in Presidential Systems: Evidence from the Bolivian and Colombian Cases. *Latin American Politics and Society* 50 (4):59-89.
- Bucaram Ortiz, Abdalá. 1998. *Golpe de Estado*. Guayaquil: PREdiciones.
- Buitrago, Miguel. Forthcoming 2010. Civil Society, Social protest and presidential breakdowns in Bolivia. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave MacMillan,
- Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon Wolchik. 2009. Getting Real About "Real Causes". *Journal of Democracy* 20 (1):69-73.
- Calvo, Ernesto, and María Victoria Murillo. 2005. A New Iron Law of Argentine Politics? Partisanship, Clientelism, and Governability in Contemporary Argentina. In *Argentine democracy: the politics of institutional weakness*, edited by S. Levitsky and M. V. Murillo. University Park, Pa: Pennsylvania State University Press, 207-226.
- Cameron, Maxwell. 1997. Political and Economic Origins of Regime Change in Peru: The Eighteenth Brumaire of Alberto Fujimori. In *The Peruvian Labyrinth*:

- Polity, Society, Economy*, edited by M. Cameron and P. Mauceri. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 37-70.
- . 2006. Endogenous Regime Breakdown: The Vladivideo and the Fall of Peru's Fujimori. In *The Fujimori Legacy. The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism*, edited by J. Carrión. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 268-293.
- Cameron, Maxwell A., and Philip Mauceri, eds. 1997. *The Peruvian labyrinth: Polity, Society, Economy*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Carey, John M. 2005. Presidential vs. Parliamentary Government. In *Handbook of New Institutional Economics*, edited by C. Ménard and M. M. Shirley. Dordrecht: Springer, 91-123.
- Carrión, Julio F., ed. 2006. *The Fujimori legacy. The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Castañeda, Jorge G. 2006. Latin America's left turn. *Foreign Affairs* 85 (3):28-43.
- Centellas, Miguel. 2009. Electoral Reform, Regional Cleavages, and Party System Stability in Bolivia. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1 (2):115-132.
- CEPAL. 2008. *Inflación Mensual América Latina, 1980-2008*.
- Cheibub Figueredo, Argelina. Forthcoming 2010. The Collor Impeachment and Presidential Government in Brazil. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,

- Cheibub, José Antonio. 2002. Minority governments, deadlock situations, and the survival of presidential democracies. *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (3):284-312.
- . 2006. Presidentialism, electoral identifiability, and budget balances in democratic systems. *American Political Science Review* 100 (3):353-368.
- . 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, and Fernando Limongi. 2002. Democratic institutions and regime survival: Parliamentary and presidential democracies reconsidered. *Annual Review of Political Science* 5:151-179.
- Cheibub, José Antonio, Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian M. Saiegh. 2004. Government coalitions and legislative success under presidentialism and parliamentarism. *British Journal of Political Science* 34:565-587.
- Christensen Bjune, Maren, and Stina Petersen. Forthcoming 2010. Guarding privileges and saving the day: Guatemalan elites and the settlement of the Serranazo. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,
- Christophersen, Jens A. 1969. *Representant og velger*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Collier, D. 1995. Translating Quantitative Methods for Qualitative Researchers - the Case of Selection Bias. *American Political Science Review* 89 (2):461-466.
- Collier, D., and J. Mahoney. 1996. Insights and pitfalls - Selection bias in qualitative research. *World Politics* 49 (1):56-+.

- Collier, David, Jody La Porte, and Jason Seawright. nd. Putting Typologies to Work: Levels of Measurement, Concept-Formation, and Analytic Rigor. Unpublished Manuscript.
- Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. Democracy with adjectives - Conceptual innovation in comparative research. *World Politics* 49 (3):430-451.
- Collier, David, and James E. Mahon. 1993. Conceptual Stretching Revisited - Adapting Categories in Comparative-Analysis. *American Political Science Review* 87 (4):845-855.
- Collier, Ruth Berins, and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the political arena : critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Conaghan, Catherine M. 2007. The 2006 presidential and congressional elections in Ecuador. *Electoral Studies* 26 (4):823-828.
- Coppedge, Michael. 1997. A Classification of Latin American Political Parties. In *Kellogg Institute Working Paper Series*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.
- . 1998. The Evolution of Latin American Party Systems. In *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and A. Valenzuela. Boulder: Westview Press, 171-206.
- . 2003. Venezuela: Popular Sovereignty versus Liberal Democracy. In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America* edited by J. I. Domínguez and M. Shifter. Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 165-192.

- Corrales, Javier. 1997. Do Economic Crises Contribute to Economic Reform? Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s. *Political Science Quarterly* 112 (4):617-644.
- . 2009. Power Asymmetries and the Origin of Constitutions: Latin America, 1987-2009. In *American Political Science Association Annual Meeting*. Toronto, Canada.
- Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale university press.
- Di Tella, Torcuato S. 2004. *History of Political Parties in Twentieth-Century Latin America*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers. Original edition, Historia de los partidos políticos en América Latina, siglo XX.
- Diamond, Larry. 2002. Thinking about hybrid regimes. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2):21-35.
- Díaz Santana, Juan Bolívar. 1996. *Trauma Electoral*. Santo Domingo: Mograf S.A.
- Doyle, David. 2009. The Bifurcation of the Left in Contemporary Latin American Politics: Democratic legitimacy and public trust. Paper read at 5th ECPR General Conference, 10-12 September, at Potsdam, Germany.
- Dunkerley, J. James. 2007. Evo Morales, the 'Two Bolivias' and the Third Bolivian Revolution. *Journal of Latin American studies* 39 (1):133.
- Edwards, Margaret E. 2007. Presidential Survival in South America: Analyzing Institutional, Economic and Social Factors. In *Congress of the Latin American Studies Association*. Montréal.
- . 2009. Determinants of Contentious Political Participation: An Analysis of Citizen's Survey Responses. Paper read at Annual Meeting in the American Political Science Association, September 3-6, at Toronto.



- Elgie, Robert. 2005. From Linz to Tsebelis: Three waves of presidential/parliamentary studies? *Democratization* 12 (1):106-122.
- Ellner, Steve. 2005. The Emergence of a New Trade Unionism in Venezuela with Vestiges of the Past. *Latin American Perspectives* 32 (2):51-71.
- Elster, Jon. 1989. *Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2007. *Explaining Social Behavior. More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Esping-Andersen, Gösta. 1990. *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Faundez, Julio. 1997. In Defense of Presidentialism: The Case of Chile. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 300-320.
- Fukuyama, Francis, Björn Dressel, and Boo-Seung Chang. 2005. Facing the perils of presidentialism? *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2):102-116.
- Gamarra, Eduardo A. 1997. Hybrid Presidentialism and Democratization: The case of Bolivia. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 363-394.
- . 2008. Bolivia. Evo Morales and Democracy. In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, edited by J. I. Domínguez and M. Shifter. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 125-151.
- Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (11):1279-1301.

- Gans-Morse, Jordan, and Simeon Nichter. 2008. Economic Reforms and Democracy: Evidence of a J-Curve in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (10):1398-1426.
- García Montero, Mercedes. 2004. El Procedimiento Legislativo en América Latina. *América Latina Hoy* 38:17-55.
- . 2006. Presidentes y Parlamentos: un análisis sobre el control de la actividad legislativa en América Latina. PhD dissertation, Departamento de Derecho Público General. Área de Ciencia Política y de la Administración, Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca.
- . 2007. La actividad legislativa en América Latina: sobre el papel reactivo y proactivo de Presidentes y Parlamentos. *Lateinamerika Analysen* 17 (2):3-35.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1990. How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis* 2 (1):131-150.
- . 1994. *Politician's dilemma: building state capacity in Latin America*, California series on social choice and political economy ; 25. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press.
- . 2003. *Paradigms and sand castles: theory building and research design in comparative politics, Analytical perspectives on politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences, BCSIA studies in international security*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Gerring, John. 2007. *Case study research: principles and practices*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Goertz, Gary. 2006. *Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Graham, John W. 2008. Dominican Republic 94 - Stepping back from the precipice, November 4, at FUNGLODE, Santo Domingo.
- Gramajo, Silvio René. 2009. Personal Interview (31/03-2009). Guatemala City.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Haarstad, Håvard. 2009. Changing conditions for political practice: FDI discourse and political spaces for labor in Bolivia, Department of Geography, University of Bergen, Bergen.
- Haarstad, Håvard, and Vibeke Andersson. Forthcoming. Backlash reconsidered: the interrelations between neoliberalism and popular mobilization in Bolivia. *Latin American Politics and Society*.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan. 1994. Crisis-Ridden Elections (Again) in the Dominican-Republic - Neopatrimonialism, Presidentialism, and Weak Electoral Oversight. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 36 (4):91-144.
- . 1998. *The struggle for democratic politics in the Dominican Republic, H. Eugene and Lillian Youngs Lehman series*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
- Hartlyn, Jonathan, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1994. Democracy in Latin America since 1930. In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, edited by L. Bethell. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 99-163.
- Heath, Roseanna Michelle. 2007. Presidential and congressional elections in Chile, December 2005 and January 2006. *Electoral Studies* 26 (2):516-520.
- Helmke, Gretchen. 2007. The Origins of Institutional Crises in Latin America: A Unified Strategic Model and Test. Unpublished manuscript.

- Hempel, Carl G. 1942. The Function of General Laws in History. *The Journal of Philosophy* 39 (2):35-48.
- Hernández, Iduvina. 1992. Su ambición de poder lo llevó a prostituir la ley. *Crónica*, July 2, 16-21.
- Hernández, José, Marco Aráuz, Byron Rodríguez V., and Leonel Bejarano. 2000. *21 de enero. La vorágine que acabó con Mahuad*. Quito: C.A. El comercio.
- Heston, Alan, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten. 2006. Penn World Table Version 6.2: Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania.
- Hochstetler, Kathryn. 2006. Rethinking Presidentialism: Challenges and Presidential Falls in South America. *Comparative Politics* 38 (4):401-418.
- Hochstetler, Kathryn, and Margaret E. Edwards. 2009. Failed Presidencies: Identifying and Explaining a South American Anomaly. *Journal of Politics in Latin America* 1 (2):31-57.
- Hochstetler, Kathryn, and David Samuels. Forthcoming. Crisis and Rapid Re-equilibration: The Consequences of Presidential Challenge and Failure In Latin America. *Comparative Politics*.
- Huber, John D. 1996. The vote of confidence in parliamentary democracies. *American Political Science Review* 90 (2):269-282.
- INCEP. 1993. La crisis político-constitucional de Guatemala. Del golpe de Estado de Jorge Serrano a la Presidencia Constitucional de Ramiro de León Carpio. In *Panorama Centroamericano*. Ciudad de Guatemala: Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios Políticos.
- Jagers, Keith, and Ted. R. Gurr. 1995. Tracking Democracy 3rd-Wave with the Polity-III Data. *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (4):469-482.

- Jones, Mark P. 1995. *Electoral laws and the survival of presidential democracies*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
- Kada, Naoko. 2003. Impeachment as a Punishment for Corruption? The Cases of Brazil and Venezuela. In *Checking Executive Power. Presidential Impeachment in Comparative Perspective*, edited by J. C. Baumgartner and N. Kada. Westport: Praeger, 113-136.
- Kasuya, Yuko. 2003. Weak Institutions and Strong Movements: The Case of President Estrada's Impeachment and Removal in the Philippines. In *Checking Executive Power. Presidential Impeachments in Comparative Perspectives*, edited by J. C. Baumgartner and N. Kada. Westport and London: Praeger Publishers, 45-64.
- Keesings. 2009. Keesing's record of World Events.
- Kennedy, Peter. 2003. *A guide to Econometrics*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Kim, Young Hun, and Donna Bahry. 2008. Interrupted Presidencies in Third Wave Democracies. *The Journal of Politics* 70 (3):807-822.
- King, Gary, Sidney Verba, and Robert O. Keohane. 1994. *Designing social inquiry. Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- King, Gary, and Langche Zeng. 2001a. Explaining rare events in international relations. *International Organization* 55 (3):693-715.
- . 2001b. Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data. *Political Analysis* 9 (2):137-163.
- Kurtz, Marcus J. 2004. The dilemmas of democracy in the open economy - Lessons from Latin America. *World Politics* 56 (2):262-+.

- Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. The "Effective" Number of Parties. A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1):3-27.
- LADB. 2009. Latin America Data Base: Latin American and Iberian Institute, University of New Mexico.
- Lakoff, George. 1987. *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Lalander, Rickard. Forthcoming 2010. The impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez and the collapse of the Venezuelan Partyarchy. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,
- Laserna, Roberto, Jesús Ortego, and Douglas Chacón. 2006. Conflictividad sociolaboral en Bolivia. Estudios y reflexiones. La Paz: Departamento de Prevención de Crisis y Misiones Especiales de la Subsecretaría de Asuntos Políticos de la Organización de los Estados Americanos.
- LAWR. Latin American Weekly Report.
- Lean, Sharon F. 2007. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Nicaragua, November 2006. *Electoral Studies* 26 (4):828-832.
- Levitsky, Steven. 1999. Fujimori and post-party politics in Peru. *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3):78-92.
- . 2008. Argentina: Democracy and Institutional Weakness. In *Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America*, edited by J. I. Domínguez and M. Shifter. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 99-123.

- Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 1998. Between a Shock and a Hard Place. The Dynamics of Labor-Backed Adjustment in Poland and Argentina. *Comparative Politics* 30 (2):171-192.
- . 2002. The rise of competitive authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2):51-65.
- . 2005. International linkage and democratization. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3):20-34.
- . 2006. Linkage versus leverage - Rethinking the international dimension of regime change. *Comparative Politics* 38 (4):379-400.
- Lijphart, Arend. 1999. *Patterns of democracy : government forms and performance in thirty-six countries*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Linz, Juan J. 1978. *The Breakdown of democratic regimes: crisis, breakdown & reequilibration*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 1990. The Perils of Presidentialism. *Journal of Democracy* 1 (1):51-69.
- . 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? In *The Failure of presidential democracy*, edited by J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 3-90.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M., and Stein Rokkan. 1967a. Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction. In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1-64.

- , eds. 1967b. *Party systems and voter alignments : cross-national perspectives, International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research ; 7*. New York: Free Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M., K. R. Seong, and J. C. Torres. 1993. A Comparative-Analysis of the Social Requisites of Democracy. *International Social Science Journal* 45 (2):154-175.
- Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democracy. Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *American Political Science Review* 53 (1):69-105.
- Llanos, Mariana. 2007. Minority Governments and Interrupted Presidencies: The Modern Iron Law of Argentine Politics. In *First Joint Session of Workshops of Latinamericanists of the Institut für Iberoamerika-Kunde, GIGA-Hamburg, and the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen*. Bergen.
- . Forthcoming 2010. Presidential Breakdowns in Argentina. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 55-71.
- Llanos, Mariana, and Ana Margheritis. 2006. Why do Presidents fall? Political leadership and the Argentine crisis (1999-2001). *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40 (4):77-103.
- Llanos, Mariana, and Leiv Marsteintredet. 2010. Epilogue. The Breakdown of Zelaya's presidency: Honduras in Comparative Perspective. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan,



- , eds. Forthcoming 2010. *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*. New York and London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- López Maya, Margarita. 2003. The Venezuelan Caracazo of 1989: Popular protest and institutional weakness. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 35:117-137.
- López Maya, Margarita, and Luis Lander. 2005. Popular protest in Venezuela - Novelties and continuities. *Latin American Perspectives* 32 (2):92-108.
- Luna, Milton. 1997. Bucaram, ¡¡Fuera!!: La voz de los movimientos profundos. In *¿Y ahora qué...? Una contribución al análisis político-histórico del país*, edited by R. Báez, E. Ribadeneira, A. Acosta, F. Muñoz, A. Carrión, W. Paredes, C. Verduga, M. Luna, S. Pachano, M. Donoso Pareja and R. Rosero Jácome. Quito: Eskeletra Editorial, 229-264.
- Madrid, Raúl L. 2005a. Ethnic cleavages and electoral volatility in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 38 (1):1-20.
- . 2005b. Indigenous Parties and Democracy in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society* 47 (4):161-179.
- . 2007. The Indigenous Movement and Democracy in Bolivia. In *Prospects for Democracy in Latin America*. University of North Texas.
- Mahoney, James. 2000. Path dependence in historical sociology. *Theory and Society* 29 (4):507-548.
- . 2001. *The Legacies of Liberalism. Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- . 2008. Toward a Unified Theory of Causality. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4-5):412-436.

- Mahoney, James, Erin Kimball, and Kendra L. Koivu. 2009. The Logic of Historical Explanation in the Social Sciences. *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (1):114-146.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. Presidentialism in Latin-America. *Latin American Research Review* 25 (1):157-179.
- . 1993. Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy - the Difficult Combination. *Comparative Political Studies* 26 (2):198-228.
- . 1998. Introduction: Juan Linz and the Study of Latin American Politics. In *Politics, Society, and Democracy: Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and A. Valenzuela. Boulder: Westview Press, 1-26.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Ana María Bejarano, and Eduardo Pizarro Leongómez, eds. 2006. *The Crisis of democratic representation in the Andes*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2001. Classifying political regimes in Latin America, 1945-1999. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (1):37-65.
- Mainwaring, Scott, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds. 1992. *Issues in democratic consolidation: the new South American democracies in comparative perspective*. Notre Dame, Ind.: Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of Notre Dame Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2003. Level of Development and Democracy: Latin American Exceptionalism, 1945-1996. *Comparative Political Studies* 36 (9):1031-1037.
- . 2005a. Latin American Democratization since 1978: Democratic Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions. In *The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin*

- America: Advances and Setbacks*, edited by F. Hagopian and S. Mainwaring. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 14-63.
- . 2005b. Why Regions of the World are Important: Regional Specificities and Region-Wide Diffusion of Democracy. In *The Kellogg Institute Working Papers*. Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute for International Studies.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully. 1995. Introduction. Party Systems in Latin America. In *Building Democratic Institutions. Party Systems in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1-34.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Christopher Welna, eds. 2003. *Democratic accountability in Latin America*. Edited by S. Mainwaring and C. Welna. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mainwaring, Scott, and Edurne Zoco. 2007. Political sequences and the stabilization of interparty competition - Electoral volatility in old and new democracies. *Party Politics* 13 (2):155-178.
- Mair, Peter. 1997. *Party system change. Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Malamud, Andrés. 2006. Social Revolution or Political Takeover? The Argentine Collapse of 2001 Reassessed. Paper read at XXVI Latin American Studies Association Congress, March 15-18, at San Juan.
- . 2008. Winning Elections versus Governinng: A Two-Tier Approach to Party Adaptation in Argentina, 1983-2003. In *New Frontiers on Institutional Research in Latin America*. Hamburg: GIGA.

- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. The New Institutionalism - Organizational-Factors in Political Life. *American Political Science Review* 78 (3):734-749.
- Marsteintredet, Leiv. 2007. Graded Conceptual Membership. Linking Radial Concepts and Fuzzy Sets in the Study of Democracy. Working paper.
- . 2008a. Executive-Legislative Deadlocks in the Dominican Republic. *Latin American Politics and Society* 50 (2):131-160.
- . 2008b. Las consecuencias sobre el régimen de las interrupciones presidenciales en América Latina. *América Latina Hoy* (49):31-50.
- . 2009. *Political Institutions and Democracy in the Dominican Republic. A comparative case-study*. Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag.
- . Forthcoming 2010. The fall of President Balaguer: Presidential Breakdown or Democratic Transition? In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,
- Marsteintredet, Leiv, and Einar Berntzen. 2008. Reducing the Perils of Presidentialism in Latin America through Presidential Interruptions. *Comparative Politics* 41 (1):83-101.
- Marsteintredet, Leiv, and Mariana Llanos. 2009. Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America: Between Breakdowns of Democracy and Changes of Government. In *ECPR General Conference*. Potsdam, Germany.
- Mauceri, Philip. 2006. An Authoritarian Presidency: How and Why Did Presidential Power Run Amok in Fujimori's Peru? In *The Fujimori Legacy. The Rise of*

- Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by J. Carrión. University Park: Pennsylvania University Press, 39-60.
- Mayhew, David R. 1991. *Divided we govern : party control, lawmaking, and investigations, 1946-1990*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- McClintock, Cynthia. 2006. Electoral Authoritarian Versus Partially Democratic Regimes: The Case of the Fujimori Government and the 2000 Elections. In *The Fujimori Legacy. The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism*, edited by J. Carrión. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 242-267.
- McCoy, Jennifer. ed. 2000. *Political learning and redemocratization in Latin America. Do politicians learn from political crises?* Miami: North-South Center Press.
- McFaul, Michael. 2005. Transitions from postcommunism. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3):5-19.
- Mejía Acosta, Andrés. 2006. Crafting Legislative Ghost Coalitions in Ecuador. Informal Institutions and Economic Reform in an Unlikely Case. In *Informal Institutions and Democracy. Lessons from Latin America*, edited by G. Helmke and S. Levitsky. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 69-86.
- Mejía Acosta, Andrés, and John Polga-Hecimovich. Forthcoming 2010. Parliamentary Solutions to presidential crises in Ecuador. In *Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Causes and Outcomes of Executive Instability in Developing Democracies*, edited by M. Llanos and L. Marsteintredet. New York, London: Palgrave Macmillan,
- Midtbø, Tor. 2007. *Skandaler i norsk politikk*. Oslo: Universitetsforl.

- Mill, John Stuart. 1868. *A System of Logic. Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation*. 7th ed. London: Longmans, Green, Reader and Dyer.
- Mooney Marini, Margaret, and Burton Singer. 1988. Causality in the Social Sciences. *Sociological Methodology* 18:347-409.
- Morgenstern, Scott, Juan Javier Negri, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán. 2008. Parliamentary Opposition in Non-Parliamentary Regimes: Latin America. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 14 (1/2):160-189.
- Munck, Gerardo L. 2004. Democratic politics in Latin America: New debates and research frontiers. *Annual Review of Political Science* 7:437-462.
- Murillo, Maria Victoria. 2001. *Labor unions, partisan coalitions and market reforms in Latin America, Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. Cambridge, UK New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
- Murillo, María Victoria, and Andrew Schrank. 2005. With a little help from my friends. Partisan Politics, Transnational Alliances, and Labor Rights in Latin America. *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (8):971-999.
- Mustapic, Ana María. 2005. Inestabilidad sin colapso. La renuncia de los presidentes: Argentina en el año 2001. *Desarrollo Económico* 45 (178):263-280.
- Negretto, Gabriel L. 2006. Minority Presidents and Types of Government in Latin America. *Latin American Politics and Society* 48 (3).
- Nohlen, Dieter, ed. 2005a. *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook: North America, Central America, and the Caribbean*. 2 vols. Vol. 1, *Elections Worldwide*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- , ed. 2005b. *Elections in the Americas. A Data Handbook: South America*. 2 vols. Vol. 2, *Elections Worldwide*. New York: Oxford University Press.

- Nolte, Detlef. 2008. Constitutional Reforms in Latin America. In *NOLAN Conference: Futuros Latinoamericanos*. Bergen.
- NotiSur. 1992. Venezuelan President rejects senate proposal for referendum on ending his term in office (10/11-1992): Latin America Data Base.
- . 1993. Venezuela: Perez permanently removed from office (10-/09-1993): Latin America Data Base.
- . 2004. Ecuador: President Lucio Gutiérrez overcomes Impeachment Effort (19/11-2004): Latin America Data Base.
- . 2005a. Bolivia: Massive protests after Congress passes hydrocarbons law (27/05-2005): Latin America Data Base.
- . 2005b. Ecuador: large-scale protests call for President Lucio Gutiérrez to resign (25/02-2005): Latin America Data Base.
- O'Donnell, Guillermo. 1988. *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Argentina 1966-1973 in Comparative Perspective*. Translated by J. McGuire and R. Flory. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- . 1994. Delegative Democracy. *Journal of Democracy* 5 (1):55-69.
- . 2003. Horizontal Accountability: The Legal Institutionalization of Mistrust. In *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and C. Welna. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 34-55.
- OAS. 2000. Report: Electoral observation mission in Peru. 2000 General Elections. Washington DC: Organization of the American States. Unit for the Promotion of Democracy.
- Ollier, María Matilde. 2008. La institucionalización democrática en el callejón: la inestabilidad en Argentina 1999-2003. *América Latina Hoy* 49:73-103.

- Pachano, Simón. 1997. Bucaram ¡fuera! Bucaram ¿fuera? In *¿Y ahora qué...? Una contribución al análisis político-histórico del país*, edited by R. Báez, E. Ribadeneira, A. Acosta, F. Muñoz, A. Carrión, W. Paredes, C. Verduga, M. Luna, S. Pachano, M. Donoso Pareja and R. Rosero Jácome. Quito: Eskeletra Editorial, 229-264.
- Palmer, David Scott. 2006. The Often Surprising Outcomes of Asymmetry in International Affairs: United States-Peru Relations in the 1990s. In *The Fujimori legacy. The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by J. Carrión. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 227-241.
- Pape, I. S. R. 2009. Indigenous Movements and the Andean Dynamics of Ethnicity and Class Organization, Representation, and Political Practice in the Bolivian Highlands. *Latin American Perspectives* 36 (4):101-125.
- PDBA. 2009. Political Database of the Americas: Georgetown University.
- Pedersen, Mogens N. 1983. Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems; 1948-1977: Explorations in Explanation. In *Western European Party Systems. Continuity & Change*, edited by H. Daalder and P. Mair. London: SAGE Publications, 29-66.
- Pérez-Liñán, Aníbal. 2003a. Presidential Crises and Democratic Accountability in Latin America, 1990-1999. In *What justice? whose justice? Fighting for Fairness in Latin America*, edited by S. E. Eckstein and T. P. Wickham-Crowley. Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 98-129.
- . 2003b. Pugna de Poderes y Crisis de Gobernabilidad. *Latin American Research Review* 38 (3):149-164.



- . 2005. Democratization and constitutional crises in presidential regimes - Toward congressional supremacy? *Comparative Political Studies* 38 (1):51-74.
- . 2007. *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2008. Instituciones, coaliciones callejeras e inestabilidad política: perspectivas teóricas sobre las crisis presidenciales. *América Latina Hoy* 49:105-126.
- Pierson, Paul. 2003. Big, Slow-Moving, and...Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics. In *Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 177-208.
- . 2004. *Politics in time: history, institutions, and social analysis*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the market : political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Studies in rationality and social change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990, Cambridge studies in the theory of democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Przeworski, Adam, and Henry Teune. 1970. *The logic of comparative social inquiry*. New York,: Wiley-Interscience.
- Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The comparative method: moving beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- . 2000. *Fuzzy-set social science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Roberts, Kenneth. M. 2002. Social Inequalities Without Class Cleavages in Latin America's Neoliberal Era. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (4):3-33.
- Rokkan, Stein. 1968. Structuring of Mass Politics in Smaller European Democracies: A Developmental Typology. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10 (2):173-210.
- . 1970. *Citizens, Elections, Parties. Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Processes of Development*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Rokkan, Stein, Charles Tilly, and Gabriel Ardant. 1975. *The Formation of national states in Western Europe, Studies in political development* 8. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Saad Herrería, Pedro. 2005. *El libro negro de Lucio Gutiérrez*. Quito: Editorial Rocinante.
- Saiegh, Sebastian M. 2004. Government defeat: Coalitions, Responsiveness, and Legislative Success. PhD-dissertation, Department of Politics, New York University, New York.
- Sánchez, Omar. 2008. Transformation and Decay: the de-institutionalisation of party systems in South America. *Third World Quarterly* 29 (2):315-337.
- . 2009. Party Non-Systems: A Conceptual Innovation. *Party Politics* 15 (4):487-520.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1970. Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. *American Political Science Review* 64 (4):1033-1053.
- . 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: a framework for analysis*. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- . 1984. Guidelines for Concept Analysis. In *Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis*, edited by G. Sartori. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 15-85.
- Sartori, Giovanni. 1994. Neither Presidentialism nor Parliamentarism. In *The Failure of presidential democracy*, edited by J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 106-119.
- Schamis, Hector E. 2002. Argentina: Crisis and democratic consolidation. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2):81-94.
- Schedler, Andreas. 2002. The menu of manipulation. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2):36-50.
- , ed. 2006. *Electoral authoritarianism the dynamics of unfree competition*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Schmidt, Gregory D. 2007. Back to the future? The 2006 Peruvian general election. *Electoral Studies* 26 (4):813-819.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. 1974. Still the Century of Corporatism? *The Review of Politics* 36 (1):85-131.
- . 2004. The ambiguous virtues of accountability. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4):47-60.
- . 2009. *The Confessions of a Repeat Offending and Unrepentant Conceptualist*. Santiago de Chile: IPSA.
- Schmitter, Philippe C., and Terry Lynn Karl. 1991. What Democracy Is...And Is Not. *Journal of Democracy* 2:75-88.
- Shugart, Matthew S., and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and assemblies: constitutional design and electoral dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Shugart, Matthew S., and Scott Mainwaring. 1997. Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and M. S. Shugart. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12-55.
- Siaroff, Alan. 2003. Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. *European Journal of Political Research* 42 (3):287-312.
- Singer, Matthew M. 2007. The presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia, December 2005. *Electoral Studies* 26 (1):200-205.
- Singer, Matthew M., and Kevin M. Morrison. 2004. The 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections in Bolivia. *Electoral Studies* 23 (1):172-182.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and social revolutions : a comparative analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Slatopolsky Cantis, Mario. 1995. *La Caída de los tres Gobiernos Radicales*. Vol. 27, *Colección Estudios*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Centro de Estudios Unión para la Nueva Mayoría.
- Smulovitz, Catalina, and Enrique Peruzzotti. 2003. Societal and Horizontal Controls: Two Cases of a Fruitful Relationship. In *Democratic Accountability in Latin America*, edited by S. Mainwaring and C. Welna. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 309-333.
- StataCorp. 2007. *Stata Release 10. Longitudinal/Panel Data*. College Station, Texas: Stata Press.
- Stepan, Alfred, and Cindy Skach. 1994. Presidentialism and Parliamentarism in Comparative Perspective. In *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspective*.

- Comparative Perspectives*, edited by J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 119-137.
- Stokes, Susan C. 2001. *Mandates and Democracy. Neoliberalism by surprise in Latin America*, *Cambridge studies in comparative politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Stoll, H. 2008. Social Cleavages and the Number of Parties How the Measures You Choose Affect the Answers You Get. *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (11):1439-1465.
- Taylor-Robinson, Michelle M. 2007. Presidential and congressional elections in Honduras, November 2005. *Electoral Studies* 26 (2):521-524.
- Train, Kenneth. 2003. *Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tsebelis, George. 1995. Decision-Making in Political-Systems - Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. *British Journal of Political Science* 25:289-325.
- . 2002. *Veto players : how political institutions work*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Urrutia, Edmundo. 2009. Personal Interview (31/03-2009). Guatemala City.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. 1993. Latin America: Presidentialism in Crisis. *Journal of Democracy* 4 (4):3-16.
- . 1994. Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile. In *The Failure of Presidential Democracy. The Case of Latin America*, edited by J. J. Linz and A. Valenzuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 91-150.
- . 1997. Paraguay: The coup that didn't happen. *Journal of Democracy* 8 (1):43-55.

- . 2004. Latin American presidencies interrupted. *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4):5-19.
- Valenzuela, J. Samuel. 1992. Democratic Consolidation in Post-Transitional Settings: Notion, Process and Facilitating Conditions. In *Issues in democratic consolidation : the new South American democracies in comparative perspective*, edited by S. Mainwaring, G. O'Donnell and J. S. Valenzuela. Notre Dame, Ind.: Published for the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies by University of Notre Dame Press, 57-105.
- Van Cott, Donna Lee. 2005a. Building Inclusive Democracies: Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities in Latin America. *Democratization* 12 (5):820-837.
- . 2005b. *From Movements to Parties in Latin America. The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Villagrán de León, Francisco. 1993. Thwarting the Guatemalan Coup. *Journal of Democracy* 4 (4):117-124.
- Way, Lucan A. 2005a. Authoritarian state building and the sources of regime competitiveness in the fourth wave - The cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine. *World Politics* 57 (2):231-261.
- . 2005b. Kuchma's failed authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2):131-145.
- WDI. 2008. World Development Indicators: World Bank Group.
- Wedge, Bryant. 1969. Case Study of Student Political Violence - Brazil, 1964, and Dominican-Republic, 1965. *World Politics* 21 (2):183-206.
- Weyland, Kurt. 1993. The Rise and Fall of President Collor and Its Impact on Brazilian Democracy. *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 35 (1):1-37.

- . 2002. *The Politics of Market Reform in Fragile Democracies. Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . 2006. The Rise and Decline of Fujimori's Neopopulist Leadership. In *The Fujimori Legacy. The Rise of Electoral Authoritarianism in Peru*, edited by J. Carrión. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 13-38.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1967. *Philosophical investigations*. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. Original edition, *Philosophische Untersuchungen*.
- Wolff, Jonas. 2007. (De-)Mobilising the Marginalised: A Comparison of the Argentine Piqueteros and Ecuador's Indigenous Movement. *Journal of Latin American studies* 39 (1):1-29.
- Wolinetz, Stephen B. 2006. Party System Institutionalization: Bringing the System Back In. In *Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association*. Saskatoon.
- Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. 2002. *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- . 2006. *Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach*. 3 ed. Mason: Thomson South-Western.
- Yashar, Deborah J. 1999. Contesting Citizenship. Indigenous Movements and Democracy in Latin America. *Comparative Politics* 31 (1):23-42.
- Zamosc, León. 2007. The Indian movement and political democracy in Ecuador. *Latin American Politics and Society* 49 (3):1-34.