



UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN

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Department of Administration and Organization Theory

# **Persistent Inequalities in Providing Security for People in South Africa**

**A comparative study of the capacity of three communities  
in Hout Bay to influence policing**

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## **Abstract**

Despite the hopes of the people in South Africa that the new democracy would bring significant changes to the many impoverished people in the country, this has not happened. In relation to security, crime has risen to the top of the national agenda and is the focus of public and media attention. The government's lacking capacity to deal with the massive problems of crime has led to a gap in the provision of security. The economically empowered have been able to fill part of this gap by purchasing the services of private security companies, but to the vast majority of South Africans this is not an option. The focus of this study is to locate the different communities' ability to generate local capacity to confront this gap in security provision. A comparative study of three distinct communities in Hout Bay is in this respect suitable because they each contain a different segment of the South African population, and represent very different socioeconomic standards. The relatively affluent white community in the Valley has managed to gather around a collective project to reduce property crime through a newly formed Neighbourhood Watch, and network extensively with the police and private security companies to achieve their goals. In contrast to this, the neighbouring communities have not been successful at developing projects that could enhance their security. Instead, the mainly African township Imizamo Yethu is characterised by internal division and conflict, while the coloured community in Hangberg has sunk into a collective apathy. To explain the communities' varying ability to affect their provision of security, a focus on social relations, identity formation, and networking is applied, as well as a nodal governance approach to map the existing nodes that seek to impact the governance of security in each community. Though the white community is more able than the others to affect the local provision of security, the contemporary development is increasing the already substantial differences between the communities, and it is likely that this will lead to more distrust and tension. This study seems to indicate that unless the people of Hout Bay are able to build common projects that will enhance the provision of security to all communities, they may all stand to lose in the long run.

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## Abbreviations

ANC	African National Congress
CPF	Community Police Forum
DA	Democratic Alliance
DOCS	Department of Community Safety
HBCA	Hout Bay Civic Association
HBCPF	Hout Bay & Llandudno Community Police Forum
HBNW	Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch
IY	Imizamo Yethu
IYNW	Imizamo Yethu Neighbourhood Watch
PEACA	the Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency
PSIRA	Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority
SANCO	South African National Civic Organisation
SAP	South African Police
SAPS	South African Police Service (renamed from SAP after apartheid)

*“Hout Bay is like a rose. You’ve got the Valley in the middle, and Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg on the outside. In the middle it’s nice, but on the outside it’s all withered, and the rose doesn’t look so nice if you come from the outside. You have to see it from the top to see that the rose is actually nice in the middle. You must sort out the outside of the rose, but of course you mustn’t neglect the inside of the rose as well.”*

- ‘David’ – Vice Chairperson of Hout Bay Civic Association (April 30 2006)

## 1. Introduction

The end of apartheid in South Africa was marked by the first free and fair elections of April 27, 1994, and was widely celebrated as a miracle, by both South Africans and outsiders. This is mainly because South Africa is often seen as one of the very few successful attempts at making a transition from a divided and conflict-ridden society ruled by an oppressive and authoritarian regime to a peaceful, democratic state. It is often used as an example of what can be accomplished through negotiations, for there can be little doubt that the political transition in South Africa has been successful. However, claiming that the transition from apartheid was peaceful, is misleading. It is estimated that around 16.000 people died in political violence from the mid-80's (Shaw 2001a:xii). Terming the democratic transition a miracle neglects both the struggles that lay behind it and the dilemmas still facing it (Gordon 2006:1).

Today most South Africans are less euphoric. The new democracy has not brought all the changes to the lives of the majority of South Africans that they had hoped for in 1994, and it has brought very little in terms of material betterment. Although there has been a rapid rise in the black and coloured middle class, the majority of the black and coloured population remains poor. The legacy left by apartheid is reflected clearly in the economic sphere of democratic South Africa, dominated by an affluent white population and a minority of blacks and coloureds. Thabo Mbeki, then Deputy President, made a speech in 1998 using the metaphor 'a country of two nations', one being the white and relatively prosperous, the other, and the majority, being black and poor (Mbeki, 1999, cited in Hendricks 2003:10).

Alongside, and in no small part due to, the major poverty problems in South Africa, crime has risen to the top of the national agenda in South Africa, and has become something of a national obsession. Indeed the level of crime in South Africa is formidable, but it is not necessarily the level of crime in itself that makes it stand out, many countries, both developed and developing, have serious issues of crime. It is the level of violent crime in South Africa that is alarming (Marsh 1999:4). According to statistics released by the South African Police Service (SAPS), 18.528 people were murdered in the country between April 2005 and March 2006, this makes a ratio of 39.5 murders per 100.000<sup>1</sup>, which in all respects is staggering. Problems of domestic violence, rape, assaults, house robberies and carjackings also plague the

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<sup>1</sup> South African Police Service – national murder statistics 2005/2006

country and attribute to the high levels of violent crime. Violence is certainly not new to South Africa and although statistics prior to 1994 are notoriously unreliable, they do suggest that there was a dramatic increase in violent crime during the early 1980's, but it wasn't until the early 1990's, when the crime began to pour out of the townships and homelands, that most white South Africans realized it (Marsh 1999:4). For white South Africans, violent crime is the number one reason cited for emigration, and is also the main factor that undermines their confidence in the new democracy (Shaw 2001a:42). Having lived in a world shielded from crime by the apartheid state, it is not surprising that the rise in crime of the early 1990's must have come as a shock to many white South Africans. The impression often given is one of a black perpetrator and a white victim. Despite a race-conscious press this view is often reinforced by the foreign and national media when they give more coverage to cases where there are different race-groups involved, and particularly if it can be given political undertones. However, this image is misguided; the reality is that black people in the country are disproportionately the victims of violent crime, and while race continues to be central to the understanding of patterns of victimisation, this seems to be mostly due to the division in wealth and property ownership (ibid:50). In late 1994 6 percent of all South Africans reported crime as one of the most important problems facing the country, by 1999 this had ballooned to 65 percent (Gordon 2006:203).

Faced with the enormous level of crime in South Africa, the police have no chance of meeting the public's outcry for safety. The reality is that the SAPS in general are severely understaffed, under-resourced, and lack the training necessary to cope with such immense levels of crime. To make matters worse, it is no secret that the SAPS also face a great problem of internal discipline relating to corruption and other types of crime committed by police officers. In 1998 the Minister of Safety and Security released data on charges brought against police officers for a great range of offences over a seventeen-month period. The Minister asserted that the likelihood of a police officer committing a crime was three times that of an ordinary citizen, though it remains unclear whether this conclusion is based on actual convictions or an assumption of guilt on the part of the charged officers (Gordon 2006:100). Regardless of their guilt, this highlights a major problem between the South African population and the police; that of trust. The average South African has low expectations of the ability of the police to deal with crime, and there is a reason for this. During apartheid, and particularly during the unrest of the 1980's, the police was used mainly as an extended arm of the government to quell political uprising and keep the majority of the population under the

thumb of apartheid rule (Brogden and Shearing 1993). Restructuring the police at the end of apartheid, from an instrument of oppression and into a crime-fighter intended to serve the people, was no small task, but the worries over legitimacy were soon replaced by complaints over poor police performance (Shaw 2001a:34). The police's lacking ability to handle every day crime during apartheid led to an invitation for commercial private security to enter the fight against crime and fill the gap left by the police who had to focus on 'political unrest'. The private security industry in South Africa has flourished since the 1970's, and has continued to do so after the end of apartheid (Shearing and Berg 2006). Given the lack of confidence in the police and the perceived high level of threat from crime, it is not difficult to understand why the people who can afford it look to private security companies for protection. The fear of crime however is not restricted to the more affluent, but they are the only ones able to bear the cost of privately enhanced security, thus leaving the majority of the population with no alternative but relying on an already strained police force, and themselves.

Popular justice has long traditions in South Africa. Without a formal justice system considered legitimate during apartheid, popular justice flourished in many black and coloured communities, in the form of street committees, vigilante organisations, and other kinds of community organisations. Though internal discipline was hard and often violent towards those considered traitors to the anti-apartheid cause, these people's courts were often characterised by a restorative philosophy with wrongdoers assigned various community tasks to make up for what they had done (Gordon 2006). A central question at the end of apartheid was how one would now ensure safety and security for all, not just for those privileged under apartheid. In the beginning after the first elections, the government was seemingly committed to a strategy of greater public participation in maintaining order, by participation in both crime prevention and sanctioning. However, this was not long lived, and the focus on public-empowering measures in the security governance soon gave way to a more traditional, western, state-centred view of policing, dictating a muscular state response to crime (ibid.).

It is against this background, where the state is unable to deliver sufficient security to its people, and wide socioeconomic and structural differences in security provision exist, that this thesis is set. Although the formal and political rights are equal in democratic South Africa, great differences remain in the ability of different groups to take steps towards enhancing and providing security for themselves.

## 1.1 The Purpose of the Study

This thesis deals with how security in South Africa is provided by an ever increasing mixture of nodal actors ranging from the public police to private security companies, and the many different forms of citizen responses to crime and insecurity. The empirical study of this thesis is located in Hout Bay, a suburb of Cape Town which contains three distinct communities.

The perspective of ‘nodal governance’, as developed by Clifford Shearing and colleagues (Burris et al. 2005; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Wood 2003b; Wood 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007), provides the theoretical framework for this thesis. The important aspect of nodal governance is that it does not give a priori focus to the state as the central auspice of governance, but instead focuses on empirical observations in each given case as to which nodes, be they state or non-state, perform the roles of auspice or provider, in a network with many such nodes.

The focus of the study is on how groups are able to affect the provision of security in their own communities by forming nodes and networking with other governing nodes. A central theme of inquiry is the collective capacity of different groups to establish effective governing nodes. The thesis has two central concepts that relate to this: *identities* and *networks*. First, identities are understood as collective forms of identification that enable political action through the establishment of a shared ‘we’ (Mouffe 2005). The question is whether some forms of identity are more suited to generate collective capacity compared to others. Second, networks are important because there is seldom only one node active in shaping the provision of security. The multi-nodal reality of security governance means that any group seeking to form a node capable of affecting the provision of security, must in one way or another relate to the other existing nodes. The question is how does the nature of these networks condition the various groups’ collective capacity to govern. Theoretical approaches to identities and networks are examined in detail in chapter 3.

The research question guiding this thesis is:

*How do identities and networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?*

In the chapters 5-7 this question will guide the empirical analysis of the nodes taking part in the governance of security in Hout Bay, as an empirical mapping of their location, networks,

and governing technologies, mentalities and resources and institutional arrangements is performed.

## **1.2 The Case – Hout Bay**

The reason for selecting Hout Bay is found mainly in the geographic and demographic composition of the area. The demography of Hout Bay makes it an interesting case as it provides a very limited area containing many of the dilemmas and problems characterising South Africa as a nation. Hout Bay is composed of three distinct communities. There is a township called Imizamo Yethu consisting almost exclusively of black South Africans, mainly Xhosas, and also foreign immigrants from other Sub-Saharan African countries. Surrounding Imizamo Yethu on three sides lays the area called the Valley, home to mainly white South Africans of middle to high income. By the harbour on the south western side of the Valley lays Hangberg, home to the majority of the coloured population of Hout Bay. The composition of Hout Bay's communities has led it to be characterised as a microcosm of South Africa.

Like the rest of South Africa, Hout Bay has experienced an increased public awareness towards crime, and crime has become one of the most contentious issues separating the three communities. Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg are poor communities with high rates of unemployment, and they both have issues of housing and informal settlements and are otherwise characterised by many of the same criminal issues facing poor communities elsewhere in South Africa; drugs and alcohol abuse, assaults and domestic violence, and rape. In the Valley the main concern has been on the issue of burglaries and house robberies which they attribute mostly to the neighbouring community Imizamo Yethu, and to a lesser extent Hangberg. The fact that Hout Bay contains most of the span in racial and socioeconomic differences, along with the problems and concerns that follow, makes Hout Bay an extremely interesting case for studying how groups in very different surroundings are able to generate collective capacity to affect the provision of security in their respective communities.

## **1.3 The Governance of Security**

Central to this thesis is the concept of 'governance of security', since it will be used frequently throughout the thesis, it is important to create an early understanding of what it entails. First a look at the 'security' aspect:

*Security is both a state of being and a means to an end. As a state of being, security suggests two quite distinct objective and subjective conditions. And as an objective condition, it takes a number of possible forms. First, it is the condition of being without threat: the hypothetical state of absolute security. Secondly, it is defined by the neutralization of threats: the state of 'being protected from'. Thirdly, it is a form of avoidance or non-exposure to danger [...] As a subjective condition, security again suggests both the positive condition of feeling safe, and freedom from anxiety or apprehension defined negatively by reference to insecurity. (Zedner 2003:155)*

This means that security contains both the objective state of safety, and the subjective state of feeling safe, which are both important to understanding why people act the way they do. What is important is that the concept of security is wider than simple crime-control. It deals just as much with people's perception of security as it does with the actual state of security.

The other central concept to be clarified is that of 'governance' which will here be defined simply as "*intentional activities designed to shape the flow of events*" (Wood and Shearing 2007:6). This definition of governance is inspired by Parker and Braithwaite's broad understanding of regulation as "*influencing the flow of events*" (Parker and Braithwaite 2003:119). This definition of governance entails the way people and organisations purposefully act to shape and influence their surroundings. "*The business of managing our world is the task of governing, or governance*" (Wood and Shearing 2007:6). Put together the concept of 'governance of security' refers to deploying governing technologies on the field of security, and attempting to design and shape the events and create 'spaces' of security. 'Spaces' are to be interpreted broadly as not only conventional territorial spaces, but also social spaces like communities or even cyberspaces (ibid:7).

#### **1.4 The Outline of the Thesis**

Chapter 2 deals with the complexity of the current multi-nodal policing arrangements found in South Africa. It starts by looking at the how the government's policies on policing have shifted from an initial focus on dual policing (Brogden and Shearing 1993) and community involvement in the Community Police Forums (CPF) to gradually becoming ever more police and state centred, resulting in 'get tough on crime' policies (Gordon 2006). The chapter then shifts to look at how non-state policing continues to play a crucial role in South Africa through the private security industry and different forms of citizen responses to insecurity. The chapter closes with an introduction to the different communities of Hout Bay and a short presentation of the crimes that concern its citizens.

Chapter 3 presents the theoretical foundation of this study. It starts by looking at the formation of political identities as collective forms of identification and the potential for antagonism between groups (Mouffe 2005; Schmitt 1996). Second, it turns to look at how groups can gain power by enrolling other governing nodes and aligning their agendas (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Latour 1986; Rose and Miller 1992). Third, *nodal governance* is introduced and an outline for doing nodal mapping is presented. This nodal mapping provided the guideline for how the empirical study was performed as well as structuring the presentation of nodal arrangements in chapters 5-7. Finally the chapter presents a model of *collective capacity* based on contributions from several scholars (Briggs 2008; Granovetter 1973, 1983; Kempa 2008; Mouffe 2005; Sampson et al. 1999; Tuomela 2007), which frames the central questions of inquiry for the analysis in chapters 5-7.

Chapter 4 presents the methodological framework of the study and evaluates the case in relation to the chosen research techniques, and how the field work was carried out. It attempts to weed out any potential pitfalls that the study may encounter, and also deals with the matter of generalising to theory from a single-case study. The data foundation is presented and special attention is given to the process relating to the interviews. Documents and observation is also presented as parts of the data foundation. The chapter closes by a short discussion of validity and reliability, and some ethical considerations connected to the study.

Chapters 5-7 present the empirical findings from Hout Bay. Each chapter deals with a separate community starting with the Valley, then Imizamo Yethu, and then finally Hangberg. The chapters follow the same basic outline, starting with a thorough introduction to the community, followed by the perceived threats to safety and security that concern its residents. This is followed by a comprehensive mapping of the nodes active in the governance of security, structured around identifying the nodes' mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional arrangements. This mapping also explores how these nodes are connected to each other through networks, and how they relate to each other. The chapters close by summarising the central findings and make some concluding remarks connected to these findings.

Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter which compares the findings from the analysis in each of the empirical chapters. While the empirical chapters contain some concluding remarks on the specific community, the primary focus of the concluding chapter is to employ these findings and use them to answer the research question. The final section of the thesis is devoted to

making some theoretical recommendations to nodal scholars who wish to expand their studies of nodes to include how different identities can have an important impact on various groups' ability to establish and sustain effective governing nodes.

## 2. Policing South Africa

Policing in South Africa has always been pluralised to some extent; the reasons for this are many. Bruce Baker (2008) comments on the complexity of Sub-Saharan African policing in general, that it is the product of intense social and political upheaval brought about by colonial conquest, self-serving and predatory rulers, weak states, violent rebels, economic transformation, and hardship. At the heart of this lies the state's failure to deliver a universal police force that is fair, respectful, efficient, and effective. The South African experience with policing is a fragmented history of multiple actors working both within the law as well as outside it, at times performed by the state itself or condoned and aided by it, at other times actors are working independently of the state. Several factors have contributed to the current state of South African policing, including; the legacy of Apartheid, SAP (South African Police) operating as suppressors for the regime against the majority of the population, transfers of neoliberal policies, lay-participation, community empowerment policies, and alarming socioeconomic differences.

The aim of this chapter is to highlight the complexity of policing in South Africa. It begins by looking into the different policies adopted by the South African government, from the wish to include wide community participation in the Interim Constitution of 1993, to the government crackdown and 'get tough on crime' policies adopted at the turn of the millennium. The section attempts to explain how the government of South Africa has gradually moved towards a more orthodox stance on policing as the prerogative of the public police, SAPS. The next section looks at how policing, in addition to the public police, is performed by a range of non-state actors. In South Africa formal and informal non-state groups are involved in a wide variety of activities; street patrolling, guarding, order maintenance, arrests, searches, detection, surveillance, inspection, traffic control, crowd marshalling, risk management, cash transports, personal escort/protection (Baker 2002:29), and even punishment. In order to get an understanding of policing in South Africa, it is vital to understand the role of these non-state actors. The final section of this chapter introduces Hout Bay and takes a brief look at local history and the developments leading to the three communities sharing Hout Bay today, as well as a look at developments in the crime and security situation going back to the year 2001. The goal is to relate the situation in Hout Bay with more general developments in South African security governance.

## **2.1 Government policy changes – from ‘dual policing’ to the ‘war on crime’**

The end of Apartheid in 1994 brought about the enormous challenge of transforming the SAP from an instrument of Apartheid suppression to a modern, democratic crime fighting police force. Shearing stated that Apartheid “*is both a state of affairs and a mechanism. It is a way of doing things that at once promotes discrimination and is discriminatory. It is both an order and the policing that secures that order*” (Brogden and Shearing 1993:15). During Apartheid the SAP functioned mainly as a political instrument to enforce Apartheid rule and suppress dissent from the majority of the population. According to Terreblanche (2002:43), only one in ten members of the SAP was engaged with crime detection, the rest were engaged in efforts to protect the Apartheid regime. Their notorious brutality and legacy of violence was well documented by the ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’. The nature of this policing order was embedded in a deeply racist culture permeating the entire SAP structure. While SAP functioned as a suppressing force for the Apartheid regime, it also neglected the black communities when it came to dealing with ordinary crime like theft and assaults. For the black majority it was often regarded as futile, and at times even dangerous to go to the charge office in the local police station to report a crime (Gordon 2006). This ensured a growing distance, and in many areas a complete alienation, between the SAP and the vast majority of the people (Shaw 2001a).

Faced with a predatory police force, many black Africans turned to community structures for their safety and to resolve conflicts. According to Schärf (1989:208) political movements aligned with the liberation movement ‘mushroomed’ throughout South Africa after September 1984 as part of an initiative to set up organs of people’s power to prefigure a part of the post-apartheid infrastructure of ordering and adjudication. Nina (1995:7) argues that this period of revolt gave rise to organs of popular justice and to many forms of organisation with a two-fold fundamental aim: firstly, to make the townships ungovernable, and secondly, to create an alternative legal system to maintain order and resolve conflict within the communities.

As the violence of the 80s quieted in the early 90s, and talks began between the ANC (African National Congress) and the Apartheid government about a transition to democracy, planners were faced with the dilemma of what to do about policing the country. Despite the legacy of SAP, ANC strategists realised early on that they had few alternatives to adopting the SAP, even when vacancies occurred in leadership positions, the new government did not have qualified ANC members or loyalists to fill them with. As such, the best candidates for the top

police jobs became middle management officials from the old regime who were considered relatively untainted by its abuses (Gordon 2001:130). During Apartheid the SAP was not the only police agency in the country, there were ten other police forces in the 'homelands', some of them notorious for their allegiance to their homeland regimes. It was agreed that the new police would integrate these police forces with the SAP, which was now symbolically renamed the South African Police Service (SAPS), and that there would now be a restructuring in the new provinces. Senior SAP managers however, continued to occupy the key senior positions of the new SAPS (Shaw 2001a:27-28). For the ANC policy makers, who inherited the police, it became a critical priority to improve the relations between the communities and the police, and try to legitimate the police in the eyes of those it had once suppressed. Their first priority then became to find ways in which to make the SAPS more accountable to those it policed, at the same time as making it more legitimate (ibid:29).

However, there was disagreement from the start between the leadership of SAPS and other interests relating to how one should accomplish the goal of making SAPS accountable and legitimate. While the police envisioned a change in style in how they related to the public, a top-down consultative role where community residents would help to gather intelligence, scholars and representatives of non-profit organisations saw community policing as an opportunity for the public to oversee government performance in a communitarian effort that would help to consolidate South African democracy (Gordon 2007:59-60). These scholars and non-profit organisations pointed to the long South African heritage of non-state policing and self-help in many black communities that had sprung up during Apartheid in response to the vacuum of law-enforcement. The ANC formed planning committees and subcommittees, one of which was composed by criminologists and legal scholars, bringing their ideas and experiences to the table. Common to them was a commitment to community based research and solutions favouring local autonomy (Gordon 2001:130).

### ***2.1.1 Aspirations for Dual Policing***

Among the scholars arguing for a more bottom-up organising of policing were Brogden and Shearing (1993) who envisaged a dual system of policing. The dual system of policing is based on an ideal of creating more inclusive forms of policing that should draw upon the experiences of community involvement in townships during the apartheid struggle, and combine this with public state policing. Ideally this should support an ethos of proactive and problem solving policing. By incorporating civil and state policing they would seek to create

an environment for collaboration between the communities and the police that should identify and coordinate the policing resources in a joint effort to maintain security on the local level. In a similar vein Nina (1995) observed that the period of transition from 1990 to 1994 created a process of peaceful coexistence between the old Apartheid regime and the contesting civil society. The process of political negotiation forced both the state and representatives of civil society to negotiate at the local level, creating a situation where the state reduced the level of repression against community structures of popular power, and accepted a level of collaboration. From this a new culture of autonomy and acceptance followed, on the part of both the state and the community, towards organs of popular justice. This process of self-regulation and cooperation between state and community structures was seen as the fundamental issue for consideration in the period to follow (ibid: 8).

Herman Goldstein has argued that what was needed was a move from bandit-catching to problem-solving in which the police attention is shifted from legal to community definitions of wrong-doing (Brogden and Shearing 1993:168). The problem-solving approach recognises that it is disorder rather than crime that should be the primary concern. The focus on disorder stems from the point that most citizen concerns are not directly related to crime, problems relating to noise, rubbish in the streets, abandoned and ill maintained buildings, barking dogs, and the like often make up the bulk of calls to the police. This focus on disorder should further lead to less dependence on physical force, as it becomes a less critical resource in policing (ibid.).

This form of problem-solving policing should be rooted in dialogue between the police and actors in the community, and police reform should adhere to some core principles. First, the focus of reform should be on policing, not the police. Second, policing should be understood as a product of networks of interrelated institutions operating at different levels and with different knowledge and resources. Third, policing should primarily be located in civil society institutions. Fourth, civil society should be understood as fractured and as made up of cross-cutting territorially-based as well as 'deterritorialized' communities. Fifth, the state police should be defined as specific and not all embracing problem-solvers. Sixth, the police role should be organised around their capacity as bearers of force. Seventh, the use of force should be limited as only one of many resources in peace-keeping. Eighth, the use of force should be strictly licensed and reside primarily with state police. Ninth, constitutional restraints should apply to all features of peace-keeping (ibid:175-176).

To Brogden and Shearing the implication of these principles was that police reform would have to proceed on two levels. The first is to reform the state police, with a conservative aim of establishing a police force capable of using force in responding to disorder at the same time as making them responsive to communities and ensuring that they are held accountable for the way they exercise their role (ibid:176). The second level of reform was seen to be the role of civil society. According to the principles reform at this level should seek to place the responsibility for policing on local community structures, required to direct, support, foster, and coordinate peace-keeping. This goes further than the normal community-police liaison, where the community is expected to provide greater support for the police in one form or another, or strengthened community supervision of the police. In middle and upper class communities this could take the form of encouraging and facilitating existing networks of private policing, as well as monitoring systems to ensure they stay within the constitutional frame. Poorer communities could create networks of civil policing by further developing those features of popular justice, which arose during the struggle against Apartheid, that are in line with the principles of the constitution (ibid:181).

The key to realising this dual policing system was seen to be the establishment of forums where dialogue could take place between the actors in civil society and the state structures, such as the police, where identification and coordination of policing resources could be mobilised in the maintenance of local order (ibid:165), in turn leading to a broader conceptualisation and participation in governing security, and following this greater popular power to go with the responsibility of policing.

However, the system of dual policing required a more radical reforming of the police than many of the state officials were prepared to do, as it in several ways conflicted with the traditional mentality of the police role. Although, some aspects of the dual-policing ideal have seen practice it ended up as too radical to be implemented in full. As mentioned above, the ideological range of the planners for the post-Apartheid South Africa was wide, and the positions from which they viewed civil involvement in policing varied accordingly. Officials, some of them holdovers from the old regime, were more prone to view reform in policing as developing ways to involve the public as a means of acquiring greater legitimacy for a discredited system, and as supplementary resources to aid the police, who would remain the primary and authoritative providers of official social control (Gordon 2006:215-216). Beyond the divergent institutional goals were also fundamental differences in the perspectives of what

constituted the social order to be achieved. While most officials tended to view arrests and punishment of offenders as the desired outcome of intervention with criminal incidents, citizen groups and their representatives were often less concerned with labelling troublesome behaviour as ‘crime’ and often satisfied with restitutive solutions (ibid:216). As officials of the formal system were reluctant to concede too much control over resources and authority to non-professionals, and the planners knew that the majority of black South Africans were unlikely to believe that political transformation from above would deliver humane and protective law enforcement, the solution became something of a compromise. A common objective of greater public participation in maintaining order yielded efforts to bring civic influence to bear on the formal system, rather than expanding popular justice that would have been more autonomous (ibid.). To address the local concerns and establish both the reality and the perception of police accountability, the planners for post-apartheid South Africa turned to the concept of community policing (Gordon 2001:130).

### ***2.1.2 Community Policing and the Community Police Forums***

From the very beginning the term ‘community policing’ came to signify different things to different people. Originating from Britain it has since spread to many countries around the world. Very shortly, and for the present purposes, ‘community policing’ can be summed up with Bayley (1994:105) as a prevention-focused program that involves consulting with community residents, adapting to local needs, mobilising the public in pursuit of order, and solving problems before they turn into incidents that require police reaction. This very wide definition reflects the great variety of ideals and practices pursued in the name of community policing, and it is understandable that Bayley characterised it as “*a set of aspirations wrapped in a slogan*” (1988:225). However, Gordon (2006:218) asserts that the ubiquity and vagueness of the concept of community policing may have been the very reason it allowed people with very different visions to come together and plan a program for the new government.

The dominant model for community policing in South Africa became the establishment of ‘Community Police Forums’ (CPF), mandatory for all precincts in the 1993 Interim Constitution<sup>2</sup>. Three key factors influenced the choice of CPFs as the dominant model of community policing in South Africa. First, availability of funding from foreign governments

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<sup>2</sup> Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 – Chapter 14, Section 221 (1)

steered planners toward a western style and more state centred program. Second, the legacy and tradition of organised self-help in many black communities through civic associations, block committees, and self-defence units formed during Apartheid, had created a vision of democratic policing through a more communitarian process. This influenced the choice of a model that anticipated citizen mobilisation around community protection in even the poorest areas. Third, the choice was dictated also by a pragmatic concern about what the police would accept. Since the existing police personnel could not be changed, there was a need to accommodate existing attitudes and experience. This was perhaps the determinative of the policy choice (Gordon 2001:131). According to Shaw (2001a) many officers within the SAPS regarded the CPFs as a necessary evil, required to bring citizens in contact with the police. But they were acceptable as they had little impact on the day-to-day conduct of policing. The CPFs remained to many within the SAPS a 'soft' add-on to the 'hard' aspects of 'real' policing (ibid:31). The outcome of the choice of CPFs as the main strategy of community policing was a hybrid model. A state centred structure that was to be guided by the values and voices of civil society. Into this model the police could incorporate their needs for crime control by providing an arena for the community to help gather intelligence and improve public relations, while activists and scholars involved in the policy planning could somewhat naively see it as an arena of local democracy (Gordon 2001:131).

Though there is no standard CPF some organisational characteristics may be summed up. Each CPF must have a written constitution and a code of conduct, and an Annual General Meeting, and both police and residents must be involved. Members are usually representatives of local organisations, but membership is open to all. Area and provincial boards coordinate the individual CPFs. CPFs should meet monthly, and meetings are formal in structure with minutes being taken. Attendance varies widely between the various CPFs. All community members are volunteers and receive no compensation, though some members spend a lot of time on CPF matters (Gordon 2001:131-132). According to the 1993 Interim Constitution:

*The functions of community-police forums referred to in subsection (1) may include-*

- a. the promotion of accountability of the Service to local communities and co-operation of communities with the Service;*
- b. the monitoring of the effectiveness and efficiency of the Service;*
- c. advising the Service regarding local policing priorities;*
- d. the evaluation of the provision of visible police services, including-*
  - i. the provision, siting and staffing of police stations;*
  - ii. the reception and processing of complaints and charges;*

- iii. *the provision of protective services at gatherings;*
- iv. *the patrolling of residential and business areas; and*
- v. *the prosecution of offenders; and*
- e. *requesting enquiries into policing matters in the locality concerned.*<sup>3</sup>

The role of the CPFs as presented here is very much monitoring function to ensure police accountability, and influencing policing priorities, as well as evaluating the police services rendered, and as such, a very progressive lay control with local police (Gordon 2001). However, this progressive role of the CPFs as police oversight bodies was to dwindle in the legislation to follow in the ensuing years.

Gordon (2001, 2006) argues that the legislation and guidelines following the Interim Constitution of 1993 show a rapid decline in the government commitment to local participation in policing. Only two years later the Police Service Act (68) of 1995, enacted pursuant to the Interim Constitution (Section 214), used a much less confrontational language describing the CPF – police relationship. While police accountability was still the main issue, this was now to be accomplished through “*establishing and maintaining partnership between the community and the service*” and by promoting “*communication*” and “*cooperation*” as well as “*joint problem identification and problem-solving*”<sup>4</sup>. Principles of oversight, while still important, appear to have conformed to a more indirect, Western style of police decision making (Gordon 2001:133). This orientation continued in the 1997 ‘Community Policing Policy: Framework and Guidelines’ where it is stated that community policing is a “*collaborative effort of the SAPS; other government institutions; the organisations and structures of civil society; and individual citizens*” it further envisions “*an active partnership between the Police and the community through which crime, service delivery and police-community relations can jointly be analysed and appropriate solutions designed and implemented*”. And “*In adhering to a police / community partnership the police adopt the key strategy of community consultation [...] CPFs are intended to assist the police...*”<sup>5</sup>. This shift in orientation of the CPF mandate from oversight to assistance continued in the 1998 ‘White Paper on Safety and Security’ where it is stated that CPFs should cooperate with local government by “*Assisting with the development of targeted social crime prevention programmes*” and “*Identifying flashpoints, crime patterns and community anti-crime*

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<sup>3</sup> Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 – Chapter 14, Section 221 (2)

<sup>4</sup> South African Police Service Act 68 of 1995 – Section 18 (1)

<sup>5</sup> Department of Safety and Security (1997) Community Policing Policy: Framework and Guidelines (1,8)

*priorities and communicating these to local government and the SAPS and participating in problem solving*”<sup>6</sup>. The White Paper stresses the involvement of municipal government in setting the priorities for the police, further shifting responsibility away from the CPFs for police decision-making at the local level. By this time the practical policy influence of the CPFs had waned in most communities, the range of their activities had narrowed, and participation had dwindled, with the exception of some affluent white suburbs and parts of the Western Cape, according to Gordon (2006:223).

By 2004 provincial departments of community safety still provided a modicum of support for the CPFs, but they had, by then, been dropped as a national priority, and support for broadly participatory activities and organisations appear primarily rhetorical. Finance is meagre, and the necessity of cobbling together marginal sources of funding keep the progressive programs small and local (Gordon 2006:242). Democratic South Africa seems to have chosen to retain a great deal of central control. The pressure to transform necessitated a brief period of public empowerment through partnerships, oversight mechanisms, and affirmative action. As the justice system gained increasing legitimacy through the democratically elected government, the professionals in the public institutions could gradually ensure a return to more traditional methods, redefining the public’s interests as consumers rather than producers of public order (ibid:244).

### ***2.1.3 Back to Basic – State Centred Policing***

When the ANC prepared to take over government prior to the first free elections in 1994 the key question had been to create a legitimate and accountable police force. The assumption had, according to Shaw, been that the levels of violence and lawlessness were rooted in the struggle against Apartheid, and would decline once a democratic government was in power, and the instruments of the state had been legitimised in the eyes of the public majority (2001a:24). Linked to this was another assumption, that the SAP was a lot more effective and powerful than they actually were, and that their power could be effectively used by the new government if the conditions of accountability and legitimacy were satisfied (ibid:29). By 1996 some serious deficiencies were showing, as the SAPS had a poor history of criminal detection their general skills of collecting collating and presenting evidence were weakly developed (ibid:33). Also, the resources of SAPS were not equally distributed, as late as in

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<sup>6</sup> Department of Safety and Security (1998) – White Paper on Safety and Security 1999-2004 – Section V

1996 almost three quarters of the national police stations were based in white suburbs and business districts, and less than 15 per cent in black urban areas, while the vast majority of inter-personal violent crime took place in the townships and rural areas (Terreblanche 2002; Shaw 2001a).

Police surveys conducted from 94-98 suggest initially a distinction between white and black citizens' view of policing. While whites were inclined to trust the police, they viewed service delivery as declining rapidly. Blacks were more likely to mistrust the police, but saw democratic governance as improving service delivery on the ground. However, these views converged over time, and safety became one of the hottest issues of concern to all citizen groups. As public outcry over the perceived increasing levels of crime was intensifying during the mid and late 90's, the police were increasingly seen as performing poorly in their fight against crime. This had a profound effect on the policymakers, as the focus on legitimising SAPS was no longer sufficient, the legitimacy would also have to be earned by having an impact on crime levels (Shaw 2001a:34). The crisis of legitimacy had in a short time been replaced by a crisis of confidence, and a widespread belief that the criminal justice system was ineffective in addressing the new democracy's violent crimes (Gordon 2006:250). The decline in government commitment to the CPFs, and their rapid transition from a body of oversight and evaluation of police accountability to a function of police assistance, reflect the government's shifting focus from one of active citizen participation in policing to a more 'back to basic' police centred approach to crime fighting. This shift was most clearly marked in 1999 when the assumption of Thabo Mbeki as president of South Africa heralded a shift from the focus on human rights issues and police accountability, to a clear focus on fighting crime. Though the two approaches are not mutually exclusive the weight shifted decisively to crime fighting through centralised and effective law enforcement (ibid:38).

The reaction from ordinary citizens in response to the high levels of violent crime was a strong support for harsh measures, including overwhelming popular support for reinstating the death penalty which had been rendered unconstitutional in 1995. At the same time the police fell back on their professional culture, focusing mainly on technocratic reforms to make them more efficient crime fighters and rejecting crime prevention approaches in favour of better investigation and intelligence capacity (Gordon 2006:251). Since about 1999 the government of South Africa has intensified its commitment to a 'get-tough' response to crime, including restrictions on bail, the introduction of minimum sentences, asset forfeiture

upon reasonable suspicion, and police crackdowns on particular problems. An elite national force of investigators, prosecutors, and accountants, nicknamed the 'Scorpions', has also been established, often likened to the FBI. In early 2000 the new police commissioner, Jackie Selebi, announced a three year strategy, named 'Operation Crackdown', to target 124 crime hotspots and reorganise the SAPS into units that would address their particular crime problems (Gordon 2006).

The effectiveness of these get-tough measures on the crime rates is debatable. Although official data reported some drop in crimes of murder, vehicle theft, and commercial burglary, and some experts agree that violent crime has stabilised, these would have to be seen as incomplete and tentative findings (Burton et al. 2004). While the get-tough strategy and Operation Crackdown have resulted in many arrests, few are in connection with the crimes that mostly affect South Africans in their daily lives. Further, less than half of the arrested suspects are prosecuted, often because the cases are too weak. Nonetheless, the primary impact of the get-tough approach appears to be on the prison population, from 1996-2003 the incarceration rate in the population rose from 280 to 402 per 100.000, leaving the prisons with a greatly exceeded capacity, and clogging up the judicial system as the number of prisoners awaiting their trial increased from 41,435 in 1997 to 58,144 in 2002 (Gordon 2006:258-259). Regarding the average South African, the impact of the get-tough approach seems mainly to be a symbolic reassurance that something is being done about the high levels of crime.

Garland (1996) argues that the essential attractiveness of such punitive responses, as witnessed in South Africa, is that it can be represented as an authoritative intervention to deal with serious, anxiety-ridden problems. A show of punitive force against individuals is used by the state to repress any acknowledgement that the state is unable to control crime at acceptable levels. The willingness to deliver harsh punishments to convicted offenders is supposed to compensate for the state's failure to deliver security to the population at large (ibid:460). Such punitive outbursts and get-tough rhetoric have featured more prominently in weak political regimes than in strong ones, locating the real roots in the state being confronted by its own limitations. As such, Garland argues, the punitive strategy is driven by a political dynamic rather than a penological one (ibid:462).

According to Gordon (2006), some within the government acknowledge that the principal desirable outcome of the get-tough policies is increasing public confidence, and it appears that

these policies, and the hard talk, have been popular with the general public. By increasing visible policing and toughening criminal penalties, the state and the police are able to sell it as improved service delivery. This is also cheaper and politically safer than the 'soft' approaches of crime prevention through community development and participation (ibid:265).

Along with internal pressure from the public to be tough on crime, the South African state has also been pressured by foreign governments and international organisations, most prominently the USA, UK, and UN, bringing diplomatic pressure on states that appear to be weak links in the global problem of organised crime. With foreign aid in short supply South Africa has been keen to show that it can contribute in the war on organised crime, reinforcing the punitive direction of local criminal justice policies (Gordon 2006:265). Also investment in South Africa, by local or foreigners, is influenced by the perception that crime is a serious problem, as noted by both the World Bank and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, although there is no evidence that these have explicitly favoured one policy option over another (ibid:266). A further incentive for the get-tough approach is neoliberal policy transfer from the USA. The get-tough program (originating from the USA) fits better with the neoliberal expectations of privatisation of state assets, deficit reduction, and reliance on market dynamics for economic growth. Corresponding to this was the assumption that crime was the outcome of individual choice, which was to be addressed with penalties that would make clear the costs of such choices. The preventative approach first adopted was seen as neither quick nor muscular enough (ibid:266-267). While neoliberal ideas were not imposed, policy related activities like technical assistance, negotiations of lending conditions, and debates that provided the background to policy making in favour of a neoliberal commitment (Hanson and Hentz 1999:480).

However, Gordon asserts that, although foreign pressure may have influenced the choice of policies towards crime, it would be a mistake to suggest that macroeconomic policy determines crime policy. The public outcry and demands for safety, media and political hype, and the professional self-interests of police and public servants, have combined to set the pattern (2006:267). The result has been that the South African government has opted to centralise policing and concentrate it in the public police. While the police and their political authorities acknowledge that the public police are unable to meet the most basic policing needs, there are no clear mechanisms or structures for mobilising policing resources outside of the state (Marks and Wood 2007:150), and contrary to early conceptualisations of

community policing in post-Apartheid South Africa, there is presently no real support for counter-hegemonic policing initiatives (ibid.). This does not mean that official talk of police partnership with actors in the civil society is dead, but it's all being done "*with a decidedly police-centred tilt*" (Shearing and Berg 2006:198). The reality of the policing reforms from the latter half of the 90s onwards proved increasingly police centred, with less emphasis on building multi-nodal arrangements of security, and more emphasis on centralising and building the police into a strong and effective crime fighter, capable of carrying the burden of governing security in South Africa. In relations to local communities, the police have increasingly been viewed as a community leader that can harness community resources to tackle problems of crime and disorder, as well as developing positive relationships with the private sector and citizens (ibid.). However, the reality of policing in South Africa is far more complex than the image of the police as a community organiser could lead one to think, and even if they would try, the resources of SAPS are nowhere near sufficient to secure even the basic policing needs of all South African citizens.

In his book 'Thin Blue' Johnny Steinberg (2008) makes the central argument that the most important precondition for policing in a democratic society is that the general population consent to be policed. But 13 years into the new democracy, the general population of South Africa has yet to give its consent to being policed. He argues that this is due to the fact that the SAPS still lack legitimacy, and demonstrate a poor record in fighting crime and maintaining order. Steinberg focuses on the daily interactions between the police and local community members, and demonstrates police ineffectiveness in creating order and enforcing the law when going into townships: "*the cops are always bluffing, and the role of civilians is always to refrain from calling the bluff. It is the citizenry who determine to what extent they are policed*" (ibid:35-36). Steinberg refers to this interaction as a 'script', where the script is dictated by the audience (the community) rather than the play-writes (the police). If the police don't perform correctly, they will be thrown off the stage as the community takes over and become the actors. Steinberg's book illustrates well the inability of the SAPS to singlehandedly operate as a guarantor of security to all people, as they are not even allowed to operate freely in all parts of South Africa. Steinberg goes on to show how communities throughout South Africa, both rich and poor, have come together in very different ways to organise themselves against threats to their security. The next section takes a look at how communities engage in different sorts of non-state policing to protect themselves, either because the police lack the resources, the presence or the will to effectively police these areas.

## **2.2 Non-State Policing in South Africa**

While policing policies have changed in respect to the way they conceptualise and practice police partnerships with civil society, South Africa does still emphasise partnerships. These partnerships are based on an acknowledgement that police objectives can only be achieved through a collaborative effort between the police and other government organisations, and structures of civil society and the private sector. But it has become focused almost entirely on ways of mobilising non-state actors to legitimise and increase the effectiveness of the public police. The talk about partnerships have become limited to conventional notions of the communities assisting the police through provision of information and support for public policing initiatives (Marks et al. in press, 2009). At the same time, non-state policing is a very broad category, operating in very different ways; from commercial security firms, through semi-official community guards and patrols, to formal and informal vigilante groups (Baker 2002:30). While these have very different organisational structures and legality, as well as different goals about the type of order they wish to establish, they all share some similar characteristics. All are forces of coercion, engaged by social groups in civil society to preserve some social order. They are all controlled relatively poorly or not at all by state institutions, and have a very limited accountability to the general public. They have a few things in common. First, they are continuations of an established culture of self-reliance. Second, they arise from communal dissatisfaction with the state services, first under Apartheid and now under the current democratic regime. Third, they all in a way by-pass the SAPS, meaning they have some implications for the perception and role definition of the SAPS (ibid.).

Marks et al. (in press, 2009) make the point that the ways in which the various actors view themselves and each other may not align, and there is a lack of clarity about the identities of the roles of the different nodal actors. This confusion, combined with strong directives and close monitoring from the centre, has resulted in limited possibilities and support for local innovation and responsiveness, and at the same time created space for private companies with a very narrow set of interests to take over a range of traditionally public police roles.

The rise of non-state policing in South Africa, as well as many other countries in the world, is often interpreted as an aspect of neoliberalism, promoting a shift from the public to the private. While the welfarist model of policing deployed images of public dependency on police expertise by conceptualising states as both authorities and providers of governance of

security, the neo-liberal mentality seeks to uncouple the ‘authority’ and ‘provider’ functions by stressing networks of agentive, expert, and independent actors who enter into partnerships with the police (Mazerolle and Ransley 2005; Wood and Shearing 2007). Ian Loader has described this as a shift from ‘police to policing’ (2000). Nevertheless, the state-centric view of policing has remained remarkably resilient in the broader shift from welfarism to neoliberal thinking. The devolution of provision is justified in the neoliberal thinking on the grounds of efficiency and economy, while the retention of the authority to ‘steer’ is seen as necessary in order that the ‘public good’ of security is maintained in the hands of those able to distribute it in accordance with the ‘public’ interest. However, such a view of ‘private rowing’ regulated and legitimated by ‘state steering’ is in reality a simplistic representation of what has in practice been a diversification of not only rowing functions, but steering functions as well (Wood and Shearing 2007:14).

Baker (2002:31-32) stresses that the centralisation of a South African police force took place as late as in 1913, and that even then policing was primarily urban, whereas the rural areas were still largely responsible for their own security, and policing was local, voluntary and discretionary. The unrest of the 70s and 80s, as mentioned previously, meant that the SAP had their hands full, and non-state policing became ever more important. White neighbourhoods hired private security companies to police, as part of what Stenning and Shearing have called a “*quiet revolution*” (1979:270), because the expansion of private security happened largely without public debate or input, and little state control (Shearing and Stenning 1983). In South Africa the private security industry was even encouraged by the Apartheid government to fill the gaps left by the police’s shift in priorities (Irish 1999). In sharp contrast, the poor, black and coloured communities had little or no access to corporate policing, and remained at the mercy of the SAP, who not only neglected, but also harassed them. In response the townships saw a multitude of self-protection units arise during the period of unrest, some conservative and aligned with the Apartheid regime, others associated themselves with the resistance of ANC or Inkatha Freedom Party (in KwaZulu-Natal). Autonomous groups also arose within the townships to deal with crime and disorder, frustrated with the lack of protection afforded by the SAP (Baker 2002:33). These included vigilante groups, street committees, the Makgotlas (revived customary courts with an ethnic base), people’s courts, which covered procedures ranging from responsible and orderly investigation with restrained punishments to the summary justice of the Comrades and kangaroo courts (Brogden and Shearing 1993:143-165). Combined with easy access to guns, both legally and on the black market, these

developments have contributed to a tradition of self-policing, in both black and white communities across South Africa, seeking security in a context where the state had very little to offer at best, and was hostile, racist and illegitimate at worst (Baker 2002).

According to Baker (2002:33) the overall picture of non-state policing in South Africa since the 80s is best captured as a growing interpenetration and overlap, and even growth of non-state policing into new, previously unpoliced areas. There is recruitment from one sector to the other. State police have been recruited by private security firms, autonomous residential security organisations and vigilante groups. Community anti-crime groups have in some areas been absorbed into the public police reservists. There is an increasing exchange of information about patterns of crime, policing techniques and technology, and at least covertly the disclosure of public criminal records to private police groups. The private security industry has been hired to police the property of both public and quasi-public bodies. All of this contributes to make it very hard to distinguish between state and non-state actors (ibid.). Finally, there are cases of commercial security and even vigilante groups working with state police in dividing work according to whose modus operandi is best suited to the task (Buur and Jensen 2004). Within this fragmented image there exists considerable geographical overlapping of policing agencies, meaning that South Africans commonly move into and out of spaces of policing authorisers and providers, or may even be in a position to choose between providers where multiple options exist, further meaning that there may exist competition as easily as cooperation. However, their existence and variety clearly demonstrate that non-state policing, in one form or another, frequently emerges to fill the vacuum of unavailable or inadequate state provision (Baker 2008:77). The following turns to take a short look at the different forms of non-state policing currently operating in South Africa, categorised by Johnston into; the private security industry, ‘responsible citizen responses’, and ‘autonomous citizen responses’ (Johnston 1992).

### ***2.2.1 The Private Security Industry***

The private security industry in South Africa has grown rapidly since the 1980s, and has continued to grow despite at times poor economic conditions in the general economy (Shaw 2001b:209). Stenning has commented that *“It is now almost impossible to identify any function or responsibility of the public police which is not, somewhere and under some circumstances, assumed and performed by private police in democratic societies”* (2000:328).

The industry is prolific and diverse, containing national and international capacities, a range of different players, and is conducting a wide range of activities, including:

*“Commercial / industrial / residential guarding or patrolling as well as assets in transit, car watch activities, reaction or response services, and safety promotion during special events...There is also in-house security, the monitoring of signals from control rooms, consultancy and advisory activities, close protection services, installation and repair of security and monitoring equipment, security training activities, labour brokers, locksmiths, and private investigators”* (Berg 2007:6)

According to Berg (ibid:4), it has been claimed that private security is currently one of the fastest growing industries in South Africa, and members of the industry estimate an annual turnover of around R40 billion. While the number of businesses operating has fluctuated, the number of registered security guards has grown from 115,331 in 1997 to 288,686 in 2005 (ibid:5).

While the security guards do not have the powers of the SAPS, only those belonging to all citizens, these include holding a gun under licence and to use it, or use other means like C/S or pepper gas, in self-defence or in order to perform a citizen's arrest of someone suspected of a serious crime (Baker 2002). Further, they operate under a variety of legal auspices, in particular the property law, according them powers of arrest as well as search and seizure. They can also invoke powers of peace officers indirectly by handing over suspects to the police and by providing the police with information that they can act upon (Shearing and Berg 2006:204).

Shaw argues that the growth of the private security industry in South Africa is connected to three developments (2001b:213-214). First, the growth is closely related to the withdrawal of the SAP from some of its functions during Apartheid, and the Apartheid state's active encouragement of the private security sector to fill the gaps left as the SAP concentrated on quelling the political resistance. Private security responded and assisted the state where their interests coalesced around the protection of white property (ibid:214-215). Further, through the National Key Points Act of 1980 the state made direct use of private security to secure installations of particular strategic importance. This has resulted in a fairly well organised private security sector with historically close links to the state (ibid:215).

Second, the growth of ‘mass private property’ (Shearing and Stenning 1983) has contributed to the growth in the private security industry. ‘Mass private property’ “*comprises spaces that are owned by individual citizens or by corporations, while granting particular forms of common access or flow*” (Hermer et al. 2002:46), making it appear very much like a ‘public’ space. Because more and more ‘public’ places are now located on private property, the protection of property by private security has also increasingly come to encompass the maintenance of public order, which has traditionally been the prerogative of the public police, and in so doing brought areas of public life, previously under state control, under the control of private corporations (Shearing and Stenning 1983). What is important to note here is that this new form of private governance and the spaces associated with it have led to an increased blurring of the public/private dichotomy. These ‘public’ spaces of mass private property are not ‘public’ in the traditional sense of conventional public spaces which give access to all as a right of being a citizen provided they comply with the law, they are instead spaces where access is dependent upon an invitation from the private owners of the property (Shearing and Wood 2003b). As more and more private property becomes ‘public’ in character, the congruence between private place and private property is eroded, and this has given a sphere of independence and authority to private corporations which in practice far exceeds that of individual citizens and which at times rivals that of the state (Shearing and Stenning 1983:498).

Third, growth in the private security industry is related to the police’s inability to protect citizens, or at least the public perception that this is the case. This may be the prime reason for the growth, as companies and householders have decided to hire private security to protect themselves from a growing sense of insecurity (Shearing and Berg 2006:202).

Even though the fear of crime is not restricted to the affluent, private security has only been available to those able to afford to employ their services. As a consequence the ‘security deficit’ left by Apartheid has not been reduced, but rather widened (Bayley and Shearing 1996). Private constituencies are ‘clubbing’ together to provide collectively for their own security by hiring private security (Shearing and Berg 2006:202). The more recent development of gated communities is a good example of how those who can afford it can enclose themselves in pockets of private security. However it is also a reminder that private security is essentially a contractual arrangement, and as such the private security providers remain, in most cases, accountable to their clients, and seek to protect their interests, as

opposed to the police who are, at least theoretically, defending the rights of citizens (Shaw 2001a:113). While they remain loyal to the particular interests of the client, these companies are not necessarily aligned with a broader public interest. It has been argued that in the South African context there are considerable problems relating to the accountability of the private security industry. As they often carry out tasks similar to public policing functions, they are not accountable to the public at large in the same way that the police is (ibid.).

Regulation and accountability has also been a concern to the democratic government of South Africa which has sought to regulate the industry directly through the 'Private Security Regulation Act 56 of 2001', replacing the 'Security Officers Act 92 of 1987', which was seen as having several shortcomings (Shearing and Berg 2006). Berg (2007) identifies several mechanisms available to regulate the security industry available in South Africa today, ranging from internal oversight mechanisms such as; marketplace accountability and self-regulation, through state oversight mechanisms such as; legislation aimed at the industry, the Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA), and judicial oversight, to other state mechanisms of oversight such as; training standards, employee rights, special commissions and civil society oversight through the media. Despite this there remains considerable mistrust against the private security industry within the government. Arising from the fact that there have been several cases of abuse within the industry, its previous involvement with apartheid activities, its current composition (containing many ex-military and police personnel), and its unprecedented growth and the duties it is taking on (Shearing and Berg 2006:205), but also because the companies secure only those who can afford to pay for their services (Shaw 2001a:113).

### ***2.2.2 Citizen Responses***

The participatory justice initiatives that were initially embraced and then abandoned by the South African government have ended up very lopsided, focusing almost entirely on complementing and aiding the SAPS, while losing their power to influence problems definitions and priority settings (Gordon 2006:237). However, the range of popular initiatives to curb crime is still great in South Africa, some operating with the approval of the state and at times cooperating with the SAPS, others operate independently of the state and the police, and are often prepared to break the law in order to achieve their goals of protection and investigation (Baker 2002). Johnston (1992) refers to the former as 'responsible citizen responses', the latter he calls 'autonomous citizen responses'.

### Responsible Citizen Responses:

Working within the law and with the approval and cooperation of the state and SAPS are a range of non-profit security groups organised by groups of concerned citizens willing to volunteer time and energy to 'assist the police'. Though this form of self-policing is initiated out of self-interest, their autonomy is rarely total, as they acknowledge the state as performing a valuable service for the community's order and safety (Baker 2004). These forms of 'state approved civil guarding' are found particularly amongst the middle class of South Africa (Baker 2008:96). A good example of these policing organisations is neighbourhood watches, where volunteer citizens operate vehicle patrols with the cooperation of the SAPS and private security firms. Elsewhere, residents have formed non-profit companies that hire police reservists and armed foot-patrols (ibid.). A good example is 'Obs Watch', established and funded by Observatory Civic Association in the Observatory district of Cape Town, which employed local people to patrol their neighbourhood in collaboration with the local SAPS (Rosingaunet 2007:117-118). Others are based on city businesses, such as the blocks in the city of Johannesburg, which are patrolled by security guards. Still others are based on farms, such as the 'Farm Security Service' in the Free State, which engaged security firms to patrol the farms. It was set up by the farmers, but cooperates with the SAPS (Baker 2002:36). However, the relationship between these citizen groups and the SAPS is often strained by mutual criticism and rivalry, partly due to the fact that neighbourhood watches in certain areas outnumber the police, but also because they often do not have universal local support (Baker 2008:97). As with private security it is also the case here that these initiatives are aligned around the specific interests of their stakeholders, and not necessarily those of the entire community. While this form of self-policing clearly offers benefits of increased resources and local knowledge, it also comes at the expense of some state control. It is not always the case that these groups avoid the brutality of vigilantes. Some patrol their streets armed with batons and handguns, confronting anyone they deem suspicious, which can easily degenerate into assaults that cause civilians to challenge the right of these groups to stop and search them (ibid.). Joint operations between SAPS and community initiatives may also end in frustration on both sides, as the civilians want some control over the police agenda, and the police want to enlarge its capacity for intelligence gathering (Baker 2004), leading to situations where each want to influence and enrol the other to suit their own needs.

Another form of non-state policing operating within the framework of the constitution are various dispute resolution forums and traditional courts. Some 1500 traditional courts are

recognised in the Black Administration Act, though many have broken down as a result of modernisation and the traditional leaders being discredited after collaborating with the Apartheid regime. Some have maintained a measure of authority over those living under the jurisdiction of a chief, and in situations where arrests are made by tribal police, tribal courts can pass verdict on disturbances of order, such as petty theft, fights, out of wedlock pregnancies, adultery, and civil disputes. Though they police customary law, it must all be done within the spirit and objectives of the Bill of Rights (Baker 2002:37).

Informal dispute resolution forums have a long history in African communities, organised by elders, clan and religious leaders, friends and customary doctors. The street committees, once common in South African townships, often comprised of older, respected citizens, resolve a variety of social conflicts, though their influence has waned since the time they were part of the liberation movement. Street committees, while rarely making a distinction between civil and criminal matters, often refer cases involving serious interpersonal violence to the police and formal prosecution (Gordon 2006:238). More formal structures have been added over the last 20 years, formed outside of the locality where they operate, and based partly on Western mediation principles. Currently NGO (Non-Governmental Organisation) human rights and legal awareness groups are starting to support and train paralegals in community-based justice forums (Baker 2008:99). One example is the peace committees formed by the Community Peace Programme (Froestad and Shearing 2007; Johnston and Shearing 2003). Peace committees have since 2000 been formed in about 20 communities across South Africa. There are two main processes to the model, 'Peacemaking' and 'Peacebuilding'. Peacemaking is concerned with establishing peace in interpersonal conflict. This is the main work of committee members, for which they are paid a small remuneration. Gatherings are held in the informal surroundings of committee members' homes, where all parties affected by the dispute convene. Together, the opposing parties and their supporters attempt to negotiate on a consensual basis a resolution to the dispute. Cases could include debt repayment, shack inheritance, noise complaints, infidelity, domestic violence, rape and assaults. Negotiated settlements may include the return of stolen goods, repayment of money owed, assistance to repair material damage, or to desist from offending behaviour in the future. An important feature of this model is its future orientation and the avoidance of labelling parties as 'offenders' or 'victims', arguing that "*today's offender may have been yesterday's victim*" (Froestad and Shearing 2007:25). The goal is rather to establish a future oriented solution to the conflict that will make for a better tomorrow, upon which most, and ideally all, parties can

agree; as such the model stresses a deliberative approach to consensus building. These committees provide an alternative to formal conviction and sentencing, although the threat of taking the matter to the police and the state courts remains, if a solution should not be reached. In contrast to a lot of informal justice systems in the townships, the peace committees abide by a strict rule of conduct which pledges to work within the South African law, in order to eschew force and to follow transparent procedures. The second process 'Peacebuilding' deals more with broader generic problems rather than individual disputes, the committees here consult the community about how to resolve and address long term problems in the community.

#### Autonomous Citizen Responses:

Autonomous citizen responses cover groups that not only act independently of the state police, but often do not cooperate with it and are prepared to break the law to achieve their goals of protection and investigation, and at times may perform trials and carry out sentencing. These groups are characterised by reactive, ad hoc, and often violent methods of control, and are often called vigilantes (Baker 2002:34). While popular policing in the period before 1994 has largely been explained in terms of political motivations, the period after 1994 has experienced subtle changes in the forms of popular policing. In particular the period has seen a rise of more formal or organised vigilante groups concerned with policing crime (Minnaar 2002).

Vigilantism in South Africa covers a range of activities. They encompass punishment of suspected criminals either by spontaneous mob gatherings, individuals taking the law into their own hands, or the organised activities of vigilante groupings or people's courts in communities, assassinations of known druglords, and burning of alleged witches (Minnaar 2002:118). Common to them is that the crime control element is fuelled by frustration over the SAPS's inability to provide security, and a perception that they at times even collaborate with criminals (Baker 2002:35). *"In essence the current vigilantism in South Africa is a brutal indictment of the whole criminal justice system and an expression of its failure and the inadequacies of the policing that is or is not occurring"* (Minnaar 2002:118).

While informal groups, such as mobs, operate in an ad hoc fashion, and may resort to beatings or executions of persons believed to have committed a crime, organised vigilante groups operate in more sustained ways to counter crime (Shearing and Berg 2006:206). Baker

categorises the latter groups under ‘Informal organised security groups’ as they involve some degree of organised action by private citizens. Invariably they use, or threaten to use, force in order to control crime and police a given social order. Whether their acts are extra-legal or involve the infliction of punishment, or simply censure, varies from group to group (Baker 2008:81). Though they are run by volunteers, this does not mean that vigilantes may not profit from their actions. Some charge members for their services and others force their victims to pay, and not only to their complainants, but often to the vigilantes themselves (ibid.). There is often a short step from the informal organised security groups to what Baker calls ‘Informal commercial security groups’ where these groups can grow into significant commercial operations, and commodify the violence they wield (ibid.).

The largest organised vigilante group in South Africa ‘Mapogo a Mathamaga’, a Sotho expression which roughly translates to “If you are a leopard, I’ll be a tiger”, was formed in 1996, after the violent killing of six businesspeople in the Nebo area of Sekhukhune in the Northern Province, which at the time was one of the most crime ridden provinces in the country (Oomen 2004). Initially Mapogo members arrested suspects and handed them over to the police, but changed tactics after the police released a number of suspects. They started apprehending suspects in the night and beating confessions out of them before handing them over to the police. The organisation grew quickly, and by 1999 the group had expanded from the Northern Province and into Mpumalanga, Gauteng, and Northern Cape, opening more than 90 branch offices. It claimed a membership of 35,000, and according to the chairman 10,000 were white and mostly farmers who were tired of being attacked (Minnaar 2002:123), by 2002 the organisation boasted 70,000 members in at least five provinces (Oomen 2004:157). Members of Mapogo refused to join with more legitimate anti-crime structures like the CPFs, feeling that the CPFs and the police were too lenient when dealing with criminals. The group has become infamous for its sjambokking and brutal assaults of alleged criminals, by mid 2000, hundreds of people had been subjected to Mapogo’s vigilante style justice and reportedly more than 20 people had died from beatings (Minnaar 2002:123). Mapogo operates much like a private security business, its members paying a fee for the services, where the fee is set in accordance with the financial status of the individual member (Oomen 2004:157). The Peninsula Anti-Crime Agency (PEACA) operates in the Western Cape, much like Mapogo, investigating reported cases and uses its discretion in deciding on the appropriate judgement and punishment to be meted out, ranging from threats to actual

beatings. Like Mapogo PEACA receives a fee for its services and operates as a private security business (Shearing and Berg 2006:206).

Vigilante activity, both organised and ad hoc, has become a common feature of South African life. The majority takes place in black communities, while the private security companies are predominately active in wealthier, most often white, suburbs and gated communities (ibid.). The state's response to vigilantism has been to arrest vigilantes, but few convictions seem to come of it. There has been no hard commitment in trying to eradicate vigilante groups, the government often attempts to negotiate before taking a punitive approach, and politicians have even tried to mobilise support from vigilante groups (Baker 2002). This ambivalence is also present in SAPS when dealing with organisations like PEACA and Mapogo who straddle a fine line between vigilantism and commercial security, and hence between being of assistance to SAPS versus employing illegitimate means that undermine the entire criminal justice system (Shearing and Berg 2006:207). However, the popular support for vigilante activities is not unsubstantial, as witnessed by the membership of Mapogo. A support born from high levels of frustration and anger at criminal depredations, and a feeling of need for the individual citizens to defend themselves (Minnaar 2002). This combined with a perception that the state is failing in its duty to protect its citizens, has given vigilantes the possibility:

*“to claim the moral high ground. They claim, in the absence of any strong civic organisations in certain areas, as well as the widespread lack of a police presence or response to crime...to be protecting the community, or administering justice for the benefit of the residents in their area. It is then no wonder that ordinary citizens give such support to vigilante activities”* (ibid:121).

As the ubiquity of South African non-state policing clearly shows, the fact remains that wherever state policing is absent or ineffective to curb high levels of crime, communal responses in one form or another can be expected.

### **2.3 Implications of the Fragmented Policing Initiatives**

The overall pattern is clear. Policing is not a monopoly of the state police, but is diversified to formal and informal agencies outside of the state police. It is ubiquitous to the point that few challenge its legitimacy, even if they criticise some of its practices (Baker 2008:100). The attempts of the South African government to centralise policing and concentrate it around the state police does not appear to have had the desired effect of lessening crime in South Africa.

There are indications that as the South African government gradually shifted away from its initial aspirations of community policing with broad public participation, they may also have missed an opportunity to deepen democracy and get better control with popular policing initiatives so common in the country. Instead they opted for centralisation and get-tough policies that had a more instant appeal with the masses (Gordon 2006). This missed opportunity is reflected in that many of the CPFs first created to ensure public participation in policing through legitimate channels have ended up being largely abandoned as their priorities shifted. Not only have the increased focus and concentration of resources in the public police done little to change the levels of crime and feelings of insecurity in South Africa, but also they have done nothing to turn the tide against the variety of rapidly expanding non-state policing orders. From private security to vigilante organisations non-state policing is an inescapable part of the security landscape of South Africa, and a lot of it is being performed without any state control, and often in violation of the constitution.

Though there are few in South Africa that would insist that the state be given a monopoly of all policing functions, many concede that the market can never ensure that there is equal provision and access (Baker 2002). Differences in the ability to access various forms of policing exacerbate the differences between rich and poor communities in their ability to provide security for themselves. While middle and upper class citizens are able to confront their growing insecurity through their purchasing power, the marginalised and the poor are left with an increasingly under-resourced and overworked public police, giving room for the widespread vigilantism in South Africa. As security becomes 'commodified' (Loader 1999) disadvantaged communities are unable to participate as customers and are excluded from experiencing the benefits of enhanced self-direction and choice in the provision of security (Shearing and Wood 2003a, 2003b). These will continue to look at local level self-help groups and autonomous security groups to provide the needed additional security. As sections of society insulate themselves inside security bubbles, there is also the danger that dialogue across political class and racial lines withers. Social exclusion and urban fragmentation is no basis for a common identity, and to many this development echoes the Apartheid days of racial segregation that should have been abandoned (Baker 2002). There is cause for concern that the degree of non-state policing currently unfolding in South Africa is exacerbating inequality. The nature of non-state policing and the lack of government ability to provide universal security or even control the various forms of non-state policing means that it can

offer no equality of accessibility and adjudication, as such the right to freedom and security is not universally available (ibid.).

### **2.3 Introducing Hout Bay**

Hout Bay is located a few miles south of Cape Town along the Atlantic west coast. Hout Bay belongs to Ward 74 of the City of Cape Town along with Llandudno, Camps Bay and Clifton, which is governed by the DA (Democratic Alliance) Ward Councillor. Today Hout Bay is home to three distinct cultures or communities, consisting of whites, coloureds and black Africans.

The largely white middle-to-upper-income residents live in the Valley and along the mountain slopes in homes representing a high socioeconomic status. The Valley has become an urban suburb of Cape Town, and is home not only to South Africans but also foreigners. A lot of people from Europe keep houses here as part time residents, leaving the country for parts of the year. The natural beauty of the area keeps the prices on houses here fairly high. The Valley consists mostly of single houses, with high fences surrounding a lot of them. But there have also been constructed apartment buildings, and development of new real estate is continuously ongoing. There are also a couple of more newly developed gated communities found in different parts of the Valley, guarded around the clock by private security.

The 'Harbour' or 'Hangberg' community consists mainly of lower-income coloured residents residing in hostels and flats. There has also been an expansion of informal settlement behind the flats, of shacks built on sand, and there are distinct areas with freestanding houses or bungalows<sup>7</sup>. An informal dwelling count performed by the City of Cape Town in December 2005 counted 288 informal residencies in Hangberg<sup>8</sup>. The majority of coloureds in Hout Bay still reside in this area. Traditionally a fisherman village, the lack of fishing quotas has now made unemployment a major issue in this part of Hout Bay. Higher up on the slopes above Hangberg is an area called 'Hout Bay Heights' which is home to middle-income coloured and white residents.

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<sup>7</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>8</sup> Rodriques et al. (2006). Informal Dwelling Count (1993-2005) for Cape Town.

The third community of Hout Bay is the township 'Imizamo Yethu', also known as 'Mandela Park', consisting of a mix of formal housing and informal shacks. Imizamo Yethu is a low-income area, and home to a mixed community of black Africans, with the majority comprised of Xhosas. Other members of the community include Zulu-speakers, Angolans, Nigerians, Ovambos, Malawians, Congolese, and other people from neighbouring states. Part of the township has been converted into solid 2 and 3-bedroom houses through a project that started in November 2002, and was funded by the wealthy Irish entrepreneur Niall Mellon through the Niall J. Mellon Housing Project. These houses are arranged in an orderly, linear fashion divided by clear roads; however several shacks have been built behind and between them by homeowners renting them out or using them for businesses<sup>9</sup>. Some of these brick houses now have as many as three shacks attached to them, earning the owners R300 a month for each<sup>10</sup>. In January 2006 Roger Carney, project manager for Imizamo Yethu Settlement Services, stated that "A total of 330 houses had been completed and 120 were in the process of construction"<sup>11</sup>. In addition to the formal housing built there is extensive informal settlement in Imizamo Yethu. An old part of the informal settlement, built early in the 1990s close to the main road, called 'Dotsoayake' by the locals, still remains. There is also extensive informal settlement above the formal housing in the areas known as 'Hector Petersen' and 'Shooting Range'. This is a fairly new section largely developed after a substantial part of the informal settlement was ravaged by fire in February 2004. This area has no distinct roads, and confusion reigns about the numbers and ordering of shacks<sup>12</sup>. The Informal Dwelling Count registered an approximate 1713 informal dwellings in Imizamo Yethu in December 2005 based on aerial photography<sup>13</sup>.

Prior to 1950 people of all races lived mixed together in the Valley of Hout Bay, but following the Group Areas Act of 1950 Hout Bay was designated as an area for white occupation, with the section above the harbour on the western side of the bay; 'Hangberg' or merely 'Harbour', designated for the coloured population. The result was forced removals of the coloured population to an area of the bay more exposed to the strong winds. The foundations had been laid for a strained relationship between the races (Froestad 2005:341).

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<sup>9</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>10</sup> 'Alexandra' and 'Mary', interviewed May 19 2006

<sup>11</sup> Sentinel News, January 27 2006, Mellon puts IY on ice

<sup>12</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>13</sup> Rodriques et al. (2006). Informal Dwelling Count (1993-2005) for Cape Town.

As the fishing industry of Hout Bay grew after the Second World War, exploitation of coloured and African labour created an extremely poor and dependent workforce, incapable of ensuring its own housing needs. As Hout Bay became increasingly urbanised and changed from an agricultural area into a suburb of Cape Town, squatter camps grew as farm workers were squeezed off the land. Simultaneously the need for labour in construction and an expanding fishing industry created job opportunities, and more African families moved into the Valley. (ibid: 338). During the 1960s and 1970s virtually no housing was constructed for Africans in the Cape Metropolitan area, causing overcrowding in the existing black townships and increased illegal squatting settlements (Saff 2001:92). From the 1970s onwards the 'African squatting problem' increased in Hout Bay due to the contradiction between the need for labour in 'white' industry and the apartheid policy of turning Western Cape and Hout Bay into a Coloured Labour Preference Area. As Africans were denied accommodation in order to limit their influx, squatting remained the only solution (Froestad 2005:338). During the 1980s squatting came increasingly to be seen as a threat to the state, and jurisdiction over squatters was given from local authorities over to provincial government acting on behalf of central government (ibid:339). As the white community increasingly regarded the growth of squatter camps as an eyesore, measures were taken, from 1975 onwards, to evict unwanted elements from the Valley and limit African and coloured influx. During the next ten years racial tensions peaked as detection and pass raids, demolition of shacks, forced removals, and imprisonment became the order of the day (ibid:341-342). This would also explain why the number of Africans in Hout Bay declined from 480 in 1970 to 326 at in 1985<sup>14</sup>. From the year 1986 influx control relaxed and politics towards informal settlements changed. The aim now became one of establishing control over squatters and manipulate how and where they lived in urban areas, rather than excluding them (Murray and O'Regan 1990 in Froestad 2005:339).

In 1991 Imizamo Yethu was established on the Regional Services Council forestry station site in Hout Bay. This was to accommodate the African population, about 2500, of Hout Bay which had up to this point lived in several squatter camps in the area. The government decided to allocate 18 hectares of land to build 440 stands, consistent with the number of African families at the time, but within a year another 16 hectares was added to the township<sup>15</sup>, these were however not intended for residences, but rather as a buffer zone

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<sup>14</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>15</sup> Sentinel News, December 5 2003, Two opposing views on Hout Bay's most contentious issue

against the surrounding white settlement, and later intended for community facilities. Following the establishment of Imizamo Yethu the influx of Africans to Hout Bay has exploded. While the 2001 census records 8063<sup>16</sup> people residing in Imizamo Yethu the actual number is disputed, estimates vary between 10 - 16.000 people<sup>17</sup>, as the township has expanded to include informal squatters living well beyond the designated 18 hectares.

The people of the various communities in Hout Bay do interact on a daily basis, but with few exceptions this interaction is restricted to the economic domain. Otherwise Hout Bay is still extremely segmented and the people of the various communities stick to their own. Given the extreme economic differences between the communities in such close proximity, it might be surprising to note that there are very few signs of open hostility between blacks, coloureds and whites in Hout Bay. On the surface they seem to live in a very peaceful coexistence. However, beneath the surface of politeness and tolerance one can easily sense feelings of distrust, anxiety and suspicion harboured by inhabitants against the people of their neighbouring communities. Especially crime seems to serve as a catalyst for this suspicion and strengthen the segmentation of the communities against each other.

### ***2.3.1 Crime in Hout Bay***

Annual crime statistics released by the SAPS provide the overall figures from the precinct, and these cannot be traced back to the specific suburb or community in which they occurred. Hout Bay police station is situated close to the Harbour, and serves Hout Bay and Llandudno, a small upmarket residential area on the outside of Hout Bay, home to some 536 people<sup>18</sup>, and as such a much smaller community than the greater Hout Bay which numbers a total of 21,314 people<sup>19</sup>, though the number is probably greater due to the influx to Imizamo Yethu.

The crime statistics presented by the SAPS cover a twelve month period from April to March the following year. It is important to note that these figures reflect only crime that has been discovered, reported, and registered by the SAPS, however they are sufficient for the current purpose of giving a rough overview of the development of crime in Hout Bay over the last

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Sentinel News, October 26 2001, How Imizamo Yethu rose from the ashes

<sup>16</sup> City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Imizamo Yethu


<sup>17</sup> Sentinel News, July 25 2003, Outsiders still streaming into IY

<sup>18</sup> City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb index - Llandudno

<sup>19</sup> Combined of: City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Imizamo Yethu & Suburb Index – Hout Bay


years leading up to the study<sup>20</sup>. Statistics are compiled from 1994 to 2006 and show the actual figures for reported crime in selected categories for Hout Bay precinct<sup>21</sup>.

**Table 1 – Murder, attempted murder, and rape**



Murders and attempted murders both show a fairly stable trend though they vary between years the trend does not seem to alter significantly over time. In the case of rapes, they seem show a slightly increasing trend, although they fall in 2002/2003, this is probably coincidental, as the slow increase continues in the following years.

**Table 2 – Assaults**




<sup>20</sup> A discussion of the potential pitfalls when interpreting crime statistics is located in chapter 4. Methodology.

<sup>21</sup> Tables in this section are based on the actual figures from the South African Police Service Crime Statistics 1994/1995 – 2003/2004 and South African Police Service Crime Statistics 2001/2002 – 2005/2006 for Hout Bay Station. The Vertical Axis shows the number of recorded cases and the Horizontal Axis the year it was recorded.

Assault is one of the priority crimes at Hout Bay SAPS, meaning that it is one of the four most reported crimes in Hout Bay. The graphs show that Common Assaults have been rising steadily since 96/97. Grievous Assaults start climbing rather rapidly in 2000/2001. While both take a turn in the last year of 2005/2006, this could be coincidental, as they have both dropped in earlier years too. What is interesting though is that while common assaults for several years were a lot more common than the grievous assaults the more serious of the two seems to be catching up, suggesting that the assaults may be becoming more serious.


Table 3 – Burglaries and theft<sup>22</sup>



Burglaries and theft constitute two of the priority crimes at Hout Bay SAPS. Property crime has been the focus of much attention in Hout Bay for some years. While burglaries are fairly stable with variations between the years at first, they seem to increase dramatically around the turn of the millennium. ‘Thefts’ have risen steadily since 1996/1997. The ‘theft out of or from motor vehicle’ show a more volatile trend making it difficult to say anything specific about it, but it persists at a fairly high number of incidents. What is interesting is that all categories show a marked drop between 2004/2005 and 2005/2006. Whether this is coincidental or not cannot be answered by these statistics alone, but the fact that they all drop at the same time suggest that there may be a reason behind this. This should be noted for the proceeding, and kept in mind when looking at the developments in Hout Bay in because 2005 also marks the start for Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW), which has concentrated primarily on preventing property crime.


<sup>22</sup> The categories ‘Theft of motor vehicle and motorcycle’ and ‘Burglary at business premises’ are not included because they did not concern the residents of Hout Bay to a significant degree.

Table 4 – Robberies



Robberies are not among the most common crimes in Hout Bay, but what is interesting is that they both show a significant and fairly steady increase over the recorded period. Another interesting point is that is that while common robberies seem to take a steep fall over the last recorded year, aggravated robberies continue to rise. This fall in common robberies may be coincidental as the statistics cannot show whether this one fall will stabilise or go back up in the future, but the steady rise in aggravating robberies does suggest that robberies are taking becoming more violent.

Table 5 – Drug related crime



While these statistics cover the entire area service by Hout Bay SAPS, drugs are particularly a problem in the Hangberg community of Hout Bay, as will be shown in chapter 7, and are therefore included here. While these figures show a dramatic increase in drug related crime over the last three years this does not necessarily result from an increase in drug related crime, but may also be a result of increased police activity in drug related matters because drug-crimes are highly dependent on police action in order to be reported.

### ***2.3.2 Studying Hout Bay***

The study of Hout Bay is concentrated around how the different communities are coping with issues of security and policing. It is of particular interest to look at how the different communities respond to insecurity. Given the vast differences in socioeconomic standing between the communities of Hout Bay, it is possible to get a detailed look at how the different communities organise and respond to these challenges. Mapping the security networks of Hout Bay provides an opportunity to systematically compare multi-nodal security arrangements as they appear within very different communities in close proximity to each other. The study is concentrated around the idea that challenges of insecurity are collective problems, as they have implications not only for the persons directly involved in an incident, but more wide ranging implications of reinforcing feelings of insecurity in the community as a whole, and even beyond to neighbouring communities. Hence, a central question is whether the communities are also able to face the problems collectively, either as a single community, or by joining with other communities, rather than facing the problems as individuals. By analysing the different responses to security challenges in Hout Bay it is hoped to provide an answer to the main research question presented in the introduction: *How do identities and networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?*

### 3. Collective Capacity and Nodal Governance

The proliferation of non-state actors active in the field of security governance in South Africa today necessitates a theoretical framework capable of grasping the complexities of both state and non-state actors attempting to affect the outcome of security governance in both direct and indirect ways. The governance of security in South Africa is today performed by complex networks of state and non-state actors, each with their own agendas, goals, techniques and resources; some working within the law, some on the side of it or even in direct violation of the law.

The nodal governance framework as developed by Clifford Shearing and colleagues (Burriss et al. 2005; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Shearing and Wood 2003b; Wood 2006; Wood and Shearing 2007) contains important features making it suitable for mapping and explaining the behaviour of both state and non-state actors active in security networks, and opens for the mapping of nodal arrangements contributing to the governance of security in any given location.

While the nodal governance approach gives significant insight into the mapping and understanding of the way existing actors, or nodes, operate in the network, it is not sufficient on its own for grasping how these nodes come into being, nor to explain the conditions for why some groups may be in a better position to form nodes capable of shaping the flow of events. It is therefore believed that it is important look into how political identities are created and how groups can go from sharing an identity to converting this into collective capacity for action.

The chapter starts by looking at political identities as collective forms of identification (Mouffe 2005; Schmitt 1996). It then turns to looking at how groups can muster power by involving in processes of enrolment (Latour 1986). Third, the chapter turns to nodal governance, and provides the basis for doing a mapping of nodal arrangements. Next, the chapter will develop a theoretical model of *collective capacity*, which seeks to make some suggestions about the conditions for achieving effective collective action. Finally, the chapter closes by pointing the way forward to how these models will be employed in the analysis in chapters 5-7.

### 3.1 Political Identities

As governance has been defined in the introduction as “*intentional activities designed to shape the flow of events*” (Wood and Shearing 2007:6) it is important to grasp how groups form in ways enabling them to perform governance. This rather broad definition of governance ensures that analytical focus may be given to any group of actors intentionally attempting to shape their surroundings, rather than giving a priori attention to the state as the central locus of governance. Governance as such is seen to be performed where actors are able to generate enough capacity behind their intentions to actually shape their surroundings. In this section the primary focus is on looking into how the political identities which inform the governing agendas are created, and what is perceived as important for them in order to be effective agents of governance in accordance with some core democratic values.

In his classic work ‘The concept of the political’ (1996) Carl Schmitt makes a case for political identities to be understood as collective forms of identification. Arguing against what he perceives to be a rationalist and individualist approach dominating in much liberal thought, which he sees as foreclosing the nature of collective identities. As such it is argued that this kind of liberalism cannot grasp adequately the pluralistic nature of the social world and the conflicts that this pluralism entails, conflicts for which no rational solution exists (Mouffe 2005:10). For Schmitt the criterion of the ‘political’ is the distinction between friend and enemy (Schmitt 1996:26). It deals with the formation of a ‘we’ as opposed to a ‘they’ and is therefore always concerned with collective forms of identification. Further the ‘political’ has to do with conflict and antagonism, making it the realm of decision, and not free discussion (Mouffe 2005:11). In her book ‘On the political’ (2005) Chantal Mouffe argues with Schmitt that properly political questions always involve decisions which require making a choice between conflicting alternatives, she goes on pointing out that for Schmitt every consensus is based on acts of exclusion, which reveals the impossibility of a fully inclusive, ‘rational’ consensus (ibid.). According to Schmitt the political derives its energy from the most varied human endeavours, he states that: “*Every religious, moral, ethical, or other antithesis transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy*” (Schmitt 1996:37).

However, for Schmitt the only possible and legitimate pluralism was the pluralism of states. As he understood it a democracy required the existence of an homogenous *demos*, and would not acknowledge the possibility of pluralism within a democratic political community

(Mouffe 2005). It is therefore necessary to part with him at this point, and to do what Mouffe calls to “*think with Schmitt against Schmitt [...] and to visualize other understandings of the friend/enemy distinction, understandings compatible with democratic pluralism*” (ibid:14-15). What is required in a democracy is drawing the we/they distinction in a way which is compatible with the recognition of the pluralism which is constitutive of modern democracy (ibid:14).

According to Mouffe the creation of an identity implies the establishment of a difference, and such a difference is often constructed on a basis of hierarchy. Every identity is relational and the affirmation of a difference is as such a precondition for the existence of any identity. She goes on to argue that in the field of collective identities one is always dealing with the creation of a ‘we’, which can only exist by the demarcation of a ‘they’. This should however not be taken to mean that such a relation needs to be one of friend/enemy, i.e. an antagonistic one as Schmitt envisaged it, in order to be ‘political’, but it should always be acknowledged that in certain conditions it could become antagonistic. This happens when the ‘they’ is perceived to be putting into question the identity of the ‘we’ and as threatening its existence (ibid:15-16). The challenge of democratic politics is trying to keep the emergence of antagonism at bay by establishing the we/they in a different and non-antagonistic way (ibid: 16).

James Tully, in his article ‘The agonic freedom of citizens’ (1999) states a case for political participation to be understood as a strategic-communicative game in which there is a struggle for recognition and rule between citizens. This struggle may play out within the rules and sometimes over the rules. However, he points out that when agreement occurs it is always to some extent non-consensual and remains open to disagreement and dissent (ibid:170-171). There exists, in any game of governance, what Habermas named ‘relations of inter-subjective recognition’ according to which the actors involved recognise each other, and with which they are constrained to conduct themselves in order to be acknowledged as players. These include; types of knowledge, standards of conduct, and relations of power governing negotiations between citizens and governors (ibid:172). In relation to these rules of recognition there are, according to Tully, different constraints or ‘blockages’ in the way of various groups seeking to participate either directly or indirectly. The forms of recognition under which one has to act in order to be acknowledged as ‘citizens’ places arbitrary constraints on the diverse, identity-related forms of thought and action. He goes on to state that such prevailing forms of

recognition which block the diverse modes of being citizens are experienced as ‘structures of dominance’. They are presented as the background conditions of free and equal participation, and are arbitrary in the sense that while often put forth as neutral and universal, they favour the forms of participation appropriate to the practical identities of those groups who have dominated the public institutions for decades, and discriminate and often exclude others (ibid.). Accordingly, if citizens wish to participate, two options are available to them: Either to participate within and assimilate to the given structures of recognition, thereby perpetuating the biased system, or to challenge the prevailing forms of recognition so they can participate on par with the others, this is to negotiate the rules of inter-subjective recognition (ibid.).

Recognising the hegemonic nature of every kind of social order and the dominating tendencies that may follow, coupled with the fact that every society is the product of a series of practices attempting to establish order in a context of contingency is central to the understanding of the political, according to Mouffe (2005). Following this there is an ever present possibility of antagonism between different groups. This would also imply that when challenging hegemonic practices or structures of dominance this threat of antagonism seems especially acute. The concept of power is essential to the understanding of this struggle to bring about change, Monbiot argues that:

*“Power [...] either forces the weaker person down or forces him out. Power is as intrinsic to human society as greed or fear: a world without power is a world without people. The question is not how we rid the world of power, but how the weak first reclaim that power and then hold it to account.”* (Monbiot 2003:15 cited in Shearing 2006:29)

Before looking more into possible ways of taming antagonism and creating a way of making it possible to accommodate opposition within democratic pluralism it is necessary to get a better understanding of the ever present concept of ‘power’.

### **3.2 Agency in Power: Translation and Enrolment<sup>23</sup>**

In contrast to the traditional approach to power, Foucault understands power as being everywhere, not because it is exercised everywhere, but because it is viewed as coming from everywhere (Wood and Shearing 2007:9). Bruno Latour, like Foucault (1998), Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963), and Lukes (2005) agrees that “*power is not something you may possess and hoard*” (Latour 1986:265). However, Latour sets himself apart by his focus on agency in

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<sup>23</sup> This section is based on a thorough literature review of different conceptions of power which can be found in appendix 1.

the formation of power. Rather than viewing power as the explanation of success of authorities in composing a network of forces, he proposes to view power as an effect of such a composition (Rose and Miller 1992:183).

*“Power is not a matter of imposing a sovereign will, but instead a process of enlisting the cooperation of chains of actors who ‘translate’ power from one locale to another. This process always entails activity on the part of the ‘subjects of power’ and it therefore has to build into it the probability that outcomes will be shaped by the resistance or private objectives of those acting ‘down the line’”* (Garland 1997:182 cited in Braithwaite and Drahos 2000)

Latour (1986) proposes a model of ‘translation’ which he opposes to a traditional model of ‘diffusion’<sup>24</sup>. The translational model of power assumes that *“the spread in time and space of anything – claims, orders, artefacts, goods – is in the hands of people; each of these people may act in many different ways, letting the token drop, or modifying it, or deflecting it, or betraying it, or adding to it, or appropriating it”* (ibid:267). This means, first of all, that if there is no one there to take up the statement or the token, it will simply stop. Secondly, displacement is not seen to be caused by the initial impetus, since the token has no impetus whatsoever, it should rather be seen as the consequence of energy given to the token by everyone in the chain, who does something to it. Third, and most importantly, the people in the chain are not simply resisting a force or transmitting it, they are doing something essential for the existence and maintenance of the token. This means that the chain is made up of *actors*, actively involved in shaping the token according to their different projects. This in turn is also why it is called the model of translation (ibid:267-268). As for Foucault, the norm is that the outcome is rarely exactly the same as what was intended by the initiators of an order. In fact, Latour states that if it should be the case that the token remains unchanged through this process, this is what requires an explanation, as the chances are much greater that an order has been modified and composed by so many people who are slowly turning it into something different, seeking to achieve their own goals (ibid:268).

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<sup>24</sup>In the diffusion model of power what counts is the initial force of those who ‘have’ power; this force is then transmitted in its entirety; finally the medium through which power is exerted may diminish the power because of friction and resistance (Latour 1986:267). Power is seen to be applied by the initiator; when an order is faithfully executed, one can simply state that the initiators had a lot of power, but when it is not, the argument becomes that the power of the initiators was met with a lot of resistance (ibid.). Latour likens this conception of power to the idea of inertia in physics. Movement from an inertial perspective is the result of an initial force. This movement, once initiated, continues until it meets resistance, unless resistance undermines the initial force the movement continues. Power here is seen as ‘owned’ by its source. Even though others may frustrate it or even mobilise it, it remains centrally located (Wood and Shearing 2007:9).

Power, as conceived in the translation model, is thereby exercised by enrolling the capacities of others to one's purposes. Power depends on the linkage of locales where action occurs to the loci of calculation where knowledge can be accumulated, power is thereby diffused through the actions of chains of agents, each involved in translating it to their own projects. This translation ensures that in some sense power is always out of the control of the powerful (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000:482). A powerful actor, agent or institution, as such, becomes one that *“in the particular circumstances obtaining at a given moment, is able to successfully enrol and mobilise persons, procedures and artefacts in pursuit of its goals”* (Rose and Miller 1992:183).

The extent to which actors have come to understand their situation according to a similar language and logic, and to construe their goals and their fate as in some way inextricable, they are assembled into mobile and loosely affiliated networks. Shared interests are construed in and through political discourses, persuasions, negotiations and bargains (ibid:184). These processes entail translation also in the literal sense of moving from one person, place or condition to another. When each of the actors can translate the values of others into its own terms, such that they provide norms and standards for their own ambitions, judgements and conduct, a network has been composed that enables rule 'at a distance' (ibid:184). The power to shape events is produced, then, according to Latour, not by owning it, but by enrolling others to perform actions required to realise one's objectives, this power is produced through action at a distance (Wood and Shearing 2007:9). Power should, therefore, not be treated as the cause of people's behaviour, but as the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting (Latour 1986:273).

### ***3.2.1 Relating Power and Governance***

Governance has previously been defined as *“intentional activities designed to shape the flow of events”* (Wood and Shearing 2007:6), as such it entails the way people and organisations purposefully act to shape and influence their surroundings. This view of governance may be related with the conception of the political, following Schmitt and Mouffe, as collective forms of identification, where different groups attempt to establish order in a context of contingency. By doing this governance takes the form of people, groups, or organisations attempting to create order by intentionally seeking to affect their surroundings in accordance with their goals.

Power in this thesis is to be understood along the lines of Foucault and Latour, not as an explanatory capacity for securing outcomes, but as a result of processes of enrolment where the outcomes are far from secure. Latour and Foucault see the potential for power to be an outcome produced by collective and integrative action (Hutchens 2007). Foucault understands power/knowledge relations as constitutional for discourses (Digeser 1992); these various discourses are represented by different groups, guiding their attempts at governance and making action possible. The ability to govern is understood to be produced as an effect of intense processes of enrolment into discourses. Dominant institutions, actors and groups are ultimately reliant on the power gained from the many others supporting them or their set of beliefs and practices (Hutchens 2007:27). Taking this view of power gives room for understanding how actors with different governing agendas are trying to persuade, cajole, and pressure other actors to go along with their vision of governance. It avoids the temptation of always locating power, and hence the ability to govern, in a centre, instead viewing it as created by masses of people enrolled into a governing agenda. The question of who is doing the enrolling and who is enrolled can also be said to be a matter of perspective, as the parties may have separate things to gain from the relationship.

This is not to say that power is never exercised through coercion, to be sure this happens every day. Nor is it to suggest somehow that power is evenly distributed, as it most certainly is not. The accumulation of resources such as wealth, territory, decision-making authority, and knowledge certainly do affect the ability to exercise power. Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) stress this importance of resources whilst agreeing with Latour that:

*“...effectiveness at enrolling others to one’s projects is a far more important determinant of the effective exercise of power than resources possessed. Those who exercise the greatest power are those who enrol many others with more resources and authority than themselves, and, more importantly, those who enrol others who are even better at enrolling than themselves.” (ibid:482)*

The playing field in the game of governance is not level. Different groups have widely different access to resources and their ability to enrol is also greatly skewed. Whilst agreeing with Foucault and Latour on how power is produced through enrolment into discourses, it is important to remember also that this does not exclude power from being used coercively or to dominate others. Foucault himself was adamant in his warnings of the oppressive potential of power. Not all groups will have equal access to the exercise of power and while the power to

govern does not have to entail the domination of one group over another, the governing strategies of a major group are often not beneficial to weaker groups either.

### 3.3 Nodal Governance

Nodal Governance is a theoretical model for understanding governance processes which refutes taking any predetermined position when searching for actors taking part in shaping the flow of events, i.e. governing. It is argued that only by taking an empirical approach where one is open to the idea that important actors for change may arise from all spheres that one is able to retrieve the most unadulterated empirical knowledge. As such the nodal governance approach is a theoretical concept for describing what *is* rather than a normative concept promoting what *ought to be* (Johnston 2006:47).

The analytical framework of nodal governance distinguishes between the sources of direction of governance (*auspices*) and the agencies that provide governance (*providers*) (Shearing 2004:39). It endeavours to capture the complexity of governance, extending insights on ‘multilateralisation’ and ‘pluralisation’ and places itself squarely within the concepts of power and governance as expressed by Latour and Foucault (Wood and Shearing 2007:27). The exact nature of governance and the precise contribution of the various nodes are matters for empirical inquiry. For this reason the specific ways in which governmental nodes relate to one another will vary across time and space. Thus specific governmental configurations should be seen as products of specific conditions rather than expressions of essential characteristics (Johnston and Shearing 2003:147).

The distinction between auspices and providers fits nicely with Latour’s power as translation framework.

*“Latour’s framework emphasises that while from the point of view of a governing entity, like a state that seeks to govern by inducing others to do what it requires, it sees these others as providers of governance. However, as entities with their own objectives and plans that are also seeking to implement in some sphere or another, these others are also auspices of governance in their own right. It is only when, and to the extent that, these auspices are enrolled in a governmental strategy that allows another governing entity to govern at a distance through them that it becomes a provider of governance to another.”* (Shearing 2004:39)

Within Latour’s and the nodal governance framework, all entities may be seen as both auspices and providers of governance. What differentiates governing auspices is the extent to

which they are able to realise their governing aspirations by creating assemblages of entities that enact their objectives at a distance (ibid:39). Governance, therefore, is always a matter of integrating objectives. This integration, however, is never smooth and always involves some degree of contestation and conflict; as such each auspice is always seeking to rule at a distance through others (ibid:40).

Nodal governance is conceived in relational terms, between political institutions, commercial entities, non-governmental organisations, voluntary agencies, and other civil bodies (Johnston and Shearing 2003). Networks are, as such, of central importance to nodal governance. Manuel Castells argues that networks have overcome their historical weaknesses in coordinating functions and bringing resources to bear on goals by becoming information networks. It is information technology which has allowed these networks to retain the adaptability and the time to achieve superior levels of coordination and management of complexity (Castells 2000:15). Castells states that “*A network is a set of interconnected nodes. A node is the point where the curve intersects itself*” (ibid:15). Using this mathematical metaphor Castells recognises nodes as the sites where the ‘curves’ that constitute networks intersect (Burriss et al. 2005:37). Castells claims that “*A network, by definition, has nodes, not a centre*” (Castells 1998:332 cited in Loader 2000:325). Nodal governance scholars take this definition of nodes and use it to focus on the nodes themselves in order to deepen the understanding of network governance. Nodes use networks to communicate with other nodes, but while network theorists take this as a given, nodal governance scholars argue that this depends on the structure and purpose of the specific node. Besides, the latter scholars argue that nodes can establish their own networks, rather than incorporating themselves within already established networks, and that some nodes may not even come together to form networks at all (Wood and Shearing 2007:27). Nodes are sites of knowledge, capacity and resources that function as governance auspices or providers (ibid:27). The strength of the nodal governance framework lies in its focus upon how nodes possess both specific and general knowledge and capacities, and how these nodes constitute the points where governance is being conducted. Hence, what nodal governance does is to put the theoretical emphasis on the nodes as centres of governance, rather than on the networks themselves.

### ***3.3.1 Nodal Structure***

Conceiving a node as a site of governance means that it has to be able to in some way intentionally shape the flow of events if it is to be in line with the established definition of governance used in this thesis. As such nodes exhibit four central characteristics: a mentality, technologies, resources and an institutional arrangement. It is through these characteristics that the node derives its ability to govern, and it is also through these that its governing project may be analysed and understood.

First, a mentality refers to the mental framework that shapes the ways we think about the world, and as a result, the way we act towards it. It sets terms for how we interpret our perceptions and how our thoughts are constructed and translated into action. Mentalities tend to be taken as matters of course by the subject who inhabits them; as such they tend to be more implicit than explicit, and must often be inferred from the actions that flow from them. Methods for governance always implicitly reflect a mentality, and because mentalities unlike methods and practices are not situationally specific, they are reflected in several of the more widespread actions taken by subjects (Johnston and Shearing 2003:29-30). Mentality in a node, then, refers to the way of thinking about the matters that the node has emerged to govern (Burriss et al. 2005:37). Foucault's understanding that truths are constituted in discourses is important for understanding mentalities, as they are not only ways of seeing the world, but also determinant to how people choose to act towards it, and that different people will inhabit different discourses which may or may not be compatible with one another. As such the mentalities of nodes are intrinsic to understanding the struggles they engage in when seeking to govern.

Second, technologies refer to the set of methods used for exerting influence over the course of events (ibid:37). The methods available will vary between different nodes, and depend on what field it seeks to engage with as well as the resources available to it. These methods may be thought of as tools, such as physical, legal, symbolic, and personal tools. They will also vary in strength, but it is often not necessarily the accessibility of a given tool that will determine a node's capacity for governing, but the way it is able to combine the various tools available to it (Johnston and Shearing 2003:28).

Third, resources provide support for the operation of the node and its ability to exert influence (Burriss et al. 2005:37). Nodes differ on the availability of resources. Because the capacity of a

node to influence will depend in large part on its resources they are of central importance. Nodes rely on a wide range of different forms of resources. Financial resources are of importance to all nodes, but especially for large corporations that are able to use their economic strength as coercive mechanisms (ibid:39). But other forms of capital, in a more Bourdieuan sense, are also available, in this way local knowledge and capacities may serve less financially strong nodes well. Burris et al. (ibid:39) argues that a small NGO, with limited financial resources, may use its social capital to persuade others or give voice to local needs and mobilise local pressure. Julia Black (2003) has identified a set of resources that are essential for regulatory capacity. These may well be suited for the more general purposes of governance as well. First among these is *information*, which is seen as central for any governing node. Second, *expertise* is particularly important in areas characterised by a high degree of technical complexity. Third, *financial resources* are crucial for the access to other resources, but may, also be used to gain leverage. Fourth, *authority* and *legitimacy*; both are interlinked. Authority is decided by whether or not what an actor says makes a practical difference to the way others act by the simple virtue of the actor saying it. Legitimacy signifies whether or not an actor is seen to have ‘the right to govern’, both by those it would seek to govern and those on whose behalf it seeks to govern. Fifth, *strategic position*; a key question tied to this is whether an actor can act as a gatekeeper by occupying a key resource in relation to other actors. Finally, *organisational capacity* refers to the ability to handle more complex technical problems, more broadly the ability to solve problems and learn, as well as the capacity to regulate internal affairs (ibid.).

Fourth, a node needs a structure that enables it to direct mobilisation of resources, mentalities and technologies over time, in short, it needs an institutional structure (Burris et al. 2005:38). A node can take a variety of forms; it does not have a particular structure, and does not even have to be developed as a tool for governance or regulation, nor does it have to be formally constituted or legally recognised, but to be a governing node it must have an institutional form, even if temporary, which gives it the ability to mobilise resources, mentalities and technologies over time. As such nodes can range from government agencies through neighbourhood associations, NGOs, private firms, and even gangs (ibid:38).

Nodes govern by mobilising their resources and technologies to cajole, coerce or in other ways move those they wish to govern into complying with their directions. And so, they directly govern the people who are subject to their influence. Perhaps even more important is

the fact that nodes often regulate other nodes that are accessible to them through networks (ibid:39). A node may be one node among many within an integrated network, like a smaller unit within a larger organisation. At other times a node may be linked to multiple networks without having a primary network affiliation, such as a small firm (ibid:38). Nodes may even bring together representatives from different nodal organisations and form what is called a 'super-structural node' that does not integrate networks, but is rather a structure that brings actors who represent networks together in order to concentrate the members' resources and technologies for a common purpose (Shearing 2006:26-27). These super-structural nodes form the command centres of networked governance. This tying together of networks is one of the very important ways that nodes gain their capacity for governance. Nodes of this type can have significant ability to exercise power and perform governance.

The nodal governance approach has some important implications. First, it stresses that it is only by denying conceptual priority to the state that it becomes possible to consider the range of governmental nodes that exists and the relationship between them. Second, it emphasises that the state is no longer a stable locus of government; therefore the model employs governance as the property of networks rather than a product of a single centre of action. Third, as a relational model, the approach defines governance as the property of shifting alliances rather than as the product of state led 'steering' and 'rowing' strategies. Finally, the approach stresses that every form of governance is a product of human invention and re-invention and has, as such, normative implications (Johnston and Shearing 2003:148).

The nodal governance approach, thus, centres on the notion of governing nodes, described in terms of its mentalities, institutional structures, technologies, and resources. Further, that governance is never fully actualised by any single node, even though some nodes may be hegemonic (Wood 2006). Central to the understanding of nodal governance in practice is an awareness of how practical actors contest and reconstitute ways of thinking; hence it is essential to acknowledge strategic and contingent initiatives that account for local variations and particular configurations (ibid.). There are forms of governance 'from below' that must be studied and captured, as they can serve to resist, destabilise and reconstitute formal governance agendas (ibid:225). Doing nodal governance research should, therefore, begin with an explanatory mapping of the nodes involved in the governing field, structured around answering questions about their mentalities, technologies, resources and institutional structures, as well as mapping how these nodes relate to one another (ibid.).

### **3.4 Collective Capacity**

After having related power and governance an important question remains to be answered; how do groups wield the power generated through these processes? Following Mouffe (2005) and Schmitt (1996) in acknowledging the ever present possibility of antagonism between groups seeking to affect their surroundings, and Tully's (1999) contention that there may be 'blockages' in the way of weaker groups seeking to participate in governance, it is necessary to formulate how these things may come about and how they might be avoided.

According to Mouffe, if conflict is to be accepted as legitimate it needs to take a form that does not destroy the political associations, meaning that some common ties must exist between the parties in conflict, in order that opponents are not seen as enemies to be eradicated. On the other hand, opponents cannot be seen simply as competitors whose interests can be dealt with through mere negotiation, or reconciled through deliberation, this would mean that the antagonistic element would be eliminated (Mouffe 2005:20). While antagonism is a we/they relationship where the two sides are enemies who do not share any common ground, 'agonism' is a we/they relationship where the conflicting parties, although there may not exist any rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognise the legitimacy of their opponent (ibid:20). Further, consensus is no doubt necessary, but it must be accompanied by dissent. The need for consensus is on the institutions constitutive of democracy and on the 'etico-political' values which inform the political association – liberty and justice for all – but there will always be disagreement over their meaning and how they are to be implemented (ibid:31). This means that, while in conflict, they see themselves as belonging to the same political association, as sharing a common symbolic space within which the conflict takes place. A central task of democracy is to transform antagonism into agonism (ibid:20).

In order to enable governance through 'civic capacity' Xavier de Souza Briggs (2008:42) states that collective action benefits from divergent as well as convergent thinking, it requires robust and flexible mechanisms for 'getting to yes' as well as space and rules for 'having a good fight'. Civic capacity needs room for confronting and pressuring on one hand, but it is also necessary to overcome impasses that impede valuable agreements, and each of these in its appropriate context and time. According to Briggs (ibid:43) coming to workable agreements in a context of ongoing difference helps 'delivering the goods', in the best of times this can happen through decisions that are not only legitimate and popular, but also

wise. In addition it may help keep conflict, which may easily become shrill, self-serving, and unproductive, in check. In other words, ‘getting to yes’ hinges on bargaining effectively where some interests are shared while others are not, and will remain not (ibid.).

*“Civic capacity is not only, or primarily, about getting past conflict. Nor is it universally about stirring up conflict to get new proposals heard, change the balance of power, or make decision making more inclusionary. Both contentious and agreement-seeking civic action matter. And both demand acts of leadership when people and institutions cling fervently to one at the expense of the other, whether because of ideology, partisan perceptions, or what psychologists term ‘defensive routines’ that block learning.”* (ibid:45)

Robert Sampson suggested the term ‘collective efficacy’ defined as *“a group’s shared belief in its conjoint capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to produce given levels of attainment”* (Bandura, 1997:477 cited in Wickes 2003:17). Sampson claimed that it is the shared beliefs in a neighbourhood’s conjoint capability for action to achieve an intended effect that determines whether values are realised or not (Wickes 2003:4). He argues that:

*“collective efficacy is a task-specific construct that relates shared expectations and mutual engagement [...] From this perspective, resources and networks alone (e.g., voluntary associations, friendship ties, organizational density) are neutral – they may or may not be effective mechanisms for achieving an intended effect.”* (Sampson et al. 1999:635).

Collective efficacy captures the process of activating or converting social ties to achieve desired outcomes, and differentiates it from the social ties themselves (ibid.). It is important to stress this difference as Sampson argues that strong personal ties may also at times inhibit effective action (ibid:635). He claims that recent writing on social capital tends to gloss over this potential downside that social capital may be drawn upon for negative as well as positive goals.

Raimo Tuomela argues in “The Philosophy of Sociality” (2007) that there are two fundamentally different ways of acting as a group member, the ‘we-mode’ and the ‘I-mode’. Acting as a group member in the we-mode sense involves acting for a collectively constructed group reason. The I-mode is concerned only with private personal and interpersonal reasons and relations, as well as with groups involving these ingredients. The important divide between the two is that the former represents a group thinking and acting as one agent,

whereas the latter consists of some agents acting and interacting, perhaps in concert, in pursuit of their private, but possibly shared, goals (ibid:3-4).

The we-mode presupposes a collective acceptance of the group's 'ethos', defined as a set of constitutive goals, values, beliefs, standards, norms, practices and / or traditions that give the group motivating reasons for action. The ethos directs group members' thoughts and actions toward what is important for the group and what is generally expected to benefit the group (ibid:16). Tuomela argues that it is only in the we-mode that people are able to act fully as a group, because it is only in the we-mode that members can be seen to necessarily share a common fate where they stand and fall together, this is what he refers to as the 'Collectivity Condition': "*The goal is satisfied for a member if, and only if, it is satisfied for all other members*" (ibid:4). Another central element of the we-mode is 'Collective Commitment'. It is required that the group member is committed to performing actions that further the group's ethos. Collective commitment has two intertwined roles: First, it glues the members together around the ethos and gives the foundation for unity and identity in the group. Secondly it serves to give joint authority to the group members to pursue ethos related action (ibid:5).

*"The full-blown collective acceptance of an ethos as a group's ethos by the members basically results in their forming a we-mode group. Such collective acceptance is based on a thick notion of 'we' ('we-together'). The result of the collective acceptance is a group that the members qua members construct for themselves and in which there is not only the (pro tanto or prima facie) obligation to obey the ethos but also a functionally substantial number of members who are collectively committed to obeying the ethos and maintaining it 'for the time being'"* (ibid:18)

Counter to this the I-mode group members are only privately committed to an ethos. An I-mode group is based on its members' interrelations, but is not constructed by the members as a group in the same way as a we-mode group because they are not collectively committed to promoting the group ethos, and is therefore incapable of acting fully as a group. However, the members may still act towards the same goal, so that the group can be seen as acting in an ordered manner toward the goal, but the commitment will be weaker because it is only private and therefore easier to change (ibid:21-22). Accordingly, privately committed members in interdependent I-mode activities have more possibilities to quit without criticism because they have preserved their full agency authority (ibid:37).

A crucial argument for the importance of collective commitment is that when a collection of individuals believe that they share a common in-group membership, they are more likely to

act in the interest of collective welfare as opposed to individuals in the same situation who do not share this sense of group identity (ibid:36). A central point here is the fact that the social commitment involved in collective commitment can provide more than aggregated private commitments. The fact that group members are committed to each other means that they can better rely on the others to perform their respective tasks, and this is crucial in the case of interdependent and joint action (ibid:37). This also means that the we-mode is not reducible to the I-mode, they remain fundamentally different ways of viewing people in a social context (ibid:38).

The insights of Tuomela on collective commitment to group action is a valuable addition to the concept of collective efficacy, because it clarifies in a very elegant way that the composition of a group is important for its ability to act collectively by stressing the importance of the motivations for action held by the group members. It also fits nicely with the Latour's (1986) understanding of how power is the result of enrolment. The extent to which people commit to a collective ethos enables them to direct their efforts in a coordinated manner, thus focusing the power towards a shared goal.

Michael Kempa (2008) suggests there is reason to believe that governance can be most effectively achieved through fostering notions of collective efficacy when emotionally charged identity politics is sidestepped, through forging 'weak ties' amongst individuals premised on the expectation that cooperation will lead to mutually beneficial outcomes, rather than upon sustained, shared political identities. This idea of forging weak ties draws upon Granovetter's article 'The strength of weak ties' (1973). In this article he focuses on the importance of weak ties in networks as critical for generating social resources and accessing information. Tie strength is defined and measured by four variables: the amount of time spent, the emotional intensity, the intimacy, and the reciprocal services which all characterise the specific tie (ibid:1361). An example of a strong tie may be family members living together, while a weak tie may be old friends that meet every now and then.

There has been debate around the importance of weak ties and about how to measure them. Krackhardt (1992) criticises Granovetter (1973) for not generating more objective criteria on which to judge if a tie is weak or strong. He points to the fact that many studies following Granovetter's article have employed different definitions of tie strength, while all of these can be argued to capture the essence of what Granovetter meant (Krackhardt 1992:217). Marsden

and Campbell (1984) problematise the issue of measuring tie strength and conclude that there are two distinct aspects of tie strength, one having to do with time spent, and the other with the depth of the relationship. They conclude that the best indicator of tie strength is a measure of 'closeness' which is a measure of the emotional intensity of a tie (ibid.:297). This definition is also the one that has been employed most often as a single indicator of tie strength, and it is also the one employed in this study (ibid.).

Granovetter's central argument is that it is often through forging weak ties that actors are able to access ideas, resources and aid that do not exist within their closer network of strong ties. Networks of strong ties are likely to consist of several people who all share ties, in addition it is argued that knowledge, resources, ideas and information is likely to be shared widely within these networks of strong ties. Actors connected by weak ties, on the other hand, are more likely to have access to separate networks of strong ties. The reason for this is that actors engaged through weak ties are more likely to be involved with networks that are not part of ones own network, and as such will have access to other information and resources that may not be available in ones own immediate surroundings. An important concept is that of a 'bridge', bridges are weak ties that serve the function of a link connecting two separate networks of strong ties (Granovetter 1973:1364). That a weak ties constitutes a bridge means that an actor is able to access resources, information or ideas from a separate network of strong ties. As such these weak ties become more than just a loose connection between two networks, but an important bridge that can create possibilities for new ideas and resources into ones own network (Granovetter 1983). The importance of weak ties lies in their ability to constitute bridges between different networks of strong ties and the way they can transfer new ideas, information and resources between networks. This does not imply that all, or even most, weak ties are bridges (ibid:229). However, while weak ties provide a greater reach and access beyond the immediate social circle, strong ties provide a greater motivation to be of assistance and more easily available, and as such are more easily trusted (ibid:209). From this it is argued that the utility of a weak link is a function of the security of the individual. A highly insecure individual, for example people living in great poverty, is under a strong pressure to become dependent of one or a few strongly protective individuals. On the other hand, a person with resources to fall back on will be less dependent on others and is freer to explore alternatives presenting themselves (Pool 1980 in Granovetter 1983:210-211). This dependence on strong ties by the disadvantaged is potentially detrimental because:

“...heavy concentration of social energy in strong ties has the impact of fragmenting communities of the poor into encapsulated networks with poor connections between these units; individuals so encapsulated may then lose some of the advantages associated with the outreach of weak ties. This may be one of the reasons why poverty is self-perpetuating” (Granovetter 1983:213).

This does not mean that strong ties are not important; in addition to being more dependable strong ties carry more influence and are therefore more important in decision making. But it is through weak ties that innovations are carried across the boundaries of different social groups (ibid:219).

The concept of collective efficacy moves from a focus on private ties to an emphasis on shared beliefs in the capacity of a community to achieve an intended effect (Sabot et al. 2004:325). In the sense of a group’s ability to act as a governing node, making use of weak ties then becomes a question of the group’s ability to enrol other actors and their resources (broadly speaking) and align them with one’s own governing agenda. It also offers a promising foundation on which to align the various theoretical contributions presented in this chapter. The contributions of the scholars mentioned above all make valuable contributions to understanding how social ties may be converted into action, but because they all employ different terminology and have slightly different focus I suggest the term ‘*collective capacity*’ to construct a model capable of drawing on the insights of civic capacity (Briggs 2008), collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1999), and collective commitment (Tuomela 2007). This model also draws upon the insights of Mouffe (2005) on the importance of developing agonistic social relations and Granovetter’s (1973, 1983) focus on strong and weak ties in networks. The idea is to construct a model of *collective capacity* to be used alongside a model of nodal governance to explain how people in civil society may come together and establish a node capable of effective governance.

Firstly, collective capacity narrows the focus on groups, from being on some loose definition of a network, to a collective gathered by a shared goal. This constitutes the first step in becoming an effective governing node. Not just establishing an identity in the form of a common ‘we’, but at the same time the group is able to structure itself around a common *ethos*. The degree to which the members of the group devote themselves to the common *ethos* is believed to strengthen the group’s joint ability to govern.

Secondly, collective capacity offers room for both conflict and consensus, as stressed by Briggs (2008). As collective capacity is structured around a common goal or ethos, other conflicts arising between members that do not directly threaten the ethos itself can be sidestepped or resolved without necessarily affecting the group's ability to perform its function. As previously stated the potential of conflict is always present, and this is not necessarily a bad thing, but there must be ways for either resolving it or working around it. Collective capacity, thereby, can be argued to conform to the need for agonistic ways of handling conflict. It allows for dissenting voices, while at the same time working towards a goal shared by the group. In some cases this may lead to groups containing people who would otherwise disagree on several subjects, but who nonetheless come together around the specific ethos of the group. Following Mouffe (2005), this also applies to how the group meets other actors working in the same field, but holding conflicting views about how to solve it.

Thirdly, collective capacity includes both weak and strong ties. While advocating the advantage of weak ties among the members of the group organised by their common ethos, this does not mean that strong ties are unimportant, they may be important for the core members' commitment to the ethos. However, in line with Kempa (2008), the focus on weak ties make it more likely that the group is able to sidestep potentially hampering conflict.

Fourthly, collective capacity may be increased by enrolling other actors and aligning them with the group's goals. Enrolling other actors into the group's governing agenda is here seen as particularly important in order to enhance the group's power to govern as other actors may have access to resources that are not available within the group itself. Again the focus on weak ties is important, as the ability to enrol other actors is much more likely to be done through weak ties existing between members within the group and members of other groups, thus functioning as bridges (Granovetter 1973). If a group attempting to govern have few or no bridges to other governing nodes, the likelihood of success is greatly diminished compared to one with many bridges.

Fifthly, collective capacity is expected to be affected by cumulative forms of disadvantage (Sampson et al. 1999). It is once again important to stress that the playing field is not level. Concentrations of low income, low education, housing issues, high rates of residential turnover, racial and ethnic segregation, single-parents, and immigrants are all expected to

negatively affect the ability of a community to achieve a high level of collective efficacy (ibid.).

*“Economic stratification by race and residence thus fuels the neighbourhood concentration of cumulative forms of disadvantage, intensifying the social isolation...from resources that could support collective social control [...] Even when personal ties are strong in areas of concentrated disadvantage, daily experiences with distrust, fear of strangers, uncertainty, and economic dependency are likely to reduce expectations for taking collective action.”* (ibid:637)

Combining this with Granovetter’s (1983) contention that an over reliance on strong ties within poor communities can lead to fragmentation and poverty being perpetuated, serves as a strong reminder of the importance of finding ways to increase the collective capacity within poor communities to ensure that the people are able to take part in their own uplifting.

### **3.5 The Way Forward**

The aim of this chapter has been to develop two models to be used jointly in exploring the governance of security in Hout Bay. First, the nodal governance model provides the basis for an empirical mapping of the nodes existing in Hout Bay that are involved with the governance of security, including their involvement in networks and relations to other governing nodes in the security field. Second, the collective capacity model is concerned with the importance of identities and networks in the ability of various groups to generate collective action capable of forming an effective governing node.

Together these models structure the empirical findings in the analysis of the three communities in chapters 5-7, and they provide the basis for some questions that guide the analysis of the nodal arrangements around security governance in Hout Bay: First, *how are the nodes organised?* To answer this, a nodal mapping of the organisations active on the provision of security is performed. All nodes are to be examined in terms of their mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional arrangements.

Second, *collective efficacy*: Are they able to convert the social ties in their surroundings to act on some specific goal, and form effective nodes? To what degree are the various nodes capable of achieving their set goals?

Third, *networking*: Networks consist of both strong and weak ties between different units, both on an individual level, which makes up the individual nodes, and on an inter-nodal level which makes up the networking between the various nodes. Measuring the strength of the ties is primarily a question of closeness, or emotional intensity of the tie. The stronger ties are characterised by a more complete social integration between the parties involved. Weaker ties are characterised by the involved parties sharing some specific mutuality, related to some specific situation or context. On a single nodal level, how do these ties impact on the ability to form collective commitment to group action? On an inter-nodal level, how do the ties affect the nodes' ability to form networks with other governing nodes?

Fourth, *enrolment*: How are the different nodes able to enrol other nodes' resources and technologies and align them with their own governing agenda? Some nodes may be able to function as super-structural nodes, by bringing other nodes together and coordinate the members' resources and technologies for a common purpose (Shearing 2006:26-27). Are there any super-structural nodal arrangements in Hout Bay, and if so how are they able to coordinate the efforts of the nodes involved?

Fifth, *identity*: Identity is constructed in a multitude of different ways. Some are strongly integrative and contain a more holistic sense of 'we' that envelopes a greater part of the members social belonging; these are seen as organic forms of identity. Other forms of identity are limited to a shared project and have a more pragmatic character, rather constituting a shared intention. How do the different constructions of identity affect the nodes' ability to generate collective action? How do these identities affect the ability of the nodes to handle internal or external conflict?

## **4. Methodology**

This chapter starts by looking at the research question and the models that guide this study. Following this the chapter will elaborate on the choice of a qualitative, embedded single-case design (Yin 2003). Subsequently the research methods will be looked into. The main source of data stems from open-ended interviews, which have been complemented by documents and observation. Finally a look at the validity, reliability and some ethical considerations are necessary. The aim of this chapter is to see how the study has been designed and conducted, why this path has been chosen and how this has guided the analysis of the study, as well as strengths and weaknesses in connection with the design.

### **4.1 Research Question, Theory and Models**

The theoretical conceptualisation of governance of security in the previous chapters has shown that though this field has tended to be viewed as a central occupation of the state, the field is by now far more fragmented and diverse to be understood as directed by any single agency or actor. The nodal governance framework suggested in the previous chapter has been important for guiding the collection and interpretation of data, and has been central for opening the view of governance of security to extend far beyond the realm of the state.

The research question guiding the empirical studies:

*How do identities and networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?*

This entails a mapping of organisations and people actively seeking to influence the governance of security in Hout Bay. In order to do this, interviews were conducted with representatives from different state, civic and private organisations. In total 37 interviews were conducted during a period from the middle of March till the end of May 2006. In addition to this, documents were collected from the various organisations, as well as participating as an observer at different meetings and other events that took place over the three months that the field work lasted.

The role of theory and the development of a sound theoretical model to be used in the collection and interpretation of data have occupied central roles in the study. Brox (1995) differentiates between ‘analytical’ and ‘empirical’ models. Models may contain hypotheses,

claims about the world that can be tested; in this case they are called 'empirical models'. 'Analytical models' on the other hand are empirically 'empty'; they contain in themselves no claims which can be true or false, but rather function as tools enabling the researcher to observe, structure observations, and eventually post claims which in turn may be true or false. According to Brox (1995:86) analytical models are necessary as templates in order to formulate empirical models. Jeffrey Alexander (1982:2) argues that even though science can be viewed as a process occurring within the context of two distinctive environments, the empirical observational world and the non-empirical metaphysical one, scientific statements can never be determined exclusively by either one on its own. Rather scientific arguments should be understood as representing different positions on the same two directional epistemological continuum. The idea being that different components of scientific thought can be placed on the continuum according terms of generality and specificity, ranging from general presuppositions on the metaphysical end of the continuum to observations on the empirical end. This would also apply to the idea of analytical and empirical models, placing analytical models closer to the metaphysical end and empirical models closer to the empirical end.

In this study both analytical and empirical models have been employed when collecting and analysing data from Hout Bay. In chapter 3 it was argued that the governing entities in the field of security are made up of nodes, that contain four essential characteristics; a mentality, technologies, resources, and an institutional structure (Burriss et al. 2005). The nodal governance framework constitutes the analytical model on which the study is built. The categories are empirically empty, allowing each node to be described and understood independently and according to its own premises, thereby avoiding the problem of giving à priori priority to one node over any other. These categories have been used actively during the data collection, constituting the variables that make up a governing node, and the central variables in the process of mapping the nodes active in Hout Bay. The analytical model of nodal governance has functioned as a theoretical lens guiding the issues which were deemed important during both the data collection and the subsequent analysis (Creswell 2003).

Adding to the analytical model of nodal governance chapter 3 also developed an empirical model of collective capacity. This model is based on several theoretical propositions and takes the form of a series of hypotheses. These are presented towards the end of the theoretical chapter. Generating these hypotheses has been an ongoing process moving between

theoretical propositions put forth in scholarly literature and the findings made during the field work. The development of these hypotheses have followed a pattern-matching logic (Yin 2003:116), comparing the empirically based pattern from the field study with the predicted hypotheses grounded in theory. The usefulness of a theoretical framework based on both analytical and empirical models is to have a sufficient blueprint for the study, containing theoretical propositions as to why hypothetical acts, events, structures, and thoughts occur (Yin 2003:29).

#### **4.2 An Embedded Single-Case Design**

A case study is characterised by a research design attempting to gather a lot of information about few units, or cases (Thagaard 2003:47). According to Yin (2003:1) case studies are the preferred strategy when questions about ‘how’ or ‘why’ are posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context. He goes on to define a case study as: *“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”* (ibid:13). A central goal of the case study is to develop a holistic understanding of the unit(s) being studied (Grønmo 2004:90).

The focus of this study is on how governance of security is being performed at a local level in contemporary South Africa, and on how different segments of the population are able to influence issues of security in their immediate surroundings. In order to study this, the choice was made early on to focus on the suburb of Hout Bay as the case through which light can be shed on contemporary developments in security governance. There were two main reasons for picking Hout Bay; partially it was a practical decision as contact with stake holders in the security situation of Hout Bay was readily available through the supervisor of this thesis, Jan Froestad, who at the time was a resident of Hout Bay himself. The main reason for selecting Hout Bay however, was made because Hout Bay in a lot of ways can be seen as ‘typical’ for many of the challenges facing South Africa at large. Both in academic literature and by respondents Hout Bay has often been characterised as a microcosm of South Africa, as the relatively small valley contains three distinct communities of whites, coloureds, and black Africans; divided both by the colour of their skin and the socioeconomic conditions of the people residing there, a legacy from the days of apartheid. Because of this Hout Bay is seen to contain many of the same challenges, conflicts, and problems that characterise South Africa

as a nation. Hout Bay then conforms to the idea of a case as a representative or typical case as the conditions there are believed to be typical of the situation which may be found in many other urban areas of South Africa. Conforming to one of the rationales for selecting a single case study, according to Yin (2003:41).

It is necessary to note that although the selection of Hout Bay as a single case study based on the idea of it representing a 'typical' case for South Africa, does not mean that it should in any way be regarded as a representative population of a universe, enabling statistical generalisations. It has been a common criticism against case studies that they attempt to generalise from one case to another, making "*analysts fall into the trap of trying to select a 'representative' case or set of cases*" (ibid:38). Rather than aiming at statistical generalisation, case studies rely on analytical generalisation to theory. The goal is to use the findings of a case to expand and generalise theories and theoretical categories common to a set of cases. By analysing the empirical case the aim is to provide knowledge that can inform other cases that can be explained by the same theories or categories. Such generalisation is not automatic, a theory must be tested by replicating the findings in a second or even a third study where the theory suggests that the same results should occur (ibid:37-38). Therefore it would be wise to withhold firm *conclusions* of generalisation based on this study alone, and rather *suggest* that such findings may occur in other similar contexts.

The main unit of analysis in the study is Hout Bay as a whole, but as the suburb contains three distinct communities it was also seen as necessary to go into each one and investigate its particularities. Each community contains several organisations or interest groups working in different ways to promote security in their area, and it is by looking into these groups that the study has attempted to form a picture of how the governance of security is being performed in the communities, and Hout Bay at large. Because of the multiple levels of analysis, the study requires a design accommodating multiple embedded units (ibid.). As such the whole of Hout Bay makes up the total system to be studied, or the main unit of analysis, the communities make up the intermediate units, while the organisations operating in or across communities make up the lower units.

There are pitfalls connected with an embedded design, Yin (ibid:45) points to the danger of focusing only on the subunits levels and failing to return to the larger unit of analysis. In this study steps have been taken to avoid this problem as each empirical chapter includes a

finishing section where the lower level is discussed against the intermediate level and theory. Further the final chapter is focused on bringing the findings from each community into a discussion about the larger level of analysis and relating the findings to the empirical model of collective capacity. Additionally the nodal governance framework emphasises the importance of networks and stresses the importance of these to understand how governance of security is achieved. It is therefore important to examine each governing node in relation to the others in order to reach any conclusions about the overall security governance, making it less likely that the study will focus solely on subunits.

### **4.3 Data Foundation**

There are several methods of data collection available when doing case studies. When selecting the methods to be used in collecting the necessary data some important considerations had to be made. First, the research question sets out to create an analytical description of the security situation in Hout Bay. The aim is not to generate any statistical generalisations, but rather analytical ones. Further the aim is to understand the reasons for success or failure in obtaining wanted levels of security, and as such the study takes an explanatory approach. Second, the nature of the research question entails a mapping of the nodal environment in Hout Bay. This means that previous to the data collection there was limited direct knowledge of how many and which organisations and actors were active in the field of security in Hout Bay and how they related to one another. The selection of methods therefore had to be made open ended to allow for new and important information to arise. This meant that organisations and actors necessary to get in contact with expanded during the data collection itself, as it was not possible to know in advance how many actors were involved and how they related to one another. Third, the methods applied had to be open enough to allow for unexpected information and data to be brought forth, and not discriminate ensuring that the study would not focus an unwarranted amount of attention on any one subunit. Fourth, understanding how the actors think and understand their surroundings, and how they choose to act, is central to the nodal governance approach, therefore the data collection must also reflect this and be able to these collect data. The selection of methods had to be able to capture nuances in the way actors understand and react to their surroundings.

Early on these considerations combined led to a decision to adopt a qualitative approach for the study. This does not mean however that the study was initiated without prior knowledge of the field to be studied. Rather the predefined variables originating from the nodal

governance theory functioned to structure the design and also in selecting units for research. The design locates itself in the more structured end of the qualitative spectrum, containing a previously defined precise research question and the researcher subsequently chooses his/her research methods in relation to this (Thagaard 2003:16). However, it must be noted that as all methods applied for gathering data have weaknesses, it is important to triangulate different sources of evidence to back one another up, as they should be seen as complimentary (Yin 2003:97). In this study the main sources of data have derived from interviews, which have been complemented by documents and observation.

#### ***4.3.1 Interviews***

During the study a total of 37 interviews were conducted with residents of the different communities in Hout Bay, representatives of Hout Bay SAPS, civic leaders in all three communities, representatives of NGOs in all three communities, as well as representatives of local schools and churches, and representatives of the private security industry. Of the 37 interviews 34 were transcribed and are included in the final study<sup>25</sup>. Because some respondents were interviewed twice and some interviews contained more than one respondent (up to three in one instance) the final number of respondents is 36, covered over the 34 interviews included in the final study.

The interviews were all conducted between March and the end of May 2006 in Hout Bay, with the exception of two<sup>26</sup>. Because all interviews had to be conducted within a limited period of time, it required thorough preparations as there would not be another chance to do additional interviews later. The preparation consisted of reading relevant literature on development and policing in South Africa, and developing a theoretical framework that could guide my research questions and lead to a working interview guide.

An interview guide was prepared to structure relevant questions able to inform both the empirical and theoretical dimensions of the study. In the interview guide questions were made reflecting the four characteristics derived from the nodal governance theory (mentalities, technologies, resources, and institution), as well as questions about their environment, and

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<sup>25</sup> Two interviews were rejected because they lacked relevance. One was a case of mistaken identity. The second was due to the person to be interviewed not turning up, but another member of the household was eager to talk in her place. The third interview was lost due to technical problems with the recorder, and no new interview was scheduled because the information from this interview was already covered by several other informants.

<sup>26</sup> Of the two conducted outside of Hout Bay one was conducted at the ADT headquarters, the other at the Department of Community Safety, both located in Cape Town.

their relationship with other actors active in the field of security; this in order to capture both the functioning of the node itself, and its relationship with the surroundings. The guide was not intended to be followed strictly as all the interviews were based on open-ended answers. Questions were adapted to the specific answers and topics that became relevant during the interview. This worked rather well, giving the respondents the possibility to reflect openly on the issues raised, and also allowed for the questions to be rearranged in sequence to fit more naturally to the specific interview. More importantly it gave the respondents an opportunity to raise issues that were not anticipated and included in the prepared guide, at the same time as the guide enabled the interviews to be kept within the confounds relevant to the research question.

Selecting respondents was first of all based on the kind of information they were likely to possess. They would have to have first hand knowledge of one or more of the groups being studied, either because they currently occupied a position within one of them, or because they had been involved in projects or work relating to these groups. This way of selecting respondents is called strategic sampling (Thagaard 2003:53-54). The selection was further a mix of theoretical sampling and convenience sampling. Theoretical because the decision about who to contact was based on whether it was likely that the person would be able to inform the overall research questions based on the theoretical foundation of the study. Convenience because not all persons who were contacted were willing or able to give an interview, this was however very rare and only four people declined or cancelled their interviews. Regretfully an interview with the Superintendent of Hout Bay SAPS was never conducted, meetings were scheduled on three separate occasions, but he cancelled them all at short notice. An interview with Hout Bay SAPS Deputy Station Commissioner was however conducted and is included in the study. Overall SAPS was the most difficult organisation to get access to because they did not allow low level police officer to give interviews, permission was however granted to speak with some of their reservists on the condition that they speak as private citizens and not as police officers.

The interviews were arranged on the basis of a snowball principle (ibid:54). The analogy of the snowball means that the selection starts with a few informants relevant to the study that are then asked to name others that could be relevant to interview for the study, this is repeated throughout the data collection process. Because it was not known how many and who exactly were involved with questions of security before the study commenced, it was necessary to

start with a few people and expand from there. A first meeting was arranged with the Chairperson of 'Imagine Hout Bay'; a local NGO attempting to unify the different communities in Hout Bay, and one of the sector leaders of Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW). At this meeting the prospect of the study was presented and a discussion about which people might be relevant to speak to followed. From this meeting a list of 14 names was drafted, this list quickly grew as the respondents were asked to add names they felt would be of interest. The limited time and resources available made it impossible to interview all of them, but effort was made to cover people representing all organisations and interests relevant to the study, and most of the people not interviewed belong to organisations already covered by other respondents.

A potential pitfall when selecting respondents this way is that all respondents may belong to the same established network, making the data biased (ibid:54). To avoid this it was necessary from the start to establish contact with different networks. It was important for the study to include representatives from different, and at times conflicting, networks to capture different points of view on the situation in Hout Bay. It became apparent from the start that Hout Bay contained several groups with very different perspectives on what the problems were, the reasons for them and what was needed in order to make things better. Thus coming to grips with the story of Hout Bay from various angles became of central importance to understand the structures of governance in the area, both within the separate communities and between them. As is often the case, there seemed to always be at least two sides to every story, and getting to an understanding of these stories required interviewing people with conflicting views, and also talking to more than one person holding similar views to corroborate the information given. By doing this it was possible to construct some central narratives about Hout Bay held by different groups and contrast them with each other. The main idea of this was not to decide whether one party should be seen as more truthful or correct than another, but rather to understand why different actors seek to act the way they do and to understand how these narratives inform and affect governance of security in Hout Bay. A frequent technique used in the interviews to bring the different perspectives to light was confronting respondents with information brought forth in other interviews and asking for their perspective on the matter. This resulted in many interesting conversations and opened the possibility to corroborate the story or to shed a completely new light on the data gathered, and became an invaluable way of understanding the different narratives about Hout Bay. The relatively large number of people and the variety of organisations they represented has the

benefit of strengthening the credibility of the data collected, because it avoids the temptation of following the first and best explanation given by an informant to any given event.

Interviews were conducted with representatives of state and non-state organisations, and commercial as well as non-profit organisations. Some had security as their primary concern whilst others were concerned with it mainly because it affected their ability to perform their primary function, and others saw it as one concern among many others. However, all of them had experiences and knowledge that informed the research question<sup>27</sup>.

In preparing the interview guide and conducting the interviews it was important to consider how to get respondents to talk about issues that were seen as controversial and sensitive. The fact that interviews were conducted with people in very different organisations meant that I had to make slight variations to the interview guide between some of the interviews to focus on the specific aspects of the informants' knowledge and information. An always present danger is that respondents might tell you what they think you want to hear. By approaching the respondents with an open mind, and trying to ask the questions in an open and non-leading way I attempted to avoid this (ibid:99-101).

The challenge was to find non-threatening ways of engaging respondents so that they would trust that no information would be misused. By offering anonymity to all respondents and starting each interview with the more general questions helped ease tension in some cases. Additionally the locations of the interviews were all chosen by the respondents themselves, which also contributed to a more relaxed atmosphere. Most often the setting was their office, a café, or their own home. Some interviews were conducted with more than one respondent present, most often this occurred because the person to be interviewed had invited a second person to join us. These interviews tended to become time consuming, but also yielded additional information as the two respondents could engage each other in conversation and uncover things that might not otherwise have surfaced.

A digital recorder was used during all interviews, except one where technical difficulties led to writing notes using pen and paper was the only way to get the interview done. On two occasions the recorder was turned off for brief periods of time at the request of the

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<sup>27</sup> Appendix 2 contains a list of all respondents which includes their organisational affiliations, community of residence, and other people present during the interview.

respondent, because they did not feel comfortable that the information they were about to give was recorded. The interviews have all been transcribed as they were formulated, but on occasions where grammatical errors and hesitations have made citations difficult to understand some adjustments have been made. Effort was however made to avoid this to keep the authenticity.

#### ***4.3.2 Documents***

Collection of various documents has occurred throughout this study. At the outset of the data collection and interview process newspapers and especially the local Hout Bay newspaper “Sentinel News” was important to get an oversight on happenings in the years previous to the study. Six years of Sentinel News (from January 2000 until May 2006) was reviewed and copies were made of all cases relating to issues of security, crime and policing, as well as discussions about the relationships between residents in the different communities. These were available through the library in Hout Bay which keeps a full record of the biweekly newspaper. Going through these papers gave valuable insight into what had been going on over the last few years and became a good foundation when talking to people and following what they were talking about. Also it gave some good ideas about lines of inquiry during interviews, as a lot of the past and ongoing conflicts in the communities frequently surfaced in the paper.

During the data collection in Hout Bay documents were also collected from informants, these include statutes for organisations, minutes from meetings, and letters and e-mails sent between different organisations. Following Yin (2003:87) the importance of these documents have first and foremost been to corroborate and augment evidence given in interviews. It is however always important to remember that these documents were all written for other purposes than the need of this study (ibid.). For this reason it is critical to view them in relation to the specific purpose they were written for, and efforts have been made to remember this when using them, this also applies to the newspapers, and they can never be treated as objective accounts of what has transpired. It should, therefore, be noted that the vast majority of newspaper articles in Sentinel News are written by one man, Don Lilford, and his views on Hout Bay could mark the angle of the stories that are used in this thesis.

Documents containing statistics of crime rates, dwelling counts, and population censuses have also been collected. These documents must however be treated with a lot of care, as their

reliability is very uncertain. The most recent official data on how many people that reside in Hout Bay stems from the 2001 census<sup>28</sup>. Since then the population in Hout Bay has continued to grow. And especially the expansion of the informal parts of Imizamo Yethu has grown past the point where anyone has a clear idea of how many people actually reside there. The numbers drawn from these should therefore be seen more as suggestive, and are in reality probably too low. To make an estimate of how many people live in Imizamo Yethu a combination of the census of 2001 and newspaper reports have been employed, but the actual number is still far from certain. In addition to the census a more recent study of migration to Hout Bay by SALDRU<sup>29</sup> has been used to look more closely at the numbers in the census of 2001. The census of 2001 contains no specification of Hangberg as a separate area the way it does for Imizamo Yethu, therefore it was necessary to go to this report to get figures for Hangberg. In December 2005 the city of Cape Town performed an informal dwelling count using aerial photography<sup>30</sup>. This has been used to establish an approximation of how many informal dwellings there are present in Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. Again this material should be treated with caution, and rather than providing an exact number of dwellings it should be seen as suggestive. However, even though these statistics should be treated carefully, they are the best available indicators about how many people currently reside in the different communities of Hout Bay. The need for these statistics in the context of this study does however not require them to be perfectly accurate; rather what is needed is an indicator of how many people reside in the various communities in relation to one another and to the crime statistics emerging from SAPS, for these purposes the documents collected are judged to be sufficient.

The crime statistics included have been gathered from the annual crime statistics released by SAPS and contain registered cases going back to 1994/1995. The statistics presented in chapter 2 are a selection of some of the categories that are seen as the most relevant to Hout Bay, and show how these have developed from 1994/1995 to 2005/2006. It is necessary to note that analysing crime statistics is fraught with potential problems. Antony Albeker (2005a, 2005b) stresses the importance of having a critical approach to crime statistics. He argues that in order for a crime to be recorded in the statistics, three things must happen: the

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<sup>28</sup> City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Hout Bay

City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Imizamo Yethu

<sup>29</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>30</sup> Rodriques et al. (2006). Informal Dwelling Count (1993-2005) for Cape Town.

crime must be noticed, it must be reported, and it must be accurately recorded. Especially the last two steps are important in order for the statistics to be reliable, and this is also the area where doubts are most frequently expressed (Altbeker 2005b). The combination of these factors leads Altbeker to argue that there is a substantial amount of crime that goes unrecorded. Underreporting may occur when people don't see the point in reporting a crime to the police, either because the incident is too minor to bother or because they don't see the purpose as the police won't be able to help. Another reason could be that they know the perpetrator and would prefer not to subject him or her to the potential criminal sanctions (ibid.). It should also be stressed that some crime is more likely to go unreported than others<sup>31</sup>, and that this is in no way unique to South Africa. There are also problems of faulty or lack of recording on the side of the police, often believed to be on purpose in order to deceive the public into believing crime to be lower than it is. Another example of how things go unrecorded is that they may be dealt with at the scene. However, Altbeker does not see any reason to dismiss the police statistics, for two reasons. First, the trends in the statistics may reflect an underlying reality, if the underreporting is relatively stable<sup>32</sup>. Second, not all types of crime are subject to any significant degree of underreporting or under-recording, these include murders, car-jackings, and car theft (ibid.). The statistics included in this study are mainly used to reflect the changes in levels of recorded crime in Hout Bay, it is important to keep in mind that they do not necessarily reflect the actual levels of crime. However, following Altbeker it is likely that they can produce a good indication to the changes experienced over the years, and used in combination with statements from informants and other documents they are used to corroborate their experiences.

Literature written by other researchers has been an important source of information throughout this study. Especially when coming to grips with the South African context the contributions of several researchers have been important. The limited amount of time spent in South Africa (only 15 weeks) meant that there would not be sufficient time to get to know the country in all its facets. Therefore reading about the country's history and contemporary society has been of great importance in order to attempt to cover at least some of the limited

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<sup>31</sup> Altbeker (2005b) points to a South African survey from 2003 stating that victims of 71% of robberies, 59% of thefts, 45% of assaults and 43% of burglaries had chosen not to report the matter to the police. Rapes and indecent assaults are likely to contain even greater underreporting. On the other hand murders are much less likely to go unreported.

<sup>32</sup> Comparing the Victimisation survey of 2003 with one from 1998 Altbeker (2003b) shows that reporting rates in general have risen, leading him to argue that any changes in the recorded levels may either understate any fall or overstate any rise in the actual number of crimes committed.

cultural competence and historic knowledge. Assessing ones own cultural competence and knowledge about South Africa is difficult, as such being humble and seeking to confront ones assumptions through dialogue with South Africans during the data collection process became an important means to seek to compensate for the lack of cultural and historic understanding. This also helped to increase the understanding of literature and documents collected about South Africa. A number of reports, articles and books about South Africa, and especially the context of crime and policing, have been reviewed as an important part of this study. Since the amount of literature on the subject is vast, it means that this thesis can only manage to scrape the surface, but they have nonetheless been an invaluable part of the process.

### ***4.3.3 Observation***

During the data collection process it became important to attend meetings and other events arranged by the various groups being studied. The role of observation is limited in this study, but on occasions it was used as a way of witnessing first hand how meetings in and between various organisations played out. Also observation has been helpful in understanding the layout of the different areas in Hout Bay, on several occasions walks were taken through Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg along with locals who talked about the development and history of the various places. During the walks in the neighbourhoods pictures were taken, these along with the walks themselves helped in the later description of the different neighbourhoods of Hout Bay, in addition to notes made after the walks. Several meetings arranged by various stakeholders in the communities were also attended, and notes made. Some of these meetings became places to meet people who would later be interviewed. The observation described above was more of a direct form of observation, the goal was just to take in the impressions and observe what went on in the situations, as well as getting a look at the surroundings. During the meetings taking notes of what was said and what was happening was important for later use. Information gathered at these meetings often triggered new questions to ask informants in later interviews.

On two occasions I also participated as an observer on HBNW activities, the first time was on a regular patrol with my main informant in HBNW, the other was partaking in a CoSAP operation<sup>33</sup> which involves the SAPS, HBNW and the three private security companies. Participating in these ensured a first hand experience of how the cooperative network between

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<sup>33</sup> CoSAP is a project that seeks to coordinate the efforts of private security companies and the SAPS and make a show of force on selected occasions. These operations will be described in further detail in chapter 5.

these different security providers functions on the ground, and valuable for understanding what respondents are talking about and also to understand where they want to go when they were talking about possible future directions. On these occasions participation was necessary in order to be where the action was, this also gave me the opportunity to talk to the people involved whilst they were doing their job, giving a good look into how they wanted to function and what they were actually doing.

The limited amount of time spent on observation means that it can only be used to supplement and corroborate information given by respondents in interviews. The experience was however that it functioned very well as a way of enhancing understanding of what they were talking about in interviews, as there can be no real substitute to experiencing first hand what goes on.

#### **4.4 Validity, Reliability, and Ethical Considerations**

The terms validity and reliability do not carry the same connotations in qualitative research as they do in quantitative research, and their relevance in qualitative research are disputed (Ringdal 2001:247). Thagaard (2003:21) argues that concepts of credibility, corroborability, and transferability should substitute the concepts of validity and reliability in qualitative research. Contrary to this Yin (2003) has argued that validity can be divided into three categories; construct validity, internal validity, and external validity. And further that these along with reliability are relevant to case study research. The final section of this chapter will follow Yin's argument and examine the study according to these categories.

##### ***4.4.1 Construct Validity***

The challenge of construct validity means developing a sufficiently operational set of measures for the phenomenon to be studied. It means being able to relate the phenomenon to be studied with the objectives of the study, and further that the measures taken to study it reflect the actual phenomenon (ibid.). In this study the objective is to study how governance of security is performed in Hout Bay. First, relating to this a clarification of the concepts 'governance' and 'security' are important. The use and definition of these concepts are subject to debate in academic literature, and because of this it is important to clarify the understanding of them relating to this study. In the first chapter these concepts have been discussed and related to other theoretical contributions to ensure a clear understanding of the way they are employed in this study. As the aim of the study is to cover multiple types of actors seeking to influence the security situation it was necessary to employ a fairly wide

definition of 'governance'. The selection of documents, events and respondents were all grounded in the theory developed and in the stated definitions of 'governance' and 'security'.

It is however always possible that respondents and informants have had a different understanding of these concepts than the ones intended in the study. To prevent this all respondents were presented with a short description of what the study was about and what the data was to be used for before commencing with the interviews. Some were given these in advance by e-mail, and some received them when we met, but before the interview began they were given a chance to ask questions, and clarify them. This also helped give the respondents some idea of what the interview would be about and on the occasions when they received it before meeting a chance to reflect a bit before the interview started.

Another important way of strengthening construct validity is the use of multiple sources of evidence, as well as multiple methods during the data collection. In this study interviews have functioned as the main source of data, but these have been sought corroborated by various documents and observation whenever possible.

#### ***4.4.2 Internal Validity***

Internal validity concerns causal explanations in instances when the researcher is trying to determine whether one or more events have led to a specific outcome (ibid:36). Isolating causes for why one has arrived at a specific outcome is difficult in qualitative research, as it involves making inferences about things that have not been directly observed.

The strategy of coming to grips with this problem in this study has been to follow a pattern matching logic, which involves comparing an empirically observed pattern with a predicted one, if these should coincide the internal validity is strengthened (ibid:116). In the analytical chapters to follow each chapter is closed by looking at the empirical findings of the considered community and comparing these findings to the empirical model of collective capacity. This section of the chapter seeks to compare the predicted patterns of the model developed from theory with the empirical findings of the data analysis. If the empirical findings coincide with the predicted pattern internal validity can be regarded as strengthened.

#### ***4.4.3 External Validity***

External validity deals with the issue of generalising the findings in the study. Earlier in this chapter it has been noted that the goal of the study is not to enable a statistical generalisation, but rather an analytical generalisation to theory. Analytical generalisation means that “*a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to compare the empirical results of the case study*” (ibid:32-33). As previously noted this form of analytical generalisation is not automatic, to strengthen the external validity it is better to perform multiple case studies following a replication logic (ibid:37,47). However, as this study is based on a single case, this form of replication logic is impossible to satisfy at the moment. As such the external validity will never be as strong as it could have been if more cases were studied at the same time, and demands for external validity will have to be confined to comparing the empirical findings with the previously developed theory. However, an advantage of the single case design is that given the limited time and resources it is possible to dig deeper into the case and thereby strengthen demands for internal validity.

#### ***4.4.4 Reliability***

In quantitative research reliability deals with the replicability of a study; that a later investigator should be able to conduct the same study and arrive at the same findings and conclusions. In qualitative terms this is more difficult, according to Yin (ibid.) it is about minimising the errors and biases in the study. Silverman (2006:282) suggests making the research process transparent through describing the research strategy and data analysis methods in sufficient detail, this chapter has sought to do just that. The various data collection techniques and procedures have been explained and their strengths and weaknesses described and criticised. An attempt has been made to be completely open about the strategies and considerations that have led to this study, making sure that anyone wishing to challenge it should be able to do so freely. Any biases that may affect the study have sought remedied by triangulating methods and sources of evidence to ensure accurate reporting of the circumstances, as well as strengthening both reliability and validity.

Evaluating the reliability of the secondary sources, mostly made up of academic literature, is difficult to do directly, but by reviewing several scholars' contributions to the same field of research, and the credibility of the academic publications they are printed in, it is less likelihood of there being problems of reliability. Throughout the study efforts have been made to distinguish between documents received from informants and private archives, and

academic literature and official records. Many of the former are not published material and only intended for use by the groups they were made by, and can be difficult to obtain. A list of these is included in the bibliography.

#### ***4.4.5 Ethical Considerations***

Because of the sensitive nature of the topics discussed in this study anonymity has been given to all respondents and informants in the study, all names included in the study are pseudonyms intended to protect the informants' identity. The titles and positions granted to the respondents are, however, accurate. This is because it would be nearly impossible to give a full account of the security network in Hout Bay without being able to refer to the positions of people in the various networks. In this way it has been sought to protect the individuals interviewed in this study as well as the integrity of the research itself.

## **5. The Valley – Pragmatic Partnerships in Crime Prevention**

This and the following two chapters seek to describe the various units identified as being part of the safety and security governance of Hout Bay. These units will be described according to the four characteristics; institutions, resources, mentalities and technologies, as they have been referred to in the nodal governance framework. By investigating these units independently and as parts of a more extensive network, an attempt will be made to map the governing nodes of central importance and how they attempt to direct safety and security in Hout Bay.

The following chapters are based mainly on interviews with residents and other stakeholders in Hout Bay, as well as local newspaper articles, and other documents collected while conducting the field study in Hout Bay during three months from the beginning of March till the end of May 2006.

This chapter will show how the establishment of a collective identity has enabled the inhabitants of the Hout Bay Valley to construct a security network along with the Hout Bay SAPS and the private security industry which has had a significant impact on property crime in their residential areas.

### **5.1 Introducing the Valley**

The Valley consists mostly of middle to high-income families residing along the mountain slopes in homes that represent high socioeconomic status, and the vast majority of them are white. The Hout Bay Valley represents for many a chance to live in a quiet area of great natural beauty (Oelofse and Dodson 1997). In addition to the permanent residents of the Valley there is also a high number of what they call ‘swallows’<sup>34</sup> in Hout Bay, foreigners who fly in just for the summer, leaving a number of houses empty for parts of the year. The fact that the majority of people in the Valley have a high socioeconomic status and the presence of foreigners also leads to expectations of a high standard of living, this demands that the government delivers high quality service. Some residents in Hout Bay live in gated communities protected by fences and guards around the clock. There are several of these gated communities in Hout Bay, but it is not home to the majority of the residents there.

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<sup>34</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

Fencing around the houses is common in Hout Bay; most houses have high fences surrounding their yards. Some have electric fences or barbed wire at the top to keep intruders out. It is also fairly common to have dogs walking in the yard.

### ***5.1.1 The Perceived Safety and Security Threats in the Valley***

Security has both an objective and a subjective dimension, as stated in the introduction. It is the objective condition of being without threat, the neutralisation of threats, and avoidance of danger. But equally important is the subjective condition of feeling safe and free from anxiety, by reference to insecurity. Although the subjective condition of security may be correlated with the objective condition, it may also be unrelated or even inversely related (Zedner 2003). The main point here is that the people's perceptions of their own security can be just as important, or even more important, in understanding their rationales for action, as their actual exposure to risks and dangers.

Concerns relating to crime and security have run high in the Valley for several years, reading the local newspaper 'Sentinel News' there is hardly an issue going by without mentioning concerns for the security situation in Hout Bay. Although the previous Chairperson of the Hout Bay & Llandudno Community Police Forum (HBCPF) in 2001 assured the citizens of Hout Bay that regarding crime "*we are better off than most other areas of the southern suburbs*"<sup>35</sup>, the focus on crime has been high in the Valley. In mid 2003 House break-ins escalated dramatically, Superintendent 'Otto' of Hout Bay SAPS was quoted saying "*We are in trouble. Juvenile crime is a huge problem and house break-ins has gone through the roof*"<sup>36</sup>. A month later things were getting even worse when a record number of 66 homes had been broken into and 15 businesses had been forcedly entered. 'Elizabeth', the Chairperson of the HBCPF stated that "*House break-ins in Hout Bay are now among the highest in the whole Peninsula, taking into account the size of the community. The incidence of theft out of motor vehicles is as high as in the city centre*"<sup>37</sup>. The high level of attention given to crime in Hout Bay continued through 2004, and by September the SAPS' acting deputy commissioner of the Muizenberg zone, of which Hout Bay station is one of five stations, stated that it was now the

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<sup>35</sup> Sentinel News, September 14 2001, Hout Bay crime 'lower than most'

<sup>36</sup> Sentinel News, July 25 2003, 'We're in trouble: break-ins through the roof'

<sup>37</sup> Sentinel News, August 15 2003, Urgent campaign to curb break-ins

“worst station in the entire province”, the period July to September had seen a rise in most categories of crime except murder, compared to the year before<sup>38</sup>.

*“crime has been a major issue, we were averaging for a while on something like 80 house break-ins a month [...] you’d go to a meeting or a dinner party and almost the sole topic for conversation was crime, and everybody knew somebody who’s been burgled or had been hit or something like that.”*<sup>39</sup>

The concerns about crime held by the residents of the Valley concentrate mainly around property crime, the fear of being burgled or assaulted by burglars. According to the police the types of incidents they are called out to in the Valley include assaults, domestic abuse, and light vandalism by juveniles, but the majority are house break-ins and trespassing<sup>40</sup>.

The presence of Imizamo Yethu in the middle of the Valley is most often blamed for the rise in house break-ins that have taken place in the Valley. According to the Chairperson of the HBCPF *“there is a direct correlation between the increase of crime in Hout Bay and the expansion of Imizamo Yethu as a village.”*<sup>41</sup> This view has strong support from the majority of the inhabitants in the Valley, as well as the Ward Councillor<sup>42</sup> and the Ratepayers<sup>43</sup>. Many feel that the rapid expansion of Imizamo Yethu has made it a hideout for criminals, and that the root cause of crime in the Valley is the overcrowding in Imizamo Yethu. This common perception has led the majority of Valley residents to view the township with suspicion. There is a general agreement among the majority in the Valley that the influx of people to Imizamo Yethu must stop, and many blame the ANC and SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation), the main civic in Imizamo Yethu, for letting the population growth get out of control. The most commonly held perception in the Valley is that the majority of people in Imizamo Yethu need to be moved to housing elsewhere as there are neither jobs, nor enough space available to them in Hout Bay, and that this exacerbates the problem of crime<sup>44</sup>, this perception is also supported by the local SAPS<sup>45</sup>. Residents of Hughenden Estate, neighbouring Imizamo Yethu to the northeast, have been particularly vocal about the problems arising from the expansion of the township, as they have become targets of frequent

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<sup>38</sup> Sentinel News, October 29 2004, Simply the worst!

<sup>39</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>40</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>41</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>42</sup> ‘Walter’, interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>43</sup> ‘Deacon’, interviewed April 10 2006

<sup>44</sup> Sentinel News, April 27 2001, Illegal squatting tops residents’ list of concerns

<sup>45</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

house break-ins<sup>46</sup>. Having Imizamo Yethu in the middle of the Valley also causes additional problems for the police, as one officer commented *“it’s not outside criminals who come into the area; these are guys who live here. It’s sometimes very difficult to police. Because you’re not actually catching the guys moving out of your area, you’ve literally got to hop in their community where they’re protected.”*<sup>47</sup>

A reoccurring problem for the residents of the Valley has been that a lot of the property crime has been the work of juveniles, many of whom have been traced back to Imizamo Yethu.

*“The pattern is that it’s usually 21-22 year olds, whereas the experience we’ve been having is that it’s a lot of younger kids, juvenile delinquents [...] I’d say most of the crime in Hout Bay is done by four or five gangs, crime levels always go up once the criminals are released. A lot of the juveniles go away to reformatory school or whatever it is, and during the school holidays they come back, and that’s when the crime goes up [...] A lot of them don’t have parents, but they obviously stay with the people who sell their stuff.”*<sup>48</sup>

Juveniles are a source of frustration because they cannot be sent to jail after being caught. Combined with the general slow process of the South African judicial system this means that a lot of the people who are caught committing burglaries have also been caught two or three times before<sup>49</sup>. A SAPS reservist commented on some of the juveniles from Imizamo Yethu: *“to look at them many would say that they’re cute and look like nice kids, but if you actually look at their tattoos these are hardened criminals at the age of 13-14, so that’s what you’re up against.”*<sup>50</sup>

All of this has contributed to a lot of animosity between the Valley and Imizamo Yethu where the people of the Valley see the township as harbouring the people responsible for their insecurity, and on the other hand many in the township feel as if they are being wrongfully accused of being criminals by the people of the Valley. In addition there have been accusations from the Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu communities that the whites in the Valley are themselves exacerbating the problem of crime by deliberately not hiring people who live in their communities, but rather bussing people in from other townships around Cape Town because they fear that hiring locally will lead to more influx<sup>51</sup>. A member of HBNW summed

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<sup>46</sup> Sentinel News, February 11 2005, Residents point to mayor’s ‘broken promises’

<sup>47</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>48</sup> ‘Andrew’, interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>51</sup> ‘David’, interviewed March 21 2006

it up: *“it’s easy to blame the crime on Imizamo Yethu, there’s certainly a high proportion of the criminal element coming out of there [...] That in turn was creating potential clashes between white and black. You’ve got the racial divide anyway, but crime was exaggerating that”*<sup>52</sup>. The relationship between Imizamo Yethu and the Valley has been shaped strongly by the rise of crime in Hout Bay. Hangberg, the third community in Hout Bay, has to a much lesser degree been involved in the way the residents of the Valley perceive the crime affecting themselves. The main line is clearly situated between the Valley and Imizamo Yethu.

The police in Hout Bay had repeatedly stated that they needed the help of the community if they should make a significant impact to curb crime in Hout Bay, and in March 2005 their pleads were answered as a group started working to launch a neighbourhood watch in the Valley along with SAPS. At a HBCPF meeting it was decided that an attempt would be made to start Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW). During the preparations to the launch of HBNW a murder occurred which shocked the Valley community. Gerhard Vergeer, a cyclist participating in the Argus cycle tour, was shot and killed in a Hout Bay guesthouse during a robbery by a gang of three who had been committing regular house break-ins in Mount Rhodes over the previous two weeks. Two of them, a Namibian and an Angolan, were arrested shortly after in Imizamo Yethu<sup>53</sup>. Following the murder the meeting to launch HBNW in March 2005 was attended by nearly 500 people and HBNW was launched.

The murder proved a pivotal point for community action in the Valley, as will be shown in the section about HBNW, but it is worth pausing to ask the question of why this murder in particular became so important. Hout Bay has on average about a murder a month, but none of these have created the uproar that this one did. The answer may seem obvious, but the fact is that even though people had been severely injured as a result of assaults during house robberies in Hout Bay, so far none had been killed. The vast majority of murders usually take place in either Imizamo Yethu or Hangberg. But this time it had happened right in their midst, to one of their ‘own’, and in a situation they had all come to fear most of all, a house robbery. Combining this with the fact that two of the perpetrators were caught in Imizamo Yethu, the very place most of their insecurity originates, it is little wonder that the result was explosive. To many living in the Valley, Imizamo Yethu has come to represent the ‘other’ threatening their security. The timing to launch a neighbourhood watch could not have been better, as the

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<sup>52</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>53</sup> Sentinel News, March 25 2005, Murder accused confesses in court

murder now seemed to confirm all the perceptions many in the Valley had about Imizamo Yethu, and the inability of the government to provide its citizens with sufficient security. All of these factors contributed to launch a very active and vibrant civil society network attempting in various ways to govern security in the Hout Bay Valley. Since the launch of HBNW crime in the Valley has decreased dramatically. According to SAPS there was an over 70% drop in both violent crime and burglaries during the first quarter of 2006 compared to 2005, and a lot of this has been attributed to HBNW activity<sup>54</sup>.

## **5.2 Nodes Implicated in the Governance of Security in the Valley**

The security governance network of the Valley consists of several actors with different agendas and mentalities. In order to understand how security is governed in the Valley, it is therefore important to perform a consistent mapping of all the central auspices and providers operating in the Valley. The following is a mapping of the major and most important security nodes operating in the Hout Bay Valley. The section will look at each node individually and explore its institution, resources, mentality and technology in accordance with the nodal governance model. In addition its contact with other nodes in the security network will be explored as these networked relations are seen to be of central importance for understanding the way the nodes operate and achieve their goals, as well as the totality of the security field.

### ***5.2.1 Hout Bay & Llandudno Community Police Forum***

Hout Bay & Llandudno Community Police Forum (HBCPF) is to operate as a statutory body looking at the overall safety and security in Hout Bay and Llandudno. But for some years the HBCPF in Hout Bay has been a source of much controversy, mainly due to clashes in personality between the SAPS station commander and the Chairperson of the HBCPF. Since 2002 the HBCPF has been led by 'Elizabeth', a lawyer and previous public prosecutor, this has led the HBCPF to rely heavily upon using the law and courts to attain their goals. Two incidents in particular have served to severely distance the HBCPF from many of its members and the SAPS.

The first major conflict arose as the HBCPF got involved with allegations of corruption at the Hout Bay SAPS. According to 'Elizabeth' she was alerted by SAPS personnel to irregularities at the station, involving allegations that two of the senior police officers at the station might

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<sup>54</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

be guilty of various forms of misconduct<sup>55</sup>, including: soliciting or receiving material benefits, nepotism, and the misuse of police vehicles<sup>56</sup>. She subsequently went to the CPF Area Board Chairperson and was advised to go to the SAPS Area Commissioner, resulting from this an investigation was launched against the Hout Bay SAPS station commander and his second in command at the time. Some days later ‘Elizabeth’ was informed by the area commissioner of SAPS that they were not going to pursue the investigation any further<sup>57</sup>, and that both the Station Commissioner and his second in command were cleared of all charges. Following this a near complete breakdown in the relationship between SAPS and the HBCPF occurred where allegations between the supporters of the two blocks have hampered any possibility of a working relationship. In March 2004, the relationship between the SAPS and the HBCPF was so bad that the Area Commissioner of the SAPS, when attending a meeting between the HBCPF and the SAPS, instructed the Hout Bay SAPS to “*distance themselves from the CPF and politics*”, and that that he would recommend to the Community Safety MEC (Member of Executive Council) that the Hout Bay HBCPF be disbanded in order to form a new HBCPF that would be able to cooperate with the SAPS<sup>58</sup>. This instruction was challenged in the Cape Town High Court by the HBCPF, and the Area Commissioner subsequently withdrew his directive “*unconditionally and with immediate effect*”<sup>59</sup> and undertook that the SAPS “*would cooperate with the Hout Bay CPF and would further meet their statutory obligations regulating CPFs*”<sup>60</sup>. Following this the complaints continued that the Station Commissioner was sabotaging the HBCPF by not cooperating or attending meetings.

What has followed is essentially a blame game between the supporters of ‘Elizabeth’ and Superintendent ‘Otto’ of Hout Bay SAPS, resulting in the abandonment of the HBCPF by many of its members. According to the Hout Bay SAPS Deputy Station Commissioner “*there is a total lack of trust, almost hate between them [...] It cannot function without changes [...] there is a need for either a new station commander or a new Chairperson of the CPF, there is no other way of solving it.*”<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>56</sup> Sentinel News, March 26 2004, Forum challenges top cop in court

<sup>57</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>58</sup> Sentinel News, March 12 2004, Top cop torpedoes Hout Bay forum

<sup>59</sup> Sentinel News, April 16 2004, Sibulelo’s ‘hot potato’

<sup>60</sup> Sentinel News, April 30 2004, About Smit

<sup>61</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

The second conflict to cause controversy around the HBCPF started when ‘Elizabeth’ in March 2005 announced that the HBCPF on behalf of its members would launch a class action law suit against the government for failing to provide security to the people of Hout Bay. This lawsuit, though still not actually filed at the time of visiting Hout Bay, had managed to alienate especially parts of Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg from the HBCPF as the main focus of the lawsuit is on the growth and expansion of Imizamo Yethu as a threat to both the ‘legal beneficiaries’ of Imizamo Yethu and the broader community of the Valley. So far only one letter, dated April 19<sup>th</sup> 2006, had been sent to all three levels of government detailing their complaint, the letter was sent on behalf of the HBCPF and the Sinethemba Civic Association, a group claiming to represent the ‘original beneficiaries’ of Imizamo Yethu<sup>62</sup>. SANCO withdrew from the HBCPF after the intentions of a lawsuit was made known. Hout Bay Civic Association (HBCA), based in Hangberg, also chose to distance themselves from the lawsuit and the HBCPF, stating that “*We’re not interested in taking any government to court, or any local council or provincial government to court.*”<sup>63</sup>

Both Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu residents felt by and large that the HBCPF did not represent their interests, with the exception of Sinethemba. The Chairperson of HBCA stated that: “*...the CPF is more concerned about problems in the white area instead of addressing things here. For them house break-ins are much more of a concern than the drugs in this community*”<sup>64</sup>. This feeling seemed to be reflected in many of the people that were interviewed in Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu concerning the HBCPF, and to many of them the pending lawsuit represented a confirmation of this belief. In addition many in Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu regarded the decision to take legal action against the government a political ploy to weaken the ANC:

*“politics here play a major role [...] especially in the [Valley]. You know exactly who is DA or whatever party, we all know [‘Elizabeth’] is DA. When we get together there’s always a political side coming out, especially at meetings this political thing sticks its head out. It always sticks its head out because they, I don’t want to say rich people, but they don’t care what happens in the Harbour”*<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Hout Bay Community Police Forum, Letter to local, provincial and national government, April 19 2006

<sup>63</sup> ‘David’, interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>64</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>65</sup> ‘David’, interviewed April 30 2006

### Institution and Resources

The HBCPF is made up of 22 civic organisations from all communities of Hout Bay and Llandudno where each of the organisations has a representative with one vote. An Executive Committee consisting of nine members is elected by these member organisations to perform the daily work of the HBCPF. The current Chairperson of the HBCPF was elected twice, but is not a member of any of the organisations represented on the HBCPF, as this is not a requirement to be elected. Among the organisations represented on the HBCPF are HBNW, HBCA, Sinethemba, SANCO, the Residents Association, the Ratepayers, Harbour Development Forum, the Better Business Club, the Friends of the Museum, the Friends of the Library, various heritage trusts representing environmental interests in Hout Bay, and different churches<sup>66</sup>. Their resources all come from the contribution of time and money by the individual members of the HBCPF. Through the election of ‘Elizabeth’ as Chairperson in April 2002 the HBCPF certainly gained access to very strong legal resources, and has relied heavily on those in its work since.

However, several of the organisations which belong to the HBCPF have stopped attending their meetings as they no longer see any point. As a result of the actions taken by the HBCPF leadership, and in particular the two cases mentioned above, serious problems have followed in the relationship between the leadership of the HBCPF and central parts of its member organisations. As stated by the Chairperson of the Ratepayer’s Association:

*“We’re still a member, I still attend the annual general meeting, but we don’t participate in the monthly meetings [...] I’m not even kept informed anymore, but for a period of time we did attend, and they were so filled with controversy and issues that were so irrelevant to what the objectives of that committee were, that we felt it was a complete and utter waste of time.”<sup>67</sup>*

According to the Co-Chairperson of HBNW, who is also a member of the HBCPF, he had not received any news of the HBCPF since November 2005, “*had it been active we would be taking a very active role in it, but it’s not so there’s nothing to be done*”<sup>68</sup>. HBNW was also among the organisations which distanced itself from the HBCPF both with regard to the ongoing dispute between ‘Elizabeth’ and Station Commissioner ‘Otto’ and the pending lawsuit against the government. Though the HBNW contains supporters of both views regarding the lawsuit, a firm decision was reached by the then Chairperson of HBNW to keep

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<sup>66</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>67</sup> ‘Deacon’, interviewed April 10 2006

<sup>68</sup> ‘Gareth’, interviewed April 7 2006

HBNW neutral towards the lawsuit out of fear of being perceived as taking a political stance and alienating the other communities of Hout Bay<sup>69</sup>. This was done despite the fact that HBNW is constituted under the HBCPF and has to remain a member, though in reality there is no real cooperation between them.

The conflicts in the HBCPF have served to split the membership in two. This came fully to light when two meetings were held on subsequent days by separate divisions of HBCPF members. The first was an 'official' meeting attended by four of its nine executive committee members, including the Chairperson, and about 40 other HBCPF members. At this meeting it was decided by a vote of 3-0, with one abstaining, to pass a motion of no confidence in Superintendent 'Otto', as he was still not complying with the court's order that the police should liaise with the HBCPF. The following day a meeting of people discontented with the current HBCPF was held at the police station. At this meeting a vote of full confidence in Superintendent 'Otto' was taken unanimously, and the assembly also disassociated itself from the law suit to be taken out by the HBCPF against the government. Attending this meeting were 10 people, among them the Chairperson of the HBNW and several of its executive committee members, as well as the suspended Secretary of the HBCPF and Superintendent 'Otto' himself<sup>70</sup>.

Reinforcing the division between the two sides are allegations of political motivations for their actions. According to 'Andrew', one of the Co-Chairpersons of HBNW, the HBCPF has been "*hijacked by political organisations [...] I'd go so far as to say that they've weighed the CPF with community organisations that had very little to do with community policing. So just to put it very plainly is; white organisations have got control of the CPF*"<sup>71</sup>. He further suspected that many of the organisations on the HBCPF and particularly Sinethemba, which has two members on the Executive Committee, actually serve as puppets for the DA "*I think there are 26 organisations on the CPF, and of those 26 in my opinion 15 or 16 of them are puppet organisations. And I've made myself very unpopular for saying that, but it's the truth*"<sup>72</sup>. Although this view is not shared by all members of the HBNW it is supported by several of the members on the executive committee, and has been a strong part in the argument of keeping HBNW out of the law suit against the government planned by the

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<sup>69</sup> 'Andrew' interviewed, March 14 2006

<sup>70</sup> Sentinel News, July 15 2005, Forum policing row breaks into the open

<sup>71</sup> 'Andrew', interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

HBCPF. It was noted by several that the lawsuit against the government was simply a ploy to gain support for the DA over the incumbent ANC government in Cape Town just before the upcoming local elections in March 2006.

The HBCPF and its supporters, among them the Ward Councillor for the DA, have strongly refuted these allegations. After the local elections ended with the DA taking over office in Cape Town, the Chairperson of the HBCPF stated that this had made no difference in her intentions to go through with the court action, although no legal action had yet been taken<sup>73</sup>. The Ward Councillor went further: *“the kind of people who would describe it [the HBCPF] as defunct would be people like ‘Andrew’, who stood for the executive, but wasn’t able to get elected onto it [...] He is of course just the ANC’s lackey. There’s always something wrong in their opinion about the CPF”*<sup>74</sup>.

The staunch line between the opposing groups has made it very difficult for the HBCPF to operate effectively over the last couple of years. In the words of one of the SAPS reservists:

*“It’s a balls-up, complete balls-up. And in my opinion as a civilian, unfortunately political agendas have crept in there [...] There are some personality conflicts and at the end of the day when they’re meant to be assisting us and be some sort of watch dog in some ways, and a liaison between the community and the SAPS, they’re sort of trying to twist it to their political agenda [...] it’s become this ‘the DA didn’t do this, the ANC did that’ [...] It’s a bickering session, have you ever been to a CPF meeting where both parties are there? It’s a free for all, it’s actually unpleasant.”*<sup>75</sup>

The Department of Community Safety (DOCS), which among other things has an oversight and support function relating to the various CPFs in the Western Cape, also found the situation relating to the HBCPF difficult:

*“The problem at the moment is that we don’t have a CPF that’s functioning properly, because that leads to a situation in this department where we can’t get the real picture of what’s happening in Hout Bay, we’re now relying on police stats [...] without a functioning CPF it’s very difficult for the department to say what we’re going to do in Hout Bay”*<sup>76</sup>.

The DOCS has previously attempted to make the HBCPF accept a new uniform constitution, as has been done by many of the other CPFs in the Western Cape. But the HBCPF would not

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<sup>73</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>74</sup> ‘Walter’, interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>75</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>76</sup> ‘Trevor’, interviewed May 26 2006

accept this constitution as written because it among other things would give the Provincial Commissioner of the SAPS authority to disband CPFs. According to Elizabeth this is contrary to the Police Act of 1995 and they therefore refuse to accept it<sup>77</sup>.

Both the DOCS and the HBCPF were clear on the fact that at the moment there was no real cooperation between them. The DOCS claimed, without providing any details, that a process had been started to resolve the problem of the HBCPF through the CPF area board: *“We want to give them time and space to do whatever they’re doing. Once they give us a report that says we’ve reached an agreement, that’s when we’ll start interacting with them again”*<sup>78</sup>. The lack of support from the DOCS did not seem to affect the HBCPF much. When the DOCS withdrew its financial support to the HBCPF of R3000 a year, this was regarded as such a small sum that they decided it was just as well to stop applying for government subsidy, rather than conform to the wishes of DOCS<sup>79</sup>.

### Technology and Mentality

The primary function of the HBCPF is to liaise with the police and function as a watch dog according to its Chairperson<sup>80</sup>. With ‘Elizabeth’ as the Chairperson and the driving force behind the HBCPF since 2002, a legal mentality has come to dominate how they operate. The amount of legal actions taken by the HBCPF testifies to this, and appears at the moment to be their sole way of achieving their ends. It is apparent that this approach has also been part of the reason why the HBCPF has ended up in such controversies with many of its members. The use of legal action as a way of resolving disputes seems so far to have done little to improve relations between the HBCPF and the police, rather it seems to harden the conflict and make a solution to the problem of cooperation less likely without either removing the current leadership of the HBCPF or the Commissioner of Hout Bay SAPS. The HBCPF maintain however that the fault lies with the police who are not complying with their obligations, according to their Chairperson: *“we can only liaise with the police in so far as they let us liaise with them. But the Police Act states in section 215 that the police shall liaise with the CPF, not the other way around. There’s no obligation for the CPF to go and chase information from the police, we’re civilians”*<sup>81</sup>.

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<sup>77</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>78</sup> ‘Trevor’, interviewed May 26 2006

<sup>79</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

The willingness of the HBCPF to use court actions and legal measures to obtain their goals can be understood in relation to their broader mentality that it is the responsibility of the government, and not civil society, to ensure the safety of the citizens and prevent crime:

*“It’s not what I feel; it’s what the constitution says. The SAPS, it’s their primary responsibility to take care of crime in our area. But the local government in terms of the constitution chapter 7, section 152, also have an obligation to secure the safety, security and health of the local residents, that’s the new national constitution. The province also has an obligation with regard to the supply of security services to the community, and that’s why we address our letter of demand to all three levels of government.”<sup>82</sup>*

The mentality that the government is responsible and should be held accountable for their delivery to the citizens explains the actions taken by the HBCPF. By maintaining the task of being a civilian oversight mechanism or watch dog as its primary function, the HBCPF is going against the current. As discussed in chapter 2, the CPFs nationally have largely abandoned this function in favour of partnerships with the police, where they play more of a support role to the SAPS. A development strongly favoured by the SAPS, as would also seem to be the case in Hout Bay. The Hout Bay SAPS have repeatedly stated that they want the aid of the community in fighting crime, and called for citizens to take more personal responsibility. According to the Hout Bay SAPS, the HBCPF should be a meeting place where the community and the police together could find ways for the community to aid the police in fighting crime. It is clear that there is a discrepancy between the way that the HBCPF sees itself and the way the police wish them to perform their function, and it is equally clear that this difference of opinion is a strong source of friction in their relationship.

The officers at DOCS reaffirmed this conception about a disagreement in the mandate of the HBCPF, while clearly siding with the police:

*“It’s an issue of community members overstepping their boundaries, not keeping their mandate as stated within the Act, the Police Service Act of 1995. That raises attention because the police obviously will always try to protect their territory, they will always protect themselves if they feel people are beginning to overstep their boundaries. That’s where the bone of that contestation was between the CPF and the police.”<sup>83</sup>*

While many in the Valley support the actions taken by the HBCPF, or at least sympathise with their cause, there are also those who see it as a futile direction, such as the Ratepayers, in

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<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> ‘Trevor’, interviewed May 26 2006

the words of their Chairperson when commenting on the threat to sue the government: *“I think she was justified in what she was attempting to do although ultimately it was very unrealistic. My biggest concern with the court action that she was taking, was that I couldn’t see it accomplishing an awful lot”*<sup>84</sup>. The decision of the Ratepayers to stop attending the monthly meetings of the HBCPF is a matter of practicality rather than political disagreement *“we’ve shifted our focus to the HBNW which really is serving a functional purpose in Hout Bay. Our intention is to place our time where it can best be spent”*<sup>85</sup>. The result is that most of the people in the Valley have shifted their focus away from the HBCPF as a vehicle for voicing their opinions and communicate with the police, over to the more newly established HBNW which has taken a very different approach to govern security.

Whatever the truth about political agendas, accusations of corruption, and the other issues fuelling the quarrel between members of the HBCPF; the fact remains that it has become very difficult for the HBCPF to function as it has managed to alienate large parts of its own constituency and the SAPS in the process. As the people and organisations that are supposed to make up its institutional framework are unable to agree on which direction to pull, the result is that the HBCPF for the time being has ended up more or less paralysed. Whether or not the court action actually will take place is uncertain, but what this process has contributed to is further the distance between the Valley and its neighbouring communities who feel sidelined in the discussion about what the HBCPF should be and do, and where some even feel it is working against them and the good of their community. Both Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu residents, with the exception of Sinethemba, expressed clear feelings that the HBCPF was mainly concerned with issues threatening the people of the valley at the expense of their own communities, and thus chose to distance themselves from the HBCPF.

### ***5.2.2 Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch***

Hout Bay Neighbourhood Watch (HBNW) was established on 6<sup>th</sup> of April 2005, as a result of the escalation in crime which had taken place in Hout Bay. It was a result of citizens responding to the plea from the police that they didn’t have the resources to handle the growing problem of crime in Hout Bay themselves. ‘Gareth’, the man behind the initiative, explained that lack of action on the part of the HBCPF was also a strong part of the reason why he saw a need to establish a Neighbourhood Watch:

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<sup>84</sup> ‘Deacon’, interviewed April 10 2006

<sup>85</sup> Ibid.

*“...it started because I was a member of the CPF, which does nothing, it’s powerless, it’s bad meat, it does nothing. A year ago it was bad, but not so bad, and I went to a meeting and as a big difference the chairman wants to sue the police, she says the police are bad, the police are corrupt, they don’t do their job [...] Superintendent [‘Otto’] then stood up and said ‘look I’m here as a policeman and I don’t want to talk about all of this [...] what I want to do here and now is talk about crime, that’s what the police are here for’. That made me say [...] ‘the only way we’re going to do anything about crime is for there to be a neighbourhood watch in this area. Nobody is doing anything about it, if the CPF agrees I will try to start a neighbourhood watch in this area.’”<sup>86</sup>*

At this meeting in the HBCPF it was decided, with the blessing of the police, that a community meeting would be called to establish whether there was enough interest in the community to create a sustainable neighbourhood watch in the Valley. Prior to the community meeting only 44 people had signed up as full members of HBNW<sup>87</sup>, but the murder of Gerhard Vergeer during the Argus Cycle Tour increased the interest in the concept of a neighbourhood watch dramatically. *“It just shocked everybody in Hout Bay out of their apathy...”<sup>88</sup> “...that seemed to be a catalyst that galvanised the community into action, and the people were saying enough is enough and the troops started rallying”<sup>89</sup>*. The meeting which was held at Kronendal Primary School was attended by nearly 500 people as well as representatives from the Hout Bay SAPS and the Private Security Industry.

*“It was launched in a whole hype of emotion, but stuck and carried on, so the HBNW really got started through ‘Gareth’s’ effort. But he was a swallow so he left us to go back over seas for a while and we carried it on, but it got going quite strongly. With the strong motivation of one of the SAPS captains ‘Thomas’, he took on a role to get HBNW off the ground; he worked in the evenings trying to get together groups of people. He’d find two or three people in certain areas and they would gather people to meetings in their homes to form their own neighbourhood watch.”<sup>90</sup>*

The rise in crime in Hout Bay over the last couple of years combined with the murder had created an ideal environment for launching an initiative like HBNW, which otherwise might have proven difficult to persuade people to get involved with as it requires them to take action and be involved. By March 2006, a year after the launch, HBNW numbered 1500 members, with about 100 of them doing active patrols at night, cooperating with the police and private security providers.

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<sup>86</sup> ‘Gareth’, interviewed April 7 2006

<sup>87</sup> Sentinel News, March 11 2005, Hout Bay slow to react to judge’s call

<sup>88</sup> ‘Andrew’, interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>89</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

By distancing themselves from the court action initiated by the HBCPF the HBNW has also managed to gain the respect of many in Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu, and everyone interviewed shared a positive view on them, although some noted that they didn't really have a direct impact on the crime in the neighbouring communities. There have even been talks between SANCO and the HBNW about reviving the Block Committees in Imizamo Yethu in cooperation with HBNW<sup>91</sup>. This is however unlikely to happen as several of the executive committee members of HBNW were very sceptical about getting involved with SANCO, who many in the Valley perceive as illegitimate 'warlords'<sup>92</sup>. The relationship with HBCA was better, and some small steps had been taken to create a section of HBNW in Hangberg, but so far little interests had been generated by the community in Hangberg to get such a project up and running<sup>93</sup>. The scepticism about involving Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg in HBNW also extended to concerns that if people in these communities got access to radios they could quickly fall into the wrong hands and the entire radio-network would be compromised. At the moment however, HBNW remains an exclusive Valley operation and the day to day operations concentrate solely on the issues relating directly to the security of the Valley.

### Institution and Resources

Membership in HBNW is open to any person living, working, or owning property in Hout Bay. The membership is free and does not require its members to do anything actively<sup>94</sup>. HBNW, in cooperation with SAPS, has divided Hout Bay into 27 sectors based on geographical location. HBNW members are allocated to the sector in which they reside or own property<sup>95</sup>. Each sector is left a great deal of autonomy to act in ways they see fit to increase security in their own area. Each sector also has a 'Sector Leader' elected at the Annual General Meeting (AGM). The main governing body of the HBNW is the 'Executive Committee' which is made up of the Sector Leaders from each member sector. In addition to the sector leaders the Executive Committee may (and does) co-opt additional members to serve on the Executive Committee until the next AGM; these are also entitled to a vote. Members of the Executive Committee are often referred to as 'officers'. Further the acting SAPS Crime Prevention Officer is also a member of the Executive Committee and entitled to

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<sup>91</sup> 'Andrew', interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>92</sup> 'Charles', interviewed May 15 2006

<sup>93</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>94</sup> HBNW Constitution 6<sup>th</sup> April 2005

<sup>95</sup> Not all sectors have members in HBNW. Both Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu are considered sectors in HBNW but neither has a single member. There are also sectors that consist of gated communities and these have showed little interest in contributing to HBNW.

a vote, ensuring a tight relationship with the SAPS. The Chairperson of HBNW is elected by the Executive Committee and serves as Chairperson over both the Committee and HBNW as a whole. Decision making in the Executive Committee is based on a simple majority vote.<sup>96</sup>

Formally HBNW is constituted under the HBCPF, but have minimal contact: “...under the Western Cape constitution [...] for the HBNW to be recognised it had to have the approval of its existence by the CPF, which has been done, and thereby members of the CPF [...] we’re not on the CPF executive committee, but we’re members and we have to be.”<sup>97</sup>

The first year of operation ‘Andrew’ acted as Chairperson for HBNW, he is a local real estate agent operating in Hout Bay, but as of the AGM 2006 the chairmanship was divided into two Co-Chairpersons due to the workload put on the Chairperson and the nature of the work being voluntary and unpaid along with having a business to run. After the AGM of 2006 ‘Andrew’ and ‘Gareth’ took up a co-chairmanship of HBNW. Other Officers in the Executive Committee include a Treasurer, Secretary, Membership Coordinator, Police Liaison Officer, and an Operations Manager. Acting as the SAPS member on the Executive Committee was Deputy Station Commissioner ‘Thomas’.

An interesting feature of the HBNW Executive Committee is that both the treasurer ‘Christina’ (up till the 2006 AGM) and the Police Liaison Officer, ‘Edward’, are owners of private security companies. ‘Christina’ is part owner of the company ‘Deep Blue Security’ which is one of two main private security providers in Hout Bay, the other and much larger is ADT. ‘Edward’ is the proprietor of ‘Coastal Security Services’ a company that handles provision and installation of alarms and other technical security solutions for homes and businesses. As the police liaison officer of HBNW it is ‘Edward’s’ task to keep regular contact with SAPS in Hout Bay, a function he was familiar with as he had been liaising with SAPS the last four or five years as part of his work through Coastal Security Services<sup>98</sup>. Due to the breakdown in the working relationship between Hout Bay SAPS and the HBCPF it was seen as necessary for HBNW to establish their own lines of communication with the police:

*“Informal structures have arisen and the HBNW now is the predominant force in place of supporting the police in crime prevention and I’m functioning as the liaison between the*

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<sup>96</sup> HBNW Constitution 6<sup>th</sup> April 2005

<sup>97</sup> ‘Gareth’, interviewed April 7 2006

<sup>98</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed 21 2006

*police and the community, which should be the role of the CPF. So other non-institutional organizations have risen to fill the gap, which becomes quickly a part of the solution to how the community shapes itself around to deal with the situation.”<sup>99</sup>*

The potential tensions between owning a security company and being involved as an Executive Member of HBNW, and the tight relations to the SAPS is not lost on the other members of the Executive Committee. One executive member commented on the issue:

*“‘Edward’ is the conduit for crime for the civilian side. He goes in on the behalf of Coastal Security, ADT and I think Deep Blue to talk on a Monday meeting with SAPS about the crime over the weekend and in the previous week. So on the one hand he’s got the straight avenue to the police, he runs and helps and assists, which is very good and commendable, for the CoSAP operation. He is also working in the Security business and that’s an awful lot of roads which lead to crime.”<sup>100</sup>*

Although the members of HBNW are aware of potential problems when it comes to individuals having several different roles to fill on the same issue, the general feeling seemed to be that there was no real problem in this case; rather it would seem that it was viewed as a resource to be taken advantage of.

As membership in HBNW is free any income generated is results from various donations, the majority comes from private businesses, NGOs, or individual donors. At the first AGM in March 2006 the treasurer of HBNW reported a total income of R 133,453 of which R 100,249 was spent building an extensive radio communication network<sup>101</sup>. These numbers show that, although HBNW is a voluntary organisation, they have gathered substantial funding.

HBNW has come to rely greatly on the use of radios to perform their patrolling functions and they form a central part of the resources available to HBNW, by April 2006 the number of radios in HBNW was 120 units and expanding<sup>102</sup>.

The relationship between HBNW and Deep Blue Security is tight, not only is one of the owners of Deep Blue on the Executive Committee, but Deep Blue also provides the control centre (WatchCon) for the HBNW radio communications network via their own control centre free of charge. WatchCon is manned by Deep Blue employees who listen in on both the HBNW radio frequency and their own Deep Blue frequency 24 hours a day, providing a

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> ‘Charles’, interviewed May 15 2006

<sup>101</sup> Minutes HBNW AGM, March 29 2006

<sup>102</sup> ‘Nick’, interviewed April 6 2006

vital service to HBNW. This tight relationship has led to some confusion as to where Deep Blue Security ends and HBNW starts or visa versa. According to the General Manager of ADT in the Western Cape “We’ve had people calling us saying we’re cancelling with ADT because we want to join the neighbourhood watch. And we ask why? And they say that Deep Blue is the Neighbourhood Watch so we want to join them”<sup>103</sup>. Deep Blue is not the only one of the two private security providers in Hout Bay that provides resources to HBNW. As of May 2006 ADT started sponsoring HBNW with R 15,000 a month. The general suspicion is that ADT done this to compensate for the aid given to HBNW by Deep Blue.

### Technology and Mentality

The different sectors of HBNW have sought different approaches to protect themselves from crime. The techniques vary from taking to the streets at night and patrolling their sector to paying private security providers to patrol for them, putting up fences around their neighbourhood and hiring guards to protect the entrance. Some have simply tried to get to know each other better and keep an eye out if something happens. Very early on it was decided that HBNW was going to target property related crime since there was nothing they could do about murders, rapes and assaults. These are also crimes that mostly take place in the disadvantaged areas of Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. The common denominator is the focus on preventative measures in order to prevent incidents from happening, and discourage criminals from trying to enter their homes.

*“Basically what we did was make a decision to create awareness in Hout Bay because we all knew there was crime, but people just didn’t realize the extent of the crime [...] So we started every week having people’s reports on what crime had happened that week, which we did for a whole year [...] people think neighbourhood watch is; you go out on patrol, which is a big misperception, although that is a factor of the stuff we do, but it isn’t the only thing. The most important is creating awareness. We have a motto which is ‘protect your neighbour and be safe’”<sup>104</sup>*

The different sectors of the Valley have taken different approaches to provide safety and security for themselves and their families. Some of the sectors are located within gated communities which already have 24 hour guarding services provided by the private security industry. These are also the ones which have involved themselves least in HBNW as they are already paying for services. However, gated communities are restricted to those that can afford to live in them. Two sectors far into the Valley, ‘Tarragona’ and ‘Longkloof’, an area

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<sup>103</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>104</sup> ‘Andrew’, interviewed March 14 2006

of about 50-60 houses, have put up a road boom with a guard at their entrance, during the day the boom is up, but at night they close it and protect it with a guard. Putting up such a boom is not legal as the road is public, but the council has so far turned a blind eye to it<sup>105</sup>. Mt. Rhodes, where the cyclist was murdered, has chosen a similar strategy. By getting a donation of R25,000 from about 70% of the residents they erected a palisade and electric fencing around their entire sector, and put a guard and CCTV monitoring at the entrance. Like the boom guarding Tarragona and Longkloof the fence at Mt. Rhodes is erected on council land and is therefore illegal:

*“[They got] kind of a guarded consent from the municipality, you’re not really allowed to do it, but they had got a murder to point at and say ‘well, what are you going to do about it?’ So the municipality has let it slide because obviously they can’t give permission as it goes against the constitution.”<sup>106</sup>*

Other areas in the Valley decided to pool their resources and buy additional private security in the form of guards patrolling their streets.

Out of the 1500 members of HBNW about 100 of them do regular patrols at night. The intention of HBNW patrolling is to be the eyes and ears of the police, not to engage in apprehending suspected criminals. Before being allowed to go on patrol as a HBNW member a signature on the HBNW code of conduct is required, where the individual takes full responsibility for his or her own actions and accepts that HBNW is under no circumstances responsible for their actions or anything which may happen to them during these patrols. Further it is important to note that some of the people do arm themselves with pepper ball guns or firearms when going on patrol. Firearms must be declared at Hout Bay SAPS before the patrol begins<sup>107</sup>. The patrols consist of two people in a car either sitting in an intersection or along the road, or driving around the sector looking for activity they find suspicious; generally people or cars they don’t recognise, as the Valley is almost exclusively white this means that often it will be black or coloured people that are deemed suspicious.

Should anything happen to arise suspicion the patrollers will radio this to WatchCon and all other HBNW members listening in on the radio. HBNW has also provided SAPS with these radios to keep in their response vehicles, so if they have their radios switched on, they will

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> HBNW Protocol / Code of Conduct

also be alerted and called to the spot if they are available. Deep Blue quite frequently send their own patrol officers to aid as backup during these incidents, something which has helped them establish an identity as a strong community supporter. Having access to both police and private security response simply by calling on the radio puts HBNW in a unique position when it comes to preventing crime, in a matter of minutes they can have cars from all three units on the spot of a suspected crime where previously it would have taken much longer.

Not all members of HBNW are satisfied with being the eyes and ears of the police; some are described as being more ‘gung-ho’. There is a group of people, primarily in the sector ‘Disa River’, who have gone further and perform active citizen’s arrests of suspected criminals:

*“...some people believe that HBNW is purely about patrolling, and that kind of patrolling is preventative. And it does play a role, but it’s a very limited role because you can see a vehicle coming miles away, you can hear it, so you can just sidestep it, so what value does it really have? So in terms of actually dealing with crime you have to apprehend the guy [...] If you don’t arrest people they’re free to move to another place and try again and again. If he’s successful, success breeds success, then he’s going to try again [...] We need to really cut it off at the start; if a person is trespassing he’s broken the law, let’s arrest the guy for trespassing before he gets into the house and maybe hurts somebody.”<sup>108</sup>*

The people who perform these tasks are known as ‘prime responders’ and defend their actions according to the Criminal Procedure Act No. 51 of 1977<sup>109</sup>. The Disa River sector is quite close to Imizamo Yethu and some areas along the river have been identified as ‘hotspots’ for criminals going to and from house break-ins. A group of these prime responders have put up sensors along the river to tell them where people are running so they can cut them off before they escape, or merely alarm them before something occurs<sup>110</sup>. The lack of faith in police and private security response time is what motivates these prime responders:

*“...we look for our own people for a prime response, somebody who can get there in 30 seconds shining torches just to scare the guy away and get him moving. On the other side, our prime responders are people who if things do get really tight, and we still don’t have security services on hand, that person is able to handle a citizens arrest, if he’s properly backed up.”<sup>111</sup>*

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<sup>108</sup> ‘Nick’, interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> ‘Andrew’, interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>111</sup> ‘Nick’, interviewed April 6 2006

The Operations Manager of HBNW explains that what they are trying to establish is an ‘in-depth’ response where WatchCon should be able to direct the different responders to strategic points via radio to make an arrest more likely.

A common denominator for the actions taken by the various groups of HBNW stem from a deeply rooted scepticism in the SAPS and the government’s ability to do something about the perceived threats from crime in their community. “*We don’t really want to be in this position, however if the police are not really in a position to defend us, then we need to defend ourselves. And it’s a basic right, the civil right of self defence*”<sup>112</sup>. The Chairperson of the ‘Ratepayers’ in Hout Bay summed it up:

*“The police I think have been very demotivated because they’ve been very low on resources. However I still think that we have a major problem within the police force itself. A lot of the police, because of being demotivated, have left the police force; we’ve lost a lot of the experience. Because of the affirmative action process that we have in this country a lot of the police are being replaced by inexperienced, and without trying to be derogatory, a lot of incompetent people. So whilst we may be seeing slightly greater numbers now a day I think we might have less competence than in the police previously. So it’s sort of a two edged sword. The situation isn’t improving to the extent that we’d like to see it improving, that’s why we have to get involved ourselves.”*<sup>113</sup>

This view of the police as not being able to fulfil their function was reflected by all members of HBNW that were interviewed. This scepticism about police competence combined with the previous years’ escalation in property crime fuels the motivation of the more active members of HBNW.

There are three key factors to the success of HBNW in reducing crime in Hout Bay. First, central to the sustainability of HBNW has been a common idea of identity. This is not to say that all members of HBNW share a particularly strong feeling of responsibility towards one another, as is the case of Granovetter’s strong ties (Granovetter 1973). Rather it is the result of sharing an identity of being victimised. Having Imizamo Yethu in their midst seems to have reinforced a feeling of ‘us’ in the Valley falling pray to ‘them’, the criminal elements of Imizamo Yethu. Further contributing to the strong support HBNW has gathered in the Valley is the realisation, and admittance, that the police are unable to curb crime on their own. HBNW has been established around a common ethos that ‘we’, the citizens of the Valley, need to do what we can in order to stop crime ourselves. This ethos is open to several roads of

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> ‘Deacon’, interviewed April 10 2006

action and though their working technologies vary, they are all pulling in the same direction. The ties between the majority of the members seem to be relatively weak, but in line with the idea of collective efficacy, it is not necessarily the strength of the ties that matter, but the ability to work towards a common goal. However, while the majority of the bonds are weak, there is a core of stronger ties between the most active participants of HBNW which forms the driving force behind the entire operation. Tapping into this common interest enables HBNW to fight crime where it starts, in the public space. For his book “Thin Blue” (2008) Jonny Steinberg interviewed ‘B’, a cofounder of an initiative called ‘Community Active Protection’ in the north-eastern Johannesburg suburb of Glenhazel, an almost entirely Jewish community. ‘B’ noted that while South Africans are increasingly surrounding their houses with walls, security systems, and armed security, they are still falling prey to crime, even though these systems may provide an emotional security. Rather what is needed he argued is to concentrate action on the point where crime is initiated, and that is in the public space (ibid:165). This is precisely what HBNW has done by patrolling and watching the streets at night. Rather than act as individual house owners they have acted as a group, opening new possibilities for action. Second, by actively sidestepping the political hot potatoes of Hout Bay, the HBNW has managed to retain the active support of all parties, although there is disagreement between its members on several of these issues, it does not disrupt that they are working together in HBNW. This conforms to the concept of agonism (Mouffe 2005), that while there may be disagreements that are not reconcilable, these are accepted and do not come in the way of working towards the shared ethos. Third, HBNW has managed to develop ties to several different organisations and enrol them with their governing agenda, the effective cooperation they have formed with ADT and Deep Blue, as well as the SAPS testifies to this. This combination of a shared ethos stating that ‘we’ as citizens need to take action to reduce property crime, the ability to sidestep conflict to prevent disruption of attaining the shared goal, and active use of networks to enrol other security providers has been the key to HBNW success at reducing crime in the Valley.

### ***5.2.3 The Private Security Industry***

Hout Bay has two private security companies providing guarding and response service. ADT (a branch of the American company Tyco International) the larger of the two companies, dominates the private security provision in Western Cape as the largest provider in the

province<sup>114</sup>. The other company is newly formed Deep Blue, a local Hout Bay company established in 2005 as a merger between Deep Blue Security and Coastal Guarding Service<sup>115</sup>. Prior to the establishment of Deep Blue, ADT was the only operating private security provider in Hout Bay. There are some interesting differences between the two companies, especially connected to their technology and mentality, when it comes to the way they operate in order to protect their clients, and also in relation to the way they identify with the community.

### Institution and Resources

In Cape Town ADT has a client base of 108,000 customers; they employ 2100 staff and keep 170 armed response vehicles on the road 24 hours a day, each with a trained armed response officer. Their main office in Cape Town has a control room of 33 staff on duty at all times. They also own and run their own training facilities<sup>116</sup>. In Hout Bay ADT is by far the major provider of private security, operating five armed response vehicles in and around the area. ADT focus in Hout Bay concentrates mostly on armed response, which entails the monitoring of alarms and responding to them. The resources ADT commits to an area are dependent upon response time:

*“... all we do is measured on response time. And what we will do is look at each car’s response time, and if it starts getting to six-seven minutes we’ll say: ‘hang on, there’s a problem here. Either we’ve got too many clients for that car or maybe the area is too big for that car, and we need to make the area smaller?’ But that question will come from the response time. We will only add additional cars if that response time gets bad. As long as our cars are coping with the response time we’ll leave it as it is.”<sup>117</sup>*

ADT also has a small, local office provided by Coastal Security Services and enjoy a tight working relationship with Coastal Security which mainly focuses on installing the alarms for people and thereby has a mutually beneficial interest in cooperating with the response companies.

Deep Blue Security, being a newly established company, has relatively few clients compared to big brother ADT, but is growing steadily. According to part owner of Deep Blue ‘Christina’ Deep Blue is the second biggest employer in Hout Bay with a guarding staff of

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<sup>114</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>115</sup> ‘Christina’, interviewed March 24 2006

<sup>116</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

about 150<sup>118</sup>. Deep Blue is however not able to provide armed response, because they were unable to acquire a license for firearms, instead they have equipped their officers with pepper ball guns, which is not classified as a firearm and may therefore be carried freely. Despite not having firearms Deep Blue does provide a response service, competing with ADT, though they so far had only two cars operating in Hout Bay. To bolster their response service Deep Blue has established a canine unit composed of ten dogs, and provides two response officers in each car, where one is a trained dog handler<sup>119</sup>. Deep Blue also has a 24 hour operational control centre from where they monitor alarms contracted to them and stay in touch with their guarding and response officers in the field located in Hout Bay. This control centre, as described above, also doubles as WatchCon for HBNW. Along with the fact that one of the owners of Deep Blue has been represented on the executive committee of HBNW, this has created a strong tie between the two organisations.

### Technology and Mentality

ADT operates Hout Bay the same way it does other areas, their two main tasks being the monitoring of alarms in houses contracted to them, and responding to these alarms: *“Everything we do is about response time, we average at about 5 minutes 40 seconds throughout Cape Town [...] by a speedy response we minimise loss, so in other words the faster we are the less time the burglar has, and the other, to prevent the loss of life”*<sup>120</sup>.

An important feature separating the private security providers from the functions performed by SAPS is the fact that they are not responding in order to capture criminals, but rather to protect the client and the client’s possessions:

*“My job as an ADT response officer is to get to you, maybe get you first aid, get medics out there, get the police out there and make sure you’re alive, not too worried about the perpetrator. I’m contracted to protect you, not to arrest people specifically. If there’s a choice I will always protect you first, so that’s really ADT as an armed response company.”*<sup>121</sup>

The main focus of ADT is on response, not prevention, however when the response vehicles are not called to a scene, they do patrol the areas where they have contracted clients, and may even confront people in the area that look suspicious, in that way it is also about proactive

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<sup>118</sup> ‘Christina’, interviewed March 24 2006

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

visibility<sup>122</sup>. ADT performs a uniform service to all its members based on ideas of best practice, where everything is standardised and controlled from the centre. Everything that is done by the ADT is concerned with enhancing their ability to deliver the standardised service; this applies to their commitment of resources to an area as well as their operating procedures.

Deep Blue has taken a somewhat different approach than the standardised armed response service provided by ADT. As stated their response officers are not permitted to carry firearms, and carry pepper guns instead. As opposed to ADT Deep Blue has a stated objective of also trying to capture the perpetrator, which is the reason why they have two officers in each car: *“The idea is again if you’re in a situation where you have had a crime committed against you there is an officer that can assist you with the trauma, and there is an officer that can take up the chase and try to get your stolen goods back”*<sup>123</sup>. Later it was added that the rationale employed by Deep Blue for performing arrests was *“if you can’t prevent it, stop it from happening again; take that person out of the community, that’s our intention”*<sup>124</sup>.

The business of Deep Blue is very much built on the company promoting itself as a strong community supporter with roots in the community of Hout Bay. This is reflected both in its tight relationship and backing of HBNW as well as the employment of mostly local people for staffing. ‘Christina’ explains the reasons for employing locally as twofold:

*“One is that they tend to know Hout Bay better and therefore have a better rapport with the people of Hout Bay. But also because your working staff is close at hand [...] to fill in if someone’s sick [...] It also enables you to see what kind of person they are off duty and that’s important [...] It helps with transparency of character.”*<sup>125</sup>

Deep Blue enjoys a very tight working relationship with HBNW, and according to one of the Co-Chairpersons of HBNW Deep Blue was basically built on HBNW<sup>126</sup>. Edward explains:

*“Deep Blue have been very good at identifying with the community as opposed to ADT [...] Because there’s only 6 officers people get to know them personally and so there’s a personal relationship building up on local knowledge [...] [the] Deep Blue control room has also brought local connectivity and developed local relationships [...] Of course they are hoping to create business as a spinoff from it”*<sup>127</sup>.

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

<sup>123</sup> ‘Christina’, interviewed March 24 2006

<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> ‘Andrew’, interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>127</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

The relationship with HBNW has led Deep Blue to be involved in responding to calls to premises where they are not contracted, in order to back up HBNW. As all calls for HBNW go through WatchCon, they are always informed on what goes on in HBNW operations, and representatives of HBNW come by the control room every day and talk to the controllers. Because ADT have been equipped with HBNW radios even they are now connected to Deep Blue via WatchCon. Christina explains their tight relationship with the community: “*We don’t have that many clients so we have a lot more interaction [...] the fact that management is local, we live here [...] it’s very much a quid pro quo. And in a small community like Hout Bay, especially businesswise, if you rub my back I’ll rub your back*”<sup>128</sup>. In order to build a successful business Deep Blue has grabbed onto HBNW and used it in order to successfully establish a business in direct competition with one of the largest private security companies in South Africa. The business model of Deep Blue is very much built upon developing a local identity. For the company to thrive it is important to be seen as a strong community supporter, and it is their hope that this will deliver more business in the future as they continue to develop ties to the community.

ADT on the other hand, while keen on showing their support for HBNW, richly illustrated by ADT donating R15,000 a month to their cause, had some reservations about getting too close to some of the HBNW activities. The General Manager of ADT summed up their reluctance:

*“There are a couple of things; number one, we can’t be seen to operate outside the law. Number two, we can’t put our staff into positions where they’re going to be physically harmed or at any grater risk than they are already. The third is that all of our resources have to be put into protecting our client. So that any duty we pursue that is not directly channelled in that direction is potentially creating a risk for our client.”*<sup>129</sup>

ADT are in the midst of drawing up some guidelines for how they can support HBNW, detailing their legal responsibilities and a suggested modus operandi for cooperation. ADT has clear legal concerns about some of the activities they were asked to perform by HBNW: “*We can only, theoretically, provide and respond to a person we’re contracted for, and key to that is the right to operate on your premises. If a guy climbs over a wall to a person we’re not contracted to and we chase him over we’re trespassing*”<sup>130</sup>. ADT also refused to put up a boom at the entrance to the fenced off area at Mt. Rhodes because they did not want to be

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<sup>128</sup> ‘Christina’, interviewed March 24 2006

<sup>129</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

seen guarding an illegal boom. Behind these concerns was the fear of a major lawsuit<sup>131</sup>. The second objection concerns the safety of their employees and their clients.

Committing their employees to chase down potentially armed suspects who no longer present a direct threat to their clients was considered an unnecessary danger to their staff, and seen as an ethical problem. Combining this with the need for a quick response it was summed up:

*“So for example running around at night with bushes so you can’t see in front of you there’s a threat to the personnel as well. The other thing is if we’re running round in the bushes, out of our cars, how are we going to respond to the next alarm? If it takes us five minuets to get back to the car and another five to respond that might cost you your life, and bearing in mind that I’m contracted to the person whose alarm went off, not to the HBNW. So those are all potentially conflicting decisions.”<sup>132</sup>*

This reluctance from ADT to perform tasks on sites they are not contracted to has not gone down well with all members of HBNW, and has caused some friction between ADT and especially the Operations Manager of HBNW who would like to see extended aid from ADT. However, both Chairpersons of HBNW have expressed understanding towards ADT when these issues have been discussed. On the other hand Deep Blue has benefited greatly from ADT’s reluctance to commit fully to HBNW as they themselves show none of the reservations noted by ADT against operating with HBNW. It has helped Deep Blue to establish itself as the local community supporter, and thereby gain a firm footing in Hout Bay as a competitor to ADT. ADT on the other hand are hoping that their monthly donations to HBNW will put them in a somewhat more favourable light.

The business models of the competing companies in Hout Bay have without a doubt led them to identify with the community in very different ways. Where ADT rely on their size and vast resources to deliver a standardised service, the much smaller Deep Blue have sought to develop their business upon closeness, and identifying with the community, a strategy which so far has given them a tremendous amount of goodwill in the Valley community, and is likely to provide more business in the future. Further their desire to be seen as not only a supporter of the community, but also very much a part of the community has given the HBNW a tremendous resource in their support during patrols, and provision of WatchCon.

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

#### ***5.2.4 The Hout Bay South African Police Service***

The Hout Bay police station services the entire Hout Bay and Llandudno. Because the SAPS are pledged to serve all of Hout Bay, their activities affect all three communities. To avoid repetition a short introduction of the Hout Bay SAPS is provided in this chapter relating to the four nodal characteristics: institution, resources, mentality, and technology. However, the main point of interest is on how the SAPS relates to the specific communities, because this varies a separate section about SAPS and the individual community will follow in each of the empirical chapters.

##### Institution and Resources

Hout Bay SAPS has endured a nomadic existence over the years, having no permanent police station. After vacating two temporary police stations in only a few years, Hout Bay SAPS moved into the renovated premises of the old Hout Bay yacht club by the beach front close to Hangberg in December 2002. In 2006 a new and permanent police station was under construction, situated next to the entrance to Imizamo Yethu. Though it was almost completed by May 2006 its opening had been postponed several times due to delays in construction. The SAPS station in Hout Bay is small and has suffered shortages of manpower for several years. In 2002 the Hout Bay SAPS numbered only 28 police officers out of a complement of 70, leading central police officers to call the station chronically understaffed<sup>133</sup>. This situation had persisted for years and several local initiatives had been undertaken to provide the SAPS with more resources. Amongst them was a scheme called “the Blues Buddies”, a section 21 company (non-profit) established in 1999, that raised money from the public in Hout Bay to pay for 18 Community Patrol Officers to support the SAPS with visible patrolling. But by the end of 2001 the donations to pay for the Community Patrol Officers had dried up and the final six were let go<sup>134</sup>. In August 2002 the SAPS Area Commissioner of the West Metropole promised that the manpower shortages of Hout Bay would be addressed within the next six months<sup>135</sup>. By July 2004 the number of SAPS personnel stationed in Hout Bay had reached 65<sup>136</sup>. However, in 2006 Captain ‘Thomas’ stated to Sentinel News that even though the staff situation had improved and the station now employed a total of 68 people, including

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<sup>133</sup> Sentinel News, May 31 2002, ‘Short-staffed police doing a fantastic job’

<sup>134</sup> Sentinel News, November 9 2001, Time running out for Blues Buddies as contributions dry up

<sup>135</sup> Sentinel News, August 8 2002, More police within six months, promises top cop

<sup>136</sup> Sentinel News, July 16 2004, Traffic ‘blitz’ promised after death smash

detectives and administrative staff, the numbers were still not adequate for the size of the area and the number of people living in Hout Bay and Llandudno<sup>137</sup>.

In addition the station employs 16 voluntary reservists, the majority from Imizamo Yethu, working a minimum of 16 hours a month and have all the powers of a regular SAPS officer, but are not paid. Each crime shift consists of 8 police officers, not including detectives, and has only two police vans to cover Hout Bay, each patrolling a separate side of the Disa River<sup>138</sup>. The problem with having only two vehicles becomes apparent when there is a serious crime, such as a rape, and one vehicle has to take the victim to the hospital in Wynberg, in these cases Hout Bay is left with only one police van for hours. There have been times when Hout Bay SAPS have had to make due with only one police van per shift, leading the SAPS to have to rely heavily on ADT for assistance. According to Captain 'Thomas' the minimum requirement for Hout Bay would be 10 police and 3 vehicles per shift<sup>139</sup>. Further, in August 2003 the head of the detective branch at Hout Bay SAPS reported that his team of five detectives and two students had to deal with more than 1230 dockets a month, while the number of cases finalised by the team in July was 297, of which 58 went to court<sup>140</sup>. Though the staffing situation has improved there is still a long way to go to keep cases from piling up.

The understaffing and general lack of resources was not likely to improve in the immediate future, according to the Deputy Station Commissioner orders from above were that 'contact crime' was to be prioritised, and the stations which have the most problems in these categories of crime were hence also prioritised when it came to new resources and manpower<sup>141</sup>. In a letter to Sentinel News Superintendent 'Otto' explains that:

*"Among the 29 police stations, 17 category crimes are priority crimes. This relates to the 17 most reported crimes in the Western Metropole. Each station, in turn, focuses on their own priority crimes, of which Hout Bay has identified the four most reported crimes in its area. These are (1) burglaries, (2) thefts out of motor vehicles, (3) theft and (4) assaults."*<sup>142</sup>

The high level of property crime experienced in Hout Bay would therefore not rank high enough on the SAPS priority list to ensure more resources to the station. According to the

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<sup>137</sup> Sentinel News, January 27 2006, House break-ins cut by more than a third

<sup>138</sup> 'Roger', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>139</sup> Sentinel News, April 30 2004, Rumblin's of discontent...

<sup>140</sup> Sentinel News, August 15 2003, Urgent campaign to curb break-ins

<sup>141</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>142</sup> Sentinel News, February 14 2003, One crime reported is one too many

Western Cape General Manager of ADT: *“There are 65 police stations in the Western Cape, five of them are priority stations [...] where crime is so bad that they receive preference in terms of logistics, staff, vehicles [...] all the police’s top resources go to those stations. Hout Bay probably features somewhere at the bottom of the list”*<sup>143</sup>. In 2004 Captain ‘Thomas’ told Sentinel News that *“Hout Bay was not a high priority area for crime such as Mitchell’s Plain or Khayelitsha, where a major crime like murder occurred virtually every night.”*<sup>144</sup> Taking this into account not even the police were very optimistic about the chances of being allocated more resources and manpower in the near future.

### Mentality and Technology

Because of the low resources and escalating crime over the last years, Hout Bay SAPS have been very keen to form networks and ensure the cooperation of civilians and other policing agencies operating in Hout Bay. Much of their initiatives concerning crime prevention have revolved around getting communities to take responsibility for themselves, by performing preventative measures, and not just call the police once a crime has been committed. In the words of Captain ‘Thomas’: *“it takes five seconds a day, just check around you as you get out of your car to see if the gate is closed will help reduce crime a lot”*<sup>145</sup>. The realisation of Hout Bay SAPS that they are unable to do very much about the escalating levels of crime on their own, have led them to adopt extensive networking with civil society actors and other security providers.

However, at the moment most of their networking is concentrated on the Valley, as they have not been successful in reaching out to Imizamo Yethu or Hangberg. Although there is some cooperation with groups also in the poorer areas, as will be shown in the following chapters, this is nowhere near as far reaching as in the Valley. In fact, much police work in these areas still revolves around reactive bandit catching and investigating after an incident has occurred.

While the SAPS are keen on forming partnerships, they also wish to remain in control. The consistent call is for partnerships to aid the police in doing their job. And there have been incidents where the police have felt that civilians have overstepped their boundaries by trying

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<sup>143</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

<sup>144</sup> Sentinel News, April 30 2004, Rumblin’s of discontent...

<sup>145</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

to control the actions of the SAPS, rather than providing assistance to the police, as the SAPS would have it.<sup>146</sup>

The need for additional resources has also resulted in well established connections between the SAPS and private security industry operating in the area. Because the response time of the private security providers is quicker, it often becomes a case of backing each other up, and both sides report a very good working relationship. ‘Edward’ the owner of Coastal Security Services, a company that specialises in installing alarms and other security equipment, has for years attended regular weekly meetings at the SAPS station, and brought with him his contacts and experience when he joined the HBNW as their ‘police liaison officer’. ADT and Deep Blue, the two response companies operating in Hout Bay, both reported to have excellent working relationships with the Hout Bay SAPS and had regular contact with the leadership at the station. According to one of the SAPS reservists the working relationship between the private security companies and the police on the ground is excellent:

*“Deep Blue and ADT [...] they’ll often call us for assistance or they hear us on the radio and say ‘do you want back-up?’ They’re extra manpower. We have a very healthy relationship with them and most of the guys we know on first name basis and greet each other and all that sort of stuff.”<sup>147</sup>*

### SAPS and the Valley community

Since 2003, when the quarrels between the HBCPF and the police started, the police had great difficulties maintaining an efficient partnership with the community. Instead of assisting the police the relationship with the community was characterised by antagonism and allegations of poor performance, nepotism and corruption. While many supported the police in this matter and would like to see a more effective working relationship it was not until the establishment of HBNW that this was accomplished.

However, cooperation between SAPS and the private security companies predates the HBNW. About once a month, since about 2004, the private security providers of Hout Bay along with SAPS have conducted what they call CoSAP operations. The CoSAP initiative was launched by ‘Edward’ of Coastal Security Services and Superintendent ‘Otto’ of Hout Bay SAPS. It consists of the various security providers making a show of force:

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<sup>146</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>147</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

*“We did what we call a blue light parade, so we had 20-25 vehicles and we’d go through a convoy and start off through the coloured township, through the white areas of Hout Bay and also drive through Imizamo Yethu so that the word got out that there was a massive presence out tonight and it wasn’t a good idea to work if you’re a house-breaker”<sup>148</sup>*

These CoSAP operations have continued after the establishment of HBNW and now also involve civilians from HBNW as part of the operations, as well as staff from ADT, Deep Blue, Coastal Security Services, and SAPS. The CoSAP operations are interesting because they show how integrated the security network in Hout Bay has become, and just how closely they are able to work together and coordinate their efforts, by joining civilians with the police and the private security industry all on the same radio-network and responding to the same calls. In many ways the CoSAPs show on a grand scale what takes place in the Valley on a regular basis through the cooperation between the SAPS, HBNW, and the private security companies, but in an even more coordinated effort.

Hout Bay SAPS has played a major role in supporting and even aiding in establishing the HBNW. It has done so by attempting to harness public frustration concerning high levels of crime and using it to aid the police in the fight against property crime. In many ways this has been a very successful strategy for the police. However, the rapid growth of HBNW into the largest civic organisation in all of Hout Bay has brought with it some results that are not always to the liking of Hout Bay SAPS officials. Some of the activities of HBNW border on vigilantism, as there are instances of armed civilians chasing suspected criminals. The police argue that civilians should be the ‘eyes and ears’ of the police and not get directly involved, but as is clearly demonstrated by parts of the HBNW, not all are willing to settle for this passive role and take on a more direct approach. Further there is the struggle between HBNW and SAPS over control, as the SAPS attempt to use HBNW in a way they see as beneficial to their goals, so the HBNW often want and expect more from the SAPS than they are able to provide. While the SAPS first and foremost seek to direct HBNW to be their eyes and ears and thus provide the police with additional manpower, HBNW has their own agenda and seek to direct the police in ways they deem most beneficial to themselves. The question of who performs the enrolling and who is enrolled is as such never straight forward. The police welcome the aid and support that HBNW is giving them, and often acknowledge that the HBNW has freed up the police’s time by patrolling and thereby allowing the police to focus

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<sup>148</sup> ‘Edward’, interviewed March 21 2006

more on serious crimes like drugs and problems relating to the shebeens in the poorer areas<sup>149</sup>, and enabled them to spend more time at a crime scene without having to rush back to patrolling<sup>150</sup>. However, there is also the reverse taking place, in which HBNW will call on the police and expect an immediate response, without realising that the police may be tied down on a crime scene or with another complaint. *“It’s a bit of a cry wolf system. [...] ‘there’s a suspicious guy in the area, please come and check it out.’ The thing is it doesn’t happen in the five minutes he expects it to happen because you’re busy with another call. [...] We can’t drop everything to run there and just look at him”*<sup>151</sup>. These situations do at times breed ill will between the SAPS and the HBNW, and the police reservists tend to be caught in the middle because they are seen to represent both the community and the police and have to act like buffers<sup>152</sup>. It would seem however that their role as police officers does take preference most of the time. This shows the challenges that also come with forming tight partnerships. While the HBNW certainly does seem to free up the police in certain capacities, they also demand a lot from the police and attempt to direct them to their own interests, sometimes without regard for whatever else the police may need to prioritise.

When I personally attended a CoSAP operation in Hout Bay the 7<sup>th</sup> April 2006, the situation where HBNW are attempting to control and direct the police was illustrated in a somewhat strange performance. The evening began with a meeting at the Hout Bay police station, present were all the members of the night’s operation: SAPS, ADT, Deep Blue, Coastal Security, and HBNW. After the Superintendent had introduced the meeting, the floor was given to the HBNW operations manager ‘Nick’ who laid out the plans for the operation. While the majority of the participants of the evening would patrol different sectors of Hout Bay, a group of police officers and HBNW members were to do an exercise to familiarise the police officers with the terrain in Hout Bay, particularly along the Disa River, which has a lot of small tracks and trails often used by suspects escaping from break-ins. It was strange to witness how HBNW was able to direct police and private security personnel alike, all in an attempt to improve the coordination between the groups to suit the needs of HBNW, sending police officers running through the bushes along the river at night, while carrying paintball guns. When speaking to ‘Nick’ the day before the operation he explained his reasons for having an exercise with the police:

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<sup>149</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>150</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>151</sup> Ibid.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

*“It’s no good to have 20 police officers when only 4 of them know the area. The guys at the top they can see how it all works but getting to the front line guys, making sure that they carry their radios all the time, what happens when they get a call from the HBNW and letting them know that they now have 8 other guys who can help them, guys who are prepared to respond, and help catch the guys, organize them so that they can assist. [...] and as a community we take the lead, and provide some sort of leadership role, provide basic guidelines and infrastructure, and let the guys hang on to that.”<sup>153</sup>*

The operation was however not very successful and provoked many members of the SAPS:

*“These guys must realize that they’re not the police, we take preference. They sometimes try to order us around or tell us what to do. There are certain strong individuals in this area who try to tell us what to do and order us around ‘you must search down here’ and it’s like ‘you guys have been doing this for a year; we’ve been doing it far longer. We know where they go and they’re not down there’. And then they sulk with us because they deem us not doing our job, but we know that they haven’t gone in that direction. So there can be some times a bit of ill feeling because these guys are overstepping their limit, and they’ve got to realize that they’re the eyes and the ears and that’s it. They shouldn’t really be getting out of their cars essentially.”<sup>154</sup>*

Regarding ‘Nick’ and his performance on the CoSAP a police reservist stated that ‘Nick’ was a prime example of how the HBNW is getting involved in things they have no authority over, and should stay out of.

*“He will be roped in, I can tell you that. [...] He made us do certain tasks that evening where he got a lot of backs up. We’re not here to go walking through the bush because he deems it necessary; we know that bush like the back of our hand. [...] He’s trying to perform a function that he’s really not qualified to do, for a civilian to tell the police what to do, it doesn’t happen, it becomes a lawless society”<sup>155</sup>*

The events surrounding this CoSAP operation is a good characteristic of the cooperation between the SAPS and HBNW and their fight for control in the relationship. While the police seek manpower and aid, they have to put up with the fact that the HBNW has a lot narrower field of interest than the police, and that they will therefore seek to direct the police to their own ends. The lesson from nodal governance, that it is not always clear cut who is the auspice and who is the provider, and Latour’s idea of enrolment is central to understand that the outcomes provided by this cooperation will be shaped in a struggle for control where each side attempts to make the other conform to its own needs.

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<sup>153</sup> ‘Nick’, interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>154</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>155</sup> Ibid.

It is also likely that the reason the police are willing to overlook some of the more shady sides of HBNW operations, is their desperate need for manpower. While the police are fully aware that much of what HBNW is doing is not a hundred percent legal, they have yet to do something about it. This does not mean that the police are happy about some of the things they see, and it does cause concern when HBNW is seen to perform borderline or in certain cases directly illegal actions, like putting up a boom at a public road, or chasing down suspects on their own: *“It’s not a legal task; it’s a vigilante group at the end of the day. They’ve got to be very careful”*<sup>156</sup>. There is also a very real police concern that someone is going to get hurt or killed due to HBNW activity:

*“There are certain times with these guys when they’re quite bravado and they don’t really know what they’re getting themselves into. They have a sudden rush of adrenalin; they’re now weekend warriors running around with their vehicles and their radios. And these guys [the suspects] can be armed. We’ve got to go in there as a police unit, we know what we’re up against, and all of a sudden you’ve got a civilian running across your line of fire or somebody who’s not meant to be there and you didn’t know was there, it can become dangerous.”*<sup>157</sup>

However, as long as the police remain short on manpower, and the HBNW continues to operate without any major accidents or stepping on the wrong toes, it is unlikely that the SAPS will do very much to discourage the most active parts of HBNW from doing what they’re doing, as it has so far proven very effective at bringing down property crime in the Valley. In the words of police reservist ‘Roger’:

*“Fair enough, if you want to walk into the bushes it’s your own earnest to do that, and it does work because as I said it’s manpower which corners these guys, but they’ve got to be careful. If one of these civilians gets injured or shot the HBNW will come to a stand still. They will shut it down. [...] It will come from a national level.”*<sup>158</sup>

As the Hout Bay SAPS have come to rely upon civilian manpower to police the Hout Bay Valley, they have also been forced to accept the potential risks and side-effects that this brings. And also to relinquish some control over policing to civilians, even if it is unwillingly.

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid.

### 5.3 Concluding Remarks

In the short span of a year, from April 2005 till April 2006, the residents of Hout Bay Valley managed to turn the tide of property crime, reducing it by as much as 70% in the areas where they are active<sup>159</sup>. Mainly due to the establishment of HBNW, residents of the Valley have been able to confront a problem which has been plaguing them since the late 90's. While public attention and focus on the problem of property crime in Hout Bay has been prominent for years it continued to rise steadily until the launch of HBNW. I shall argue that the cause of this change is tied directly to the way HBNW operates, and mainly for three reasons: first, the establishment of a clear agenda and a collective commitment to a shared ethos. Second their ability to handle internal conflicts by fostering agonistic social relations. And last but certainly not least networking.

#### Collective commitment to the common ethos

*“Every religious, moral, ethical, or other antitheses transforms into a political one if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy” (Schmitt 1996:37).*

*“The creation of an identity implies the establishment of a difference, difference is often constructed on the basis of a hierarchy [...]. Once we have understood that every identity is relational and that the affirmation of a difference is a precondition for the existence of any identity, we are, I think, in a better position to understand Schmitt's point about the ever present possibility of antagonism and to see how a social relation can become the breeding ground for antagonism” (Mouffe 2005:15).*

HBNW was established as a result of the actions made by a few concerned and active citizens, its success however is the result of several factors, some of them pre-existing. HBNW very effectively utilised the feeling of being victimised, shared by many residents of the Valley, and a clear distinction has been drawn between ‘we’ the victims of crime and ‘they’ the criminals of Imizamo Yethu, thus harnessing the pre-existing feeling of being victimised to rally people for action. This idea is crucial to the identity of HBNW, and is the driving force of its members; ‘we’ must protect ourselves from ‘them’. When I was participating in the CoSAP, my partner for the evening summed it all up in one simple statement, when I asked if I should do anything while sitting in the car, he replied with a grin: *“Just let me know if you see anything black”*<sup>160</sup>. Although I did not encounter any other overt racism in HBNW, the idea of who the culprit is was very clearly communicated.

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<sup>159</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>160</sup> Participation in CoSAP operation, April 7 2006

However, while this general feeling of ‘we’ against ‘them’ has been present in many settings in Hout Bay over the years, for example in the HBCPF, HBNW has added a very specific focus on what ‘we can do’. By narrowing the field of interest it becomes much easier to determine possible causes of action, and also to award members a clear idea of intent. This contributes to establishing what Tuomela (2007) calls a common ‘ethos’, giving the group a clear common purpose in reducing property crime, and further the understanding is made between the members that they will stand or fall together. In addition HBNW has allowed its members great independence in seeking ways of achieving their common goal, while there is a very active group of members making up the core of the organisation, the majority of members are loosely affiliated. This loose affiliation does however not seem to weaken HBNW’s ability to perform effectively, but rather strengthens it because it allows for local diversity united under a common purpose. Further it is believed that the need for strong social ties between all members is not necessary because their collective efficacy rather stems from a clear common idea of intent (Sampson et al. 1999).

#### Agonic social relations

In Hout Bay as in South Africa in general the question about security is a highly politicised matter. As seen throughout this chapter political disagreements and personal conflicts have stood in the way of cooperation more than once. And while HBNW is not immune to conflict, it is their way of dealing with it that ensures that its members are not derailed from performing their function. By allowing space for disagreements between its members on issues not directly relating to their common ethos, and fostering agonic social relations, the organisation as a whole is able to function quite well despite internal disagreements. This is seen in the decision not to participate in the class action law suit launched by the HBCPF, even though many of its members are pro. The fact that the intent of the ethos of the organisation is so specific, it is easy to work around other political differences that might otherwise have prevented members from working together. Members of HBNW, though they may be in conflict, still see themselves as belonging to the same political association (Mouffe 2005). By handling conflict agonistically HBNW has ensured that it is able to perform its function effectively even though it operates in a politically charged environment.

#### Networking

There seems little doubt that networking is the crux of the matter when asking why the residents of the Valley have succeeded in reducing crime in their home area. While Hout Bay

SAPS had been working with the private security companies to combat crime, and the HBCPF had been very active and at first very cooperative with the police, they had not been successful in reducing crime in Hout Bay. A case could be made that the increase of police officers from less than 30 to over 60 has played a substantial role, and while this should not be overlooked, it should not be overestimated. The police still have to do with two vans and small crime shifts covering a large area. In addition the correlation in time between the inauguration of HBNW and the drop in property crime in the areas where HBNW is active, is unlikely to be coincidental. However, it would not be right to attribute the success to HBNW alone. The partnership which has been established between HBNW, the SAPS and the primary private security providers ADT and Deep Blue has proven very effective reducing property crime in the Valley. According to ‘Sam’ at the ADT:

*“It’s a three way partnership, the police can’t do it alone they don’t have the resources, we can’t do it alone we don’t have the powers [...] the residents are key to that. If you look at Hout Bay over the last ten years, the residents have to a large extent left security issues to the police and service providers. The drastic reduction in crime has only come once the residents have become involved, and that shows you that the service providers can only do so much and the police can only do so much.”<sup>161</sup>*

A crucial point to the success of HBNW is that its members have managed to position HBNW as a super-structural node. They function as the primary meeting place between private security companies, the SAPS and the residents of the Valley, where the different nodes can come together and coordinate their efforts. While the HBCPF also constitutes an attempt at a superstructural node, the political intrigue and conflict hampered any chance it had of successfully coordinating the nodes.

HBNW has managed to enrol the resources of the police and private security companies to suit their own needs. Utilising Deep Blue’s wish to be seen as a community company and setting this up against ADT who wish to be seen as contributing on equal footing with its competitor has generated enormous resources for HBNW. Further the relationship with the SAPS is not as straight forward as would seem to be the case at first, as there are many that do not suffice themselves with being the eyes and ears of the police, but rather see the police as a resource to be taken advantage of to further the needs of HBNW. The relationship between HBNW and SAPS seems to be one where it is never quite clear who is doing the enrolling, and who is being enrolled. There seems to be a constant struggle between them as to which

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<sup>161</sup> ‘Sam’, interviewed April 11 2006

party is to steer. Even so, both parties seem to benefit at the moment: While the SAPS can show their superiors better crime statistics and extra manpower, HBNW get access to greater legitimacy through their cooperation with SAPS, and borrow extensively from the symbolic power of being associated with the police. However, the fact that SAPS has yet to come down on some of the more shady dealings of the HBNW says a lot about the relative strength between the two organisations. Finally, the insights of 'B' (Steinberg 2008) should not be forgotten, the fact that collective action allows one to initiate crime where it starts, in the public space, has been essential to the success of this three way partnership that the formation of the HBNW has enabled in the Hout Bay Valley.

## **6. Imizamo Yethu – A Community Divided**

This chapter focuses on the African township Imizamo Yethu and the challenges facing this community. Their concerns and problems relating to crime are vastly different from those facing the inhabitants of the Valley discussed in the previous chapter. Imizamo Yethu has, no equivalent to HBNW operating and patrolling their streets, and the nodes that have been established to handle crime are largely abandoned. There are however some central actors still involved with safety and security in Imizamo Yethu. The challenges existing in Imizamo Yethu also impact on how SAPS operate in the community. This chapter elaborates on how the safety and security situation in Imizamo Yethu is perceived by its inhabitants and how some central governing nodes attempt to govern this situation.

Conflict among different actors in the community is detrimental to cooperation and development in Imizamo Yethu. The lack of trust in the community leadership combined with conflicts over housing issues and influx control have spilled over to other issues facing the community, and make it difficult for organisations to work together on any issue, though the problems facing them may be shared. This environment of suspicion and lack of trust has created great difficulties for the residents of Imizamo Yethu in sustaining functioning security measures, though there have been attempts.

### **6.1 Introducing Imizamo Yethu**

The exact number of people inhabiting Imizamo Yethu is extremely difficult to account for as more immigrants are arriving every week from other parts of South Africa as well as other African countries. The census of 2001 recorded 8063 people residing in Imizamo Yethu<sup>162</sup>, but depending on who you ask, the number of people there will vary between 10-16.000 people<sup>163</sup>. The area is a mix of formal and informal housing with the majority living in shacks built above the formal settlement of some 450 houses built by the Niall Mellon Housing Project.

Life in Imizamo Yethu is hard, which is reflected in the extensive unemployment, which according to the 2001 Census was at 46.44%<sup>164</sup>, and there is no reason to believe that this

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<sup>162</sup> City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Imizamo Yethu

<sup>163</sup> Sentinel News July 25 2003, Outsiders still streaming into IY

<sup>164</sup> City of Cape Town, Census 2001: Suburb Index – Imizamo Yethu

number has sunk as more people have settled down in Imizamo Yethu in the years since the census. The high density of people in Imizamo Yethu makes privacy a luxury to many inhabitants as several of the small shacks and brick houses contain more than one family. Noise from the shebeens or neighbours can be heard day and night, and is a constant nuisance to many. In addition the township has problems involving alcohol abuse, drug abuse, domestic violence, neglected children, unhealthy conditions in the shacks, lack of sanitation, and high HIV/AIDS and TB rates.

Many inhabitants of Imizamo Yethu come from the Eastern Cape and have principally economic motives for moving to Hout Bay, hoping to find work. Because of this many of them do not identify with the region or the township, and have little interest in the general development of the area (Froestad 2005:339). Imizamo Yethu is a mixed community although the majority consists of Xhosas, other groups include Zulu-speakers, Angolans, Nigerians, Ovambos, Malawians, and Congolese. The ratio between the Xhosa majority and the other minorities is also difficult to establish, but one resident speculated that it was probably about 50/50 Xhosa and non-Xhosa<sup>165</sup>. Although this cannot be verified, it does testify to the ethnic diversity in the community of Imizamo Yethu. There has also been tension and some violence between people of different ethnic origin in the township, but this has quieted and was not an issue. However, the relations between the ethnic groups remained cautious, and the various ethnic groups mostly stay amongst themselves.

These gaps between the groups residing in Imizamo Yethu are clearly reflected in the organisational life of the community. Division, lack of trust, allegations of corruption and nepotism is frequently mentioned when speaking to residents of the township.

*“There’s no trust between the different organisations at the moment [...] People who believe in Sinethemba support Sinethemba, people who believe in SANCO support SANCO [...] It’s not like they’re united inside. They’re still pointing fingers at each other. Sometimes there’s a tendency that the leadership doesn’t care what the people feel. They make decisions, if people complain they don’t come back again and try to resolve what the problem is. That’s why the people have lost trust”<sup>166</sup>*

Much of the criticism has been directed at SANCO and the ANC who many feel have let down the people of Imizamo Yethu and only represent the interests of themselves and those close to them. SANCO has a clear, commanding presence in Imizamo Yethu. Its leaders are

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<sup>165</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 19 2006

<sup>166</sup> ‘Baruti’, interviewed May 3 2006

most often referred to as ‘the community leaders’ by residents of the township. They seem to control most of the resources coming into Imizamo Yethu, be it public funding for programs or private initiatives for development. *“Here in Mandela Park [...] everything is structured, mobilised, and seen to by the community leaders who belong to SANCO. Everything goes through them; everything that is available in the community is run by them”*<sup>167</sup>.

### The Housing Issue

A lot of this malcontent is fuelled by the allocation of plots and houses constructed by the Niall Mellon Housing Project, because SANCO is responsible for managing the list of people eligible to receive a plot. The houses were supposed to be allocated according to the agreement made with the 445 families, roughly 2500 people, when Imizamo Yethu was established<sup>168</sup>. However, ever since the first houses were completed, controversy has raged in Imizamo Yethu over who are eligible to take ownership of them, a controversy which quickly spread to the Valley as well. The problems started when people who were not living in Hout Bay at the establishment of Imizamo Yethu started getting houses at the expense of people who had been there from the start: *“They can’t agree on the housing list, which is not fairly drawn up. Some people who’ve been here fifteen years don’t have houses, but some who have only been here one or two years have houses. So definitely there’s something that’s not right”*<sup>169</sup>. Another went further: *“The people expected that when they started giving houses to the people it would be first come, first served. But they didn’t. They gave houses first to the ones they thought might be favourites to them. That’s why they lost support”*<sup>170</sup>. There is a lot of confusion about the housing lists in Imizamo Yethu and nobody seems to know any longer who is supposed to be on it. Ray Padoa, project manager for the Niall Mellon Housing Project, stated to Sentinel News that *“his company was in the business of building houses and the allocation of the homes was in the hands of SANCO”*<sup>171</sup>. The allegations against SANCO have included the facilitation of people selling their plots to others not on the list. Manipulating the list and taking plots for themselves or giving them to friends and relatives who are either not on the list or are moved up the list at the expense of others, and even threatening people into giving up or selling their plots to others favoured by SANCO. While SANCO admits that people have been selling their plots, they maintain that this is within their

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<sup>167</sup> ‘Linda’, interviewed March 17 2006

<sup>168</sup> Sentinel News November 22 2002, Merry Christmas, IY!

<sup>169</sup> ‘Linda’, interviewed May 3 2006

<sup>170</sup> ‘Aaron’, interviewed May 23 2006

<sup>171</sup> Sentinel News, June 10 2005, ‘Allocation of homes in SANCO’s hands’

right and does not concern SANCO and their role as responsible for the allocation of plots. Responding to the allegations of corruption and selling of plots, the Chairperson of SANCO 'Thaba' explained that the reason why many newcomers have houses, is that they have bought the plots from the people on the list, and had nothing to do with corruption:

*"...if you come to me and say that you want to sell your plot, then sell your plot. Why would I want to say no? [...] You decided that you wanted to sell your plot, it doesn't concern me. But we need something that at the end of the day, after months and years, we have a document that says you sold your plot on your own. Because people now are shifting blame [...] By selling your plot you are giving your right to stay here to somebody else [...] I have bought my plot from an original, and that guy wouldn't claim to be an original, because I'm the original now. He sold his right of being an original to me."*<sup>172</sup>

Like many others 'Thaba' claims to have bought his home from a person on the list. However, even the facilitation of selling plots, which SANCO admits to, is illegal according to the Ratepayers:

*"The way national laws operate; plots can only be allocated to people who earn between a certain parameter of income. [...] That entitles them to a free site, and also a grant which enables them to build a hut. With the granting of that subsidy they're not entitled to sell it, for a period of I think is 6-7 years, so how can this be taking place? Titles are being sold before people even have taken title to their properties."*<sup>173</sup>

The rest of the allegations are refuted by SANCO as vicious lies spread by political opponents, spearheaded by the HBCPF, the Ward Councillor, the Ratepayers, and their 'puppets' in Sinethemba.

Sinethemba claims to represent those they see as the 'original beneficiaries' of the township, and have been in several disputes with SANCO over the issues of the influx to the township and the housing allocation. Sinethemba fights to get all the houses in the hands of the people on the original list of 1992 and also to severely reduce the number of people residing in Imizamo Yethu. This is in direct opposition to the view supported by SANCO and the ANC who claim that in accordance with the new democratic South Africa all people have a right to move freely and live where they wish. Their disputes also extend to what is to be done about the remaining 16 hectares of land on the Forestry Station, currently zoned to build community amenities. SANCO argue that these hectares should be rezoned to build more houses whilst Sinethemba maintain that they are needed for community facilities. In March 2004 the leader

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<sup>172</sup> 'Thaba', interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>173</sup> 'Deacon', interviewed April 10 2006

of Sinethemba had his shack smashed by an angry mob after Sinethemba along with the Ratepayers had obtained a court interdict preventing the construction of informal settlement on the Forestry Station. The background for the construction of these shacks was a large fire that had left more than 2000 people in Imizamo Yethu homeless one month prior to this<sup>174</sup>. The community leaders of SANCO were accused by Sinethemba for arranging the mob but any involvement in the incident was denied by SANCO.

The issues over influx and housing allocation have left many in Imizamo Yethu in a state of resignation; as they lack trust in their community leaders working for them. At the same time most are not willing to lend support to the other side represented by Sinethemba; as they are seen to be an instrument used by the whites to control and prevent development in Imizamo Yethu, much due to their cooperation with the Ratepayers and the HBCPF. Further, as so many of the community structures are in some way tied to SANCO, many of them have ended up being abandoned by the very people who once were their driving force:

*“There is something there with regards to working with the leadership. It’s something which made them demoralised with the whole situation [...] Due to the fact that there were these allegations; people couldn’t trust [...] The whole thing with the so called allegations of the leadership started immediately after Niall Mellon entered this community [...] The allocations of plots is the main reason why we can say that we are in this mess today”*<sup>175</sup>

### **6.1.1 The Perceived Safety and Security Threats in Imizamo Yethu**

The concerns relating to safety and security in Imizamo Yethu are different from those found in the Valley and contain most problems common to South African townships, and a lot of it is connected to alcohol abuse and the Shebeens. According to the Deputy Station Commissioner at Hout Bay SAPS, the majority of burglaries committed in Hout Bay take place in Imizamo Yethu<sup>176</sup>. However, while the Valley community has created an uproar over the increase in burglaries, the burglaries do not feature at the top of concerns for the people in Imizamo Yethu, this despite the fact that this community bears the brunt of the burglaries. The Chairperson of SANCO even went as far as suggesting that the statistics must be wrong: *“No, I think the statistics is wrong. They did the wrong studies. You know the number of break-ins in Imizamo Yethu is much less than in the Valley”*<sup>177</sup>. It is interesting to note that

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<sup>174</sup> Sentinel News, March 12 2004, ‘They destroyed my home...’

<sup>175</sup> ‘Nelson’, interviewed May 16 2006

<sup>176</sup> ‘Thomas’, interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>177</sup> ‘Thaba’, interviewed April 6 2006

even though the police confirm that Imizamo Yethu is the area most frequently hit by burglars, the people living there have not latched on to it as one of their main concerns. Probably this is due to other concerns being more important, and seen as much bigger problems to the community than burglaries. Also it could be suggested that the attention the residents of the Valley have managed to attain to burglaries in their community, has led to an image of things being comparatively worse than anywhere else in Hout Bay, making the residents of Imizamo Yethu downplay the importance of the burglaries taking place in their own community. This is not to say that burglaries were not an issue in Imizamo Yethu, but it did not feature at the top of concerns when residents were asked about crime or threats to personal security.

There are, however, major issues relating to crime in Imizamo Yethu which are of importance to the residents and that were mentioned by most people interviewed. Murders in Hout Bay almost exclusively take place in either Imizamo Yethu or Hangberg, and have averaged at about one murder a month, since 1994, according to the police statistics<sup>178</sup>. Adding to this a lot of children go missing from Imizamo Yethu<sup>179</sup>. The most common criminal problems in Imizamo Yethu which involve the police often stem from the alcohol abuse which is a major problem in the community. Crime relating to alcohol abuse includes assaults, stabbings, domestic abuse of wives and children, and rapes<sup>180</sup>. Most instances of violence and abuse are related to the shebeens, of which there are over 100 in Imizamo Yethu alone<sup>181</sup>. It is also very common to hear complaints from residents about the noise from the shebeens at night making it impossible for the neighbours to sleep. Because virtually all shebeens operate without a licence and are therefore illegal, they are very difficult for the police to regulate short of shutting them down, and even though shebeens are regularly being shut down by the police they usually reopen very quickly, and return to business as usual. Drugs are also a concern in Imizamo Yethu, but less so than alcohol and it tends to be mostly tied to 'dagga' (marijuana). But more recently a drug called 'Tik' (methamphetamine) has become more common in the township, especially amongst the youth, leading to more crime being committed to satisfy the need for drugs<sup>182</sup>.

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<sup>178</sup> South African Police Service crime statistics 1994/1995 – 2003/2004, Hout Bay Station  
South African Police Service crime statistics 2001/2002 – 2005/2006, Hout Bay Station

<sup>179</sup> 'Roger', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>182</sup> 'Mamello', interviewed May 20 2006

Juvenile gangs doing break-ins and robbing people have also become a problem in the community. Because they are too young to be sent to prison, they get released quickly by the police and frequently end up repeating their crimes. These gangs are suspected of being controlled by others taking advantage of their young age to do the deeds for them<sup>183</sup>. 'Mamello', a boy of 18 who started begging in the streets when he was 8, has witnessed many of his earlier friends turn to robberies and break-ins. He explains that as security in the Valley has gradually become tighter after the establishment of HBNW, juveniles are doing more of their criminal acts inside the township itself: *"they used to do a lot of house break-ins in Hout Bay, but now Hout Bay is tight, what they do now is rob in IY, they rob the people who come from work and they break into houses in IY, they take things that they can maybe get some drugs for, because it's only the drugs that they chase."*<sup>184</sup>

There have been a lot of complaints from the residents of Imizamo Yethu that SAPS are not committing to combat crime in their part of Hout Bay. The perceived inability of the SAPS to handle the robberies and burglaries has led to instances of vigilantism and mob justice in Imizamo Yethu. In early 2003 a group of about 20 businessmen got together and attempted to impose a curfew on the township in order to secure their businesses. This resulted in random shootings in the streets and a number of young people being beaten up as the businessmen patrolled the streets at night<sup>185</sup>. This organisation of businessmen has since been stopped, but there are still the occasional beating taking place if someone is caught doing a burglary. Although this form of mob justice is not an everyday occurrence in Imizamo Yethu, they do happen. Early in the process of doing interviews I was told a story about a juvenile who had recently been caught breaking into a man's shack. After he was caught, the story went that he was stripped naked and beaten before he was paraded around the township by an angry mob. The story was since confirmed by the local leader of the ANC 'James':

*"Yes, I was one of the community leaders who came and stopped that [...] So I made the police aware and the police came, but did nothing [...] They were just following the group. Because the people were saying to the police 'this young lad' and pointed at the house where he sells the stuff, so the police allowed the situation to happen without knowing that this guy is being abused. But taking their clothes off that's an abuse of its own, by beating and other things that's humiliating somebody's rights. So when I came all the way down there I tried to stop this thing, and I said to the police 'you must take action this is not what things are built on, they've got no right to do A, B, C, D and you know the*

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<sup>183</sup> 'James', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>184</sup> 'Mamello', interviewed May 20 2006

<sup>185</sup> Sentinel News, February 14 2003, 'Vigilantes cause problems in Imizamo'

*law better than I do' so I started to intervene.*"<sup>186</sup>

Although this was said to be something which happened seldom, it was not unheard of. The fact that SAPS arrived without intervening and had to be prompted by local leaders to do so is interesting. It could indicate that a certain amount of mob justice is tolerated, if not by the SAPS as an organisation, then at least by individual officers. It might also be that the officers were afraid to get involved with an angry mob, knowing that they would probably have to release the culprit shortly after arresting him. Nonetheless such incidents do occur in Imizamo Yethu and is mainly ascribed to people not having faith in the justice system's ability to deal with the criminals:

*"Those are the kind of things which makes life more difficult for people. To lose my laptop and everything, and these juveniles walk free the next day. And how much money did I spend on that laptop? [...] It gives me that kind of resentment, that kind of hatred. Why me, why must I lose? I've strived for those things and now he's walking there smiling as if nothing's happened. It despises the effort I've made. It makes people change their attitude and way of thinking"*<sup>187</sup>

These forms of vigilantism and mob justice are not the norm in Imizamo Yethu, but does show the dangers connected to leaving an area feeling as if they are not being serviced properly by the authorities employed to the job. The challenges facing Imizamo Yethu relating to safety and security are daunting, especially due to the police's admission that there are great difficulties in relation to patrolling the township effectively<sup>188</sup>.

## **6.2 Nodes Implicated in the Governance of Security in Imizamo Yethu**

The social structures in Imizamo Yethu seem chaotic at first glance. Compared to the coloured township in Hangberg Imizamo Yethu is less organised and contains fewer social ties between various groups residing there. This is reflected in the organisational life as most organisations consist mainly of a close network of people sharing an interest, and cooperation between or across these closed networks seem virtually non-existent. Three organisations in addition to the SAPS are of particular interest. First, as in many other townships, Block Committees have been formed in Imizamo Yethu. While their working conditions have been deteriorating for years, some still remain active. Second, the role of SANCO is important as they are the largest civic in the community and have an interest in most of what goes on in the community. Third, Sinethemba which has chosen to oppose SANCO, have involved

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<sup>186</sup> 'James', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>187</sup> Ibid.

<sup>188</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

themselves directly in the governance of security as they have allied with the HBCPF in the planned law suit against the government.

### **6.2.1 The Block Committees**

Community courts, often known as ‘Block’ or ‘Street Committees’ are found in many South African townships and informal settlements and are mainly restricted to the poorer sections. These community courts are not only courts, but are often part of an important array of social support and control mechanisms created by the community members themselves and suited to their needs. It is important to note that these committees are almost always a substructure of civic associations (Schärf 2001:45). In Imizamo Yethu the tradition of establishing such Block Committees has been brought by the people who came to Hout Bay from other and more rural parts of South Africa, replicating the conflict resolution model of their former homelands:

*“It’s an African thing. Normally we’re from the country in the Eastern Cape where we don’t have police because we’re too far from the police station. It can take maybe two days or a full day to reach the police [...] but we use the chiefs and head men. When they’re solving the cases we used to gather the people in what we call colleges, whereby we solved these problems with a word we call ‘Ubuntu’. ‘Ubuntu’ means ‘a friendship’, ‘in a friendly manner’. We sit down and solve the problem in a friendly manner. Sometimes we punish someone in a way which is agreed upon at a certain time. It’s a traditional way of healing each other, so it’s working very well.”<sup>189</sup>*

Currently the Block Committees which are operating in Imizamo Yethu are tied to SANCO as their main structure. According to SANCO they operate as a means for people to resolve issues and help each other with lesser issues which don’t require the involvement of the community leaders at the top of the SANCO structure<sup>190</sup>. Although several of the people interviewed in Imizamo Yethu insisted on the Block Committees being a success and a great benefit to the community, many of the committees have been abandoned by the very people who once organised them. Like other issues in the organisational life of the township the involvement of SANCO and the housing conflict was given as the main reason for not wanting to continue their work. And some of the ones still operating have sought to distance themselves from their affiliation with SANCO, and no longer report to them<sup>191</sup>.

### Institution and Resources

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<sup>189</sup> ‘Aaron’, interviewed May 23 2006

<sup>190</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>191</sup> ‘Aaron’, interviewed May 23 2006

Imizamo Yethu is divided into nine Block Committees serving different parts of the township, consisting of up to 50 members each and serving more than 200 families on their block<sup>192</sup>, although as previously stated not all of these are operational. The committees started with one block around 1999, as an initiative of people then active in Imizamo Yethu Civic Association, which would later become SANCO. To begin with it consisted of a group that was unhappy about the shebeens playing loud music at night. ‘Mary’, one of the founders of the first Block Committee in Imizamo Yethu, explains how it got started:

*“So we just got together a few ladies and men. You just picked one lady next door and if they think that this is good then we stand up and make a group of people and say ‘what can we do, where can we start?’ Ok, we’ll go and tell that person that we don’t like this, or we’ll make a meeting where we’re going to call community people and have a general meeting. We’ll call them to the Imizamo Yethu hall where we’re going to tell them that we’re unhappy about 1, 2, 3, but we’ll involve the police as well. The police felt very happy about our team; so everything that was going on like crime or people fighting; when they went to the police station the police would ask ‘did you tell ‘Mary’?’ And since then people never went to the police station, when they’d got whatever problem, family problem they would come to us.”<sup>193</sup>*

The committees are made up of volunteers within the area they are set up to serve. An important feature is that anyone can join the committee by simply asking to join; as such the committees are elected by its constituency. The Block Committees are also intended to serve as a link between the community and the leadership in SANCO, bringing larger issues to the main structure and be part of the election process of the leadership of SANCO. This was done through a branch of SANCO called the ‘Police Forum’<sup>194</sup>, where the top officers at the Hout Bay Station would often attend their meetings and work with them<sup>195</sup>.

The Block Committees and the Police Forum also functioned as a link between the community and the police, assisting the police in handling petty crime and negotiating in family disputes and arguments between people in the community. The committee meetings are usually made up of about 10 people, mostly elders or other respected members of the community, church leaders are often an important part of the committees<sup>196</sup>. Because the work done by the committees is voluntary and no payment is expected from any part, these committees provide an important task of social control available to even the poorest members

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<sup>192</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>193</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 30 2006

<sup>194</sup> The Police Forum should not be confused with the CPF as they are separate structures

<sup>195</sup> ‘Baruti’, interviewed May 3 2006

<sup>196</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

of the community. These committees rely on no other resources than the abilities of the people who make up the committees to negotiate peace and solutions for the parties that come to them for aid.

### Technology and Mentality

In order to understand how the Block Committees operate, it must be noted that they are not structured the same way as an ordinary court which is set up to determine guilt. The focus of the committees is much wider, and they do not distinguish between civil and criminal matters, but rather deal with problems. Their focus is on making peace, and their rules and procedures are based on common sense, and the values enforced are normally known to all participants (Schärf 2001:45-46).

The involvement of the Block Committees in Imizamo Yethu includes direct intervention in cases of domestic violence or fights in shebeens. Representatives of the committees would be called and asked to come help stop the problems, and afterwards a meeting might be summoned to resolve the issue<sup>197</sup>. Significantly their involvement also stretches to helping people who don't have the money to buy food. The committees may negotiate arrangements between local shop owners and the person in need so that payment for food can be done on a weekly or monthly basis, when the money is there. The arrangements would then be supervised by the committee, and if payments are not met, another meeting will be called and a solution mediated<sup>198</sup>. Some Block Committees would also involve themselves if a person wished to put up a new shack in their area: *"Even someone from here cannot just go and build [a shack], he must contact them [the Block Committee], and explain why he comes and why he wants to erect a structure"*<sup>199</sup>. Other problems may be as trivial as someone throwing dirty water in front of their shack.

There is no issue too small for the Block Committees, and it is probably due to this that they seem to have enjoyed a great deal of legitimacy within the community. The focus on making peace and finding solutions between parties rather than distributing guilt is the key to how they operate: *"The main thing is to make peace, not to create friction. Psychologically you must know that although these people have been fighting, they love each other because they*

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<sup>197</sup> 'Baruti', interviewed May 3 2006

<sup>198</sup> 'Mary', interviewed May 30 2006

<sup>199</sup> 'Nelson', interviewed May 16 2006

*know each other*”<sup>200</sup>. This combination of approaching every case as a problem to be solved through mediation, and the fact that issues may be brought before them no matter how small they may seem is the foundation of the mentality applied by the Block Committees.

The process of making peace between conflicting parties is done by gathering a meeting at a neutral venue where the different parties are given an opportunity to state their case to the Block Committee. It is important to note that the Block Committee has no authority to force either party to accept the solution they propose, and are as such dependent on the weight they carry in the community to create acceptance if either of the parties should be unhappy with the result. Otherwise the parties are free to ignore the recommendation of the committee, but in some of these cases the result may be that the case is reported to the police who then have to look into it<sup>201</sup>.

One of the Block Committee members told a story about a foreigner who operated a shebeen. One day the shebeen owner was brought before the Block Committee because his music was too loud, but he refused to heed the committee’s urges for him to close his shebeen at night and there was no resolution. However, a while later the owner of the shebeen found himself with the prospect of having to go to court over a quarrel with a neighbour, and the police sent him to the Block Committee to have the matter resolved. He now found himself on the other end, needing the help of the committee to avoid going to court. When he returned to the Block Committee this time he first apologised and promised to heed the previous decision of the committee. After this, an agreement was made that he would bring his problems to the committee in the future, so that they could be solved together with the community<sup>202</sup>. This single incident explains how the Block Committees can be very effective mechanisms of social control. What this story illustrates is that when you don’t accept the legitimacy of the committees you also to run the risk of social exclusion, and in turn the risk being denied aid if needed. Hence the Block Committees may function not only to resolve disputes, but also in a broader sense of social control.

The relationship between the police and the Block Committees has overall been stated as very positive, and mutually beneficial:

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<sup>200</sup> ‘Aaron’, interviewed May 23 2006

<sup>201</sup> Ibid.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

*“We normally ask the police to stand by when we’re dealing with a case inside the township [...] We’re used to being fair and just in making peace between two parties, but if we can’t, we always take the case to the police [...] Even the courts sometimes send the people to us if they’ve just gone to court to settle their case there. The court normally sends the case back to us so that we can first talk in the community about why and how it happened. Then, if it’s difficult for us to solve it we send it to the police and the police can take it to court.”<sup>203</sup>*

For the police there are clear advantages to having these Block Committees operating. Because they are able to handle conflict resolution effectively it saves the police a lot of time and effort, as well as saving cases from being brought to an already strained judicial system. Members of the Block Committees also reported to have a very good working relationship with the police, stating that the police were quick to respond to their calls when they were needed by members of the Block Committees<sup>204</sup>.

In earlier days, the top of the Block Committees, the Police Forum also provided aid to the police. One of the previously active members told how they would assist the police in cases of rape or child abuse by being there as victim support at the police station, or getting the victim to the hospital or to the police station to lay a charge. *“We had days when every day one of us would go to the police station and stand by there [...] it would be all day or all night. Then if there was no one there when they needed immediate help they would just call and we had to get up and go down there”<sup>205</sup>.*

### Breakdown of the Block Committees

The problem remains, however, that many of these committees have ended up being abandoned by their members. Their role as a link between the community and the main leadership of SANCO is what many claim to be the central reason for this abandonment. The disappointment with the SANCO leadership was most often related to not being listened to in various cases and lack of support when it was needed<sup>206</sup>. Some noted that the leadership of SANCO was not fairly elected by the members of the various blocks like they were supposed to. Instead a small number of people at the top kept re-electing themselves<sup>207</sup>. Others pointed to the lack of trust in the leadership due to their handling of the housing issue in Imizamo

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 19 2006

<sup>206</sup> ‘Aaron’, interviewed May 23 2006

<sup>207</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 30 2006

Yethu<sup>208</sup>. There was also a certain amount of frustration about the feeling that the SANCO leadership provided very little aid to the committees and at the same time was seen to be taking most of the credit for their work. One of the previous Block Committee members sums it up:

*“It stopped when they started building houses [...] I think when SANCO also wanted to be involved in the Block Committees, while they were not doing so much. We were working so hard but they were not doing so much, but they wanted to be the ones who got praised, so then people got fed up with it and so they left and it stopped [...] Let me put it this way, when we were doing this, we were working so hard. But when it came to the elections of the SANCO we are looking at those Block Committee people, people wanted to elect someone on those groups because they could see how we were working. But the SANCO committee which would be there by then when the time of election comes, they don’t give the people their own choice, they’ll elect somebody that they want, and the people are not happy with that person.”<sup>209</sup>*

The loss of many of these Block Committees has left large parts of Imizamo Yethu having to rely on the police as the only viable option when it comes to conflict resolution. An alternative which is not to their benefit, as Hout Bay SAPS has repeatedly stated that they are understaffed and lack the resources to police Hout Bay efficiently by themselves. SANCO claimed they were working to figure out what was needed in order to get the Block Committees back in action<sup>210</sup>.

### **6.2.2 The South African National Civic Organisation**

SANCO plays an important part in most aspects of governance in Imizamo Yethu. Their close links with the ANC and their position as the largest and longest standing civic in the community means that the majority of the resources and jobs coming into the community go through them. This position has also placed them at the centre of the controversies raging around the housing project and they find themselves being accused of serious offences relating to threats, violence, and corruption. Irrespective of the validity of these accusations, they have led to difficulties for SANCO and have seriously injured its legitimacy in the eyes of many, both within and outside of the township. However, no other group has managed to gather the support needed in order to take over its functions and SANCO continue to play a central role in the township.

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<sup>208</sup> ‘Nelson’, interviewed May 16 2006

<sup>209</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 30 2006

<sup>210</sup> ‘Nelson’, interviewed May 16 2006

### Institution and Resources

SANCO, as the name implies, is a national civic organisation with local branches in many parts of South Africa. Originally this civic was called 'Imizamo Yethu Civic Association', but has since switched to calling itself by the name of the national organisation SANCO. In Imizamo Yethu SANCO is structured around a main committee with representatives from various sub committees. Amongst these is the Housing Committee, which is responsible for the much debated plot allocations in Imizamo Yethu. Another is the Police Forum which is to work with the Block Committees and the police. It was impossible to determine exactly who within SANCO was responsible for managing the housing and plot allocation, because nobody could or would answer this clearly.

The relationship between SANCO and the ANC in Imizamo Yethu is very tight. The Chairperson of SANCO was also the ANC candidate for Ward Councillor during the 2006 local elections, though he lost to the DA. But this is not the only link; most of the leaders of SANCO are also members of the ANC, such as the leader of Hout Bay ANC. The association between the two organisations is so close that the Chairperson of SANCO stated: "*The ANC and SANCO are one big structure*"<sup>211</sup>. At the centre of this ANC / SANCO alliance stands one man who has been involved in the community since its establishment in 1992, and who is presently the leader of Hout Bay ANC, he will be referred to here as 'James'. Although he is not the Chairperson of SANCO, his word does seem to carry a heavy weight in the decisions made by both organisations, and he is regarded as the top community leader in Imizamo Yethu. Several earlier members of SANCO noted that the civic had now in practice been reduced to only a few people still active: "*there are only three or four people that are still active. I don't see anymore people. There are no SANCO meetings*"<sup>212</sup>. While SANCO still have more members than this there does seem to be truth to the claim that its core is mainly made up of a very small close knit group of people.

One of the main concerns of many residents in Imizamo Yethu is linked to the appointment of the leadership in SANCO. It was not possible to determine how the people who hold positions in SANCO had come to them. This confusion was shared by several of the informants; one stated that "*You will never know that because they elect themselves. Four people, not the community [...] they're pushing us down, you know [...] And the community doesn't put their*

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<sup>211</sup> 'Thaba', interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>212</sup> 'Baruti', interviewed May 3 2006

*foot down to support you, so the three or four people who bring you down always win*"<sup>213</sup>. Talking to the same informant again some days later I asked about how it was possible for SANCO leaders to elect themselves without the community intervening: *"this is what we don't know, and they are doing that [...] they [the community] do care, but we're afraid to speak up because tomorrow I'll be burned up in my house [...] they'll kill me. Even the information that I'm giving you [...] if it went to them what I've said to you now; I'm dead"*<sup>214</sup>. The fear of retribution connected with open opposition to SANCO was shared by several of the people interviewed. Although this was the most extreme response, this fear may be part of the explanation to why there is so little opposition to SANCO in the township.

Adding to this are the accusations from Sinethemba that members of the ANC and SANCO leadership have incited and performed violence against their members and demolished their leader's house<sup>215</sup>. Further Sinethemba claim they are afraid to hold public meetings in Imizamo Yethu because of SANCO<sup>216</sup>. Combined with the fear of opposing SANCO some pointed to how the leadership in SANCO is buying their place in the community by favouring those close to them:

*"Just recently when those houses were built [...] we heard that there were people who obtained contracts, and the people who obtained them were people who are near to 'James' and stuff. So they obtained painting contracts, carpet fitting contracts, tiling contracts, electricity contracts. Those types of things they don't come to us, they come to certain individuals."*<sup>217</sup>

This is not the only time charges of nepotism were brought against SANCO; in relation to the housing project these charges are common as has been noted earlier. These types of client / patron relationships may serve as a way for many to secure their position in the community. The client by getting access to much needed resources or work, and the patron by securing the allegiance of those close by, securing a network of support in the community. The result is that the community is fragmented into groups forming strong ties internally, but end up being closed off to those on the outside of the network.

The SANCO / ANC alliance has representation on the Ward Committee in Hout Bay and attend their meetings, but have little faith in the Ward doing anything to aid Imizamo Yethu,

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<sup>213</sup> 'Mary', interviewed May 19 2006

<sup>214</sup> 'Mary', interviewed May 30 2006

<sup>215</sup> 'Sandra', interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>216</sup> 'Samuel', interviewed April 5 2006

<sup>217</sup> 'Linda', interviewed March 17 2006

and rather see it as favouring only what is good for the whites in the Valley<sup>218</sup>. SANCO also had representation on the HBCPF, but decided to withdraw from it because they felt that the HBCPF no longer represented the interests of Imizamo Yethu after they announced their intention to launch a campaign to sue the government for, amongst other things, allowing the continued influx of people to Imizamo Yethu:

*“...we feel that the CPF is no longer representing the whole community, it’s representing a certain interest group; Sinethemba and ‘Elizabeth’s’ group. ‘Elizabeth’ is using the CPF, and used it last year to fight the mayor. She also used it to try and change the issues that were raised in the CPF, and put her own words and used it the wrong way around. Which is why we’re not in favour of the CPF anymore...”*<sup>219</sup>

SANCO has been in meetings with HBNW about a possible cooperation by tying the Block Committees to HBNW, but nothing has materialised other than talk<sup>220</sup>. It would probably prove difficult for SANCO to act as such a link due to the lack of trust they are currently faced with in large parts of the Block Committees. In addition many of the members of HBNW have uttered their scepticism towards aligning the HBNW too closely with SANCO<sup>221</sup>.

There are ties between SANCO and HBCA in Hangberg through the ANC, but the working relationship between the communities is limited<sup>222</sup>. Old prejudices are still alive and preventing the communities from working much together:

*“It’s difficult to define the relationship between us and them, because coloured communities are people that were in the middle class in the previous government, and that perception has stayed in their minds. As a result some of them are still thinking they are better than us, they can do better than us, they can perform better than us, and that they are the ones who are nearly whites. [...] When they see that ‘now we need to get something from the government’ they come to us first as quite a friend, but when that’s not happening they ‘re staying their normal life in a better community that’s very close to the whites, you see.”*<sup>223</sup>

The resources available to SANCO are very scarce, as stated by their Chairperson:

*“[We have] very limited resources. Otherwise we have nothing at all. We have only this office which has a phone if you want to phone and a fax if you need to fax. That’s all.*

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<sup>218</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>219</sup> ‘Thaba’, interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>220</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>221</sup> ‘Charles’, interviewed May 15 2006

<sup>222</sup> Section 7.2.1 in chapter 7 provides a little more information on the relationship between SANCO and HBCA

<sup>223</sup> ‘Nelson’, interviewed May 16 2006

*Financially we have don't have money at all, and if we're to do something we need to collect money from the people, or get them to help with organizing whatever we need to organize. But we don't have a source of income.”<sup>224</sup>*

Though they have very little resources, SANCO still holds a key position in the community, partly due to their involvement in the housing list for the Niall Mellon Housing Project. This position ensures that SANCO remains a force to be reckoned with in the township as people rely on them to take hold of their plot.

### Technology and Mentality

SANCO's conviction that the democratic South Africa has given its people a right to settle down wherever they like is important to understand the way they operate in the influx and housing issue in Hout Bay. As opposed to Sinethemba, the HBCPF, the DA, and the Ratepayers who demand that people must be removed from Imizamo Yethu to make room for the people who were there at the founding of the township. This view is supported by many in their community, and especially those who have arrived in the years after the founding of Imizamo Yethu. There are still 16 hectares of Imizamo Yethu which were part of the deal made in 1992, but because these are zoned for community amenities, they may not be used for housing. According to SANCO, this land should be rezoned to build more houses for the people of Imizamo Yethu, but they have so far been stopped in court by Sinethemba and the Ratepayers. SANCO claims that there is no need for community facilities, arguing that what is needed are rather integrated facilities for all communities in Hout Bay<sup>225</sup> *“If we have a soccer field we want white boys also to play there, so that if we need money to repair the soccer field we can get from them as well because their kids are also playing there. If we build a soccer field here, who's going to maintain it?”<sup>226</sup>* There is considerable support for this view in Imizamo Yethu, as many of the people living in shacks would like an opportunity to get a house on the available land, although there is not nearly enough room to accommodate them all on this land. The fact that SANCO has taken a stance for allowing 'newcomers' access to Imizamo Yethu does seem to give them some support in this segment of the population, and as the number of people who have come to the township since 1992 vastly outnumber the people who were there from its establishment, this support is not insubstantial. Even though many in Imizamo Yethu share SANCO's view that anyone can freely settle down in Hout Bay, their actions in relation to plot allocation has cost them a lot

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<sup>224</sup> 'Thaba', interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>225</sup> Ibid.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

of support. Many of the people who made up their sub committees, and where a lot of the work was done, have abandoned SANCO, no longer wanting to work for the current leadership, as seen in the case of the Block Committees.

The Chairperson of SANCO shared some of his thoughts about what it means to be a leader:

*“I find out that once you’ve been elected you become a model and you find that there’s a group of people who want to build you as a person, and you find there’s a certain group of people who’ll want to destroy you as a person. Therefore you need to identify those two groups and work with the one that wants to build you; then you’ll be a leader.”<sup>227</sup>*

This mentality of leadership is part of the explanation for the fragmentation of different groups in Imizamo Yethu. Schmitt (1996) and Mouffe’s (2005) idea of the political as collectives grouping people into ‘we’ and ‘they’ once again seems prudent. The claim that leadership is built around ‘those who want to build you’ as opposed to, ‘those who want to destroy you’ is once again a reminder of the ever present danger of antagonism. When confronted with the claims that SANCO leaders support friends and family over others in the township, his response was:

*“Why have we got lots of friends? Because they are familiar with us from meetings, because when they’ve got problems they come to us and we help them, those people become our friends. And later on, once you become a friend, you become close to me and you become my family because you know my daily routine, you know where you can get me if you need me. [...] Even if I help one now, then tomorrow he’ll come with another one and it grows and grows, and I end up having friends and some that I don’t even know”<sup>228</sup>*

This form of patronage looks to be the foundation of how SANCO are able to stay in power, and is widely acknowledged by the residents of Imizamo Yethu. By affording some help to those who seek it in return for support, SANCO has built a close network of strong ties. This is consistent with information provided by other informants in Imizamo Yethu stating that there is very little cooperation between different organisations in the community. People tend to stick with the organisation of their choice:

*“They’re more focused into community organisations on their own. If I’m in the UDF or UDM, I stay in UDF or UDM. So it’s not like cooperation, they’re still not united [...] There’s no trust between the different organisations at the moment [...] People who believe in Sinethemba support Sinethemba, people who believe in SANCO support*

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<sup>227</sup> Ibid.

<sup>228</sup> Ibid.

*SANCO [...] It's not like they're united inside. They're still pointing fingers at each other.*"<sup>229</sup>

One person mentioned the lack of community involvement taking place in Imizamo Yethu, even though there is no shortage of people who are unhappy with the current circumstances: *"People do see that things are not right, but they're afraid to go to the meetings with the positions, so they just complain from behind. Not even complaining in a meeting situation, they just complain from outside"*<sup>230</sup>. One of the earlier members of SANCO, who has since withdrawn, stated the problem of creating opposition to the leadership: *"The problem of our people is that they know what they want, but they can't say it, that's the problem. They'll choose you, trust in you, but they won't support you"*<sup>231</sup>. It is very difficult to ask to risk opposing established power structures in the community. Even though people may disagree with the current leadership and support changes, they do little or nothing to back anyone seeking change. A plausible reason for this may be that they risk opposing the very people who they may later come to rely upon for help, and stand to gain very from such action in the short run. The safety in accepting the status quo therefore outweighs the potential benefits of supporting change in the leadership. To people who are already in a deprived situation, the immediate safety in tying themselves to the existing powers would seem to provide a much more secure alternative to opposing them without knowing the consequences. This could also be part of the reason why SANCO, whilst being heavily criticised by members of the community, can still remain in power relatively unopposed. The risks of opposing those who control the scarce resources available in the community, are too great compared to what could potentially be gained by supporting opposition.

Coming to grips with exactly how SANCO operate is very difficult because, on the surface, they seem mostly inactive. One informant told a story about a time he had been approached by one of the community leaders to do a project for the children of Imizamo Yethu, they told him to be at the office at six:

*"They were there when I got there. But all that happened is that they started drinking, and I was there for about half an hour. And they were drinking and they started talking about things that I didn't want to hear, things that they get up to, and started exposing it. But I didn't want to know so I pretended that I didn't hear any of it. But the point is that that's*

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<sup>229</sup> 'Baruti', interviewed May 3 2006

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> 'Mary', interviewed May 19 2006

*how they are. They call you and say we'll do this, you get there, they get drunk, and nothing happens.*"<sup>232</sup>

The vast majority of their dealings happen out of sight of the general population who only take notice once decisions have been reached. It is difficult to determine the truth of the allegations against SANCO concerning corruption, patronage, and nepotism, but the belief that this is taking place is certainly clear in the minds of most people residing in the township. And while many support the initiatives taken by SANCO they often strongly disagree with the way resources are distributed. Further, many fear opposing SANCO openly either because they fear violent reactions, or because they fear being deprived of resources which SANCO control, either future jobs, housing plots, or other resources they may control. The fact that the government has taken no steps to investigate the many accusations against SANCO in the housing issue, is a strong indication that they have no real wish to antagonise the power-holders in the township. In light of this, it is not hard to understand why most people do little to oppose SANCO despite their unhappiness with the current leadership.

### **6.2.3 Sinethemba**

Sinethemba is the other of the two civic organisations in Imizamo Yethu, but unlike SANCO they do not claim to speak on behalf of the entire community. Rather they claim to represent the people who were given entitlement to the land of Imizamo Yethu according to the 1992 agreement, the people they refer to as the 'legal beneficiaries' or 'originals' of Imizamo Yethu. Currently the number of people Sinethemba claim to represent is vastly outnumbered by the people who have immigrated to Imizamo Yethu since its establishment, making it difficult to determine how much support they actually have in the community. What makes Sinethemba particularly interesting is that they have chosen to confront SANCO openly, and that they do so primarily by the aid of the HBCPF and the Ratepayers.

#### Institution and Resources

Sinethemba is Xhosa and means 'We have hope'. The organisation was originally led by a committee of 15 people, but now only 4 remain on this committee<sup>233</sup>. As stated Sinethemba is a civic organisation set up to ensure that the people who resided in Imizamo Yethu at the time of its establishment in 1992 are given what was promised to them by the government: "*We are trying to get our rights back, our legal rights [...] what's happening is that they [SANCO]*

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<sup>232</sup> 'Bulelani', interviewed May 19 2006

<sup>233</sup> 'Sandra', interviewed March 28 2006

*are always selling plots to other people than the legal beneficiaries*"<sup>234</sup>. Sinethemba has little to no resources of their own and they have so far allied themselves with the Ratepayers and the HBCPF to achieve their goals. They also enjoy the support of the local DA and its Ward Councillor 'Walter'.

Although Sinethemba claim not to be allied to any particular political party, they are often believed to be working for the DA, as two of its members ran for the DA during the local elections in 2006. This has caused some problems for them with regards to working with the community in Imizamo Yethu, where many now perceive them to be an organisation controlled indirectly by the white community in the Valley. Adding to this suspicion is the fact that they have been aided significantly by the Ratepayers, an organisation which has been very critical of the development in Imizamo Yethu. Further, two of the central committee members of Sinethemba may also be found on the executive committee of the HBCPF as Vice Chairperson and Secretary.

The tone between Sinethemba and SANCO is especially harsh. On the one hand Sinethemba accuses SANCO of corruption and selling plots to outsiders, as well as threatening, intimidating, and using violence against their members<sup>235</sup>. Sinethemba has several times brought charges against SANCO, and SANCO members with the Hout Bay SAPS. The charges include violence and intimidation, threats of having their houses burnt, and the compilation of a hit-list calling for the assassination of Sinethemba members<sup>236</sup>. In 2002 the leader of SANCO at the time was arrested on charges of attempted murder of the leader of Sinethemba. He was released on bail<sup>237</sup>, but was later convicted<sup>238</sup>. The same year 'James', the ANC leader, charged with assaulting the wife of the Sinethemba Vice Chairperson 'Samuel' in her home<sup>239</sup>, but in 2006 the case had still not made it to court, something which has led Sinethemba to accuse SAPS of taking sides with SANCO and suspect corruption. *"The illegal ones wanted to chase the legal beneficiaries out. And there was a lot of involvement with Superintendent 'Otto' [...] He was choosing sides; he was with the illegal ones. I think he was on the payroll or something"*<sup>240</sup>.

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<sup>234</sup> 'Samuel', interviewed April 5 2006

<sup>235</sup> Ibid.

<sup>236</sup> Sentinel News, May 17 2002, We're living in fear of our lives, Sinethemba leader claims

<sup>237</sup> Sentinel News, March 15 2002, IY on city agenda as tensions rise

<sup>238</sup> 'Elizabeth', interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>239</sup> Sentinel News, May 17 2002, We're living in fear of our lives, Sinethemba leader claims

<sup>240</sup> 'Samuel', interviewed April 5 2006

SANCO on the other hand is accusing Sinethemba of having no real legitimacy in the community. According to SANCO and the ANC; Sinethemba is simply a DA puppet trying to divide the community by spreading lies and stopping further development in Imizamo Yethu.

*“There is no Sinethemba [...] What’s here is the DA, and the DA trying to infiltrate the people and name them Sinethemba. Sinethemba claim to represent the 455 families that were here. Where are those 455? When they call a meeting there’s only five of them. I’m also one of the 455 who stayed in those houses but I’m not their member. How can they claim to fight on my behalf when I’m not their member?”<sup>241</sup>*

It is difficult to determine the support Sinethemba has in Imizamo Yethu, but the numbers are probably not very large. According to the HBCPF Chairperson ‘Elizabeth’:

*“The legally entitled beneficiaries of IY in terms of the government waiting list constitute 2200 people. You’ve now, in IY, got approximately 16.000 people. So if you deduct 2200 from 16.000, what are you left with? You end up with a majority of people who are in fact not on the government waiting list [...] Another fact that makes it difficult to establish the extent of support Sinethemba enjoys is the fact that people are intimidated to disclose their affiliation with Sinethemba because of the violence, assaults, marches and demolishing of houses. [...] So the legal beneficiaries are in a very dangerous situation because they’re outnumbered by far and they have been intimidated and assaulted.”<sup>242</sup>*

The simple fact that their potential constituency excludes all the people who have moved to Imizamo Yethu since its establishment, is enough to make them a minority group in the Imizamo Yethu of today. Additionally they have supported some very unpopular views in the community. Their belief that most of the people who have come to Imizamo Yethu since its establishment will have to be relocated in order to give room for the ones who were promised the land, according to the original agreement, alienates a significant proportion of the community, in some cases even those they claim to speak on behalf of.

### Technology and Mentality

Sinethemba has taken a very clear stance against the continued influx of people to Imizamo Yethu. Their view is that it is already severely overcrowded and that this overcrowding is a direct cause of a lot of the social problems, such as crime, plaguing not just Imizamo Yethu, but the entire population of Hout Bay. Sinethemba believe that if Imizamo Yethu is to have room for the original beneficiaries, then the majority of the people now residing in the informal parts of the township will have to be moved to another location, a view which is wholeheartedly supported by the HBCPF and the Ratepayers as well as the DA.

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<sup>241</sup> ‘James’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>242</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

There are especially two cases in which Sinethemba have been involved which have sparked controversy in Imizamo Yethu. First, in 2004 Sinethemba along with the Ratepayers went to court to prevent people from erecting structures on the Forestry Station land in Imizamo Yethu which is zoned for community amenities<sup>243</sup>. They were successful in their court action and the area remains free of development today. Sinethemba insists that there is a need for facilities in the community, such as a mall with a library and a soccer field<sup>244</sup>. However, given that the background for why people had moved into the Forestry Station was the fire that devastated large parts of Imizamo Yethu in February 2004, the decision to get a court action preventing people from erecting a new structure was met with resentment and anger in the community. Shortly after this, the acting Chairperson of Sinethemba had his shack demolished by an angry mob which, he claims, was been led by prominent SANCO leaders<sup>245</sup>.

The second case that Sinethemba has been involved with is the class action lawsuit to be carried out by the HBCPF on behalf of its members. As this lawsuit was dealt with in the previous chapter, it will not be dealt with in detail here, but as stated this lawsuit has generated a lot of controversy in all three communities of Hout Bay.

Generally it looks as if the governing technology of Sinethemba is very much linked to the organisations they have chosen to align themselves with. It is difficult to envision an organisation like Sinethemba being able to take court action without the financial support of the Ratepayers. Likewise the second court action of the HBCPF seems to be more of an initiative of the HBCPF and its Chairperson, than it is an initiative on behalf of HBCPF member organisations like Sinethemba. There seems to be a trade-off between Sinethemba and its supporting organisations in the white community: Sinethemba are able to access resources they would otherwise not have, through the HBCPF and the Ratepayers. In return Sinethemba can provide a certain amount of legitimacy to the Ratepayers and the HBCPF when they want to prevent further squatting development in Imizamo Yethu, by showing the world that they also have support inside Imizamo Yethu, not only in the white community.

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<sup>243</sup> Sentinel News, April 30 2004, Next round of battle over extra land for IY looms

<sup>244</sup> 'Samuel', interviewed April 5 2006

<sup>245</sup> Sentinel News, March 12 2004, 'They destroyed my home...'

However, the alliances that Sinethemba has entered into with ‘white’ organisations are costing them the trust of their community. Even people who would otherwise sympathise with Sinethemba’s case, find it hard to swallow their association with these ‘white’ organisations:

*“Sinethemba are the people who know exactly about where Imizamo Yethu comes from. They have the real truth about this, but they can’t stand up for their rights [...] they don’t have any backbone. They are the kind of people who, when somebody comes along and say ‘let’s do this’ they will follow that person [...] They have the support of the CPF, but as I say they’re strong today, but tomorrow they’re weak. We, the people here, don’t like to see that; it now looks like the white people are behind them. We want to see them stand strongly for what they are saying. I’m not saying they are wrong; they are right [...] but we don’t want to see a lot of power on that side [the whites] rather than on their side. They must be strong, they must stand firm for what they believe.”<sup>246</sup>*

This illustrates the deeply rooted mistrust found between the Valley and Imizamo Yethu, as well as the price Sinethemba has to pay for aligning with interests in the Valley. It is therefore not surprising to see that the price Sinethemba has to pay for aligning their interests with the Ratepayers is to be met with suspicion and hostility in the township, even amongst those they claim to represent and that would otherwise be sympathetic to their cause.

#### **6.2.4 The South African Police Service**

Policing Imizamo Yethu is not an easy task for the SAPS. As with the Valley, the SAPS have repeatedly called for community involvement in policing the township since their resources and manpower are limited. Where HBNW has answered this call in the Valley, no such initiative has been successfully sustained in Imizamo Yethu. In September 2003 a neighbourhood watch doing foot patrols in the township was established in Imizamo Yethu, comprising 5 men and 22 women who had received a week of training at the SAPS College in Philippi<sup>247</sup>. However, the Imizamo Yethu Neighbourhood Watch (IYNW) was short lived. Over the Holidays in December 2003 members of the IYNW was deployed on the beaches as part of a DOCS project to keep the beaches safe. While it was all regarded as voluntary work, the participants did receive a stipend from DOCS to cover food and travel expenses<sup>248</sup>. According to the Chairperson of SANCO, it was shortly after this operation that the IYNW withered and dissolved, presumably because there was no payment involved for returning to patrol the township<sup>249</sup>. Apart from this attempt the Block Committees seem to have enjoyed

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<sup>246</sup> ‘Mary’, interviewed May 30 2006

<sup>247</sup> Sentinel News, October 10 2003, Volunteers trying to keep IY streets safe

<sup>248</sup> ‘Alex’, interviewed May 26 2006

<sup>249</sup> ‘Thaba’, interviewed April 6 2006

some success for a time. But their involvement is now severely limited, thus leaving SAPS largely alone with the responsibility of policing the township.

There are several challenges facing the police when operating in Imizamo Yethu. The lack of proper infrastructure in Imizamo Yethu makes it difficult for the police to service the area properly when patrolling. While there are streets and roads in the lower and formalised parts of the township, there is no proper infrastructure in place in the upper parts where the squatter camps are found, and the police have problems leaving their cars unprotected while walking the area because police vans get vandalised when left alone<sup>250</sup>. Further, according to the police the majority of crimes in the township happen inside the many illegal shebeens, giving rise to even more difficulties to effective policing as the police can't patrol inside shebeens, there are just too many of them<sup>251</sup>. While the police do on occasion raid and close down shebeens, the effect of this strategy is severely limited, and not without risk to the officers involved. When the police arrive to close down a shebeen it has not been uncommon for them to be met with violence and intimidation, although this has cooled down in more recent times according to one police officer:

*"In Imizamo Yethu if you close down shebeens they will stone you, they'll throw bricks at you. Generally, in IY, when we close down shebeens we don't have that many problems now a day. We've got a fairly healthy working relationship with them. Once in a blue moon we'll pick up problems up there, especially in certain sectors. It's not the local community generally; it's generally the Ovambos who run a lot of the illegal shebeens high up on the mountain."*<sup>252</sup>

Closing down shebeens is not a very effective strategy for controlling crime in the township. According to the SAPS Deputy Station Commissioner Captain 'Thomas', people do not realise how hard it is to control the shebeens. Even if they are shut down for a while and the police confiscate all the liquor, the proprietors will get the liquor back after paying their fines, and they are able to reopen. Captain 'Thomas' also posed the rhetorical question of where the people who frequent the shebeens would go if they were all shut down. Before answering his own question; *"They would probably just go to the bars in the Valley and we would have even more trouble with fighting between races, because the different communities are so fed up with one another"*<sup>253</sup>. The comments made by Captain 'Thomas' also shows that there is an

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<sup>250</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>251</sup> Ibid.

<sup>252</sup> 'Roger', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>253</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

important, pragmatic side to the police's approach to the shebeens because they realise the need for people to have some place to go and enjoy themselves. To the police the shebeens represent both a source of potential problems and a necessary confinement that makes sure people have a place to go. It is neither desirable nor practically possible for the police to shut down all the illegal shebeens in Imizamo Yethu; the issue becomes to regulate them effectively. Captain 'Thomas' was quoted by Sentinel News saying: "*We recognise the need for shebeens. They're the equivalent of the local pub and people must have a place to socialise and let their hair down. Provided the shebeens close around 11pm at weekends, there are few problems.*"<sup>254</sup> Regarding those that did not stick to this agreement, Captain 'Thomas' stated that: "*Since the advent of neighbourhood watch we have been visiting the shebeens every weekend. If they are open after closing time, we charge the owners and confiscate the liquor.*"<sup>255</sup> While there seems to be improvement in the police capacity to regulate the shebeens, it is hard to believe they are able to charge every shebeen that ignores the closing time, and the many complaints from respondents being kept awake by the noise from shebeens certainly testifies to this. This leaves the police in a difficult position, it is not possible to shut down the shebeens, nor do they have the manpower or resources to monitor them all. Captain 'Thomas' claimed that it was is not possible for the police to effectively police Imizamo Yethu and the shebeens on their own, at least not in terms of crime prevention, and once more he calls for the community to get involved and aid the police<sup>256</sup>.

With the exception of some contact with the Block Committees, which is limited at present, Captain 'Thomas' has been unsuccessful in establishing any lasting cooperation with members of the community in the township. This is not for lack of trying, according to Captain 'Thomas' he had made three or four appointments with the community leadership about establishing a new neighbourhood watch in Imizamo Yethu, but on every occasion the community leaders had failed to show up for their appointment, even though the meetings had all been scheduled to take place in the township. This had all caused Captain 'Thomas' to give up trying<sup>257</sup>. The result has been that the township is largely left with a police force that respond to calls, but with little ability to have a real preventive effect on crime.

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<sup>254</sup> Sentinel News, January 27 2006, House break-ins cut by more than a third

<sup>255</sup> Ibid.

<sup>256</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

The problem of violence against police personnel is one of the main problems related to patrolling Imizamo Yethu, and officers rarely go into the township alone. *“I don’t feel unsafe walking around in IY. We generally go in as a group of 6-8 members, sometimes 12 depending on what we’re doing. You just have to watch your back so that they’re not going to throw stones at you, but it depends on the task.”*<sup>258</sup> It seems that the pattern from other townships of South Africa is also found in Imizamo Yethu, if the police are to make an impact they need to move in numbers. As noted by Steinberg (2008:43) there is a lesson known to every cop in South Africa: *“where a population is reluctant to give its consent to being policed, you police it by outnumbering it.”* However, this can only be done at certain times, when resources and manpower are available, and the manpower at Hout Bay SAPS means that these kinds of operations are not everyday occurrences. The story about the juvenile who was beaten and paraded around the township by an angry mob, told earlier in the chapter, also raises some interesting questions about how the police act in relation to the township. Whether the officers were afraid to get involved because of possible reprisals from the mob or they simply were prepared to tolerate a certain amount of mob justice, can only be speculation. But it does seem to corroborate the central finding made by Steinberg (ibid.) that when the police enter a township in smaller numbers, they are forced to play by the rules of the township, to negotiate their presence, or run the risk of being thrown out. In this case, only when pressured by community leaders, did the police get involved and stop the mob. It is possible that the backing of the community leaders was necessary for the police to have sufficient authority to be respected by the mob.

The attitude towards the police and their ability to service the community were divided in the responses from the residents of the township. Among the respondents affiliated with ANC and SANCO, the attitude towards the police were very favourable, and all three of them claimed that relations with the police had improved in recent time because Hout Bay SAPS had recruited more officers residing in the township:

*“Because they’ve employed more black people from Imizamo Yethu who know the community, who can, even if there’s a problem, just go there and sort out the problem without arresting anybody, which is good as well. There’s no reason to arrest somebody just for stealing this bread, just tell them to take it back. But if you call the police all the way from the Valley he’ll arrest the person because he doesn’t have room to manoeuvre, his only option to deal with crime is to arrest. But if this black cop comes in and his*

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<sup>258</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

*brother or something is involved then he must talk to his brother or whatever, then arresting will be the last option.*"<sup>259</sup>

It is hardly surprising that the employment of more police officers from Imizamo Yethu has helped improve relations with the people of the township, and this was also noted by one of the police reservists. He claimed that Hout Bay SAPS was now getting the racial balance right in their ranks<sup>260</sup>. It is interesting to note that while most respondents in the Valley complained over a loss in competence with the new police officers, the image is reversed for Imizamo Yethu. It seems reasonable to interpret this as a result of the SAPS having to adapt to different needs from the different communities. While these new officers may not meet the expectations of the Valley community in every way, it would seem they bring important insight into dealing with issues in Imizamo Yethu which may have been lacking previously. However, the SANCO members also noted that relations with the police had been good even before the increase in police officers from their own community, and the cooperation with Superintendent 'Otto' was seen to have been very good all along<sup>261</sup>. Additionally, it was noted that the police were now very quick to respond when called, and that this had improved much over the last year:

*"I guess it's fair here. When people call them they do come. I don't know of any incidents where the police don't come when we call them. Before it was more relaxed when a crime was committed in IY, they were more focused into the Valley. But now they come each and every time. [...] Since of last year."*<sup>262</sup>

The estimate in time of this improvement in police response corroborates the police's claim that the establishment of HBNW has given them more time and ability to respond more quickly to calls and take more time on the scene to deal with the problems in the shebeens<sup>263</sup>. It is also likely to be a result of the rapid strengthening of the police contingent stationed in Hout Bay which has taken place in recent years.

Not everyone is quite as happy with police performance in the township. As mentioned above Sinthemba members have accused the police of siding with SANCO, a claim that was also supported by other residents of the community not affiliated with Sienthemba<sup>264</sup>. Sinthemba

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<sup>259</sup> 'Thaba', interviewed April 6 2006

<sup>260</sup> 'Terry', interviewed May 1 2006

<sup>261</sup> 'Nelson', interviewed May 16 2006

<sup>262</sup> 'Baruti', interviewed May 3 2006

<sup>263</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>264</sup> 'Alexandra', interviewed May 19 2006

members argue that the police give preferential treatment to those affiliated with SANCO and the ANC<sup>265</sup>, and they are supported by the Chairperson of HBCPF:

*“What has happened in IY, and also to a certain extent in the Hangberg area, is that you have your people who belong to SANCO and the ANC alliance. In fact it’s SANCO who support the ANC and the South African Communist Party who are in an alliance. And when they have a problem they get immediate service from the police because the police are a national government body and the national government service is being run or managed by the ANC. So there are groups in IY and Hangberg who have access to the police, more than anyone else, because they’re strongly involved with the political parties.”*<sup>266</sup>

For the members of Sinethemba and the HBCPF it is once again Superintendent ‘Otto’ that is seen to be the problem: *“we know he [Superintendent ‘Otto’] supports ‘James’. A policeman must be straight, he mustn’t choose sides, he must be straight with people.”*<sup>267</sup> But the allegations were not restricted to the leadership. Police officers who reside in the township were also seen to be too friendly with ‘James’ and the other community leaders: *“One day we are sitting there and what’s happening is that the police are sitting over there partying with guys like ‘James’. I call him a criminal and they party with him. They were having a big party and a lot of police guys were at ‘James’ house, partying and drinking”*<sup>268</sup>.

While it is not possible within the scope of this thesis to establish the truth of the allegations made against the police, it is clear that the allegations themselves inhibit the police’s ability to form functioning and broad partnerships with the community in Imizamo Yethu. As long as the police are perceived to give preferential treatment to some members of the community over others, it is also unlikely that they will be able to gather the support needed to form any lasting partnership with the broader community. It seems that the same conflicts that divide Imizamo Yethu over housing, and has led to the disbandment of the majority of the Block Committees, is hampering any attempt at gathering strong support for the police. As long as the police are seen to be close with the current leadership, it is difficult to see why the same people that abandoned the Block Committees would make an effort to form a new initiative with the police, especially when most contact with the police goes through SANCO. Imizamo Yethu may have experienced an improvement in police response, and benefits of police officers with local know-how in recent time, but it is difficult to imagine that any greater

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<sup>265</sup> ‘Sandra’, interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>266</sup> ‘Elizabeth’, interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>267</sup> ‘Samuel’, interviewed April 5 2006

<sup>268</sup> Ibid.

changes will come about. Without a community commitment to provide additional sources of security the residents of Imizamo Yethu have no viable alternatives to relying on a police force that freely admits that it has great difficulties policing the township on its own.

### **6.3 Concluding Remarks**

Generating wide commitment to group action in Imizamo Yethu seems to be a tremendously difficult task. Currently there are no viable alternatives to supplement or aid the police. Although the police claim to have more resources available to police Imizamo Yethu now compared to earlier, there is still a large gap in the provision of security to the township.

#### Unfulfilled potential

For a short period the Block Committees were able to fill at least parts of this gap in security provision. By involving the residents in their immediate surroundings, the Block Committees seem to have been able to provide some sense of community and self-reliance to their participants. Their willingness to let anyone participate and their focus on solving problems, no matter how small, gave them the trust of their peers. Although the full potential of the Block Committees has never been realised, they include several promising characteristics that could be a valuable supplement to the police in providing security to the people of Imizamo Yethu.

First, the Block Committees are based on participation from the ground and are open to all interested parties. This means that their legitimacy is based on that they are seen to be representing a shared interest of its constituency. This has the potential to develop collective commitment to a shared ethos of keeping the peace in ones own immediate community, and in some instances this has succeeded. Because Imizamo Yethu consists mostly of newly arrived immigrants, strong social ties between the people residing in the township are virtually nonexistent outside of smaller groups. However, the Block Committees have rather focused on ideas similar to those of collective efficacy, concentrating the effort around specific tasks. Their central task being to create a forum in which potentially disrupting disputes could be resolved in a manner which secures a peaceful coexistence in the future. In Imizamo Yethu no other initiative has come closer to creating a wide collective capacity than the Block Committees.

Second, the way in which the Block Committees handle their disputes is crucial to their legitimacy. Their focus on building a peaceful tomorrow rather than punishing trespassers is likely to have been vital. The Committees' approach of solving conflicts by involving all parties and negotiating a solution that is acceptable (if not always preferable) to all involved parties, is beneficial to creating agonistic social relations (Mouffe 2005).

Third, the Block Committees did have some weak ties to the police and were able to cooperate with the police by aiding them with victim support and taking cases that would otherwise add to the workload of the police and the criminal justice system. Conversely the Block Committees were able to lend authority from the police because of the ever present threat that if a solution is not reached, the matter would have to go to the police.

These features contain some promising potentials for establishing a community wide commitment to take action against many of the problems facing the township, and network with the police in this. The potential for the Block Committees to constitute a super-structural node around security provision was clearly present as they could have served to coordinate police efforts with those of the community and the various community organisations. However, the majority of the Block Committees ended up being deserted by their members, and those that are still operating seem to have severed their ties to the community leadership. The question of why this happened is linked to some central factors that make wide collective commitment to group action very difficult to establish and sustain in Imizamo Yethu.

#### Patronage, dependency and fragmentation

*“Poverty is not only about being poor, it is also about the risk of becoming poor or poorer in the face of change” (May 1998:3)*

The groups operating in Imizamo Yethu are all characterised by following their own agenda, and a lot of it seems to be motivated by personal interests. There is no common 'we' in Imizamo Yethu, instead there are many smaller groups with strong internal ties. These groups share the characteristic that they mostly function in the I-mode (Tuomela 2007). Members are committed to the group actions only to the extent that they can achieve some personal gain. As exemplified by the short lived neighbourhood watch in Imizamo Yethu, there is a tendency that the moment compensation for the efforts is stopped, commitment to the project also stops. In many ways, this is part and parcel of the poverty which has given rise to a system of patronage where people are dependent on those few sources of resources that exist.

This is one of the reasons why SANCO has maintained its central position in the township. Because SANCO is seen by the outside world as representing the community, they have an almost exclusive possession of the weak ties that go out of the township to private entrepreneurs and the government. This leaves SANCO in a position to decide who is to be involved with and benefit from the projects they are able to provide. SANCO act as patrons for a network of people who depend on them for what little resources they can provide, but the fact remains that there is not enough resources to go around for everyone in the township. This means that the weak ties to resources outside of the township possessed by SANCO is reinforcing the fragmentation of the community and generating even more dependency. Those who are left out react with resentment and suspect corruption, which serves to further the distance between the leadership and large parts of the community, whilst fear of being excluded prevents a broad opposition and alternative channels from forming. This pattern of dependency is likely to be crucial to why people in the township are clustered into smaller groups with relatively few connections to each other. Inside of these groups they can form strong ties to each other which make it more likely that other group members will come to their aid if they need it. Further, the continued influx to Imizamo Yethu and the relatively fresh establishment of the township means that there are very few ties between the residents to begin with. This contributes to very favourable conditions for local patrons, because most people have few, if any, alternatives. Because strong ties provide stronger motivation for assistance, highly insecure individuals are pressured to become dependent on one or a few strongly protective individuals (Granovetter 1983). A focus on weak ties requires that people take a chance that the others will live up to their end of the bargain, but because people cannot afford take this chance they lose the potential benefits of engaging in wider collective forms of interaction.

### Conflict and antagonism

The destructive power of patronage in Imizamo Yethu is most clearly seen through the way SANCO handled the allocation of plots for the Niall Mellon Housing Project. The accusations of corruption and nepotism that followed served to further fragment the community into groups that regard each other with suspicion and outright antagonism. The housing issue is seen as one of the direct causes of the breakdown of the Block Committees, and is by many seen as proof that SANCO are primarily concerned with lining their own pockets. The shrill conflict that has followed the housing issue between SANCO and Sinethemba is causing the wider community to distance itself from both organisations. Both parties are seen as primarily

serving their own ends and pay little attention to the needs of the wider community. While Sinethemba is trying to provide an alternative, their alignment with the white community puts a stop to any wide involvement in the township. The whites are still regarded with deep suspicion, and considering the HBCPF and the Ratepayer's commitment to having the majority of the township's population relocated, this is hardly surprising. The housing project exemplifies how external resources have served to further the fragmentation of the community because the only ties to the outside go through a very small number of people. In a community that is already fragmented into close, unconnected networks, this means that generating collective commitment to confront shared problems becomes even more difficult. It is also a good example of how conflict can have a devastating effect on collective capacity if there are no ways to work past or sidestep the issue while working on problems that affect all parties equally, which is the case in relation to providing security.

#### The impact of fragmentation and conflict on forming collective capacity

Committing to a wider project, such as the Block Committees, requires trust that other members will do their part. Collective commitment to a project that will involve a substantial number of strangers requires taking a chance on trusting weak ties, and in an environment where trust is in short supply it takes a great deal to convince people that this will not cost them more than they could gain by sticking to their established networks of strong ties. In Imizamo Yethu this trust is very hard to obtain, and easily broken down. Imizamo Yethu is unable to handle conflict in ways that do not disrupt the possibility of the people in conflict working together. What is striking about Imizamo Yethu, is the degree to which politics and conflict has a paralysing effect on collective capacity to perform tasks that are not directly related to the dispute. The housing issue does not need to affect the work on security, but it clearly does. The experience with the housing issue and the lack of influence on SANCO elections seems to have been the final straw for the Block Committees. The hard work that was put in did not result in any personal benefits for the members, instead they witnessed how the leadership received praise from the work they were doing without contributing.

The loss of the Block Committees represents a severe blow to the hopes of establishing a wider collective capacity to confront the challenges to security in Imizamo Yethu. The lack of trust in the community leadership makes it unlikely that SANCO will be able to re-establish the Block Committees. It is difficult to see how a community wide initiative to provide additional security should come about given the level of fragmentation and suspicion that

currently characterises the township. While the Block Committees contained potential for what could have been a vessel for collective capacity to group action, they have instead ended as a sad reminder of how poverty combined with self-serving interests and conflict can disrupt even the best of intentions.

## 7. Hangberg – Weakness in Strong Ties

Like the previous chapter on Imizamo Yethu this chapter also puts focus on an impoverished section of Hout Bay, the coloured community by the harbour called Hangberg. The problems and concerns of the people of Hangberg are in many respects similar to those found in Imizamo Yethu. However, unlike Imizamo Yethu, which is characterised by division between opposing groups and made up mostly of people coming to Hout Bay in the years since apartheid ended, Hangberg is a far more integrated community. Despite the fact that Hangberg is a community characterised by strong family ties, and there appears to be very little internal conflict, they have not been able to do very much about the problems facing the community as a collective. On the contrary the community seems to have become trapped in a collective apathy. There are, however, those who try to spur people into collective action and this chapter will describe some of these organisations trying to affect the safety and security situation in Hangberg. Among these are the HBCA, some of the local Churches which play a central role in the lives of many in the community, and an organisation working towards the abuse of children and women called ‘Eye on the Children’, and finally, the Hout Bay SAPS.

### 7.1 Introducing the Hangberg Community

Hangberg is the smallest of the three communities in Hout Bay, home to approximately 5500 people, the vast majority of them coloured<sup>269</sup>. Although Hangberg is the smallest community in Hout Bay, it is also the oldest. Most of the people living here come from families that have resided in Hout Bay for generations, which also means that most of the people in the community are in some way related to one another. While the African population of Hout Bay was forcefully removed from the area in the from the 1950s onward as the Western Cape was turned into a Coloured Labour Preference Area (Cornelissen and Horstmeier 2002), the coloured population of Hout Bay was moved from the Valley and over to the western Sentinel side by the Harbour. *“This community is smaller than the other two in Hout Bay. You must remember that we were forcefully removed to this area of Hout Bay during apartheid; the blacks were moved to Transkei or Ciskei. Most of us are relatives here, many families...”*<sup>270</sup> Hangberg is home to mostly Christians of different denominations. It is also contains a minority of Moslems, but the coexistence was said to be peaceful, as one stated: *“that’s not*

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<sup>269</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>270</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

*an issue. Because when we've got meetings we always ask the local Imam or Pastor to say a prayer in the meeting. The relationship is good. You see it's a small place and people intermarry, some become Christians and some become Moslems*"<sup>271</sup>. The churches in Hangberg seem to play a central role in the lives of many people. They offer a place where people meet and share the latest news, discuss problems and help each other, as well as a place for spiritual consolation.

At present Hangberg has four distinct types of housing areas, there is a clearly demarcated section with flats. Behind the flats there is an informal settlement of shacks built on sand; although this area has no tarred roads, the shacks are all numbered. There is a section of compounds comprised by blocks of flats which previously belonged to a fishing company. According to locals, these were occupied mostly by foreign African immigrants. Finally there are several distinct areas of freestanding houses and bungalows<sup>272</sup>. The informal dwelling count performed by the City of Cape Town in 2005, concluded that there were approximately 288 informal dwellings in Hangberg<sup>273</sup>. Because several generations often share a single flat privacy is a scarce commodity to many of hangberg's inhabitants. The bungalows and shacks are so closely built that people can hear what goes on at their neighbours'<sup>274</sup>.

Further up the slopes above Hangberg lies Hout Bay Heights. This used to be a coloured middle class area, but is now home to a mixed population of middle class whites and coloureds. Though the geographical proximity between Hangberg and Hout Bay Heights is very close, the relationship between its inhabitants varies. Some of the coloured people living in the Heights retain a link to the community especially through the churches, while the white people living there don't seem to have any more to do with the people of Hangberg than any other white people in Hout Bay. The natural beauty of Hout Bay Heights has caused a greater white influx to the area over the later years, but it is not the only reason some of its residents have chosen to stay there; Hout Bay Heights is regarded by many as one of the safest areas in all of Hout Bay when it comes to crime<sup>275</sup>. Because of its location on the top of a hill and the

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<sup>271</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>272</sup> Adams et al. (2006) Migration to two neighbourhoods in the suburb of Hout Bay, Cape Town, 2005: Survey report and baseline information.

<sup>273</sup> Rodrigues et al. (2006). Informal Dwelling Count (1993-2005) for Cape Town.

<sup>274</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>275</sup> Ibid.

fact that there is only one way in and out of the area, it makes escape more difficult after burglaries<sup>276</sup>. Hout Bay Heights is also the latest sector to join the HBNW.

Hangberg has traditionally been a strong fishing community, where the men go out on the boats and the women have been employed in the fish processing factories by the harbour. In later years this dependence on the fishing industry for employment and income has left many people in Hangberg with serious financial problems as quotas for fishing have not been renewed for many of the businesses in the area. This has created a substantial problem of unemployment in the fishing industry, which affects many of the families in Hangberg who rely on fishing to make a living.

*“the fishing quotas that these men had done here for 300 years, it’s the only business they know, and they own their boats, that’s their life. And the women know nothing else but fish, their wives are down in the cleansing factories. [...] In the last quota, three months ago, out of scores of quotas out there, they got three.”<sup>277</sup>*

The growth in unemployment is seen as the root of most of the social problems that plague Hangberg. Hangberg gives the impression that a collective depression has descended on the community causing apathy and making it very difficult to create any community involvement. Though there are major issues of concern that regard the entire community, little or nothing is being done to try and stop these issues from developing further. Any significant solidarity between the two impoverished communities does not seem to exist, rather there is a strong perception that Imizamo Yethu is receiving preferential treatment when it comes to government and private aid and development projects, and that Hangberg is being sidelined. According to the Principle of the public primary school in Hout Bay, ‘Sentinel Primary School’, which is situated in Hangberg, the projects that come into Hout Bay to aid the poor tend to go to Imizamo Yethu: *“I call this community ‘the forgotten community on the hill’, people have forgotten about it. It’s sad. And they were the first people in Hout Bay”<sup>278</sup>*. The apartheid legacy of racism, still very much alive, is also contributing to this lack of solidarity between the disadvantaged communities of Hout Bay:

*“Coloured people can be very racist, and that’s the reality. They will always see a white person as being superior to themselves, and they will always see an African as being inferior to themselves. The white is the first class citizen, myself would be a second class, but an African would be a third class citizen. That’s one good thing that apartheid has*

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<sup>276</sup> ‘Terry’, interviewed May 1 2006

<sup>277</sup> ‘Jane’, interviewed May 9 2006

<sup>278</sup> ‘John’, interviewed May 10 2006

*taught coloured people: White people are always on top, but the African is always at the bottom, and that's still alive.*"<sup>279</sup>

It should be noted that Sentinel Primary as well as the local public high school are both located in Hangberg, but both schools are attended by the children of Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg, as there are no schools in Imizamo Yethu. This has resulted in both schools now having to teach a much higher number of children than they were intended to, putting strain on both the children and the teachers. However, this does give the children of the two communities an opportunity to interact which they would probably not have had otherwise.

A comment by the Ward Councillor of Ward 74, of which Hout Bay is a part, seems to confirm some of the feelings that Hangberg is being sidelined:

*"You see the focus of the authorities have very much been on Imizamo Yethu, and because the Imizamo Yethu community has been politically more assertive they've sometimes been advantaged over people living in the Harbour. I think people in the Harbour are much less organised than the people in Imizamo Yethu are. And the fact that in terms of council budget spending Imizamo Yethu is in far more need of basic infrastructure. But almost nothing gets spent in the Harbour area compared to spending in Imizamo Yethu [...] But also when communities organise themselves, one; if they're organised, and two; if they're assertive, then the authorities will have to take their needs and demands much more seriously than they do with that community. I mean in some ways that community is a victim of its own apathy."*<sup>280</sup>

The Principal of Sentinel Primary School also commented on the apathy of the community in Hangberg:

*"I don't think the community [Hangberg] is doing enough to address the social problems [...] in fact I think it's getting worse. Because they feel they're being sidelined, so what's the use of striving towards anything better then? I think that's the problem. I told them at the meeting we had with the mayor that pre 1994 the school delivered very, very successful students [...] But since 1994; nothing. It's as if people have given up on their dreams, children don't dream anymore, they just go through the process. Go through school, if they're successful it's good and well, if not, they just fall to the wayside. It's very unfortunate [...] If we have parent evening very few fathers will come to this meeting [...] Mostly the mothers and grandmothers. In previous years they would say that some fathers work on the sea and they're out, but they're not, they're just not interested."*<sup>281</sup>

Hangberg seems to be faced with a double problem when it comes to creating collective capacity, and they are mutually reinforcing. On the one hand there is not a lot of external

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<sup>279</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>280</sup> 'Walter', interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>281</sup> 'John', interviewed May 10 2006

aid coming into Hangberg to help with the problems they are facing. On the other hand there is a lack of engagement on the part of the community itself to actively pursue solutions to their problems. This lack of community involvement not only makes it more difficult to solve problems on their own, but also makes it less likely for external players to be brought into the community to help. In the words of one of the church activists: *“The people don’t try, the churches try [...] The people have no initiative, no drive, no willpower, no strength [...] They’ve given up!”*<sup>282</sup>

### **7.1.1 The Perceived Safety and Security Threats in Hangberg**

Hangberg shares many of the same problems relating to crime that are found in Imizamo Yethu, violent crime is a massive problem in both of the impoverished communities. Hangberg has many taverns and shebeens to where the police are frequently called in to stop the noise and fights, and where stabbings are not uncommon. A lot of the violent crime is tied to the shebeens in Hangberg too. Apart from this, rapes and abuse of women and children are other common criminal problems often related to drug and alcohol abuse<sup>283</sup>.

An area where Hangberg seems to separate itself from the rest of Hout Bay is its massive drug problem. While Imizamo Yethu has a larger problem of alcohol than drugs, many people in Hangberg fear that the dramatic increase in drug abuse among their youth is going to destroy an entire generation. Common drugs found in Hangberg are ‘Mandrax’, ‘Dagga’ (Marijuana), and a crude form of methamphetamine known as ‘Tik’ which has become the drug of choice for many young people in Hangberg. There have been reported cases of children down to primary school level getting high on Tik, and the problem is increasing. A direct consequence of Tik abuse is that light bulbs are being stolen from the local schools<sup>284</sup>, and cars parked in the area have their headlights smashed in and their bulbs stolen<sup>285</sup>. The light bulbs are used to smoke the Tik, the most common way of using the drug. By pouring the substance into the bulb and lighting a flame beneath it, the user will inhale the smoke it produces. The production of Tik can be done very easily with relatively common household articles, and it is therefore very easy to obtain and relatively cheap compared to other drugs on the market<sup>286</sup>.

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<sup>282</sup> ‘Jane’, interviewed May 9 2006

<sup>283</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>284</sup> Sentinel News, July 16 2004, ‘Stand together to fight huge tik menace’

<sup>285</sup> Sentinel News, January 27 2006, ‘Tikked’ off by globe thieves!

<sup>286</sup> Sentinel News, February 10 2006, ‘Tik is tearing us apart’

*“Children as young as 10 use it, I think it’s the main cause of crime in the area to feed their habit, and it’s mainly young people. It’s got its origins from I don’t know where but as far back as the apartheid years. And it’s a quick way to make money, and kids idolise the drug dealers because they have money and cars, fancy clothes. The schools have a major problem [...] The children who use Tik can’t sleep because it gives you energy, so they sleep in school. The police are trying but they’re not doing their best.”<sup>287</sup>*

The drug problem and other social problems in Hangberg have led the Principle of Sentinel Primary to issue a letter to the parents, churches, and civic organisation in Hangberg as well as Hout Bay SAPS detailing what he perceives to be a downward spiral of social problems and crime in the community:

*“The Harbour / Hangberg community is ravaged by every social evil imaginable. As concerned educators we notice with deep concern the moral and social decay of this isolated community. On a daily basis we have to deal with the following:*

- 1. Ill-disciplined learners, due to lack of parental guidance at home.*
- 2. Substance abuse by learners, due to the availability of all kinds of substances.*
- 3. Untold number of child abuse cases, due to the neglect or alcohol and substance abuse by some parents.*

*All the above are exacerbated by the following:*

- a) The large number of illegal shebeens and taverns.*
- b) The flourishing drug trade in the Harbour area.*
- c) Easy access for our young children to obtain these drugs.*
- d) The inability of the Law Enforcement Agents to stop these activities.*
- e) Learners used by poachers as mules. Our children just cannot concentrate in class the next day.*
- f) Hangberg community is becoming a haven for paedophiles. Some parents are turning a blind eye – in cases- where they are **aware** that their children are being sexually molested!*
- g) The incomplete church building between Hout Bay Secondary and Sentinel Primary School, is an eye sore. It’s a haven for learners bunking classes and criminals for their criminal activities.”<sup>288</sup>*

The contents of the letter leaves little doubt about the seriousness of the problems facing the community in Hangberg, as it is victimising even their youngest. Principle ‘John’ commented on the letter and what he thought had to be done to improve conditions on the short term:

*“On the short term, one of the things which give rise to problems is the number of shebeens or taverns; there are quite a number of those. And these places are being frequented by parents, children, very young children in some cases, and children get in touch with alcohol and drugs [...] SAPS must step in and close down those institutions,*

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<sup>287</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>288</sup> Letter from Principal of Sentinel Primary School to community organisations in Hangberg (original emphasis)

*because they're illegal [...] I don't know the reasons but they're unable to do it. The taverns and shebeens are becoming more and more in this community.*"<sup>289</sup>

Overall the problem of drugs amongst youngsters is commonly perceived to be caused by two factors. First and most importantly; the number of shebeens operating in Hangberg gives easy access to drugs and alcohol at a very early age. Second, there is a concern about the fact that many parents are not involving themselves in their children's lives and thereby neglecting them, leaving them free to roam the streets at night. Many of these parents have problems with some form of substance abuse themselves, be it alcohol or drugs. Some also mentioned the lack of role models for young people in Hangberg as a way into drugs:

*"There are only low income people in the Harbour area, because people who become architects or land-surveyors or those kinds of people move out of the area [...] Now if the role models for the children at the schools are the low income role models and where you have potentially people selling drugs or entertainment like shebeens [...] the kids see them and that's the role models that they have. They don't see that 'I can become president, a doctor, or a lawyer' [...] they don't see that there's a stepping stone to move up.*"<sup>290</sup>

Another issue of the safety and security situation mostly affecting the Hangberg community is poaching of crayfish. This is seen to be closely related to both the massive unemployment and the flourishing drug trade in the area. As many fishermen have been left unemployed by the loss of quotas, the illegal poaching has become an increasing problem in Hangberg. People risk their lives going out at sea in the middle of the night to fish crayfish, often in boats in very poor condition: *"We've had a lot of drownings since last year, four or five young kids of 18 years. They catch the crayfish and throw them in the back of the bakkies or small boats, so when the seas are rough they don't come back"*<sup>291</sup>. The drug trade and poaching operations taking place in Hangberg are thought by many to overlap, and are part of serious organised crime. The people behind the crayfish poaching are seen to be paying their poachers in drugs, rather than money:

*"Most of the drug dealers don't take your money; they're in charge of poaching, so you sign a contract for debt, and 2-3 Tiks will cost you R150, and they charge you interest R200-250. Most of them have nothing, the drug dealers who are in charge of the poaching operation take the money and you sit with nothing.*"<sup>292</sup>

One of the SAPS reservists reflected on the difficulty in policing drugs in Hangberg:

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<sup>289</sup> 'John', interviewed May 10 2006

<sup>290</sup> 'Jonathan', interviewed May 22 2006

<sup>291</sup> 'Luke', interviewed March 30 2006

<sup>292</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

*“Tik is a very difficult drug to police; it comes in a little straw or a little packet and they can destroy it very quickly or get rid of it [...] [And] they’re organised. They’ve got syndicates who run the stuff in. These guys are hardened criminals; they’ve been doing it for years. First it was Mandarx and now it’s Tik. Tik is R30 a straw, it’s cheap.”*<sup>293</sup>

The organised character of the drug and poaching activity in Hangberg makes it very difficult for the police to get help from the community when trying to police the issues, because people fear police corruption and reprisals from the drug lords who run the operations. In the 90’s Hangberg had a big problem with gang wars, resulting in a lot of shootings and killings. These gangs have since been eradicated and many of the gang members have ended up in prison<sup>294</sup>. The current fear in the community is that the increase in organised crime will lead back to the days of gangsters running the streets at night.

The drug abuse is followed by a lot of other problems like theft, robberies and break-ins. Because most of the people involved in drug abuse have no income, the money to finance the habit tends to come from criminal activity. Hangberg, like the other communities of Hout Bay have faced an escalation in burglaries for some time, but a common problem in Hangberg is that a lot of these crimes go unreported: *“...this is a problem here, because if I break into ‘David’s’ house, it’s difficult for him to report me because I’m his relative. And that’s one of our biggest problems, there will be family feuds”*<sup>295</sup>. The strong ties between families in Hangberg and the fact that so many people are related to one another makes it very difficult for them to report a crime even when they know who did it. When asked about how they settled these matters one respondent answered:

*“people steal from others who are family members, distant down the line, and then people find who it was and they will go to the family and say ‘look here, I heard that your son stole from me at this and this time, do you know about it?’ and they would approach him and get the item back if possible. And if that person has already sold it, they will maybe ask the family to pay them, and just leave the case. That is one option. The other option is that when the family member discuss, they will actually hit that family member [the perpetrator], and after they’ve hit that family member they will say ‘ok, the case is now finished’. Because they’re both brought in trouble you see. One could go down for stealing and the other could be brought charges against for assault.”*<sup>296</sup>

This form of settling things within the families doesn’t seem to be organised in any particular way, and will vary with each individual case. What is important is that the strong ties in the

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<sup>293</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>294</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>295</sup> Ibid.

<sup>296</sup> ‘Jonathan’, interviewed May 22 2006

community seem to prevent a lot of criminal activity from ever being reported to the police, and at the same time there is no set way of settling these disputes within the community. The fear of causing feuds between families and the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the community in many cases outweigh the importance of getting back the material possessions lost, although this is not always the case:

*“for some family members, where they’ve had enough of some kid stealing their stuff, they say ‘let’s send him to community service, because he hasn’t learnt the protocol of family, because you don’t steal from family’ [...] So some people will physically punish him, and others would go to the family and say ‘no, we’ve had enough, let the law take its course’. But of course in the first instance it would take the obvious route of trying to keep the family intact and at peace with one another.”<sup>297</sup>*

Cases of theft are not the only instances where the fear of causing family feuds is preventing people from contacting the police. Several respondents noted on serious problems of abuse, rape, and incest in Hangberg. The matter has become so grave that the Principal of Sentinel Primary accused the community of willingly turning a blind eye to it even though they must know it exists.

*“Child abuse is ripe in this community, but it’s not being reported. Before when there was no formal housing here people used to live 4-5 families in a two bedroom flat, and that’s where the abuse started; the woman abuse, the child abuse, the social problems. We’ve inherited an apartheid problem [...] the houses are so tight together that whatever happens at my neighbour I will know about and visa versa.”<sup>298</sup>*

The combined image of the safety and security situation in Hangberg is not one which encourages too much hope of quick improvement. Very serious organised crime, against which the community are afraid to come forward to a police force they perceive as corrupt, combined with a lack of faith in the police’s ability to perform normal policing has left a lot of people unhappy and dissatisfied with the service they are getting. At the same time there are no clear community substitutes to the police for handling the ordinary crime of burglaries and theft. So in the cases where the police are not contacted, the people in the community have to enter into ad hoc solutions, bartering with families of the suspect to get some form of compensation.

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

## **7.2 Nodes Implicated in the Governance of Security in Hangberg**

Despite the general apathy of the people in Hangberg there are those who try to make an impact on the governance of security in their community. This section will present three different governmental nodes, some with subunits, in addition to the police, that try to affect the situation of safety and security. These are first Hout Bay Civic Association, an independent civic organisation. Second, the churches play a major role in to large parts of the community in Hangberg, and are therefore important to look into. Third, a community organisation called 'Eye on the Children' works to aid children exposed to neglect and abuse, as well as women who have been abused. Finally a look at how SAPS operates in Hangberg.

### ***7.2.1 Hout Bay Civic Association***

'Hout Bay Civic Association' (HBCA) is an independent civic operating in Hangberg. The civic is structured around several issues and has representatives working on separate areas such as tourism, employment, housing, safety and security etc. The following will concentrate on how HBCA is operating in the field of safety and security, and is based mostly on an interview with its Vice Chairperson, 'David', who is also in charge of the safety and security portfolio in the civic.

#### Institution and Resources

HBCA is a rather small civic with few active members, but nonetheless it does seem to enjoy a wide degree of legitimacy among its constituency, i.e. the people of Hangberg. HBCA claims to spring from the former 'Hout Bay Action Group' formed during apartheid and fighting for the democratic rights of all South Africans. The organisation is built on a participatory democracy where the members elect the leaders of the civic for a period, and it's all based on voluntary work<sup>299</sup>. The operating resources are very limited. They have access to a small office but otherwise there is little to no income for projects. The civic has to rely on local volunteers to get things done, and this is not easy to come by. For the most part they network and pool their resources with some of the churches and others active in Hangberg.

Although HBCA is an independent civic several of its members are involved with the ANC, its Chairperson is also the Vice Chairperson of Hout Bay ANC. This connection would also seem to be one of the very few links connecting organisations operating in Hangberg with

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<sup>299</sup> Sentinel News, November 26 2004, Letter from Chairperson of HBCA

what goes on in Imizamo Yethu. Their ties in Imizamo Yethu are mostly with ANC and SANCO, who they claim to cooperate with on certain specific issues:

*“We do work together, especially through the civic association in IY, SANCO. We sometimes work closely together when we’ve got problems and they’re related problems. We set up meetings with people and go together. But also with SANCO they belong to an organisation and they’ve also got a constitution which they must stick to, and if you belong to a group like that you also get told what to do. I think they must follow a set of rules, because they must go to their mother body, and I don’t know if they must get permission or whatever but they must work through them, whilst our civic doesn’t belong to a [larger] civic association. We’re not obliged to stick to their rules [...] we can play the game as we see fit; we don’t need approval or anything from somebody.”<sup>300</sup>*

The working relationship between HBCA and SANCO is limited, and they do not get involved with the internal affairs of each others’ communities. Asking ‘David’ about their involvement with SANCO and the challenges facing them in Imizamo Yethu he replied:

*“We don’t want to get involved with their politics. They’ve got their own politics in that place. We’ve heard about it because that’s a big issue there, and you hear people talking about corrupt leaders [...] I’m not going to put my head in that fire because you’re going to get burnt”<sup>301</sup>.*

The affiliations between the two civics is not strong, and seems to be limited to specific occasions when attempting to negotiate for resources with other outside actors, such as government agencies, that can be of mutual benefit.

Like SANCO, HBCA has withdrawn its support for the HBCPF as they would not be a part of their lawsuit against the government. HBCA also supported another candidate to chair the HBCPF, and have little faith in the current leadership and their willingness to aid Hangberg. *“The CPF is more concerned about problems in the white area instead of addressing things here. For them break-ins to houses are much more of a concern than the drugs in this community”<sup>302</sup>.* The suspicion that the HBCPF is a DA tool that works mostly for the interests of the whites in Hout Bay runs deep, a suspicion they also have towards the Ratepayers and Sinethemba.

*“things like the CPF and other bodies like the Ratepayers, we find we have problems with them. [...] If we have this development here, everything that’s to be done here on this side*

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<sup>300</sup> ‘David’, interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>301</sup> Ibid.

<sup>302</sup> ‘Dominick’, interviewed March 21 2006

*of Hout Bay they oppose, and we'd like to know why? They oppose any development here, but on that side they develop like it's nothing and we don't oppose anything.*"<sup>303</sup>

HBCPF's Chairperson 'Elizabeth' stated that there was not a lot the HBCPF could do to aid Hangberg with its problems because they are primarily linked to organised crime, which must be handled by the police. The only thing the HBCPF could do was liaise with the churches and the police<sup>304</sup>.

In contrast to the other major civics representing the other communities in Hout Bay, HBCA does not have a representative on the Ward Committee. *"We aren't represented on the Ward Committee as well. [...] there are nine portfolios on it from economics to safety and security through sports, and all these people who're on it, some of them have no clue what's happening in the community."*<sup>305</sup> 'Walter', the Ward Councillor claimed that Hangberg has no legitimate civic which is the reason why they are not included: *"There's no legitimate civic association out there. There's a grouping who call themselves Hout Bay Civic Association, which is a bit of a joke [...] they represent just about no one in the Harbour community. They are SANCO affiliated [...] it's really just an ANC office."*<sup>306</sup> HBCA being left out of the Ward Committee also led others in Hangberg to comment that the committee is not inclusive of everybody<sup>307</sup>. The lack of inclusion is seen as typical of the fragmentation between communities in Hout Bay, and preventing cooperation between communities: *"now each one fights for his own thing. We're fighting for ourselves here, we don't care about IY or the Valley. Because as a civic when we go to a meeting we put our needs on the table. [...] And now to grab a piece of that pie you must fight."*<sup>308</sup>

Relations are far better with the HBNW *"We work nice with the HBNW, we have actually a good relationship with the HBNW people. So if we've got a problem I can call 'Andrew' [Co-Chairperson of HBNW] or 'Charles' [Sector leader of HBNW] and then we can meet and talk, and they can give us advice. We've had meetings with them"*<sup>309</sup>. There have even been talks between HBNW and HBCA about starting a sector of HBNW in Hangberg according to the HBCA Chairperson: *"There are people like 'Andrew' who are trying to make a*

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<sup>303</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>304</sup> 'Elizabeth', interviewed May 18 2006

<sup>305</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>306</sup> 'Walter', interviewed March 28 2006

<sup>307</sup> 'Isaac', interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>308</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

*difference; he's trying to set up HBNW here. He's trying to play a very progressive role. [But] on the economic level we're far from where the white people are in this community*"<sup>310</sup>, the Vice-Chairperson continued: *"The problem is that they're only based in their own white area. And we want to start one here but it's difficult to get support from our people in this area. The support is there, but still..."*<sup>311</sup> Like so many other things in Hangberg it is not due to lack of intent, or passive support, that there has yet to be established a sector of neighbourhood watch in the community. The problem is once again to generate enough commitment in the community to get it off the ground.

### Technology and Mentality

The attempts by HBCA to establish a sector of HBNW in Hangberg have so far been unsuccessful, but this is not the only way in which HBCA is trying to make an impact on the safety and security situation in their community. Most of their time devoted to safety and security goes into facilitating and aiding groups in the community that are trying to make a difference. Examples include aiding one of the churches trying to establish a 'crime awareness day' in Hangberg:

*"I show people where to go and put them in contact, like 'Brother Luke's' festival, he came to us for help, and that's how we got involved. We take the steering in the right direction and people to meet and how to get this thing off the ground. But they're solely in charge of the operation, we just guide them. We help in which authorities to get to and he can use our name, the civic association's name, to get through to the different departments. Like the department of community safety, we've dealt with them already so we've got their names and numbers of people there."*<sup>312</sup>

Another example comes from the Moslem community in Hangberg where a group of concerned mothers contacted HBCA about the increasing problem of Tik amongst their children. They sought the civic in order to get help on how they could start a group in Hangberg that could deal with these matters: *"Where I came into the picture was that they wanted to know from the police's side what we can do as civilians for the police to stop Tik."*<sup>313</sup> Meetings were held in which the group was advised on how to make a referendum and formalise the group, to make sure they have the necessary support. Nothing has materialised from these meetings except for a very poorly attended meeting with a Christian Anti-Tik group that came to speak about the dangers of addiction to Tik.

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<sup>310</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>311</sup> 'David', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>312</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>313</sup> Ibid.

People in Hangberg on occasion come to HBCA to get help when dealing with the SAPS:

*“I’ve gotten a few calls to come out to the police station, and people come here to me and say they’ve been to the police station and are not happy with the service. So then I must go there and most of the time it’s a miscommunication because they didn’t put clearly what the procedure is or whatever.”<sup>314</sup>*

Again the role of HBCA looks to be one of facilitating, in this instance as a broker between the police and the community when people feel they are not being given adequate service from the SAPS personnel. This role as a facilitator in the community seems to be a good indicator of the mentality applied by HBCA, in an environment characterised by apathy, HBCA are trying to generate some form of public participation by aiding those they can.

HBCA also participated at a meeting with the newly elected Mayor of Cape Town along with representatives of other community organisations in Hangberg such as the schools and churches. Also present at the meeting were ‘Elizabeth’, Chairperson of the HBCPF, and ‘Walter’, Ward Councillor for Hout Bay. At the meeting they discussed a list of grievances which needed government attention in Hangberg, the principal issues being housing and unemployment, as well as the security situation<sup>315</sup>. The meeting gave no concrete resolutions to any of their problems but the mayor promised to look into it. However the meeting did give them an opportunity to come face to face with their Ward Councillor who admitted to having neglected Hangberg, and now wanted to reopen cooperation with the community organisations in this part of his Ward<sup>316</sup>.

The general mentality of HBCA seems to be activism, trying to get the people engaged in what goes on in their local surroundings, but this role is being reduced to that of a facilitator resulting from the lack of response from their constituency. They are left with supporting initiatives when and where they appear. Their attempts at getting the community interested in starting a sector of HBNW in Hangberg can serve to illustrate their frustration with the lack of community involvement:

*“We want to work closely with them in HBNW, but with our own neighbourhood watch here so we can link up with them by radio and belong to the same organisation [...] we just also want to be a sector [...] I don’t believe in duplicating things, we starting our own thing here when they’ve already got something going and doing great [...] but we’re not*

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<sup>314</sup> Ibid.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid.

*going to get off the ground that quickly so why not just belong to them and just be a sector? [...] But as I said we must get more people interested first, even if it's just five or ten people.”<sup>317</sup>*

Their problem is, as always, to get people to show up at meetings:

*“If you talk to the people they say yes. But when you come to the actual meeting nobody turns up. Actually they're wasting my time because if I call a meeting at 7 o'clock and I'm there till 8 o'clock and I've got two people there, it's not doing me any good because what am I going to do with two people?”<sup>318</sup>*

As their involvement in the HBCPF has been severely reduced in light of the events described above and their cooperation with HBNW has yet to bear any concrete results the actual direct involvement with issues related to safety and security have come to a halt. As for the role of the activists that HBCA aspires to be, their Chairperson reflected upon the lack of initiative in Hangberg as a lack of aspirations:

*“The problem with coloured people, and some will not like what I'm going to say, but they must stop feeling pity for themselves. They must stop saying 'yeah, it's because of this and this.' They must stop blaming someone else for their misery; they must take the initiative and say that 'I want to play a more constructive part in my community. I want to take a more constructive role where I live. I want to be a part of those who are working to address the social differences in our community.' And people are not doing that.”<sup>319</sup>*

### **7.2.2 The Churches**

The churches occupy an important position in Hangberg. According to one of the priests there are about 20 separate churches in Hangberg alone, all quite small congregations, but many of them cooperate<sup>320</sup>. The churches do more than offer spiritual guidance to its congregations, they are also important channels through which the community in Hangberg stay in touch and get the latest news. According to the Vice Chairperson of HBCA:

*“The churches are a very good link to let the community know what's happening. Because you get people who go to church but they don't want to be bothered by their neighbours. They're in church every week so we can spread the gospel through the church. And then maybe we can get them involved as we get the church involved, the people who belong to the church.”<sup>321</sup>*

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid.

<sup>319</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>320</sup> 'Luke', interviewed March 30 2006

<sup>321</sup> 'David', interviewed April 30 2006

### Institution and Resources

The tradition of the churches as important community structures in Hangberg stretches back in time. A lay minister of St. Simon Anglican Church explains about the role of the churches in Hangberg:

*“Initially everything revolved around this church, it was the centre point. It provided schooling, because all the people from the Harbour that was moved here from the other area attended school here. Secondly, the church provided spiritual sanctity for the people involved. Thirdly, from a social perspective the church also provided the care groups and prayed for people and conducted the services for occasions, with the result that the people were brought up in a place where the church was a caring facility. So, if you belong to the church; that has the same moral backing organisation that the local government has to care for people. The AIDS people, where did it start? It started with the church that took care of the sick. So it was a natural thing for people to merge those things.”<sup>322</sup>*

The central role of the churches remains an important part of the lives of many people in Hangberg. Given the small community and the fact that there are so many different denominations and congregations, the relationship between the churches remains tight, and they also hold interdenominational services. Some people even maintain relationships with several churches as members of different congregations intermarry, making it all quite closely knit.

In addition to the informal links between the churches, the different parishes have also established a church panel where priests from all the different parishes get together about once a month to discuss issues related to their parishes and the community, and how they can aid one another<sup>323</sup>. However, not all informants were equally sure about how active this forum was<sup>324</sup>.

Resources remain a problem and an area of concern. As most of the churches are reliant on the income generated by their parishioners, there is little in the way of financial resources available to the churches. Contributions through initiatives like cake sales provide some income, but if there is a need for funding events of a larger format, fiscal resources quickly become a problem. One of the church leaders is trying to hold a ‘Crime Awareness Day’ in Hangberg. His single biggest problem, he said, is getting the money needed to rent a proper sound system for the occasion:

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<sup>322</sup> ‘Jonathan’, interviewed May 22 2006

<sup>323</sup> ‘Sarah’, interviewed May 25 2006

<sup>324</sup> ‘Jonathan’, interviewed May 22 2006

*“Like I say to my church members, ‘you are poor; we don’t have the money to do what you want to do here. But out there, somewhere, there is money. You must go out there and get it. ’Lately I wrote to some of the newspapers, all over the Western Cape. And somewhere there will be somebody who will come up with help. We can’t sit here and do nothing and say ‘we don’t have the money for it.’ The sound system is R5700, where am I going to get that money? [...] A factory sent me 10 boxes of materials that I can sell, I’ve already sold most of it and have got in over R2000 already. So that’s how I try to get along in a community that is poor.”*<sup>325</sup>

The main resources of the churches come from the effort and input of their parishioners as well as their ability to gather support from businesses and other potential contributors. Maintaining contacts is in this respect important to be able to generate resources for projects, as underlined by the same church leader: *“as a church leader I know quite a lot of people and that’s where my resources come from”*<sup>326</sup>. The voluntary efforts of the people active in the churches are the most important resources to keep them going.

### Technology and Mentality

While the churches of Hangberg have severely limited resources, some of them are doing what they can to alleviate some the difficulties experienced by the people in their community. The most common way for them to operate seems to be through various forms of social work. St. Simon Anglican church has started a program called CARE (Christians Are Really Excited) which gathers donations in church every Sunday and splits the donations in two. One for the church and the other to buy food, electricity, or other essentials for people in the community who are sick, can’t work, or have other special needs. This initiative is intended for those with special needs and is selective about who it gives aid to<sup>327</sup>. Some of the churches have also started soup kitchens for the poor and the school children, where the children can get sandwiches in the morning and some soup in the afternoon<sup>328</sup>.

While the churches themselves seem to delve relatively little in matters of direct policing and more on social work, there is an initiative to arrange a ‘Crime Awareness Day’ in Hangberg by one of the churches. As in the rest of the community, the rising problem of Tik amongst their youth is of great concern to the church leaders. The idea of the Crime Awareness Day is to show the children of Hangberg that it is possible to achieve something in life, according to the man behind the idea, Pastor ‘Luke’:

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<sup>325</sup> ‘Luke’, interviewed March 30 2006

<sup>326</sup> Ibid.

<sup>327</sup> ‘Jonathan’, interviewed May 22 2006

<sup>328</sup> ‘Sarah’, interviewed May 25 2006

*“The point is that there is something, the kids don’t have to be on drugs. To show that there are kids who can excel in the community, so that other kids can understand that they can also excel, maybe not in that area but in another area. That they can better their lives, not only go on drugs.”<sup>329</sup>*

The Crime Awareness Day is intended to include two parts; the first part is to be non-religious and has invited high profile speakers such as the Mayor of Cape Town Helen Zille, the Minister of Education, the Premier of the Western Cape, and the Commissioner of the SAPS. Captain ‘Thomas’ of Hout Bay SAPS had also promised to make sure that the station would be present and he would also involve the private security companies ADT and Deep Blue and make sure they could perform a security convoy as a show of force for the day<sup>330</sup>. During the first part the intent was also to show a play made by students of the drama group at Hout Bay High School with a message of aspiration and involvement. The second part of the day is to be religious with preachers and gospel music. However, as stated the greatest challenge to this day was raising the money needed for a proper sound system. His hope is that the Crime Awareness Day will become an annual event in Hangberg.

An important way in which the church leaders are able to have an impact on crime and policing in their community, is not a result of any one specific program initiated by their church. While the churches’ involvement is much broader than policing and rather tends towards social work, they are also able to affect policing because of the authority they are granted as respected members of the community.

*“Church leaders play a very important role in this community and some people have more respect for the church leaders than for you or an ordinary person in the streets [...]. People won’t allow you to come into their house if there are problems or domestic violence. But the church leaders can go in there and talk to those people.”<sup>331</sup>*

The church leaders are able to step in and act as negotiators in cases where the police would have to arrest someone if they were called. Pastor ‘Luke’ has been involved in cases of domestic trouble where the police have advised families to contact their church leaders before making a complaint to the police, because this would leave the police few options other than arresting. To illustrate his point he told an anecdote about a time he had been called to a house where the son was influenced by drugs and had threatened to shoot his father. After a long talk with the son he was able to secure the gun and hand it in at the police station, without any

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<sup>329</sup> ‘Luke’, interviewed March 30 2006

<sup>330</sup> Ibid.

<sup>331</sup> Ibid.

charges being brought<sup>332</sup>. This anecdote illustrates the respect that church leaders enjoy in this close knit community and their potential as mediators. Further, ‘Sarah’ a voluntary social worker in Hangberg states that it is not uncommon for them to send their reports about domestic trouble to a representative of the church she knows the family belongs to: *“Whatever cases I get, whether it’s from this church or that, I can send a report to someone who can see to it, because at the end of the day we cannot see to all the families. So they also need to take responsibility for them and their people and see to them.”*<sup>333</sup>

The churches’ potential as mediators in areas that include policing could be significant. However, the extent of this form of mediation is difficult to establish because of its very informal nature. While the personal involvement of church leaders in the lives of their congregation is likely to have been around for a long time, this does not seem to have done much to prevent crime from spreading in the Harbour. Matters relating to crime and policing are still handled in a very private manner by the families affected, even when church leaders are brought into the picture. Even though the church leaders are able to aid in specific cases, there does not appear to be any organised attempts at dealing with matters of crime in a wider perspective or gather the community as a whole to confront their common problems. While the churches may come together and cooperate at a higher level, it still appears that the involvement with the members is largely handled by each separate church on its own, where tactics may vary according to the beliefs of the church and its members.

### ***7.2.3 Eye on the Children***

‘Eye on the Children’, or ‘Isolabantwana’, is a volunteer program established by ‘Child Welfare South Africa’, one of South Africa’s largest non-profit NGOs. The program is developed to empower community members to take action in cases of child abuse and neglect when Child Welfare social workers are off duty or unavailable. In Hangberg the organisation has been operating since 2001. Eye on the Children is the only civic organisation in Hangberg that has a direct policing function, and volunteers have a legal right to remove children at risk of abuse and bring them to a safe place until the police or a social worker can intervene.

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid.

<sup>333</sup> ‘Sarah’, interviewed May 25 2006

### Institution and Resources

Eye on the Children is run by a group of 19 volunteers who have all received a 10-session two week course provided by Child Welfare. The volunteers consist of 17 women and 2 men. The course trained the volunteers to handle: child abuse, parenting skills, counselling, first aid, conflict resolution, assessment and management, domestic violence, substance abuse, and how to manage HIV / AIDS<sup>334</sup>. The group is based in an office provided by the St. Simon Anglican Church, an office they also share with Child Welfare during work hours on weekdays.

Because the members are all volunteers, they do not receive any payment from Child Welfare. However, they do receive some compensation from the Anglican Church which supports their work. 'Sarah', one of the leaders of the group, is being paid a small amount of money by St. Simon Anglican Church, where she is also a Lay-Minister, although this is mostly to cover expenses that she has in relation to Eye on the Children: petrol, telephone, and other office equipment which the volunteers must provide themselves<sup>335</sup>. Because resources are so scarce, 'Sarah' hopes to register their organisation under the Social Services, making them a government representative in the Hangberg and bring in more money:

*"We want to register under the social services as a representative of the Harbour. [...] If our community was properly equipped then we could sort ourselves out. If we had a rehab centre, a support centre, we would have more people trained in this area. If we had people trained in abuse then we could teach the parents what abuse really is, and we wouldn't have these things."*<sup>336</sup>

Currently, if additional resources are to be available the volunteers need to raise the money themselves, and have done so by organising cake-sales and take small jobs sowing and the like to provide some extra income<sup>337</sup>.

During weekends and after office hours Eye on the Children is alone in responding to calls from the community. There is no representative from Social Services in the area and Child Welfare is only present during regular work hours. This has led to that Eye on the Children are involved with the Victim Support Centre at SAPS, and their volunteers work closely with the police in helping victims suffering from different kinds of abuse.

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<sup>334</sup> Sentinel News, December 21 2001, Volunteers keep the children safe

<sup>335</sup> 'Sarah', interviewed May 25 2006

<sup>336</sup> Ibid.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.

## Technology and Mentality

The main objective of Eye on the Children is to act as community social workers by identifying and acting primarily on different cases of child abuse, but their efforts have also included abused women and children suffering from neglect. The project started because of a realisation these problems were spreading in the community: *“back around 2000 we found that we had a lot of problems with step-dads and dads sexually abusing their little ones”*<sup>338</sup>. When the need arises cases are reported to the appropriate authorities such as Child Welfare, Social Services, or the police. The total amount of cases handled by Eye on the Children for 2006 was already at 69 by May, and ‘Sarah’ estimated to personally have assisted about 300 children since 2002<sup>339</sup>.

Evenings and weekends are the most active times for Eye on the Children; this is when the volunteers go into the community:

*“We go into the shebeens and we see that here’s the mum, and we’re community people. Hout Bay is a very small place, so we’re very close, so we know who’s got a small child, and we can send somebody to the house to check. And if there’s nobody there, the child is alone, we go back and bring the mother home, if she’s under the influence, and not capable of looking after the children, we remove them until the next day. Because of the load of cases we try to work with them, we give them a warning and tell them the importance of not leaving their children. [...] So if we see that the parents don’t work with us and it happens again in the next month then she needs to go to special classes of parental training through Child Welfare. We first try and see what we can do, and if not then we remove the children, that’s got to be our next move. So if it’s Sunday then Monday she’s got to be in court. [...] So we take the children into our own homes over the weekends, until the Monday or the next day when the mum is up again.”*<sup>340</sup>

The fact that the volunteers from Eye on the Children can enter people’s homes and take their children says a great deal about their standing in the community. Key to their operating capacity is the status the people involved have in their community. Several of the members in Eye on the Children are people who have been involved with community work through the churches for a long time, making them respected members of the community.

*“They respect you for who you are and they know that you’re making a difference in the community, so they work alongside you. If you approach them right and they see that you’re concerned, and you’re concerned about their child, and at the end of the day you are going to be the one that’s going to be there for that child when things go wrong.”*<sup>341</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> Ibid.

Working with children is not the only thing these volunteers do. In cases of domestic abuse it is not uncommon for them to bring women into their homes until the situation has cooled down. In these cases it is common for them to go to the family in question and talk to them about the incident and try to teach them about communication in order to prevent the abuse from reoccurring. This form of family counselling makes up the preventive work that Eye on the Children are doing, by giving the families goals to work towards together to improve relationships.

Eye on the Children are also involved in very serious cases of abuse and assist the police through the Victim Support Centre at the SAPS station. Their volunteers bring abuse and rape victims to the police and help the police debrief them before giving a statement. Sometimes the victims are traumatised and need to speak to someone before being able to give a statement. In other cases they bring the victims to the hospital and stay with them for treatment before they can be taken to the police station to give their statement.<sup>342</sup>

The need for an organisation like Eye on the Children was identified because neither government Social Services or Child Welfare were available to the community at the times they were most needed. Because the Eye on the Children is made up of respected volunteers from the community they are in a position to interact with the people involved in an entirely different way to those coming in as professionals:

*“The professional people won’t be able to get the information we can get because we live in the community. We work with them, we have contact with their neighbours, we can go and ask what is really happening. This is where we are more valuable. For the Eye on the Children, we do all the work by the time social workers take it to court and decisions get made. Before Child Welfare and Social Services just used to remove children and the parents had no say: Maybe it was the first time it happened, or because she went through a trauma after being abused herself, that the people didn’t know about? So this is what we say, instead of just taking the children away and the mums not knowing where they are [...] you start working with them and change their minds. Assisting and supporting them.”<sup>343</sup>*

The fear that families will be split up, which leads to a lot of crime not being reported, seems to be lessened by the approach taken by Eye on the Children. They are able to communicate with the families as concerned helpers, not as outsiders, and become less of a threat. By using their local knowledge they are in a position to do what professional outsiders cannot: break

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<sup>342</sup> Ibid.

<sup>343</sup> Ibid.

the silence and bring help to many that previously may have suffered in silence from fear of being severed from their families. Because they work to preserve the families where this is possible, they gain important respect from the community which also makes it easier for them to find evidence in cases where the police and social workers need to be involved. By building networks with Child Welfare, Social Services, and the SAPS, Eye on the Children are able to bridge a gap between the community and the agencies created to deal with issues of abuse. Eye on the Children provide important insight into how local knowledge and capacity can be harnessed and used to police areas which are difficult to access for professionals if the local community is not willing to cooperate. In the case of Hangberg Eye on the Children is one of the few organisations that have managed to act as a bridge between the community and outside agencies, and as a result they have brought new resources and capacities to the community through their training.

The mentality of Eye on the Children is primarily deals with educating and supporting the community. In the same way that keeping the peace is important to families when resolving disputes, this has been adopted in the mentality of Eye on the Children. Only as a last resort should families be torn apart, and matters should ideally be resolved within the community itself, by people who know the community. This seems to have led Eye on the Children to adopt a mentality of high self-reliance in much the same way as the rest of the community in Hangberg, a position that certainly seems to have gained them the trust of their community. However, Eye on the Children remains a small group with severely limited resources, and they are faced with enormous challenges. It does not seem likely that they will be able to turn the tide against abuse and drugs without more involvement from the community and additional resources from the outside.

#### ***7.2.4 South African Police Service***

The challenges facing the police in Hangberg are in many ways similar to those in Imizamo Yethu. The lack of infrastructure in the upper areas behind the flats and the often violent reactions police are met with when attempting to close shebeens, means that the police take the same approach to policing the taverns and shebeens of Hangberg that they do in Imizamo Yethu, by using large numbers when going in at night:

*“The Harbour community, if they’re fuelled up on liquor, you’ve got to be very careful. You go in there with a fair presence depending on your call and who’s called you. You have to watch your back up there, you’ve got your gang related sort of bickering that*

*carries on against you and they will try and intimidate you, they will try and bait you, that sort of thing. They've stoned vehicles before and members have been intimidated.*"<sup>344</sup>

According to the police, one of the great difficulties in policing Hangberg is that they get very little cooperation from the community. Captain 'Thomas' claims to have made the same advances to build partnerships with Hangberg that he has done in Imizamo Yethu and in the Valley<sup>345</sup>, but with the exception of the talks between HBNW and HBCA little has materialised. A lot of the problems of generating police partnerships with the community stems from a deeply rooted scepticism towards the police within the Hangberg community. There is a widespread perception in Hangberg that the police are not doing enough to service the area, and that they are being sidelined by the whites who demand a lot more attention of the police, but also there is a perception among some that Imizamo Yethu is getting a greater share of the SAPS time and priority:

*"I think Imizamo Yethu and some of the stiff upper lip areas enjoy priority [...] I mean, there's a major income among the stiff upper lip people in the Valley, so obviously most of the ratepayers, or the high rate payers, come from that area, so obviously they would prioritise and serve that area"*<sup>346</sup>.

The grievances with the police most often involve slow response time, or not showing up at all when called. Also there is a frustration with the lack of control over the taverns and shebeens. *"It's true that the police have more time now with the HBNW to concentrate on poor areas like Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. But they're not doing it at all, not at all. If you see a police car twice a day it's a miracle. They only come here once a day"*<sup>347</sup>. Another responded about the police that:

*"There is a lot of disappointment with police services in our area. Some people say they've got break-ins, or they complain about violence in the street, or whatever crime there is, and they phone the police to come and assist, and the police are never available. If they come, they come after something has happened"*<sup>348</sup>.

The general faith in the SAPS' ability to deal with crime in Hangberg is low and reinforces the perception people have of Hangberg being sidelined compared to its neighbouring communities. In addition to this the police also have problems with the community when arresting people because fights may arise between community members and the police:

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<sup>344</sup> 'Roger', interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>345</sup> 'Thomas', interviewed March 29 2006

<sup>346</sup> 'Isaac', interviewed March 14 2006

<sup>347</sup> 'Dominick', interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>348</sup> 'Luke', interviewed March 30 2006

*“The police, they also have problems with the community when they go up to arrest somebody. Then, there’s always a fight between the community and the police, because seeing as this is a close knit area, and mostly families live here, they don’t want to see their sons or cousins go to jail or be locked up. So then they give the police a hard time, they abuse the police, verbal abuse.”<sup>349</sup>*

The perception that Hangberg is given less attention by the police compared to its neighbouring communities, combined with strong family ties that lead the community to react with hostility towards some of the police actions, makes it difficult to establish partnerships. However, in relation to the organised crime in the area the people of Hangberg have even more reservations about going to the police.

Intimidation prevents a lot of people from coming forward with their information about when and where these things take place. According to an article in Sentinel News, parents of children involved with drugs dare not go to the police because of fear of retribution from the drug dealers<sup>350</sup>. It is not just the drug dealers they fear. It is a widespread belief that at least some of the police officers at Hout Bay SAPS are corrupt and in some way involved with both the drugs and the poaching. The lack of confidence in that the police will do their job and arrest the people who are reported along with a fear that the police will tell the criminals who made the call prevents people from contacting the police.

*“They [The police] know who sells the stuff [...] but they don’t do anything about it. [...] If they plan a raid at the police station, the minute that van pulls out from the station the people here already know. They have policemen inside who phone them and tell that they’re doing a search. So they find nothing, they can’t do anything”<sup>351</sup>.*

The same problem of police corruption was suspected when speaking about poaching:

*“When people here see that things are being off-loaded they phone the cops. And when we tell them that there’s just been something loaded off a boat and that there’s crayfish so they must go and raid, so they go, but afterwards they say they didn’t find anything. Then, about two hours later they carry the things away and put them in a truck. There was a time when people were fed up with the police. They phoned but they found nothing, and at the end of the day you see how things are going. So they’re not working with them”<sup>352</sup>*

This lack of trust in the police is detrimental to the policing of one of the most serious problems facing Hangberg, that of organised crime.

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<sup>349</sup> ‘David’, interviewed April 30 2006

<sup>350</sup> Sentinel News, May 14 2004, Tearful drugs mom: We have to discipline our children

<sup>351</sup> ‘David’, interviewed March 21 2006

<sup>352</sup> ‘Sarah’, interviewed May 25 2006

*“The people know. They’re very quick to shout at us that there’s a big tik problem in the Harbour, but they’re sitting with the information. Come and make a statement, but they don’t. We need to know where it is and who’s bringing in the stuff, and they see it, they have the eyes. I know that if I was living next to a drug dealer or something like that I see it taking place, and that’s the thing that these guys pray upon in the harbour.”<sup>353</sup>*

The fear of going to the police with information about drugs and poaching is increased by the fact that the police now require a signed statement in order for the police to react on it: *“Some of the community will come to you rather easily, but they’re scared of intimidation, especially when you tell them that you need a signed statement to get a search warrant. That can put people off”<sup>354</sup>.*

Despite the difficulties in obtaining cooperation from the community, the police claim to have experienced an increase in their ability to police the drugs in Hangberg. According to Captain ‘Thomas’, there were two key factors to their ability to do successful drug busts. First, the willingness of individuals in the community to provide the police with positive information and a signed affidavit, and second the time freed by the HBNW enabling police officers to focus on other duties<sup>355</sup>. One respondent confirmed that the police had been doing more arrests in relation to drugs lately:

*“They raid at the early hours and certain times. But as I said, because of those that are corrupt the message comes out to those people. They might find a lot of money, but they might not find drugs. They’ve had a few raids that have been quite valuable, but the next day they’re going to court and they’re out after paying a fine. So what’s that telling you?”<sup>356</sup>*

Despite police claims that any information given to them by informers would be kept strictly confidential by the station’s crime prevention officers, and despite some successful drug raids, the larger community of Hangberg remains unconvinced and fears the consequences of cooperating with the police.

The combination of the fear that some police officers are corrupt and the general dissatisfaction with the lack of police presence in Hangberg seems to make it difficult to establish cooperation between the SAPS and the community. While the police are saying that they need community involvement and information if they are to make an impact against the

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<sup>353</sup> ‘Roger’, interviewed May 5 2006

<sup>354</sup> Ibid.

<sup>355</sup> Sentinel News, August 26 2005, Drug ‘kingpins’ netted in Hangberg

<sup>356</sup> ‘Sarah’, interviewed May 25 2006

major problems of drugs and poaching, the community is waiting for the police to show them that they can be trusted and that they are actually willing to make an effort to police Hangberg. According to the Vice Chairperson of HBCA: *“They say we won’t work with them, but we will if they’ll work with us [...] We’ve got nothing against the police, but spend more time in our area.”*<sup>357</sup> In contrast to the Valley, which has seen an improvement over the last year in their primary areas of concern, Hangberg seems to be deteriorating and experiencing increased difficulties in relation to drugs and poaching which is taking its toll on their young. While the Valley has responded by pushing the police and forming partnerships, the reaction in Hangberg has been to pull away from a police force they perceive as corrupt in matters of drugs and as unresponsive in relation to everyday crime in the community.

### **7.3 Concluding Remarks**

*“[There is a] twist with the capacity to aspire. It is not evenly distributed in any society. It is a sort of metacapacity, and the relatively rich and powerful invariably have a more fully developed capacity to aspire. What does this mean? It means that the better off you are (in terms of power, dignity, and material resources), the more likely you are to be conscious of the links between the more and less immediate objects of aspiration.”*  
(Appadurai 2004:68)

Despite the formidable challenges facing the community in Hangberg, one of the greatest obstacles facing those organisations and individuals trying to make a difference is the apathy of the wider community. There seems to be a fundamental lack of aspiration from the general community, and it is taking its toll on those that are doing what they can to improve conditions. In a stark contrast to the Valley which has managed to turn the tide against their collective problem of property crime, conditions in Hangberg are said to be at an all time low and getting worse. While the gangs are gone, the increase in availability of drugs is causing many to fear that the majority of a generation will be lost if nothing is done and the community does not take a stand for itself.

#### The Hangberg paradox

In Hangberg there exists the potential for collective action, but despite this there is not a lot taking place that generates wide community participation. First, Hangberg is a long standing community with strong family ties between the residents. At least on the surface it seems that the solidarity between these families runs deep and there is commitment to keep the community close by resolving disputes in ways that do not disrupt the strong ties that glue the

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<sup>357</sup> ‘David’, interviewed March 21 2006

community together. These strong ties also lead to an implicit understanding of a common identity. The community clearly identifies itself as a coloured community that has been here for generations and has strong roots in Hout Bay. There is a clear understanding in Hangberg of who 'we', as a community, are, that demarcates them from their neighbouring communities, and this identity as 'coloureds' and the original inhabitants of Hout Bay seems to be shared by all in Hangberg.

Second, Hangberg does have some strong community organisations that are respected by all members of the community, the churches are the prime example. The churches have a long history along with the community and though there are many of them, and some are more involved with social work than others, they and their leaders do seem to have the respect of the wider community. The fact that a civil organisation like Eye on the Children is permitted to enter people's homes and remove children as they deem necessary, speaks volumes about the members' standing in the community. But despite the standing and the respect these organisations have, they are still unable to generate wide community participation. Even in the case of HBCA trying to muster interest for starting a sector of HBNW, a very concrete initiative, the response seems to have been a resounding shrug of the shoulders.

By lending an idea from Tilly (1978) it could be assumed that a high degree of common identity shared by an entire community, combined with a highly integrated network of people would lead to highly organised efforts<sup>358</sup>. In Hangberg the combination of strong community ties, a clear community identity, and strong community churches could then be expected to lead to a strong drive in the community for social change. However, in Hangberg this is not happening. There seems to be a paradox at work because while strong ties and a strong community identity as well as vessels through which social action could take place are present, actual commitment to any specific initiative is not taking place.

### Exploring the paradox

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<sup>358</sup> Tilly (1978:62-64) proposed the concept 'catnet', comprised of the words 'category' and 'networks'. Where categories are people who share some characteristics or an identity, and networks consist of people who are linked to each other, directly or indirectly, by a specific kind of interpersonal bond. Catnet is understood as a function of the variables category and networks where the more extensive its common identity and internal networks, the more organized the group.

It is not easy to determine exactly why Hangberg is unable to mobilise around specific goals, and a single answer is probably not possible to obtain. However, there are several problems connected with the lack of initiative in Hangberg that are worth looking into that may be parts of a complex explanation. First, while there certainly is a strong sense of identity with the community that is shared by the people who live in Hangberg, this identity is based on kinship and strong ties to the community in general and does not automatically translate into a clearly defined interest that people can latch on to. The crucial point of a collective commitment to a common ethos stressed by Tuomela (2007) is lacking in most regards, with the exception of a few activists. While there is a community 'we', the notion of this 'we' does not involve an understanding of a joint responsibility to promote a group ethos, thus there can be no strong collective action. This means that even though there may be strong community ties and a sense of a common identity, this is not enough to constitute a group capable of joint action.

*“Thinking and acting in the we-mode basically amounts to thinking and acting for a group reason, that is, to a group member’s taking the group’s views and commitments as his authoritative reasons for thinking and acting as the group ‘requires’ or in accordance with what ‘favours’ the group.” (ibid:14)*

In Hangberg it seems that the common identity is based on a notion of 'who we are' rather than an idea of 'what we do'. This could be essential to understanding why the strong collective identity does not easily lend itself to group action, but can equally well lead to fatalism and apathy, a shared sense of hopelessness. The lack of commitment to a common ethos from the wider community means that the shared identity does not have a direction on which to grow. Although the different organisations individually may have a defined goal, it does not seem that even they share a set ethos that they engage in collectively. Rather they seem to each be working on their own thing and helping each other where their interests overlap. The churches for example tend to work with donations and alleviation to the poorest, while HBCA is more concerned with generating community activism. This need not be a problem, because all organisations could hardly be expected to have the exact same goal, but there seems nonetheless to be a fundamental lack of coordination between the various organisations, even when they cooperate. At present the individual initiatives in Hangberg seem to go in different directions and lack a coordinated vision around which people can gather. Where HBNW managed to become a super-structural node for coordinating the Valley, none of the organisations found in Hangberg have even come close. The church panel constitutes a potential super-structural node where the community leaders from the different

churches come together and coordinate their efforts, but this has not been successful. A possible explanation could be that they lack a clear intention, making it more a forum for deliberation and mutual aid, rather than a forum for planning joint action. Further, the church panel is entirely made up of representatives from the community, and lacks ties to nodes outside of Hangberg that could be enrolled to provide additional resources and new ideas.

Second, in Hangberg it is a common perception that the community is being sidelined in comparison to the other two communities in Hout Bay, in regards to police priorities as well as government and privately funded programs. The transition from apartheid to the democratic South Africa seems to have left many in the coloured community with a feeling of being set aside. In their minds the government is now working for the alleviation of the black people, but the coloureds are not being fully taken into account. The loss of fishing quotas has been a severe blow to the income of many in Hangberg as many families were completely reliant on the fishing industry, which seems to have confirmed that the community is not being prioritised by the government. Adding to this is the increased competition in regards to the few available jobs in Hout Bay, as Imizamo Yethu has had its population increased dramatically over a short period of time. The perception of many in the community is that they fall between two stools, they were not white enough to be privileged by the apartheid regime, but they are not black enough to be granted the same attention from the current government that their neighbours in Imizamo Yethu are. It seems that this feeling of being a pariah is reinforcing the community apathy.

Third, the strong ties between members of the Hangberg community reinforce the necessity for self-reliance. Because of the fear that families may become enemies, it is of vital importance to resolve disputes in ways that keep the peace. In many cases this leads to private ad hoc solutions when crimes have been committed without involving more people than necessary. It could also be speculated that these private solutions between families may be part of reproducing negative trends because it prevents a wider community sanction against the perpetrators and they are free to try again in other places. Further it may be that this form of handling crimes has the effect of hiding from the wider community and the outside world the extent of the challenges facing Hangberg. The tradition of solving matters privately may also be part of what is keeping the community from acting as a group with a common interest and agenda, because there is an unspoken rule that these things are to be kept and managed privately, by those it immediately concerns. If this is the case then it will certainly be a great

challenge to turn the community around and create openness about the social and criminal ills plaguing Hangberg. Combined with the fear of retribution from drug dealers and corrupt police officers, the ‘conspiracy of silence’<sup>359</sup> seems to be an important part of keeping the community in Hangberg from dealing more openly with its issues.

Fourth, the heavy reliance on strong ties within the community is not accompanied by weak ties to actors and agencies outside of the community. Even though organisations like HBCA, the churches, and the Eye on the Children do have some limited contact with government officials and organisations, these are few and do not seem to be highly developed. For the community as a whole, isolation from its neighbouring communities as well as government agencies seems to be the norm. As stressed by Granovetter (1973) weak ties are essential because they are the ones that often enable new opportunities, innovation, and resources to flow from one network of strong ties to another. The lack of weak ties to the outside has left Hangberg in isolation, as witnessed by the virtual nonexistence of external aid and focus on the community compared to its neighbour Imizamo Yethu. While Imizamo Yethu has been the focus of much negative attention from especially the Valley, the fact that they are being noticed has also generated at least some opportunities, such as the housing project. The lack of outreach has meant that Hangberg has largely been left to itself, and this in turn has probably had a reinforcing effect on the reliance on strong internal ties, increasing the necessity of self-reliance, and further diminishing the ability to reach outside of the community for aid and resources. A probable contributing factor is the prevailing scepticism towards the neighbouring communities that many in Hangberg still hold.

Fifth, the organised character of many of the prevailing crimes in Hangberg is accompanied by intimidation and fear of being targeted if one comes forward with information. The deeply seeded fear that the police cannot be trusted is also contributing to the lack of action on the part of the community.

Combined all of these factors may be seen as reinforcing each other and perpetuating the difficulties of establishing group action in Hangberg. Despite the existence of organisations that attempt to build and encourage communal action, the initiatives invariably fail to gather any wide response in the community. In lack of any clear alternatives the provision of security

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<sup>359</sup> Sentinel News, May 14 2004, Tearful drugs mom: We have to discipline our children

in Hangberg seems destined to remain a patchwork affair of different community organisations doing what they can, and private resolutions between families. Meanwhile, whatever is left will remain the responsibility of SAPS alone to deal with as they are able and as it arises. Taking into consideration the feelings harboured by the Hangberg community towards the SAPS, this seems very far from an optimal solution.

## 8. Conclusion

At the outset of this thesis the South African security field was shown to be very fragmented, consisting of a variety of different nodal constellations actively shaping the provision of security, ranging from the state police to the private security industry and different forms of citizen responses. The South African government has chosen to channel ever more of its resources into the SAPS, straying further and further from the initial focus on community participation through the CPFs, towards ‘get-tough’ policies and crackdowns. The result is a gap in the provision of security between the wealthy and the poor. While the economically empowered are able to fill part of the security gap left by the state’s inability to provide universal security to all citizens, the economically disadvantaged are left with a deficit in the availability of security.

The study has explored the potential for generating collective capacity, on a local level, to confront the deficits in security experienced by citizens in communities with widely different socioeconomic conditions. The first part of this concluding chapter will focus on the findings in the three communities studied in Hout Bay and compare them to each other. This is followed by a debate about the benefits of including a focus on identity and agenda to the understanding of how nodes are constituted.

### 8.1 Summary of Findings

The research question of this thesis has been: *How do identities and networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?* This question contains an inquiry of two interrelated key variables, *identity* and *networks*, and their affect on the various communities’ collective capacity to influence the provision of security. The impact of these variables on the capacity to influence the provision of security in the different communities of Hout Bay will be explained in sequence.

#### *How do identities condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?*

The first striking thing about Hout Bay is the degree of separation that exists between the communities cramped together in such a small space. There are virtually no attempts at confronting challenges that affect all three communities in a coordinated and collective

manner. Instead they regard each other with suspicion and antagonism, and choose to deal with their problems separately. Though there have been attempts at uniting them, specifically by an initiative called 'Imagine Hout Bay', this has been met with the same suspicion they have towards each other. The construction of a common identity as residents of Hout Bay is nonexistent. Instead the communities construct their identities in very different ways, where some have been more beneficial to the construction of collective capacity for action than others.


In the Valley HBNW has managed to become a vessel for establishing an issue specific identity concentrating on the provision of security. While the community has been concerned about crime for many years, the HBCPF proved unsuccessful in uniting people to collective action, but rather served to split the community into those supporting the HBCPF and those that sided with the police and wanted a broader cooperation with the SAPS. The HBNW emerged from the latter group, and by focusing on the common external "threat" from Imizamo Yethu they managed to construct a common identity around security in the Valley that bind its members together. Because the social ties in the Valley are quite weak, the establishment of a shared interest and a common ethos has been crucial to the successful commitment to collective capacity generated by HBNW. Further, the HBNW sidestepped the ongoing political quarrels that hamper the HBCPF, by maintaining a policy of not getting involved in the disputes, but rather allowed its members to hold whatever view they wished on the matter, so long as it does not come into conflict with the common ethos of providing security to the Valley. The agonic attitude of accepting conflict, while still working toward a shared goal, strengthens the HBNW, because it means that they can avoid potentially disruptive conflicts from interfering with the task at hand. The combination of an issue specific identity fostered from a collective commitment to a common ethos, combined with the agonic social relations, has enabled the HBNW to become a successful vessel for the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in the Valley.

In Imizamo Yethu the situation is very different. There is no common identity that connects the community as a whole; instead the community is divided into smaller groups with strong internal ties, and local patrons who serve these groups. In addition the rapid growth of the community means that there is little basis for an organic sense of identity that ties people to the community. This is increasing the reliance on local patrons for aid because many have no other options as they lack a stable social network around them. This pattern of dependency is

detrimental to creating a common identity, because there is no basis for forming a collective interest when these groups are primarily concerned with helping themselves. The antagonism with which the different groups regard each other, is also preventing any chance of creating a common ground. Antagonism is serving to further the distance between members of different groups, cementing the fragmentation in the community, as seen in the conflict between SANCO and Sinethemba. This antagonism is also increasing the group members' reliance on the local patrons serving each group because it is not possible for them to move between the different groups. Generating collective commitment to group action on a wider scale has proven extremely difficult in Imizamo Yethu, as witnessed by the Block Committees.

In contrast to the other two communities, Hangberg has a strong organic identity, stemming from a long history in Hout Bay and tight family relations. But the nodes operating in Hangberg fail on the level of converting this organic identity into commitment to specific actions. The strong family ties in Hangberg may even be part of what prevents collective action because disputes are being solved privately in small groups without much interference from the rest of the community, because of concern that these issues may disrupt the peace between families. When matters are being settled quietly without involving the rest of the community, it is preventing the wider community from realising the full scale of the problems, and may be contributing to an acceptance of the status quo. The obsession with avoiding conflict in the community makes sure that there is little antagonism within the community, but it is also preventing a healthy debate about the many serious problems facing them, and rather increases the apathy of the community. The apathy is added to by the isolation of the community and a feeling of falling between the cracks compared to the privileged white community and Imizamo Yethu which receives the majority of government and private attention when aid is distributed. This apathy is Hangberg's greatest challenge in generating collective capacity for action.

Model 1: Location of communities in relation to their internal construction of identity and social relations:



When comparing the locations of the communities in Model 1 the impact of identities and the respective communities' ability to convert social relations into collective action becomes clearer. The Valley has successfully established a vessel for collective capacity for action, through the HBNW, by generating collective commitment to a common ethos and focusing on agonistic social relations for handling conflict. In Imizamo Yethu groups are isolated by antagonism and dependency on local patrons. Identities are fragmented and tied to personal motivations rather than shared interests. Hangberg lacks a focus on specific issues; while the shared identity is there, the conversion of this identity into collective commitment to generate capacity is missing. What the model shows, is that a combined focus on agonistic social relations and conversion of identity into collective commitment may be vital for achieving collective capacity for joint action.

How do networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?


The ability to form networks as the second variable that conditions the collective capacity to affect the provision of security is also very different in the three communities of Hout Bay. In the Valley networking and enrolling other governing nodes to coordinate their efforts has

been one of the most crucial processes leading to their successful capacity to affect the provision of security. The combination of utilising weak and strong ties is essential to the operating capacity of HBNW. While the core is made up of people who have developed strong ties to the organisation and its collective ethos, the wider organisation is manned by members who have weaker ties to the organisation, but nevertheless remain committed to its collective ethos. The extensive networking of weak ties to the SAPS and the private security companies has given HBNW access to resources that they would not have otherwise, such as the radio control centre provided by Deep Blue Security, and this has proven crucial to their operation. This networking has made HBNW into a super-structural node in the governance of security in the Valley, aligning the resources and technologies of the SAPS and private security companies with the manpower available in the community through HBNW, and coordinating joint action. This has possibly been the most important contribution to effectively utilise the collective capacity developed by the HBNW to increase the provision of security to the residents of the Valley.

In Imizamo Yethu networks play a very different role. As mentioned the township is primarily made up of smaller groups that have developed strong internal ties, leading to fragmentation and little contact between the various groups. The benefit of outreach connected with weak ties functioning as bridges are denied the majority of people in Imizamo Yethu. However, there are weak ties to nodes located outside of the township, but these are primarily restricted to the community leadership in SANCO and the ANC, and serve to strengthen their position as patrons to those that are close to them. This leads to a situation where the limited access to weak ties is contributing to the fragmentation of the community as it increases people's dependency on strong ties to local patrons in order to reap the benefits of weak ties. The other group that has developed some weak ties, is Sinethemba, but their networking with the white community has come at the cost of their legitimacy in the eyes of the township. The weak ties created by the Block Committees to the police and the efforts made to establish a platform that would operate across these closed networks of strong ties, have all but disappeared, along with their potential to form a super-structural node for coordinating initiatives to increase the provision of security in Imizamo Yethu. The result of the majority's dependency on strong ties to the few who possess weak ties to the outside, is that the networks currently operating in Imizamo Yethu reinforce a negative trend towards dependency rather than create opportunities for generating collective capacity.

Of all communities in Hout Bay, Hangberg is the one that most clearly suffers from a lack of weak ties. The Eye on the Children’s cooperation with the police and their weak ties to child welfare and social services shows the importance of accessing external resources. Networking with these nodes has given the community a sorely needed centre to aid children who fall victim to the drugs and the abuse. The problem is that this is the exception in Hangberg; apart from this one initiative the outreach of other communal structures, such as the HBCA and the churches, is limited. The HBCA does have some connections to the government, but little has come out of this in the form of resources or aid. Their attempt at connecting with the HBNW and forming a sector in Hangberg also failed at the point of generating interest in the community. The result is that Hangberg remains mostly isolated to a larger degree than its neighbouring communities. The strong internal ties are not sufficient to bring Hangberg out of its current state of apathy, the fostering of weak ties to external nodes capable of bringing in resources and aspirations is crucial if the community is to be able to generate collective capacity to confront its massive problems. The current isolation means that few external resources reach Hangberg, and the community is left to fend for itself.

Model 2: The location of communities in relation to their access to weak and strong ties:



Model 2 clarifies the great differences in the different communities’ access to weak and strong ties. The combination of utilising weak and strong ties in the Valley has led HBNW to

become a super-structural node that coordinates efforts to provide security to the Valley between the participating nodes, and has greatly increased the collective capacity to provide security to the Valley. The fostering of weak ties that involve a large part of the community, as well as connecting HBNW to other governing nodes, has been crucial. Both Hangberg and Imizamo Yethu lack the benefit of these weak ties. While Imizamo Yethu has a limited amount of weak ties, these are controlled by local patrons who use them to serve specific interests. Hangberg, however, is characterised by an almost complete lack of weak ties capable of bringing in resources and innovation to the community. While strong ties may be important to generate and sustain commitment, it is clear that the presence of weak ties is crucial for the effective networking needed to generate collective capacity to affect the provision of security.

*How do identities and networks condition the collective capacity to affect the provision of security in Hout Bay?*

There is a synergy between the way identities are constructed and the ability to network effectively, and the specific ways in which these identities and networks are constructed are important for establishing and maintaining collective capacity. In the Valley the issue specific identity and agonistic relations lend themselves easily to networking because they have a clear ethos that can be aligned with the interests of the SAPS and private security companies. This works both ways, the effective networking with the SAPS and private security companies help clarify what the contribution of HBNW should be, and contributes to the formation of the identity and the common ethos of its members. In Imizamo Yethu the antagonistic social relations and fragmented social identities make networking very hard, because there is no common ground on which to interact with nodes that could benefit the entire community. Instead, the few weak ties that go out of the township are controlled by a few narrow interests. The lack of networks that reach a wider part of the community is in turn contributing to reinforce the antagonism and the fight for control over the few available networks, as well as increase an identity of dependency on those that currently control these networks. The strong internal ties in Hangberg and lack of commitment to a common ethos makes networking difficult to achieve, at the same time this lack of outreach is contributing to the apathy of the community because they see nothing worth aspiring towards. It becomes a vicious circle, the lack of weak ties to bring in innovation and aspiration reinforces the identity of being cast aside, a pariah, and breeds apathy that prevents commitment to collective action that could bring a capacity to improve conditions in the community.

While the importance of establishing an identity capable of converting the social ties to collective capacity as well as networking with other nodes in order to affect the provision of security is clear in the case of Hout Bay, it must be noted that the playing field is not level. The extreme differences between the communities in their access to resources means that the starting point of the Valley and HBNW is far beyond what can be expected in Imizamo Yethu and Hangberg. The strong position of private security companies in South Africa means that SAPS has been cooperating with them for years. Because the police are familiar with the working procedures of private security companies, which are often very close to those of the police itself, cooperating with these companies is easy for the police compared to networking with the messy and complicated affairs of a township. Because the Valley residents have access to private security, they indirectly have an easier access to the police, resulting in tight relationships between the community, the police and the private security companies. However, there have been promising tendencies in the impoverished communities as well, especially through the Block Committees in Imizamo Yethu, that show the potential of effective identity building around a common ethos, as well as their networking with the police. While never fully realised, the Block Committees show that a lot can be done with a relatively limited amount of resources if the collective commitment is present and access to enrolling some additional resources through the police are available. In Hangberg the civil structures show that there are those who are willing to make an effort, but they lack outreach and the ability to give hope to their people.

The antagonism and mistrust that prevails between the three communities means that there is currently no basis for joint action across communities that could enhance the provision of security to all in Hout Bay. Even though the HBNW have managed to construct a local collective capacity that benefits the Valley in the short run, this is unlikely to be a strategy that will reconcile and bring the communities closer together. Rather, the increasing differences in the provision of security may lead to further the distance between the communities. This prospect is likely to have a negative impact on everybody in Hout Bay. If there is one thing the years since the fall of apartheid has shown, it is that security is difficult to sustain when it is concentrated to a minority. This makes it unlikely that HBNW will be able to sustain their affect on security provision in the long run, unless the neighbouring communities are included in some way.

Another central problem is the continued commitment of the South African government to channel ever more of the available resources to the police rather than pooling some of that money into facilitating structures that could create collective capacity from the bottom. However, the current trend of concentrating virtually all resources into the public police is perpetuating the differences between the rich and the poor. Those who have money are able to fill part of the gap, left by a police force that cannot cope with the level of crime, with private security, whilst those without access to these resources are forced to make due with an overworked police force. This is reproducing the old apartheid structures through unequal distribution of security, favouring the well off while leaving the poor with very little.

## **8.2 The Importance of Identity in Generating Nodal Action**

Nodal scholars have made a significant contribution to understanding how governance is performed by a vast range of different nodes in very different settings and employing a high variety of different technologies and resources to reach their goals. They have underlined the importance of realising the complex diversity and hybridity of arrangements and practices that this variety brings to governance (Wood and Shearing 2007). Jennifer Wood's (2006) proposal that any study of nodal governance should start by a comprehensive empirical mapping of the existing governing nodes and networks within the specific sites, with an emphasis on their mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional arrangements, provides the basis for researching the complexity of multi-nodal governance. This empirical mapping has proven crucial to understanding how the governance of security is performed in Hout Bay, by a network of nodal arrangements, that all affect the provision of security. The importance of networks stressed by nodal scholars has also been confirmed in Hout Bay. The insights added by distinguishing these networks into strong and weak ties, as suggested by Granovetter (1973, 1983), have contributed to a deeper understanding of why nodes characterised by greater access to weak ties have a greater outreach and ability to enrol other nodes than those with less access to these weak ties.

However, while nodal governance scholars have contributed greatly to the understanding of how nodes operate and use their technologies, mentalities and resources to achieve their goals in a variety of ways, as well as their reliance on networking, they have had less to say about the way different forms of identity may play a crucial role in the ability of a group to construct and maintain a governing node. The empirical findings in Hout Bay suggest that there may be merit in a focus on how interests go from a vaguely shared idea to a collective

commitment capable of forming a governing node. While some nodes are sustained by long standing institutional arrangements, such as government nodes and nodes springing from corporate companies or existing NGOs, other nodes are built on collective commitment from the bottom. The focus on various forms of constructing identities may be important to nodal scholars because it provides a basis for understanding why some groups are more effective at mobilising and generating collective capacity that can form governing nodes than others.

Tuomela (2007) and Sampson et al. (1999) have made considerable contributions to how social ties may be converted into group action. Tuomela's argument that effective collective action must be rooted in a collective commitment to a shared ethos potentially provides an important part of an explanation to why some groups are more effective than others at coming together and forming governing nodes. The empirical findings in Hout Bay suggest that groups that are unable to generate an identity connected to a specific ethos will find it much harder to form effective nodes. Collective commitment is the key to forming effective nodes from the grass root level. This collective commitment to a shared ethos is important to the generation of collective efficacy, as defined by Sampson et al. (ibid.), because it is the basis from which social ties can be converted into specific action designed to shape the flow of events, in other words govern. Groups that function primarily to serve the individual desires of its members have greater problems sustaining collective action and form governing nodes that can direct actions over time, because the individual commitment to such a node will be more fleeting and less stable. Groups that share a collective commitment to an ethos, and have developed an understanding that they can only reach their goals by reaching them together, will, on the other hand, have a better chance of success because the node they constitute will be formed on a stable platform of collective commitment.

Exploring different groups' identities and motivations for collective action may be of particular importance to nodal scholars working with areas characterised by poverty, because impoverished communities can get locked in patterns of dependency and antagonism, as seen in Imizamo Yethu, and apathy, as seen in Hangberg. These conditions make collective commitment harder to achieve because collective commitment requires taking a chance that other group members will fulfil their end of the bargain. It then becomes a challenge to establish functioning nodes that can help alleviate many of the social problems that exist in these communities. Exploring the identities that are shared by people in these situations,

deepens the understanding of why governing nodes take the forms they do, or may even be part of an explanation to why nodal action is lacking.

The suggestion is that if nodal scholars wish to understand not only how nodes govern, but also why and how some nodes can be, and are, created from a grass root level, then a look at the identities that exist in the nodes' surroundings may merit a more thorough investigation. This insight can also contribute to the understanding of why some communities have a very difficult time generating collective action that could constitute a node. In particular the contributions of Raimo Tuomela (2007) should be of interest to nodal scholars seeking to understand why some groups are capable of forming effective governing nodes while others struggle.

This study indicates that – at least in some contexts – two dimensions as to how identities are formed may be significant to establish functioning and effective governing nodes.

First, the formation of strong organic identities that are based on a sheared feeling of 'who we are' may not always be enough to convert the social ties into action. The study indicates that forming an *issue specific identity*, which is based on a collective commitment to a shared ethos, may lead groups to concentrate on specific achievements, this may in turn lead to greater collective efficacy because the social ties can be converted into action on specific goals.

Second, antagonistic social relations can be detrimental to generating collective action, because this may lead groups to regard each other as enemies that cannot be cooperated with. Fostering *agonic social relations* may lead groups to accept that there will always be disagreements and conflict to which there may not be a rational solution, but they nevertheless identify themselves as belonging to the same political association. This may be important for groups to be able to bargain effectively and cooperate around those interests that are shared, while other interests will remain in dispute without disrupting the group's commitment to the collective project.

## Appendix 1

### Conceptions of Power

There is a large number of definitions and conceptualisations of the concept of power, both between different disciplines and within the same areas of study. According to Stewart Clegg (1989) much of the dominant theories on the concept of power in the twentieth century has been grounded in a notion of ‘human agency’, which is “*expressed through causal relations and measurable in terms of mechanistic indicators*” (ibid: 22). This view of power as a locus of will, a supreme agency to which other wills bend, and a negative and restrictive force which prohibits people from acting on their interests and knowledge is traceable in a lineage stemming from Thomas Hobbes (ibid.). However, while Hobbes and his successors may be said to have endlessly legislated what power *is*, the legacy of thinkers such as Machiavelli and Foucault may be said to have interpreted what power *does* (ibid:5). Their notion adds a new dimension to the concept of power, which sees power as a productive force that constructs knowledge and facilitates new structures of action (Bjørkelo 2003:54).

The following will approach the topic of power by distinguishing the central themes of these two conceptions of power. The first part will deal with what Clegg (1989) terms the conventional approaches to power, including the work of Dahl, Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes. The second part will take on a notion of power stemming from Foucault and what Digeser (1992) has dubbed ‘the fourth face of power’.

### *The Three Faces of Power*

In “Two faces of Power” (1962) and “Decisions and Nondecisions: An Analytical Framework” (1963) Bachrach and Baratz initiated and redefined much of the debate over political power in political science. Their contributions can be seen as both a sharpening and a widening of Robert Dahl’s much quoted definition of power “*A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do*” (Dahl 1957:202-203 cited in Digeser 1992:978). The contribution of Bachrach and Baratz first sharpens it by arguing that it was important to make clear distinctions between concepts that had previously been confused with power, and contend that three conditions must be met in order to identify a power relationship (1963:635):

- a) *there is a conflict over values or course of action between A and B;*

- b) *B complies with A's wishes; and*
- c) *he does so because he is fearful that A will deprive him of a value or values which he, B, regards more highly than those which would have been achieved by noncompliance*

Through deeming these three conditions necessary for a power relation they also make distinctions between power and other concepts which have been used interchangeable with power, such as 'force', 'influence' and 'authority' (ibid.).

Agreeing to a large extent with Dahl on the first face of power, Bachrach and Baratz criticise him for only focusing on "participation in decision-making" (1962:948) and thereby neglecting the whole second face of power, what they call "*nondecision making*" (1963:632). They argued that power is not only a matter of making B do something that he does not want to do, but could also be a matter of A preventing B from doing something that he wants to do (Digeser 1992:978). Bachrach and Baratz argue that the model of Dahl:

*"takes no account of the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 'safe' issues [...] But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A."* (1962:948)

The second face of power sees it as crucial to identify these potential issues which nondecision-making prevents from being actual. A key issue being that it involves a genuine challenge to the resources of power of those who currently dominate the process by which policy outputs in the system are determined (Lukes 2005:23). Despite this crucial difference from Dahl's conception of power, Bachrach and Baratz did not alter the conceptual map of power. Both faces contain an understanding of power as characterised by "*an overtly or covertly conflictual relation between agents coercively advancing well-understood, self-defined, interests against the interests of other agents*" (Digeser 1992:979). Together these constitute what may be called the liberal conception of power (ibid.).

In his classic text "Power: A Radical View" (2005) Steven Lukes argued that both Dahl's first face and Bachrach and Baratz's second face of power were inadequate. While he agreed on the importance of the two faces of power, he contended that a 'third dimension' must be added. According to Lukes, B may willingly do something that A wants him to do. Under the first two faces of power this does not constitute a power relationship since B is seen to be acting voluntarily and there is no conflict of interest (Digeser 1992:979). Lukes (2005:27)

contends that “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or determining his very wants”. Relating his third dimension of power to the liberal conception of the first and second faces of power he states:

*“Extremely crudely, one might say that the liberal view takes people as they are and applies want-regarding principles to them, relating their interests to what they actually want or prefer, to their policy preferences as manifested by their political participation [...] The radical, however, maintains that people’s wants may themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to what they would want and prefer, were they able to make the choice.”* (ibid:37-38)

Lukes differentiates between subjective interests and ‘real’ objective interests. Implicit in this view is that everyone has some objective interests which can be defined according to class, gender, ethnicity etc. However the realisation and articulation of these interests can be repressed by means of power, which make people act according to subjective interests that actually violate their real, objective interests (Bjørkelo 2003:57-58). This third dimension of power, or ‘invisible power’, manifests as an acceptance of, or belief in, one’s subordinate position and a denial of the problems one faces in one’s environment; shaping ideological boundaries of individual or group beliefs, interests, wants, and identity (Hutchens 2007:20). This is what Lukes terms the radical dimension of power, the way that power can make a person act in ways which violate his objective interests.

Some lines may be drawn from Dahl via Bachrach and Baratz to Lukes’ third dimension of power. Although more dimensions are added they share some common features: First power can only be exercised in a *relation*<sup>360</sup> (Bjørkelo 2003:58), as stated by Bachrach and Baratz “one cannot have power in a vacuum, but only in relation to someone else” (1963:633). Secondly, a conflict of *interests* (objective or subjective) needs to be present in order to have a power relationship. The beliefs and values of the involved are taken for granted and seen as fixed, and compliance is achieved if someone is coerced to behave in a way contrary to these values (Bjørkelo 2003:58). Thirdly, power is *negative*; restricting the alternatives of actions either by coercing B into doing something that he does not want to do (first face), by

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<sup>360</sup> Although Lukes concedes in his second edition of “Power a Radical View” that power as he defined it here was a more narrow definition of power as ‘domination’, he sees it as implausible that it is possible to arrive at an uncontested definition of ‘power’ and such defends his claim that power has a third dimension which secures the consent to domination of willing subjects (Lukes, 2005:108-109)

preventing B from doing what he wants to do (second face), or by repressing B's objective interests (third dimension) (ibid:58).

### ***Foucault and the Fourth Face of Power***

The fourth face of power, as it is represented by Foucault's notion of power, differs from the preceding accounts of power in how it deals with subjects, where it is found, and how it is exercised, studied, and manifested (Digeser 1992). According to Clegg (1989:155), Foucault sees the discursive field in which the classical theorizing about power has been constituted as being derived from notions of sovereignty, and in this context sovereignty refers to an organising subject whose will is power. Foucault's notion of power attempts to break decisively with this 'mechanistic' and sovereign view.

Foucault agrees that power is relational, and that it cannot be possessed or be a property of one interacting partner. He states that: "*power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations*" (Foucault 1998:94). However, although there is agreement on the basic relational character of power, the first three faces of power hold that on some level A exercises power over B in a manner contrary to B's interests, the A's and B's are taken as given (Digeser 1992:980). Even if they don't see power as something that can exist in a vacuum, they do see it as a capacity which can be held in a particular relation (Bjørkelo 2003:59). In contrast Foucault does not presuppose the subjects (the A's and B's) of the other three faces (Digeser 1992:980), he rejects the notion that power is exercised by empowered agents on disempowered agents to make them act contrary to their real or subjective interests (Bjørkelo 2003:59). For Foucault "*the exercise of power is not simply a relationship between partners, individual or collective; it is a way in which certain actions modify others*" (Foucault 1982:788). He conceives of power in terms of a 'structure of actions' bearing on the actions of those who are free (Hindess 1996:97). The exercise of power is seen to be:

*"...a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon or being capable of action. A set of actions upon other actions"* (Foucault 1982:789)

Power involves structuring the possible field of action of others, and putting in order the possible outcome (ibid: 789). The core of Foucault's understanding of power in general is 'the

total structure of actions' bearing on the actions of individuals who are free, meaning those whose behaviour is not totally determined by physical constraints. Power is exercised over those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what their choices will be (Hindess 1996:100). These actions upon actions are not violence because violence acts upon the body or upon things, and so closes the door on all other possibilities.

*"...a power relationship can only be articulated on the basis of two elements which are each indispensable if it is really to be a power relationship: that 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the very end as a person who acts; and that, faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions, results, and possible inventions may open up"* (Foucault 1982:789)

This argument corresponds with what Bachrach and Baratz has to say about the difference between force and power.

A crucial point according to Foucault is that the effective use of power needs not imply a removal of liberty. On the contrary he claims that where there is no possibility of resistance there can be no relations of power. From this it follows that the exercise of power will normally be at risk from the recalcitrance of its subjects, as such it always involves costs, and the outcome will often be far from certain (Hindess 1996:101). Also to say that those who are subject to power are free, is to say that they themselves are in a position to act on the actions of others, i.e. to engage in the exercise of power on their own account. It is for this reason, according to Foucault, that relationships of power will often be unstable, ambiguous, and reversible. A matter of 'strategic games between liberties' (ibid: 101).

Stating that power is always exercised over subjects who are free is not the same as saying that all people have the same room in which to manoeuvre for the exercise of power. Foucault stresses that power is exercised in the *"interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations"* (1998:94). To designate power relationships that are relatively stable and hierarchical Foucault uses the conceptions 'domination' and 'government' (Hindess 1996:97), as he states:

*"We must distinguish the relationships of power as strategic games between liberties – strategic games that result in the fact that some people try to determine the conduct of others – and the states of domination, which are what we ordinarily call power. And between the two, between the games of power and the states of domination, you have governmental technologies..."* (Foucault, 1988a:19 cited in Hindess 1996:99)

Here Foucault identifies three types of power relationships: ‘Strategic games between liberties’, ‘domination’, and ‘government’. Foucault uses the term ‘domination’ to designate ‘what we ordinarily call power’. Domination, as such, refers to those power relationships where the subordinated persons have little room for manoeuvre because their margin of liberty is extremely limited by the effects of power (Hindess 1996:102). Taylor (1984:172) stresses the point that domination does not necessitate a clearly demarcated perpetrator, but it does require a victim. Something needs to be imposed on someone if there is to be domination. In such cases, those who dominate will have a good chance of being able to impose their will, even, as Weber stated ‘against the resistance of others who are participating in the action’ (Hindess 1996:102). In much of Foucault’s work domination is regarded as something which should be avoided whenever possible, it is therefore important to Foucault that domination is distinguished form of power in general, lest power in general be seen as something inherently bad<sup>361</sup>.

Having illustrated how Foucault sees power as having the potential of turning to domination, it is now important to note another and central feature of his view on power, that of power as a constructive force. The argument that power acts on action and not agents is part of Foucault’s rejection of both the “*traditional ontological notion of self*” (Prado 1995:72 cited in Bjørkelo 2003:59) and the dominantly negative and prohibitive characteristics of power as envisaged in the first three faces. An important feature of the first three faces of power is the presupposition of A’s and B’s with definable and given interests. Accordingly, for there to exist a power relationship these interests are in conflict and A makes B comply with his own interests based upon his capacity for power. Unlike the first three faces, the forth face of power eschews appeal to the notion of an objective interest. According to Foucault there are no essential interests, nor any enduring set of ‘true’ desires and wants that are part of our natures (Digeser 1992:983), rather there is a temporary construction that is historically described and filtered through the ideas, discourses and institutions that constitute society (Danaher et al. 2000:48). Power as understood by Foucault seems to be more of a universal feature which imbues and creates social practices and forms discourse, where the idea of

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<sup>361</sup> Hindess (1996:104) states that, just as Lukes condemned certain kinds of power in the name of an ideal of individual autonomy, one can find passages in Foucault’s later works where he appears to condemn domination in the name of liberty. The important consequence of Foucault’s distinction between power and domination, becomes that it allows him to condemn states of domination in contrast with strategic games of power between liberties.

resistance entails a presumption that we are neither infinitely pliable, nor naturally suited to be one kind of person rather than another (Digeser 1992:985).

Seeing subjects and their interests as socially constructed opens up the possibility for both changing identities and interests, and it is through the construction of identities, knowledge and 'truths' that power becomes a productive force. As such power is not simply something that A exercises over B, but has something to do with the construction of A's and B's (Bjørkelo 2003:60). In a critical vein Foucault characterises the traditional approach to power:

*"It is a power that only has the force of the negative on its side, a power to say no; in no condition to produce, capable only of positing limits, it is basically anti-energy. This is the paradox of its effectiveness: it is incapable of doing anything, except to render what it dominates incapable of doing anything either, except for what this power allows it to do [...] All the modes of domination, submission, and subjugation are ultimately reduced to an effect of obedience"* (Foucault 1998:85)

Counter to this, Foucault would argue that power should be seen as a productive force capable of shaping, creating and facilitating action rather than simply prohibiting and obstructing. *"Basically power is less a confrontation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government [...] To govern in this sense, is to structure the possible field of action of others"*<sup>362</sup> (Foucault 1982:789-790). This possible field of action is constructed by knowledge and it is the knowledge/power relationship that makes power productive. Foucault suggests the abandonment of the idea that knowledge can only exist where power relations are suspended and encourages us to:

*"...admit rather that power produces knowledge [...] that power and knowledge directly imply one another, that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations"* (Foucault 1991:27)

It is important to note that Foucault never intended the power/knowledge relationship as one that equates knowledge with power, they are different (Digeser 1992:986). If we understand knowledge as a system of beliefs which is upheld by standards of truth or right, then the pursuit and conveyance of these truths affect how we understand ourselves and others. As such what we take as known or true serves to direct our intentions and goals, and thereby focusing power (ibid:987). On the other hand, to Foucault, there is the idea that power is also

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<sup>362</sup> Foucault uses the term 'government' in its broad meaning, referring not to political structures and the management of states, but rather to designate the way in which the conduct of individuals or of groups might be directed (Foucault, 1982:790)

involved in the production of knowledge, suggesting that what counts as knowledge is also in some ways affected by power (ibid:987-988). Accordingly it is in discourses that power and knowledge are combined, and where interests are constituted. These discourses function to structure behaviour and to sustain certain knowledge which counts as true. This would seem familiar to the ideas of Lukes' radical conception of power, claiming that what counts as true is the result of the power of one dominant group who determine what is to be taken as true or false, manipulating knowledge and concealing the 'real truth' from others. But to Foucault it is not so, his claim is that there is no truth that escapes power, rather the truth is defined in discourses, or dominating paradigms, which are taken for granted. Truth is thus seen as constructed by power/knowledge relationships which make up certain discourses that structure the possible field of action. It is important to note that to Foucault there is no one single authoritative discourse, institution or group in a state, but rather a number of competing discourses and groups which produce different versions of events (Danaher et al. 2000:77). As such power is ubiquitous, there can be no knowledge or personalities formed without its effects, but it is important, once again, to note that Foucault does not claim that people are nothing but the products of power, since he insists that the exercise of power always presupposes some degree of freedom on the part of its subjects and is therefore always met by resistance (Hindess 1996:150). This means that there will always be struggle as to how the world is to be perceived, and it is in these struggles over discourses that the power/knowledge relations become most traceable for analysis. In order to study the relations of power Foucault suggests that:

*“It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point [...] it consists of using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, and find out their point of application and the methods used. Rather than analyzing power from the point of view of its internal rationality, it consists of analyzing power relations through the antagonism of strategies”* (Foucault 1982:780)

Power then, as Foucault understands it is action upon action. These actions are results of the power/knowledge relations that constitute discourses which guide possible actions. Power struggles, thereby, are not so much the case of A making B act in a way contrary to his own interests, but rather a struggle where one discourse of truth, represented by groups and individuals (A), is challenging another discourse of truth (B) (Bjørkelo 2003).

Although Foucault's conception of power is fundamentally on the positive and constructive nature of power, and the potential for agency in the form of resistance, there is a sense that this view of power becomes very deterministic, giving 'a sense of entrapment' for the subjects of this ubiquitous power (Hutchens 2007:22). Feminist theorists such as Townsend have criticised Foucault for marginalising and under-theorising the possibility of agency for which his own work created space (ibid:22). In order to understand processes of governance the concept of agency is central, one needs to acknowledge the fact that somewhere along the line someone does something which affects the surroundings, although the effects may not be exactly those that were intended. Bruno Latour (1986) conceives of power as a process of enrolment and translation that opens up for the adaptations made by agents actively involved in the process of governance.

## Appendix 2

### List of Respondents

<b>Respondent</b>	<b>Organisations &amp; Positions</b>	<b>Residency</b>	<b>Date of interviews</b>	<b>Others present at interview</b>
'Aaron'	- Block Committee – leader of one committee - Imagine Hout Bay	Imizamo Yethu	May 23 2006	
'Alex'	- Department of Community Safety	Other	May 26 2006	'Trevor'
'Alexandra'	- Monrovia Church – Pastor	Valley	May 19 2006	'Mary' & 'Bulelani'
'Andrew'	- HBNW – Co-Chairperson	Valley	March 14 2006	
'Baruti'	- Imagine Hout Bay member - South African Communist Party member	Imizamo Yethu	May 3 2006	
'Bulelani'	- Themba Care	Imizamo Yethu	May 19 2006 May 20 2006	'Mary' & 'Alexandra' (May 19) 'Mamello' (May 20)
'Charles'	- HBNW – Sector Leader	Valley	May 15 2006	
'Christina'	- Deep Blue Security – Part Owner - HBNW – Treasurer (resigned at 2006 AGM)	Valley	March 24 2006	
'David'	- Hout Bay Civic Association – Vice Chairperson - Hout Bay ANC	Hangberg	March 21 2006 April 30 2006	'Dominick' (March 21)
'Deacon'	- Ratepayers – Chairperson - Ward committee member - HBNW member	Valley	April 10 2006	
'Dominick'	- Hout Bay Civic Association – Chairperson  ANC – Deputy Chairperson	Hangberg	March 21 2006	'David'
'Edward'	- HBNW – Police Liaison Officer - Coastal Security – Owner	Valley	March 3 2006 May 23 2006	

<b>Respondent</b>	<b>Organisations &amp; Positions</b>	<b>Residency</b>	<b>Date of interviews</b>	<b>Others present at interview</b>
'Elizabeth'	- Hout Bay CPF – Chairperson - Ward Committee member	Valley	May 18 2006	
'Gareth'	- HBNW – Co-Chairperson	Valley	April 7 2006	
'Isaac'	- Priest - Hout Bay Business Opportunity Forum – Chairperson	Hangberg	March 14 2006	
'James'	- Hout Bay ANC – Chairperson - SANCO – Committee Member - Ward Committee member	Imizamo Yethu	May 5 2006	
'Jane'	- St. Simon Anglican Church - Democratic Alliance member	Valley	May 9 2006	
'John'	- Sentinel Primary School – Principal	Other	May 10 2006	
'Jonathan'	- St. Simon Anglican Church – Lay minister	Hout Bay Heights	May 22 2006	
'Linda'	Hout Bay Business Opportunity Forum	Imizamo Yethu	March 17 2006	
'Luke'	Fair Heavens Faith Mission Church – Pastor	Hangberg	March 30 2006	'Michael'
'Mamello'	Used to beg in the streets of Hout Bay as a child. Now employed but still involved with drugs.	Imizamo Yethu	May 20 2006	'Bulelani'
'Mary'	- Imizamo Yethu Civic Association (now SANCO) – Previous committee member - Block Committees – Co-Founder of the Chris Hani Block Committee	Imizamo Yethu	May 19 2006 & May 30 2006	'Bulelani' & 'Alexandra' (May 19)
'Michael'	- Hout Bay High School – Teacher	Other	March 30 2006	'Luke'
'Nelson'	- SANCO – committee member	Imizamo Yethu	May 16 2006	
'Nick'	- HBNW – Operations Controller	Valley	April 6 2006	
'Roger'	- Hout Bay SAPS – Reservist	Valley	May 5 2006	
'Sam'	- ADT – General Manager Western Cape	Other	April 11 2006	

<b>Respondent</b>	<b>Organisations &amp; Positions</b>	<b>Residency</b>	<b>Date of interviews</b>	<b>Others present at interview</b>
'Samuel'	- Sinethemba – committee member - Hout Bay CPF – Vice Chairperson	Imizamo Yethu	April 5 2006	
'Sandra'	- Sinethemba – Vice Chairperson - Hout Bay CPF – Secretary	Imizamo Yethu	March 28 2006	
'Sarah'	- St. Simon Anglican Church – Lay minister - Eye on the Child	Hout Bay Heights	May 25 2006	
'Terry'	- Hout Bay SAPS – Reservist	Hout Bay Heights	May 1 2006	
'Thaba'	- SANCO – Chairperson - Hout Bay ANC – Candidate for Ward Councillor of Ward 74 in 2006 local elections	Imizamo Yethu	April 6 2006	
'Thomas'	- Hout Bay SAPS – Deputy Station Commissioner - HBNW – Representative of the SAPS	Other	March 29 2006	
'Trevor'	- Department of Community Safety	Other	May 26 2006	'Alex'
'Walter'	- Ward 74 - Ward Councillor - Democratic Alliance	Valley	March 28 2006	

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