

# **Between Communism and Democracy**

## **Why Postcommunist Regimes get «Stuck in Transition»**

**Odin Lekve Alvsåker**

**Master Thesis**

**November 2010**

**Department of Comparative Politics**

**The University of Bergen**

## Contents

List of tables .....	3
Acknowledgements .....	3
Abstract .....	4
<b>1 Introduction .....</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>2 Theory .....</b>	<b>9</b>
2.1 Defining the dependent variable: A quantitative operationalisation of regime types .....	9
2.2 A qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable .....	18
2.3 Independent variables and hypotheses .....	29
2.3.1 General theories on democratization .....	29
2.3.2 Path-dependency, and transitions from communism.....	33
2.4 Data reliability in the empirical analysis .....	38
<b>3 Statistical analysis .....</b>	<b>39</b>
3.1 Data, and measurement of the independent variables .....	41
3.2 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 1994 .....	42
3.3 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 2008 .....	50
<b>4 Empirical analysis of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes .....</b>	<b>53</b>
4.1 Russia .....	54
4.2 Belarus .....	59
4.3 Armenia .....	63
4.4 Albania .....	67
4.5 Kyrgyzstan .....	72
4.6 Macedonia .....	76
4.7 Moldova .....	80
4.8 Croatia .....	84
4.9 Georgia .....	87

4.10 Romania .....	92
4.11 Ukraine .....	97
4.12 Conclusions .....	102
<b>5 Conclusion .....</b>	<b>108</b>
Literature .....	115

## List of Tables:

2.1 Diamond's classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in 2002 .....	15
2.2 Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in 1994 .....	17
2.3 Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in 2008 .....	18
2.4 Wigell's two-dimensional regime typology .....	21
2.5 Storm's continuum .....	24
2.6 A qualitative regime typology .....	28
3.1 Correlation analysis 1994 .....	43
3.2 Correlation analysis 2008 .....	49
4.1 A qualitative operationalisation of the 11 hybrid regimes in 2008, .....	101
4.2 A qualitative regime typology of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes in 2008 .....	102

## Acknowledgements

I am very grateful to my supervisor, Associate Professor Einar Berntzen, for his excellent guidance during the process of writing this master's thesis. His detailed and structured comments have enabled me to significantly improve the quality of this thesis.

## **Abstract**

The transitions from communist rule throughout Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have resulted in high regime diversity among the postcommunist regimes. Which factors may explain these differences in the political development of postcommunist regimes, and why have several of these states got «stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes?

Theoretical models that have been conceived to analyse transitions from communism have been able to shed light on two of the major political pathways in the postcommunist region: those leading to either democracy or autocracy. With regard to the regimes that have got stuck in the «middle» as hybrid regimes, far less significant explanations have been found, which most likely can be attributed to the apparently higher regime diversity among these regimes. Thus, the structure of this thesis is twofold: First, theories regarding transitions from communism as well as general theories of democratization are reconstructed as independent variables, and their relative impact on the dependent variable (regime types) in 1994 and in 2008 are assessed in two correlation analyses. Second, a qualitative operationalisation of regime types is combined with case studies of the hybrid postcommunist regimes, in order to compare and analyse their political development.

In the quantitative analyses, where scores from Freedom House were used to measure the dependent variable, the majority of the hypotheses were confirmed, as existing theories largely accounted for the political trajectories of authoritarian and democratic regimes, whereas the hybrid regimes were poorly explained. However, when applying the qualitative case study approach, it became possible to identify several variables that may explain not only why several postcommunist countries turned into hybrid regimes, but also the varying degrees and types of democraticness that have emerged among these regimes during the last two decades.

## 1. Introduction

After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, and the fall of the Soviet Union two years later, the evolving postcommunist regimes suddenly had to face several simultaneous transitions and challenges. Firstly, it involved a political transition, and a move from communism toward a new type of governance; either a re-consolidation of authoritarian rule, a transition to democracy, or to something in between (as a hybrid type of regime, combining authoritarian and democratic elements). Secondly, they had to deal with an economic transition from a state-governed plan economy to a capitalist market economy. Thirdly, the postcommunist regimes were also in dire need of a rapid and efficient state-building process in order to cope efficiently with the political and economic transitions (particularly the new states without a previous history of statehood). In addition, several of the postcommunist regimes that had large multi-ethnic populations also had to solve the challenges of «nation-building» (i.e. determine the procedures regarding citizenship, and assimilating different ethnic groups). As all of these transitions from communism erupted at nearly simultaneous historical moments throughout the entire postcommunist region (between 1989-1991), and because all of these regimes share a similar historical legacy (communism), a comparison of the political development among these regimes appears to be of high validity, and also of great importance.

Despite this occurrence of nearly simultaneous transitions from communism, the political development among these regimes has differed greatly over the last 20 years. While some of these countries have experienced successful transitions to democracy, several other postcommunist regimes have ended up as hybrid regimes, in a grayzone between autocracy and democracy. In addition, several postcommunist regimes have also reverted to authoritarianism. Most strikingly, the different political pathways of the various postcommunist regimes display a highly visible geographical pattern. While many of the regimes with a Western geographical location have become democracies, several regimes that are located further East (within the postcommunist region) have reverted to authoritarianism. With regard to the regimes that are situated in the «middle» geographically, there seems to be a much higher likelihood of becoming a hybrid regime. Thus, since the fall of communism, a high level of regime diversity has emerged among the postcommunist countries.

Which factors may explain these differences in the political development of postcommunist regimes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?

Why have several of these states ended up as hybrid regimes, unable to consolidate its political

development in either an democratic or authoritarian direction?

Since the fall of communism, several influential studies have been conducted on the political development of postcommunist regimes, and on their transitions from communism. The significance of these theories with regard to the political development in the postcommunist region will therefore be tested in a statistical analysis (in chapter 3). While several of these explanatory paradigms have already been convincingly presented and explained by scholars such as: Bunce (2003), McFaul (2002), Fish (2006), Fish and Choudry (2007), and Kitschelt (1999), this dissertation will seek to combine the most influential independent variables (also including general theories of democratization), and explore their relative effects on the dependent variable in 2008 (and also in 1994). A similar regime typology to the one originally applied by Diamond (2002), is used when conducting this statistical analysis. This analytical approach is also reminiscent of Jørgen Møller's comparative study of postcommunist regimes in 2007 (Møller, 2009), although he applied a typological analysis<sup>1</sup>, whereas the present research study utilizes the bivariate correlation method, when seeking to explain the political development of postcommunist regimes. However, the main aim of this research project transcends evaluating whether or not these theories display significant effects on the dependent variable in a more recent setting, in 2008. As will be demonstrated in the statistical analysis, the available literature on transitions from communism (and on democratization in general), appear to be highly efficient tools when explaining why some of the postcommunist regimes have either become democratic or have reverted to authoritarianism. With regard to the regimes that have «got stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes, there are very few significant correlations, which also seem to illustrate why there is such great scholarly disagreement on how to define different regime types. Thus, it also seems necessary to adopt a more qualitative approach when examining the political development of these hybrid regimes. A qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable (in section 2.2 of chapter 2), which is partly based on the regime typologies developed by Wigell (2008), and Storm (2008), is therefore combined with case studies of these hybrid regimes (in chapter 4), in order to explain the political development of those regimes that «get stuck in transition». Thus, the greatest innovation of this dissertation seems to be the combination of a quantitative approach, which assesses and confirms much of the existing theory regarding postcommunist regimes, with a qualitative case study approach, which seeks to explain the political development of the hybrid regimes in the postcommunist region, which so far have been relatively poorly explained.

---

1 A typological analysis can be defined as a multidimensional and conceptual classification, involving an ordering of concepts (regime types) on a compound of attributes (independent variables/conditions) (Møller, 2009: 77-78).

In order to explain the political development of the postcommunist regimes, it is necessary to begin by defining the dependent variable; regime types. Initially, in section 2.1 of chapter 2, the operationalisation of regime types is executed in a quantitative manner. The theoretical discussion in this chapter, regarding the operationalisation and classification of regime types, and of the related concepts, such as democracy and autocracy (and any other type of regime that may be included in a regime typology), makes it very clear that there is a considerable lack of scholarly consensus regarding the «regime question». The various disputes regarding how to define different regime types, and democracy in particular, also highlights the severe challenges of measuring these different regime types properly, and especially when applying statistical datasets/indices (such as Freedom House or Polity IV) as a means to operationalise the dependent variable. In these cases, it may often be difficult to know whether a definition that has been carefully established theoretically actually corresponds to the measures that have been collected from these quantitative datasets. Thus, instead of producing an explicit definition of different regime types, and of the differences in the level of democraticness that separates them, the statistical operationalisation will rather be based on a theoretical discussion of regime types, which is then linked to one of the most widely used measurement tools of democratization processes: Freedom House. As a consequence of this theoretical debate, four main types of political regimes are then identified: liberal democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, and autocracies. These concepts are then measured by applying scores from Freedom House, which although highly criticized, is also one of the most popular tools to measure political regimes and political development. Thus, this methodological choice should make this operationalisation, and the following statistical analysis (in chapter 3), highly comparable to many other studies that have been conducted on democratization. Given the inherent methodological flaws in many large datasets, which are pointed out by authors such as Munck and Verkuilen (2002), the main aim of the statistical operationalisation of regime types is therefore not to determine the precise nature of each of the regimes (i.e. to precisely reveal differences both in kind and in degree of democraticness), but rather to uncover some important generalizations regarding how and why the political development has proceeded like it has, throughout the postcommunist region. Thus, the statistical operationalisation of the dependent variable will subsequently be applied in the statistical analysis, in chapter 3.

A more elaborate and carefully constructed definition of the dependent variable is instead developed in the following section of chapter 2 (in section 2.2). The rationale behind developing a qualitative operationalisation of regime types, is mainly that it seems necessary to make a definition of regime types that can be more explicitly linked to empirical realities. While the scores from Freedom House (and other statistical datasets) are regularly applied by political scientists, their measurement

and conceptualization of different components of democracy are still highly controversial. However, without questioning the ability of Freedom House to reveal fairly accurate (but perhaps not flawless) differences in the level of democraticness (between different political regimes), a more explicit definition of the dependent variable, which can subsequently be linked directly to the measures applied to analyse postcommunist regimes, still seems necessary. This approach is not only motivated by methodological concerns, but also by the necessity of complementing the results of the statistical analysis, and hopefully provide explanations of different patterns and developments that the statistical analysis is unable to provide. Thus, the qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable in section 2.2 of chapter 2, will subsequently be applied as a measure to compare postcommunist regimes in a qualitative analysis (in chapter 4), which is then combined with the application of second-hand sources (that are found to be relevant when evaluating these regimes). This qualitative regime typology will be established by identifying the most important elements of democracy, which in turn are based on theories regarding democratization. In order to achieve greater analytical differentiation between the different regime types, and at the same time avoid conceptual stretching, it is therefore vital to attribute more weight/significance to those concepts/elements of democracy that are theoretically assumed to be more democratically important, than the other definitional components of democracy. This also enables the qualitative operationalisation to differentiate both between differences in kind (i.e. what type of hybrid regime, and which elements of democracy it incorporates) and in degree (i.e. which hybrid regimes are the most democratic) simultaneously. It is therefore likely that this qualitative operationalisation of regime types will avoid grave errors of conceptual stretching, and simultaneously be able to detect and incorporate many more types of political development (i.e. the process of democratization may proceed very differently from country to country, which is not always sufficiently accounted for in many regime typologies).

Having defined the dependent variable twice (but in different ways), it is then necessary to identify the independent variables that may have had an impact on the dependent variable. In section 2.3 of chapter 2, different theories associated with democratization and with transitions from communism are assessed, in order to select independent variables that may have influenced the political development in the postcommunist region. These independent variables (13 in total) are then operationalised in terms of their hypothesised relationships to the dependent variable. Before moving on to the statistical analysis, where the relative significance of these variables are further explored (through the application of two correlation analyses that assess the political situation in 1994 and 2008, respectively), the data reliability of the empirical analysis (conducted in chapter 4) is discussed in section 2.4 of chapter 2.



Then, in chapter 3, the correlations between the independent variables and the dependent variable (and also among the different independent variables) are analysed in order to uncover some generalizations regarding the political development of the postcommunist regimes.

In chapter 4, the hybrid regimes that are poorly explained by the statistical analysis, will be analysed more thoroughly. An empirical analysis, employing relevant sources regarding the countries under consideration, will then be conducted in order to answer how these regimes correspond to the qualitative operationalisation of regime types (developed in chapter 2.2), and why they have developed the way they did.

Due to lack of statistical data, only 25 out of the 29 postcommunist regimes currently located in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, have been included when analysing the political development within the postcommunist region. Thus, four regimes (Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) have been excluded from the analysis because there are not sufficient available data for these regimes.

## **2. Theory:**

### **2.1: Defining the dependent variable: A quantitative operationalisation of regime types**

One of the greatest and perhaps most important challenges within democratization theory, is making an adequate operationalisation of different regime types (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). This will also be very important here, especially because regime types constitute the dependent variable. In order to uncover the main explanatory factors behind the political development in 25 postcommunist regimes, it therefore seems necessary to begin by defining the most important distinctions between various regime types.

Defining and differentiating between various regime types is getting increasingly difficult, or at least more confusing as the variation among various regimes seems to have increased following the third wave of democratization. These transitions from authoritarian rule, have led to a growing number of hybrid regimes (regimes that are characterized by a mix of both autocratic and democratic elements), and thus it has also contributed to greater confusion and disagreement on how to classify different regime types. Because of this development, relatively similar and

overlapping concepts and definitions (but with different names) are used by various political scientists, and there seems to be a lack of coordination and a great deal of confusion when dealing with the classification of regime types, which in turn has negative consequences for the efficient use of theories on regime change and democratization (Collier et al., 1997: 450).

In order to solve this mess, Sartori suggests differentiating the concepts by comparing them hierarchically (Sartori in Collier et al., 1997: 436). This would entail that concepts with less defined attributes (i.e. regime), fits more cases than concepts that have more defined attributes (i.e. parliamentary democracy). When applying this method, it is not possible to achieve differentiation both in kind (i.e. different types of democracy) and degree (i.e. level of democraticness) simultaneously. Thus, achieving greater analytical differentiation between the concepts may come at the expense of conceptual stretching, by categorizing cases that don't fit the concepts (Collier et al., 1997: 437). In order to distinguish between differing degrees of democracy without «stretching» the concepts it is, according to Collier and Levitsky, necessary to define the different regime types in a way that shows how they fulfill various democratic standards, for instance on a scale from illiberal democracy to electoral democracy (Collier et al., 1997: 437). This also entails the use of diminished subtypes, that highlight the elements (types) of democracy (or authoritarianism) that are either present or missing (Collier et al., 1997: 438). However, in studies where there is a high number of cases (large N), the use of diminished subtypes may not be sufficient to avoid conceptual stretching due to the greater political differences examined (Wigell, 2008: 232). This is especially true when comparing different regions or a set of cases with great political variation.

There are many different opinions among researchers regarding which requirements (and how many) that should be fulfilled in order for a regime to be democratic. According to Robert Dahl, a regime is democratic when it functions as a responsible and accountable political system to the interests of its citizens (Dahl, 1971: 2), by fulfilling two dimensions of democracy: public contestation and public participation (Dahl, 1971: 4). Each of these two dimensions incorporates several different criteria (such as free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections, and the protection of basic civil liberties). While democracy therefore could be regarded as a political system where parties lose elections, authoritarianism is a system where opposition parties always lose elections (Schedler, 2002: 47). Thus, hybrid regimes should be found somewhere in between these two extremes, not sufficiently democratic, nor are they quite authoritarian. There are, however, many who disagree with the minimalist standards applied by Dahl, and demand that several additional criteria need to be met in order for a regime to qualify as democratic. While Dahl's definition of democracy can be defined as a procedural minimum definition, as it incorporates only a small

number of vital democratic procedures, other scholars argue that additional features relating to the output side of democracy should also be incorporated (Collier et al., 1997: 433). For example, in an expanded procedural minimum definition, the criterion that the government must have effective power to govern, is also included (Collier et al., 1997: 434). Other, more maximalist definitions of democracy also include additional political, economic, and social features (such as socioeconomic equality) associated with industrial democracy (Storm, 2008: 216). However, according to Collier and Levitsky, it is more viable to treat many of these additional features as potential causes or consequences of democracy, rather than as a part of democracy itself (Collier et al., 1997: 434). While the minimalist, and procedural definitions of democracy have become increasingly influential in studies of democratization (and particularly in quantitative/statistical studies, which is partly because democratic procedures are easier to measure/quantify than the additional features of democracy), there is still great disagreement regarding the number of regime types, and where the boundaries should be drawn between different forms of hybrid regimes, and between hybrid regimes and closed authoritarian regimes. In addition, many scientists often use different concepts or definitions that often mean nearly the same. Extra properties or adjectives are added to their various definitions of democracy and/or regime types, which make the classification of regime types even less lucid. Thus, it could also be debated whether various hybrid regimes ought to be considered as subtypes of democracy or autocracy (Collier et al., 1997: 450).

The great difficulties in classifying regimes in an efficient and categorical manner (that also could create consensus among scientists), is partly caused by the problems of defining the concepts of transition and consolidation, which are two of the most vital concepts within democratization theory (Munck, 2001: 123-24). As there are several different methods being used to measure the process of democratization, there are also differing opinions regarding how the outer and inner boundaries of regime transitions and the consolidation of a new regime should be defined. Using dichotomous measures, by identifying key thresholds to conclude when a political transition is being initiated or a democratic regime has been consolidated, is one possible procedure. Thus, the outer boundaries of a transition are often considered to be the fall of an authoritarian (or democratic) regime and the consolidation of a new regime, either authoritarian or democratic (Schedler, 2001: 6). The challenge of defining the inner boundaries within a transition, or between various forms of hybrid regimes, is possibly even more problematic, as there is a lack of consensus regarding which (and to what degree) democratic standards should be met when defining and differentiating among various forms of regime types. One of the most common requirements when considering if a regime is democratic or not, is whether there is free and fair political elections. This is criticized by Schedler, who argues that elections increasingly are being used as a tool by political elites in order to manipulate the

masses (Schedler, 2002: 36). Another possible problem with focussing too much on elections, is that it implies that transitions necessarily must end with the installation of a new democratic or authoritarian regime, but precludes the possibility of a consolidated hybrid type of regime (Schedler, 2002). This view partly originates from modernisation theory, which asserts the importance of structural variables, such as economic growth, economic development (modernisation) and urbanisation, as crucial in explaining transitions from autocracy to political democracy (Lipset, 1960). Due to growing globalisation and subsequent modernisation, this theory argues that democracy is a natural endpoint of any political transition or regime change.

As there is a growing number of hybrid regimes with a relatively high level of stability, and that shows no signs of moving towards either democratic or authoritarian modes of governance, the critique of the structural approaches to democratization (and modernisation theory in particular) has increased over the last couple of decades. Several scholars, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) have therefore suggested that a more qualitative approach that applies actor-centred variables is more efficient when explaining processes of democratization. This view was partly induced by the third wave of democratization that began in the 1970s and 80s, and that led to an unprecedented level of political variation between different countries, and different regions. Actor-centred theories therefore suggest that regime transitions are particularly characterized as periods of high institutional uncertainty, where negotiations and the struggle for power among relevant actors within (and between) the elites and the opposition, should be seen as crucial to the eventual outcome of such processes (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986: 6). Thus, according to O'Donnell, transitions should be considered as simply the interval between two regimes, and therefore precludes the possibility of a «permanent transition» that lasts until either authoritarian or democratic modes of governance have been consolidated (O'Donnell in Schedler, 2001: 11). In other words, also hybrid regimes should be regarded as consolidated regimes as every regime per definition is consolidated.

Despite different methodological approaches, there are still several similarities between actor-centred studies and the structural approach in their classification of regime types. According to Schedler (actor-centred approach), the processes of transition and consolidation could potentially be divided into four different phases (or potential regime types); Solid and weak autocracy, and weak and solid democracy (Schedler, 2001: 6). Depending on the level of uncertainty, these phases could then develop at four different levels; gradual changes, fluctuations (i.e. cycles, non linear processes), permanent transition, or sudden changes (only process where the outer boundaries could easily be defined). As mentioned above, O'Donnell disagrees with the idea of a permanent transition

as it implies a certain level of stability (thus it is also consolidated). Looking at the empirical reality, it also seems evident that political transitions could end at any point during the four phases put forward by Schedler. This is also supported by O'Donnell, who operates with four relatively similar outcomes to those of Schedler; continued autocracy, liberalised type of autocracy, transition to democracy, or civil war/revolution (O'Donnell et al., 1986).

Larry Diamond, who applies a structural approach, operates with six different categories in his most recent analysis of postcommunist regimes (from 2002), but like Schedler and O'Donnell he also differentiates among four main groups of regime types. These groups are; democratic regimes, hybrid regimes that fulfills many democratic standards, hybrid regimes that fulfills few democratic standards, and closed authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002: 25). Diamond asserts that all hybrid regimes are pseudodemocratic, in the sense that their formal democratic institutions function efficiently to conceal the authoritarian nature of the regime (Diamond, 2002: 24). While many hybrid regimes have established electoral forms of democracy with relatively free elections, they fail in many other aspects of political democracy (i.e. lack of civil liberties, poor political accountability/transparency, lack of rule of law etc.), which is one of the reasons why it is so hard to classify/define the various subtypes of hybrid regimes (Diamond, 2002: 22). Another important aspect of this development is the fact that transitions to democracy increasingly are expected to happen over night. As the fundamental principles of democracy, which evolved gradually over centuries in the oligarchic democracies in Western countries, are already in place, the prospects of establishing new (democratic) institutions as well as expanding voting rights immediately is so intimidating for authoritarian elites, that they apply other methods to limit and control political competition (Diamond, 2002: 23-24). In other words, they've got more to lose when the transition to democracy is expected to occur rapidly rather than gradually (by opposition, international observers etc.), and thus they turn to repressive means, that in the end often reinforce or consolidate the hybrid (or authoritarian) nature of the regime.

Diamond has based his categorization of regime types on scores from Freedom House, which presents annual ratings on the democratic performance of all the countries in the world (Diamond, 2002: 25). Freedom House operationalises democracy as two dimensions; political rights and civil liberties, and categorizes the regimes based on a rating from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). The two dimensions applied by Freedom House incorporate the minimum democratic requirements identified in Dahl's procedural definition of democracy, but also include a large number of other criteria. Thus, according to Gerardo Munck, the dataset provided by Freedom House should therefore be regarded as a maximalist definition of democracy (Munck, 2002: 9). One of the main

challenges involved in applying a maximalist definition of a concept, is that it often includes attributes that should rather be regarded as a part of other concepts (i.e. the inclusion of attributes such as «property rights» and «freedom from war» in the conceptualization of democracy applied by Freedom House), or perhaps as potential causes or consequences of the defined concept (Munck, 2002: 9). Munck also criticizes the method that Freedom House has applied to measure democracy and regime types, as the relationship between the selected components of democracy is not theoretically justified or explained, and because Freedom House doesn't offer any explanation of how the different components have been coded (Munck, 2002: 20). This also weakens the aggregation of the different measures of democracy, as the implied equal weighting of the various components is theoretically a highly controversial decision (Munck, 2002). For instance, whether elected officials have effective power to govern is theoretically a more important component of democracy than for example the decentralization of political power (Munck, 2002: 25). Thus, according to Munck, it is not evident whether these graded measures (from Freedom House) actually correspond to Diamond's defined regime types (Munck, 2001: 125), and he therefore concludes that the datasets provided by Freedom House «have to be accepted largely on faith» (Munck, 2002: 20). Munck rather suggests that comparative and nuanced methods looking more closely on the background and stability of regime types, is a better way of making research on processes of democratization (Munck, 2001: 143). This critique is partly reflected in the view that all political systems combine authoritarian and democratic elements to a varying extent, and that there may often be an overlap of democratic (or authoritarian) elements between various types of regimes (Wigell, 2008: 233). While there may exist some cases of conceptual stretching in Diamond's classification of regime types, he still manages to establish a framework that seems promising in order to uncover the main political trajectories or trends, in the postcommunist region.

In his regime typology, Diamond differentiates between two democratic regime types (liberal democracy (common in the West), and electoral democracy), three forms of hybrid regimes (ambiguous regimes, competitive authoritarianism, and hegemonic authoritarianism) as well as one regime type containing closed, authoritarian regimes (Diamond, 2002: 25). In addition to the scores from Freedom House, Diamond also takes into account the perceived intentions and the power of the elites by incorporating the percentage shares of seats in parliament, presidential votes for the incumbent party at the previous election, as well as the time period the incumbent rulers have been in government, when operationalising the various regime types into different categories (Diamond, 2002: 32). His analysis is therefore more an attempt to classify the postcommunist regimes based on the situation in 2002, than explaining why the various transitions that were initiated with the collapse of communism had developed like they did. However, the classification scheme that

Diamond uses, seems like a good starting point, when aiming to understand and explain the political development in the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the downfall of communism.

**Table 2.1: Diamond's classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (2002):**

	Liberal democracy	Electoral democracy	Ambiguous regimes	Competitive Authoritarianism	Hegemonic Authoritarianism	Politically closed regimes
Postcommunist Regimes (former Soviet Union) N=26	Czech Republic Hungary Poland Slovakia Slovenia Estonia Latvia Lithuania Bulgaria Croatia Romania	Moldova Albania	Armenia Georgia Macedonia Ukraine	Bosnia-Herzegovina Russia Belarus	Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Uzbekistan	Turkmenistan

After Diamond's analysis in 2002, three more states have gained their independence within the postcommunist region. Montenegro and Serbia became independent in 2006, and Kosovo gained independence in 2008. Unfortunately there is a great lack of data for Serbia-Montenegro (the state that previously incorporated all of these new independent regimes), and also for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, it is not feasible to incorporate these four countries in my analysis. Nevertheless, it is necessary to make an update of Diamond's table in order to take account of the political development in the other countries in recent years, and base it on scores from 2008. It also seems necessary to make a slightly different operationalisation of the dependent variable than Diamond. In fact, his original division into four main categories may seem to correspond better to the empirical realities than the six categories applied above (Møller, 2009: 30). While the differentiation between competitive authoritarianism and hegemonic authoritarianism may seem necessary in order to get a better picture of the various kinds of hybrid regimes, it is hard to say whether the scores from Freedom House provide sufficient theoretical justification for the inclusion of these subtypes (of hybrid regimes) in the statistical analysis. Instead, the various differences and similarities among hybrid regimes will be explored more thoroughly in a qualitative analysis based

on second-hand literature, and function as a complement to the results from the statistical analysis (in chapter 4). Also, the category of ambiguous regimes doesn't seem necessary, as its vague operationalisation, as regimes that are neither quite hegemonic nor competitive, and at the same time just below the thresholds of electoral democracy, doesn't really contribute to explaining various kinds of regime types, but instead offers another concept which it is difficult to connect to the empirical realities.

According to Møller, who divides postcommunist regimes into a tripartition; democracies, hybrid regimes and autocracies, Diamond's differentiation between liberal democracies and hybrid regimes that fulfill many democratic standards (also referred to as electoral democracy), is also problematic as it is difficult to disentangle the liberal (civil liberties) and electoral (political rights) standards from each other when comparing empirical examples (Møller, 2009: 37). Analysing scores from Freedom House on these two dimensions, Møller found that they share an increasing co-variation, and that the developments of the electoral and liberal dimensions usually goes in the same direction (Møller, 2009: 39). Thus, differentiating between liberal and electoral democracies makes little sense according to Møller (Møller, 2009: 36), and he therefore proposes to collapse these two types into one; democracies (Møller, 2009: 47). However, this increasing co-variation has occurred mostly over the last decade, and as Diamond points out there was more often than not higher electoral than liberal scores among democratic states at the end of the 1990s (Diamond, 1999: 12). More importantly, Diamond argues that it is vital to make a distinction between liberal democracies, and other democracies that lack many democratic standards (whether it is liberal or electoral standards) in order to better depict the differences in regime types (Diamond in Møller, 2009: 29). Even though Møller has lowered his threshold (to an average score of 2 instead of 3 in Freedom House) when defining democracy, and thereby decreased this conceptual problem, he instead faced the challenge of a very broad category of hybrid regimes (ranging from 2.5 to 5.5 in Freedom House), that theoretically could entail a number of very different regime(type)s.

In order to avoid the empirical challenges that might arise when differentiating between liberal and electoral democracy, and at the same time producing a regime typology that corresponds well to the empirical realities, I have decided to use some slightly different thresholds and categories from those applied by Diamond and Møller. Similar to their studies, and despite the flaws identified by Munck, I will also base the operationalisation of the dependent variable; regime types, on the scores from Freedom House using the average value of political rights and civil liberties. The main reason for this decision, is that while the dataset provided by Freedom House perhaps has incorporated too many features of democracy, which makes it vulnerable to conceptual stretching, many of the



alternatives (such as POLITY IV) seem to incorporate too few components of democracy, which may stem from the fact that these indices of democracy often apply minimalist and procedural definitions of democracy (Munck, 2002: 9) In a typology where the aim is to classify and explain regime types on a scale from authoritarian to liberal democratic, and not only whether they are democratic or not, it seems necessary to include criteria such as the rule of law and civil liberties, which are provided by Freedom House, but not in POLITY IV (Møller, 2009: 27). Another reason is that the data from Freedom House have been widely used by other scholars, and my results would therefore be comparable to other analyses of the postcommunist region (such as the studies conducted by Møller and Diamond).

My fourfold categorization of regime types has the following definitions:

Liberal democracies are political regimes in which the average value is 1.5 or less on the scores produced by Freedom House. Flawed democracies are political regimes in which the average value ranges from 2 until 2.5 on the scores from Freedom House. Hybrid regimes are political regimes in which the average value ranges from 3 until 5 on scores from Freedom House, and Autocracies are political regimes in which the average value is 5.5 or higher on the scores from Freedom House. This operationalisation is fairly similar to the categories used by Freedom House; free (1-2.5), partly free (3-5) and not free (5.5-7). The difference is of course that I have included an additional category, flawed democracies, which in fact is an elaborated version of Diamond's regime type; electoral democracy. Flawed democracy appears to be a more conceptually valid term, as also hybrid regimes may incorporate elements of electoral democracy.

**Table 2.2: Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 1994:**

	Liberal democracies	Flawed democracies	Hybrid regimes	Autocracies
Postcommunist regimes N=25	Czech Republic Hungary Slovenia  N=3	Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia  N=6	Albania Armenia Belarus Croatia Georgia Kyrgyzstan. Macedonia Moldova Romania Russia Ukraine N=11	Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan  N=5

**Table 2.3: Classification scheme for postcommunist regime types in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in 2008:**

	Liberal democracies	Flawed democracies	Hybrid regimes	Autocracies
Postcommunist regimes (former Soviet Union) (N=25)	Czech Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Slovakia Slovenia  N=8	Bulgaria Croatia Romania Ukraine  N=4	Albania Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan Macedonia Moldova  N=6	Azerbaijan Belarus Kazakhstan Russia Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan  N=7

## 2.2 A qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable

As discussed in the previous section, there seem to be several drawbacks when applying large-N data sets to conceptualize and measure the dependent variable (see Munck, 2002). In order to better address the methodological challenges of conceptualization, measurement, and aggregation, and subsequently develop a more conceptually valid regime typology, it seems necessary to make a more qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable. This will be done by assessing the degree and type of democratic performance within several vital dimensions of democracy, which are identified and selected based on theoretical considerations. These components of democracy are then coded as either yes or no (either the element is present or it is not), and the consideration behind these verdicts (in chapter 4) are based on identified sources that are relevant to the different regimes that are being evaluated. The aggregation of the different criteria (for democracy) is also based on existing theory, as some of these democratic elements have been assigned more importance than the remainder of the criteria. The subsequent classificatory scheme of regime types, will then be applied to compare and categorize the regimes that got «stuck in transition», as hybrid regimes in the statistical operationalisation, in the empirical analysis in chapter 4.

Perhaps the most important precondition for democracy is the existence of a state that has relatively

undisputed boundaries and a monopoly on the use of force and taxation (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 17-18). Without these capacities that hallmark the modern state, democracy is impossible according to Linz (Linz et al., 1996: 18). This is particularly relevant for new states and/or new democratic regimes, as they, unlike the Western countries that gradually developed their state structures and became democratized over several hundred years, often have to face the challenge of state formation at the same time as embarking on a transition to democracy. In the postcommunist region, stateness problems have been particularly troublesome in the Balkans and among the Central Asian countries, and many of these states also had large multiethnic populations that exacerbated the post-independence challenges (Berg-Schlosser, 2003: 3). Thus, whether a regime has relatively undisputed territorial boundaries, and the extent to which it has a full monopoly on the use of force and taxation, is one of the dimensions that will be considered in the classification of regime types.

The concept «democracy» descends from ancient Greece, and means «rule by the people» (McClean and McMillan (red), 2003: 139). Traditionally, this happened by direct political participation of the citizens (in the Greek city-states), but in modern times democracy has been redefined as indirect political participation through a representative government (Wigell, 2008: 234). For a government to be representative, it requires that the electoral process be free, fair, competitive, and inclusive (with full suffrage), according to Wigell (Wigell, 2008: 237). The gradual evolution towards representative government (beginning in the 19<sup>th</sup> century), can partly be seen as a consequence of the fact that the concept of democracy had gradually merged with another ideological concept; liberalism, between the 17<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century (Plattner in Diamond and Plattner (red), 2001). Liberalism is based on the principles that all men are born with a natural liberty and equality (Locke in Diamond et al. (red), 2001: 80), and it therefore entails that the government has a responsibility to protect individual liberties and rights, and that there also must be a set of rules and institutions (typically a constitution and rule of law) that protect the individuals from the government by limiting its power (Plattner in Diamond et al. (red), 2001: 78). The merging of these two ideologies, democracy and liberalism, eventually resulted in the transition to liberal democracy in most of the Western world during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

According to Wigell, democracy should therefore be defined as the two separate, but interdependent dimensions of electoralism and constitutionalism (Wigell, 2008: 234). The former dimension is the mechanism that provides the level of representativeness in a regime, and can therefore be operationalised as the four electoral criteria mentioned above (free, fair, competitive and inclusive elections), which also constitute the minimum electoral threshold of democracy (Wigell, 2008: 237). However, in order for a regime to be classified as democratic it must also fulfill the following

four minimum criteria on the constitutional dimension; Freedom of organization (citizens are free to join and establish organizations, parties etc.), freedom of expression/speech, right to alternative information (independent, and uncensored media), and freedom from discrimination (minority groups are free to express their views/interests and participate in the political process). Regimes that fulfill all of these minimum criteria on Wigell's twodimensional typology are democracies (as they meet the procedural minimum definition of democracy). However, only those regimes that fulfill another eight additional criteria (four on each dimension) are considered to be liberal democracies by Wigell (Wigell, 2008: 238).

The four additional electoral criteria are; 1) Electoral empowerment (elected officials have an effective power to govern, that is not formally (constitutionally) constrained by other unelected/undemocratic actors such as the military or religious authorities). 2) Electoral integrity (all electoral votes weigh equally when the distribution of seats in parliament are decided). 3) Electoral sovereignty (the decision making authority of elected officials are not dependent or highly influenced by its informal relations with external actors, such as foreign powers, patrimonial networks or economic corporations). 4) Electoral irreversibility (the democratic process is not jeopardised by violent actions from other unelected actors). The four additional constitutional criteria are; 1) Executive accountability (the government is horizontally accountable to other state institutions, such as an independent judiciary, the legislature, and other independent control organs). 2) Legal accountability (Efficient and independent judiciary that is able to hold public officials accountable for their actions). 3) Bureaucratic integrity (politically independent, transparent and efficient bureaucracy, which applies the law without being corrupt). 4) Local government accountability (local governments abide by the same constitutional rules as the national government) (Wigell, 2008: 242). Liberal democracies fulfill all of these minimum and additional democratic criteria (16 in total). In between the threshold of democracy and liberal democracy several other types of democracy can be found. Wigell distinguishes between democracies that performs well on the electoral dimension and badly on the constitutional dimension (electoral democracies), and vice versa (constitutional democracies). In addition, there is also a category of limited democracies that barely pass the thresholds on both dimensions (Wigell, 2008: 246).

These two dimensions can also be applied to distinguish between other regime types, such as hybrid and authoritarian regimes (Wigell, 2008: 243). Like many other scholars (i.e. O'Donnell, Schedler, Diamond), Wigell differentiates between four main types of regimes. These are; democracies, constitutional-oligarchic (fulfills all of the minimal constitutional criteria, and perhaps none, some, or all of the additional criteria, but fails to meet the threshold for the minimum or the additional

electoral criteria), electoral-autocratic (opposite from constitutional-oligarchic), and authoritarian regimes (fails to meet the threshold for the minimum criteria on both dimensions). In this categorization, both constitutional-oligarchic and electoral-autocratic regimes can be seen as hybrid regimes, as they fulfill the minimum threshold (all of the democratic criteria) on only one of the two dimensions. Authoritarian regimes may fulfill some of the different democratic criteria, but they fail to meet the minimum demands on either dimension. Thus, it is obvious that there may be great variation within each of these regime categories. While Wigell only chose to distinguish between different types of democracy in his study, this can also be done between different types within the other regime categories.

Wigell's two-dimensional regime typology (electoral dimension goes vertically along the y-axis and constitutional dimension horizontally along the x-axis):

**Table 2.4: Wigell's two-dimensional regime typology:**

Electoral- Autocratic Regimes	Democratic Regimes
Authoritarian regimes	Constitutional- Oligarchic Regimes

x

The minimum definition (threshold) of democracy that is applied by Wigell, is fairly similar to Robert Dahl's procedural definition of democracy (Dahl, 1971). Dahl's definition is one of the most influential and most cited definitions in democratization theory, and because it also seems to capture the most basic and important dimensions of democracy, Berg-Schlosser argues that it should be regarded as the «root concept» of democracy (Berg Schlosser, 2003: 4). The three elements in Dahl's minimalist definition of democracy mostly relate to the input side of political systems, and therefore illustrate the level of representativeness of a regime (Berg Schlosser, 2003: 4). As previously mentioned, these elements are public contestation (competitive electoral process), public participation (free and fair elections with full suffrage), and according to Berg Schlosser it also encapsulates a third, implicit dimension; protection and promotion of basic civil liberties (which relates to Wigell's constitutional dimension). While there exist many different definitions of

democracy within the scholarly literature, there is an increasing consensus that Dahl's definition incorporates the most important dimensions of democracy (Collier et al., 1997: 431). According to Collier and Levitsky, a standardized usage of such procedural definitions of democracy (or other concepts), has been largely successful in decreasing conceptual confusion and in avoiding conceptual stretching (Collier et al., 1997: 431). The main reason is that democratic procedures (elections, guarantee of civil liberties etc.) is much easier to measure than more extensive definitions of democracy that also include the output side of political systems (functioning system of checks and balances, level of democratic political culture, etc.).

While there seems to be reasonable consensus regarding the minimum requirements for democracy, there is still many disputes on how to differentiate between other types of regimes. Both between different democratic regimes, and between different hybrid and authoritarian regimes. These disputes relate both to difference in degree (level of democracy) and in kind (what kind of democracy). According to Wigell, most regime typologies are based on indexes of democracy that have a unidimensional approach, and that therefore only uncover the difference in degree of democraticness, but fails to discover the difference in kind (Wigell, 2008: 231). Thus, many regimes may perform similarly in their measured degree of democracy, but they may still be different democracies or different hybrid regimes. Several regimes (such as in Western Europe) did for instance develop its constitutional dimension before its electoral institutions, whereas other regimes (many Latin American countries) have followed the opposite trajectory towards democracy (Wigell, 2008: 235). Thus, unlike for instance Diamond who defines democracy as a single dimension that can be differentiated along a linear scale, Wigell applies a two dimensional space (based partly on Dahl's scheme from 1971) that allows for more different political pathways and types of regimes to be identified (Wigell, 2008: 235). By applying two dimensions, Wigell also avoids the «fallacy of electoralism» as his constitutional criteria are of equal importance to the electoral criteria.

Many regime typologies are often predominantly focussed on these minimum requirements (on the electoral and constitutional dimension) when defining democracy, while other criteria (such as Wigell's additional features) may not be included, or are of less importance (Schedler, 2002). Such additional features of democracy are therefore often ignored or vaguely conceptualised in studies that produce extensive regime typologies (Schedler, 2002). According to Berg-Schlosser, the most important additional features of democracy both relate to the efficiency and performance of the political system (and could therefore be found on Wigell's constitutional dimension) (Berg-Schlosser, 2003: 5). The most important mechanisms for providing efficient and good democratic performance are the horizontal and vertical accountability, according to Berg-Schlosser. Horizontal

accountability refers to an independent and efficient judiciary and parliament, in addition to other specialised control organs that are able to hold the executive branch (government) accountable for its actions. Vertical accountability could be defined as various feedback mechanisms between state and society, such as independent media, public trust/ belief in the democratic system, a free, vibrant civil society, and most importantly the political elections. Thus, this type of accountability consists of three interdependent features; information, justification, and punishment/reward (Schedler in Diamond and Morlino, 2004: 25). The media and civil society therefore play a vital part in demanding information and justification from the government regarding policymaking, which subsequently influences whether the electorate chooses to punish or reward the incumbents in the next elections (Diamond et al., 2004: 25). Implicitly, this also entails a relatively free, fair, competitive political process, and respect for civil liberties, as necessary preconditions for vertical accountability. According to David Beetham, these criteria should not only be regarded as additional features but as crucial components of democracy (Beetham (red), 1994: 30). Beetham even rejects the idea of democracy as an essentially contested concept, and argues that the majority of political theory ever since the ancient Greeks have defined democracy as the interacting dimensions of popular control and political equality (Beetham (red), 1994: 28). Popular control consists of four overlapping elements; 1) popular elections, measured as the reach, inclusiveness and fairness of the electoral process, 2) open and accountable government, both horizontally (in relation to the parliament and the judiciary), and vertically (to the electorate), 3) guaranteed civil and political rights/liberties, and 4) independent and vibrant civil society (Beetham (red), 1994: 28-29). These are all interdependent, and overlapping elements, and are further dependent on a high level of political equality (among individuals) within each of these areas (Beetham (red), 1994: 30). These two dimensions are fairly similar to the two dimensions applied by Wigell, but Beetham differs with him as he argues that democracy should be measured according to the degree to which regimes fulfill these dimensions on a unidimensional continuum scale, and not a two-dimensional space (Beetham (red), 1994: 32). Thus, in order to depict the variations in democratic performance (and to categorize regime types), a qualitative assessment of the extent and degree of democracy within each of these dimensions is needed (Beetham (red), 1994: 33).

Paradoxically, however, there may be several non-democratic (hybrid or authoritarian) regimes that perform better with regard to the additional democratic features (that Berg-Schlosser and Beetham discuss above) than some of the democratically flawed states, but have yet to liberalise the electoral process, and/or protect basic human rights. Thus, it seems like the road to democracy can be very different from country to country (or region to region), something that is ignored in many of the theories on democratization, which is partly due to a Eurocentric perspective, according to Lise

Storm (Storm, 2008: 219). More problematically, this lack of democratic neutrality implies that all countries will follow the same pattern of democratization, where regimes in transition first implement democratic elections, then begin to respect civil liberties, before acquiring the effective power to govern, and possibly some additional features of democracy in the end (Storm, 2008: 219). According to Storm, this is simply not the case, and have led many cases to be wrongly categorized or simply overlooked (as they don't fit into any regime category). Underpinning Beetham's definition of democracy, Storm therefore argues that instead of focusing on different regime types, the various elements of democracy should be compared on a continuous scale where more elements of democracy have an equal value (Storm, 2008: 224). By defining democracy as a continuum, the analytical differentiation increases, while at the same time avoiding conceptual stretching and the use of diminished subtypes (democracy with adjectives) (Storm, 2008: 226). However, unlike Beetham and similarly to Berg Schlosser and several other scholars (such as Diamond et al. (red) (2001), Dahl (1971), Levitsky et al. (1997), Storm also puts more emphasis on the core elements of democracy than on the additional features of democracy. The major difference is that she considers the democratic elements of the procedural minimum definition of democracy (free elections, civil liberties) to be of equal value to a third «core» element of democracy: namely that elected governments have the effective power to govern. This latter element has often been included in «expanded procedural minimum» definitions of democracy (especially in studies of South American countries) (Collier et al., 1997: 443). Thus, the inclusion of this latter criteria may be seen as raising the threshold of democracy, but instead Storm maintains that all non-authoritarian regimes (regimes that possess one or more elements of democracy) are in differing degrees democratic regimes (Storm, 2008: 224). Storm's operationalisation of regime types is therefore much more neutral in the sense that she focuses on the various elements of democracy (and most of them with an equal value), and their possible combinations on a continuum (from autocracy to ideal democracy), instead of creating dichotomous «boxes» of regime types where the theoretical definitions of these regime types not always confine to the enormous empirical variations. Thus, even though she operationalises democracy as a continuum (and not a two-dimensional space like Wigell), her relatively neutral typology still makes it possible to identify (democratic) differences both in degree and in kind. Democracy should therefore not be regarded as a static concept, and a comparison of all possible combinations of democratic elements makes it easier to grasp the political variation among different regimes (Storm, 2008: 222).

**Table 2.5: Storm's continuum:**

0	1	1+	2	2+	3	3+ (ideal type democracy)
---	---	----	---	----	---	---------------------------



On a similar continuum to the one in figure 1 above, Storm operationalises democracy into 4 elements, where three of them; democratic elections (free, fair, competitive, and inclusive), basic civil liberties, and effective power to govern, have an equal value to each other, and higher than the last element; additional democratic features (i.e. political accountability/transparency, independent judiciary, and several other elements related to the «output» side of democracy). Storm then classifies regime types on a scale from 0 (regimes having 0 democratic elements, thus it is authoritarian) to 4 (democracies with all the 4 elements of democracy) (Storm, 2008: 223). Thus, a regime in category 2+ possesses two of the former three elements as well as one (or more) of the additional democratic features. While the former two elements (democratic elections, civil liberties) constitute the procedural minimum definition of democracy by Robert Dahl (also applied by Wigell), the latter element (effective power to govern) closely resembles two of Wigell's additional features of democracy (electoral empowerment, and electoral sovereignty).

If authoritarianism is defined in the same way Storm has done; as regimes with none of the three core democratic elements (it may have some of the additional democratic features), then it makes very much sense to operationalise the dependent variable according to the number of democratic elements that various regimes possess. In fact, the continuum scale could also be enhanced (below zero) in order to incorporate the variation among authoritarian regimes regarding which and how many authoritarian elements that various authoritarian regimes possess. Different regime types are then differentiated based on the number of democratic (or authoritarian) elements present, by applying the medium level of abstraction (Sartori in Storm, 2008: 226). Despite assessing this qualitatively, some dichotomous thresholds (of whether the democratic elements are present or not) seem to be inevitable, in order to subsequently categorize the regimes. However, there may for example still be qualitative differences in the level of horizontal accountability both among countries that are considered to fulfill this criterion, and among those that don't. The inherent implication that regime types still need to be separated by certain quantitative or dichotomous differences is also one of the greatest challenges when regime types are operationalised on a continuum from democracy to autocracy, according to Andreas Schedler (Schedler, 2001: 18-19). In other words, the various democratic elements are not simply absent or present, but there are differences in the kind or quality of various institutions and practices. This methodological problem is however mitigated by the fact that various regimes may be situated anywhere between its respective thresholds on the continuum, instead of directly on the threshold illustrating the number of elements present in the regime(s) (Storm, 2008: 220). Thus, a regime in the 2+ category may be situated anywhere between 2+ to 3 on the axis, and a more precise judgement on democratic

performances (and to what extent the elements really are present or not) would therefore be dependent on further empirical studies.

By applying a similar continuum to the one used by Lise Storm, it seems quite feasible and conceptually valid to combine it with the fourfold regime typology that was developed in the statistical operationalisation above (in section 2.1). In this context, liberal democracies are regimes that fulfill all of the democratic elements (including all of the additional democratic features). Flawed democracies fulfill all of the three core democratic elements, but lack or performs badly with regard to additional democratic features. Hybrid regimes fail to meet at least one of the three core elements of democracy, and include all of the categories between the flawed democracies and the category that fulfills no democratic elements. The latter category consist of authoritarian regimes, as they fail to meet any of the three core democratic elements (they may fulfill some of the additional features of democracy). Through a careful qualitative assessment of how the various postcommunist regimes fulfill the various democratic dimensions, it is then possible to place the regimes on the continuum.

The democratic elements that will be considered are based on the criteria that have been identified and applied in regime typologies by the scholars discussed above (Wigell, Dahl, Beetham, Storm etc.). The three core democratic dimensions constitute the minimum threshold to democracy, and are basically the same as the expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy (see Collier et al., 1997), while the additional features of democracy are applied to further improve the differentiation of regime types.

### **The core democratic dimensions:**

- 1): Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE).
- 2): Basic civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organisation, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL).
- 3): Elected governments have effective power to govern (EP). This criterion is operationalised as including two of Wigell's additional electoral criteria; electoral empowerment (that the decision making of elected governments is not constitutionally (formally) constrained by possible undemocratic actors such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves or religious authorities etc.), and electoral sovereignty (the decision making of elected governments should not be dependent on

informal relations/constraints from any external actors, such as other states, patrimonial networks, or organised crime networks). In addition to the requirement that there should be no significant formal or informal constraints on the government by undemocratic actors, the government itself needs to be democratically elected. Thus, governments that have effective power to govern, but cannot be regarded as rightfully elected (for example if the government is in complete control of the electoral process, and significantly violates the minimum electoral criteria), will therefore not be considered to fulfill this criterion.

#### **Additional democratic features (AF):**

4): Electoral integrity. All votes should be weighed equally, also when the votes are translated into seats (in parliament) (Wigell, 2008: 239).

5): Electoral irreversibility. Elected officials should not be prevented by any undemocratic actors, using violent means, from assuming office or exercising power (Wigell, 2008: 240).

6): Horizontal accountability. There should be a constitutional/legal system of «checks and balances, where the powers are separated between the state institutions. Thus, the various state institutions (such as the parliament, the judiciary, and other state agencies, ombudsman etc.) should be sufficiently independent from the government to hold it, and other state institutions, accountable for its actions (Diamond et al., 2004: 26).

7): Vertical accountability. The citizens should be able to hold its elected officials accountable for its actions/policies. Ultimately, this requires relatively democratic elections where the electorate can punish or reward the incumbent government for its actions. However, it is also important that the media and civil society is able to monitor the government and demand information and justification for its policies, which also implies that there should be a relatively high level of civil liberties, and the rule of law, in order to enlighten the electorate so that they have a better foundation for making up their minds about their elected representatives (Diamond et al., 2004: 25).

8): Legal accountability (rule of law). The judicial system needs to be independent from the other state institutions, in order to hold the government and the other state institutions accountable for its actions, as well as protecting civil liberties (O'Donnell in Diamond et al., 2004: 23). Thus, it is also vital that the judicial system is sufficiently professional and efficient, in order to perform these duties.

9): Bureaucratic integrity. The bureaucracy should be relatively independent from particular interest groups (such as clientelist networks) and party patronage (influence from political parties). It is also vital that the bureaucracy applies laws in a universal, effective, and transparent manner, and that there is a low level of corruption (Wigell, 2008: 241).

10): Local government accountability. Local governments need to abide by the rules and laws in the constitution, as the legality of the constitution should be universalistic throughout the entire state territory (Wigell, 2008: 241). On the one hand, this implies that there should be a certain level of decentralization (as local governments need to have some degree of independence and not be totally dependent or controlled by the national government, in order to have the ability to comply with the constitutional rules), but at the same time it is also vital that there is a relatively high level of «stateness»; that the state has complete monopoly on the use of force and taxation (Linz et al., 1996).

Regarding the first two dimensions of democracy above (FCE, and BCL), only regimes that fulfill all of the four respective criteria, are considered to be a FCE or BCL regime type (or both if it fulfills all of the eight criteria in total). In addition to fulfilling these two dimensions, elected governments must also have an effective power to govern (EP), in order for a regime to be considered democratic. Regarding the fourth dimension (AF), regimes that fulfill all of the additional features of democracy are defined as an AAF regime type (includes all of the liberal democracies), while regimes that fulfill less of the additional features are AF regime types (except for autocracies, as they lack any of the core democratic attributes), and the number of additional features that are met will therefore be used to further distinguish between the regimes on the continuum.

**Table 2.6: A qualitative regime typology:**

0	1	1+	2	2+	3	3+	4
Autocracy	Hybrid regimes				Flawed democracies		Liberal democracy
	FCE	FCE+AF	FCE, BCL	FCE, BCL+AF	FCE, BCL, EP	FCE, BCL, EP+AF	FCE, BCL, EP+AAF
	BCL	BCL+AF	FCE, EP	FCE, EP+AF			
	EP	EP+AF	BCL, EP	BCL, EP+AF			

In this qualitative definition of democracy, an expanded procedural minimum definition (FCE, BCL, EP) constitutes the threshold to democracy. The various thresholds that are included in the table above (between hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal democracies) were not included in Storm's typology, as she only differentiated between authoritarian regimes and non-authoritarian regimes (that were all defined as democratic, but in differing degrees). The reason why these additional thresholds (categories) have been included is mainly because it helps to produce a better understanding of how the different regime types are developing, and it also seems necessary to differentiate between those regimes that are truly democratic, and those that are hybrid. Raising the threshold of democracy, including the EP criterion (effective power to govern), also seems necessary because it appears to be very relevant for the complete fulfillment of the two other core elements of democracy (FCE, BCL). Especially in the postcommunist region where many states are either formally or informally deprived of power from undemocratic actors (such as patronage networks, minority groups with secessionist claims, foreign states etc.), and the minimum electoral and constitutional requirements may therefore not be universally applied even in regimes that are defined as FCE/BCL regimes, because a limited power to govern may entail that several geographical territories or areas of decision making are beyond governmental control. Moldova, an FCE regime type, is a good example of this, as it lacks control over the province of Transnistria (which has declared independence), and is therefore unable to enforce fully democratic elections in this area despite the fact that it is officially within Moldova's territorial borders. There are also many other examples of how the lack of EP can have a very damaging effect on democratization, and it therefore makes sense to include the EP element in the minimum threshold of democracy. However, perhaps the most important reason for the inclusion of the EP dimension is the necessity of rating the three core elements of democracy in an equal manner, as progress towards democracy can be very different from country to country (and region to region).

## **2.3 Independent variables and hypotheses**

### **2.3.1 General theories of democratization**

Today, there are totally 29 postcommunist regimes within the boundaries of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and 25 out of these regimes are included in this analysis. With such a high number of regimes (and data) to compare, a quantitative analysis based on structural variables may seem appropriate in order to produce statistical generalisations concerning the political development of postcommunist regimes. The selection of independent variables in this statistical

analysis is based on theories of democratization, and on the transition from communism.

The modernisation theory has for decades been among the most influential theories of democratization. It maintains that the chances of a successful transition to democracy increases when a regime experiences high economic development and modernisation, because this often leads to increased industrialisation, urbanisation, better forms of communication/infrastructure, and a higher education and income level, which in turn results in a changed class structure and a more liberal political culture (Diamond in Marks and Diamond (red), 1991). It is therefore perceived to be a positive relationship between economic development and political democracy (Lipset, 1960). While there has been increasing disagreement regarding the causal relationship between economic development and democracy, as an increasing number of relatively poorly developed countries have also become democratic, there has been an increasing consensus that political democracies with a high level of economic development are very unlikely to break down (Bunce, 2000: 706).

According to Larry Diamond, the majority of democratic regimes in the world are to be found either among the least developed/poorest countries or among the highest developed countries, while most authoritarian or hybrid regimes tend to be somewhere in between when it comes to the level of economic development (Diamond in Marks et al. (red), 1991: 109). O'Donnell explains this phenomenon with the alliances that tends to occur between authoritarian elites and parts of the bourgeoisie and/or middle classes when the growing economic development starts encouraging groups/processes in society to aim for democratic reforms (O'Donnell in Diamond in Marks et al. (red), 1991: 114). However, when a country exceeds a certain level of economic development (usually measured as the average income level, or GDP per capita), democracy becomes sustainable because there is less at stake for eventual losers in political elections (Przeworski in Møller, 2009: 99). In other words, in situations where economic power is not highly dependent on political power, then political elites have more to lose by contesting democratically held elections.

H1: Modernisation: The first hypothesis is that a high level of economic development, measured as the GDP per capita (in 2005 \$ prices), has a high correlation with democratic regimes. A transition to democracy may occur at any level of economic development, but there is a much higher chance of a sustainable (consolidated) democracy at high levels of economic development. At an average or a low level of economic development, there may be a higher likelihood of a «consolidated» hybrid or authoritarian regime. If democracies occur at low levels of modernisation they are much less sustainable, and are more vulnerable to breakdown. The data to this variable are taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).

H2: Economic growth: This hypothesis is partly related to the modernisation theory as a high level of economic growth may eventually lead to higher levels of economic development, and thus have a positive effect on the opportunities for democratization. A low level of economic growth may lead to decreased political stability, and therefore increase the possibility of regime breakdown (both whether it is a democratic or authoritarian regime) (Geddes, 1999: 119). This variable is operationalised as the annual GDP growth level (in %), and the data are taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).

H3: Geographical location: The geographical location of the regimes is another structural variable that seems to be of importance when studying the political development of postcommunist regimes, because it implies the kinds of external pressure the regime is likely to experience. Regimes that are more influenced by the West, seem more likely to become democratic, than those states that are located closer to the influence and pressure from Moscow (Lucas, 2008). This is partly due to the neighbour effect (as all the states in Western Europe are democratic), and other forms of external pressure/influence (for instance, potential new member states in the European Union need to fulfill certain democratic requirements). In regimes that are predominantly influenced by Russia, and thus face less external pressure to become democratic, the elites face an easier task in preserving authoritarian institutions, thus increasing the likelihood of it becoming or remaining either an authoritarian or hybrid type of regime. This variable is operationalised as a dummy variable, where Eastern regimes are coded as 0, and Western regimes as 1. Countries are considered to have a vicinity to Western Europe if their capital city is situated less than 1000 miles from either Berlin or Vienna, and a vicinity to Russia if it is not. This operationalisation is based on Møller's operationalisation of the geographical location in the post-communist region, and he has based his operationalisation on Kopstein and Reilly (2000) (Møller, 2009: 99).

H4: Natural resources: High availability of natural resources (i.e. oil or gas) should increase the likelihood of more authoritarian modes of governance. According to Ross, most states that have large quantities of such resources are authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). This is partly caused by the huge amount of extra income that these resources provide, and thus the regime could more easily reject demands of political liberalisation by for instance reducing the tax levels or offer the population other forms of economic benefits (welfare benefits, etc). This variable is operationalised as the percentage level that fuel exports make up of the total merchandise exports, and the data to this variable have been taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).

H5: Social inequality: According to Carothers, a high level of social inequality makes it harder for

regimes to escape the «greyzone» and become fully democratic, even if there is considerable political liberalisation (Carothers, 2002: 15). Thus, a high level of social inequality should increase the likelihood of a hybrid or authoritarian regime. This variable is operationalised using the Gini index, and the data have been taken from World Development Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).

H6: : Level of corruption: According to Rasma Karklins, corruption is the main challenge to democratization processes in the postcommunist region (Karklins, 2002: 31), and a high level of corruption is therefore likely to lower the chances of democratization. One of the main reasons is that the former communist regimes enjoyed a full monopoly both within the political, economic and social sphere, and that this may have facilitated a continued culture of discretion and corruption in several of these countries (Karklins, 2002: 23). Whether corruption is characterized by low-level administrative briberies, clientelism, or «state capture» by corrupt networks, it ultimately has a negative effect on the level of accountability, transparency, justice, and the ability to execute good and efficient governance (Karklins, 2002: 23). Thus, it undermines some of the most vital building blocks of democracy, which in turn decreases the level of public trust and democratic legitimacy. While corruption may also be widespread in the private sector, corruption in the public sector has a more direct and devastating effect on the political system (and thus the prospects for democracy), especially if it is becoming an institutionalised feature of politics (Karklins, 2002: 24). Thus, corruption will be measured as the level of state control over corruption, and the data are taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (The World Bank Group, 2009).

H7: Multiethnicity: In countries where there is a high level of ethnic pluralism, and where ethnicity becomes a dividing political cleavage, it may have a detrimental effect on the prospects for democracy (Kitschelt, 1999: 31). When ethnicity becomes politicized it may endanger the political and civil freedoms for ethnic minorities (who may be disenfranchised), and could possibly also lead to the establishment of clientelist networks, a weaker bureaucracy, and a lack of rule of law (Kitschelt, 1999: 31). Multiethnicity is therefore an especially relevant variable in newly independent states, where the competition for the many new political offices is high. This variable is therefore measured as a scale from 0-100, where 0 = complete ethnic homogeneity and 100 = complete ethnic heterogeneity and data are taken from the Pippa Norris data set (Norris, 2009), which in turn has applied data collected by Alesina in 2002.

H8: Religion: The level of religious fractionalization could provide another useful measure of social composition and diversity. For the same reasons that a high level of ethnical fractionalization may



be detrimental to democracy, this should also be relevant for a high level of religious heterogeneity. Many scholars have argued that societies with a high level of social diversity (including linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences), have a significantly smaller chance of becoming democratic (Fish and Brooks, 2004: 154). The data for this variable are also taken from the Pippa Norris data set (Norris, 2009), which have applied data collected by Alesina in 2002.

H9: Openness: According to Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens, the balance of power between the state and civil society, and the balance of power within civil society (the balance of class power) are two of the most crucial independent variables in determining the chances of democratization (Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1993: 73). Thus, if the «subordinate» classes in society (the working class, peasants, and middle class) have a high level of organizational power (ability to establish associations, parties, and unions, and mobilise strong support), and also are able to hold the regime and/or the state accountable, then the likelihood of democratization increases (Huber et al., 1993: 74). The openness variable will therefore be measured as the sustainability level of the non-governmental sector, which should provide a good indication of how well developed civil society is. The data to this variable are taken from the NGO index (USAID, 2008).

### **2.3.2 Path-dependency, and transitions from communism**

The four remaining independent variables in this analysis are more specifically related to transitions from communism than the nine variables discussed in the previous section, and have previously been applied in studies that have analysed the political development of postcommunist regimes. All of these four variables are also hypothesised to have a path-dependent and long-term effect on the dependent variable, and it therefore seems important to distinguish between the deeper, structural conditions, and the more proximate and shallow causes of the dependent variable. According to Herbert Kitschelt there should be more focus on explaining the chains of causation in social science, where the deeper causes (structural conditions) are more effectively linked with the more shallow causes (the triggering causal mechanisms), in order to improve the explanation of social phenomena (Kitschelt, 1999: 12). He also argues that most proposed explanations of post-communist regime diversity are either too «deep» (as they lack causal mechanisms that links them to the explained outcome), or too «shallow» (as they nearly become a part of what is being explained) (Kitschelt, 1999: 2). The application of such causal mechanisms that link the structural conditions to the dependent variable, also implies deliberate human actions, and these causal mechanisms/variables can therefore be regarded as actor-centred variables, according to Kitschelt (Kitschelt, 1999: 8).

One of these «path-dependent» independent variables, the historical legacy of post-communist regimes, which is operationalised as the type of administrative regime during communism, is considered to be a deeper structural condition/variable, and is also perceived to have a strong influence on the other three remaining independent variables: balance of power in the first post-communist election, economic reform, and institutional arrangements. Because the latter three of these variables are more proximate to the outcome than the historical legacy variable, they could therefore be defined as triggering causal mechanisms that link structural conditions/variables, such as the prior administrative regime, to the outcome. As these variables also can be considered to be largely determined by the attitudes, behaviour, and interaction among and between political elites and the opposition, which again is influenced by structural conditions, during the transition period, they could also be defined as actor-centred variables, like Møller did in his analysis of the political development in the post-communist region (Møller, 2009). However, while the latter three variables perhaps could be seen as actor-centred explanations of the dependent variable in 1994, they should all be considered as structural conditions/variables by 2008, which is partly due to the longer temporal distance from the explained outcome, and partly because of their perceived path-dependent and long-term effect on the political development in the post-communist region (see below).

The historical legacy variable is based on two «master variables»; bureaucratic state development (including rule of law, and economic reform), and the patterns of civil mobilisation, which are perceived to have a long-lasting and path-dependent effect on the regime outcome (Kitschelt, 1999). Kitschelt applies these two dimensions of the historical legacy in order to distinguish between four different politically administrative systems during the era of communism (bureaucratic-authoritarian, national-accommodative, patrimonial communism, and colonial peripheral systems).

In states that were bureaucratic-authoritarian (Czech Republic, and also East Germany), the bureaucracies were relatively professional, and civil society had previously been highly mobilised (before communism). Thus, when communism collapsed, a rejuvenated civil society (that had been harshly repressed for fifty years) quickly mobilised, and seized power over a well developed state apparatus. These two factors also facilitated the transition to democracy. The second administrative type; national-accommodative communism, consisted of countries that had not been democratic prior to communism, but in which the regime allowed for gradual political and economic liberalisation (Kitschelt, 1999: 28). This in turn, led to a gradually stronger civil society and facilitated democratic negotiations between the incumbent regime and the opposition once communism fell. The latter two types; patrimonial communism and colonial peripheral systems

have, on the other hand, had a negative effect on democratization according to Kitschelt. In patrimonial communist systems, communism was usually preceded by authoritarian or sultanistic regimes, and civil society was weakly organised (partly due to lack of industrialisation and urbanisation, which inhibited the growth of the middle and working classes). This group of communist systems was also characterized by intense repression and cooptation of civil society (Kitschelt, 1999: 32). The last group; colonial peripheral systems shared fairly similar features, but in these states (mostly central Asian countries) the level of patrimonialism (society build around clientelist networks) was higher, and the opposition was virtually non-existent (Kitschelt, 1999: 28).

H10: Historical legacy: This hypothesis claims that both bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) and national-accommodative (NA) systems have had a positive influence on the chances for a negotiated transition or clear victory for the opposition, due to a relatively well developed state apparatus and the considerable strength of civil society in such systems (Møller, 2009: 96). Thus, they are also likely to have had a long-lasting positive influence on the process of democratization. On the other hand, patrimonial communist systems (PC) and colonial peripheral systems (CP) are more likely to have had a negative effect on the chances for democratization because these states were less liberal, and thus the civil society and the opposition were weaker (Møller, 2009: 96.). This variable will therefore be measured as a dummy variable, in which BA=1, NA=2, PC=3, and CP=4.

According to Bunce (2003) and McFaul (2002), the balance of power at the first election following the collapse of communism, has also had a significant and path-dependent effect on the political development among the postcommunist countries. It also seems like this variable has had a very different effect on postcommunist regimes than it has for authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world. Among the postcommunist states there have been greater chances of a successful transition to democracy in those cases where the opposition has won an overwhelming electoral victory over the incumbent rulers (Bunce, 2003: 188-189). In the rest of the world, the scenario has usually been quite the opposite, as compromises between the regime and the opposition often has been considered a vital requirement for democracy. Such political compromises have however had a devastating effect in several of the postcommunist regimes, where this usually have made it easier for the elites to preserve some of their power, while at the same time liberalising the political rules/institutions (Bunce, 2003: 189). Thus, it has in many cases contributed to the establishment of hybrid regimes. In cases where the incumbent regime won the majority of votes at the first election following the dissolution of communism, it often resulted in transitions to new authoritarian regimes.

The balance of power between the elites and the opposition when the transition was initiated was largely determined by the role of the military and the elites and whether there was a large scale mobilisation of opposition towards the regime, according to Bunce (Bunce, 2003: 189). She maintains that these two variables help explain why many of the Eastern European countries (that had a strong opposition and a relatively weak regime) became democratic, while several of the other postcommunist countries ended up as hybrid or authoritarian regimes. The arguments of Bunce are supported by McFaul's theory, which claims that the political development in the postcommunist regimes has largely been driven by «path-dependency», and therefore argues that the balance of power when transition began has had a significant importance for the long-term political development (McFaul, 2002: 216).

H11: Balance of power: As mentioned above, the balance of power in the first postcommunist elections, is likely to be strongly influenced by the historical legacy of the postcommunist regimes (Kitschelt, 1999). Based on the theories of Bunce and McFaul, it also seems likely that the balance of power (between the regime and opposition) in the first elections after the collapse of communism have had a significant and long-term effect on the regime types in most of the postcommunist states. Given the perceived role of path-dependency on the long-term political development in these cases, it should also be expected that there has only been minor variations on the dependent variable over the last 20 years. This variable will be measured as a dummy variable with three values, where 1=balance of power favouring the elites, 2=even balance of power, and 3=balance of power in favour of the opposition.

H12: Economic reform: According to scholars such as De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1996), and Fish and Choudry (2007), rapid economic liberalization has a positive relationship with democratization. Economic reform and liberalization may function as an effective constraint on authoritarianism as it leads to pluralism of power, and separates economic power from political power (Fish et al., 2007: 257). Fish and Choudry have also discovered that economic liberalisation in the postcommunist region has had a positive impact on democratization and socioeconomic conditions in the long-term, but no particular effect in the short term (Fish et al., 2007: 278). However, the causal direction may also be the opposite, as De Melo argues that a process of democratization inherently leads to economic liberalisation (De Melo et al., 1996: 420). When communism collapsed, all of the postcommunist countries embarked on both these processes simultaneously, and there has been a thorough academic debate about whether rapid or gradual economic reform was the best way to promote a well functioning market economy and democracy (Møller, 2009: 70). Those in favour of the gradual approach argued that it was necessary to set up effective institutions (that could regulate

the economy and provide rule of law) before liberalising the economy, while the «shock therapists» maintained that rapid reforms were more effective in eliminating all kinds of opposition towards democracy and capitalism (Møller, 2009: 70). Based on the empirical findings of Fish et al., (2007) and De Melo et al., (1996), and due to the theoretically indisputable strong relationship between democracy and economic liberalisation (both are necessary components of each other), it seems that a high degree of economic liberalisation is most likely to correspond in a high degree of democracy. This is only true to a certain extent however, as too much economic liberalisation may result in an unregulated (and unjust) economy where powerful private actors (such as the oligarchs in Russia) in an undemocratic manner can obtain a large share of the country's resources, and thereby constitute a democratic deficit. Still, the hypothesis in this analysis is that a high degree of economic liberalisation in the first few years after communism has generally had a positive long-term (and possibly path-dependent) effect on the prospects for democratization. The data to this variable are taken from De Melo's annual liberalisation index, and are measured as the average annual degree of economic liberalisation between 1989 and 1994. De Melo's index is based on the performance of the internal markets, the external markets, and the private sector entry (De Melo et al., 1996: 403).

H13: Institutional Arrangements: This hypothesis is based on Steven Fish's assumption (2006) that stronger legislatures provides stronger democracies. Fish argues that weak legislatures leads to reduced horizontal accountability, as there are less checks and balances on executive power (Fish, 2006: 12). This role of the legislature is also particularly important in new democracies or newly independent states as other control organs (such as the judicial system) often needs time to reform and get rid of its authoritarian habits (Fish, 2006: 20). A strong legislature is also necessary in order to promote the development of political parties, which is a crucial element of political competition and vertical accountability (without competition, the electorate would have greater difficulties in controlling its representatives) (Fish, 2006: 13). Fish substantiates his theories with an empirical analysis that finds that countries with more powerful legislatures are generally more democratic than states that have weaker legislatures (Fish, 2006: 18). The measurement of this variable is based on the parliamentary power index, which is developed by Fish. The legislative power of each country at the time they adopted their first constitution (after communism ended) is measured on a scale from 0-100. While there have been constitutional changes and amendments in several of the postcommunist states since then (i.e. Albania, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine), it still seems likely that the original institutional arrangements have had an effect in the long run. Fish also rule out the possibility that the power of the legislatures are not simply an effect of democratization (and not the other way around) by finding that political openness (measured a year in advance of the legislatures) correlates weakly with legislative power

at the constitutional moment (Fish, 2006: 10). Thus, it seems like adopting a constitution with a strong legislature has a positive long-term effect on democratization.

#### **2.4 Data reliability in the empirical analysis**

The qualitative and empirical analysis in chapter 4 will hopefully complement the statistical analysis, and provide more detailed and nuanced explanations of the general trends regarding the political development in the postcommunist region. All relevant independent factors/variables will be identified through the use of second-hand sources with the purpose of answering whether, and how, the different hybrid regimes have managed to fulfill the 10 different criteria of democracy, which constitute the qualitative operationalisation of democracy, and regime types, discussed in chapter 2.2.

One of the greatest concerns regarding the reliability of the empirical analysis, and of the subsequent regime classification, is whether a sufficient number of relevant sources have been applied, and consequently whether all of the relevant independent variables and conditions of democracy have been identified. Thus, the verdict on whether, and how, the different countries fulfill the different criteria, will inevitably be biased by the sources that have been selected to make these qualitative considerations. This problem is exacerbated by the fact that for some countries there have been conducted much less political research than what is the case in many other countries. For example, a large number of articles and books have been produced about the political development in Russia, while in the case of Macedonia the number of available studies seem to be fairly limited. In other words, it is questionable whether the qualitative classification of regime types will be completely accurate, as a sufficient number of relevant sources may not have been identified. It should however provide a decent descriptive evaluation of the political development, and hopefully it would also be able to identify some general trends and significant independent variables, which the statistical analysis is unable to detect, regarding how some regimes have become «stuck in transition», some have reverted to authoritarianism, and some regimes are gradually becoming more democratic. In addition, due to its more detailed and qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable, the empirical analysis should also be capable of describing and explaining eventual nuances and differences between the different regime types (i.e. between different types of hybrid regimes), in a way that the statistical analysis is unable to do.

### 3. Statistical analysis

In comparative politics, one of the most common fallacies when aiming to explain empirical phenomena, is that there often tends to be a lack of methodological awareness, and a portion of «unconscious thinking» involved (Sartori in Lijphart, 1971: 682). Thus, it is important to be aware of both the possible limitations and weaknesses as well as the strengths of the method(s) that is(are) applied to explain empirical relationships (Lijphart, 1971: 682). In the social sciences, there are four basic methodological approaches; the experimental, statistical, comparative, and case study methods (Lijphart, 1971: 682). The main objective of all these methods (except for certain types of case studies), is to scientifically explain the empirical relationships between two or more variables, while at the same time controlling for the effect of other variables (Lijphart, 1971: 683). The experimental method appears to be the most ideal procedure for scientific explanation, but due to obvious practical and ethical limitations, this method is nearly impossible to apply in political science (Lijphart, 1971: 683). It would for instance be extremely difficult (or impossible) to identify and compare two completely equivalent cases (countries), and then expose one of the cases to one variable while the other variables are held constant. The closest, and perhaps most feasible alternative to experimentalism is the statistical method, as it is able to produce partial correlations among variables while at the same time keeping other variables constant (Lijphart, 1971: 684). However, the statistical method is most adequate when there are a high number of cases, and particularly if more variables are included in the analysis there is also a need for more cases, in order to produce statistically significant results (Lijphart, 1971: 684). In situations with a small N (small number of cases, often lower than ten), the more qualitative, comparative method (or a case study approach) should usually be preferred instead of the statistical method (Lijphart, 1971: 686).

Regarding the context of this research project, where there is an intermediate number of cases (25), a combination of the statistical and the comparative method would be the most appropriate approach, according to Lijphart (Lijphart, 1971: 685). Lijphart argues that whenever it is possible, the statistical method should be applied instead of the weaker comparative method, but that the latter approach may also function as a complement to the «superficial» nature of the statistical analysis (Lijphart, 1971: 685). The most obvious limitations of the statistical method when comparing postcommunist regimes in this research project, is the low number of observations, and also the high number of variables, and combined, these two factors cause several statistical challenges. This could possibly have been solved by either increasing the number of observations, or removing some of the variables. The most effective way of adding cases would be the application of a time-series analysis (for instance from 1994-2008, resulting in a N=350), or by adding more

postcommunist countries, but due to a considerable lack of data neither of these alternatives were possible. Reducing the number of variables also seems like a bad alternative, given their perceived theoretical importance. Thus, a multivariate regression analysis of these 25 postcommunist regimes yields statistically questionable results, especially because of the high multicollinearity (very high correlations among independent variables that makes it hard to distinguish between the relative effects of each variable), and a lack of a normal distribution of the variables in the normal probability plot. These are two of the most vital prerequisites in order to produce reliable and valid results in a regression analysis, and since these are violated, an alternative statistical procedure seems necessary.

The problems of a small N/ many variables-analysis, and the resulting high levels of multicollinearity, was also one of the main concerns in Herbert Kitschelt's research of postcommunist regimes in his article; «Accounting for outcomes of post-communist regime change» (Kitschelt, 1999). Kitschelt also operated with 25 cases (the exact same countries as in this analysis), and due to the statistical constraints (high multicollinearity; usually correlations above .70), he chose to apply a bivariate correlation analysis instead of a more advanced multivariate statistical analysis (Kitschelt, 1999: 38). By doing this, it became possible to better distinguish between the relative effects of each of the rival explanations (independent variables) on the dependent variable. This methodological approach was also motivated by theoretical considerations, as a multivariate statistical analysis including several variables that are far from equally distant in time to the explained outcome, usually assigns more explanatory power to the more proximate causes (Kitschelt, 1999: 21). Thus, it may ignore the fact that the more «shallow» or proximate causes may often be dependent or heavily influenced by «deeper» structural conditions or legacies. This theoretical consideration is also relevant for several of the independent variables that are discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, as some of these variables are far more temporally distant (i.e. historical legacy, balance of power) than others (i.e. modernisation, economic growth). Thus, due to both statistical and theoretical considerations it seems that the most feasible and adequate methodological approach in this analysis is to apply a bivariate correlation analysis when aiming to explain the political development in the postcommunist region. By applying a correlation analysis, it is possible to reveal whether the relationships between the explanatory variables and the outcome are significant, but unfortunately it can not say anything about the causal directions (which for instance would have been possible in a multivariate time-series analysis). In other words, if there is a high correlation between the amount of NGOs (Openness variable) and liberal democracies, the correlation analysis is unable to tell whether it is the liberal democracies that have been caused by vibrant civil societies, or whether it's the other way round (or both, which seems most likely).



However, based on the theories and hypotheses discussed in section 2.3 of chapter 2, and by examining the correlations among all of the variables, it should be possible to draw conclusions about the most likely causal directions. In addition, the results from the correlation analysis will be combined with a qualitative comparative approach in chapter 4.

### **3.1 Data, and measurement of the independent variables**

In this analysis, the dependent variable (regime types) is measured at two different conjunctures, in 1994 and 2008 (for all 25 countries). Due to the lack of data, not all of the independent variables have been measured at the exact same time in all of the 25 units of analysis. For some of the countries there is a lack of data concerning a few of the variables. In these cases, the closest available data have been chosen, and data preceding the measured conjuncture have been preferred over data that succeed it. Thus, due to less reliable data, the effects of some of these variables are most likely not as valid as the variables that have been measured simultaneously with the dependent variable in all of the countries. The most problematic variables are; natural resources, social inequality, control of corruption, ethnicity, and religion.

In the 1994 correlation analysis, the natural resources variable (measured as fuel exports in % of merchandise exports) has data from 1994 in only ten countries (Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). The data for Slovenia are from 1993, while the rest of the countries have been measured after 1994, with Tajikistan being the most deviant case (data from 2000). For Uzbekistan, there are no data whatsoever (in neither of the analyses), and this may weaken the results of the correlation analysis, as Uzbekistan is known to produce considerable amounts of natural resources. In the 2008 analysis, most of the data are found in 2007, except Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (both in 2000). While the lack of data naturally weakens the relevance of this variable, the data that are applied largely confirm which of these countries that possess large quantities of natural resources (mostly in Central Asia). Thus, the resulting correlations can still contribute to either confirming or rejecting the hypothesised relationship with the dependent variable, even though the data are less reliable than desired.

Regarding the social inequality variable, where the Gini index has been applied as measurement, there is also lack of data for the two years that are examined, and considerable deviations between the times of measurement. A possible alternative to the Gini index could have been the Human Development Index (HDI) as it has more available data, but unfortunately the HDI index is also much less accurate as it measures not only the level of inequality, but also incorporates other

features of human wellbeing (life expectancy, GDP etc.). In the 1994 analysis, the data for the majority of countries are measured either one or two years in advance (in 1992 or 1993), which may actually portray a more valid comparison of the effects on the dependent variable, as the level of social inequality then has some «time» to influence political changes. A few countries are measured several years later, Uzbekistan, Macedonia, Croatia (all in 1998), and Tajikistan in 1999. In the 2008 analysis, most of the data have been collected between 2003 and 2005, but some deviant cases such as Slovakia, Czech Republic (both in 1996), and Turkmenistan (in 1998), seriously weaken the reliability (and possibly also validity) of this variable.

The corruption variable (measured as state control of corruption, from WGI indicators), has much more reliable data, as all the measured values were found either in 1996 or 2008. Thus, only in the 1994 correlation analysis, can the effects of this variable be regarded as questionable. However, it seems unlikely that there have been significant changes in the level of corruption during just two years (at least for the majority of the cases), and at least all of the countries are measured simultaneously, which makes the comparison more valuable.

The data for the ethnicity and the religion variables, have both been collected from the Pippa Norris dataset (2009), and were originally measured by Alesina in 2002 (for all countries). As the level of religious or ethnic fractionalization in a society are two processes that usually change in a very gradual manner over time, unless there are genocides or massive purges of ethnic minorities, there have most likely not been any considerable changes in ethnic or religious fractionalization throughout this time period. However, the data are certainly not ideal, and the effects of this variable are also to some extent questionable.

For the remaining eight variables, the data seem to be very reliable. The modernisation (GDP per capita) and economic growth variables both have consistent and reliable data for both 1994 and 2008, and for all of the 25 countries. The openness variable (measured by the NGO index), is only included in the 2008 analysis, as the NGO index began collecting data as late as 1997. The five last variables are «deeper» variables that have theoretically been assumed to have a long-term effect on the dependent variable. These are: economic reform (measured as the average annual economic liberalisation between 1989 and 1994), balance of power (at the first post-independence election), institutional arrangements (parliamentary power at the constitutional moment), historical legacy (type of communist administrative system), and geographical location (East or West).

### **3.2 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 1994**

**Table 3.1 Correlation analysis 1994:**

		Autocracy	Hybrid_Reg	Flawed_dem	Liberal_dem
Modernisation	P.correlation	-,443*	-0,32	0,24	,719**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,03	0,12	0,25	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Eco_growth	P.correlation	-,417*	-0,15	0,33	0,31
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,04	0,47	0,11	0,13
	N	25	25	25	25
Geo_location	P.correlation	-,667**	-0,01	,421*	0,28
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,98	0,04	0,18
	N	25	25	25	25
Nat_resources	P.correlation	,704**	-0,22	-0,21	-0,2
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,31	0,33	0,36
	N	24	24	24	24
Soc_inequalities	P.correlation	0,21	0,15	-0,23	-0,18
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,33	0,48	0,28	0,39
	N	25	25	25	25
Balance_power	P.correlation	-,500*	-0,22	,445*	0,37
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,11	0,29	0,03	0,07
	N	25	25	25	25
Corruption	P.correlation	-,515**	-0,27	0,32	,632**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,01	0,19	0,12	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Historical_legacy	P.correlation	,606**	0,26	-,475*	-,520**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,21	0,02	0,01
	N	25	25	25	25
Eco_reform	P.correlation	-,520**	-0,28	,540**	0,36
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,01	0,18	0,01	0,08
	N	25	25	25	25
Inst_arrangements	P.correlation	-,564**	-0,19	,498*	0,33
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,37	0,01	0,11
	N	25	25	25	25
Ethnicity	P.correlation	0,19	0,07	-0,01	-0,33
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,36	0,76	0,98	0,12
	N	24	24	24	24
Religion	P.correlation	-0,33	0,21	0,01	0,07
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,11	0,32	0,95	0,75
	N	25	25	25	25

In order to better depict the relative effects of each of the explanatory variables on the dependent variable, the latter has been reformed into four new dummy variables (i.e. the autocracy dummy is operationalised as; 0=not autocratic and 1=autocratic, and so on). As the table shows, many of the independent variables have statistically significant correlations with the dependent variables. Thus, in cases where the significance value is lower than the two thresholds of 0.01, or 0.05, there is less than 1 % or 5 % possibility that the null hypothesis is correct (the null hypothesis assumes that in the population as a whole, there is no correlation). If a one-tailed test had been applied instead of the stricter and more demanding two-tailed test, a larger number of these variables would also have been able to defeat the null hypothesis (and have statistically significant correlations).

The modernisation variable seems to have a linear effect on the dependent variable. Low levels of modernisation has a statistically significant correlation with autocratic regimes at the 0.05 level (both in a two-tailed and one-tailed test), and lack of modernisation also seems to be concurrent with hybrid regimes although the correlation is not significant (almost significant in a one-tailed test at the 0.05 level). High levels of modernisation have a slightly positive, but far from significant correlation with flawed democracies, and a very significant correlation with liberal democracies (at the 0.01 level). Based on the theory in the first hypothesis it therefore seem that the liberal democracies (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) in 1994 had already become consolidated democracies (as high levels of modernisation make a democratic breakdown very unlikely), while the flawed democracies may be dependent on higher economic development in order to render the democratization process irreversible. The low levels of economic development may also have facilitated the consolidation of authoritarian regimes, and perhaps also the hybrid regimes. High levels of modernisation also have significant correlations with high levels of economic growth, rapid economic reforms, high control of corruption (low corruption), high legislative power, and regimes with a Western geographical location. In addition, it also has a significant correlation with low levels of social inequality, a bureaucratic-authoritarian (or national-accommodative) past, and with regimes where the opposition won the first post-independence election.

As hypothesised in section 2.3 of chapter 2, high levels of economic growth have a high correlation with economic development, which in turn should increase the chances of democratization. However, high economic growth does not significantly relate to either of the two democratic regime types (although there is almost a significant correlation in a one-tailed test at the 0.05 level in both cases). Low levels of economic growth was also predicted to increase the chances of a regime breakdown, but despite a significant correlation (at the 0.05 level) between low economic growth and autocracies, all of the autocratic regimes in 1994 remained authoritarian fourteen years later (in

the 2008 analysis). The level of economic growth doesn't seem to have any explanatory power for the existence of hybrid regimes. With regard to the correlations with the other independent variables, the economic growth variable shares many of the same features as the modernisation variable, except that it doesn't have a significant correlation with social inequality. In addition, high levels of economic growth correlate strongly with small amounts of natural resources and ethnically homogenous societies.

The prospects for democratization are apparently, and as predicted, much higher for states that are located to the West, and are proximate to Western Europe. A Western geographical location yields a significant correlation with liberal democracies, while the opposite (regimes closer to the influence of Russia) seems to favour the existence of authoritarian regimes. For the two other regime types (hybrid regimes, and flawed democracies) geography has had less influence, although in a one-tailed test a Western geographical location has a significant correlation with flawed democracies. The other correlations of the Geo\_location variable also makes it clear that regimes that are located further to the East, generally have higher amounts of natural resources, greater social differences, higher corruption, slower economic reforms, less legislative power, and on several occasions has the first post-independence election been won by the incumbent regime.

Regimes that have high amounts of natural resources (and are mostly located in the East), also tend to be authoritarian regimes, according to the correlation analysis (significant at the 0.01 level). For the other three regime types there is no significant effect, most likely because only Russia (hybrid regime) has considerable amounts of natural resources among these countries. This finding confirms the hypothesis that high quantities of natural resources may facilitate the existence of authoritarian regimes. The correlation analysis also finds that these regimes also tend to have very high corruption, a slow process of economic reforms, low legislative power, and that their administrative systems during communism were either of a colonial peripheral or patrimonial communist nature.

The level of social inequality is not significantly correlated with any of the four regime types. Although the analysis may indicate that lower levels of inequality increases the prospects for democratization, and that the opposite leads to either hybrid or authoritarian regimes, the relationship is far from significant for any of the instances. However, the hypothesis that large social differences lower the chances of democratization, is strengthened by the high correlation with a low level of economic development, lack of economic reform, low legislative power, colonial peripheral (or patrimonial communist) systems, and regimes that have an Eastern geographical

location. All of these attributes appears to have a negative effect on democratization, but due both to the questionable reliability and validity of this variable, as well as the lack of significant findings, it would be difficult (and wrong) to draw any conclusion as to the effect of social inequality on postcommunist regime types.

Whether the first elections after communism were won by the incumbent political elites (former communists), there was a «pacted» transition (even balance of power), or the opposition won a clear victory, seems to have made a significant contribution to the political development in the early years after transition. There is a significant correlation between transitions where the balance of power favoured the incumbent political elites, and autocratic regimes (at the 0.05 level). In cases where the opposition won a clear victory, it seems to have often resulted in a transition to flawed democracies. There is no significant correlation between this variable and the hybrid regimes and liberal democracies, although the latter would be significant in a one-tailed test (in a correlation with the opposition winning the election). The lack of explanatory value for the hybrid regimes, could stem from the fact that there often was an even balance of power at the first election, and also from the great variation among these regimes, as unlike in the cases of the autocratic or democratic regime types, none of the three types of transition were particularly dominant compared to the other types. When converting the *balance\_power* variable into three new dummy variables (one for each type of transition), there is still no type of transition that can help explain the existence of hybrid regimes (and the «even balance of power» dummy has no significant impact on any of the regime types). In the cases where the opposition won the first election, there generally also seems to be low levels of corruption, rapid economic reform, high legislative power, high economic development and growth, and a bureaucratic-authoritarian or national accommodative past.

The assumption that corruption is one of the main challenges to democratization in the postcommunist region is underpinned by the results of the correlation analysis. High levels of corruption have a statistically significant correlation with autocratic regimes, while the opposite is true for liberal democracies (both at the 0.01 level). In a one-tailed analysis both hybrid regimes and flawed democracies are close to having a significant correlation, with high and low levels of corruption, respectively. Whether there is a high or low level of corruption, or a negative or positive impact on democracy, these values correlate significantly with the other «negative» and «positive» attributes (for democracy) of several of the other independent variables (such as *modernisation*, *eco\_growth*, *geo\_loc*, *nat\_resources*, *balance\_power*, *inst\_arrangements*, *eco\_reform*, and *hist\_legacy*). In addition, high levels of corruption seem to be more prevalent in ethnically heterogeneous societies (significant at the 0.05 level).

As expected, the degree of state-building prior to the fall of communism has a statistically significant correlation with the degree of democracy after the transition. The existence of highly developed state institutions, and a relatively open and developed civil society (bureaucratic-authoritarianism and/or national-accommodative administrative systems) correlate significantly with both of the democratic regime types (at the 0.05 level with respect to flawed democracies, and at the 0.01 level with regard to liberal democracies). Among the autocratic regimes in 1994, the two other administrative types (patrimonial and colonial peripheral communism) appear to have been most prevalent during communism, while for hybrid regimes there is no distinct tendency.

Despite the widespread critique of the Washington consensus approach (those advocating rapid economic reform in order to advance the democratization process more effectively), it seems that rapid economic reforms and liberalisation had a very positive impact on democratization in the early 1990s (significant correlation with flawed democracies at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed analysis, and with liberal democracies at the 0.05 level in a one-tailed analysis). The majority of gradual reformers appears to have retained more authoritarian modes of governance, while for hybrid regimes the effect of a rapid or gradual approach is uncertain.

Those countries that granted considerable power to the legislature in their first postcommunist constitutions, predominantly appear to be in a transition towards democracy, according to the correlation analysis. Strong legislative power has a highly significant relationship with flawed democracies, and would also be significant for liberal democracies in a one-tailed test. In autocratic regimes the executive branch generally has considerably more power than other state institutions (such as the legislature), and, not surprisingly, there is also a significant correlation between low legislative power and autocracies. Lack of legislative power also seems to be prevalent among the hybrid regimes, even though there is no significant correlation.

The latter three variables that are discussed above (historical legacy, economic reform, and institutional arrangements), as well as the balance of power variable, all share some important characteristics. They have all been defined as path-dependent variables that have a long-term effect on political development. In addition, they also have very high and nearly coinciding correlations with most of the other independent variables (except for ethnicity and religion), as well as for two of the dependent variables (autocracies and flawed democracies, to some extent also liberal democracies). Thus, it appears that these three variables do in fact have a path-dependent influence, not only on the prospects for democratization but also on socioeconomic development (such as the

modernisation, economic growth, corruption, and social inequality variables). Even though these socioeconomic variables (except for social inequality) also have very high correlations with most of the other independent variables, it seems quite likely that these variables have been influenced to some extent by the structural conditions already in place (that are largely determined by the aforementioned three variables). In turn, the effect of the path-dependent variables on the other independent variables may in fact reinforce their initial effect on the dependent variable. For instance, the extent of economic reform (gradual or rapid) or the level of state-building prior to the transition (historical legacy), are likely to have influenced the degree of economic growth, economic development, and social inequality, which in turn have an impact on the political development.

The last two independent variables, ethnicity and religion, seem to be less relevant for explaining the dependent variable. Neither of them has any significant impact on the dependent variable(s). A high level of ethnic homogeneity has almost a significant correlation with liberal democracies in a one-tailed test, and the same is true for high religious homogeneity and autocracies. However, as mentioned earlier, the data for both of these variables are not completely reliable, and therefore these findings are somewhat questionable.

To sum up, the correlation analysis is not able to explain why there were 11 hybrid regimes in 1994, but it provides several indications as to how the authoritarian or democratic regimes had come into being in the first few years after the transition. A Western geographical location, high levels of economic development, low social inequality, and low levels of corruption, seem to have been very positive for democratization in the early 1990s. In addition, these regimes (mostly flawed democracies) had often been preceded by bureaucratic-authoritarian or national-accommodative administrative systems (during communism), and had later been influenced by a strong democratic opposition (that had won the first elections), and subsequently adopted constitutions that allowed for strong legislatures, and that initiated rapid economic reforms. For those regimes that were autocratic in 1994, the story was almost the opposite. Most of the autocracies were located in the East, and they generally had low levels of economic development and economic growth, high levels of corruption, and a considerable amount of natural resources. These regimes were also often preceded by patrimonial or colonial peripheral communism, often resulting in a balance of power favouring the incumbent political elites, and they generally had weak legislatures and slow economic reforms. For the eleven hybrid regimes in 1994 it is hard to discover any general tendency, as there are no significant correlations with the independent variables.



**Table 3.2 Correlation analysis 2008:**

2008		Autocracy	Hybrid_regimes	Flawed_dem	Liberal_dem
Modernisation	P.correlation	-0,34	-,525**	0,01	,797**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,1	0,01	0,97	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Eco_growth	P.correlation	,527**	0,11	-0,01	-,598**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,01	0,6	0,96	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Geo_location	P.correlation	-,646**	-0,16	0,33	,514**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,43	0,11	0,01
	N	25	25	25	25
Nat_resources	P.correlation	,858**	-0,32	-0,16	-0,37
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,13	0,45	0,08
	N	24	24	24	24
Soc_inequalitys	P.correlation	0,28	0,33	-,416*	-0,25
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,17	0,11	0,04	0,23
	N	25	25	25	25
Balance_power	P.correlation	-,601**	-0,02	-0,11	,686**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,91	0,6	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Corruption	P.correlation	-,758**	-0,14	0,12	,769**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,5	0,58	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Openness	P.correlation	,762**	0,11	-0,17	-,704**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,6	0,43	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Historical_legacy	P.correlation	,556**	0,37	-0,08	-,805**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,07	0,69	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Eco_reform	P.correlation	-,649**	-0,21	0,2	,659**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,31	0,34	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Inst_arrangements	P.correlation	-,704**	-0,07	0,17	,608**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0	0,75	0,43	0
	N	25	25	25	25
Ethnicity	P.correlation	0,08	0,16	0,06	-0,26
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,72	0,47	0,78	0,23
	N	24	24	24	24
Religion	P.correlation	-0,22	0,23	0,02	-0,02
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0,3	0,26	0,91	0,91
	N	25	25	25	25

### 3.3 Measuring postcommunist regimes in 2008

Based on the findings in the 2008 correlation analysis, it seems that the gradual polarization of the political development (that was visible in the 1994 analysis) has become even stronger among the 25 postcommunist countries since then. All of the liberal democracies have a Western geographical location (located in Central or Eastern Europe), while most of the autocracies are found in Central Asia. The flawed democracies and the hybrid regimes are more evenly spread geographically, although none of the flawed democracies are found as far east as Central Asia. In addition, most of the factors that significantly explained the development of liberal democracies and autocratic regimes in 1994, still have a significant effect in 2008. Thus, it seems that there has been some sort of path-dependent political development in the postcommunist region, and especially with regard to those regimes that are located either very close to Western Europe or far to the East (in Central Asia). Among the regimes situated somewhere in the middle (geographically), there is a higher regime diversity, and far less significant explanations.

Compared to 1994, there are six more independent variables that significantly correlate with liberal democracies in 2008. The main reason behind this development is most likely that five of the flawed democracies in 1994 have become liberal democracies (only Bulgaria remained a flawed democracy compared to the 1994 analysis). Thus, variables such as a Western geographical location, a balance of power favouring the opposition (at the first postcommunist election), rapid economic reform, and constitutions that grant the legislature considerable powers, have all become significant in its correlations with liberal democracies, while they no longer have significant correlations with flawed democracies. The latter finding also suggests that these four variables had a critical impact on the democratization process in the five former flawed democracies (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia). In addition, a high degree of openness (measured by the NGO index), also has a significant correlation with liberal democracies (this variable was not included in the 1994 analysis). Perhaps the most surprising and unexpected result of this correlation analysis, is that a low level of economic growth has a highly significant correlation with liberal democracies, and that a high level of economic growth correlates significantly with autocracies. This could possibly be explained by the global financial crises in 2008, that had a devastating effect on most of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and also that the oil and gas producing nations may have been less vulnerable to the financial meltdown (most of the autocratic postcommunist countries have large quantities of natural resources). High economic development, a low level of corruption, and a bureaucratic-authoritarian or a national-accommodative past, are still significant

explanations for liberal democracies (as they were in 1994), and all of the liberal democratic regimes in 1994 (Czech republic, Hungary, and Slovenia) are still liberal democracies in 2008.

There are also very high correlations among most of the independent variables that correlate significantly with liberal democracies, which is yet another indication that these regimes may have experienced a path-dependent political development. As already mentioned, all of the liberal democracies have a «Western» location, and they also appear to share most of the other attributes that were hypothesised to have a positive impact on democratization. Thus, of those variables that have a significant correlation, only lack of economic growth somewhat contradicts the hypothesised effect on the prospects for democracy. However, the low level of economic growth may also imply that the liberal democracies have become increasingly vulnerable to regime breakdown and/or political instability. As all of these countries are becoming increasingly integrated with Western Europe through their membership in the European Union, a serious democratic breakdown does, however, not seem very likely.

Despite the perceived (and empirically proven) importance of a Western geographical location, not all of the regimes situated close to the West have entered the ranks of liberal democracies. Among the exceptions are Bulgaria, Romania, and Croatia (flawed democracies in 2008), and Albania, and Macedonia (hybrid regimes both in 1994 and 2008). There is also one exception at the other end of the spectrum, as one of the regimes further to the East (Ukraine) has passed the threshold to democracy (was a flawed democracy in 2008). While the geographical location variable has been operationalised as a dummy, with only two values (West or East), several of the regimes are arguably in a more intermediate geographical position, as they are influenced both by the West (EU, IMF etc.), and the East (Russia). This may also help explain why the regime diversity is greater among these countries, as they apparently face less structural conditions that could either facilitate or inhibit a development towards either authoritarianism or democracy. The majority of these countries are either hybrid regimes or flawed democracies. This may also be one of the main reasons why there are very few significant correlations between the independent variables and these two regime types. While the authoritarian regimes on the one hand, and the liberal democracies on the other, seem to share many of the same attributes, there is much greater variation both among the hybrid regimes and the flawed democracies.

For the flawed democracies, there seems to be a very low level of social inequality (correlates at the 0.05 level). This is the only significant correlation (both in a two-tailed and one-tailed test) between the independent variables and this regime type. Thus, there appears to be a much higher political

diversity among the flawed democracies in 2008 (Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine), than what was the case in 1994. The latter three of these regimes were hybrid regimes in 1994, and none of these regimes have been defined as an «Eastern» regime (although Ukraine should be regarded as a borderline case). A Western geographical location has also nearly a significant correlation with flawed democracies, and it seems likely that the «neighbour effect» and Western pressure and funding (from the EU, IMF, etc.) have had a positive impact on the democratization process in these countries. However, in the case of Ukraine, that for strategic reasons need to maintain a close relationship with Russia (partly because of gas imports, and a large Russian minority), the process of democratization is most likely more fragile and vulnerable to a setback than in the countries further to the West. Due to the lack of significant findings in this analysis, it therefore seems necessary to assess these countries more thoroughly in a qualitative case-comparative study.

There is also a great lack of significant findings for the hybrid regimes in 2008, as a low level of modernisation is the only variable that has a significant correlation (at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed test). In a one-tailed test, a legacy of patrimonial or colonial peripheral communism also correlate significantly (at the 0.05 level), and high social inequality and a low level of natural resources are nearly significant. All of the 6 hybrid regimes in 2008, were also hybrid regimes in 1994. Thus, it seems like these regimes (Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, and Moldova) have become consolidated as hybrid regimes, but neither in 1994 nor in 2008 are there many variables that could help explain why this has happened. As already mentioned, three of the hybrid regimes in 1994 (Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine) have now passed the threshold of democracy, without any significant correlation (perhaps apart from low level of social inequality) to explain that phenomenon either. In addition, two of the hybrid regimes have become authoritarian between 1994 and 2008 (Russia and Belarus). Thus, it seems that the 11 hybrid regimes in 1994 should be devoted most of the attention in the case-comparative study, as these two correlation analyses are largely unable to explain the political development in these countries.

For the authoritarian regimes there are many significant correlations both in the 1994 and 2008 analyses. The tendency is that these correlations are generally the opposite of what is significant for the liberal and flawed democracies in 1994, and the liberal democracies in 2008. Thus, an Eastern geographical location, high amounts of natural resources, the incumbent regime winning the first elections, high corruption, a poorly developed civil society, a patrimonial or colonial peripheral past, slow economic reform, and a weak legislature, are all factors that seem to be conducive to authoritarianism. As mentioned before, there are also very high correlations between most of these independent variables, and because the opposite values of all these variables (except for natural

resources) significantly correlate with liberal democracies, it also implies that these regimes have experienced some sort of path-dependent political development. In addition, these correlations also confirm most of the hypotheses in section 2.3 of chapter 2. The only exceptions are the *eco\_growth* variable, which has the opposite effect of what was expected, the social inequality variable, which only has a significant effect for flawed democracies, and the ethnicity and religion variables that have no significant correlations whatsoever.

While the correlation analysis significantly explain the political development in the authoritarian states and in the liberal democratic regimes (including most of the flawed democracies in 1994), it fails to reveal any general tendency among the regimes that were hybrid in 1994. These 11 regimes will therefore be of particular interest in the following chapter. Why did three of these regimes become flawed democracies and another two become authoritarian, while the remaining six countries seem to have become consolidated as hybrid regimes? Perhaps more importantly, should the statistical operationalisation of the dependent variable (based on Freedom House) be trusted, or could a more qualitative assessment end up classifying the regimes in a different manner? For instance, should Ukraine really be classified as a flawed democracy and Russia as an autocracy, or are they both still hybrid regimes? As these two correlation analyses produce strong indications as to how the political development has proceeded among the regimes that are either democratic or authoritarian, the focus will therefore be on these 11 regimes that were considered as hybrid in 1994, from now on.

#### **4. Empirical analyses of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes**

In this chapter, the 11 regimes that were considered to be hybrid regimes in 1994 (in the statistical analysis), will be evaluated based on whether, and how, they have managed to fulfill the 10 democratic criteria that constitute the qualitative operationalisation of democracy (that was defined in chapter 2.2). The reason why the other 14 regimes, which were classified as either democracies or autocracies in the statistical analyses, have not been included is mainly that they were relatively well explained in the previous chapter. In addition, practical limitations, such as the page limit of this master thesis, meant that it was not feasible to include all of the 25 postcommunist regimes in this qualitative case-based approach.

#### 4.1 Rating of Russia according to my operationalisation of democracy:

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

Under the Yeltsin regime (1991-1999), the political elections, both to the parliament and the executive, generally fulfilled the minimum electoral criteria, according to Barnes (Barnes, 2001: 41), and Wyman (Wyman, 1997: 86). However, the high threshold in parliamentary elections (5 %) combined with a fragmented party system, and imbalanced media coverage favouring pro-government parties, as well as the use of state resources to fund Yeltsin's electoral campaigns, imply that both the 1995 and 1996 elections (to the State Duma and the presidency) seem to have lacked somewhat in fairness and competitiveness (Wyman, 1997: 80-81). After Putin was elected president in 2000, the electoral process has become much less competitive. Especially after the electoral reforms between 2003 and 2007 that added several new obligations for political parties, including requirements that they meet much higher minimum thresholds for membership, and pass a threshold of 7% in order to gain seats in parliament, the number of parties able to compete in elections has inevitably decreased (Sakwa, 2008: 122). Increasingly, political candidates are also being banned from competing in elections through the governmental use of a politicized judiciary (Sakwa, 2008: 122). The party system is also very fluid, which can partly be attributed to the frequent electoral amendments by the executive, and it poorly represents social interests. In addition, there seems to be a tendency that the state is increasingly merging with the «regime parties» (those parties that are being supported by the regime prior to elections), providing them with state resources, and favourable media campaigns, while also harassing several of the opposition parties (White, 2009: 173). According to Sakwa, Russia's regime type could therefore be described as a form of «managed democracy», in which the president and his administrative apparatus are in full control (Sakwa, 2008: 106). While Russia barely fulfilled the minimum electoral criteria on some occasions in the 1990s, by 2008 it is far off the mark as its elections only meet one of the four criteria: inclusiveness (full enfranchisement).

Verdict: NO

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

During the 1990s there was a relatively high degree of press freedom in Russia, but most of the media were owned and/or dominated by the oligarchs. Thus, as the Putin regime began the process of limiting the powerful role of the oligarchs in Russian society, it also entailed an attack on the media (Sakwa, 2008: 151). Instead of «restoring» the independence of the media, most of the media in Russia have become state-owned, and several journalists who have been critical of the regime

have been harassed or even murdered in recent years (Sakwa, 2008: 154). Thus, most of the media are either faced with government-imposed censorship or they choose themselves to apply self-censorship in fear of retaliations from the state. In addition to lacking freedom of speech, and the right to alternative information, there have also been several reports of discrimination, and particularly against minority groups.

Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

Partly because of the weak state institutions following the collapse of communism, a «state bourgeoisie» emerged in Russia during the 1990s. This was characterized by informal relationships and alliances between political elites and the new class of powerful oligarchs (Sakwa, 2008: 136). In addition, local and regional elites exploited the power vacuum of the central authorities and state institutions that erupted partly as a consequence of Russia's experiment of embarking on three major political and economic transitions simultaneously (Ross, 2000: 405). As the new regime struggled to complete the transitions to democracy, market economy and federalism (improving the balance of power between central and local authorities), local elites, often in alliance with the business class, made demands for increased local autonomy, and they were often successful. While the Yeltsin regime was either unable or unwilling to recentralise much political and economic power to the Kremlin, as he and his allies personally benefited from the emerging «state bourgeoisie», this all changed when Vladimir Putin was elected president in 2000. The strong electoral support for Putin is perhaps one of the main reasons why the executive branch was able to implement major reforms in order to regain political and economic power from both regional elites and the oligarchs (Ross, 2003: 31). Thus, Russia has been able to transform its political economy into a corporatist system with a vast state bureaucracy, and the state is no longer dependent on the financial capital of the oligarchs. By limiting the power and influence of the oligarchs and the local and regional elites, the Russian government is no longer significantly constrained by other undemocratic actors. However, while the Putin regime was able to reacquire the ability of Russian governments to govern effectively, this happened at the expense of democratization, and unlike the Yeltsin governments, the new regime, which is now led by president Medvedev (following the 2008 elections), can therefore not be regarded as being legitimately elected, as nearly all of the electoral criteria are significantly violated.

Verdict: NO

4) *Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

There have been several reports of vote fraud and stuffed ballot boxes, particularly in some of the republics in Russia (such as Bashkortostan, Dagestan, and Tatarstan). In both the parliamentary elections in 2003, and the presidential elections in 2004, there were reports of stuffed ballot boxes in some of the republics and regions (Sakwa, 2008: 114-117). In addition, there has been widespread use of administrative resources to «improve» the vote turnout, as was the case in the 2004 presidential elections when Putin won in every single region of Russia (Sakwa, 2008: 117).

Verdict: NO

5) *Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

In 1993, prior to the referendum on the new constitution, President Yeltsin dissolved parliament through the use of military force, and shortly thereafter a new constitution which granted large powers to the presidency, was adopted (Barnes, 2001: 42). Since then, there have not been any significant outbreaks of violence that have prevented elected officials from assuming office or from performing their constitutionally guaranteed right to exercise power. However, as seen above, Russia has become gradually more authoritarian, as the elections are fraudulent and manipulated by the regime, and it is therefore not a democratic achievement that the illegitimately elected officials have not been violently prevented from assuming office.

Verdict: NO

6) *Horizontal accountability:*

After Boris Yeltsin was elected president in 1991, to an office created by parliament, a power struggle quickly erupted between the parliament and the presidency, especially concerning the drafts for a new constitution and the separation of powers (Gonenc, 2002: 163) In 1993, the parliament was violently disbanded by the presidential administration, and a new constitution favouring a strong presidency was subsequently adopted by referendum, allowing the president to dissolve parliament, and to rule by decree on many matters (Barnes, 2001: 42). Under Putin, horizontal accountability has deteriorated even further as the powers of the executive branch have grown stronger. This has happened partly through the many amendments to the electoral legislation in recent years, which have managed to narrow the level of political competitiveness. According to Sakwa, the major purpose behind these amendments, was to remove the independent political parties from parliament, and to replace them with pro-government «regime parties» (Sakwa, 2008: 108-109). In addition, regional parties have nearly been eliminated as a result of these amendments,



which is particularly damaging to horizontal accountability as Russia is (supposed to be) a federal state (Sakwa, 2008: 108). Among these «regime-parties», one of them has become very dominant (United Russia), and the Russian regime is therefore increasingly being defined as a dominant one-party system. In addition, the executive branch controls the appointment and dismissal procedures of the judiciary, and consistently interferes in those court cases that are of importance to the regime (Sakwa, 2008: 158). Because of all these authoritarian, state-building reforms, opposition politicians have labeled the new system of governance as «Putinism», and defined it as having the following characteristics; «one-party system, censorship, puppet parliament, tame judiciary, strong centralization of powers and finances, and an exaggerated role for the secret services and bureaucracy» (Sakwa, 2008: 115). Thus, it seems evident that both the parliament and the judiciary lack sufficient independence to be able to hold the executive accountable.

Verdict: NO

#### 7) *Vertical accountability:*

The number of NGOs have risen dramatically over the last decade, to more than half a million registered organisations by 2006 (Sakwa, 2008: 167). However, they have very little influence on the decision making process, both by the central authorities, and in the regions. Their significance has also been reduced even further as a result of the recent state-building reforms by Putin (Sakwa, 2008: 167-168). The establishment of the civic forum, and later the public chamber in 2005, was officially designed by the government to give civil society organisations an improved supervising role over new legislative proposals. In reality it seems like it has been a successful method of assimilating large sections of civil society into a corporatist system, which is controlled and manipulated from above (Sakwa, 2008: 168-169). Russian civil society is highly fragmented, partly because most NGOs are heavily dependent on foreign funding, and also because of tight government regulation. A new law in 2006 also made it much easier for the government to force NGOs to close down (Sakwa, 2008: 176). In addition, all of the political alternatives to the current regime are suppressed through various means. Political parties are regularly denied access to media, denied to compete in elections, and subject to ever-changing electoral legislation. Thus, even despite the high popularity of the current regime among the electorate, vertical accountability in Russia is relatively low.

Verdict: NO

#### 8) *Legal accountability (rule of law):*

The professionalism of the judiciary seems to have been improved following new legal reforms in 2002, which provided a large salary increase for judges (in order to combat corruption) and more

funds to make sure that their rulings are efficiently implemented (Sakwa, 2008: 155-156). However, as long as the government controls the appointment procedures of the judges, the judicial system is far from independent, especially not in those cases that are of importance to the executive (Sakwa, 2008 p.158).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

The size of the bureaucracy has become inflated during the Putin regime, and has been growing enormously since the fall of communism (Sakwa, 2008: 163). One of the main reasons behind this bureaucratic expansion, is that the control and regulation of the Russian economy is increasingly and more effectively in the hands of a vast state bureaucracy, that tightly regulates the private sphere and the interests of the oligarchs (and not the other way around, which was the case in the 1990s) (Sakwa, 2008: 163). In order to accomplish this transformation, the Putin regime has increased the salaries of civil servants in order to improve the professionalism and efficiency of the bureaucracy (Sakwa, 2008: 165). The overall bureaucratic integrity has not been strengthened sufficiently, as there is still a high level of public corruption. In 2008, Russia ranked as 147<sup>th</sup> out of about 180 countries in a survey of the most corrupt countries in the world, by Transparency International (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

Partly because of the weak state institutions and the considerable power of regional elites following the fall of communism (see above, in the discussion of «effective power to govern»), Russia under Yeltsin developed an asymmetrical type of federalism as the high levels of regional autonomy led to many different political regimes, ranging from nearly democratic to full authoritarianism, among the various local governments and republics (Ross, 2000: 417). This changed after Putin was elected president, as his strong electoral mandate, both in the presidential elections in 2000 and in the parliamentary election in 1999, enabled him to launch attacks against the considerable powers of the regions and the republics, and to recentralize power to the Kremlin (Ross, 2003: 31). Some of Putin's most significant reforms were the creation of seven new super-districts, that were granted vast supervising and regulative powers over the local government administrations, and a new law that enabled the national regime to dismiss elected local and regional governments (Ross, 2003: 37). These reforms have had both a positive and a negative effect on democratization in Russia. The

increased central power and the universal application of federal legislation in all of the regions, has contributed to higher respect for civil liberties in some of the most «anarchic» republics during the Yeltsin years (such as Bashkortostan, Dagestan etc.). However, the reforms have also weakened the system of checks and balances, as the executive branch has grown heaps stronger, and it has become extremely difficult for any other state institution to hold it accountable (Ross, 2003: 44). According to Ross, Putin's reforms sacrificed democracy in order to gain unity and improve stability (Ross, 2003: 45). Thus, as the local governments have been stripped of their powers and become totally dependent on the national executive, they can not be regarded as democratic institutions, and the regime can therefore not be considered to meet this criterion.

Verdict: NO

### **Regime type: Autocracy**

#### **4.2 Rating of Belarus according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

The road to political power for current president Lukashenko, was mainly enabled by the high political openness preceding the 1994 presidential elections, which so far has been considered the only free and fair election in Belarus (Silitski, 2005: 85-86). Since then, none of the political elections have been considered to meet the minimum electoral democratic requirements by international election observers (Marple, 2009: 760). Harassment of opposition politicians, intimidation of voters, application of state resources for the incumbent regime's electoral campaign, unbalanced media coverage, and vote rigging have all been dominant features of Belarusian elections. In addition, several constitutional amendments (since 1995/96), have strengthened the executive so much; «that all meaningful opposition has been eliminated» according to Silitski (Silitski, 2005: 88).

Verdict: NO

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

After Lukashenko had consolidated his authoritarian power within the state institutions, following constitutional amendments in 1996, civil society organisations and the media became gradually more regulated and constrained by the regime, which consequently has worsened the level of civil liberties. In order to contain the further development of civil society, the Lukashenko regime has increasingly engaged in preemptive policymaking and attacks against civil society meant to

constrain and limit any possible source of political opposition (Silitski, 2005). The regime has become less tolerant of freedom of assembly, as demonstrations are often violently dissolved by the security agencies, and many NGOs have also been forced to close down (Silitski, 2005: 91). While the regime owns and controls much of the media, the remaining independent media outlets have been increasingly pressured into self-censorship (Silitski, 2005: 92). Thus, there has generally been a very high level of repression against organisations that have been critical of the regime, such as political parties, media outlets, and NGOs, and the regime's performance regarding human rights is therefore very bad in Belarus.

Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

While the Belarusian government could be considered to have a relatively effective power to govern, its claim to be regarded as an elected government is more controversial. As the regime is completely in control of the electoral process and efficiently limits any meaningful opposition alternative, then the only role of elections seems to be the legitimacy-enhancing efforts of the regime. The borderline between such a situation (as in Belarus) where the government is not defined as elected, and a situation where a regime fails to meet the minimum electoral threshold, but is still defined as elected due to a higher degree of political openness (more free, and/or fair, and/or competitive, and/or inclusive elections), is not a clear-cut one but rather based on qualitative assumptions. Thus, the decision not to define the Belarusian government as an elected government is based on the qualitative assessment that the degree of electoral democraticness is below an «invisible» threshold that separates elected governments from non-elected governments. Basically, if the electoral process is almost completely in the hands of the regime, and there is a significant lack of electoral freedom, fairness, competitiveness, and inclusiveness, the criteria that elected governments should have effective power to govern becomes irrelevant in terms of democratization, as it implies that the regime is in fact authoritarian.

Verdict: NO

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

Due to the many reports of vote rigging and fraud in all of the political elections since 1994, and the fact that the electoral commission has been controlled by the executive since 1996 (Silitski, 2005: 87), the likelihood that all electoral votes have been weighed equally is rather low. One relevant

example is the 2001 elections, where the OSCE electoral observers found that about 14 % of the votes had been cast in an opaque manner, without proper supervision prior to the election (White, 2003: 178).

Verdict: NO

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

Because the Lukashenko regime has such a strong authoritarian hold on power, the inability of the opposition to violently deny their illegitimate, authoritarian government to take office should not be considered as a democratic achievement.

Verdict: NO

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

Shortly after the new constitution had been adopted in 1994, Alexander Lukashenko won the presidential elections with a very strong mandate (about 80 % of the votes), which enabled him to extend the presidential powers through further amendments of the constitution (White, 2003: 173). These amendments, that can be considered as a form of «constitutional coup», included dissolving the old parliament and replacing it with a regime-loyal assembly, changes of personnel within the constitutional court (appointing judges who were loyal to the regime), and that presidential decrees became regarded as binding laws (Silitski, 2005: 87). The right to make appointments to both the constitutional court and the electoral commission was also transferred from parliament to the presidency. The referendum, in 1996, on whether to make these changes, has also been considered as an extremely fraudulent process (Silitski, 2005: 87). Since then, both of the presidential elections (in 2001 and 2006) have been used to enhance the authority of the presidency in some way or other (Marple, 2009: 758). Horizontal accountability is therefore very weak, and by removing the term limits for the presidency, through a 2004 referendum, Lukashenko also made sure that he could continue as president for an indefinite number of terms.

Verdict: NO

*7) Vertical accountability:*

As mentioned above (in the discussion of civil liberties) civil society and the media, which are two of the main instruments in providing vertical accountability, have been increasingly repressed by the regime since Lukashenko came to power. For a brief moment following the 2006 elections there were signs that a rejuvenation of the civil society could be possible in the future, as spontaneous demonstrations erupted in opposition to what was perceived as a rigged electoral process

(Korosteleva, 2009: 326). For the time being, civil society organisations are poorly organised, and are also closely monitored and often persecuted by the regime. In addition, the elections are very fraudulent and completely controlled by the regime, and it is therefore nearly impossible for the electorate to hold the government accountable.

Verdict: NO

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

Based on the discussion of horizontal accountability above, it became evident that the judiciary is highly dependent on the executive branch. According to Silitski, the judiciary is «de facto subordinated to the presidency» (Silitski in Goehring (red), 2008: 121).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

A large part of the bureaucracy is made up of the Presidential business office, a non-transparent institution directly controlled by the president (Silitski in Goehring (red), 2008: 122). The bureaucracy is vast, and civil servants often offer privileges to informal, clientelist connections. Thus, the level of corruption is very high, and on the Transparency International's corruption perception index in 2008, Belarus was ranked as 151<sup>th</sup> in the world, with a score of 2 on a scale from 0-10 (where 0 is highly corrupt) (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

In addition to quickly acquiring personal control over the national state institutions, President Lukashenko also abolished the autonomy of local governments shortly after he was elected president (Silitski, 2005: 86). By installing his own regional administrations he did ensure that the local governments became accountable and loyal to the authoritarian rules and regulations set by the national government, but clearly not in a democratic manner, as the local governments are now merely an effective instrument to implement the policies of the authoritarian regime. The lack of independence for the local governments also contributes to decreasing the level of horizontal accountability.

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: Autocracy**

#### 4.3 Rating of Armenia according to my operationalisation of democracy:

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

The 2007 parliamentary election was highly competitive, and was also considered by the OSCE to be the first free and fair elections since the referendum on independence in 1991 (Ruiz-Rufino, 2008: 369). The presidential election in 2008 was also regarded to meet minimum democratic requirements by the OSCE observers (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 3). According to Ruiz-Rufino, this electoral democratic breakthrough can partly be explained by the many constitutional amendments that were adopted between 2003-07, which led to a better separation of powers and a more powerful legislature (Ruiz-Rufino, 2008: 369).

Verdict: YES

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

The Armenian constitution officially guarantees that civil liberties should be respected, but in practice several of these rights are regularly being violated (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, 2009). In 2008, freedom of speech was suspended temporarily (in March), and the media have also been pressured into self-censorship after several incidents of intimidation and harassment of journalists (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, 2009). There have also been some occasions where the government has applied the military forces to break up peaceful rallies held by opposition organisations (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 5). However, there have still been some improvements regarding civil liberties in recent years as constitutional amendments in 2005 ensured much improved access for various groups in appealing to the court system (for citizens, NGOs, parties, etc.) (Markarov, 2006: 169).

Verdict: NO

##### *3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

Following independence in 1991, a coalition of clan-based political elites quickly seized political power, and gradually also accumulated large economic power through patronage/clientelist politics (Freire and Simao, 2007: 5). When Armenia eventually installed a semi-presidential system with large powers granted to the presidency, in the 1995 constitution, it became an effective way for the

regime to run clientelist politics (Matsuzato, 2006: 317-318). Thus, instead of being informally constrained by patrimonial networks, the strong Armenian executive could manipulate and control various elite clans through its ability to appoint and dismiss prime ministers and the cabinet, as well as dissolving parliament (Matsuzato, 2006: 318). This corrupt system of patronage politics has nevertheless had a negative impact on effective decision making, according to Freire (Freire et al., 2007: 6), and possibly even more so after the recent constitutional amendments in 2005, which transferred many of the presidential powers (and leverage) to the parliament. However, much more troublesome for the elected government's effective power to govern, is the formal constraints imposed through the increasing militarization of the state. Exploiting the nationalist sentiments that erupted as a result of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (an Armenian-populated territory within Azerbaijan), political elites claimed that a much more powerful military, also politically, was necessary to preserve national security (Freire et al., 2007: 5). In reality, this alliance between the powerful clans and the military was an effective way of securing regime survival, and to increase the personal power of regime officials, both politically and economically. Another alarming challenge for the Armenian government(s) is the high political influence of other states, and particularly Russia. Because Armenia has become increasingly isolated economically, which is partly due to economic blockades from two of its neighbour countries, Turkey and Azerbaijan, it has also become much more dependent on Russia, due to its vast energy supplies and investments. Russia owns and controls large segments of the Armenian economy (i.e. in the banking system, telecommunications, and energy companies) and can therefore use that as leverage to influence Armenian politics (Freire et al., 2007: 11).

Verdict: NO

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

As the electoral process in many of the rural areas in Armenia often lack secrecy and is tightly controlled by the heads of the local communities (see below; local government accountability), it is highly doubtful that all electoral votes weigh equally. Intimidation of voters, stuffed ballot boxes, and bribes to influence voter choices have often been regarded as common features in many of these rural areas (Sahakyan and Atanesyan, 2006: 350).

Verdict: NO

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

Following the fraudulent presidential elections in 2003, the government ordered the military to suppress protesters who were accusing the regime of vote rigging (Freire et al., 2007: 6). Thus, the



regime legitimised violent behaviour as a means to stay in power. The military forces had also suppressed opposition movements following the rigged elections in 1996, and did so again in 2004, and most recently after the relatively free presidential elections in 2008 (Way, 2008: 63). Because the two most recent elections (in 2007 and 2008) were considered to meet the minimum democratic requirements, the (re)elected officials were not prevented through violent means from assuming power. However, the willingness to apply coercion and repression of the opposition in order to secure the survival of the regime has been demonstrated on several occasions, and it therefore seems unlikely that the regime and/or the military would have allowed the opposition to assume office if they had won the elections.

Verdict: NO

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

In the constitution of 1995 there were no real guarantees for the independence of the various branches of the state, as the presidency enjoyed considerable powers (i.e. to appoint/dismiss the prime minister, dissolve parliament, and select judges to the constitutional court, etc.) (Markarov, 2006: 162-163). Following a long-lasting constitutional debate between the incumbent government and the opposition, which was also influenced by external actors (international organisations and Western countries), several amendments to the constitution were made through a referendum in 2005. The presidential prerogatives were reduced in favour of the parliament, and the independence of the judiciary was strengthened, resulting in improved horizontal accountability (Markarov, 2006: 165). Since the adoption of these constitutional reforms, the prime minister is no longer accountable to the president but to the parliament (with a few exceptions) (Markarov, 2006: 167). The independence of the judiciary has also improved somewhat after several legislative reforms recently, but alarmingly, the president is still granted the right to select and appoint judges (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 4). While the overall horizontal accountability seems to have improved significantly, at least theoretically, concerns still remain regarding the effective implementation of these reforms, and of the highly informal, and clientelist nature of Armenian politics that undermines transparency within decision making, and that ultimately may also deprive these accountability-strengthening measures of their supposed content and purpose. This is especially relevant as the three regime parties (HKK, Prosperous Armenia, and the Armenian revolutionary Federation) currently control 75 out of 90 seats in parliament (Ruiz-Rufino, 2008: 371-372), which therefore mitigates the relevance of a less powerful presidency (after the 2005 constitutional amendments). Until it is evident whether all of the adopted reforms have been effectively implemented, and the judiciary has become more independent, Armenia is considered to fail to comply with this criterion.

Verdict: NO

*7) Vertical accountability:*

Nearly all aspects of Armenian society seem to be determined by the informal relationships between and within social networks (i.e. allocation of resources, decision making, protection of civil liberties etc.) (Freire et al., 2007: 7). The strong importance of deep historical traditions, and of community and family relationships have so far seemed to limit the development of a democratic political culture and civil society, which according to Sahakyan is one of the greatest obstacles to democratization in Armenia (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 351). High government repression and efficient electoral party patronage have made it extremely difficult for the opposition to mobilize electoral support. As national authorities often make alliances with the heads of local communities, who subsequently secure the votes of the locals, it has also made it more difficult for the opposition or the NGOs to continue its development, and to demand improved vertical accountability. However, several large demonstrations have been conducted in opposition to election results over the last two decades (in 1996, 2003, 2004, and 2008). This indicates that there is a potential for a continued development of civil society, and of increased demands for improved vertical accountability among the electorate, and especially in the urban areas, where party patronage is far less effective than in the rural areas.

Verdict: NO

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

The judicial system is weak and influenced by the government, although a new law tailored to increase the independence and efficiency of the judiciary was implemented in 2008 (Walker in Goehring (red), 2008: 80). Most Armenians also have little trust in the capabilities of the judicial system to protect human rights (Walker in Goehring (red), 2008: 80), and in a 2004 survey only 12 % of the population considered the judiciary to be independent of executive control (Freire et al., 2007: 6).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

There is a very high level of corruption within the government administration and bureaucracy, and bribes are common instruments among politicians and civil servants who want to acquire more powerful positions within the state institutions, government or parliament (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 350). Transparency International ranks Armenia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world (109<sup>th</sup>) on the 2008 corruption perception index, with a score of 2.9 on a scale from 1-10

(Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

Armenian society has for centuries been based on very strong community relationships, which have particularly been built around the Armenian Apostolic Church, and/or the most powerful and wealthy clans and local elites (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 348). These local communities have retained their powerful status in the political and social sphere of society also after independence in 1991, especially in the rural areas, and an entrenched system of clientelism is therefore better equipped to explain the electoral process than political ideology and/or personal preferences among the electorate (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 349). As mentioned above in the discussion of vertical accountability, the national authorities consistently apply their political and economical power (bribes, coercion etc.) to ally with the heads of local communities in order to increase their electoral support (Sahakyan et al., 2006: 349). Thus, the local governments are generally accountable to the national government, but not in a democratic manner as the relations between national and local authorities clearly lack transparency, and have a highly informal and corrupt nature.

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE**

#### **4.4 Rating of Albania according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

*1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

During the first decade following the end of communism, most of the elections (except the 1992 elections) were full of irregularities and widespread manipulation of voters, exercised both by the government as well as opposition parties (Kajsiu, Bumci, and Rakipi, 2003: 5) The political elections were regarded as competitive but still not fully free and fair. There were however several improvements in the 2005 elections, following the implementation of a new electoral code in 2003 that provided a more reliable and efficient counting of votes (Szajkowski, 2007: 228). Still, the 2005 parliamentary elections only partially complied with international standards for democratic elections (Szajkowski, 2007: 229), and the same verdict was given for the 2007 local elections (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 53). Generally, it therefore seems that Albania has made some progress towards reaching the threshold of electoral democracy, which is partly caused by

international pressure and EU conditionality. The democratic electoral progress in the 2005 elections was for instance seen as a necessary precondition for Albania in order to be allowed to sign the Stability and Association agreement with EU in 2006 (Szajkowski, 2007: 231). The presidential election in 2007, which was executed indirectly by parliamentary vote, went according to the constitution, but electoral campaigns are still marred by irregularities. A poor system of voter registration, lack of a completely reliable vote-count, and intimidation of voters are issues that need to be dealt with before Albania is able to pass the minimum electoral threshold.

Verdict: NO

*2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

The media and civil society have been relatively independent and active since the fall of communism, which is probably partly due to the weak state institutions (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 30). On some occasions, such as between 1990-1992, and following the economic crisis in 1997, the state institutions completely collapsed, and the power vacuum was filled by organised crime and informal clientelist networks (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). Thus, it is likely that the Albanian state lacked the coercive strength to neither suppress nor protect civil liberties, as large parts of the Albanian territory were outside of government control (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). However, by 2008 all of the minimum constitutional criteria were relatively well protected by the state, according to the annual progress report by the EU commission, and all of these civil liberties are also guaranteed by the Albanian constitution, which was ratified in 1998 (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 13-16). Currently, the constitution also seems to be respected throughout the entire country, and Feilcke-Tiemann therefore argues that all Albanian citizens possess the same civil rights (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 28). However, there are some concerns about the lack of transparency regarding media ownership and funding, and the lack of opportunities (education, employment) for the Roma minority (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 13-17).

Verdict: YES

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

As mentioned above, the weak state building process in Albania has on some occasions resulted in a lack of state monopoly on taxation and the use of force. This was particularly true just after the old communist regime fell in 1990, and again after the economic crisis and parliamentary elections in

1997, that resulted in the Socialist Party gaining office and readapting the state institutions to its own advantage (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 17). While the state institutions have been strengthened somewhat after the new constitution was adopted in 1998, they still suffer from a high level of politicization and corruption, as there are significant changes within the bureaucracy and the judiciary whenever there is a change of government (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 28-29). This partly stems from the communist legacy of identifying the governing party with the state, and from the political and social cleavage between former communists and the anti-communists, which is still a salient issue today (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 15). Another likely explanation behind the weakness of the state institutions is the extremely isolated situation that Albania experienced during its communist era (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 5). Because of all these factors, Albanian politics is extremely polarized, and this development has also made it extremely difficult for the parliament to pass legislation, particularly on electoral and judicial reforms, as a broad political consensus is demanded by the constitution (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 51). As a result of all these factors (the lack of political dialogue, polarized political climate, and politicized state institutions), the influence of informal actors, such as the EU, and the OSCE, on Albanian politics has increased, and has also become one of the primary sources of legitimacy for the Albanian governments, that are facing an increasingly disaffected and disillusioned electorate (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 20-24). The conditionality agreements between external and informal actors such as the EU/NATO, and Albania, with regard to membership, or increased cooperation with these organisations, seem to have facilitated further democratization, and also improved the ability of elected governments to govern (Pearce, 2008). In 2008, this was exemplified by the successful adoption of a new and more proportional electoral system, which would have been impossible if it had not been for the sudden cooperation, and improved consensus among the two main political parties and arch rivals, The Democratic Party and the Socialist party (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 6). Thus, under some doubt, Albania is judged to have complied with this criterion.

Verdict: YES (barely)

#### *4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

In the parliamentary elections in 2005 there were several reports of abuse of administrative resources, vote buying, and multiple voting (Szajkowski, 2007: 229). These irregularities also appear to have been common features in the Albanian elections since the end of communism. The new electronic vote system that was established after the 2005 elections also appears to be less than reliable (Commission of the European communities, 2007: 6).

Verdict: NO

5) *Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

During the parliamentary elections in 1996, which had been rigged by the incumbent Democratic Party, the opposition was violently suppressed by the police (Szajkowski, 2007: 228). There have also been examples of police intimidation and violence during some of the other elections, and according to Feilcke-Tiemann, the election in 2005 was the first time political power was transferred in a relatively peaceful and democratic way (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 40).

Verdict: YES

6) *Horizontal accountability:*

One of the main causes behind the huge economic crisis in 1997 was the lack of government accountability and transparency<sup>2</sup>, and the weakly regulated and informal economy in Albania (Pearce 2008). Since then, it seems that there have been some improvements regarding the transparency and accountability of the executive branch. The election in 2001 was perhaps a turning point as it marked the end of a decade-long tradition where opposition parties used to boycott state institutions (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 12). Since 2001, the opposition parties have participated in parliament, thereby increasing the legitimacy and transparency of political governance as less issues are being decided behind closed doors (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 12). However, the state institutions, such as the judiciary and bureaucracy, are still highly politicized by the incumbent governments, and this vicious cycle repeats itself whenever there is a change of government (Pearce, 2008), (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 28-29). The judiciary also lacks constitutional protection for its judges (Pearce, 2008), and is often faced with political interference (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 29). In addition, the executive branch (presidential administration) is responsible for appointing judges (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). The conflict between the parliament and the president in 2008 regarding presidential appointments to the judiciary also indicates that the parliament is too weak to hold the executive adequately accountable (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7).

Verdict: NO

7) *Vertical accountability:*

Civil society have been dominated by organisations that are either dependent on foreign funding, or that are closely connected to the political elites (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 29) While the civic activity has been low, there is a growing and independent media sector that provides a more open political debate, which in turn has improved the transparency and accountability of the regime (Kajsiu et al.,

---

<sup>2</sup> Many political elites also benefited from the pyramid scheme companies that were partly responsible for the economic crisis in 1997 (Pearce, 2008).

2003: 30). However, some of the civil society organisations, such as MJAF! (Enough!) have become increasingly active in monitoring the government (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 13), and particularly with regard to the fulfilment of the SAA criteria (Stability and association pact with the EU) (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 30). Thus, vertical accountability seems to be improving, but due to fraudulent elections and the highly corrupt and inefficient governance by the Albanian governments over the last two decades, the electorate has become increasingly disaffected with politics (Feilcke-Tiemann, 2006: 30). In the parliamentary elections in 2005 the voter turnout was only 49,2 %, and it therefore seems that improved transparency, and a more democratic political culture are required in order to improve vertical accountability.

Verdict: NO

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

The judiciary is like most other state institutions highly politicized by the incumbent political party, that often hired their «own» judges and used it as an instrument for political struggles with the opposition (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 19). Thus, the judiciary not only lacks independence but also professionalism, which makes the enactment and implementation of laws even more inefficient. It also lacks adequate office space, equipment, and funding (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9). The lack of judicial independence, professionalism and efficiency, is probably also one of the main reasons why the level of corruption remains so high.

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

As mentioned above, the bureaucracy is highly politicized, and civil servants are usually appointed for political reasons rather than merit (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 8). There is also a high level of corruption within the oversized bureaucracy, as both citizens and private businesses are forced to pay bribes when dealing with it (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 37). Another reason for the high corruption is that state institutions provide employment and income possibilities in an economy where the level of unemployment and poverty is very high (Kajsiu et al., 2003: 6). In the 2008 corruption perception index, conducted by Transparency International, Albania was ranked 85<sup>th</sup> with a score of 3.4 out of 10 (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

According to Bushati, the process of decentralization has become irreversible since 1998 (when the new constitution was adopted), and the cooperation between national and local governments is gradually improving (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 57). This has especially been the case since the local elections in 2007, but some of the local governments are still not adequately funded by the national government (Bushati in Goehring (red), 2008: 58).

Verdict: YES

**Regime type: BCL, EP+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Local government accountability)**

#### **4.5 Rating of Kyrgyzstan according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

According to Scott Radnitz, the parliamentary elections held in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 that eventually led to the resignation of President Akayev, during the Tulip revolution, were perhaps the most democratic elections ever held in Central Asia (Radnitz, 2006: 134). The OSCE claims that this election was truly competitive, but that it was still lacking both in the level of freedom and fairness (Radnitz, 2006: 134). In previous elections there had been several reports of widespread electoral irregularities, for instance in the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1995 (Anderson, 1996) and in the 2000 parliamentary elections (Abazov, 2003: 549-550), where many parties and candidates were denied the right to compete in the elections. Since 2005, the new regime led by president Bakyev, who was later forced to resign following the April 2010 coup, has continued Akayev's unfinished process of establishing more authoritarian modes of governance, and the 2007 parliamentary elections also failed to meet the minimum electoral threshold (Nichol, 2009: 7). Since 2008, when this analysis ends, the situation has deteriorated even further, eventually resulting in a coup d'état in April 2010 and ethnic conflict and violence during the following months.<sup>3</sup>

Verdict: NO

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was regarded by many scholars as «an island of democracy» in Central Asia (Dukenbaev and Hansen, 2003: 27). In addition to relatively competitive elections, there was also a relatively high level of civil liberties. Following several constitutional amendments

---

<sup>3</sup> In June 2010, the power of the parliament was significantly strengthened as several prerogatives were transferred from the presidency to the parliament through new constitutional amendments, which were adopted by referendum (New York Times, 11.10.2010). However, it is possible that these changes may soon be reversed, as the interim government (following Bakiyev's ouster) that proposed these changes seems to have lost the recent parliamentary elections (on 10<sup>th</sup> of October) to an opposition that favours a strong presidency (Asianews.it, 15.10.2010).



(in 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2003), the executive branch gradually increased its powers, and began to limit the freedom of the mass media and the opposition. The judicial branch, which was controlled by the president, was abused to persecute several newspapers and members of the opposition that had been critical of the regime, thereby violating three of the minimum constitutional criteria (freedom of speech, freedom of organization, and right to alternative information) (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 32-33). While the constitution of 1993 officially protects basic human rights and civil liberties, the increased powers of the presidency and the subsequent lack of accountability and transparency means that the executive is able to circumvent the constitution when necessary. This trend has also continued after the Tulip Revolution, as independent media outlets and the political opposition are regularly being harassed (i.e. with lawsuits), and public demonstrations are often banned or violently dissolved (Nichol, 2009: 6-7). However, compared to the other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has a much more liberal society with a higher level of civil liberties, but still fails to meet the minimum constitutional threshold.  
Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

Ever since independence, the politics of Kyrgyzstan has been largely determined by the informal networks and patronage ties among the executive branch, the state bureaucracy, regional elites, and business elites (Radnitz, 2006: 132). The importance of localism, and the informal and personal patronage ties between local communities and the local and regional political candidates, who, when in office often provide material support to their local villages and supporters, are crucial factors for political mobilisation in Kyrgyzstan, and was also a vital element in the overthrow of the Akayev regime in 2005 (Radnitz, 2006: 137-138). Combined with weak state institutions and the authoritarian measures of the presidential administration (that often cause discontent and envy among other elites), the powerful patronage networks are one of the main reasons for Kyrgyzstan's constant political instability in recent years (Radnitz, 2006: 139). In addition to the «reserved domains» of powerful regional and business elites and the corrupt and incompetent state bureaucracy, it could be argued that the presidential administration, despite being an elected office, also functions as an «undemocratic» constraint on the government and the prime minister, as most of the government's constitutionally granted prerogatives (i.e. formulation and implementation of public policy) have been illegally assigned to the presidency (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 34). Because of the rivalries between different clans, and between different regions (especially along the North-

South divide), and the relatively weak central authority, which is dependent on unstable alliances with regional elites, the Kyrgyz state is unable to efficiently collect taxes and redistribute resources (Ruget and Usmanalieva, 2007: 442). Kyrgyzstan is also one of the poorest countries in the world, has a massive foreign debt (nearly 2 billion US dollars in 2005), and is very dependent on external sources of income, such as loans and investments from international organisations (Radnitz, 2006: 143).

Verdict: NO

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

In the parliamentary elections in December 2007, there were, according to the OSCE, «serious irregularities and inconsistencies» in the counting of votes and major discrepancies between the preliminary and final vote results (Nichol, 2009: 7). In 2009, during the presidential elections there were also several reports of vote rigging, flawed voting lists and some cases of multiple voting (Nichol, 2009: 7).

Verdict: NO

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

Because the elections in Kyrgyzstan have been considered to be very fraudulent, the new representatives in the legislature and government can not be regarded as being legitimately elected. Thus, Kyrgyzstan fails to meet this criterion.

Verdict: NO

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

Following independence in 1991 (once the Soviet Union collapsed) newly elected president Askar Akayev (elected in 1990) promised democratic reform, but during the 1990s there was a gradual extension of presidential powers vis-à-vis parliament (Anderson, 1996: 530). In 1994, Akayev dissolved parliament, and replaced it with a bicameral legislature, thereby weakening horizontal accountability (Abazov, 2003: 546). While the constitution of 1993 allowed for a strong presidency, further constitutional amendments in 1996, 1998, and 2000, radically increased the powers of the presidency while limiting that of the parliament (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 30). The role of the government, led by the prime minister, has been reduced to merely implementing the near unilaterally decided policies by the presidential administration, which also has the power to appoint and dismiss judges (to both the constitutional and the supreme courts, as well as some of the local-level courts) (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 34/35). The presidential administration also enjoys legal

impunity, and has the right to veto legislation by the parliament and to dissolve it (Dukenbaev et al., 2004: 30). Following the Tulip Revolution, the new president (Bakayev) was forced to make some constitutional compromises with the opposition, and the right to nominate the prime minister was transferred to parliament in 2006 (Tudoroiu, 2007: 335), but in 2007 all recent constitutional changes were invalidated (Nichol, 2009: 6). Thus, horizontal accountability remains dismally low in Kyrgyzstan.

Verdict: NO

#### 7) *Vertical accountability:*

The Tulip Revolution, which erupted in response to the fraudulent parliamentary elections in February 2005, and to the highly corrupt, semi-authoritarian, and unpopular rule by the Akayev regime, may appear to have been a demonstration of strong vertical accountability. However, according to Ruget et al. (2007), Tudoroiu (2007), and Radnitz (2006), the mobilisation of opposition towards the regime was mainly orchestrated by disaffected and defected political elites, many of which were local clan or tribal leaders, who became united in its quest to remove Akayev and change the political leadership. Many citizens were also paid or manipulated into participating in demonstrations against the Akayev regime and the rigged election results (Ruget et al., 2007: 450). It therefore seems that civil society organisations only played a minor role in the revolution (Tudoroiu, 2007: 333). Because of the weak state institutions, which were highly corrupt, and poorly equipped to provide security, law and order, and collect taxes, the loyalty of the citizens to the regime has also vanished. The citizens have generally become less willing to pay taxes and obey laws, and the electorate has become increasingly disillusioned not only with the state institutions and the government, but also with the idea of installing democracy as a political system in Kyrgyzstan (Ruget et al., 2007: 455). Thus, instead of holding the government accountable through the ballot box, it seem that the public disaffection with the government is increasingly likely to be resolved through violent means, as occurred in the April 2010 revolts.

Verdict: NO

#### 8) *Legal accountability (rule of law):*

After constitutional amendments in 1996, the presidential administration was enabled to control (appoint and sack) members of the judiciary (Anderson, 1996: 532). According to Dukenbaev the major purpose of the judicial system has become the protection of specific elite interests (of the president and his allies), while the public interests are neglected (Dukenbaev et al., 2003: 35).

Verdict: NO

9) *Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

Kyrgyzstan is one of the most corrupt and least transparent countries in the world, and ordinary citizens are often forced to give bribes to the state bureaucracy due to the poor protection of property rights (Abazov, 2003: 546). Both during the Akayev regime (1991-2005), and under the reign of Bakyiev (2005-2010), the state bureaucracy has been dominated by the interests of clientelistic networks, and has engaged in widespread corruption (Tudoroiu, 2007). In 2006, Kyrgyzstan was ranked by Transparency International as 142 out of 163 among the most corrupt countries in the world (Ruget et al., 2007: 446), and in 2008 they were ranked 166<sup>th</sup> in the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

10) *Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

According to Abazov, local governments often fail to follow the constitutional and government procedures mainly because they are influenced or ruled by personal and/or clan loyalties, and also because they receive very limited funding from the national government (Abazov, 2003: 547-548). Local elites and clans are very powerful in Kyrgyzstan, which is partly because both the Kyrgyz government and parliament are controlled by local elites, and more importantly, because it is in their own personal interests to preserve the privileges within their «reserved domains» (Radnitz, 2006: 140). As a result of the capture of the state institutions by corrupt local elites and businessmen, the state remains weak and unable to acquire a monopoly on the use of force or taxation (Ruget et al., 2007: 443).

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: Autocracy**

**4.6 Rating of Macedonia according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

1) *Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

The parliamentary elections in 2008 were full of electoral irregularities, according to OSCE-ODHIR (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). There was an unbalanced media coverage during the electoral campaign (biased in favour of the incumbent government), organised violence on election day in some of the ethnically Albanian areas, and widespread stuffing of ballot boxes (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). There were also several irregularities

during the 2006 parliamentary elections (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7).

Verdict: NO

*2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

The legal framework (i.e. the constitution) meets all the required criteria, but in practice there have been and still are many violations of some of the basic civil liberties and human rights in Macedonia. Despite the Ohrid Framework agreement that was signed in 2001<sup>4</sup>, which provided better rights and privileges for ethnic minorities, the progress on the protection of human rights has been slow, as there are still many reported cases of torture and harassment of ethnic minorities (particularly the Roma and Albanian minorities). In addition, the public has also limited access to the judicial system (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 15-17). There is also lack of freedom of expression and rights to alternative information, due to the high political interference in the media and the highly concentrated ownership of the media in Macedonia (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 17).

Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

During the first decade after independence, the state had inadequate control of its border regions, as organized crime networks were very active in the smuggling of drugs, weapons and refugees (Tsukatos, 2008: 60). Combined with a very high level of unemployment, this lack of territorial control contributed to a very large black market in the economy. These matters have improved since 2001 (after the Ohrid framework agreement), and partly because of foreign investments and loans (from the EU, IMF, the World Bank, and other international donors) as well as considerable political and economic reforms, the level of «stateness» seems to have improved (Tsukatos, 2008). While undemocratic actors such as criminal networks and nationalistic minority groups are still active, they don't seem to be a threat to the elected government, nor its ability to govern effectively.

Verdict: YES

---

<sup>4</sup> The Ohrid framework agreement was signed 13<sup>th</sup> August 2001, and was a peace treaty between the Macedonian government and Albanian minority leaders. The agreement was signed following the escalation of an ethnic conflict between ethnic Macedonians and the Albanian minority in 2001 (Tsukatos, 2008: 33-35). As a result of this treaty, the Albanians have been granted better privileges/rights, and it has also enabled the Macedonian government to improve its relation to the European Union (Tsukatos, 2008: 35-36).

4) *Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

Due to the violent attacks on several polling stations, and the stuffing of ballot boxes in the 2008 parliamentary elections, 15 % of the vote counts were regarded as bad or very bad by the OSCE (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). Despite moderately successful attempts at new rounds of voting, the votes can hardly be said to have been weighed equally during this election.

Verdict: NO

5) *Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

While there were several outbreaks of violence on election day in 2008, which possibly had a significant effect on the outcome of the elections (involving members of the Albanian minority) (Mavrikos-Adamou, 2010: 517), the winners of the election (a coalition led by the VMRO-DPMNE party) were not prevented from assuming office. Thus, under some doubt, Macedonia is considered to have fulfilled this criterion.

Verdict: YES (barely)

6) *Horizontal accountability:*

The government in office between 1991 and 1998, led by the SDSM party, was regularly alleged to be corrupt, and to politicize the public sector (Tsukatos, 2008: 28). The public administration was also highly underdeveloped, and there was a severe lack of accountability mechanisms within the state (Tsukatos, 2008: 29). According to the EU commission report, there is still a great lack of political dialogue between political actors/parties, which has halted the progress of promoting better accountability structures and transparency within the state institutions. As a result, both the bureaucracy and the judiciary remain highly politicized (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9). A recent example of this lack of political dialogue was the near unilateral adoption of 170 new laws by the newly elected government in 2008, by urgent procedure, while the opposition parties had been boycotting parliament (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9).

Verdict: NO

7) *Vertical accountability:*

Vertical accountability is also relatively poor, as most civil society organisations are heavily dependent on foreign funding, and the government has so far been unwilling to offer much support (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 17). The level of public trust in the elected representatives is also very low (only 12 % in a 2001 survey), partly due to high corruption and the

poor rule of law in Macedonia (Tsukatos, 2008: 29). Because the electoral process is also insufficiently democratic, Macedonia is considered to fail to comply with this criterion.

Verdict: NO

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

The judicial system in Macedonia has generally been very politicized, inefficient, and corrupt (Tsukatos, 2008: 62). In 2004, there were approximately 1 million court cases, which constitute half a case for each inhabitant. Due to considerable international pressure, several attempts to reform the judiciary have been made in recent years, but progress has been slow (Tsukatos, 2008: 63). The EU commission maintains that the independence and efficiency of the judiciary have been somewhat improved, but that lack of adequate funding and poor recruitment procedures, means that Macedonia has only moderately advanced in this area (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 13/14). The fragmented legal system has also made the implementation of laws very inefficient.

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

While the state bureaucracy has improved in terms of efficiency and professionalism, due to better training and recruitment procedures, the level of transparency and accountability is still not up to international standards, according to the EU commission report (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 11). This is partly because the level of public corruption remains such a serious issue, even despite recent improvements following new anti-corruption policies (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 15). In the 2008 corruption perception index, Macedonia was ranked as 72<sup>th</sup> in the world, with a score of 3.6 out of 10 (Transparency International, 2008), and according to Vladimir Misev, most Macedonians have come to perceive of corruption as an integral part of public life (Misev in Goehring (red), 2008: 385).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has a full monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

One of the basic principles of the peace treaty that ended the ethnic revolts in 2001, the Ohrid framework agreement, was power-sharing governance, including considerable self-government for ethnic communities, and local and regional governments (Tsukatos, 2008: 48). While decentralization reforms since 2001 have been largely successful, state funding of local and regional

governments is insufficient, and the efficiency, transparency and accountability of many of these local governments are therefore inadequate (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 10).

Verdict: NO

### **Regimetype: EP+1AF (Electoral irreversibility)**

#### **4.7 Rating of Moldova according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

Except for the uncontested election in 1991, all parliamentary and presidential elections during the first decade of independence were highly competitive (Way, 2002: 130). Even though there have been some electoral irregularities prior to some of the elections, such as unequal campaigning opportunities, Moldova should according to McDonagh be considered to meet the minimum threshold of democracy (McDonagh, 2008: 147). However, after the Communist Party won the elections in 2001 (stayed in power until 2009), the level of political competition became slightly more limited, as several political candidates and parties were banned (Way, 2002: 130-131). The local elections in 2007 were considered by the OSCE/ODIHR to be generally free and fair, but they lacked somewhat in competitiveness, as some candidates were denied the right to compete for public office (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 3). Despite these minor shortcomings, all elections since 1991 have been recognized as legitimate democratic elections by international observers, such as the OSCE and IEOM (Senyuva, 2010: 190). One of the greatest (electoral) democratic tests for Moldova so far came during the parliamentary elections in April 2009, as it led to violent protests by the opposition and accusations of electoral fraud in what has later been called «the Twitter Revolution». However, the turmoil was eventually solved peacefully with a transfer of power from the Communist Party to a united opposition, a coalition of opposition parties, labeled as the Alliance for European Integration, following new and «virtually trouble free elections» in July 2009, according to Senyuva (Senyuva, 2010: 194).

Verdict: YES

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

There has generally been a high level of political pluralism and freedom in Moldova, as the state has been too weak to efficiently limit (or improve) civil liberties, such as freedom of expression (Way, 2002: 133). In the 1990s the media outlets were relatively free, and were able to provide many alternative sources of information, according to Way (Way, 2002: 130). After the Communist



Party came to power, press freedom deteriorated, particularly among the predominantly state-owned television media, and in 2001 an anti-government newspaper was forced to close down (Way, 2002: 131). During the same time-span, violations of human rights also increased, especially regarding basic political rights, such as the four criteria that constitute the BCL dimension (the minimum constitutional threshold) of democracy (McDonagh, 2008: 148). The discrimination of ethnic groups and their civil and cultural rights has also been cited as one of the main reasons behind the secessionist claims made by minority groups within Moldova since independence (Heintz (red), 2008: 5). In addition, there are frequent human rights abuses within the secessionist province of Transnistria, a region within Moldova's territorial borders that the Moldovan government is unable to control (Popescu in Heintz (red), 2008: 58).

Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

All of the Moldovan governments since independence have lacked an effective power to govern, for several different reasons. First, considerable parts of the Moldovan territory are beyond government control, such as the secessionist province of Transnistria, which controls nearly all of the energy resources within Moldova (Heintz (red), 2008: 7). Transnistria, which is governed by a rebel government and supported by Russia, has declared the province to be autonomous, and refused to participate in Moldovan politics (Way, 2002: 128). Secondly, the question of whether Moldova should be independent or reunite with Romania has led to very polarized identity politics, and also a polarized electorate (Mungiu-Pippidi and Munteanu, 2009: 141). Thirdly, Russia has an enormous influence over Moldovan politics, both economically and politically, as Moldova is highly dependent on gas and electricity coming through the Russian-controlled Transnistrian pipelines, and because Russia still has a significant military presence in the country, in support of Transnistria's independence claims (Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2009: 141). The fourth reason is the very close links between political elites and informal patrimonial networks, which has led to the «capture» of the state by particular interest groups, such as clientelist networks consisting of political and economic elites (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 23). Thus, the bureaucracy has also been increasingly politicized by government (Way, 2002: 129). Finally, the Moldovan state lacks sufficient control over its border regions, where organized crime networks are heavily involved in smuggling and trafficking of drugs, humans etc. (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 27).

Verdict: NO

4) *Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

While the OSCE report on the parliamentary elections in April 2009 was very positive (perhaps due to Russian influence within the OSCE), there were several complaints made by the opposition regarding multiple voting, inaccurate voter lists, and graveyard votes, which ultimately led to the Twitter Revolution (Senyuva, 2010: 192). New elections in July 2009, which were called because the opposition boycotted parliament, were considered to meet international democratic standards, and the only significant issue was the lack of a completely balanced media coverage (Senyuva, 2010: 194).

Verdict: YES

5) *Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

While there was a great deal of violence after the parliamentary elections in April 2009, as the parliament was set on fire, and there were clashes between protesters and the police, the new elections in July 2009 were executed without any major violent incidents, and political power was transferred in a peaceful and democratic manner (Senyuva, 2010: 194).

Verdict: YES

6) *Horizontal accountability:*

During the first decade of independence, both the legislature as well as the constitutional court were very effective in limiting the power of the president and the government, and of holding the executive branch accountable (Way, 2002: 130). In 2001, the Communist Party won the elections with a strong electoral mandate (winning 71 of 101 seats in parliament), and the legislature therefore became dominated by the new government (Way, 2002: 130). Horizontal accountability was further weakened through new judicial reforms, limiting the independence of the judiciary (Way, 2002: 130). The communist legacy of combining informal and formal institutions has also constituted a severe constraint on the degree of accountability and transparency, and of the whole state-building process (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 23). Because of the patrimonialisation of the state by different interest groups<sup>5</sup>, the formal democratic institutions are in consequence subordinated to informal and clientelistic modes of governance (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 29).

Verdict: NO

---

5 Patrimonialisation of the state can be defined as the «private appropriation of the governmental sphere by those who carry political power» (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 29).

7) *Vertical accountability:*

Vertical accountability is relatively weak, partly because civil society is poorly developed. One of the main reasons for the weakness of civil society is probably that the population is predominantly rural. Thus, Moldova could be defined as a «nation of villages» that are poorly interconnected and have a largely uninformed electorate (Heintz (red), 2008: 11). In addition, most NGOs are dependent on foreign funding, there is no independent business class, and civil society is therefore unable to hold state actors accountable (Way, 2002: 129). The electoral mobilisation and voting patterns among the parts of the electorate that have not become disillusioned with politics (and abstain from voting), are also predominantly determined by the patron-client relations between political elites and the citizens, along hierarchical lines from the national to the local level (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 30-31). Thus, as long as a large share of the votes are «bought» by patrons, representing various political parties, and civil society remains underdeveloped, vertical accountability will also remain low.

Verdict: NO

8) *Legal accountability (rule of law):*

As mentioned above, judicial independence has deteriorated significantly during the last decade, following the new judicial reforms and increased government control over appointment procedures for judges (Way, 2002: 131). The level of professionalism and efficiency also seem to be poor, as the implementation and enforcement of laws with regard to human rights legislation has been very slow, despite the fact that Moldova has a fully democratic constitution (Heintz (red), 2008: 9).

Verdict: NO

9) *Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

Because of the weak legal tradition in Moldova, several state institutions, such as the tax administration and the intelligence bodies, have become politicized by the government (Way, 2002: 129). These formal state institutions have often been abused by political elites to implement policies and allocate resources in an informal manner, through their patrimonial networks of political allies and supporters (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 24). Such «client politics», which has been a dominant feature of Moldovan politics, generally involves high corruption levels and the use of state resources for personal gain (Parmentier in Heintz (red), 2008: 31). According to the World Bank, Moldova ranks as the second worst country with regard to «state capture» (by other undemocratic actors) among the former Soviet republics, and Transparency International rates Moldova as one of the least transparent and most corrupt countries in the world (113<sup>th</sup> out of 180)

(Mungiu-Pippidi et al., 2009: 140).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

As mentioned above, the Moldovan state does not have absolute control over its territory, and neither the governments nor the citizens in these areas take part in national Moldovan politics (only 2 % of the Transnistrians voted in the 2009 parliamentary elections; Senyuva, 2010: 192). In addition, the «local» elections in Transnistria are very fraudulent, and human rights have been frequently violated by the Transnistrian governments (Popescu in Heintz (red), 2008: 58).

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE+2AF (Electoral integrity and Electoral irreversibility)**

#### **4.8 Rating of Croatia according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

*1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

The 1995 elections marked the end of a dominant one-party system in Croatia. The Croatian national movement that had been formed before the first free elections in 1990 had until 1995 been indistinguishable from HDZ, the party that had governed Croatia throughout the Balkan Wars (Kasapovic, 1996: 273). Since 2000, the elections in Croatia have generally been free and fair, and there were no irregularities in the 2007 parliamentary elections (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 6). Some of the main reasons behind this development, seem to be the influence from international organisations (such as the EU, USA, and NATO), as the main political parties and political elites (including HDZ, which governed Croatia in an authoritarian manner throughout the 1990s) have become increasingly moderate, pro-democratic, and pro-European (Pickering and Baskin, 2008: 534-536).

Verdict: YES

*2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

Currently there seems to be high respect for freedom of expression, freedom of organization, and the right to alternative information (pluralist media), but in some of the local municipalities there have been some cases of political pressure and attacks aimed at journalists (Commission of the

European communities, 2008: 10-11). Freedom from discrimination is officially respected, but there have been some minor incidents of persecution of minorities, especially against Roma and Serbs, and the judicial system has sometimes been accused of being biased towards Croats against Serbs (in cases of war crimes, property (re)allocation etc.) (Blitz, 2008: 132). However, Croatia has generally been able to fulfill the minimum constitutional democratic threshold (Commission of the European communities, 2008).

Verdict: YES

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

Due to the EU accession requirements regarding possible future membership, Croatian politics is very much influenced from abroad (Antic and Dodic, 2008: 755), albeit in a positive democracy-enhancing way. There is also a large consensus among the Croatian political parties about the need for further European integration (Doric in Goehring (red), 2008: 173-174), and there doesn't seem to be any significant formal or informal constraints on the elected government's capability of governing effectively.

Verdict: YES

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

There have been some problems regarding the large Diaspora vote (mostly Bosnian Croats), which is sometimes cast under military and not civilian control, and there seems to be an arbitrary control over these foreign polling stations (Kasapovic, 1996: 272). In addition, Croatia still has a very «complicated, disorganized, and senseless» representation of minorities (Antic et al., 2008: 754), as there are separate, proportional elections for ethnic minorities, and these minorities are often overrepresented (except for the Serbs) in parliament (Antic et al., 2008: 752).

Verdict: NO

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

In the 2000 parliamentary elections, a group of war veterans organised mass protests as the incumbent party (HDZ) lost the elections, but they failed to remove the newly elected government (Zakosek, 2010: 600). Since then, elections have been relatively peaceful and democratic, and the electoral process in Croatia has therefore been irreversible.

Verdict: YES

6) *Horizontal accountability:*

During the 1990s, the governing political party, HDZ, and president Tudjman were able to monopolise political power, and control all state institutions, partly because they were seen as «the champion of Croatian statehood» during the war against Serbia, and also because the opposition was highly fragmented and poorly organised (Ottaway and Maltz, 2001: 376). The end of the war, in 1995, and a dire economic situation eventually led to declining legitimacy for the authoritarian regime, which was weakened even further when Tudjman died in 1999 (Ottaway et al., 2001: 377). In addition, an electoral reform in 1999, which installed a more proportional and democratic electoral system, and a better mobilised and organised opposition and civil society, which were actively monitoring the incumbents in order to prevent electoral fraud, were also some of the critical factors behind the sudden transition to democracy in 2000. This event has later been labeled Croatia's second transition (Pickering et al., 2008: 533). Following the first relatively democratic elections in 2000, several constitutional amendments were adopted, which limited the power of the presidency and installed a more parliamentary regime, thereby improving horizontal accountability (Pickering et al., 2008: 534). However, the authoritarian legacy of the Tudjman era, and possibly also the communist era, still causes problems for the consolidation of democracy in Croatia. Both the judiciary and the bureaucracy remain highly politicized, and the judiciary is constantly prey to political interference in court cases (especially concerning war crimes). Thus, as long as the judiciary lacks sufficient independence (see below for further elaboration), horizontal accountability also remains inadequate.

Verdict: NO

7) *Vertical accountability:*

In the 2000 elections that finalised the transition to electoral democracy, several civil society organisations, such as Glas and Gong, played a very important part in monitoring the election and increasing the transparency of the electoral process (Pickering et al., 2008: 533). Thus, vertical accountability was improved, and according to Doric, civil society is currently highly developed and continues to have a strong political influence (Doric in Goehring (red), 2008: 178-179).

Verdict: YES

8) *Legal accountability (rule of law):*

According to Blitz, the judicial system in Croatia has been, and still is; «astonishingly slow, corrupt, and inefficient», and particularly at the local level (Blitz, 2008: 132-133). The judiciary also lacks

independence, as the legislature on several occasions has intervened and altered decisions made by the Constitutional Court (Blitz, 2008: 134). While there has been increasing international pressure on Croatia to implement necessary judicial reforms (particularly from the EU), this has proved to be very difficult, mainly because of a politicized and weak bureaucracy (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 8).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

As mentioned above, the bureaucracy is weak and highly politicized, and it is also seriously lacking in qualified personnel (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 7). Corruption is also widespread, and due to the lack in professionalism and transparency, the bureaucracy is still too weak to effectively fight corruption (Commission of the European communities, 2008: 9). In 2008, Croatia was ranked 62<sup>th</sup> in the world, with a score of 4.4 out of 10 in the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

During the Tadjman era, the Croatian state was very centralised and local governments were highly dependent on the central government (Ottaway et al., 2001: 376). One of the main reasons behind this policy was probably that Croatia lacked control over large parts of its territory at the time, as Serb insurgents were fighting for increased autonomy or secession from Croatia in some of the Serb-dominated provinces (Zakosek, 2010: 599). Since then, Croatia has been under lot of international pressure to initiate local government reforms and improve the balance of power between central and local governments, but so far few changes have been made (Doric in Goehring (red), 2008: 182). The lack of independence for local governments is partly due to poor coordination within the bureaucracy, lack of dialogue between central and local governments, and lack of political will in the central government (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 8).

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE, BCL, EP+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Vertical accountability)**

#### **4.9 Rating of Georgia according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

*1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

Following fraudulent elections in 2000 (presidential election) and in 2003 (parliamentary), there was a massive mobilisation of the opposition and civil society, which eventually resulted in the Rose Revolution, and the resignation of president Eduard Shevardnadze (Tudoroiu, 2007: 322). The new «special» elections in 2004 (both presidential and parliamentary) were considered relatively free and fair by the OSCE (Jones, 2005: 308). While some scholars, such as Lincoln Mitchell, claim that «fair elections are now the rule» (Mitchell, 2006: 672), there have been several electoral irregularities in the most recent elections. According to the European Commission, the most recent elections in Georgia, the parliamentary elections in May 2008, generally met international democratic standards. However, there had been some electoral irregularities in the presidential elections four months earlier, in January 2008, such as unbalanced media coverage, intimidation of opposition candidates, and lack of transparency (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 3-4). Still, the OSCE did note several improvements in the parliamentary elections, but did not make any detailed assessment of the many electoral irregularities that had been mentioned by domestic observers (Lanskoy and Areshidze, 2008: 165). Due to these reports, it can be argued that Georgia barely manages to meet the required electoral standards, despite domestic reports regarding lack of fairness (several reports of voter intimidation etc.) that were not thoroughly assessed by international observers.

Verdict: YES (barely)

*2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

During the Shevardnadze regime, the society was relatively open and free, with a independent and active media and civil society (Mitchell, 2006: 673). Since Saakashvili was elected in 2004, civil liberties have become more limited, as a result of more authoritarian government policies. The state-building reforms of Saakashvili therefore seem to have come at the expense of further democratization (Mitchell, 2006: 674). In the fall of 2007, the opposition staged several large demonstrations protesting against the lack of freedom of speech, as the media were becoming increasingly dependent on the regime, and against the impunity and corruption of political elites (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 162). The Saakashvili regime responded by closing down the most popular (and opposition-friendly) private television station (Imedi) (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 163). According to Sue Davis, this move by the government to limit political pluralism can be explained by the inverse relationship that exists between regime insecurity and media freedom (and other features of a liberal society) (Davis, 2008: 471). Thus, the less popular a regime is, the more repressive it will become



(towards opposition, media etc.).

Verdict: NO

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

One of the main reasons why civil liberties have become more limited in Georgia during the last decade is probably the great necessity of reforming and strengthening the state institutions, which in turn has had a damaging effect on democratization. As two provinces within Georgian territory, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, remain outside of government/state control, the Saakashvili regime opted for constitutional amendments (in 2004) that strengthened the power of the executive, so that it could more easily reform and improve the state institutions. The main aim of this process seems to be future state consolidation, and a potential reunification with the aforementioned provinces. While the decisionmaking of the government and the president have become more effective<sup>6</sup>, these two provinces remain independent, and they were also the source of a military conflict with Russia in 2008. However, the Saakashvili regime has managed to regain control over the Adjara province, which was autonomous until 2004. The vastly improved state institutions, including a more professional and efficient bureaucracy, combined with a stronger executive (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 159), means that the Georgian government most likely has improved its ability to govern effectively within the territory that it controls. However, the overall power to govern effectively is severely limited, not only by the separatist provinces, but also because of the strong Russian influence on Georgian politics. In addition to Russia's strong support for Georgia's secessionist regions, Georgia is highly dependent on Russian gas (Tudoroiu, 2007: 319). Thus, despite increased economic and political cooperation with Western organisations and countries (such as the EU, USA etc.), the Georgian government still lacks an effective power to govern.

Verdict: NO

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

In the presidential elections in January 2008, the vote-counting process in as many as 24 % of the precincts, mostly in ethnic-minority areas, was regarded as bad or very bad by the OSCE. This was mainly due to inaccurate voter lists, and despite the improvements of electoral legislation, it seems unlikely that these flaws had been adequately amended before the parliamentary elections in May

---

<sup>6</sup> Following the 2004 «special» elections and constitutional amendments, the Saakashvili regime not only managed to strengthen the executive, but also gained control over more than 2/3 of the seats in parliament (Mitchell, 2006: 673).

2008 (Lansky et al., 2008: 164-165).

Verdict: NO

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

During the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2008, the opposition held several large demonstrations protesting against perceived fraudulent election results, but there doesn't seem to be any evidence of elected officials being violently or unconstitutionally prevented from assuming office or exercising power.

Verdict: YES

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

The constitution of 1995 allowed for a strong legislature and Supreme Court, and it therefore provided for an effective separation of powers among state institutions (Lansky et al., 2008: 157). Following constitutional reforms in 2004 that were adopted without any political debate, president Saakashvili now has the power to appoint the prime minister and cabinet, as well as dissolving the parliament (Mitchell, 2006: 672). The governing party, UNM, that supports and is supported by president Saakashvili, also controls more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, which has led to an increasing degree of party patronage within state institutions (Mitchell, 2006: 673). As both president Saakashvili and his political party, UNM, won the presidential and parliamentary elections in 2004 with a very strong mandate, about 96 % of the votes, the new regime has managed not only to gain considerable control over the legislature, but has also exploited its great political power to politicize the judiciary (Lansky et al., 2008: 160). It has therefore become a super presidential system (Lansky et al., 2008: 160), where there is a great lack of horizontal accountability and transparency.

Verdict: NO

*7) Vertical accountability:*

While press freedom is becoming increasingly limited, civil society organisations are relatively independent from interference and restrictions by the state institutions (Nodia in Goehring (red), 2008: 232). Civil society organisations were very active during the Rose Revolution, but their influence on decision making has diminished since then, which partly stems from the fact that many of the dominant figures during the Rose Revolution have now become part of the government or the opposition, and also because of the high dependence on foreign funding (Nodia in Goehring (red), 2008: 232-233). Most of the NGOs are also located in the capital (Tbilisi), and have very limited

influence on the electorate in other parts of the country (Nodia in Goehring (red), 2008: 225). According to Fairbanks, the electorate is quite disillusioned with politics, which has been demonstrated by low voter turnout, and in the presidential elections in January 2008 it also lacked adequate ability to hold the executive accountable (Fairbanks, 2010: 146). Statistical analyses showed that Saakashvili would not have won the majority of votes (he won 53,4 %) without fraud. While the parliamentary elections four months later, in May 2008, were free and fair, the lack of vertical accountability with respect to the executive branch, which was largely determined by the fraudulent presidential elections, means that Georgia is considered to fail this criterion.

Verdict: NO

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

According to Charles H. Fairbanks, the judicial system is the least independent state institution in Georgia, and in all court cases that are even remotely political there is a high level of political interference from the government (Fairbanks, 2010: 147).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

Before the Rose Revolution in 2003, the state institutions in Georgia were considered to be very weak, with a highly corrupt and unqualified bureaucracy (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 157). However, since Saakashvili was elected president, his regime has been extremely effective in reducing the level of corruption and improving state institutions (Fairbanks, 2010: 145). Thus, the efficiency and professionalism of civil servants has improved. This is partly due to better salaries and better training procedures, and these improvements may also have contributed to lower levels of corruption, according to Lanskoy and Areshidze (Lanskoy et al. 2008: 159). Despite these improvements, the level of public corruption still seems to be relatively high, as Georgia ranked as number 67 in the world in the 2008 corruption perception index, conducted by Transparency International, with a score of 3.9 on a scale from 0-10 (where 0 is highly corrupt) (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

Following independence, in 1991, a civil war broke out between the Georgian government that was led by the highly nationalistic president Gamsakhurdia, and the provinces of Abkhazia (claiming

full independence) and South Ossetia (desiring reunification with North Ossetia, which is part of Russia). These two provinces are still self-autonomous, and their independence and reunification claims are backed by Russia (Lanskoy et al., 2008: 155). Similar to the situation in Moldova, where Russia supports the separatist province of Transnistria, very few citizens from Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been taking part in the political elections in Georgia, as these areas remain outside governmental control (Jones, 2005: 306). While Georgia managed to regain control over the Adsjara province in 2004, which had been under the personal control of Aslan Abashidze for over a decade, the unsuccessful war against Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in 2008 indicates that the chances of restoring or establishing local government accountability to an acceptable democratic level seems very limited.

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE+1AF (Electoral irreversibility)**

#### **4.10 Rating of Romania according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

According to Gross, 2004 can be seen as a turning point in the possible consolidation of Romanian democracy, as the incumbent Socialist Party (heirs of the former communists) lost both the parliamentary and presidential elections to a more democratic, and pro-European opposition (Gross and Tismaneanu, 2005:146). The four parliamentary and presidential elections that had been held before 2004, and mostly during PSD (Socialist Party) rule, were considered as free, but not entirely fair (Gross et al., 2005: 151). Party patronage, illegal use of state resources to run electoral campaigns, and unbalanced media coverage (in favour of the incumbent party) had been dominant features of Romanian politics, especially before the 2004 elections (Ciobanu, 2007). However, by 2008, both the local and parliamentary elections that were held that year were considered to be free and fair, and to meet the minimum democratic requirements (Stan and Zaharia, 2009: 1099).

Verdict: YES

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

Since the fall of communism, the media have been subject to a relatively high level of party patronage, as the government is responsible for appointing officials to the broadcasting council which often refuses to grant licences to media outlets that are critical of the regime (Roper, 2006: 370). In addition, large sections of the media are financially indebted to (and thus dependent on) the

state, which could possibly be used as leverage by the government in order to pressure the media into self-censorship (Roper, 2006: 370). However, according to the 2008 human rights report by the US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, Romania currently fulfills all of the minimum civil liberties criteria, despite some minor incidents and flaws (regarding harassment of journalists, the highly concentrated ownership of media in the hands of a small group of powerful elites, and police brutality towards the Roma minority) (US Bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor, 2008).

Verdict: YES

*3) Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

The legacy of a patrimonial and totalitarian communist system seems to have had a negative effect on the democratization process in Romania, and on the ability of elected governments to govern effectively. Due to the total lack of an active civil society and opposition during communism, the violent revolution in 1989, which led to the downfall of patrimonial-totalitarian president Ceausescu, was more or less a transfer of power among incumbent political elites, as large parts of the former nomenklatura dominated the transition process and the crafting of new institutions after the fall of communism (Ciobanu, 2007: 1432). Partly because there was no «clean break» with communism, the patrimonial political system (re)consolidated through the increasingly closer ties between the political elites and the emerging business class, and this led to a highly clientelistic party system (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). This also made it harder to introduce both legal and democratic norms as modes of governance within the new state institutions (Ciobanu, 2007: 1431-1432). Thus, the political sphere became highly informal, corrupt and opaque (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 224), and was dominated by informal alliances between political elites and the business class (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). It also contributed to an extremely polarized political climate where the main cleavage line ran between former communists and anti-communists. Throughout the 1990s, conflicts both within and between political parties and government coalitions considerably reduced the ability of elected governments to govern effectively, and new legislation often had to be passed through the issuance of executive emergency ordinances (Ciobanu, 2007 p.1436). Romanian politics remain very polarized and confrontational today, which is perhaps one of the main reasons why the policymaking of the executive is increasingly being decided upon in courts and not in the legislature or within the government administration. Similar to the situation in the Ukraine following the Orange Revolution, the Constitutional Court has increasingly assumed an executive

role in politics, as it is appealed to for arbitrating disputes between government and parliament, and the presidency and prime minister (Stan et al., 2009: 1087). Following the 2008 elections that led to a government coalition consisting of two arch rivals (the Liberal Democratic and Social Democratic parties), the politicization of the judiciary seems likely to continue. Thus, the patrimonial political legacy, that has led to high levels of public corruption, lack of transparency, and clientelistic political parties, is still a significant obstacle for the ability of elected governments to govern effectively.

Verdict: NO

*4) Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

In the 2004 elections, about 160 000 votes «disappeared» and were annulled from the vote-counting procedure, and attempts at new rounds of voting were flawed (Ciobanu, 2007: 1441). This event was one of the catalysts behind the rapid development of civil society organisations that demanded improved transparency (Ciobanu, 2007: 1441). Several amendments have been made to the electoral process since then, including more proportional representation and the removal of party lists, which have led to increased electoral transparency and accountability, as it has become easier for the electorate to know who they vote for (Downs, 2009: 511), and there have also been fewer electoral irregularities in the most recent elections.

Verdict: YES

*5) Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking office or exercising power):*

It can be argued that Romania fulfilled this criterion for the first time in 1996, as the illiberal incumbents (former communists) peacefully left office after losing what Kalandadze refers to as Romania's critical election (Kalandadze and Orenstein, 2009: 1405). Peaceful transfers of power from the incumbents to the opposition also occurred following the elections in 2000, 2004 and 2008.

Verdict: YES

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

Due to the symbolic and vague nature of the constitution (of December 1991), the separation of powers are not explicit, nor are the prerogatives of various state institutions (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 222). The Romanian constitution of 1991 allowed for a very strong presidency, where the president had the power to dissolve parliament (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 223). The debate on whether Romania should have a more parliamentary or a more presidential system is still a

salient issue today, and is perhaps one of the main reasons why the judiciary is becoming increasingly politicized and less independent (Stan et al., 2009: 1093). Another important reason is the high level of competition and polarization within the legislature, and within the executive, which makes it more difficult for the government to pass legislation. However, this also indicates that the legislature is relatively independent and able to hold the executive accountable. As a consequence of this development, an increasing number of political issues are being decided upon in the courts. Thus, the independence of the judiciary has decreased, severely weakening the ability of the judicial system to hold the executive accountable. In order to improve horizontal accountability, the judiciary therefore needs to be strengthened and become more independent, and the decision making process must become more transparent and less informal, which probably requires an improved political dialogue between parties, thereby reducing the polarization of political competition in Romania.

Verdict: NO

#### 7) *Vertical accountability:*

Civil society experienced rejuvenation during the 2004 elections, as it played a pivotal role in mobilising the electorate, and in assuring improved vertical accountability (Gross et al., 2005: 148). A coalition of civil society organisations presented a proposal for a clean parliament, and made successful demands that a large number of «dirty» politicians should be dismissed from the parliament (Gross et al., 2005: 149). These civil society organisations have been highly successful in promoting higher fairness and transparency in the electoral process and in improving the accountability of the elected representatives (Ciobanu, 2007: 1440). This development seems to have influenced the electorate, as the relatively illiberal and semi-authoritarian rule of the PSD was punished in the 2004 elections, and they were voted out of office. However, the high level of political corruption and the informal, clientelistic nature of governance (by all parties) has also made the Romanian electorate very disillusioned with politics, and is perhaps one of the main causes behind the increased popularity of nationalistic, populist, and «anti-system» parties. Thus, the increasing activity of civil society seems to have had a countervailing effect on this trend, as its democratizing influence on political elites indirectly also improves the democratic political culture among the electorate (and extremist parties have also become less prevalent since their peak in the 2000 elections).

Verdict: YES

#### 8) *Legal accountability (rule of law):*

The Romanian judicial system lacks independence, qualified personnel, and operates with outdated

laws, according to Gross (Gross et al., 2005: 149). Appointments of judges, and judicial personnel have also to a large degree been controlled by the executive (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 229), and as mentioned above (in the discussion of horizontal accountability) it has become increasingly politicized due to high polarization and competition within the legislature and the executive.

According to Ciobanu, the weakness of the rule of law also partly stems from the close ties between political elites and the business class (Ciobanu, 2007: 1446). Thus, entrenched public corruption and clientelism has made it more difficult for the judiciary to become truly independent, professional and effective.

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

According to Stan, the Romanian bureaucracy is inefficient, lacks transparency, and the civil servants are poorly trained and poorly paid (Stan et al., 2009: 1094). Over the last decade, several reforms aiming to improve the transparency and professionalism of the bureaucracy have been passed, but there is great variation in the implementation of these laws across the different ministries (Roper, 2006: 371). According to Roper, this is mostly due to the unequal monitoring of ministries by international agencies, such as the EU, and only those ministries that have been closely monitored and assisted by these external agencies have succeeded in establishing an adequate level of bureaucratic integrity (Roper, 2006: 371). In addition, the size of the staff in the bureaucracy is highly inflated, mostly due to client/patronage politics (Roper, 2006: 371). Romania ranked 70<sup>th</sup> in the world with a score of 3.8 out of 10 in the 2008 corruption perception index that was conducted by Transparency International (Transparency International, 2008).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

The Romanian state is very centralized and little power or competence has been delegated to the local level (Weber in Zielonka (red), 2001: 232-233). In addition, party patronage extends to the local level, as government representatives have large control over local governments, in effect of their power to appoint and dismiss local representatives (Roper, 2006: 368). Local opposition officials are often persuaded or pressured by possible material benefits, or by the threat of dismissal, into switching party affiliations (Roper, 2006: 369). Thus, this causes not only a lack of local government accountability and transparency, but also a significant reduction in horizontal accountability, as local representatives have limited opportunities to hold the central authorities



accountable for their actions. Another problem is that in some of the poorest counties of Romania, local elites have in some cases «stolen» EU investments, and harassed the local media (Ciobanu, 2007: 1439).

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE, BCL+3AF (Electoral integrity, Electoral irreversibility, and Vertical accountability)**

#### **4.11 Rating of Ukraine according to my operationalisation of democracy:**

##### *1) Free, fair, competitive, and inclusive elections (FCE):*

Broad presidential powers and a high degree of party patronage allowed Leonid Kuchma to stay in power from 1994 to 2004, for two presidential terms (Hesli, 2006: 168-169). In the 2004 presidential elections there were widespread allegations from the opposition that state resources were unfairly applied to back prime minister Yanukovich as presidential candidate, as he was favoured by incumbent president Kuchma. According to most international observers of the election, both the first and second round of voting failed to meet basic democratic standards, and the implausible results (Yanukovich won) resulted in large-scale public protests (the Orange Revolution) that eventually led the Supreme Court to demand that new elections be held (Hesli, 2006: 171). The Orange coalition led by Yushchenko won the new elections, and this time the elections were rated as democratic (peaceful and free of fraud) (Hesli, 2006: 175). Both of the following elections, the parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007, have also been regarded as free and fair (Herron, 2008: 551).<sup>7</sup>

Verdict: YES

##### *2) Civil liberties: freedom of speech, freedom of organization, right to alternative information, and freedom from discrimination (BCL):*

According to the EU commission (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 4), and the US bureau of democracy, human rights, and labor (2008), Ukraine currently meets all of the required civil liberties in order to pass the minimum constitutional democratic threshold. Two of the main reasons are probably the fast development of civil society during the Orange Revolution, and a much more independent and active media in recent years (since the Orange Revolution).

Verdict: YES

---

<sup>7</sup> In the presidential elections in January and February 2010, Viktor Yanukovich became the new president following a narrow victory over the other main presidential candidate, Yulia Tymoshenko.

3) *Elected governments have the effective power to govern (EP); the decision making of elected governments should not be formally (constitutionally) or informally constrained by any undemocratic actors, such as the military, bureaucratic enclaves (formal constraint) or patrimonial networks, other states etc. (informal constraint):*

According to Kubicek, the lack of a sufficiently «clean break» with the communist legacy, and lack of institutional change, are the main reasons why postcommunism has ended in political instability that is inhibiting further democratization (Kubicek, 2009: 325-326). While the party system has stabilized, it remains highly personalistic (Herron, 2008: 555), and most political parties operate as patronage networks (Kubicek, 2009: 339). The Orange coalition that came to power in 2004, included many of the political and economic elites that had benefitted economically during the Kuchma rule (Kubicek, 2009: 331). Thus, much political power still remains in the hands of the oligarchs, clientelistic networks, and clans, and most of these elites enjoy immunity from prosecution, which may also explain why there is still a high level of corruption, clientelism, and informal politics in Ukraine (Kubicek, 2009: 332). In addition to the informal influence of business elites and clans, the highly polarized and confrontational political climate, both between the Orange coalition and the opposition, and also within the Orange coalition, has also had a devastating effect on the elected government's capability to govern effectively. As will be further elaborated below (in the section on horizontal accountability), governmental decision making is increasingly being decided upon within the judicial system, which as a consequence is becoming increasingly politicized. Because of these informal constraints, and the lack of political dialogue, the Ukrainian government lacks an effective power to govern.

Verdict: NO

4) *Electoral integrity (votes weigh equally):*

A possible violation of the electoral integrity criterion occurred in the 2007 elections, as there was some uncertainty regarding the regulation of absentee voters (Ukrainians living abroad), and to what extent they were either allowed or denied the possibility to vote (Herron, 2008: 552). This may have disproportionately affected the votes of the OU-SPD and Byut parties, as there may have been some cases of multiple voting, and some cases where voters have been disenfranchised (Herron, 2008: 552). Because of the uncertainty regarding these votes, and the possible politicization of absentee votes, Ukraine is not regarded as having fulfilled this criterion.

Verdict: NO

5) *Electoral irreversibility (elected officials are not prevented through violent means from taking*

*office or exercising power):*

The most recent political elections in Ukraine, following the Orange Revolution, have been relatively free and fair. There has also been a peaceful transfer of power in those cases where the incumbent party has lost the elections, such as in 2006 when President Yushchenko was forced to cooperate with his arch rival Yanukovich, following the parliamentary elections.

Verdict: YES

*6) Horizontal accountability:*

Within the legislature, the horizontal accountability has increased considerably since the Orange Revolution, as the political competition and fragmentation is now very high compared to the situation during the Kuchma regime (1994-2004), when the government/president had much more power vis-à-vis the legislature. Several new reforms that have increased the power of the legislature and limited presidential powers seem to have improved the separation of powers and accountability structures, but it has also made it more difficult to implement further democratic reforms (Kubicek, 2009: 328). The main reason for this is the high polarization among political elites, and a much stronger opposition than before in the legislature, which means that governmental decision making has become much more difficult in recent years, as it often requires support from arch rivals (Trochev, 2010: 140). For the same reason, the judicial system has become the main source of acquiring political power. Thus, state bodies, and especially the judiciary, but also parts of the bureaucracy, have become more politicized, as political actors appoint loyal servants, and secure judicial loyalty through the use of bribes. This development is most likely a consequence of the highly polarized climate in the legislature, or even within the executive branch, which in effect means that the overall horizontal accountability remains inadequate.<sup>8</sup>

Verdict: NO

*7) Vertical accountability:*

Vertical accountability has improved in recent years, and according to Hesli, a rejuvenated civil society was a critical factor in the democratization process that began during the Orange Revolution (Hesli, 2006: 175). Combined with more independent and active media, civil society organisations have become much more active and persistent in demanding improved transparency and accountability from the Ukrainian governments (Kubicek, 2009: 338). In addition, all elections since 2004 have been relatively free and fair, which indicates that the Orange Revolution was the

---

<sup>8</sup> On October 1. 2010, the constitutional amendments from 2004/2005 were repealed, and the semi-presidential system that was adopted in the original constitution of 1996 was reinstated, following a ruling from the Ukrainian Constitutional Court (KyivPost, 01.10.2010). This means that the newly elected president, Viktor Yanukovich, has been granted large powers (i.e. to dissolve parliament, appoint cabinet ministers, nominate candidates for prime minister, and veto government resolutions), while the powers of the parliament has been significantly weakened.

triggering cause behind improved vertical accountability in the Ukraine.

Verdict: YES

*8) Legal accountability (rule of law):*

Judicial independence has decreased significantly over the last decade, according to reports from Freedom House and the World Bank (Trochev, 2010: 122). Due to increasingly competitive elections, and high fragmentation and polarization among political parties and political elites, the stakes have been raised so much that; «rival elites use all available resources (including courts) to win elections, to hold onto power, or to undermine the political and economic bases of rivals» (Trochev, 2010: 123). Normally such a development, which involves high competition and fragmentation, would lead to the opposite result, namely an empowered and independent judiciary, but in the Ukraine these elements are combined with entrenched impunity for political and economic elites, and a heightened uncertainty regarding the political process (Trochev, 2010: 128). While the constitution officially guarantees judicial independence (Trochev, 2010: 132), the judiciary is nevertheless getting increasingly politicized by political parties, and even electoral results are increasingly being decided upon in courts (Trochev, 2010: 128).

Verdict: NO

*9) Bureaucratic integrity (professional, transparent, and not corrupt bureaucracy):*

According to Sushko and Prystayko, the bureaucracy lacks transparency and accountability, which partly stems from the high level of politicization, as civil servants are usually appointed based on their party affiliations rather than merit or professional competences (Sushko and Prystayko in Goehring (red), 2008: 613). In 2008, Ukraine was ranked 134<sup>th</sup> in Transparency International's perceptions of corruption index (Commission of the European communities, 2009: 4), and according to GRECO (the Group of States Against Corruption, which is a committee in the European Union) the high public corruption is a threat to the democratic principles in the Ukraine (Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 613).

Verdict: NO

*10) Local government accountability (that local governments obey the rules set by the constitution). This also implies a high level of stateness; that the state has complete monopoly on taxation and the use of force:*

Local governments are inadequately funded, and they are also less transparent than the national government (Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 609). In addition, the members of the local governments are highly dependent on both the central government, as the president is entitled to

dismiss local-level officials, and on the political parties that got them elected, as a new law in 2007 enabled political parties to dissolve the powers of local officials (if they are affiliated with that party) (Sushko et al., in Goehring (red), 2008: 609-610). Thus, there is a lack of democratic self-governance and transparency in the local government administrations.

Verdict: NO

**Regime type: FCE, BCL+2AF (Electoral irreversibility and Vertical accountability)**

**Table 4.1 A qualitative operationalisation of the 11 hybrid regimes in 2008**

	Autocracies			Hybrid regimes							fl.dem.
	0			1	1+regimes			2+regimes			3+reg.
	Belarus	Kyrgyzstan	Russia	Armenia	Georgia	Macedonia	Moldova	Albania	Ukraine	Romania	Croatia
FCE	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	YES	YES
BCL	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES
EP	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Elec. integrity	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
Elec. irreversibility	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Horizontal accountability	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Vertical accountability	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Legal accountability	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Bur. integrity	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO
Local gov. accountability	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	NO

**Table 4.2 A qualitative regime typology of the 11 hybrid postcommunist regimes in 2008:**

0	1	1+	2	2+	3	3+	4
Autocracy	Hybrid regimes				Flawed democracies		Liberal democracy
	FCE	FCE+AF	FCE, BCL	FCE, BCL+AF	FCE, BCL, EP	FCE, BCL, EP+AF	FCE, BCL, EP+AAF
	BCL	BCL+AF	FCE, EP	FCE, EP+AF			
	EP	EP+AF	BCL, EP	BCL, EP+AF			
Belarus Kyrgyzstan Russia	Armenia	Georgia Macedonia Moldova		Albania Romania Ukraine		Croatia	

#### 4.12 Conclusions:

As can be seen in the table above, the qualitative classification of regime types differs somewhat from the statistical regime typology. This is partly due to the application of an expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy (FCE, BCL, EP) as a means to distinguish between democracies and non-democracies. Thus, in the empirical analysis only Croatia is assessed to be a democracy (flawed democracy). However, if the procedural minimum definition (FCE, BCL) had been applied instead,<sup>9</sup> both Romania and Ukraine would also have been regarded as flawed democracies (like they were in the statistical analysis). Albania, the third regime in the 2+ category, would not, as it fails to meet the FCE criterion, but unlike Romania and Ukraine it does comply with the EP criterion, which illustrates how the process of democratization may proceed in different ways. Albania also fulfills the minimum constitutional criterion (BCL), and one of the additional constitutional criteria (local government accountability), and therefore seems to have made more progress on the constitutional dimension of democracy than it has on the electoral dimension. The case of Albania therefore shows the usefulness of assigning equal value to the three core elements of democracy (and of applying an expanded procedural minimum definition of democracy), as the democratization process may evolve differently from country to country. Another difference from the statistical regime typology, is that Kyrgyzstan is considered to be an autocratic regime (but was

<sup>9</sup> FCE and BCL resemble the two criteria that Freedom House have applied when operationalising regime types; political rights and civil liberties (and that therefore also became the main pillars of the statistical operationalisation of regime types, in section 2.1 of chapter 2). However, Freedom House defines these two criteria as including many more components of democracy than what is applied in this qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable.

categorized as a hybrid regime in the statistical analysis) as it fails to meet any of the 10 democratic criteria. Last but not least, the hybrid regimes have become better differentiated both with regard to their level of democraticness (ranging from 1 to 2+ in the typology), and also with regard to what type of regime they are (depending on which criteria they have fulfilled, which is listed in the summary formula of each of the country assessments)

Based on the findings in the empirical analysis, it seems that the 11 regimes that were hybrid in 1994 have mostly democratized along the electoral dimension of democracy. Only the 4 most democratic regimes, Albania, Romania, Ukraine (in the 2+category), and Croatia (the only democratic regime, in the 3+category) managed to fulfill the minimum constitutional democratic criterion (BCL) in 2008. With regard to the additional constitutional criteria, none of these 11 regimes are considered to have an adequate democratic level of horizontal accountability, legal accountability (rule of law), or bureaucratic integrity, while only Albania (2+) fulfills the local government accountability criterion. In addition, three of the most democratic regimes (Romania and Ukraine in the 2+ category), and Croatia (the only flawed democracy, in the 3+ category), are considered to comply with the criterion of vertical accountability. By contrast, 5 out of 7 hybrid regimes in 2008 (ranging from 1 to the 2+ category) fulfill the minimum electoral criterion (FCE). In addition, all the hybrid regimes except Armenia, and the flawed democracy (Croatia), fulfill the electoral irreversibility criterion, while Moldova and Romania also comply with the electoral integrity criterion. Regarding the EP criterion (elected governments have effective power to govern), which should also be considered a component of the electoral dimension of democracy (as it was operationalised as the electoral empowerment and sovereignty of elected officials, who also needed to be democratically elected), only Macedonia (1+), Albania (2+), and Croatia (3+) have been considered to fulfill this criterion. In total then, the four criteria along the electoral dimension of democracy (FCE, EP, electoral integrity, and electoral irreversibility) have been fulfilled in 18 observations, while the remaining six constitutional criteria have only been fulfilled in 8 observations, by these 11 postcommunist regimes (in 2008). Thus, it is fair to say that where democratization has occurred, it has predominantly happened along the electoral dimension of democracy.

These findings therefore seem to support the theories of Diamond (2002: 24) and Schedler (2002: 36), as they have argued that many hybrid regimes hold relatively free elections as a means to manipulate the population and increase their legitimacy, and also to conceal their more authoritarian nature. Regardless of whether this is the case, these findings also appear to contradict the argument made by Møller; that electoral and constitutional democratization usually happens simultaneously

(Møller, 2009: 39). Should these seven hybrid regimes in the table above, and perhaps even Croatia (the only classified democratic regime) really be considered as «pseudo-democracies», or are there any other possible explanations behind this uneven development?

In these 11 postcommunist countries, there seems to be some structural conditions in place, that have had a negative effect on the democratization of the constitutional criteria, and that ultimately may also explain why only one of these regimes has managed to become democratic (Croatia), while the rest of the regimes are either hybrid (7 regimes) or have reverted to authoritarianism (3 regimes). Firstly, in 8 of these 11 countries there was an insufficient break with communism during the transition. Only Albania, Croatia, and Georgia were operationalised in the statistical analysis to have made a clean break with communism, as the opposition won the first postcommunist elections in these countries. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, only Croatia was perceived to have a democratically favourable historical legacy, as it had a national accommodative system during communism (see Kitschelt, 1999). Thus, with the exception of Croatia, the communist legacy is likely to have had a significant and negative effect on the prospects for democratization in these postcommunist countries. All of the other 10 countries had either a patrimonial or a colonial peripheral system of governance during the communist era. As mentioned in section 2.3.2 of chapter 2, these two systems of governance were characterized as having a high level of patrimonialism/clientelism, being very repressive, and having extremely weak civil societies (Kitschelt, 1999: 28). Thus, it is perhaps no surprise that all these postcommunist countries, to some extent also Croatia, currently have highly politicized state institutions, and high levels of corruption. Most of these countries also have clientelistic party systems with a high level of party patronage, perhaps with the exception of Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia. To varying degrees, the mode of governance in these 11 countries is also quite informal, corrupt and non-transparent, which is probably also one of the reasons why so few of these countries fulfill the EP criterion. Only Macedonia (1+), Albania (2+), and Croatia (3+) have elected governments that have effective power to govern. With all of these constraints in place, it is understandable that less progress have been made with regard to the constitutional criteria of democracy than with respect to the electoral criteria. After all, high levels of horizontal accountability, legal accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and/or local government accountability, require relatively transparent, non-corrupt governance based mostly on formal institutions and rules, such as the constitution. If these conditions are present, it would also facilitate a more efficient protection of basic civil liberties (BCL; the minimum constitutional criterion).

For the same reasons that the democratization along the constitutional dimension of democracy has



progressed rather slowly, it also seems likely that the classification of these 11 regimes as hybrid regimes in 1994, may be partly explained by the high level of clientelism, the high level of corruption, and the informal and non-transparent governance in these countries, which in turn are consequences of their unfavourable type of communist legacy. This probably also help explain why, 14 years later (in 2008), only one regime (Croatia) had managed to become democratic, while 3 of these regimes had reverted to authoritarianism (Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia), and 7 regimes still remain hybrid (Armenia, Macedonia, Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Albania, and Romania).

Those variables that appear to have been most conducive to democratization are the presence of a strong political influence from the European Union, relatively well developed civil societies, effective power to govern for elected governments, and the presence of an electoral revolution. The most democratic regimes, Croatia (3+) and Romania, Albania (2+) have all been highly influenced by the EU, partly through economic support, and partly through the leverage that EU has regarding membership accession and conditionality negotiations. The last regime in the 2+ category, Ukraine, seems to be highly influenced by both the EU as well as Russia. In addition, Macedonia (1+) is also strongly influenced by the EU. In all these regimes, it seems likely that the EU accession talks have contributed to democratic reforms. Another variable that appears to be of even greater significance when explaining the differences in democraticness, is the level of civil society development. The four most democratic regimes, including all of the 2+ regimes and the 3+ regime, are all considered to have relatively decently developed civil societies, and, except Albania, all of these regimes also fulfill the vertical accountability criterion. The remaining seven regimes, all of which have lower scores on the level of democraticness, have relatively poorly developed civil societies, and none of these regimes have therefore been capable of fulfilling the vertical accountability criterion. In addition, the fulfillment of the EP criterion, that elected governments have effective power to govern, seems to have had a slightly positive impact on the democratization process. Croatia (the most democratic regime), Albania (2+) and Macedonia (1+) are the only countries that fulfill this criterion. However, it should be noted that also two of the authoritarian regimes (Russia and Belarus) have effective power to govern, but their governments have not been legitimately/democratically elected. The fourth variable that appears to have had a positive influence on democratization is the presence of an electoral revolution.<sup>10</sup> In the postcommunist region, the electoral revolutions that at first sight appear to have been the most comprehensive and important in terms of political development, as they are widely described and analysed in the

---

10 Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik define an electoral revolution as a crucial election in which a liberal opposition is able to defeat the illiberal political incumbents/elites, and also introduce a more free and fair electoral process (this could also happen before or during these pivotal elections, often with the support of international agencies) (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006: 5-6).

literature, are the Colour Revolutions in Georgia (2003), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005). In the former two of these cases, Georgia and Ukraine, the electoral revolutions seem to have had a profound and positive impact on the democratization process, particularly along the electoral dimension of democracy. In the case of the Ukraine, the Orange Revolution also seem to have facilitated democratization along the constitutional dimension of democracy, as they now fulfill the minimum constitutional criterion, by more effectively guaranteeing basic civil liberties. The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan was, on the other hand, less successful, which partly stems from the fact that the revolution was driven by illiberal political elites. Other less described, but perhaps equally or more successful electoral revolutions, were the Croatian election in 2000, which resulted in Croatia moving directly from «not free» to «free» in the Freedom House rankings (Bunce and Wolchik, 2006: 6), and Romania's elections in 1996, and in 2004. Also Slovakia and Bulgaria have experienced electoral revolutions (in the mid-1990s), which subsequently led to democratic progress. These electoral revolutions have mostly contributed to progress along the electoral dimension of democracy, even though Romania, Ukraine, and Croatia also fulfill the minimum constitutional criterion (BCL).

Only one country (Croatia), has experienced the presence of all of the four variables mentioned above, which seems to have a positive impact on democratization (strong EU influence, highly developed civil society, EP, and an electoral revolution), while the most democratic of the hybrid regimes lack some of these attributes. In the 2+ category, Romania and the Ukraine lack EP, Albania has not experienced an electoral revolution, and the Ukraine is also strongly influenced by Russia, which are possible explanations why these countries haven't been able to pass the minimum democratic threshold. Another possible reason why the other hybrid regimes have been unable to become democratic is paradoxically also a possible cause behind the democratic progress that has been made by some of these hybrid regimes. In five out of seven hybrid regimes, the political climate is highly polarized (the only exceptions are Armenia and Georgia), and there is a severe lack of political dialogue between the main political actors. In the case of the Ukraine, the highly polarized political climate that erupted following the Orange Revolution in 2004, paradoxically seems like one of the main causes behind the democratization that followed, as political power became fragmented into several factions (both between the Orange coalition and the former incumbent elites, and within the Orange coalition), whereas before the revolution most of the power had been located in a strong executive branch (led by former president Leonid Kuchma). Thus, as none of these groups were powerful enough to rule unilaterally, it became easier for civil society, the opposition, and international agencies to demand democratic reforms from the government. However, the highly polarized political climate also meant that it became harder for the government

to pass legislation through the legislature, which resulted in an increasing politicization of the judicial system and other state institutions, as decision making increasingly became decided upon in the courts. This is also one of the main reasons why the process of democratization stagnated, and why it became harder to fulfill the constitutional criteria of democracy. In addition to the Ukraine, also Romania, Albania, Moldova, and Macedonia have a highly polarized climate, and the main cleavage line in these cases is usually found between former communist elites and anti-communists (who are often more liberal).

Some of the variables that most clearly seem to distinguish the 1+ regimes from the 2+ regimes, are the presence in the former regime type (1+) of: poorly developed civil societies (in all of the three 1+ regimes; Macedonia, Moldova, and Georgia), lack of state monopoly on taxation and the use of force (Moldova and Georgia), ethnic conflict (Macedonia), recent war (Georgia, in 2008), a very rural and uninformed electorate (Moldova), strong Russian influence (Moldova and Georgia), and a fairly strong and «unchecked» executive branch, partly induced by the strong electoral mandates of the current incumbents (Moldova and Georgia). However, it should be noted that also Croatia (3+ regime type) struggles with ethnic tensions and has experienced a war recently, though not as recently as Georgia (in 1995), and that also the Ukraine is strongly influenced by Russia (but unlike Georgia and Moldova, and similar to Macedonia, the Ukraine also appears to be strongly influenced by the EU).

Armenia, the only regime in the 1 category, seems to share some of the features of the regimes in the 2+ category. Like the three 2+ regimes, Armenia has a poorly developed civil society, and similar to Moldova and Georgia, Armenia is also strongly influenced by Russia, and has a very strong executive branch (and a small and poorly organised opposition). The main aspect that seems to differentiate Armenia from the 2+ regimes, as well as all the other postcommunist regimes, is the militarization of the state. The military has become increasingly politicized, and a vital instrument for regime survival. In addition, Armenia also has a much more clientelistic societal structure than most of the other postcommunist countries, as nearly all aspects of Armenian society seem to be determined by the informal relationships between and within social networks (Freire et al., 2007: 7).

Unlike the other regimes that are being compared in the empirical analysis, there is a much higher level of repression of the opposition and the media, and of civil liberties in general, in the authoritarian states (particularly in Belarus and Russia, and to a lesser extent in Kyrgyzstan). This development of preemptive policymaking has partly been made possible by the increasingly powerful executive branches, in Belarus and Russia respectively (not in Kyrgyzstan, where the state

institutions are very weak), which have been able to eliminate most of the opposition. Examples of such preemptive political measures are: frequent changes to the electoral legislation, electoral fraud, persecution and repression of opposition, and control of the media. Both the Russian and the Belarusian regimes also enjoy high levels of popular legitimacy, and have received strong electoral mandates which have facilitated the authoritarian development in these two states. This can probably be partly attributed to great economic success/growth, lack of democratic history/traditions, and the charismatic leaders of these two countries. Both Belarus and Kyrgyzstan are also strongly influenced by Russia, which have facilitated continued authoritarian development and consolidation in these two countries. The main explanation why Kyrgyzstan has reverted to authoritarianism is probably that Kyrgyzstan is a much divided country, where different clan-based elites and ethnic groups compete for political and economic power. Combined with a highly clientelistic society and a very disillusioned electorate, which is unhappy not only with the government, but also with democracy as a political system, this has contributed to the lack of state monopoly on taxation and the use of force. The extremely high levels of corruption and cronyism, as well as very weak state institutions are other elements that may help explain why the Colour Revolution in 2005 became a failure, and why Kyrgyzstan currently is an authoritarian regime.

## **5. Conclusion**

When assessing the political development of 25 postcommunist regimes since the fall of communism, it appeared necessary to combine quantitative and statistical methods with a more qualitative and case-based approach. This choice was partly motivated by the necessity of producing a definition of different regime types that could be explicitly linked to the means applied to measure these regime types. The linkage between the definition of these concepts (different regime types) on the one hand, and the measurement of these concepts on the other, is often lacking or very implicit in quantitative operationalisations of regime types. This methodological problem stems from the fact that large quantitative datasets, which are commonly applied as means to measure previously defined concepts, such as democracy, in many academic studies, often lack sufficient theoretical justification or explanation for how these concepts have been measured and/or defined. Thus, it is uncertain whether such graded measures collected from large datasets actually correspond to the definitions of these concepts, which ultimately may cause conceptual stretching (i.e. by categorizing countries to concepts they don't belong to). Thus, it seemed necessary to also produce a qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable, which could be more explicitly linked to empirical realities, and that could complement the results of the statistical analysis, which

had been based on a quantitative operationalisation of the dependent variable. Another reason behind this combination of methodological approaches when examining the political development of postcommunist regimes, was the great lack of data and observations in the statistical analysis, which inevitably caused several statistical challenges (such as high levels of multicollinearity). These statistical challenges consequently meant that advanced statistical methods (i.e. multivariate regression analysis) could no longer be regarded as appropriate measures when comparing these countries, as it would have yielded questionable statistical results. Thus, instead of applying either a time-series analysis (covering the entire time-span since the fall of communism) or a cross-sectional analysis, the simpler bivariate correlation analysis was applied when examining the political development in the postcommunist region. This allowed the comparison to avoid high levels of multicollinearity, better distinguish between the relative effects of different independent variables, and better differentiate between the explanatory power of long-term and short-term causes (independent variables), which also were the same reasons that made Herbert Kitschelt apply a bivariate correlation analysis when he conducted his comparison of postcommunist regimes in 1999 (Kitschelt, 1999). However, the bivariate correlation analysis can only determine whether the relationship between two variables is significant, but not the direction of causality (i.e. whether the dependent variable is influenced by an independent variable, or the other way round). More importantly, the bivariate correlation analysis was only able to explain the political development of those postcommunist regimes that either became democratic or that reverted to authoritarianism, but proved to be an insufficient tool when trying to explain why a relatively large group of regimes became «stuck in transition» as hybrid regimes. Thus, these statistical challenges provided another good reason why the statistical approach needed to be complemented by a more qualitative and case-based analysis.

When making a quantitative operationalisation of the dependent variable (in chapter 2.1), the regime types were conceptualized as autocracies, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal democracies. Differentiating between four main types of regimes appears to be relatively common within theories of democratization, as several scholars such as Diamond, Schedler, O'Donnell, Wigell, and Dahl, have all identified four main types of political regimes. In many studies of democratization, and particularly in statistical studies, it is also common to measure these concepts (regime types) by applying scores from Freedom House (or from other similar datasets that attempt to measure the level of democraticness in different regimes). This was also done in this analysis, partly because it made this analysis more comparable to other studies on democratization, and the values assigned to each of the four regime types also resemble the categorization that is applied by Freedom House (free, partly free, and not free) when applying the average value of political rights

and civil liberties on a scale from 1-7. However, the aggregation of these scores, and the relationship and coding of each of the selected components of democracy, lack sufficient theoretical justification and explanation, according to Gerardo Munck (Munck, 2002: 20). Thus, the definition of democracy that has been applied by Freedom House should be regarded as a maximalist definition, as it includes concepts and attributes that perhaps should rather have been regarded as possible causes or consequences of the defined concept, and it is also difficult to see exactly how these attributes of democracy have been coded, which in turn makes it difficult to know exactly which democratic components must be fulfilled (and/or to what degree) in order for a regime to meet the threshold/definition of democracy (and of other regime types).

The difficulty of determining how Freedom House has measured the level of democraticness, and how much weight it has attributed to each component of democracy, is also the main reason why the quantitative operationalisation of regime types didn't include an explicit definition of democracy. In other words, it would be very difficult to produce a definition of democracy (and of different regime types) that could correspond to the measurement and aggregation of scores conducted by Freedom House without knowing exactly what methods they have applied. Instead, a theory-driven conceptualization of regime types (i.e. four main types of regimes) was combined with the scores from Freedom House in order to reveal the general political trends in the postcommunist region. However, a more thorough operationalisation and definition of democracy (and of the other regime types) that could be more explicitly connected to empirical realities also seemed necessary. Thus, in chapter 2.2, a qualitative regime typology was established by identifying the most important elements of democracy. These 10 democratic elements were identified and selected based on theoretical considerations, and as some of these components were assigned a higher value than others (also based on existing theory), it became possible to achieve greater differentiation between the various regime types. Similar to the statistical operationalisation, the same four regime types were applied (autocracy, hybrid regimes, flawed democracies, and liberal democracies), although in the qualitative regime typology four different types of hybrid regimes were also included. One of the greatest advantages of this qualitative approach, is that the definition of these different regime types is relatively neutral, which therefore made it possible to achieve differentiation both in degree (level of democraticness) and in kind (what type of regime). Because the three core elements of democracy (FCE, BCL, EP) are of equal value, and higher than the 7 additional features of democracy, this typology therefore increased the capability of identifying different types of democratization processes, and also reduced the likelihood of conceptual stretching. The possible flaws of this approach were related to the measurement of these democratic elements in the empirical analysis, as it is uncertain whether sufficiently relevant sources have been applied when

determining whether the postcommunist regimes had managed to fulfill these criteria or not. In addition, the qualitative approach was only applied to analyse the political development of the 11 regimes that were considered to be hybrid regimes in 1994, as these regimes were poorly explained by the statistical analysis.

The development of the 14 postcommunist regimes that had either become democratic or had reverted to authoritarianism by 1994 was relatively well explained by the statistical analysis. Most of the hypotheses that were outlined in section 2.3 of chapter 2, were also confirmed in the two correlation analyses that assessed the situations in 1994 and 2008. In fact, many of the hypothesized effects were visible as early as 1994, and by 2008 the gradual polarization of the political development had become even stronger, as the correlations that had a significant relationship with democratic states generally had the opposite values of the correlations that significantly explained the autocratic regimes. In 1994, a high level of modernisation (economic development), a low level of corruption, and a favourable historical legacy (either a bureaucratic-authoritarian or a national-accommodative administrative system during communism), were significantly correlated with liberal democracies. The latter condition (favourable historical legacy) also showed a strong correlation with flawed democracies. In addition, the flawed democracies could also be significantly explained by situations in which the opposition had won the first postcommunist elections, strong legislatures, rapid economic reform, and a Western geographical location. All of these correlations complied with the hypothesised relationships to the dependent variable predicted in section 2.3, and by 2008 these theories seem to have been thoroughly confirmed as all of these independent variables correlated strongly with liberal democracies, while no longer correlating with flawed democracies. These findings can partly be explained by the fact that all of the flawed democracies except Bulgaria became liberal democracies during this time-span. Perhaps more importantly, this also seems to confirm the thesis that there has been a path-dependent political development in the postcommunist region, as most of the independent variables that correlated strongly with liberal democracies in 2008 (and with both democratic regime types in 1994) also correlated strongly with each other. In addition, the opposite values on the majority of these independent variables strongly correlated with autocratic regimes in both of the two correlation analyses. In 2008, an Eastern geographical location, an unfavourable historical legacy (patrimonial or colonial peripheral administrative system during communism), the incumbent regime winning the first postcommunist elections, slow economic reform, a high level of corruption, and weak legislatures, were significant conditions explaining the autocratic regimes. Another significant factor; high amounts of natural resources, also correlated strongly with autocracies (both in 1994 and 2008). When comparing these findings to the results of the 1994 analysis, all of these factors also displayed significant

correlations with autocratic regimes 14 years earlier. The main differences were that the level of modernisation no longer had any significance in 2008 (a low level of modernisation significantly correlated with autocracies in 1994), and, surprisingly, also that the economic growth variable showed the opposite significant effects in 2008. The strong correlation between high levels of economic growth and autocracies (and between low economic growth and liberal democracies) in 2008, can probably be explained by the global financial meltdown that occurred during that same year, and the stronger financial resources of the autocratic regimes, as they generally possessed higher amounts of natural resources that enabled them to cope better with the crises.

As pointed out above, the findings of the statistical analysis indicate that there has been a path-dependent political development in the postcommunist region. In addition to the obvious geographical explanation (regimes with a Western location are more likely to become democratic, while authoritarianism is more likely to take hold further to the East), the predicted long-term and path-dependent variables such as the historical legacy, the balance of power in the first postcommunist election, and the institutional choices made during or shortly after the transition from communism (such as the formal powers granted to the legislature and/or the speed of the transition toward a capitalist economy) appear to have been confirmed as having had significant path-dependent effects on the dependent variable in the majority of these postcommunist regimes (those regimes that are located either far to the East or far to the West). This argument is underpinned by the finding that the conditions that strongly correlate with democracies are nearly the opposite of the conditions that correlate with autocratic regimes, and also that these conditions share very strong correlations with each other when explaining these two regime types.

However, the political development of the 11 regimes that were hybrid in 1994 were poorly explained by the statistical analysis. By 2008, the only condition that helps explain why three of these hybrid regimes (Croatia, Romania, and Ukraine) had become democratic (flawed democracies), was the significant correlation that had emerged between a low level of social inequality and flawed democracies. With regard to the two former hybrid regimes that had reverted to authoritarianism by 2008 (Belarus and Russia), the only statistical indication of why this had happened is that they appear to have experienced higher levels of economic development than the 6 regimes that still remained hybrid in 2008, which contradicts the hypothesised relationship between modernisation and democratization. Thus, it became evident that it was necessary to conduct a case-based analysis, based on the qualitative operationalisation of the dependent variable in section 2.2, in order to explain the political development of the hybrid regimes in the postcommunist region. The qualitative classification of these 11 regimes in 2008 ended up being slightly different from the



statistical categorization of these regimes in the same year. Unlike in the statistical classification, Romania and Ukraine were not considered to have passed the democratic threshold (and remained hybrid regimes) in the qualitative assessment, which can probably be partly explained by the application of an expanded minimum definition of democracy (FCE, BCL, and EP). In addition, Kyrgyzstan turned out to be an authoritarian regime (and not a hybrid regime as it had been labeled in the statistical analysis).

One of the main findings in the case-based analysis was that these 11 countries share several attributes that help explain why these regimes have made such limited progress on the constitutional dimension of democracy, why they were all hybrid regimes in 1994, and also why only one of these countries had managed to become democratic by 2008. To varying degrees, all of these countries struggle with relatively high levels of corruption, highly politicized state institutions, clientelistic party systems, and informal and non-transparent governance. These features can probably be partly attributed to the unfavourable historical legacies (in 10 out of these 11 countries<sup>11</sup>), and an insufficient break with communism (in 8 out of 11 countries). Considering this background it is understandable that more progress has been made along the electoral dimension of democracy, and that very few of these countries have managed to meet any of the constitutional criteria of democracy. The variables that appear to have had the most positive impact on democratization in these countries are: strong EU influence, highly developed civil societies, effective power to govern for elected governments, and electoral revolutions. The existence of a highly polarized climate also seems to have had a slightly positive influence on democratization in some cases (such as in Ukraine, where it resulted in higher political openness), but only to a limited extent, as polarization also makes it harder to achieve progress along the constitutional dimension of democracy. Further down the ladder in the level of democraticness, the impact of variables such as: strong Russian influence, poorly developed civil societies, lack of state monopoly on the use of force and taxation, ethnic conflict, quite strong and «unchecked» executive branches (which are often the result of strong electoral mandates for the incumbent elites), and militarization of the state (only Armenia), becomes more frequent. As for the 7 regimes that were still regarded as hybrid in 2008 (Armenia, Georgia, Macedonia, Moldova, Albania, Romania, and Ukraine), a low level of modernisation is also a significant explanatory factor (the only significant correlation with hybrid regimes in the statistical analysis, in 2008). The 3 regimes that are considered to have reverted to authoritarianism (Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan) share many of the «negative» factors for democratization that are common among the hybrid regimes. The main features that seem to distinguish these authoritarian

---

11 Only Croatia, which is the only country of these 11 regimes to become democratic by 2008, had a favourable historical legacy with a national-accommodative system.

regimes from the rest, are: higher levels of regime repression (preemptive policymaking) and much stronger and more popular executive branches (Russia and Belarus), and an extremely divided, clientelistic, and poorly developed society, that in several cases have barely avoided civil war (Kyrgyzstan, in 2005 and 2010).

To sum up, the quantitative analyses largely confirmed most of the theoretical models that were discussed in chapter 2.3, but were unable to explain the existence of hybrid regimes. However, the application of a qualitative analysis made it possible to identify several variables that help explain why these 11 regimes were «stuck in transition» following the collapse of communism, and also why there are considerable differences in the level of democraticness among these regimes in 2008. Another great advantage of this qualitative approach is that its more «conceptually neutral» definition of the dependent variable, ensured that it became possible to achieve greater analytical differentiation between these postcommunist regimes, both in degree and kind of democracy, while at the same time avoiding conceptual stretching.

## Literature

- Abazov, R. (2003): "The parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, February 2000". *Electoral Studies* 22: 545-552.
- Anderson, John (1996): "The Kyrgyz Parliamentary and Presidential Elections of 1995". *Electoral Studies* 15 (4): 529-533.
- Antic, Miljenko, and Maia Dodic Gruicic (2008): "The parliamentary election in Croatia, November 2007". *Electoral Studies* 27: 752-755.
- AsiaNews.it (2010): Parliamentary elections in Bishkek: vote recount. <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Parliamentary-elections-in-Bishkek:-vote-recount-19728.html> (downloaded at the 15<sup>th</sup> October, 2010).
- Barnes, Andrew (2001): "Property, power, and the presidency: ownership policy reform and Russian executive-legislative relations, 1990-1999". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*. 34: 39-61.
- Beetham, David (red) (1994): *Defining and Measuring Democracy*. London: Sage Publications.
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk (2003): *The Quality of Democracies in Europe as measured by current indicators of democratization and good governance*. Paper presented at the 2<sup>nd</sup> General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) in Marburg, September 18-21, 2003.
- Blitz, Brad K. (2008): "Democratic Development, Judicial Reform and the Serbian Question in Croatia". *Human Rights Review* 9 (1): 123-135.
- Bunce, Valerie (2000): "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations". *Comparative Political Studies* 33: 703-734.
- Bunce, Valerie (2003): "Rethinking Recent Democratization, Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience". *World Politics* 55 (2): 167-192.
- Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik (2006): "Favorable conditions and electoral revolutions". *Journal of Democracy* 17 (4): 5-18.
- Carothers, Thomas (2002): "The End of the Transition Paradigm". *Journal of Democracy* 13 (1): 5-21.
- Ciobanu, Monica (2007): "Romania's Travails with Democracy and accession to the European Union". *Europe-Asia Studies* 59 (8): 1429-1450.
- Collier, David and Steven Levitsky (1997): «Democracy with adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research». *World Politics* 49 (3): 430-451.
- Commission of the European communities (2007): *Albania 2007 Progress report*. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key\\_documents/2007/nov/albania\\_progress\\_reports\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2007/nov/albania_progress_reports_en.pdf) (downloaded at 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2008): *Albania 2008 Progress Report*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press\\_corner/key-documents/reports\\_nov\\_2008/albania\\_progress\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/albania_progress_report_en.pdf) (downloaded at 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2008): *Implementation of the European neighbourhood policy in 2007, Progress Report Armenia*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08\\_392\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08_392_en.pdf) (downloaded at 8<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2008): *Croatia 2008 progress report*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press\\_corner/key-documents/reports\\_nov\\_2008/croatia\\_progress\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/croatia_progress_report_en.pdf) (downloaded at 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2009): *Croatia 2009 progress report*. [http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvijesce/Progress\\_report\\_2009.pdf](http://www.eu-pregovori.hr/files/Izvijesce/Progress_report_2009.pdf) (downloaded at 5<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2008): *The former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, 2008 progress report*. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press\\_corner/key-documents/reports\\_nov\\_2008/the\\_former\\_yugoslav\\_republic\\_of\\_macedonia\\_progress\\_report\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia_progress_report_en.pdf)

(downloaded at 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2008): *Progress Report Moldova*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08\\_399\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2008/sec08_399_en.pdf) (downloaded at 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2009): *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood policy in 2008, progress report Georgia*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09\\_513\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_513_en.pdf) (downloaded at 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

Commission of the European communities (2009): *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood policy in 2008, progress report Ukraine*.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09\\_515\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_515_en.pdf) (downloaded at 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2010).

Dahl, Robert (1971): *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davis, Sue (2008): "Elections, Legitimacy, Media and Democracy: The case of Georgia". *Nationalities Papers* 36 (3): 471-487.

De Melo, Martha, Cevdet Denizer, and Alan Gelb (1996): "Patterns of Transition from Plan to Market". *The World Bank Economic Review* 10 (3): 397-424.

Diamond, Larry (1999): *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

- Diamond, Larry (2002): «Thinking about Hybrid Regimes». *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 21-35.
- Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner (red) (2001): *The Global Divergence of Democracies*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino (2004): «The Quality of Democracy, An Overview». *Journal of Democracy* 15 (4): 20-31.
- Diamond, Larry (1991): «Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered». In Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (red). *Reexamining Democracy: Essays in Honor of Seymour Martin Lipset*. 93-139. London: Sage Publications.
- Downs, William M. (2009): “The 2008 parliamentary election in Romania”. *Electoral Studies* 28: 510-513.
- Dukenbaev, Askat, and William H. Hansen (2003): *Understanding Politics in Kyrgyzstan*. Edited by Ole Nørgaard and Lars Johannsen. Demstar Research Report No.16, September 2003.
- Fairbanks, Charles H. (2010): “Georgia's Soviet Legacy”. *Journal of Democracy* 21 (1): 144-151.
- Feilcke-Tiemann, Adelheid (2006): “Albania: Gradual Consolidation limited by Internal Political Struggles”. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 6 (1): 25-41.
- Fish, Steven M., and Robin S. Brooks (2004): “Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (1): 154-166.
- Fish, Steven M. (2006): “Stronger Legislatures Stronger Democracies”. *Journal of Democracy* 17 (1): 5-20.
- Fish, Steven M., and Omar Choudry (2007): “Democratization and Economic Liberalization in the Postcommunist World”. *Comparative Political Studies* 40: 254-282.
- Freedom House (2009): *Country ratings and status, FIW1973-2009*.  
[http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW\\_AllScores\\_Countries.xls](http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fiw09/CompHistData/FIW_AllScores_Countries.xls)  
 (downloaded at the 24<sup>th</sup> of November, 2009).
- Freire, Maria Raquel, and Licinia Simao (2007): *The Armenian Road to Democracy, Dimensions of a Tortuous Process*. CEPS Working Document No. 267/May 2007, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Geddes, Barbara (1999): “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115-144.
- Goehring, Jeannette (red) (2008): *Nations in Transit 2008, Democratization from Central Europe*. New York: Freedom House.
- Gonenc, Levent (2002): *Prospects for Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Countries*. London: Brill Academic Publishers.
- Gross, Peter, and Vladimir Tismaneanu (2005): “The End of Postcommunism in Romania”. *Journal of Democracy* 16 (2): 146-162.

- Heintz, Monica (2008): *Weak State, Uncertain Citizenship: Moldova*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften.
- Herron, Erik S. (2008): "The parliamentary election in Ukraine, September 2007". *Electoral Studies* 27: 551-555.
- Hesli, Vicki L. (2006): "The Orange Revolution: 2004 presidential election(s) in Ukraine". *Electoral Studies* 25: 168-176.
- Huber, Evelyne, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and John D. Stephens (1993): "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy". *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7 (3): 71-85.
- Jones, Stephen (2005): "Presidential and parliamentary elections in Georgia, 2004". *Electoral Studies* 24: 303-311.
- Kajsiu, Blendi, Aldo Bumci, and Albert Rakipi (2003): *Albania – A weak Democracy, A weak State – Report on the state of Democracy in Albania*. Tirana: Albanian Institute for International Studies.
- Kalandadze, Katya, and Mitchell A. Orenstein (2009): "Electoral Protests and Democratization Beyond the Color Revolutions". *Comparative Political Studies* 42: 1403-1425.
- Karklins, Rasma (2002): "Typology of Post-Communist Corruption". *Problems of Post-Communism* 49 (4): 22-32.
- Kasapovic, Mirjana (1996): "1995 Parliamentary Elections in Croatia". *Electoral Studies* 15 (2): 269-274.
- Kitschelt, Herbert (1999): *Accounting for outcomes of Post-Communist Regime Change. Causal depth or shallowness in rival explanations*. Paper prepared for delivery at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1-5, 1999.
- Korosteleva, Elena (2009): "Was there a Quiet Revolution? Belarus after the 2006 Presidential election". *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 25 (2): 324-346.
- Kubicek, Paul (2009): "Problems of post-post-communism: Ukraine after the Orange Revolution". *Democratization* 16 (2): 323-343.
- KyivPost (2010): *Update: Return to 1996 Constitution strengthens president, raises legal questions*. <http://www.kyivpost.com/news/politics/detail/84619/> (downloaded at the 1. October, 2010).
- Lanskoy, Miriam, and Giorgi Areshidze (2008): "Georgia's Year of Turmoil". *Journal of Democracy* 19 (4): 154-168.
- Lijphart, Arend (1971): "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method". *The American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682-693.
- Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan (1996): *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. London: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lipset, Seymour M. (1960): *The Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, New

York: Doubleday.

Lucas, Edward (2008): *Den nye kalde krigen, Kremles grep om Russland og Vesten*. Trondheim: Gyldendal.

Markarov, Alexander (2006): "MacroInstitutional Political Structures and Their Development in Armenia". *Demokratizatsiya* 14 (2): 159-170.

Marples, David R. (2009): "Outpost of tyranny? The failure of democratization in Belarus". *Democratization* 16 (4): 756-776.

Matsuzato, Kimitaka (2006): "Differing Dynamics of semipresidentialism across Euro/Eurasian Borders: Ukraine, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova, and Armenia". *Demokratizatsiya* 14 (3): 317-345.

Mavrikos-Adamou, Tina (2010): "Challenges to democracy building and the role of civil society". *Democratization* 17 (3): 514-533.

McDonagh, Ecaterina (2008): "Is Democracy promotion Effective in Moldova? The Impact of European Institutions on Development of Civil and Political Rights in Moldova". *Democratization* 15 (1): 142-161.

McFaul, Michael (2002): "The fourth wave of Democracy and Dictatorship". *World Politics* 54 (2): 212-244.

McFaul, Michael (2005): "Transitions from Postcommunism". *Journal of Democracy* 16 (3): 5-19.

McLean, Iain, and Alistair McMillan (red) (2003): *Oxford concise dictionary of Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mitchell, Lincoln A. (2006): "Democracy in Georgia since the Rose Revolution". *Orbis* 50 (4): 669-676.

Munck, Gerardo L. (2001): «The Regime Question, Theory Building in Democracy Studies». *World Politics* 54: 119-144.

Munck, Gerardo L. (2002): «Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices». *Comparative Political Studies* 35 (1): 5-34.

Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina, and Igor Munteanu (2009): "Moldova's "Twitter Revolution". *Journal of Democracy* 20 (3): 136-142.

Møller, Jørgen (2009): *Post-Communist Regime Change, A Comparative Study*. New York: Routledge.

New York Times (2010): *Party opposed to New Constitution Leads in Kyrgyzstan Voting*.

[http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/asia/12kyrgyz.html?\\_r=1&ref=kyrgyzstan](http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/asia/12kyrgyz.html?_r=1&ref=kyrgyzstan) (downloaded at the 11<sup>th</sup> October, 2010).

Nichol, Jim (2010): *The April 2010 Coup in Kyrgyzstan and its Aftermath: Context and Implications for U.S Interests*. Paper prepared for Members and Committees of Congress, Washington DC, USA: Congressional Research Service.



- Norris, Pippa (2009): *Democracy Timeseries Data release 3.0, January 2009*.  
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Democracy%20TimeSeries%20Data/Democracy%20Timeseries%20Data%20January%202009%20Excel2007.xlsx> (downloaded at 25<sup>th</sup> January, 2010).
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter (1986): *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Ottaway, Marina, and Gideon Maltz (2001): "Croatia's Second Transition and the International Community". *Current History* 100 (649): 375-380.
- Pearce, Emily (2008): "Birth and Rebirth: The Past, Present, and Future of Albanian Transition". *Nordicum-Mediterraneum, Icelandic E-Journal of Nordic and Mediterranean Studies* 3 (1).  
[http://nome.unak.is/previous-issues/issues/vol3\\_1/pearce.html](http://nome.unak.is/previous-issues/issues/vol3_1/pearce.html) (downloaded at 5<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).
- Pickering, Paula M., and Mark Baskin (2008): "What is to be done? Succession from the League of Communists of Croatia". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 41: 521-540.
- Radnitz, Scott (2006): "What really happened in Kyrgyzstan?" *Journal of Democracy* 17 (2): 132-146.
- Roper, Steven D. (2006): "The influence of party patronage and state finance on electoral outcomes: Evidence from Romania". *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 22 (3): 362-382.
- Ross, Cameron (2000): "Federalism and democratization in Russia". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 33: 403-420.
- Ross, Cameron (2003): "Putin's federal reforms and the consolidation of federalism in Russia: one step forward, two steps back!" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 36: 29-47.
- Ross, Michael L. (2001): "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53 (3): 235-361.
- Ruget, Vanessa, and Burul Usmanalieva (2007): "The Impact of state weakness on citizenship, a case study of Kyrgyzstan". *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40: 441-458.
- Ruiz-Rufino, Ruben (2008): "The parliamentary election in Armenia, May 2007". *Electoral Studies* 27: 369-372.
- Sahakyan, Vahe, and Arthur Atanesyan (2006): "Democratization in Armenia: Some Trends of Political Culture and Behavior". *Demokratizatsiya* 14 (3): 347-354.
- Sakwa, Richard (2008): *Putin, Russia's choice*. New York: Routledge.
- Schedler, Andreas (2001): «Taking Uncertainty Seriously: The Blurred Boundaries of Democratic Transition and Consolidation». *Democratization* 8 (4): 1-22.
- Schedler, Andreas (2002): «Elections Without Democracy, The Menu of Manipulation». *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2): 36-50.
- Senyuva, Ozgehan (2010): "Parliamentary elections in Moldova, April and July 2009". *Electoral*



*Studies* 29: 190-195.

Silitski, Vitali (2005): "Preempting Democracy: The case of Belarus". *Journal of Democracy* 16 (4): 83-97.

Stan, Lavinia, and Razvan Zaharia (2009): "Romania". *European Journal of Political Research* 48 (7/8): 1087-1099.

Storm, (2008): «An Elemental Definition of Democracy and its advantages for Comparing Political Regime Types». *Democratization* 15 (2): 215-229.

Szajkowski, Bogdan (2007): "The parliamentary election in Albania, July-August 2005". *Electoral Studies* 26: 227-231.

The World Bank Group (2009): *WDI Online World Development Indicators*. <http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=6>

(downloaded data for the Modernisation variable at 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2009, the Eco\_growth variable at 24<sup>th</sup> November, 2009, the Soc\_inequality variable at 16<sup>th</sup> February 2010, and the Nat\_resources variable at 16<sup>th</sup> February, 2010).

The World Bank Group (2009): *Governance Matters 2009 Worldwide Governance Indicators, 1996-2008*. <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls> (downloaded at 25<sup>th</sup> of January, 2010).

Transparency International (2008): *Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI)*.

<http://www.transparency.org/content/download/36555/574728> and

<http://www.transparency.org/content/download/36529/574586> (downloaded at 20<sup>th</sup> October, 2010).

Trochev, Alexei (2010): "Meddling with Justice Competitive Politics, Impunity, and Distrusted Courts in Post-Orange Ukraine". *Demokratizatsiya* 18 (2): 122-147.

Tsukatos, George A. (2008): *The Republic of Macedonia: Implementing the Ohrid framework agreement and reforming the state*. Master's Thesis, of Arts in security studies, at the Naval postgraduate school in Monterey, California.

[http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Sep/08Sep\\_Tsukatos.pdf](http://edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/theses/2008/Sep/08Sep_Tsukatos.pdf) (downloaded at 21<sup>th</sup> May, 2010).

Tudoroiu, Theodor (2007): "Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet Revolutions".

*Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 40: 315-342.

USAID (2008): *2008 NGO Sustainability Index*.

[http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe\\_eurasia/dem\\_gov/ngoindex/2008/complete\\_document.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2008/complete_document.pdf) (downloaded at the 16<sup>th</sup> November, 2009).

US Bureau of Democracy, human rights, and labor (2009): *2008 Human Rights Report: Armenia*. <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119066.htm> (downloaded at 10<sup>th</sup> September, 2010).

US Bureau of Democracy, human rights, and labor (2009): *2008 Human Rights Report: Romania*.

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119100.htm> (downloaded at 25<sup>th</sup> August, 2010).

US Bureau of Democracy, human rights, and labor (2009): *2008 Human Rights Reports: Ukraine*.

<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/eur/119110.htm> (downloaded at 27<sup>th</sup> August, 2010).

Way, Lucan (2002): "Pluralism by Default in Moldova". *Journal of Democracy* 13 (4): 127-141.

Way, Lucan (2008): "The real causes of the Color Revolutions". *Journal of Democracy* 19 (3): 55-69.

White, Stephen (2003): "The presidential election in Belarus, September 2001". *Electoral Studies* 22: 173-178.

White, Stephen (2009): "The Duma election in Russia, December 2007". *Electoral Studies* 28 (1): 171-173.

Wigell, Mikael (2008): «Mapping «Hybrid Regimes»: Regime Types and Concepts in Comparative Politics». *Democratization* 15 (2): 230-250.

Wyman, Matthew (1997): "The Russian Elections of 1995 and 1996". *Electoral Studies* 16 (1): 79-86.

Zakosek, Nenad (2008): "Democratization, State-building and War: The cases of Serbia and Croatia". *Democratization* 15 (3): 588-610.

Zielonka, Jan (red) (2001): *Democratic consolidation in Eastern Europe Volume 1 Institutional Engineering*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

