Desiring the Good:
Motivational Development in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics

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Sammendrag:

Karakterutvikling henger nøye sammen med vår sansning og emosjonelle drag mot de ønskeobjektene som motiverer oss til handling, i følge Aristoteles i den Nikomakiske Etikk. Problemet som oppstår når vi leser Etikken, til tross for å bli møtt med en stor variasjon av psykologiske mekanismer, er at vi mangler støtteteorier som gjør det mulig å forstå hvordan mekanismene henger sammen. Mitt mål med denne oppgaven er å få på plass slike støtteteorier med utgangspunkt i den tekstlige kilden. For å få støtteteoriene til å fungere tar jeg i bruk flere filosofiske virkemidler og har konstruerer et tankeeksperiment om en tenkt karakter under utvikling av ønskeapparater.

Denne oppgaven undersøker hvorvidt vi, i den Nikomakiske Etikk, finner overganger og metodikk for å utvikle våre evner til å ønske godt, til å søke de ønskeobjektene som er gode. For å forklare hvordan Aristoteles argumenterer for nødvendigheten av motivasjonsutvikling gir jeg et overblikk over det som kan kalles en aristotelisk psykologi. Jeg ser på hvilke komponenter sjelen har i Aristoteles sin begrepsbruk, men spesielt, hvordan de virker sammen. Ved å beskrive henholdsvis en emosjonell utvikling, intellektuell utvikling og sosial utvikling redegjør jeg for faktorene som spiller inn på våre evner til å ønske "godt".

Under behandlingen av Aristoteles' "motivasjonsteori" oppdaget jeg hvordan følelser og tanker påvirker hverandre, at intellektet er en "sanser" i seg selv og at våre "ønskeevner" betinger sosial anerkjennelse.

Contents:

1 Introduction

When we seek to explain why a person does some action we will often get the answer that the action is what the person desired or was motivated to do. The term 'motivation', however, seems to have to cope with several distinct and separate references, like the value the person wishes by acting, the emotional 'drive' that causes the action and even the process that leads up to us 'becoming motivated' in the first place. However, when we use this term to make sense of the connection between our inner wants and desires and the satisfaction of these by our actions, we rely on the assumption that we understand these connections. Yet even at a glimpse, it is apparent that our 'desiring', 'motivational' faculties are of a vast complexity, triggering even the deepest metaphysical questions concerning action, change and perception.

The aim of this paper is to make clearer the underlying mechanisms of our 'desiring faculties' by studying one who does not shy away from metaphysical questions concerning desire in his theories, but if anything, is the source of them. Aristotle's work the Nicomachean Ethics (*NE* for short) presents his views on what it is for the life of the human being to be complete and lacking in nothing. The *NE* consists of a group of lectures intended for an academic Greek audience and incorporates his views on both the theoretical and practical implications of specifically human psychology and activity. Aristotle does not stop with a description of action as a description of whatever causes a person to act. Instead he is concerned with our development of desiring faculties in relation to what we deem good: i.e. a relation between what is in fact fine and good and a good's truthful representations in our desires. That is, in Aristotle's project, he draws a remarkably detailed and comprehensive picture of the human soul, including the diverse needs and wants that move us into action. Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle presents his view that what humans want in life, the object that all our 'motivations' ultimately point to, which enables us as members of our species to be happy in a way only a member of our species can, is the *Summum Bonum*, or the Final Good, being happiness for man. The Nicomachean Ethics is a study of what this Final Good, our happiness, consists of, and includes not only some description of the *objects* of our desires (*what* motivates us) but also relies on a detailed look at what 'motivation' *is*, drawing a connection between the *way* we are motivated and *what* motivates us – stating that the one has a causal influence on the other and that this influence is something that can be subject to a motivational process in and of itself - *what* we want and the *way* we want stands equally in relation to the good as the desires themselves.

We can organise the above-mentioned "complexity" of the term 'motivation' by assuming that good-inducing actions can be explained by *features* of our desiring faculties. Aristotle lists readily which *features* our psychology and intellect consist of. The difficulty resides in understanding how these features contribute to a *systematic* understanding of human desires in action.

In modern philosophy theorists have come far in explaining our actions, including the process in which we gain a positive attitude towards some object of desire, *qua* desiring what we believe to be desir*able*. We thus desire what we believe to be *good*, for *us*, the one who desires. So this positive attitude, 'pro-attitude' we often say in modern philosophy[1], is an individual's positive attitude towards an object he or she deems good. The enquiry often stops, however, at individual's motivation or *intention*, to φ (or *act* in the particular way acted), thus gaining some explanation on the reasons founded by said individual. Still, we do use the term '*good*' to signify the persons object of desire as a cause of action. Yet we do not ask questions concerning what *good* is, or how *good* the object is to this person, how it became good, or give an account of what the good is thought to be in general, leaving this up to the 'intending' faculties of reasoning and desiderative capabilities of the individual. There seems none the less to be a consistent and lengthy history behind the development of, not only our desires, but our desiring faculties, including non-individualistic concerns for what we find to be good in cooperation with others. Our 'pro-attitudes' seem also to have a strong emotional slant to them; we often *feel* strongly about what we believe to be good, or desire something strongly, describing 'desire' as an emotion. It also seems evident from our practice that conflicting desires are included in the arsenal of whatever moves us, like a conscious decision to pay the tram-fair and not catch a free ride versus a desire to spend the money on a nice cup of coffee instead. Yet we manage to resolve such conflicts within us, not always because the strongest desire 'wins' but because we judge an end to be of greater value. It seems, also, that we are sensitive to the "pushes" and "pulls" that are involved in the actions of others, as well as ourselves, like when someone is being motivated from pleasure instead of pain, or whether we are treated well or badly. All these variations go into accounts of what makes an object of desire *good*. In contrast to modern theory, it appears Aristotle's concepts on human desiring attempt to include all the above lines of questioning. Indeed, Aristotle's project is inclusive of both

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[1] Davidson, Donald. *Essays on actions and Events*. 2nd edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, 1991. Pg 86-87.

what makes the object of desire good in addition to an intricate theory of psychological and physiological change, all the while being mindful that it is the human animal under development that is the desiring agent.

The list of concepts that go into Aristotle's theory of desire is indeed long. The problem, however, is not to list them. The problem is to understand how they are connected, in a systematic way, to explain action and development of human desires. The main contribution of this paper is therefore to select concepts crucial to Aristotle's theory of desire and provide explanations, consistent with Aristotle's textual basis, of how they function together in practice.

While we can get some inkling of what many of Aristotle's concepts mean, we must be aware that where we would have to construct functioning theatrical scaffolding around Greek terms, a native of ancient Greece would have had an innate understanding of the terms that we find intricate and eluding. As mentioned in the beginning, in today's language we tend to use the term "motivation" in such a broad and case-sensitive manner that it is easy for the proverbial thin red line to get all tied up in a knot. But when these same topics are presented in classical theory they are well organised in a richer grammar and modal vocabulary that is ancient Greek, in a manner that lets us see more *specific* semantic uses of the same ideas. My knowledge of the ancient Greek language is limited and I will have to rely on trusted translational works and when necessary, compare conflicting translations. I will, however, present ideas on classical notions present in Aristotle's work, and attempt to organise some of these terms in a way that makes sense in current language.

This, then, is the aim of the thesis: in order to sort out and understand how Aristotle's concepts on desire *influence* each other, we must design supporting theories that cohere to the concepts we find within the *NE*.

1.1   The Case of "Hannah": Someone Undergoing Early Development

In order to create such scaffolding around Aristotle's concepts concerning desire, we will have to dig deep into the philosophical goody bag. Since he is altogether mindful of describing our desires in development and action, we will need to make a thought-experiment in order to see how his concepts work in practice. I have therefore constructed the case of "Hannah":

> Hannah is born a healthy, bouncing baby girl who is not yet accustomed to
> choices or production in her actions. In this stage of Hannah's life we can

imagine that the pleasures and pains mentioned above are of great importance to her. Though not yet pre-empting that some pleasures are attached to specific objects, she nevertheless feels pleasure from some states and pain from others. Once Hannah learns some productive capacities, like muscle control and some higher order cognitive functions, she starts to see how, through her own actions she can be the cause of her own pleasures and pains. Her own actions involve social interaction with other people and after a while she starts to see how some of her production is connected with many others' production that can hinder her or be conducive to what she finds pleasing. But she still has very rudimentary pleasures and pains, mainly connected to her most basic needs. Then Hannah starts going to school and starts interacting with her peers. A new type of pleasure and a new type of pain emerges. All of a sudden what she finds rudimentarily advantageous and what she finds socially advantageous gives her different types of pleasure. The pleasure from, say, playing a complex game with her friends gives her a more heightened feeling than, say, eating her lunch. Her advantageous interaction with others gives off a new class of emotion. Hannah becomes interested in sports. She notices that she has some talent in track and field. She starts to experience that though running in itself can be tiring and sometimes painful, that there is something about the feedback she gets from her classmates and her teachers that give her a type of pleasure that makes it more than worthwhile. In fact, perhaps it is precisely because the sport can be fatiguing that others applaud her for doing her laps and sticking to the training, knowing that it is more difficult than simply running around the schoolyard. Hannah and her school team are competing at a track meet with many other schools in her district. She is running both individually and in a relay with her school team. However she finds out that the competitions are too close together and if she goes all out in the relay she will not be able to win her individual competition. The thought of not winning her own race really pains Hannah. In spite of this she goes all out in the relay. The team wins and she loses her own race but she is surprised in experiencing the relatively new positive feeling of making a good choice. She gained respect from her peers but the pleasure she feels has more to do

with her deliberation, conclusion and execution of the action being good in itself.

We will follow Hannah in this thought-experiment in order to illustrate and utilise key concepts of development as presented to us in the Nicomachean Ethics. The phenomenon this essay is trying to explain is a person's "firm disposition" to do ethically good acts all the while this person is motivated to become thusly disposed.

In order to approach Aristotle's psychological concepts in a conceivable order, I have separated his theory on desire into three main contexts: Emotional development, intellectual development and social development.

In chapter 2, on emotional development, we will examine Aristotle's theories concerning our growing capacities, that we initially share with all living things, such as capacities for growth, nutrition and reproduction, and go on to animal capabilities for movement, perception and memory, thereby action in relation to our wants and desires, to cognitive dispositions over each of these emotional capacities.

In chapter 3, we will look more closely into intellectual development, what our intellectual part consists of and what its job is thought to be in relation to wants and desires. We will look into what it is to *have* and intellectual development in relation to gaining the goods we want.

Last, in chapter 4, we will look into social development, while focussing more specifically on descriptions of the needs and desires that bring about change in respect to these. Aristotle has as an intrinsic idea in his theory that we need each other in order to learn and realise what our wants and desires are, how we *make* goods, for ourselves and in life.

While I separate three "routes" of development into emotional, intellectual and social development, which will lend structure to Hanna's story, we need to keep in mind that each parameter shares in the enablement of the other, meaning that getting a clear picture involves us in the end being able to consider them in relation to each other. I will draw these connections in chapter 5.

1.2 A Schema of Motivation

The investigation of motivation I present must take the 'scenic route' in order to capsulate what motivation in the *NE* is *per se*, since Aristotle utilises a vast number of, for us, foreign terms and concepts. These terms will have to be explained in stride as the examination develops. At the same time "motivation" will touch upon a vast variety of subjects in the *NE*

that together build up Aristotle's concepts on ends and desire, seen as an integral theory, but where the concepts in the *NE* lack organisation as a theoretical whole. As each concept is explained I will in the next instance present a simplified overview of the concept, thereby preparing the reader to be better equipped to utilise the concept when arriving at the next. It will be fitting, however to start off with a general outline of concepts integrated into Aristotle's theory on human desire.

1.2.1   On Ends (I)

An essential step in understanding any concept of motivation will be understanding what actions are done *for*, or the *end* of the desired act.

We start the hands-on investigation of the *NE* by looking at its first sentence of Aristotle's opening remarks in book I of the *NE*:

> "Every sort of expert knowledge and every inquiry, and similarly every action and undertaking seek some good" (1094a1-2), and "… in all activities the ends of the controlling ones [*i.e. products, ibid.*] are more desirable than the ones under them [*i.e. action, ibid.*]…" (1094a15).

The use of the terms 'seeking' (1094a1) and later 'desirable' (1094a15) in his opening remarks have an important connection, where the seeking of activities can take identical meaning to desiring or wanting, where the good is a 'product' (1094a5, 1095a14) over and above the actions that produce them (the action-production, *praxis-poiesis* distinction is present throughout the *NE*). So at least some of the content of the good is what makes it wanted in itself, as a product of our actions. It is tempting to draw the further conclusion that the quality that makes the good *good* is its composition and the refinement of the work involved in achieving it, i.e. our activity. 'Good in itself' cannot in this interpretation be a different quality than the sum of its parts and the way it is achieved, but that does not leave out the possibility that whatever leads up to the product is itself good.

After all it looks as if *fine* in the sense here alluded to, plays a rather marginal role in what moves us in our day-to-day lives. And how can one way of life seem *fine* when what appears to be *fine* differs from person to person? In order to address these questions we should look to how Aristotle forms his argument. The first book of the *NE* starts out by suggesting that all expert knowledge, enquiry, action and undertakings, is done for the sake of 'a good'. Does this sentence mean anything less tautological than that all actions are done for some reason? Well yes. What Aristotle is looking to here is to frame the question

"what does it mean to *do* something, anything at all?" by way of asking "why are actions done?", where the most obvious answer is, because the action is good for the one who acts. That is, Aristotle frames the ontological status of actions by postulating that if an action fails to meet the criterion of being 1) *for the sake of* 2) some *good* 3) *for* the one who acts, then the action would not be an action. It would be something else. So what initially seems to be a tautology ends up listing quite a demanding set of relational criteria that must be met in order to call something know-how, an enquiry, an undertaking or an action. In order for an action at all to exist, there must be some access to information about who and what the one who acts is, what it is that is that would be good for this agent and how, what, when and in which way the agent should act in order for the good to be brought about, in order for an action to be called an action.

So expert knowledge and the methods required to attain it can be read as concerning actions and undertakings leading to the specific good we are after, or the (human) good (1094a1-3). Let us assume that the good at this point is simply the reason(s) for why things are done, or the ends of the activities. Aristotle further (1094a3) postulates that what he calls the *good* is what all things seek[2]. This might not look very controversial, but it is suggesting that, if we ask the question "what is the human good?" then we are simultaneously stipulating that the human good is for some more or less specific purpose. Might we therefore anticipate that the project will try to describe some sort of *content* for this process, the aim itself and a methodology concerning how to achieve knowledge of ends, in addition to an attempt to define this purpose? These are very ambitious goals, but let us assume this for the time being. The project also appears to make plausible the statement that there is a universal goal for all actions and it is either some good or 'the good' ('what all things seek'). The later introduces to us that what is being said is similar to what we think of as a project dealing with ethics; that is, that we are trying to say something general concerning what many individuals really want with their lives and not only ourselves as readers or interpreters of a text. Another notable aspect here is the connotation of '*the* good'. Note that the good in this sense is not relative to the vast variation contained in demarking 'all things', but one good for all. The good demarks not

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[2] Though there is a possible fallacy in the transition from 'all actions seek some good' to 'the good is what all things seek', I will suggest that these are beginning propositions only. One of the goals Aristotle has in mind is to dissolve this fallacy.

only desirability (we desire what is of highest worth), but also it demarks quality, what is truly fine or *Kolos*.

We are in this sense devoted to the highest goods in a hierarchy. It would be a logical assumption to surmise that if these goods that are *to kolon* (fine) are superior, they would also be rare. One would also assume that if this is so, they would be highly sought after and fought over. This is what Aristotle himself surmises (1168b15). Under Aristotle's theory this is not the case, however. Aristotle admits that the highest goods are rare (indeed the objects that are *kolos* are so rare they should be loved; 1158a27-34, 1156b25), yet they are not those that anyone would desire, as most desire goods concerning personal wealth, pleasure and honour (1095a23). He then continues to imagine three types of lives that take each *end* as a serious basis for well-living *by* that that end, and compares them in terms of which lifestyle best deserves the heading of being a 'happy' life: The life of consumption, the political life or the life of reflection (1095b17-20). Each of these versions fall short of what can be described as *kolos*, or that which comprises human happiness or flourishing.

The question then is what might define the final good for man? There are three concepts that contribute to the good being *good* (objectively, under Aristotle's theory), comprising what I call a compositional theory of the good. First there is an object's *Final cause* (I will get back to a description of Aristotle's four causes, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause, in chapter two). An example of final cause that Aristotle uses is the final product of a sculptor's idea of the shape of a statue. The concept defines the final step that makes the statue an actual statue. The final cause defines what preliminarily will lead up to it. Second we have an object's *ergon* or function. An *ergon* defines whether something (or indeed some*one*) is functioning *as* the thing it *is*. An *ergon* is also determined by its finality in a process: what the thing could be *if* it functions well. Whether or not something functions well or not means whether it functions in *activity* as it should. The concept is interesting due to Aristotle's utilising it in defining biological function, of, say, a species. If we take a species, say a canine, we can observe the canine *activity* to get an idea of the canine *ergon*. We can in a sense use the species' noun as a verb, and ask "is this dog *dogging* well?" when we observe its activity according to its environment. Third, we have a good's *controlling principle* or *archē*. The controlling principle of what makes a good *good*, is the *final* good. Since goods i) tautologically are defined in terms of value, ii) since value is defined relatively as less or more in relation to

what it is of value *for*, iii) since goods then stand in a hierarchy, then iv) the goods that stand over and above the goods that lead up to it will be *archē* over these goods.

A desire (*orexis*) will stand in a relation to the mentioned facets of what comprises a good. Yet *orexis* is a push or pull *from within us*. Whether we desire something or not can be described as whether or not we notice what that good is *for* - for us - by our faculties of sensation and emotion. An *orexis* will sense or be affected by the features of the good that make it desirable, depending on well functioning good-sensing faculties. But desires themselves will also stand in a relation to the objects that cause them, the idea being that it is the object, or external good, that is the *cause* of affective desire when coming within reach of the sensation of the desiring animal. Thus external goods can also be categorised under *final causes*, *functions* and *controlling principles* themselves. To give an example the final cause is our 'object of desire', say an apple. The controlling principle over our hunger for the apple is our desire for health, and in continuation, life. The function of eating the apple is also life, but more important it is *human* living. That is, we eat the apple in the way humans do, for the reasons of humans, in order to do human activities.

"What Hannah is". What does that mean? The idea that what Hannah wants, what drives Hannah to do the actions she sets about doing, is the same as what Hannah "is" unveils a *teleological* thinking about the origins of Hannah's desires. In sum, this means that in all of us there is the potential to reach a certain end that is uniquely embodied by who and what we are, our *Telos*. The acorn is a potential tree, a puppy a potential dog, the young Alexander a potential conqueror of Babylon and India. So on the one side of a teleological development we have potential, but on the other we have the functions of that potential, what the particular potentialities are *for*, the end of that potential or what Aristotle calls the *form* of that potential. A particular entity's "forness" is described in Aristotle's Physics as a causal connection between what the subject is for and the end goal of the "forness" brought about by the subjects *form*. And these actualisations of Hannah's inner workings will be what her emotional composition or emotional (and intellectual, and social) *form* is *for*.

It is explicated plainly (1094a5) that there is a difference between ends discerned by whether they are activities or products of these activities. What Aristotle calls 'products' (*ergon*) are over and above the activities that produce them. At this point there is no reason to infer that 'over and above' has any deeper meaning besides simply 'resulting from them'. Thus, it doesn't simply imply that activities are prior to the products they produce,

but suggests that there is some sort of hierarchy. If there is a hierarchy of goods, the criteria for their placement must of course be one of more or less good (i.e. value). It is at this time unclear whether there is any definition of good outside of whatever leads up to it. What can be a little confusing is how the two different types of ends, products of activities and activities themselves, relate to each other in such a hierarchy. Here the concept of organising principles, or rather 'ends' in the tautological sense meaning purpose, enters the scene. In this case a purpose in one direction, let's say from shipbuilding to ship, the ship being what is good in this case. Under this interpretation the good gives meaning to the actions, pointing out specific actions that are for the sake of it. The hierarchy metaphor is strengthened in the description of desire (*boulesthai*) in 1094a15, where desirability or the strength of 'wishing' is claimed to be proportional to the placement of the activity or end (an uncontested assumption at this point is whether 'wantedness' automatically follows judgments of what is more fine). Whichever good is higher up will be correspondingly more desirable and a better goal for the knowledge and activities under it.

2   Emotional Development

Aristotle's taxonomy of emotions and psychological components in human action can be fruitfully considered a continuation of several centuries of advanced philosophical reflection on the subject of the human soul. It comes as no surprise then that students of philosophy continuously strive to climb abreast of its level of subtlety. I will in this section discuss the markings of test subject Hannah's different stages, mainly her first stage. Many of the basic psychological components that we want to explain are already present at this point, though not "complete" in Aristotelian terms. While going through these explanations, however, we should try to keep in mind the pretext that emotional development in Aristotle's theory is tightly and essentially interwoven with both social and intellectual development in a complete life, as we will see in both present and following chapters.

By observing some of the emotional starting points in Hannah's first developmental stages, the idea is that we will be able to align what we "observe" with certain Aristotelian concepts having to do with emotional development: These include, but are not limited to, pleasures, pains, affections, emotions, capacities and dispositions. We will look more specifically for arguments supporting the concepts of affections, capacities and dispositions along with pleasure and pain. In chapter 4, "Social development", we will be interested in how Hannah and the people around her can be sensitive to her "natural tendencies" in relation to others. Presently, however, we will be primarily interested in how such changes are made possible by Hanna's "natural tendencies" at different stages and how her emotions come into play in these tendencies.

And just to outline the thought, a determinate of whether or not Hannah and the people in her life will be able to facilitate and live out some of their best properties given their "natural tendencies" will be what type of habituation they get and how they affiliate themselves to it (the goal of habituation, according to Aristotle, being to enable a person to consecutively do the right actions that bring about the right outcome at the right times for the right reasons, as "the good person" does, that will bring about the *summum bonum*, or 'final good', being happiness for man). So ethical development implies that Hannah's "natural tendencies" to notice through certain feelings, and react to, certain happenings must change over time if they do not initially enable her to react aptly to the circumstance, or her desired outcome, free of inner and outward conflict. And pressing this idea forward, we should get the result that not only can our emotional make-up change, we can change *it* via several capacities that lay within our power: It can change by deliberation and decision,

by practice, by imagination, by acceptance of the potential value of change, by expanding or retracting our range of possible or permissible actions, by imagining and reflection on what the goal is, and by finding out which steps are needed and then executing them, to name but few means within our grasp. How our non-rational side is change*able*, on the other hand, is another matter. That is to say, in order to draw the aforementioned connection between development that embodies a sustainable happy life and Hannah's motivational apparatus, we need at some point to explain how her emotional-motivational make-up can be brought in under the heading of self-change through a cognitive influence on her emotions, where the motivation for change lies within Hannah's grasp, being a part of what Hannah is.

The idea that what causes our emotions can change over time, both practically and in terms of value, aligns itself quite well with our observations in Hannah, though we as of yet have no clear idea as to how and in what way emotions can transform over time. We observe that Hannah experiences pleasures and pains on a rudimentary level as an infant while gaining early on the ability to cause or have a say in things that bring about her pleasure or pain. She experiences that the pleasures brought about by some of her greater abilities are of greater importance to her the more she is able to master them, like when she interacts with her classmates and when she starts competing in track and field. She is able to assess great value to pleasures derived from her own activity, when playing or running, for its own sake, even though acquiring these values means doing something she previously would find too strenuous or taxing to be pleasurable or too exasperating or painful to execute. Emotions tied to her relations with her classmates and peers also undergo transformation, from being vehicles of basic needs and desires to being partners in, and teachers of, what she ends up valuing *because* they are socially facilitated, like imagining plausible or implausible worlds, daring to do together with others what she would not dare do alone, confiding and caring.

The end goal for Hannah's potentials, or the *summum bonum* as we say, will then be the end goal that fulfils the potentials or *telos* in Hannah most precisely, to the greatest degree by way of embodying greatest value. Somewhat controversial to modern eyes is that these potentially actualised values are not necessarily relative to Hannah the individual, but can also be *objectively* of greatest value to her given that she is not sufficiently defined only as an individual. Not even defining her as a loved one and as a member of a social/legal grouping will suffice in Aristotle's view. She is also a genus of animal with a

certain biological make-up shared by all members of her species. So the traits of our common species will in part determine Hannah's *telos* that she by definition shares with the rest of her species along with many others species of both plants and animals. The traits cognition and intellect, two of the most prominent traits of our species, play an enormous role in opening up possible *summum bonum* and will not only be utilised to give direction to our *telos* but will also by definition be incorporated in the end goal itself. I will pick up again some of the technical content of teleological thinking in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2, and 2.2.3.

2.1 An Introduction to Aristotle's Concept of the Bipartite Soul

It would be helpful to get a clearer idea as to what Aristotle's framework for psychology is and a preliminary taxonomy of the soul as focussed upon and developed by the time Aristotle wrote the Nicomachean Ethics in Plato's academy. In his early investigations, in the Republic, Plato famously divides the soul into three distinct parts, which we will soon begin to look at. As we shall see, Aristotle will be fully aware of the arguments for this tripartite psychological distinction. But instead of following Plato's organising of these psychological elements into three distinct and separate parts of the soul, Aristotle, while heeding Plato's three origins of desires, instead organises these distinctions into *two* headings for conceptually different distinct parts of the human soul: A part of our soul that has to do with reflection, reason and various cognitive activity that fall under the heading of calculation (*logismos*) and the part that is incapable of such reasoning faculties that can instead be "informed by" or "listen to" reason. In this discussion I will closely follow W.W. Fortenbaugh's (Duckworth 2008, 2. Ed) analysis of this development for the sake of briefly presenting essential terms and taxonomy of the soul nuanced enough to continue the discussion on motivational development. I will not rely on this secondary source exclusively, however, but comment on the original texts where necessary.

Fortenbaugh gives fruitful heed to a contemporary development in the subject of human psychology at the time of Plato's academy in Athens, by placing Aristotle's two-part division of the soul (the logical - alogical division) temporally and theoretically ahead of Plato's three-part analysis in The Republic. As we recall from the Republic Plato famously divides the states according to what he regards as a division within man qua man, which have each their corresponding desires (580d7-581b10):

Enthymia or *epithumia*: The appetitive part of the soul, concerned with nutrition, growth, and gain. Epithymia corresponds to the desires of hunger, thirst, sexual appetite, and the desire for money and material gain over others.

Thymos: The self-other-oriented part of the soul concerned with the human "spirit" or "temper", manifest in emotions like anger at being slighted, shame, low or high self-worth. It is from *Thymos* that the desires for honour and greatness, high self-worth, self-protection and self-love, honesty or self-truth have their origin. This part is necessitated by social interaction.

Logos: A part that enables the capability of reasoning, reflecting, planning, calculating and deciding, which concerns itself with the desire and love for knowledge and universal truths. It also involves in us a wish to "follow calculation" (604d5-6), meaning a desire to make the steps a requirement in solving puzzles along with an open interest in resulting conclusions. As *enthymia*, *thymos* and *logos* are bound to disharmony and inner conflict, *logos* is the origin of the desires that nudge our soul in a certain direction by a leading impulse (604b3-4).

Aristotle recognises these three centres for variation of desire in his ethics, and ads a fourth, though in his ethics these centres are most often explained in relation to their objects of desire in a broader sense than in early Plato. *Epithumia* is a non-rational drive for objects that "seem to be pleasurable" (*NE* 1111a31-32). *Thymos* is a non-rational desire that has as its main object of desire that which seems to be *good* (1149a15). *Logos* represents both a supposition for an object of desire to be in truth good and desirable, and also represents desires for different types of knowledge (i.e. practical, technical, theoretical etc.). A fourth centre for desire is added to the above list by Aristotle: *Boulesis* is a (deliberated) rational desire and is often translated as 'wish'. *Boulesis* has as its object to combine knowledge and what is rationally known to be good, a rational desire for an end (1111b26).

We see that for Plato all of the above psychological categories are strong emotional movers and potential sources of a vast variety of actions, and as mentioned he in fact uses these psychological distinctions as a model for his tripartite republic divided into a mercantile class representing *enthymia*, a soldier class representing *thymos* and the philosopher kings representing *logos*. Indeed Aristotle includes Plato's distinctions in his psychological analysis and even makes a similar move, of explaining mans inner workings by exemplifying three types of lives in his arguments on three specific *endoxa* (qualified and rational common opinions) on what a life of happiness is thought to be: A life of consumption (from

enthymiatic desires), a life of honour or the political life (from thymiotic desires), and the life of contemplation or the intellectual (from desires stemming from *logos*) in book I.5 of the *NE*.

Under Fortenbaugh's interpretation, the emotions and desires of *enthymia* and *thymos* in Plato's tripartite theory do not partake in the cognitive activities of the *logismos*, the reasoning capacity, and do not have cognitive content themselves. The emotion fear is distinct and separate from thoughts about a fearful situation because fear involves desires from the subcategory of *thymos*, or *enthymia*, while thoughts about the situation will engage desires like wanting to know what will happen or a desire for a truthful result which will have their origin in *logos*. This separation proves problematic, however, when faced with mixed examples. For instance, we have both cognitive prepositions that have emotional causes, like deliberation over an unjust act that have emotional causes under other distinctions, like the emotion shame, or emotions like fear that have a cognitive cause, like expectation.

Fortenbaugh warns us not to make the tempting move of simply bridging the gap between early Plato and Aristotle by simply assigning *enthymia* and *thymos* to the alogical half of the soul and *logos* to the logical half, thereby bringing Plato's theory within commensurable reach of Aristotle's bipartite psychological theory. Though the case of emotions causing cognition, and vice versa, is not controversial for Plato, and though Plato's Socrates evidently saw an intimate connection between emotions and cognition, we never get a clear idea of how the one partakes in the other. Indeed when asked to provide an explanation on how emotions interact with thought, Plato relies on metaphor in his answer. When in Plato's Philebus Protarchus asks Socrates the following question: how it can be that pleasures and pains are true or false in the same way that opinions are true or false, in this way evoking Plato's Socrates' reflection over the relation between emotion and thought. Socrates answers that pleasures often occur simultaneously, together with false opinion (36c6-d2, 37e10). Emotions are thusly described as epiphenomena with no apparent causal link. The best Socrates can do here is to observe that one often follows the other (38b9), then having to rely on dodgy empiricism, or that opinions have a tendency to "fill up" (I take it he means increase the intensity of) pleasures or pains (42a9), which again looks more to be metaphor than explanation.

The two-part division of Aristotle on the other hand, commands the advantage of being able to provide an explanation for both elements of a mixed emotional/cognitive response. Under this analysis Aristotle argues against Plato's view that *logos*, *thymos* and *enthymia* are separate qualities that do not partake in each other's activities. Instead, the

alogical half in Aristotle's theory "is above all the seat of psychic phenomena open to reason" (Fortenbaugh, 75, p. 35).

The account clarifies how Aristotle is able to make a connection between the logical and alogical halves of the soul by way of his theory of demonstrative science: Much of the distinction between Plato and Aristotle, according to Fortenbaugh (p. 11-12), hinges on their definitions of "following, together with" or *meta*. In Plato's Philebus (37 e10) Socrates tells Protarchus that pleasures often occurs *meta*, or together "with", false opinion, whereby Protarchus rightly points out a distinction between simultaneous occurrence and causal effect will be arbitrary at best. While in Aristotle's Topics the definition of *meta* is given an entirely different meaning. In the Topics (156a32-33) *meta* is defined as *causation*, following scientific principles that Aristotle lays down in his Posterior Analytics (90a14-15, 31-2, 93a3-4), called *efficient cause* or the *motive cause*. According to this principle, the definition or *essence* of a given phenomenon will necessarily refer to the cause of that phenomenon. It is implicit in the definition of a subject in existence that it has come about, so the definition will thusly be sufficient if it states the cause of the 'coming into being' and demonstrates, why this is so. When asking "what is a waterfall" the definition asked for must invoke the cause of the phenomenon, that "a waterfall is water in free-fall, by way of gravitational force", the definition says *why* a waterfall *is*. Analogously, we can demonstrate what an emotion or cognition *is* by way of stating its causes. If the emotion anger for instance, is demonstratively caused by the thought of outrage, then the thought "outrage" will necessarily enter into the sentence that defines "anger" in this instance: "His anger *is*, or exists, *because* we treated him unfairly. The thought of this unfairness is causing his anger". One main advantage to attaching demonstrative logic to emotional phenomena is that we are able to see clearly how and why cognitive phenomena interacts with emotional phenomena and vice versa, relieving the need to rely on metaphor or epiphenomena when considering the links between cognition and emotions. Emotions are causally open to reason and reason is open to change by emotion. We are also able to give explanations for the phenomena and state reasons subject to rational demonstration.

The principle of efficient cause helps us clarify Aristotle's view on what separates emotions and other sensations and affections. All emotions have thought as a part of their efficient cause. This means that any sensation or feeling that does not have *thought* as at least part of their efficient cause does not qualify for the term "emotion". This is not to say that thought has to be a part of a direct causal explanation of all emotions. It can be the thought of

what the emotion is *for*, its function or goal which can be "formulated" as a thought, like the thought of a safe haven to the emotion fear. This distinction should become clearer in the upcoming discussion on affections.

Emotions on their part are organised into practical and non-practical emotions. The main difference between them is that the practical ones are obviously goal oriented while the others are not (p.79-80). The interesting facet of this distinction is the use it has for aligning different emotions into the logical/alogical halves of the soul. Confusingly, we can construct examples that evaluate an emotion as practical here and non-practical there, but when we regard an emotion's practicality under the qualification of logical or desirable goals then we are also given a tool that can rightly sort emotions along the logical/alogical parts of the soul.

Another important Aristotelian distinction that will prove useful to draw from Fortenbaugh's analysis is Aristotle's distinction between a political/ethical psychology and his biological psychology known to us from Aristotle's work De Anima. In Aristotle's biological psychology he makes a distinction quite similar to the logical/alogical distinction, namely a distinction between sensation (*aisthêsis*) and cognition/intelligence (*nous*). When making the later separation Aristotle is widening the field of investigation to include not only us humans, but also plants and animals – the vast variety of all living things. Now instead of drawing lines between the logical/alogical, he draws lines between nutritive, sensitive and cognitive capacities (Fortenbaugh, p. 27) amongst the living creatures, in a hierarchy of baser to finer capacities.

We see this in the *NE* as well. In book II of the *NE* pleasure is described as being shared by plants and animals, drawing upon De Anima's biological psychology: "For pleasure both is something shared by the animals, and accompanies all things falling under the heading of choice (since in fact what is fine and advantageous seems pleasant)" (*NE*11034-35). But the biological common faculties shared by animals and humans stop with pleasure and pain in the Ethics. Interestingly Aristotle figures that both the logical/alogical faculties of man fit under the heading of cognitive capacities in nature (1097b33-98a5).

Aristotle names the appetitive, sensing but also reflective part of the animal kingdom, mainly embodied by man, *nous*. *Nous* in *De Anima* (we will also be looking at *nous* in *NE* VI, in 3.2.1) has the capacity for calculation and thought (*DA*414b18-19, 415a7-9) found only in a small part of the animal kingdom, capable of producing conclusions of "rightness and wrongness" (*DA*427b). Fortenbaugh makes a point of animals not being able to partake in *nous*. Since human emotions and moral virtue are

subject to *nous* then an animal's affections will not be the same as a human (p. 67). Our biological processes and needs are still about the same objects as animals', like hunger, thirst and sexual desire, and they all have the same physiological *efficient causes* (see the above chapter), which are all necessary biological faculties. When grouped under the heading of *nous* these bodily drives are not subject to "rightness or wrongness" at the level of being originated through physiological processes, but from the above we can infer that it is when these processes enter in under the faculty of persuasion (p.84) that we can begin to talk about "rightness and wrongness". We can also knowingly reflect upon our biological faculties and choose to do actions with the aim of producing the pleasure that comes thereof.

Lastly, let me expound one more essential biological term that plays a central role in both the biological and ethical of Aristotle's psychology: *Orexis*, (sometimes translated as *desire*) is a common description of all the above mentioned seats of desire (*epithumia, thymos, logos* and *boulesis*) in that it describes only what it is that pulls or pushes us into action. *Orexis* is linked to sense perception (as mentioned above, *aisthêsis*). It is described in De Anima as the souls one-way "reaching out" to an object deemed significant by the animal (via its imagination or *phantasia*), preparing the body to "receive" change (Juarrero, MIT 2002). Given sensation (*aisthêsis*), there necessarily exists also imagination (*phantasia*) and appetition (*epithumia*), and where these exist, desire (*orexis*) also exists, by necessity (*DA* II.2413b23-25). This mechanism applies to all classes of animal, including humans. Such change, say Hannah's hunger, must necessarily be brought about by something other than that which receives change. Say Hannah notices her uneaten lunch, then that lunch is what we call the object of change or the object of desire, which brings about the change in Hannah. So in Aristotle's view, the object of desire is the first cause of the change, so to speak. Since such change and affection can also occur between emotions or emotions and though or vice versa, this concept of duality between that which changes and that which is being changed will by necessity also exist within our *psuchē* or soul.

From the above introduction of Aristotelian terms, concepts and theories, let me propose the following taxonomy of the soul:

	Logical	Alogical
Biological parts of the soul	**Man:** **Nous (mind/cognition):** **Aisthesis (sensation)** **Epithumia (nutritive)** **Boulesis ("wish"/** ** rational desire)** **Phantasia (imagination)**	**Aisthesis (sensation)** **Epithumia (nutritive)**
		Orexis (desire)
Psychology in the Ethics	**Logos (intellect)** **Boulesis ("wish"/rational desire)**	**Enthymia (bodily urge)** **Thymos ("spirit", "temper")**

Table 2.1

For now this diagram will represent my interpretation of the building blocks of Aristotle's theory of psychology. Though not complete, it duly illustrates the relations of each psychological concept and will hopefully help us keep some central distinctions separate from each other.

2.2 Affections, Capacities and Dispositions

Now that we have a clearer notion of what Aristotle's psychological framework consists of, our second step will be to get a better idea of what entities emotions consist of and how we understand their changing or being changed. Change in our *psuchē*, oft translated as 'soul' or 'mind', falls under Aristotle's distinction of *quality* (Categories VIII) in the sense that they can contribute or diminish the souls functioning well, in the area of human excellence, goodness and badness (*Met*. V.14 1020b12). A *quality* of our soul's potential for change can either be stable, long lasting and difficult to change, i.e. be in a *state*, or be easily changed or changed quickly, i.e. be in a *condition*. In the following section we will examine how both the soul's stability and rapid change are thought to work.

In the *NE*'s analysis of the soul, Aristotle makes the reduction that that the things that can happen to the soul fall under three generic categories. In the *NE* II.5 (1105b20) Aristotle explains this analysis and describes in a simple sense these three generic parts dealing with change and how we react to the world as comprising of i) *affections*, ii) *capacities* and iii) *dispositions*. Here is an outline, pending further support, of how we can initially understand these terms:

Affections are the sensations that are usually conjoined with pleasures and pains that 'happen', for lack of a better word, when we are acted upon or behave in a certain way. Affections happen *to* us (the arguments for this statement will be presented shortly in the

discussion of affections) and are involuntary. This presents us with a difficulty in explaining how something that happens *to* us in a passive sense plays a role in what we do *actively* when we instantiate actions. And if character development includes how we react as affected agents, how can it be said that we are able to change our emotional reactions over time when we have no power or choice over emotional content at the level of affections.

Capacities have to do with our individual emotional make-up, which determines which specific affections are triggered by specific events, in addition to the degree of emotional 'intensity' that arises together with the affections, and whether these affections give rise to pleasures or pains. To take an example, when Hannah runs she presumably gets some sort pleasure from the activity, be it from the action itself or perhaps from a belief concerning her activity, which is greater than the pain of fatigue from running, where the one outweighs the other. She then has the capacity to tolerate pain and fatigue for some purpose, and vice versa a capacity for pleasure when running. Capacities can be 'about' physical, psychological and cognitive objects, like fear when faced by pain and formidable opponents on the track-field. The affection then of 'courage' would be described as the particular affection relative to how formidable her situation is, while the degree of pleasures and pains involved, the degree to which she is affected by her situation, would be described as her capacity in this regard.

Our *dispositions* overlay both affections and capacities and can be described as rooted but not always determinate behaviour. It is said that we are disposed *over* our affections, capacities, pleasures and pains. This entails a human ability to reflect upon how we typically act or *are*. Dispositions are different from affections and capacities in that they are subject to an intellect performing choices and decisions. As Aristotle argues (II.5 1105b30, 1105a8-9), we are neither praised nor censored for having affections or capacities, while we can be censored for our dispositions, i.e. dispositions are things we can do something about, otherwise we would not be blamed for negative affections, like being greedy. In sum, affections *happen* and capacities we *have or are capable of having*, while dispositions refer to our consecutive actions. The consecutiveness of our dispositions will in part be due to how our affective and capacitive makeup functions, while we can reflect upon dispositions in both past tense, what we do *typically*, and hypothetical future tense, what we *should* do.

All three of these notions deserve to be discussed in turn.

2.2.1 Affections

As I initially stated affections bear the properties of being initial reactions to events as they appear to us[3], allowing us the property of "being moved" (II.5. 1106a5). "The reception of change" is what Aristotle calls 'affections' in the Categories (Categories VIII, under the heading of "qualities", together with dispositions, capacities and shape, more on this under the discussion on 'dispositions', and 'capacity'). Though the Categories deal with scientific/linguistic principles, the concepts of "reception" and "change" ring true also in terms of individuals undergoing a change in gestalt by external events. So what is being changed here is Hannah's emotional state in respect to some outside influence or event. And perhaps it is prudent to ad that, within the Ethics, affections will be causal changes humans undergo involuntarily, but are caused by the practice we partake in, including complex social relations in addition to thoughts, ideas and attitudes. Let us also understand that what affects Hannah and how Hannah is affected will play an important role in Hannah's experience by way of learning what to pursue or what to avoid. So clarifying some of these observations will be the goal in the following explanation.

Germaine to the analysis is the observation that when we talk about Hanna's being affected we are in fact talking about her action in the passive verb form of the verb "to act" in the ancient Greek text[4]. Let me explain: First, it is plain that the active form of the verb "to act" would be action. Let us also call it practice, or *praxis* as derived from the text. But what would the passive form be? Can we even imagine a passive form of "action"? One suggestion, as just mentioned, is that we can think of the passive form of the verb "to act" as instances or modes of a subject being acted upon. In the Greek text let us call the passive verb form a "passion" as it would be awkward for us to say that we are "being passioned" which might be closer to the passive verb form we are after ('passion' comes from *paschein* in greek , derived from *pathé* often translated loosely as 'emotion'). So this affection is something we can understand as an emotion that emerges when something happens *to* us, when we are subjects *to* some happening. What can be confusing, is that

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[3] By "appear" I wish to invoke both biological/perceptual and cognitive/ethical "appearance" or *phantasia*.
[4] I owe this idea to L.A. Kosman (Berkley 1980, A. O. Rorty red. p104), who argues that the events *praxis* and *paté* happen in a sense simultaneously, being the same event described under different tense. While Kosman claim's the identification of *praxis* with *pathé* creates a paradox, that if it is the same event then by this definition we cannot allow the one to be the "unmoved mover" or causally lead to the other. I do not quite see this, on the grounds that we can imagine the sequence of events in steps, also causally, involving Aristotle's substantial idea of both a 'before' and 'after' an affecting cause, like his concept of event-evaluation that which follows from his concept of being cognizably disposed "over" affections. It follows that the grammatical tense will refer to events before, present and after affection.

affection here is so closely linked to all following actions, like hitting, being hit and being set into motion to hit back, that it is hard to see where an affection ends and an action begins. We can at least rely on the fact that affections refer to a causal connection between actions and being acted upon.

In order to make sense of the definition in Categories book VIII, affection, and to link the concept of "change of quality" in the Categories with what we can understand as a change of affective character state in the Ethics, it can be helpful to exemplify the causal chain happening here. What we can say initially is that affections refer to a causal event, be it physical, sensory, perceptual or cognitive. Here it might be helpful to divide such events into physical precognitive sensing of events, like being affected by the pain of a wound, a cognitive event like fearing, relying on an expectation, or a combination of the two, like fearing the expectation of a wound. A "reception" of the event by a subject could then be called a change in emotional state due to pain and/or cognition of a circumstance. A reception of change can be taken to be transitions in emotional state, from unafraid to afraid, or another example, from having a neutral view of someone to having grudging ill will in view of some event caused by that person, together with (Aristotle says "attended by", *meta*, here meaning causing[5], II.5 1105b23) whatever pleasures and pains follow this change.

The chain of events involving affections seem to evolve within a type of sequence prompted by the statement that there is a "reception of change" happening as mentioned above. So what we first have is an initial state of pre-reception, usually characterized as a state of rest as exemplified by the Greek word *pathé* or "passive state". This state will also bear importance on the mechanism I will mention under the next discussion on capacity, as this state will also imply a "readiness" or "non-readiness" for being changed (the states' potential readiness for change), so keep this in mind. Next comes the reception-part, *pathos* or "that which happens": 'that which happens *to* the subject'. The subject's state is altered by some event. Third, this change causes an alteration within the subject. The event is 'received' involving a change of the passive state, and notice the grammatical tens of "that which happens"…at present - present-tense – meaning that the change in the subject is happening simultaneously with the evolving event. The subject's apparatus involving the subjects "readiness" or "non-readiness" will be involved in *how* the event is simultaneously

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[5] W. W. Fortenbaugh, 1975.

received and *how* it will change. These apparatuses include the subject's senses, emotions and cognitive abilities. The "readiness" of the subject's state will then determine if, how and with which apparatuses, the subject will be set in *motion*, which is the fourth step. We assume that the senses are aligned in some systematic way with our emotions (more on this while discussing capacities). The change in state will then be almost spontaneous, dependant on how "ready" it is. Then we perceive the change to a varying degree, dependent upon whether it is pleasurable (invoking a possible judgment that the change is good, desirable or of worth, indicating that the chance will be followed by desires to make it last, make it happen again or pain, sorrow or regret at its loss), or painful (invoking a possible judgment that the change is bad, worthless, or undesirable, prompting desires of discontinuation, fear, anger or avoidance and relief when it is gone). If the change is too small, it will not be emotionally 'perceived'. As we have seen, many of Aristotle's explanations of phenomena are based on the assumption that phenomena in nature have a purpose, and here, we might add, it looks as if the purpose of our event-reception apparatus is to make forthright an evaluation, pleasurable/painful, good/bad, of worth/worthless, to inform us both about this particular event and what a desired outcome would be now and in similar future circumstances, given the premise that we are in action or being acted upon. What happens next? Well we are already on thin ice, as we are trying to say something general about a wide variety of event-receptions, followed by either an automated or conscious evaluative response from the subject, or a motion or action. So let's get back to our example.

If we were to involve the idea of affection to our case, Hannah at a very young age, we should get an idea of what role affections play at this stage. However, if we look to the preliminary definition stated above, derived from *NE* II.5, 1105b20-23, the affections stated there are the affections that usually only happen in adult activity. These affections correlate to specific situations in adult life, instances that produce reactions like anger, fear, grudging ill will and several others. This is not how we understand what appears to be affection in, say, a toddler[6] such as one year old Hannah. Never the less, it seems that a toddler is capable of showing clear signs of the arousal of pleasure and of being affected (1105a2-5).

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[6] In short 'todler-Hannah' is affected in a way that is similar to the appearance of advanced non-human animals, whereas the human-specific affections refer to affections causing pleasures and pains retaining to either results that are generically good for humans or goods that *can* be generically good for humans, including affections related to social, judicial and intellectual activity.

What we lack at present is an observation supporting that a very young person already at this early stage displays whatever mechanisms are involved in identifying internal emotional change and its causes.

So imagine one year old Hannah. She can already walk and even run and is well into the process of learning to eat on her own. And while she cannot be said to have higher cognitive abilities involving such complex functions as speech or the ability to reason, it would be wrong to say that she didn't feel pleasure or pain, the basic products of affections. Now place this toddler in front of a piano for instance. When she depresses a group of keys, clavier notes to ring out. These notes cause Hannah to display tell tale signs of exhilaration. Hannah starts to laugh and she cannot control her own movements, let alone the pleasure, surprise or excitement we can imagine she's experiencing. Strange as it may seem, for this person of a limited cognitive development, it appears as if she puts two and two together, the notes from the piano and her own pleasure, by way of experiencing a systematic connection between the two. She gains control of her arms and starts to bang the keyboard with accordingly more and more violent strokes.

But where do Hanna and her feelings of pleasure stand in relation to her being the cause of her activity if she is in a sense the s*ubject* of her activity? How could these emotions then in turn instantiate other emotions that in turn produce actions? Well, say that the pleasure that arises from her clunking leads to her hitting the keys even harder with greater variety. There seems to be some direction or dynamic between Hannah on the one hand being subject to sounds varying in key and strength causing her to feel in certain ways, and Hannah on the other hand producing the actions that create more sounds. The problem, however, is not only in which sequence the events "passion" and "action" happen, but also that the two different events confusingly seem to cause each other.

So what is happening here? When one year old Hanna is clunking away, her arbitrary actions produce sounds that in turn affect her as subject to those sounds, producing in this instance the emotion pleasure. This is indicated in her cognitive judgement that she wishes to repeat the action, and in the same breath repeat the emotional response. It is odd then that this child can *do* something in an active sense, that in turn is *being done* to her in a passive sense. Though this order of events may seem to be what is going on, it goes against the grain of what we intuitively may think happens causally. We may hold the belief that the *subject* Hannah is *causing* the pleasure in the activity of making notes, and not the other way around, since we like to look upon humans as the originators of their own movement. However it looks as if

this intuition has to be abandoned in the present case. Even more confusing is what is *being done* to her by the notes seems to cause her to *do* even more. What is evident is that some kind of change is happening here, and that Hannah is receiving this change in her own way. Another toddler may start to cry. As it appears, we are able follow the sequence of events from random action to triggering a sound, heard by Hannah, surprising her in a pleasant, frightening or exiting way, involuntarily to a judgement that a repetition is desired voluntarily.

Whether affections are able to fall under the heading of being voluntary or not is of little importance if affections do no play a role in what we do actively. This is evidently not the idea that Aristotle has in mind. As we have seen with the piano, we can through our own activity in the world place ourselves in situations that instantiate our actions to bring about situations that have a specific affection-production (or avoidance) as its aim. In addition, Aristotle also understands that whatever instances we bring about will not have any lasting effect on us as affections come and go as whatever causes them comes and goes. Instead, it looks as if the chronological parts of action that can tell us something interesting about an affection is whatever happens before and after an emotion is set of.

Let us then look at the idea of someone putting two and two together, meaning connecting a certain event with a certain affection-aroused emotion. This idea looks to be too advanced for our case, the one-year-old. Indeed the idea of understanding and being able to point out which factors affect us emotionally seems here to be necessary in order for us to have anything to say about the matter – for a person of more advanced cognitive abilities, and even then, not all the time. Now the main arguments for us being able to have such a complex understanding of particular event-emotion 'causality' are the 'meta'-abilities that Aristotle describe in his treatment of dispositions (I'll present a fuller overview when presenting the concept of dispositions). At present we need to identify which motivation (let's call it that since it's a toddler hardly has reasons) lead Hannah to desire 'clarification' as to her role in the production of booming noises. The motivation in the case of the piano is her desire to make incidental surprise and excitement, last or happen again. Surprise and excitement can also drive us to fear and give us a strong urge to flee. The difference separating the different responses, for adults, is either ignorance or understanding of whether the situation is dangerous or not. Cognition of this level would be a remarkable feet for a one-year-old.

At present, however, it looks as if what is happening, and what discerns tots that run away and tots that 'stand fast' and clunk away are a simple competition of emotions,

thereby making cognition of affections a faculty of comparing two or more separate affections. This idea leads us to three valuable premises for us having some power over our affective states: In order for us to display the ability of separating action from affection it seems necessary that we (A) have the capacity to access a memory of previous affections, (B), recognise or 'know' what is causing the affection and associate the cause with (A) so as to differentiate which causes lead to which affection, and (C) be in a position to pick out the relevant affection and react to its cause.

The concept of us *voluntarily*[7] causing our own involuntary affections is not difficult to grasp. Given that Hannah was the initial agent in the stroking of the key, though she did not know what would happen, we can say she instantiated the emotional result, and *discovered* what happened. I can just as easily pinch myself to the same effect, and while I cannot choose to be affected by pleasure instead of pain when I pinch myself, the point is that the action leading up to that point is none the less voluntary. The function of event-reception would be worthless unless we were able to discover which events by necessity produce which emotional responses. If our senses weren't connected to event-receiving emotions in a systematic and predictable way we would lead dangerous, miserable lives indeed, not feeling pain from being burned here and feeling joy from being slighted there. In the future, when Hannah wants to instantiate a pleasure related to her sense of sound she might go to the piano and start experimenting with the aim of reproducing that specific affect she experienced with her first encounter. She might even wonder as to what precisely caused this affect. We do not doubt that she soon will desire to discover her role in finding and choosing different keys, which ones make a high pitch and which ones make a low one, what happens when they combine together with the whole flora of experiences these produce.

What we can imagine Hannah doing in her first developmental tier is mapping her own affective reactions and gaining experience in both the range and predictability of emotions that certain events will bring with them. We will return to the social-dependency aspect these mechanisms bring with them later. An understanding of this map will have a say in what she approaches and avoids and will play a part in future actions as they are learned.

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[7] Here I mean voluntary in the minimal sense that I am the cause of the action and that it was possible to have done otherwise.

There are two points to remember: 1. We can establish that there is an emotional development through life, that changes are 'timed' in some way by facilitation and learning ability, by nature, yes, but more importantly, within the area of 'that which can be changed' by learning. 2. What happens before and after affection can lie under the heading of that which can be changed.

2.2.2 Capacities

As with an affection, a capacity (*dunamis*) is characterised two ways: (1) In the field of ethics and character development a capacity is characterised by its range and degree of strength of, say, an emotion or ability and how greatly it is affected by a desire (*orexis*), while in the field of metaphysics a capacity is (2) a potential property, condition or state innate in the subject which given the right point in development and circumstance will become an actual property, condition or state. To put it in its Aristotelian flow-chart it is when the changing or activation (*kinesis*) of a capacity or potential property (*dunamis*) happens, changing the capacity (*dunamis*) to an exercising power (*energeia*) becoming an actual property/disposition (*hexis*), illustrated as so:

Potentiality: **Actuality:**

Dunamis (capacity)

    ↓

Kinesis (movement/change) ⟶ *Energeia* (functioning/working)

                                      ↓

                                        Hexis (disposition)

Table 2.2[8]

The characterizations (1) and (2) need clarification. As for (1) the characterisation of capacity in the ethics and Categories 8, and to recap, while an affection is something's reception for change, a capacity has to do with that things "readiness" for change, in the sense that the subjects "readiness" will invoke the person's "capacity" to change in a small degree, or a large degree, fast or slowly, easily or with difficulty, activating the emotion pleasure here or pain there etc. This readiness is regarded as the subject's readiness to act and says something about that subjects ontological state:

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[8] I owe this illustration to Eyjôlfur Kjalar Emilsson.

Another kind of quality is that in virtue of which we call people boxers or runners or healthy or sickly – anything, in sort, which they are called in virtue of a natural capacity or incapacity. For it is not because one is in some condition that one is called anything of this sort, but because one has a natural capacity for doing something easily or for being unaffected... Similarly with the hard and the soft: the hard is so called because it has a capacity not to be divided easily, the soft because it has an incapacity for the same thing. (*Cat*. 8, 9a14-27)

Here we see that a capacity has to do with a subject's ability to exercise certain functions in practice. As Aristotle mentions, a boxer or runner will have the potential ability to run or box, otherwise we would not call them boxers or runners. Another connotation of capacity seems to be the capacity to do something *well*[9], since you would not be called a runner or a boxer if you did not do it well. But even more confusingly, Aristotle adds that these potentialities belonging to the subject *qua* the subject, when they are capacities, are there from nature. Are they not there by training or by practice? And how can a capacity to maintain health be regarded in the same way as a capability to box or run well? Is the one not a product of training and the other one not? Instead of thinking of these capabilities as a mixed bunch of what is hypothetical and what is imminent, it seems that Aristotle is suggesting that these imminent potential exercises exist "in virtue of" or *because* of the capacity. So it looks like these 'exercisings' do not say very much about the capacities themselves or the natural capacities. That is, the 'exercisings' are not necessary for the capacity to exist; however, it does appear as if the capacities are necessary in order for the 'exercisings' to exist. Are the capacities enough to explain the exercising? It does not appear so. Health and being a boxer are not necessary outcomes for someone who is capable of being good at boxing or of being healthy. Such a person could just as easily find interests in other activities or have an accident so as to cease being a boxer or being healthy. So "in virtue of" means that capacities are necessary, though not sufficient, for a specific activity to exist.

"Natural" seems here to invoke more of what the capacities themselves are for and capacities in the first (1) state mentioned above, meaning what we are by nature equipped

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[9] In the Metaphysics V 1019a23-25, this notion of *dumanis* as the capacity to do something well is second of three notions of *dunamis*, the first being *dunamis* as a source of change in another thing, like the verb building is the *dunamis* of what is being built. The third notion is quite the opposite of the affective states we have been examining so far: not capacity as a condition but capacity as a state, not easily changeable, enduring. Thus we see that capacity, in that it denotes both rapid change and resistance to change, can be linked both to affections and dispositions.

with, including our individual emotional taxonomies. In addition "nature" seems to refer to whether these potentials enabled by our emotional-physical makeup function well or not in regard to what they are for *qua* what they *can* do. Take Hannah's running. She undoubtedly has what we also call today a great "natural" capacity for running. We can easily imagine that Hannah has had this capacity her whole life, "readying" it through all sorts of development, like play and games. However, performing this capacity as an exercise of her capabilities is in a sense the *status quo* of her abilities: In addition to a well performing cardiovascular system, partially because of it, she has the ability to tolerate pains more easily; knowing more about her limits and the rewards of pushing them, maybe even the potential courage she showed in front of the piano is a part of the stock of capacities Hannah commands as a runner that enables her to run with running being a purpose and end in itself. Her capacities say something about who Hannah is *now* by way of what she is *ready* to do. Also when she is not running she is capable of it. Also when she was younger she was potentially capable of being a runner. She is easily moved by her desire to "work well" when she is running and the pains of running don't affect her enough to hinder her functioning to her contentment as a runner, i.e. her capacities survive rapid changes of affection that do not contribute to her running. All these things add up to Hannah's capacity, or *dunamis*, power, to run.

Let us look at the second characterisation of capacity. What we first have is an initial condition or state of pre-reception, usually characterized as a state of rest as exemplified by the Greek word *pathé* or "passive condition" which is "ready" to change. The condition's readiness will either be determined by having the capacity to affectively change quickly or easily, in this case representing a condition, or change slowly or not change at all representing a state. In either cases a pre-reception (or non-reception) of change, if they have a capacity either to change or resist, they exist potentially. This *potentiality* stands in relation to the "bringing about" of this change by a power, movement or cause, *kinesis*, a movement or process, it then becoming actuality, *energeia*.

Since our capacities are potentially existing capabilities or movements or conditions or states that are hinged on an "external" qualifier that moves us, it would appear as if our understanding of human intention is quite at odds with what is going on here and is not taken in under consideration. In what way can we say that we are φ-ing, doing what we wish to do, when as it seems we are lugged out of our unqualified state by a force or movement, *kinesis*, external from this state and otherwise would not φ? The answer from

Aristotle is cryptic but seems to say that when something is wished for (*boulesthai*) or given thought then it is the thought or rational desires that does the φ-ing: "And the definition of that which as the result of thought comes to be in fulfilment from having been potentially is that when it has been wished it comes to pass if nothing external hinders it, while the condition on the other side – viz. in that which is healed – is that nothing hinders the result" (*Met*. IX, 7. 1049a5-8). Here thought and wish are linked marking wish as the *kinesis* or qualifier of an act. Moreover, when a wish is potential it is by definition possible and wishing in this circumstance is a rational desire to bring about that which is in fact possible. Being a boxer or runner are actualities that have been brought about by the wish and corresponding circumstances and processes, internal and external, qualified by the desires to run and to box. Being healthy in contrast, does not necessitate wish as the qualifier is the power that brings it into being.

We may at this point ask where capacities as here described fit in to the greater scheme of character development. It is easy to see how capacities as defined in the first (1) sense (defined at the beginning of 2.2.2) presuppose our emotional capabilities and restraints and fittingly coincides with how we are affected, what affections do to us, how greatly or easily we are affected, i.e. our "readiness" to be affected as subjects. We may aptly add what the term 'capacities' adds to the definitions of affection discussed in 2.2.1. In addition to "readiness" capacity invokes that our emotions are engaged in specific actualisations or activities, and the dynamics of our emotions will in turn increase or decrease our intensity and desire to continue and develop that activity.

Pleasures and pains are the movers of our functions that we are first familiar with in that they partake in defining desires. The pleasures that are derivative of the more basic natural capacities of the part of the soul that has to do with natural growth and consumption will later often be in conflict with the pleasures deriving from the development of a good intellect. We do not have the capacity to judge and regulate our disposition to feel about different pleasures and pains in an encouraging way or in a way producing shame to begin with, but we have the capacity to learn it. This capacity will be wasted if one does not choose to follow the cause of the best pleasures. Though pleasure can derive from bodily activity and sensations, enjoying pleasure is a capacity of the soul, as 'what is pleasant is pleasant by nature' (1099a13). Because function in nature is necessarily done excellently as functions in nature are fulfilling whatever they are for, and will correspondingly always be doing it well, the function of pleasure in man is different in that it can exceed our

substantial needs, and because the soul's different potentials define different needs and conflicting pleasures that can hinder it in fulfilling what a soul does well.

2.2.3 Dispositions

I have already given some indication as to how we can understand Aristotle's ideas on dispositions in that they are regarded as more lasting states as opposed to conditions, that we can be either rapidly or slowly disposed when affected, that when we are disposed *for* or *over* some actions and goods then the intermediate disposition between deficiency and excess is said to be a good state, and that dispositions are actualizations of capacities as illustrated in the above flowchart, table 2.2. Most importantly, however, is the mention that dispositions, as opposed to affections and capacities, are attributed to bear the label "proposition" in that they are phenomena that we are capable of thinking *about*, but also states that we can we can do something *about*. They are both typified by, and subject to, cognition, description, reflection and choice. These choices will, then, be about whatever makes our soul "worse or better" (1104b20). We are not censured by our affections or capacities, Aristotle states (1105b32-a8), but we can be called bad or praised in view of our dispositions.

The first distinctive property that Aristotle tags on dispositions is that he wishes to induce an emotional fundament to the subjects will and deliberative faculties that is open to reason, i.e. that emotion and cognition can be each other's efficient causes (see section 2.1). At the same time dispositions describe a category of settled states that stand central to ethical living: Character excellences. Emotional growth and character excellence can rightly be described as the one depending on the other by way of reflection over what our emotional apparatus is like now and how it should be in a normative sense. While we can develop our capacity to imagine and reflect over choices concerning what is good (*while* our intellect develops), the goal of emotional development seems to be that emotions do more and more of the job regarding doing the right actions in relation to what is good, and by no means on auto-pilot, i.e. "at the right time, to the right degree, for the right things" the good man does (1109a27).

One of the synonyms of "dispositions and habits" that are in common use today is 'character', a word that invokes the meaning 'rooted behaviour', 'backbone', a mode of individual expression that typifies the way we act and who we are in a good way or a bad way: "in surmounting her hardships she displayed excellent character", "he can't be trusted with the money due to his lack of character" etc. The subject of analysis in the following section will be what we can say happens causally to support and change character. And

certainly much of such rooted behaviour is subject to rational decision-making and reflection, which we will look at in chapter 3. Still, when we call up the connotations "backbone", "character" or "rooted behaviour" there is something precognitive going on as we have seen, referring a person's typified emotional apparatus and his or her ability or freedom to act either with or against this "emotional grain". Indeed none of these terms can exist without the subject being experienced in some way or another, meaning that, in order for a person to be endowed with, say, "backbone", this person must first gain experience in how she reacts emotionally in relation to different situations and also in relation and (probably) comparison to others. This "backbone" will then partially consist of a memory or map of earlier experience of which affections where followed by which events. A category of dispositions that we will be interested in is Hannah's possible disposition towards excellence.

The beginning of *NE* II.6 provides us with a preliminary two part definition of dispositions when they are in what Aristotle calls "a good state": "we must also say what sort of disposition it is. Well, one should say that every excellence, whatever it is the excellence of, both gives that thing the finish of a good condition and makes it perform its function well" (1106a14-17). Somewhat surprisingly we see here that the terms "disposition" and "excellence" are used interchangeably. Indeed within the context of Book II.6, since disposition is a state, and since states can either be changed too easily, intermediately or too slowly in relation relevant affections, then the dispositions that are in the intermediate state are truly dispositions over the affections, while neither of the extremes are so-called "good states". In this sense a disposition is an excellence in that it is as it should be.

Dispositions then, from the definition above, are states that (i) fulfil the criterion for being the "finished" state of good condition, and (ii) perform the function of the disposition well. The premise (i) calls upon the teleological idea that dispositions qua being human states have an end or goal that "fulfils" or "completes" the owner of the state, i.e. that until the subject does what is needed to be disposed to a working state (recall *kinesis* from the diagram 2.2), the state that the subject is in cannot rightly be called a working disposition. Not until we are able to see the disposition work consecutively as it should, i.e. function in all the future circumstances that require it, or would be prudent for it, to function and be in good working condition. 'Completion' as mentioned in the teleological understanding of the

term, is the end of the activity taking place, that not only can desires (*orexis*) be actualised, but also states by the building of its components[10].

The translator Rowe here chooses the term "finish" and it appears that he understands this state as the disposition towards excellence revealing the "markings" of being in a good state. Quite often, when describing what a good person typically is like, Aristotle describes this person as someone who has all his working 'good' dispositions intact, that the good person 'shines through' in all circumstances and this could be what Rowe is thinking of. Others (i.e. Barnes) translates instead that the excellence 'brings' us into a good condition. I regard Rowe's connotation of a 'resemblance' of a good state when fulfilling the teleology of coming to be in a good state to be logically closer to the mark.

Premise (ii) on functioning well as a criterion for excellence, is derived from the idea that if you do something that requires such and such skills you will necessarily do it well. Aristotle gives us the example of the lute-player, who cannot rightly be said to be able to play the lute if he or she doesn't play well (1097b25). We see that premise (i) and (ii) both presuppose the criterion of completion, completion of a particular *hexis* or disposition. Premise (i) and (ii) also preclude each other: In order for a disposition to have the quality of "finish" then it must be active in relation to the function of the disposition, say playing the lute. If we include the premise of completion then the disposition to play the lute is completely *active* or actual when one is able to play the lute well, being the result of a disposition to play being in good condition[11], premise (ii). But whether this disposition is functioning well or not in turn is determined by the function of disposition, i.e. masterfully interpreting and playing the music, emanating the tell tale signs of being in a completed state, premise (i).

Importantly, there are three kinds of dispositional sates which oppose each other (1108b11-16), an intermediate and two extremes, for instance the intermediate 'moderation' as opposed to either excess or deficiency. Aristotle's theory of opposing dispositional states leads to an important argument: Opposing states introduces the

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[10] Aristotle argues also that what is most complete is most desirable (1097a28), that what is desirable, not because of something else, but on its own merit is more complete (1097a33-4), the totality of goods is more desirable than its components and the larger the summation or organization of the goods the greater the value (1097b20), as the building is of far greater worth than its columns because the building is what the columns are for.

[11] We see a similar argument for the well functioning of sense-perception in 1174b15-18: "But since every sense is active in relation to the sense object, and completely active when the sense is in good condition and its object is the finest in the domain of that sense (for something like this, more than anything else, is what complete activity of a sense seems to be;"

necessity of choice. One can only be in one state, and if that states is undesirable then one faces the dilemma whether continue the disposition or steer towards the other extreme. The contrary disposition will hinder the opposing state and vice versa.

Aristotle had a very clear idea as to which classes of emotional variation different dispositions are represented by. Indeed he lists a (non-exhaustive) numbered set of dispositions and their respective *hexis*, states, like the affection "fear" to the character state "courage" as the mean between "cowardice" and "rashness". In book II.7 he lists them, from healthy states derived from our bodily nature (courage and moderation), to two social states derived from the activities of giving and receiving in relation to external goods (open-handedness and munificence) , to three dealing with the relation between honour and self-worth (Greatness of soul, a nameless excellence dealing with small honours and truthfulness concerning self-presentation), to three social character assets (friendliness, truthfulness and wittiness), to mildness, having to do with temper. Over all of these "emotional variations" is the class "justice", what Aristotle calls a controlling capacity involving all the emotional relations stated above, which is also a division (to be presented in chapter 4.5) and an intermediate in both cases. Aristotle states that reason is also such a 'controlling capacity', itself an intermediate.

As we have earlier defined cognition as a necessary efficient cause or product of what we call emotion, and since emotion will necessarily involve cognitive content (chapter 2.1), it is less difficult to see how we can be quite capable of being disposed "over" emotions and affections in the present context via reflection and choice. In looking at table 2.3 we see more clearly that in many cases our dispositions will be met with normatively sensitive situations, where tactfulness here or disposition over our anger there has a distinct "mark" it *should* achieve (1138b22-23), the goal being not too much or too little, not excessive or deficient in the case sensitive continuum, but an intermediate disposition. This 'mark' will obviously not be hit if either our intellect or our emotions fail to engage in that which is case-sensitive in the particular situation. This is what we call Aristotle's 'rule of the mean'. Over-steering each continua, i.e. the implicit *goal* for all the continuum, as mentioned is the "steering" disposition of justice (more on justice in chapter 4). We understand then more clearly what type of job our emotional dispositions are supposed to, or *should*, take over time. Notice also right off the bat that the normative characteristic of the rule of the mean is not only a requirement of "do no harm", but also requires moral positives, to "do and create goods in others". We are not left without a

prescription to use the above stated table either, for when we notice ourselves missing the mark or the mean due to emotion or desire the prescription is simply to 'lean over', to do consecutively the disposition that is opposite to where we stand, thereby compensating for our emotional 'pull' to do the opposite.

2.3 Pleasures and Pains

We have now gone through some of the essential concepts and distinctions involved in understanding Aristotle's theory of emotion-/cognition-based action. Next I suggest we take a closer look at the heading of affections that are at the core of our *orexis* and movement: pleasures and pains.

In his treatment of what we today would call motivation, Aristotle gives much consideration to the role of emotional positives and negatives, pleasures and pains, as these seem to be key antecedents of a subjects' action and movement in relation to any object - towards or from something. They are also affections due to which we do morally good or bad actions or make good or bad decisions. Capacities for pleasures and pains in Aristotle's view are universally distributed both in the animal kingdom and in human action: Aristotle's statements that "All do pursue pleasure" (1153b29-31) and that "for more than anything nature seems to avoid the painful, and seek the pleasant" (1157b17) gives us a clear indication that pleasure and pain are primary and distinct elements of all animal movement, including our own. We are in no way capable of imagining a type of living that does not incorporate movement by pleasure and pain: "Pleasure is something we have all grown up with since infancy; the result is that it is hard to rub us clean of this impulse, dyed as it is in our lives" (1105a2-6). For Hannah, at every stage of her life she has had immediate and continuous experience with pleasures and pains, to the point that we can imagine it to be difficult to start thinking about them too early on in life. But pleasures and pains are there and they will always be there. At the same time, however, without guidance and some sort of reflected habituation from the adult world we can also easily see that some pleasures and pains can easily be followed blindly or misinterpreted and lead to actions that are not desired by Hannah if not only for the particular pleasures and freedom of pains. And since pleasures and pains will permanently occur, it is not hard to fathom how consecutive pleasures and pains can lead to more permanent dispositions that will be difficult to do something about once "engrained". If not for some sort of reflective guidance it is impossible for us to imagine how Hannah comes to enjoy, for instance, long distance running.

Previously (table 1.1) I attempted a sketch-up of Aristotle's biological psychology, amongst which were the appetitive parts of the soul, *epithumia* or *enthymia*. He is as stated quite prepared to use his biological psychology to explain the tension of moral weakness as a conflict of opposed *orexis* (De Anima 433b5, *NE* 1147a31-4). Under these headings the feelings of pleasure and pain are inseparably associated with our physiological processes and biological needs. And because these needs are important for life and existence at a very basic and practical level they are in a sense irascible in that they can be both pleasurable or painful and on this level intensely so. But while they are natural capacities they cannot be over-indulged in before we gain cognitive capacities, for as Aristotle states, we cannot over-indulge in pleasures or go to lengths to avoid pains before we get a grasp of universals (*NE* VII.3, 1147b4-6). In chapter 3, I will explain in more depth what it means to "grasp universals". For now it will suffice to say that, in Aristotle's view, the reason we do not see over-indulgence in infants and animals is that while they have the capacity to recognize and have a memory of particulars, they cannot from this recognition draw the cognitive assumption that all cases will lead to this pleasure or pain and therefore conclude or make judgements that the affections are an aim or avoidance in themselves. And of course we recognise a dialectic development between grasping and desiring particulars and grasping and learning universals while gaining cognitive capacities to choose courses of action. Such a process will be innately complex and difficult to navigate. At her infant stage, Hannah is visibly moved by her appetitive capacities to feel pleasure or pain to the degree that they are noticeable and discernable so that her surroundings are moved to fulfil her needs (hopefully not exclusively due to pains). She does not at this point, however, have any need of change in regards to her natural dispositions because they work well according to her needs. Indeed her *epithumia* seems wired to her vocal cords. However, when she is big enough to regard her surroundings in terms of objects of desire, or even better, things she evaluates as *good*, the correlation between body and pleasures and pains will change due to bodily and intellectual development and growth, and it is also quite fathomable that we will see emotional development on all levels, also the most basic, difficult though it may be.

Among the candidates for serious consideration over what would constitute a *bona fide* pursuit of happiness in one's life is the life of pleasure for pleasures sake:

> On the good and happiness: to judge from their lives, most people, i.e. the most vulgar, seem – not unreasonably – to suppose it to be the life of pleasure. (1095b14-15)

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> But further, it is actually a necessary requirement that we inquire into pleasure and pain, in so far as we laid down that excellence and badness of character had to do with pains and pleasures, and most people say that happiness involves pleasure – which is why the 'blessed' [makarioi] are so called, after 'bliss' [chairein]. (1152b4-8)

Aristotle in turn will rectify these suggestions, though he does seem to concede that they are "not unreasonable". A life of pleasure seems like a type of living that could be a likely candidate for Hannah, one that we quite possibly, with good will intact, could wish upon her. And certainly, we could hardly consider Hannah's evolvement to be very good or fine or worthwhile if it didn't involve any form of pleasure. But as mentioned above pleasure will in a sense "always be there" and when someone accesses a desired result purely for the sake of pleasure then you access the end for the sake of the affection, not for the end. Still, that happiness will in many ways involve pleasure seems clear and a 'life of pleasure', a *joi de vivre* if you will, seems like not such a bad thing. In this way it seems that pleasures and pains, and how we are built from nature, habitat and development, that we have a varying capacity for pleasures and pains and a disposition to react in our own ways to different types, might at a glance fulfil the necessary and sufficient criteria of being a function for Hannah. This is not, however, the conclusion we will land on, because before we can know how *good* a life of pleasure or a pain-free way of living *is* we must first examine what pleasure and pain is.

There are two main accounts of pleasure and pain in the Nicomachean Ethics: 1. *NE* VII and 2. VIII – IX and X 2-5 and7-8. The last I will only give a brief account of in the following paragraph, but the first I will elaborate on as the main basis for Aristotle's positive account of pleasures and pains as phenomena.

Book X 7-8 attempts to examine the question of whether pleasure is a good or perhaps *the good* by discussing the question in relation to theories that say that pleasure is a good in itself and the only good. The background for this discussion is the pivotal and central role pleasure plays in our nature and character, but Aristotle now sets this aspect somewhat aside in order to discuss pleasure as a phenomenon, not the object of pleasure but pleasure itself. He revokes the conclusion that since pleasure is a non-teleological item (that it is not 'for' something else), that it then is a good in itself. Nor is pleasure tautologically a good because of its standing opposite to pain, nor can it be something bad

since goods can be accompanied by it. Nor is pleasure a 'conjunctive' good (that for any object of desire A, if one ads pleasure, then any object A, plus pleasure, is better than any object A) or a quality, that by being 'tagged' onto a good then that good becomes intrinsically better. In fact Aristotle argues that pleasure is not a good at all since it doesn't 'come to be' or becomes more complete over time (does not fulfil the criterion of completeness) but is instead completed in every instance. It is a class different from goods but plays an important role in making the goods complete. Pleasure varies also in kind in relation to the kind of activity that arouses the emotion. Aristotle proposes that pleasure is most complete when caused by the most worthwhile objects and contributes to progress in skill-levels and faculties. However, since pleasures are of different kinds corresponding to different activities, then they can conflict and impede each other. Different kinds of pleasure will be relative to three variables of activity: i) Kind of object of desire, ii) kind of sensing of the object, along with the type/function of the individual person and the condition of his/her sensory faculties and iii) kind of activity (good/bad) that pursues the object of desire.

2.3.1   Pleasures as Functions

Let us next examine Aristotle's positive account of pleasures and pains. In book VII.11-12, emphasis is placed on arguments that contradict the different unqualified views on what pleasure is thought to be, especially the ones that argue for pleasure's either being a good, *the* good or an object of desire, or its opposites, that pleasure is in all cases an evil which should be avoided or that one should be satisfied with forgoing pleasure as long as one is free from pain. These views are erroneous in that they neglect to observe the variety of action and circumstance that pleasure emerges from. The case-sensitive counter-examples he brings to the table are insightful and deserve examination.

First, we may erroneously identify pleasure with being good and an object of desire. But pleasure does not meet the criterion for being a good, that it must be either a good "without qualification" (recall that this means that a good need not rely on anything else in order to *be* a good, like the good of health, that it will be a good for *anyone*) or a good "for someone" (a good "because of" something else; it is a good locked to a specific relation and without that relation it would no longer be a good, be it between the subject and the object of desire the way an apple stands to a subjects appetite, or a good that is good on the basis that it can fulfil yet another good, like money or carpentry skills to the completion of houses. Take away appetite, commodities/services or houses and there would no longer be

need for the apple, money or the carpentry skills). If pleasure was a good "for someone" then it would stand somewhere in the relation between potentiality and actuality.

Many of our pleasures and pains seem to be a relation between the object of desire and disposition and potential capacity to be affected by the object.

> The pleasure and pain that supervene on what people do should be treated as a sign of their dispositions; for someone who holds back from bodily pleasures and does so cheerfully is a moderate person, while someone who is upset at doing so is self-indulgent [......]. For excellence of character has to do with pleasures and pains: it is because of pleasure that we do bad things, and because of pain that we hold back from doing fine things. (1104b4-10)

But if we examine pleasure, it does not appear to fit well into this scheme. As Aristotle states in 1153a9-11 that "...not all pleasures are comings to be, or accompanied by coming to be, but rather they are activities, and an end", that pleasures demark quite some variety. First he emphasises "not all pleasures", evidently implying 'some pleasures *are* comings to be, but not all'. We can take this sentence as a disjunction, that either a pleasure is a coming to be *or* it is an activity and an end. The either/or statement is rather strait forward, pending examination on "coming to be", but next comes the confusing conjunction that (some) pleasures are activities, *and* an end. But how is this possible? This must imply that while not all pleasures have an end they still consist of, or are integral to, activities, while all activities on their part, given they consist of actions, have ends. But pleasures *per se* do *not* appear to have a beginning or an end in the same way as a building of a house or a replenishing of a state of hunger even though they accompany activities that are 'comings to be' – they are not themselves a "coming to be". And if they are to be located in the schema between potentiality and actuality, they are *energia* – activity – which as we see in table 2.2 goes under the heading of actuality but does not transverse *between* potentiality and actuality, thereby making the implication of "coming to be" an absurdity both in the case of activity and of pleasure. But how then can Aristotle imply that *some* pleasures *are* "coming to be"? Well, it would be initially helpful to try and see more clearly how pleasure cannot be a 'coming to be': First, pleasure is observed to go along with *energeia*, which implicitly will involve the *kinesis* or activation of a capacity (1153a12). The conjunction that pleasure, when not a 'coming to be', is an activity *and* an end could then mean that pleasure P1 arises at point in time B, simultaneously with *energeia* E1, and that both end at time B. If the point in time where different, say a

previous time A, or the activity where different, say the activity E2, then we would not get P1 but P2 or not P at all. Therefore a conjunction explicates the pleasures context-sensitivity given two premises, (i) that activity is an end only if it is completed in the instance of its happening and (ii) that if part of the conjunction, that pleasure can be identified with activity, is true, then pleasure will also be completed in every instance. From instance to instance, then, pleasure will change and cease to be P1 and go on to be P2 or not P at all. Pleasure is 'completed' under the same ontological conception as how activity is 'completed' in every instance, while the affection of pleasure is in one sense the 'crown' of the activity: "and every activity is completed by pleasure" (1175a20). The notion that pleasure, along with happiness, is an activity fits well with Aristotle's distinction between *activity* and *process*[12]. Hannah derives no direct pleasure from her subtle transitions from infant to toddler to schoolgirl to track-champ, i.e. the process itself. The rule of thumb, it seems then, for Aristotle's notion of pleasure in the above sense then is that if we can't use a verb to describe the pleasure-giving source (Hannah's eating, playing, talking, learning, making fun, running, daring and deciding) then we've missed the mark on what the source is.

While pleasure in the above sense cannot be a 'coming to be', we might speculate as to how Aristotle *could* conceive a pleasure as an end. While it seems unjustified to identify pleasure with a good on the level of the particular, "this candy is sweet, therefore this candy is good", it does seem plausible to indentify pleasure as good under the second premise in a universal about that which is fine and good in a syllogism; "all that is fine and good will seem pleasurable to one who is good. This end is fine and good. This end will seem pleasurable to me, as I am good". Here we see that there are two particulars to be recognized. The first is the fine and the good, that which has great value. The second is to recognise that "I am good" or that I am in good condition meaning that I will desire the good as something well suited given I am in a good state. Indeed, continuing on from his assertion that pleasures are "activities, and an end" (1153a12) he adds that pleasures occur "because capacities are being put to use" (1153a13). The capacities that we possess and bring with us from one state (of character) to the other will involve that the capacities that

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[12] Activity is a principle in all things in nature: things that "have within itself a principle of motion and of stationariness" (Physics II 192b13-14); "it is the primary underlying matter of things which have in themselves a principle of motion and change" (Physics II 193a28-29). Whereas a *process* fits more into the category of 'coming to be' as mentioned above.

survive are functioning as they should, while a good indication of whether or not they are functioning well is whether or not their 'being put to use' when acting (virtuously) is bringing us pleasure.

What is interesting with Aristotle's view on pleasure being context-sensitive is that, as it appears, he is of the impression that our capacity to sense pleasure is *sensitive* to *where* in the process between potential states (of character) and actual states we are at present located. If this is true, if pleasures and pains are indeed capable of pointing out the nuances of where in the process of transition from potential to actual a particular "coming into being" we find ourselves, then they are signals of exceeding value to us in indicating information about a movement. It seems they are in a sense capable then of signalling nuances from that of a start, a scope of what can be done, what it is like to be in the process, what is left in a process to what it is like to round off completion, that our ability to take on pleasure can respond to all these differences. It comes as no surprise then that in many ways, pleasure can go wrong, i.e. give us the wrong signal. A soul that is in "good condition" will then be partially marked off by whether or not it either gets the different "modes" of pleasure right or at least interprets them correctly as wrong if they do not signal a correct picture. There is obviously a strong cognitive slant to pleasures when we experience them. Interestingly, Aristotle thusly invites us to think about where in a process of coming to be we are placed at the moment, so as to be able to compare or get an overview from to which we can interpret the pleasure or understand its relevance. The main point, however, is that the pleasure *started* the process of cognising the pleasure, while in doing so our cognising the pleasure will merit the experience as pleasur*able*. Thus, pleasure is a *source* of cognition of change, while cognising the change *notices* the correlation between pleasure and change. Today we call such experiences meta-cognitive thinking, a type of double prepositional attitude, where the object of reflection is the thought that arises together with the situation or object in question (note, however, that this is an extrapolation of Aristotle's theory of cognition in pleasure-experience, not a practically utilised technique utilised by someone like Hannah).

Are we in a state of hunger, or need of intimacy or in a state of anger? Capacities for pleasure or pain will enable affections when the situation arises which will inform us of change. Being capable of looking at the bigger picture, we can recognize that the pleasures in particulars when fulfilling needs can lead us not only to desires to repeat the experience but to connect the experience to a production of goods, like keeping in good health,

keeping friends or reacting to injustice, and in so doing take pleasure in acting out productions for these reasons.

We are also informed of our condition by our ability to cognise over pleasures and pains: To know that while I feel angry, my views of others will be coloured by this condition, or while I am lonely my pleasures during discourse will be strengthened that way. Recognising these nuances seem essential in both being aware in the activity and for self-awareness about keeping track of what the activity is doing to us so as to base our next step on a more balanced outward view. To then identify pleasure as something that is simply an end as in a particular (All things that are sweet give me pleasure. This candy is sweet. This candy will give me pleasure) will then be to forgo all possible nuances that our senses of pleasure are capable of informing us and in Aristotle's view we will then totally miss out on critical information about what and how situations affect us. We change ourselves.

It is a point worth mentioning that the complexity of learning to be in a right emotional condition, or learning to compensate if we are not, does not at all seem lost on Aristotle. Indeed we see evidence of him regarding the developmental mastery of the relation between the logical and alogical halves of the soul to be a lengthy dialectic process. We already understand that an emotional development is faced with the goal of functioning well in exceedingly vast and unequal situations, which of course requires time. Aristotle is quite clear on this part, renowned for citing Aesop's metaphor in *NE* book I that "a single swallow does not make a spring, nor does a single day; in the same way, neither does a single day, or a short time make a man blessed and happy" (1098a20). This sentence functions as a preamble to both the notion that the good life will consist of habituation and consecutiveness of acting in relation to what is good and fine over a span of many human years, making habituation a requirement for happiness, and the notion that happiness resembles completeness. And while pleasure and pain is the prime subject of interest for the political expert and lawgiver[13], living by emotion is the prime mode of living for many, especially the young: "This is why the young are not an appropriate audience for the political expert; for they are inexperienced in the actions that constitute life... What is more, because they have a tendency to be led by emotions it will be without point for them to

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[13] *NE* I.13 1102a9-10, "for what he [the political expert] wants is to make the members of the citizen body good"; I.9, 1099b31-33

listen" (1095a2-5). The point I take it is not to exclude the young from engaging in political reflection or reflection over what is the best sort of living. That would strike us as starkly counter-intuitive. Instead, it seems clear that the young, when being led as they are by emotion, will have this as a both a part of their functioning well, in *addition* to a potential vice. Note that the sentence does *not* state that the young live by affection alone, or by pleasure alone. We can speculate as to which teleological positives might come out of emotional 'leadership' at this stage, like guaranteeing the movement necessary both for discovery over as vast a plethora of phenomena as possible and for growing well physically, or inciting a great variety of changing interests, or inciting a passion for, or dedication to, lasting interests, especially *liking* this and not that. Again, precisely what is needed to gain what is lacking – experience in life, great objects of desire in the hearts of young people and emotional control. In all stages of Hannah's development we see positive examples of "living by emotion". In the beginning it seems as though this is all that Hannah does, an existentially necessary function, though at this point we could hardly call Hannah's inner functioning emotion as the cognitive aspect of emotion is hardly developed. When Hannah starts school she is quickly incited and disposed to change her interests from the rudimentary to the cognitive to the social and perhaps back again throughout the day. And perhaps because of these rapid changes in activity, she gets good at running, discoursing, letting her needs be informed by her activities, while some activities she sticks to, forgoing other needs. Her decision at the track meet lets her discover emotions she would not have discovered without her having an astute awareness of her dilemma, and choosing what she deems good, she resolves a complicated situation with what she recognises as a soundly produced decision. Her well informed decision then leads to new and satisfying emotions on a level new to her and this again makes her aware of where and from what, the relief is coming.

This touches upon an aspect of pleasure and pain that seems dominating in both the modern and Socratic understanding of the *functions* of pleasure and pain[14]. In the modern sense one of the dominating notions of the functions of pleasure and pain, I will venture, is the notion of *positive* and *negative reinforcement* correlated to particulars so as to point out what is good and what is bad in relation to universals. Positive and negative reinforcement,

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[14] We have already touched upon one function, the *orectic* function which draws or repels our movement to or from an object of desire or adversity.

just to give a loose example, is either when a pleasure or pain becomes associated with an object or activity, like Pavlov's dog, or when activities that give rise to pleasures and pains are in some way cognitively affirmed to *rightly* give rise to pleasures and pains, enabling us to produce thoughts like "there is nothing wrong with this pleasure. I don't have to doubt it. I can freely enjoy it" or "this pain shouldn't really be here. I can't stand it, there is definitely something wrong! This is indeed something I don't want to repeat". Positive and negative reinforcement would either be a function of pleasures or pains themselves on the basis of the individuals own movement, or come from an outside source with the intention of inciting pleasure and pain with the intention of affirmation, or as Aristotle confirms, we steer our youth with pleasures and pains, 'like a rudder'.

Though positive and negative reinforcement on the primary level of an outside source affirming negatives and positives seems essential so as to avoid engraining what will lead to painful our counter-ethical dispositions, the focus of reinforcement on Aristotle's part seems more to be on the affirmation one gets from the activities themselves once the activity is good. The locus of ethical dispositions seems to be the pleasure one takes in good activity, for that which is good human activity. Aristotle describes how we aim at becoming the "lover of" (1099a10) "capacities [which] are being put to use" (1153a12). When we are the 'lover of' some activity we do not simply like to do it. The activity gives lead to passions and a strong emotional affiliation to the activities. This has an evident reinforcement on our desires associated with these actions. This we see in that 'the lover of [φx] gets better at his own task' [my brackets and insertion] 1175a35, i.e. the joy we get from some tasks will be a strong motivational component not only in the activity in the instance of activity, but also in the process of development. The pleasure one takes in an activity of a specific focus becomes more a disposition and expectation than affection in a strict sense: "For the activity's own pleasure contributes to increasing the activity" (1175a30), where we must assume that "increasing the activity" means simply we do it more, and want to do it more. "Increasing the activity" seems also to entail that not only get to enjoy the activity but also enjoy the association to what the activity is for: the production. This again entails yet another enjoyment of a production of our own growing affiliation and emotional attachment to good: We enjoy more enjoying it more. These types of pleasure have a different effect on us than simply being the "crown" of an activity in the instance. Immediately following the last quotation we are given an example of what Aristotle has in mind. While someone is actively partaking and interested in, say a

conversation then it is easy to enjoy and follow the curves of the conversation partner's reasoning. But say you are the lover of pipe-playing and you hear someone playing the pipe as it really should be played. You cannot help, as the *Liebhaber* of pipe playing that you are, to hark and listen (1175b4). No matter how hard you try, you are lost in the pipe-playing due to the pleasure of both the pipe and your enjoyment of enjoying the pipe. It is hard, if not impossible to be simultaneously involved in these two engrossing activities at once (here Aristotle almost banteringly suggests it to be impossible to involve ourselves in another engrossing thought while for instance having sexual intercourse; though jocose, I do not believe this to be an idle example, but an example which metaphorically emphasises the strength of affiliation the "lover of" something has to that object of desire and its productive activity), and the example explicates how pleasure not only affects us in the moment but can affect us in a way that directs our dedication and focus towards a good in a way that is relevant to *choice* and *decision.* The *Liebhaber* might have to conclude that this fight is lost and the flute-player wins her audience or he instead sacrifices this pleasure by moving the conversation to another place. Such devotion can of course be both a vice and a virtue as you involuntarily love the flute-playing. Replace the flute-playing with say car-stealing and we immediately see the flip side to 'loving' an activity and the necessity of developing dispositions such as steadily desiring reciprocity.

Loving is in this sense a habitual/dispositional 'guaranty' that will seem to stick throughout various changes in environment and development. A temperate person, for instance, has gone through what in ancient Greek is called *paideia* – a type of habituation through positive or negative reinforcement of desiring or sacrificing the right pleasures at the right time for the right objects, to "delight and be distressed in the things we should" (1104b13). Such a habituation will help the temperate person to acquire loves and hates that are subject to reasoned reflection, persuasion and argument. Loves and hates are in turn a more permanent disposition, where when we learn to hate say inequality in relation to worth early in life it will most probably "stick" throughout life, that when you learn this as a child you will most likely bear this love or hate with you also into maturity.

2.3.2 Emotions as Cognition of Value

Loving or liking, hating or disliking, have by recent commentators been interpreted as a relation between emotion and the cognition of value of particulars[15]. They have noticed that Aristotle's presentation of what the senses do, discern nuances and differences, seems to be similar descriptions of what pleasures and pains 'do', that pleasures and pains resemble a sense. We may recall that an *orexis* (desire), when perceived by the subject as just that, consists of us assessing the object as good, taking pleasure in it and sensing it all in the same instance. Taking pleasure in the object of desire is then an integral part of sensing the good object *as* good. Again, the perceptual faculties of pleasure and pain are determined by the subject's condition. This is further emphasised in the following:

> But since every sense is active in relation to the sense-object, and completely active when the sense is in good condition and its object is the finest in the domain of that sense (for something like this, more than anything else, is what complete activity of a sense seems to be; .... in case of each of the senses the activity that is best is the one whose subject is in the best condition in relation to the object that is most worth... (1174b15-19)

Let then the 'domain' of pleasures and pains be considered that which is good or bad, while their jobs then are signalling which goods are the finest. A pleasure will not signal whether or not an *orexis* is fine, however, if the subject does not have this sense in good working order, working as it should, which in turn is determined by the subjects *hexis* or dispositions to likes and dislikes of that which is good and the 'becoming' of these. Pleasures and pains are often criticized as being too 'off again/on again' to be considered stable faculties of motivation in agency[16]; however, as we have seen Aristotle not only concedes to this fact but also integrates pleasures being completed in every instance into a theory of disposition-based agency.

As we see, our test subject Hannah *likes* to run. There are many factors that play in on her enjoyment of track and field, many of them concerning a discovery and testing of her own physical capacities and capabilities, others being social (which we will get back to). More interestingly here is how she here starts to *like* sports. The first faculty we encounter is how she is acting out a *talent*. We figure that talents can refer to Aristotle's technical description of capacities, emotional/physiological quantities of capacity to do one

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[15] Julia Annas, "Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness" in A. O. Rorty (Berkly 1980) p. 291; D. Achtenberg, "Cognition of value in Aristotle's Ethics" (State University of NY 2002).
[16] N. Sherman, "Making a Necessity of Virtue" (Cambridge 1997) p. 29-30.

thing well and to a certain degree. When we say someone is talented we often say they make something look easy, or that it comes easily to that person. That running comes more easily to Hannah is evidence of her capacities. We see she also has a disposition: Because of her capacities, she has a desire/emotion based drive to fill them. The next oddity we encounter is that her desire is not driven by pleasure alone. Earlier we mentioned the capacititive emotions deriving from *thumos* (the spirited part of the soul). Here, 'spirited' refers to an aggressive urge, a strong will or desire to overcome difficulties and produce the tasks ahead, due to a feeling or desire for a greater good deserved by the desirer. If I may interpret freely, this means that for Hannah, the pains incurred by running affects her on a level of a signal that she is heading in the right direction, for producing her talent, which is the final cause, an *archē*, the latter producing pleasure in Hannah. Here we must distinguish what Hannah experiences as *in* the experience and what the experience is *for*. We know today that pleasure in running is not uncommon due to physiological effects of certain signal chemicals released when the body is under strain. This is not wholly incompatible with *thumiotic* desires we see in Hannah, only Aristotle ads to this affective mechanism the cognition of these signals as heading in the right direction of an *archē*.

So an *archē*, being a final cause, plays a defining role in which production leads up to it. As we saw, we can *like* both the action in itself and what the action is for either separately or, ideally as in the case of Hannah, in combination. We have also previously seen that emotions are fundamentally cognitive in nature, informing us that we are being affected by specific instances, relations and objects in our surroundings, informing us of whether relations are desirable or undesirable.

3 Intellectual Development

Up until now I have interpreted Aristotle's two-part theory of the soul and how he perceives the *logismos*-having part of the soul as influencing our non-rational side and vice versa. Cognitive-emotional causation can be explained by Aristotle's theory of efficient cause, while emotions themselves have what I have called a strong cognitive slant. Emotions can more correctly be seen as fulfilling several functions necessary for human living, from functioning as senses influenced by changes in our environment to the cognition of value. This leads to the conclusion that we desire our emotional apparatus to function well in both scenarios. I have, however, focused mainly on one side of the story. Presently I will interpret Aristotle's views on the composition, function and development of the *logismos*. We will look at how the intellectual part of the soul is made up, what intellectual activity is thought to be, what some of the components of the activity are (and the use of these) and flesh out how *logos* is thought to produce prescriptions for its non-rational counterpart along with some of the reasons for why intellectual development is desirable for one who wishes a 'good' life in happiness. It should become evident that the intellectual part of the soul plays a paramount role in man's fulfilling desires by way of understanding what a desire is *for us* (...whom consist of emotions and intellect and social needs and capacities), via reasoning, deliberation, intellect, intelligence, architectonic abilities and not least, wisdom.

We have thus far discussed desires in terms of emotional appraisal. However, inherent to the *logismos*-having part of our souls are also genuinely intellectual desires. We like to know things and the world seems more harmonious to us when we understand it. We are incessantly curious throughout our development, and either delight in being puzzled, or feel frustration when there is something that we cannot comprehend. These intellectual desires are responsible for us wanting to read the *NE* to begin with. Intellectual desires are not only lofty acquisitions and late in coming in our development as humans, however. They begin with 'taking pleasure in our senses' (*Meta*. I.1, 980a1-2). Hannah is *learning* rudimentary recognition of her closest others, of her surroundings and of her own make-up. When Hannah is 5-8 months old, why does she put everything in her mouth? Why does she need to feel what these objects are like, through this most tactile interaction? Why does she do it in the first place? Evidently she takes pleasure in the relief these sensations provide, or simply can't help herself. She just does. What is she doing it for? Though she has no sense of production, these experiences, through repeated interaction, are enriching to her; through repetition, these experiences allow her a faculty memory and recognition, what can only be

described as knowledge of what 'feelings' the red wooden block and the blue plastic block will give her *if* she puts them in her mouth. But what will happen with this pencil...? What can we imagine Hannah doing if we at this point take away the pencil? Her desire to have the pencil in order to feel it would be interrupted, uncompleted, and this strikes Hannah as undesirable. And she'd probably let us know. We seem born with both a vast capacity, and a great disposition, to be *curious* about our surroundings.

It is fair then to say that the central 'desire' of the *logismos* is our desire to understand. Man is by nature a systematic understander of the world.

Though I will go into some detail as to the composition of the *logismos,* the aim of this chapter is to root out and elaborate on how Aristotle emphasises wisdom to be a function of well-being and his overall view that the subject of this field is intellectual *excellence*, described by an intellect who 'grasps' principles and universal truth (theoretical wisdom), and practical *excellence* described by a well functioning decision-making faculties. When speaking of a functioning part of the soul we are in fact speaking of a part that belongs to someone to whom character- and intellectual *excellence* already belongs. In the area of the *NE*, the crowning excellence of the *logismos* is *phronēsis* or *practical wisdom*, and the standard for whether practical wisdom is in place is whether or not the decisions we make can be considered wise. How would we describe Hannah's decisions, for instance?

Assisting this chapter is the theory that our intellect has two main functions – scientific and ethical reasoning. In so doing I make an assumption that the methodology described in both disciplines by Aristotle is also explanatory of how we desire, and arrive at, functioning capacities in both disciplines. Since here-and-now-functioning intellectual capacities are the standard Aristotle sets, we must also see how the *logismos* is thought to work in action.

3.1 The *Logismos* is Divided by Two Main Functions of Reason

A disposition that functions, as it should, when it should, the way it should, why it should and for the right things (and here Aristotle often adds 'the way the good person does') is for Aristotle simply another way of saying that the disposition is what it should be. Dispositions that function in this way (adding 'well' to the word 'functioning' in this sense would be superfluous) is what is called an 'excellence'. It is presumably for this reason Aristotle so often starts with the result of a functioning property and then argues "backwards" from the property to what the property isn't, what the property might consist of, on what it depends,

what its ultimate product should be etc.. In book 6 he does the same with his analysis of our intellectual capacities: The litmus test of any intellect in 'here and now' practical situations is whether or not it produces outcomes recommended by the function *wisdom* (*phronēsis*). It is for this reason the examination of the intellectual part of the soul coincides well with Aristotle's examination of intellectual excellence in book 6.

Here he assumes that our soul's rational side is again divided in two:

> ..., one by virtue of which we reflect upon the sorts of things who's principles cannot be otherwise, one by virtue of which we reflect upon things that can be otherwise; (VI.I 1138a5-8)

These two parts of the intellect are described as being generically different because they are each by nature 'built' around fulfilling separate purposes and therefore function differently. They 'resemble their objects' (1139a13) meaning that they are by nature structured to deal with generically separate subject matter and are therefore noted as generically distinct parts of the soul.

The part which deals with principles that cannot be otherwise Aristotle calls i) the *scientific* part, while the part that reflects on that which can be otherwise is called ii) the *calculative* part, which is also identified as the *deliberative* part.

These two capacities are rendered moot outside their specific field, meaning the investigation into them is uninteresting without examining the area of either i) scientific investigation or ii) action/production. In this sense, thought consists of two separate capacities depending on which area of investigation is being developed. The function of both is truth to the highest degree (1139b12-14). Scientific thought (*epistēmonicon*) stands in relation to necessary and universal truths, relies on intelligence for the purpose of learning, reasoning and the demonstration of truths and its execution relies on intellectual excellence in its own right. Calculative thought (*logistikon*) deliberates on desire, agency and change, that which may be different, for practical reasons.

3.2 Intellectual Activity I: Ethical Enquiry as Intellectual Development

As Aristotle argues in book VII, our cognitive/analytic powers are divided by their functioning in relation to two generically different overlying principles, relating to scientific investigation on the one hand and ethical investigation on the other. This begs the question why scientific method is at all mentioned if we have no practical use for the scientific branch

of enquiry in ethical life. Its placement opens up for two different interpretations, that either the mention of intellectual excellence would simply be incomplete without the mention of scientific method or that scientific method bears some relevance to the methods of ethical enquiry and perhaps vice versa. My interpretation falls into the latter category for two reasons. First, it is evident that scientific method bears at least an indirect influence on ethics since Aristotle identifies happiness with the contemplative life of the intellectual, whom achieves happiness by engaging and achieving excellence in scientific method and activity in book X. Science is what the happy man *does* in book X. Second, once we look into particular aspects of Aristotle's scientific method, we see there are certain resemblances and *general* practical implications that must prove quite useful in practical enquiry, ethical enquiry included. In the present chapter I will therefore expound on both methodologies.

Firstly, both methodologies attempt to go from *appearance* to genuine discovery and attempt to produce a theory of how discovery takes place. In *Ways to First Principles: Aristotle's method of Discovery* (in *Aristotle: Critical Assessments;* Lloyd D. Gerson ed.), T.I. Irwin reflects upon the relation between appearance (*phainomena*) and discovery in Aristotle's two methodologies towards and from first principles. There are two types of *phainomena* which in turn lead to two different methods of discovery. Irwin reflects on different examples of scientific enquiry, enquiry into astronomy (signified T1) and into common beliefs (T2) as examples of sciences that are derived from (T2), or lead to (T1) first principles. T1 draws a path towards first principles, from appearance through experience (*Apr* 46a17-27), where the task and kind of experience is such that we become capable of determining the principles at work in the experience. This is done by i) grasping the appearance adequately, being informed correctly by *phainomena* or correcting misjudgements with reference to them and ii) finding possible demonstrations to the same principles. If, then, facts are grasped adequately (*hyparchonta*), the next task is to set out the demonstrations readily. If this enquiry (*historia*) leaves out none of the facts that truly hold for the *phainomena* then we will be capable of producing a demonstration. We will also be able to make evident that which does not readily admit to demonstration, yet in spite of this we know is still true, of the *phainomena.*

Enquiry into common beliefs or *endoxa* (T2) by contrast starts from *phainomena* under different terms and has an aim of arriving *from* first principles to distinctive practical instances. A method concerning T2 should start out by i) 'setting out the appearance' (*tithenta ta phainomena*) then ii) by going through the puzzles (*aporia*). The goal of this

methodology is to prove common beliefs (*endoxa*) to be justified. A proof in this regard is adequate if i) the difficulties presented by the puzzles (*aporia*) are resolved, and ii) the common belief is left unperturbed or remains unchanged.

In addition to similarities in how to treat *phainomena* scientifically, both methodologies utilise their own methods of induction (*epagōgē*). Aristotle argues that T1 induces demonstrations from first principles and experience on grounds that 'the inarticulate whole is better known to perception' (*Phys* 184a16-26). 'The whole is confused and we look for a clearer result' (*Phys* 184a 16-26). The method of discovery here leads from true principles with unclear observation of the particulars to clear observation of the particulars under true principles.

Induction under T2, *endoxa*, takes form by way of what is often referred to as Aristotle's 'dialectic'. In his book *Topica*, the dialectic is a method from which we are able to syllogise *endoxa* about every topic proposed to us, while our syllogistic conclusion in no way conflicts with our own account of the same topic (*Top* 100a18-21). The same method of justification is involved here when we first 'lay out the appearance', in this case the *endoxa*, then if, after resolving any conflicting beliefs the *endoxa* still stands, the belief is then justified. The dialectic is therefore particularly concerned with equally sound, yet contrary reasoning which produces an *aporia*, and when we reason on both sides, and everything seems to follow by each, we are puzzled about which one we should act on.

Both methodologies take pains in the beginning steps to 'see aright', to clarify any misjudgements or misperceptions and to get a 'grasp of' the *phainomenon* at hand. The *phainomena* arrive to us by perception first and next by 'grasping' the *phainomena*. Though the concept of 'grasping' is present in both methods, 'grasping' is different in T1 and T2. Where we induce in T1 from an 'inarticulate whole' to 'a clearer result', i.e. nomenological truths about the whole, grasping is thought more as letting *phainomena* present themselves as focussed and undistorted as possible. In addition, 'grasping' carries the connotation of mentally grasping, understanding what we are seeing. Our cognitive reflection of the *phainomenon* must thusly also 'see aright', demanding both faculties of experience and intelligence (*nous*). Obviously this also rings true of all sensory perception that we have described thus far. We can for instance rightly imagine that 'grasping aright', from which we lay out phenomena, equally relies on sensations and affection from the alogical as well as the logical parts of the soul (see chapter 2.1.). As a consequence, we see that the first steps in each methodology rely as much on character-excellence as they do

intellectual accomplishment, justified by the goal of each enquiry, i.e. truth in T1 and truthfulness in T2.

In summary we see evidence that T1 and T2 methods of inquiry under Aristotle's theory resemble each other by describing identical aims in the starting points of inquiry, i.e. to *grasp* aright the *phainomena*, that in so doing we 'lay out the problems' as they appear, appearance in both cases are 'dialectic' in nature, that each methodology is identified as an inductive method, that each method of enquiry will rely on the 'receiver' of the *phainomena* being in a state capable of seeing aright and that the goal of truth or truthfulness provides premises along with sufficient reason for the informed soul to be 1) in a ready state and 2) a state capable of solving the puzzles hindering truthful 'grasping'. Simply put, each type of general inquiry not only has practical similarities, but is practically and theoretically linked by several identical prerequisites.

3.2.1   Endoxa and the Dialectic

Though scientific and ethical enquiry have practical links in their pre-determinates, they are still as Aristotle claims generically different in nature due to their different principle aims. While scientific enquiry has as its aim theoretic truths and demonstrations applied to universals, it is still quite vague to call the aim of ethical enquiry truthfulness that starts from first principles. To site Richard Kraut (Blackwell, 2006 pg. 77) the aim of the *dialectic* in ethical investigation is not to demonstrate the correctness of any given ethical proposition per se, but to become *wiser*: "It is part of one's own intellectual and moral development".

To recall the description of *endoxa* as a dialectic process in the previous chapter, it is a method of inquiry where we first give as qualified a description as possible of common belief, next describe plausible other beliefs derived from observations of the same *phainomena* , resolve conflicting propositions, and if the initial common belief still stands it is then justified. Common belief is perhaps a misguiding translation of *endoxa*, however, as an *endoxon* need not be widely held. An example in Hannah's case would be an *endoxon* that 'running in itself is highly gratifying'. We can imagine that this proposition is not widely held in Hannah's class room, yet the claim is none the less ready to be taken seriously as a contender to activities that can be highly gratifying. They are beliefs adopted by real people, held by specific individuals who have reasons to maintain them. 'Laying out' an *endoxon* will then equally consist of understanding these reasons as testing their relevance to the enquiry. It is interesting that this type of enquiry exists on somewhat empirical grounds, at least to the degree that opinions are relied upon because they actually

come from someone's mouth or hand. That person has something at stake and a *thumos*-derived incentive to hold this opinion as justified in addition to a desire for truthfulness[17]. It is not synonymous to the subjective opinion by or from anyone, however. Instead *endoxa*, if lain out correctly, should resemble the opinion of reputably wise individuals or be thus that reputably wise persons can agree on them. Disagreement from those known to be wise should also be heeded, along with why some are considered wise, i.e. we should have a notion of the quality of their work and why some are in agreement or disagreement. *Endoxa* is also qualified if a number of people hold the opinion. If a wide number of rational, mature people with some contact with the given *phainomena* hold a relevant preposition, we must assume they have a good reason to. Aristotle is optimistic that we have in us as a capacity to derive at truths and for the most part succeed (*Rhret* I.1.1355a15-18 as cited by R. Kraut, 2006 pp. 78). In other words, it is not Aristotle's suggestion that we should only listen to experts or blindly follow a given scientific paradigm or reputation alone. We should go with the experts, yes, but also go with whatever experience in 'dialectic' which has already been lain down by those who do not have a stake, who need not defend him- or herself, casting as wide a net as possible knowing that this has been lain down by competent people capable of giving reason for their beliefs.

The second stage of ethical investigation after trying sufficiently to 'grasp' the *phainomena* at hand is to go though each *endoxon* and try to prove it. If the prepositions also resist falling into ambiguity, even when rearranging their structure while retaining their logical composition ('being said in many ways'), the *endoxa* are proven sound, but if the propositions they recommend conflict with other *endoxa*, then a contradiction is revealed, since both *endoxa* cannot be true at the same time, producing *aporia* or puzzles. When by 'going through the puzzles' we are thusly perplexed, there is no longer any obvious next step to take in the investigation. In a perplexed state in face of contradictions there is little to recommend the one proposition over the other. We will, however, be in a better position at this stage to rightly divulge the supporting reasoning of each preposition.

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[17] The dialectic rightly incorporates justification of why Aristotle and Plato's Socrates rely to such a degree on reputable names in there texts and dialogues. It is a reminder that if ethical enquiry is to take place it cannot take place in an armchair or academic vacuum. This reminder is also given by Aristotle in book I.10 by pointing out the methodological paradoxes in ethical theorizing.

We may then proceed to better compare the supported reasoning of each *endoxon* and asses which has the stronger argument.

The transition from clarification of *endoxa* to testing its actual truth-value is a transition of vast importance, because we are transitioning between two qualitatively different starting points. Whereas when we attempt to 'grasp' *endoxa* we enquire from 'what is known' to us, when we start from imagining what is and what is not the truth of the matter we start with what Aristotle calls 'that which is known without qualification, i.e. first principles, *archē* (I.4 1095a30-b4) . R. Kraut explains (Blackwell 2006, pg. 88) that the transition in enquiry from that which is 'known to us' to what is known 'without qualification' is a step in a hierarchical direction, meaning that the knowledge we gain in step two is knowledge 'up' from incidental truth to general cases of universal truth. We can also see it as a linear development through inquiry, where we start from what is known up to a point where we deplete innate ambiguities in this knowledge and still face 'endoxical' contradictions. At this point we are 'half way' to first principles. We then attempt to draw out and imagine possible first principles that go with each qualified assumption, and by doing so we discover which justified belief has the strongest arguments and thus most resembles a first principle (being then true for the most part). The act of recognising resemblances between the *endoxon* and the universal or *archē* is also a process of 'grasping' 'upwards' from the systematic thoughts too the thoughts which control these truths. Here we are at a point where intelligence plays almost a sensory role in comprehension of universals. If we have sufficient intellectual capacity qua *nous* we will 'see' the universal without further process. Nous will have grasped its object in the one direction:

> Intelligence (*nous*) has as its objects what is last in both directions [to and from universals]; for both the primary definitions and what is last in practical reasoning are to be grasped by intelligence, not with an account, the objects of the sort of intelligence that operates in demonstration that are universal consist of particulars. So one must have a sense of perception also of universals, and this is intelligence. (1143a36-1143b8)

Further, systematic knowledge (*sunesis*) and intelligence (*nous*) most resemble objects high in a hierarchy of controlling principles in nature. Like first principles *sunesis* and *nous* are themselves high ranking principles in nature (1141b3-4), because they are

from nature (a capacity for *sunesis* and *nous* is something we are born with) and much of what is naturally good for man is dependent on these capacities.

We have thus far gained precision in the prepositions, soundness and truth-value in a general sense. We have accomplished a *sunesis* of what we can say is true for the most part in our investigation, having examined the *endoxa* in relation with what is true without qualification. A universal in ethical enquiry is, however, not true in all cases since it is in the nature of cases involved that none are entirely identical (1094b15-23). An ethical *archē*, therefore will always be true *for the most part*, in most cases. This realisation also begs a reminder that a variation in *endoxa*, and true grasping of these, is a requirement in order to cover as vast a variation of general truths as possible (we are therefore reminded that one trip in this direction is not enough. We have gained the value of easier passage along with the pleasure derived thereof, encouraging us to make future enquiries).

But since this is ethics, our inquiry into ethical conduct is meaningless if left to theoretic inquiry alone. We have yet to make our enquiry relevant to real ethical activity and conduct, and thus we return to the point of departure illuminating the beginning *endoxa*. Returning to the beginning seems also to have a motivational function: The enquiring subjects will notice the difference and the value of the enquiry when being able to compare the result to the humble beginnings, the point being that this should help students of ethics more easily to arrange or rearrange their beliefs in terms of which beliefs belong under which first principles and what stage of inquiry each belief is under. In addition, having gone through ethical enquiry in this manner should also motivate in terms of revealing the value of accumulating experience in further ethical activity and enquiry into the good for humans. Indeed the *NE* seen as a whole is an example of this type of enquiry, from humble beginnings in book one, laying out the conflicting ideas of what the good for man consists of, understanding the principle that the good for man is the excellent activity of the soul in accordance with reason, but then continuing in the remaining nine books to investigate what was not fully understood to begin with. If the result then harmonises with experience, including the experience of lives outside ethical enquiry, it should be accepted. It *will* be accepted by the person who through good upbringing and character development sees the direct relevance between the investigation which one has taken pains to bring in from outside his/her subjective view point, and one's own assurance that results, is how one wants to live.

Given the method of ethical enquiry as here described, and given the central role it plays in providing not just a means to ethical ends, but to a worthwhile mainundertaking in life in and of itself, is seems prudent to present it in diagram as suggested by Aristotle's metaphor that ethical enquiry is much like the U-shaped track in Athenian sports:

Starting points: What is known to us - endoxa

Sorting out ambiguity and underlying reasoning of the endoxa. If endoxa retains its coherence through change in its logical structure it is sound, it will be true for the most part and we will be at the end of this length. If two contrasting endoxa are sound and not one has the strongest argument, we are genuinely perplexed.

Sorting out the puzzle

We now grasp fully the problem. By realizing which archē the endoxa rely, and realizing which endoxon most resembles a first principle, we will be recommended a step to understanding its universal legitimacy. Through *Nous* (intelligence) we thus 'grasp' the universal by first sensing a distinct archē in its proper form, then recognize similarities between the endoxon and the archē.

Great epistemic/moti-vational value when we compare the results with our meager starting points.

The Universal: That which is true for the most part. At this point - systematic knowledge (epistemē) and comprehension (sunesis)

Successfully 'bringing the universal back to us'.

Sensing when the universal has relevance in the particularia of our here-and-now situation by having well functioning senses (gnosis) , and again intelligence, sunesis, both derived from character excellence. The result is conduct in accordance with the universal.

Having epistemē about universals make them readily applicable for use as a general maxim to recommend certain conduct. We know not just *that* they apply but *why*.

Diagram 3.1

In this diagram we see more clearly which type of enquiry is in which place in the development. We understand as well that gaining wisdom is dependent on ethical enquiry in both directions. We have only briefly imagined the practical use of this development, but will continue to investigate this subject in the next section. A development half way, to universals, is a development that has in Aristotle's view little to no value whatsoever: "This is why people call Anaxagoras and Thales... "'accomplished' and not 'wise'" (1141b5). He continues "they say people like to know things that are exceptional, wonderful, difficult,

even super-human – but useless, because what they inquire into are not goods that are *human*" (1141b7-8). Aristotle pulls the leaf from his mouth at the thought of philosophy without the 'round trip' back to practical wisdom: "But most people fail to do these things, and by taking refuge in talk they think they are philosophizing, and that they will become excellent this way" (1105b12-15). Ethical inquiry that loses its grasp on practical reasoning for the good and the fine, in action, in relation to us – humans – is of less worth than those who lack systematic knowledge of ethical universals but who are familiar with the particular and practical, who are effective in good activity.

The trip back from first principles involves similar tasks the *logismos* must handle. The upshot in this trip back to practical wisdom is that we at this point have clearer access to *archē* controlling underlying principles for human action, which in turn gives us a sense of *direction* to our activities. Our intellect must in a different way synthesise the relevance of controlling principles concerning human action with their relevant actions. The job of the intellect is similar, however, in that it should make 'free play of thought' and give 'easy passage' (Lear, Cambridge 1988 pg. 4) to good inducing activity.

3.2.2 Wisdom (*phronēsis*)

What Aristotle calls wisdom or *phronésis* consists of an organised, though somewhat piecemeal description of characteristics: i) Wisdom will produce decisions that accomplish the good for each occasion, by issuing a prescription (*orthos logos*) ii) can be displayed by two different methods of inquiry, one for theoretical questions and one for practical questions, iii) a disposition marrying cleverness (true thought) with character excellence (true desires), iv) though Aristotle elaborates in length on the nature of technical expertise and intellectual accomplishment (a combination of knowledge , *episteme*, with intelligence, *nous*) he does so to illustrate that wisdom is separate from these, v) wisdom works on different levels: on a political level of production on a grater scale, on the level of comprehension, on the level of sympathy and on the level of intellectual mastery.

Wisdom consists of deliberation on that which is good and advantageous (1140a25-27), according to Aristotle's understanding of the *endoxa* (justified belief; see ch. 3.2.1) of the characteristics of one who is wise. Our modern *endoxa* might be different, as we may take good and advantageous to mean exclusively situational advancement. This is not the present case however, because the good and advantageous here would be for the betterment of life in general from the point of view of that person, taken as a whole, that which wisdom is for. The practically wise (*phronimos*) does not have as his or her goal "some

benefit close at hand, but at a benefit of a whole life" (1160a22-23). It is striking that Aristotle also here, in explaining his notion of wisdom, relies on his central premise for human motivation: That we find out what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general. Wisdom is a kind of excellence in its own right, enabling us to judge the relevance of particulars - under their controlling principles. Practical wisdom must thus be concerned with universal premises (VI.7 1141b14-15), and it gains its knowledge of them 'second hand' from the scientific of the logos having soul. Perception of particulars under the minor premise (or 'practical perception') by contrast, is its own unique contribution (Reeve, Blackwell pg. 208). Though the practically wise must be informed by relevant facts and knowledge of the scientific world, his or her main concern is for 'what can be otherwise' (1140b25-28) in the ethical world, the world of action. Wisdom must therefore include an 'openness' and sensitivity to the ethical situation one stands in, in this sense informing the agent truthfully of what is going on, and in continuation recommend an apt response. This is the reason why practical wisdom is inseparable from a demand of character-excellence. Without character excellence, one alogical soul would be incapable of sensation of particulars in a manner that recommends apt action: "for a good person discriminates correctly in every set of circumstances, and in every set of circumstances what is true is apparent to him" (1113a29-31). But since circumstances are particular, and since practical wisdom must consider the controlling principles in each, they must hone their *eye*, and formed from experience, they see correctly. (1143b13).

We all arrive at situations where forethought and weighty deliberation is desirable or even necessary, yet impossible, in order to bring about a result that is good, just, not evil etc. This is one reason for us to be concerned with our pre-disposition to be affected and react in the manner of one who is adept to feel, think and act wisely in situations where acquiring forethought is in conflict with the situations immediacy. The wise person acts precisely in this adept way, again underpinning the need for adaptation to character excellence in the *phronimos* (s/he who acts wisely, who has practical wisdom), seen as a goal for human functioning through ethical living. As mentioned in section 2.4 our emotional apparatus has the capability to judge value and make assessments in the here-and-now based on feelings for and from recognised objects. If the relevant particular is recognised in the instance, then that is all the urge and impulse needed in order for the *phronimos* to act, because s/he senses in the instant how to bring a good result 'back to oneself', and being rightly affected here means reacting aptly, giving the same result as if

one had deliberated at length. The question is whether or not such action indeed qualifies to be called a wise deliberative action. One criterion is that the starting points of deliberative action is having the right *archē*, or major premise in an action; but when we act with the wrong major premise, say, wanting returns instead of wishing the other well when one helps others, then the deliberative action will start out off target. For this reason the *phronimos* has a soul disposed to enjoy, take pleasure from, or like the relevant *archē*, or retract from, or be displeased by inappropriate ones.

It is therefore of some interest that, when we understand the way a *phronimos* deliberates or senses, we are a step closer to producing *epistemē* on ways in which we can go wrong. We can either i) deliberate well, i.e. successfully bridging major and minor premises in a resulting action, but for the wrong ends. This means effectively that we have either not aptly understood the *archē*, mistaken the desired outcome as a category under the *archē*, or mistaken one *archē* for another; ii) We may deliberate and act to the right result for the right *archē*, but through the wrong minor premise, because of not correctly interpreting the relevant particulars, mistaking one for another or not sensing them at all. The right result is then arrived at by luck alone and not be because of our being in a well functioning state. There are of course also the cases where the wrong *archē* and particulars are deliberated on and utilised due to an assessment by the deliberator that these are better, and these cases are examples of human badness.

3.3 Intellectual Activity II: Ethical Deliberation and Development of 'Good-Finding' Senses

We have now lain down some of the foundations in Aristotle's theory concluding in ethical enquiry being valuable and desirable as an investment in and of itself. Through ethical enquiry we more easily understand living in the world as a coherent, facilitating, richer and more truthful existence. We have also seen that ethical enquiry is far more than simply a calculating method of enquiry, but a lifestyle in and of itself by exhibiting activity attuned to the universals concerning the good and the fine for us, both in the singular and as a species. This life style consists of gaining systematic knowledge of the controlling principles of that which is fine, and then exhibiting them in action.

We have yet to look more closely at the return journey from gaining understanding of universals, to application in practical reasoning. We should therefore get a clearer idea of how practical reasoning in the *NE* is thought to work in practice. We have also taken

items such as 'the good', 'controlling principle' and 'universal' at mere face value up until now. This neglects the very foundation of why Aristotle calls this *ethical* enquiry in the first place, making further disclosure of what 'ends' consist of, the fine and the good, the true objects of desire in general, far overdue.

3.3.1 Universals, Particulars and the Senses' Dependency on Character Excellence

I have presented above the interaction between a method of systematic thinking about puzzles lain out to us in the world, and our gaining of acumen in solving such puzzles. So far, the discussion has circled mostly on how methodology is relevant to our grasping and gaining knowledge of universals, realising what is true of what we commonly sense about the world. We have not yet discussed the production and utilisation of such knowledge in practice, or the situations that depend on the recognition of the viability of universals.

One of Aristotle's rather famous logical deductions, the practical syllogism, utilises his notion of universal and particular. Thus far we have taken 'universal' to carry a rather vague meaning, incorporating both a category of 'common inference' (*endoxa*) and 'controlling principle' (*archē*). At the same time we know that any given 'universal' in ethical enquiry is intimately associated with action under the guidance of that which we judge as good for the most part. In moving away from universals towards practical effect, Aristotle relies on a specific logical function to make clear to us how we derive from something we have knowledge/experience of for the most part (all S are P), to recognising its relevance in the here and now (M is S). The *practical syllogism* is described below:

> Further, since there are two types of premiss, there is nothing to prevent someone from acting 'contrary his knowledge' when he has both premises but is using only the universal one, not the particular one; for it is particulars that are acted on. The universal too has to be differentiated, in so far as there is one term for the agent and one for the object of the action, e.g. that all human beings are benefited by dry foods, and that oneself is a human being, or that such-and-such is dry; but whether *this* is such-and-such – this is what the agent either does not 'have', or does not activate; and which of *these* ways we mean will make an enormous difference, with the result that his knowing seems, in one way, not all strange, and in the other way amazing. (*NE* VII.3 1147a1-10)

The practical syllogism is an argument showing how we go from deliberative action as described in a three-part argument. The argument consists of the universal stated as a major premise ("all human beings are benefited by dry foods"), a minor premise consisting of a particular recognition of the predicate in the universal (I am a human being, this food

is dry), to the conclusion resulting directly into action ("I am having this food now"). At face value the practical syllogism does not seem all too explanatory of how we choose to act, yet it can explain how we can gain systematic knowledge and experience of the universals in practical action. In scientific theory a syllogism would be an explanation of an acknowledged truth. In ethical theory on the other hand, a syllogism handles the purpose for which we act.

When I have a grasp of a universal, something that is for the most part true, I will have no use for this *sunesis* without recognising its salience in 'particulars', the circumference of situated events of significance to the universal or major premise: "for these are starting points of that for the sake of which, since things that are universal consist of particulars. So one must have perception of these, and this is intelligence" (1143a2-5). The universal consists of an organising context in which relational particulars represent the minor premise. Again as with the 'grasping' of universals, *nous* has as its function to acquire an interpretation of particulars as well, in their situational whole, deciphering at the same time the relevant and significant futures of situational events.

The capacity for *nous* is not alone in this task however. Grasping relevant particulars in continuous activity relies on all our senses and is exceptionally difficult. Whether we sense and recognise significant futures relies on the functioning of the entirety of our sensory devices, from 'mere' sensory perception, to correct and effective affective reception, to apt emotional reception (of affection) and response, to intellectual 'grasping', to sympathy and social understanding (see chapter 4.1 for the latter), to the cognition of value. The breadth and precision in such grasping of particulars seems daunting indeed, and is descriptive of the circumstances that necessitate character excellences. It seems all the more rational, then, that once we hone in on understanding universals, we desire at the same time to concern ourselves with the parts of the soul that will be put to the test of utilising said universals. This is the very reason why practical wisdom (*phronesis*) is impossible to attain without character excellence in the owner; however, it would be a mistake to induce that arriving from the universal to the particular the way the wise person does is an impossible task not worth contemplating. Indeed, capacities for sensing our environment in a *human* way are tautologically in us as facilitated by nature, *as humans*. It is evident from the above passage that one segment of the minor premise consists of us identifying ourselves as human. While this necessitation of self-identification in the minor premise can have all sorts of syllogistic value, from identifying relative use and value

between the object of desire and us, to self-exploration through ones surroundings, the knowledge of who we are will, at all times, play a central role[18] in sensing situations relevant to us.

It is also evident that these sensing capacities mature incrementally and in stages, as we've seen some examples of in our test subject Hannah. Myles Burnyeat in his famous article 'Aristotle on Learning to be Good' (California, 1992) draws a more detailed picture of Aristotle's theory of how rational development coincides with character-development, that the interdependency of the one on the other is a learned process. His main point is that we have today too weak a definition of 'learning', since learning also implies development in both in the non-rational and rational parts of the soul. He also provides us with concrete suggestions for where different developmental stages are present in the text. He is interested in how we go from knowing "the *that*", *that* something is so, to "knowing the *why*", *why* something is so. Burnyeat's point of departure is a look at the notion of "The *that*" in book 1, "that *that*" being the relevant first principles (*archē*) in a given inquiry: "For the starting point is *that* it is so, and if this were sufficiently clear to us – well, in that case there will be no need to know in addition *why*" (1095b6-8). From this and other passages he induces that Aristotle relies on there being consecutive steps in knowledge concerning both from and too first principles and that this is something we can accomplish by learning. The aim of upbringing is to enable the young to easily 'get' the starting points while the ones who do not easily get the starting points will be more dependent on their own motivation to understand what others are saying. They *desire* to know the *why,* even thought this type of knowledge is complex and difficult to grasp.

As for Hannah, we can presume examples corresponding with syllogistic reasoning and its authority over her actions. When she learns productive capacities she simultaneously discovers she can be the cause of production. Under the rule of Aristotle's four causes (i. formal cause, ii. material cause, iii. efficient cause and iv. final cause; see sections 2.1, 3.3.2 and 3.3.3), Hannah is the efficient cause of her productions while, whether she is conscious of it or not, her production is steered by the final cause, that for which her actions are done. In production, Hannah's actions standing in relation to the final cause is determined by whether or not they are causal constituents to the final cause. The

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[18] Recall the discussion on '"who" Hannah is' from the beginning of chapter 2. I will explain a development of self-identification in more breadth in chapter 4.

final cause acts here as an *archē* (principle), say living and doing well, constituted by - "running contributes to health" - and then 'sorting out the puzzles' in the particulars, "is this a time to run? Should I run as fast as I can? Will the way I run lead to what I want?", dependent on her senses, character and wisdom in the particular.

Concerning the practical syllogism, the question remains: Do we syllogise from day to day in any practical sense, which aids us in our return from *sunesis* of a universal to exhibition of said universals in action? In short, can the practical syllogism be used in any prescriptive sense? And is it correct to presume that syllogistic reasoning is at work in our thought experiment? Certainly, it is not as if we think in our day-to-day lives "Oh, here is as a particular under this universal I have learned a lot about. I will do this then". At the same time it seems imminent that moral prescriptions should be present in our actions, precisely in the way a universal, say, sharing goods with others, should present itself to us when the situation arises when we should act justly. Indeed a syllogism does seem to work prescriptively, in the sense that it can explain morally successful action, and failures to act. While on the other hand, it seems to press the matter too far to say that it is through syllogising we make decisions. Decisions, and what leads us to decide, are explained by Aristotle under the heading of deliberative activity, which is to follow.

John Cooper (1986, pg. 23) summarises his view on the relation between the practical syllogism and how we arrive at ends and actions clearly by concluding ""A "practical syllogism" is not in any general part of the deliberation that leads to the performance of an action"", while other views[19] maintain that we act instantly upon the conclusion of the syllogism and that syllogising *is* in some sense what it is to deliberate. As it seems, the main disagreement lies in whether or not the syllogistic conclusion includes the final resolution to act, or making a reasoned choice whatsoever. As I understand it, under Cooper's reading one cannot divulge any more information from the syllogistic conclusion than a perception of a good, presiding on a general knowledge that it is good, and a conclusive good-getting if the agent has free play to do so. One can certainly not divulge if any reasoning has taken place from the syllogism alone. There is then no explanatory link between actions described under the syllogism and action as a result of deliberation.

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[19] Cooper aims mainly at Rene Antoine Gauthier.

Here's my take. First, we do know that a syllogism will involve beliefs and knowledge of universals in a major premise which are ideally evolved from the to-journey towards *epistēme* and *archē*. These include matters we do not deliberate about, like scientific knowledge, but also ends that are over and above other ends, like the good and the fine, activity in happiness if we first have this desire, knowledge we arrive at through ethical living itself, and *epistēme* itself. Indeed Cooper acknowledges, and devotes much discussion to, the development of human flourishing as both a universal and an end. Second, we can describe the instance of action in syllogistic form in a way that informs us of deliberation taking place. When Hannah deliberates upon her dilemma, she has the capacity to imagine, possibly through *phantasia* (a sense invoking imagination when conceptualising consequential acts), not only *that* a particular is relevant to the universal, but *how* action might produce the good under said universal *if* she chooses to act. Her sensations help her perceive and be affected by the *possibility* of personal victory versus the pain of letting it go[20]. These emotions' 'cognitive slant', as I call it, inform us of how we feel about each outcome we imagine. When we arrive at the conclusion, we have brought 'the end back to us' (1113a5-6) in *two* senses. First, when we have managed to cognise what our perception is telling us about the universal, we still need to understand *why* the universal pertains to the situation, the reasons for which are object to deliberation. Second, we need to realise the ordinary practical steps we need to take in order to act according to the universal. I believe Cooper only takes into account the second, practical use of syllogistic reasoning and therefore denies its relevance to deliberation and choice.

The practical syllogism now consists of a grasp of a universal through a dichotomy of ethical enquiry and ethical living. We 1) sense and grasp relevant ethical circumstances, grasped by both logical and alogical functions of the soul, 2) know how and why they fall under a relevant ethical universal, and in so doing arrive at an outcome prescribed by this meeting, and 3) realise the necessary action which leads to the good prescribed by said universal. The practical syllogism does not sufficiently explain how we deliberate, however. In general, we deliberate on things that can be otherwise and worthwhile of pursuit. While the product of deliberation, the reason we deliberate, is to make a decision (prohairesis).

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[20] We'll go into more detail into our case-subject's choice in chapter 4.

3.3.2 Deliberation and Desire-Based Decision

Under Aristotle's preliminary definition the *cause* of 'decision' must enter into the definition of what 'decisions' are thought to be. The cause of decisions is desire. Desires in turn are 'informed' by deliberation (1139b4-5). The function of deliberation is to achieve a direct route to action by 'bringing the end back to us' (1113a5-6). Decision (*proheiresis*) is a combination of thought (*dianoia*)/intelligence (*nous*), and desire (*orexis*). After a deliberation a decision will then ensue committing us to what good deliberation prescribes. Aristotle is of the idea that once we have deliberated there is nothing else left between us and the object of desire. Given that our *orexis* (emoting desire) is a mover, we will at this time commence the good-getting action since there is nothing else left holding it back. It is a transition where the thinking (*noēsis*) stops and the doing (*poiēsis*) commences (1032b15-17). We arrive at decisions then, when we have in a sufficiently clear way seen what actions one must take in order to produce the desired outcome, thereby lifting the break off our *orexis*. Decision, under Aristotle's definition, is thus 'the source of movement' (1139a31-35).

Deliberation, we initially say, is reasoning over 'what can be otherwise', not by nature, necessity or chance, but by our agency (1112a36-37). The objects of deliberation are thus the outcomes that depend on our actions, understood as a function of intelligence. We do not deliberate when the outcome is the same every time or already known, but when the outcome is unclear and when the correct way to act is not given (1112b8-9), when we are in two minds on how to act (11121b3). When there is a gap between our understanding of the universal and what our perception of the particular is telling us, resolving the disparity will require deliberation. Objects we deliberate on are the ones that depend on our productive agency and capacity, "the things doable by him" (112a35).

I mentioned above that once deliberation is 'completed' the effect is knowledge of how we bring the object of desire 'back to where we are'. To bring the good back to us can be taken too literally however. We do not imagine ourselves walking backwards from the desired good, over certain obstacles back to where we stand. Instead the *logismos* 'sees' that the good is both desirable *and* attainable, by understanding why it is good and how to attain it. The reasoning part of the soul does not itself add to the desiring part of the soul *qua orexis* (the moving faculty), but in Jonathan Lear's words "forms" the desire[21], our

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[21] Cambridge 1988, pg. 147.

emotional faculties being ever present. It is in this sense we can understand how the logical and alogical parts of the soul can each others 'efficient cause' as described in section 2.1.

3.3.3 On Ends (II)

It seems clear that deliberation is attached to wishing and desire as a furtherance and completion of desire:

> Given that what is decided upon is an object of deliberation and desire among the things that depend on us, decision to will be deliberational desire for things that depend on us; for it is through having selected on the basis of having deliberated that we desire in accordance with deliberation. (1113a10-13)

As we found in 1.2, ends or products in relation to us stand in a hierarchy, from simple to refined, derived from the fact that it is for the controlling ends, the 'finished product' that we desire the products that lead up to it (1094a15-17). These are *archē* in a practical sense in terms of what we want. It seems logical for us to want the end that is highest in this hierarchy, yet these types of ends would require some specific knowledge of what it takes to do the things that are for the sake of it.

However, (in this opening chapter) the end's specific conditionals are not known to us. Nor is the right path of discovery, and there is little to reveal whether we are doing the things required or not. Thus the wisdom to judge is not presently available to us, but it seems evident what its job is: To both uncover the right path of discovery, which actions lead to which goods, and attempt to gain the capabilities, needed in order to get there.

A special brand of practical enquiry, 'getting there' as a type of thinking, is what Aristotle calls 'architectonic knowledge'. Architectonic knowledge is aptly named due to the inductive nature of the inquiry, defining a goal, say a house, planning out the house (sorting out the puzzles) and then ultimately bringing the plan to fulfilment by defining the right steps and in so doing defining the right consecutive first steps (bringing the thing back to oneself).

In architectonic assignment of desired ends, Aristotle attaches the concepts of action and production. Technical expertise or *techné* is a productive disposition accompanied by a true rational prescription, concerned with the capability of coming into being or not coming into being. Knowledge in this area is based on observable facts and change, of which one cannot claim knowledge once outside our direct observation. However, if a rational prescription is incorrect or gives directions on 'know-how' for the wrong product, then that

is the cause of in-expert technique. Technical expertise is concerned with the 'coming into being' (1140a11) or production: It is concerned...

> ...with the practice and theory of how to bring into being some one of the things that are capable either of being or of not being, and the origin of whose coming into being lies in the producer and not in the thing being produced (1140a12-14).

Aristotle's concept of production is underpinned by the following theory: In the Metaphysics V.2 and Physics II.3, he divides causes into four categories of explanation: The four causes are 1) Material cause, from what the production is made of, 2) Formal cause, also called the '*form*', from what knowledge, concept, designs and ideas the product is thought to be a priori, an explanation of what the product will be, 3) Efficient cause[22], the cause or source of change outside the thing itself (the thing in production) and 4) Final cause, the end, the end product for the sake of which the production was done. So technical expertise in production will concern itself with each of the four causes of production, including the role and consecutive steps of the external changer 3), the one who acts as the products efficient cause, along with what he or does in order to consider 1) and 2) in order to bring about the realisation of 4).

Technical expertise is knowledge in a very strict sense, since we can only claim to have proper knowledge of a thing once we have grasped its causes (*Posterior analytics* 71b9-11; 94a20)[23], which is precisely what technical expertise aims at, given the theory of four causes. The fact that technical expertise is a type of knowledge, and only knowledge, is also confirmed by contrasting expert knowledge with wisdom (1140b25). Technical expertise is not a capacity which we humans have in the sense that it is as it should be when it is working in us. Recall that the only qualifier of technical expertise was that it works in accordance with rational prescription. Technical expertise can, however, be an excellence in the sense that the masters of certain crafts display excellence in their field, and by this we mean that they have excellent precision in technical knowledge and practice. *Technē* can coincide with excellent capacities and dispositions, but can also exist without them. And since it is knowledge, one can also go wrong both in action and production based on

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[22] Recall the mention in 1.2 and in 2.1 where emotion is described as capable of being the *efficient cause* of belief and vice versa.

[23] This citation is from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/

technical expertise by, alone due to it, not following rational prescription. One can therefore have expertise, but still get both action and production wrong for lack of some other character state.

So habituation is not an uninformative brute prerequisite necessitated by the predefined starting points of a principle. Habituation is often a prerequisite for those who do not 'get' '*the that'* by being naturally predisposed; but more importantly, habituation is also a means to 'grasp'/'get'/ or 'see' the reasons for starting points. That being said habituation can be considered a starting point in its own right, which also starts with 'that which is familiar' ideally for each person. That habituation is a means in its own entails that *'the that'* in habituation may reveal what habituation is for along the way, meaning that by doing the habituated acts you may notice that habituation is taking place, and see the connection between the change in you and the purpose in habituation. It is also only by having acted out such change that we can get to know how that change affects us, affirming or correcting false presuppositions we might have had at the starting points. So habituation is highly based on the notion that we learn by doing but not in the sense of merely experiencing the change. As Burnyeat puts it: "The thesis is that we first learn (come to see) what is noble and just not by experience of or induction from a series of instances, nor by intuition (intellectual or perceptual), but by learning to do noble and just things, by being habituated to noble and just conduct" (Rorty ed. California 1992, pp. 73) . Again we can call upon the notion of 'efficient cause' for explanation of what Burnyeat means here: that the cause of the just and noble acts is in the agent. We therefore have to eliminate our modern understanding of practice as an observation over consecutive steps, but instead see it more as actualised action, praxis, for the goal of 'dispositioning', *hexis*. More surprisingly still is Burnyeat's theory that practice has 'cognitive powers'. It is not quite clear what he means by this, but I think he is invoking what I mentioned above, that actions affect our belief-system and dispositions in a way that *a priori* notions cannot, by affirming true presuppositions or correcting false presuppositions. Practice is both dependant on, and the begetter of, reasonably correct ideas.

Our starting points from nature, i.e. what we find naturally pleasurable, will obviously lay a major role in deciding what type of habituation is best. Here Burnyeat alludes to *NE* book X where Aristotle asks who is best suited for noticing these things before we are self aware on the level of pleasures and pains. The noble (*kalon*) and the good (for many, a true realisation of the pleasure that comes with the true enjoyment of

good and noble praxis will be out of reach, if not affixed to the pain of force). But one who decides that the noble and the good is indeed what it is, i.e. good, the stage is set for true "lovers of what is noble" (1099a13.15). Here the word "love" has no weaker connotation than it does today. This person truly sets the noble highest both in the hierarchy of goods, but also in terms of passion, being truly affected by these goods. And if such a person is not directly affected by such goods at *present*, they none the less are truly pleased by experiencing habituation that, if all goes as planned, puts them in the position to love in the way they desire. They desire a body and mind which are directly pleasurably affected by what is ultimately good, and this is a highly desirable end in itself, though not a final end.

Burnyeat distinguishes between a "modern" weak understanding of what we mean by learning and a stronger Aristotelian understanding of what "learning" implies. While we may think that learning consists solely of acquiring some information or know-how, learning in the strong sense implies a learning which involves us being in a certain condition in order to take in what is being learnt, like us taking pleasure in what is learnt. In this way Aristotle connects knowledge with the way it is enjoyed. We might know something, like parties being excellent for interacting and connecting in fun and interesting ways with others, yet enjoy a party mostly for all the important people we meet. In this example we are not learning to enjoy ourselves at parties, even though we are enjoying ourselves, because we are not enjoying the party the right way, (i.e. for the right reasons, in this example). Under Aristotle's notion of learning we may not learn by simple habituation, internalisation, or by social dictate. It is only learned by experiencing a well functioning interplay between the emotional and intellectual sides of a worth-while action or production, and deriving pleasure from it – or learning to do so. What the virtuous person enjoys is the practice of virtues because s/he sees them as such, and that is the efficient *cause* of the enjoyment.

The reasons for our capability to learn in the way mentioned above can be argued in four successive steps. i) We may either have internal or external grounds for pleasure and pain, and the more autonomously/self-sufficiently we do what is fine and good due to pleasures and pains triggering our own reflection and disposition, the surer we are of being in the right condition to attain such goods. ii) There are two ways of forming desires: one is for our non-rational side to be ready to form desires from reason, the second comes from "pursuing each successive object, as passion directs" (1.3 1095a 9-10). iii) *Akratic* action (deciding to do something, yet not acting out the decision) consists of the above desire "as

passion directs" in addition to the combination of desire and thought leading to a syllogism: "Sweets are nice; this is sweet; I'll have this". iv) There are two kinds of syllogism separating the continent person from the *akratic*. The one is of the above kind. The other is of the kind which represents a latter and less established stage of development where one has passion for the fine and the good, i.e. right desire, yet jumps the mark before recognising the situation as conducive to the good. From these steps and distinctions, we are capable of judging whether actions are causing the right enjoyment and correct desires for the lover of the fine and the good.

In order to be fully virtuous it is then required that the noble productions and actions bring us pleasure for what it is, that the noble be the chief part of the desired good, that the deliberation and choice of action/production be pleasant, *plus* that the resulting activity/production proceeds from a firm and unchangeable character. Our envisioning and sense of the good is now shaped by a free, reasoned conception of the good, where the noble is pleasant because we see it as good and our perception is correct.

4   Social Development

Thus far we have examined development of faculties essential to emotive and deliberate action by Hannah the individual. This examination has until now, however, been quite out of context: Even from birth, indeed from conception, our protagonist has stood in a relation to others and her surroundings, determinate for her capacities and possibilities, potential and actualised wishes and desires: her parents, her society, her species and her growth in the natural world. The 'development' of Hannah's wants and desires is a development both essential to, and enabled by, being born into a specifically human social context. From the beginning the Nicomachean Ethics, as an examination concerning human happiness, is strictly evolved as a line of enquiry directed at the conceived identity between the good for man and the good for individuals of this species. To our modern western eyes, with the *endoxon* that happiness for us must contain an individual 'elan' based in thorough self-exploration and expression, this may seem like a striking position that is contrary or non-sensitive to individually perceived self-originating 'styles' of living. As such we can expect to gain some insight into questions concerning this distinction by going through some of the puzzles this presents us with, if we consider these *endoxa* both valid yet contradictory.

Presently, the most illustrative example of such a distinction would be, in our thought-experiment, the conclusion our test subject makes when she decides to put all her effort into the collective honour based in winning as a team over the taste of personal victory in her own discipline. The question resounding in our modern ears would be, if I may venture, whether this decision is at all *good* for Hannah. How can we say that this outcome is what Hannah *wanted*? Does she not here sacrifice the affirmation that all her work up to this point has been worth her effort? Would this affirmation not be essentially good for her, something that we as bystanders would genuinely wish upon her? Is she at all confident of her own skills, or that running is good for her own sake, in making this decision? Does she gain *her* deserved recognition as someone capable of something extra ordinary? When asking these questions it dawns on us that answering them will indeed be a part of a complicated and delicate navigation of the not always positive forces of social influence on the one side, and necessary and often pleasurable 'good-inducing' communal bonds and relations on the other. In order to bring about more clarity, it seems useful to reflect that Aristotle's position is the one more distant to our times. Fortunately for this discussion, Aristotle is very aware of the problem that arises when we intuitively question whether Hannah's decision is *good* for Hannah, and shows this by formulating the question

we wish to ask for us by making a striking distinction: "Is it then the good that people love, or what is good for themselves?" (1155b23-24). This query allows for a disjunction between *the* good (*to agathon*) and the *individual* good. This remark also opens up the possibility of a shared good qua our distinctions as human versus an individual good qua perception of goods as self gain. To our modern eyes this distinction seems at odds with a presupposition that *all* goods are relative to the one for whom it is good, whether they be incidentally conducive to others or not. The main point is that our modern *endoxon* and Aristotle's are at odds based on whether or not the individual good and the good as a species member is *incidental*, or indeed *causal*, Aristotle claiming the latter. We should then give that idea a treatment that may let us understand how he could justify Hannah's conclusion as being good for Hannah, considering her *human* context. This context is evolved in the NE continuously, and specifically in book V on justice and books VIII and XI on friendship.

It is tempting to read these books as etching out definitive developmental stages. Traditionally, Aristotle has been thought to describe social development in three stages (Lerner, 2002) prior to the well-functioning adult. The first stage is 'infancy' from conception to early childhood, where infants exhibit capacities that are otherwise common of animal species, where the social context mainly concerns nurturing, where *epithumatic* desires are dominant. The second stage, 'boyhood', as we can imagine, contains exploration into short lived mutual pleasures, stronger passions and *memetic* desires (from *mimesis* - mirroring) in relation to others, incorporated in, but also separate from, identity-building. Here we understand, and are concerned with, shame and praise in a social context, but not yet its aim – honour and the fine. The last stage, 'manhood' continues from adolescence to the early twenties, from which development in a capacitative sense is completed. During this stage we are helped by others to understand our own dispositions, learn relevant principles for acting and understand our productive capacities in relation to others. Here we understand the *objects* of shame and honour, shunning the first in practice and desiring the last, understanding honour's relation to greater architectonic designs for a good society. We should at this point no longer have need for shame as an affective cause of action. Also, in this last stage, depending on our prior and continual character development in earlier and present stages, we are capable of what Aristotle describes as friendship between two good people, or character-friendship. From this last stage, Aristotle imagines we begin our prime of life, which continues till we are again dependant on

nurturing and relief of discomfort when we are old. These stages should not be taken too literally. It is not the intention of this paper, or of Aristotle I believe, to understand human development in clearly etched steps and looking for proof of these in the text. It is more interesting, and more fruitful, to understand which transitions occur by piecing together their mechanisms.

In discussing social development we will be discussing predominantly the development of social desires, or more to the point, the desires we have for living together both seen as a good in itself and as a means for ethical living and happiness proper, i.e. as an object of desire and as a cooperative project concerning the greater good of happiness.

4.1 Preconditions for Social Interaction

Before we summarize Aristotle's theory of social development, through, by and for others, we need to get a better grasp of what Aristotle means that we are by nature an animal whose function it is to be a part of a structured human society. Again we will rely predominantly on the NE for answers, though the reader should be forewarned that this will not present a complete picture of Aristotle's thoughts on the subject.

We already have some idea as to emotional and cognitive functions Hannah arrives with from birth to adolescence. Here we will have to go a step further back and try to see what relational contexts Hannah stands in before we can call her 'Hannah', since who and what Hannah becomes has a defining significance for what she desires. We will be interested in what emotive powers bring her into existence, both as a member of mankind and through the desires of her parents.

4.1.1   Predefining Bonds: Kinship, the Biological Continuum, Predecessors and Parental Love

Aristotle uses term 'friend' or (*philia*) as both a common and a philosophical term that can explain a direct relation, such as 'the friends we surround ourselves with', and imminent and generic relations between humans[24]. The breadth of relational examples becomes apparent in

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[24] To give a short introduction, Aristotle's concept of *philia* is defined by several moments: Friendship is fundamentally linked to happiness and pertains to loving and cherishing others throughout varying degrees of closeness and utility. Friendship is 1) love for the human species, and can imply that one loves the flourishing of the capacities of our species, 2) necessary. No one would choose life without it, 3) closeness and pleasure in seeing the true figure of another person that is his/her best functioning, 4) safekeeping of one's fortune and refuge in ones misfortune, 5) necessary for the (type of) thinking and acting that stimulates noble acts, 6) a natural bond between parents and their children, 7) a visible bond between people wherever we go, i.e. topologically universal 8) given higher priority in our lives than justice and is something fine and praiseworthy in itself, 9) consists of relative kinds, relative to different kinds of character, complete when it is between

book VIII.1, where it is proclaimed that friendship is not something only seen in the human species, but is also apparent in the bonds between parent and offspring in most animal species, such as birds (1155a16-19), an idea that seems foreign to our understanding of friendship. However, given Aristotle's concept of biological functioning (*ergon*), we can imagine that this odd observation is directed at a distinction between species that birth offspring dependant on nurturing in order to mature and species that are birthed physically adept to be left to cope on their own. The deep dependency between parent and child has, as we shall see, a broader explanatory function concerning essential bonds determined by our place in social contexts and in nature. At a second glance, species-friendship does appear coherent with our distinction 'friendship' when taking into consideration that most of us will confess to, perhaps as we watch a nature documentary, easily projecting our own relationships on turtle doves, families of elephant or herds of bison. Aristotle's case, however, cannot be seen as a mistaken or sentimental projection of human characteristics on animal behaviour. Instead it is a metaphysical observation as much as it is a biological one.

This means that prior to Hannah's conception there are a vast number of causes that lead up to Hannah being of the specific kind that she is or can be. When examining kinship in the *NE*, Aristotle gives us some important clues as to what his idea of kinship is in relation to generational procreation in our species: For instance, man is by nature 'a coupler' (1161a17), meaning that we have in us, from nature, the capacity to continue what it is to be human in other – new – individuals, *by* coupling. He goes on to elaborate logical necessities behind coupling: Coupling between man and women is a relation that Aristotle calls, from the side of nature, a 'completion' - i.e.it is a function in human biology that is only potential until 'completed' by intercourse. The completion between a man and a woman[25] happens when each make *available* what is 'there to begin with' to 'both in common' (1162a17). This indicates a mutual conscious choice to 'make available' our physiological reproducing capacities, and marks a transition from a non-enabled natural function (*dunamis*) to an enabled active and 'completed' natural function (*energeia*) in offspring. It seems that Aristotle's 'coupling' entails more that a formal biological function. It is noteworthy that the completion is only enabled by 'making available to both in

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excellent people who are lovable and desirable for each other, 10) necessitates trust and sharing and 11) brings something good with it for each friend.

[25] Aristotle actually uses the signification 'husband' and 'wife' which will be explained in more detail later.

common' i.e. *sharing*, explicating an intimate biological enclosure that is *common* to each, yet not belonging to *one* individual, being exclusive and dissimilar. We should speculate, also, that coupling is not *only* descriptive of sexual intercourse. In this context, we see that 'to make available' derives from choice. The reasons and emotions behind coupling are thereby relevant to the encounter, as any other choice. The motivation for this act is shared in nature: "The most natural act is the production of another like oneself….in order that, as far as its nature allows, it may partake in the eternal and divine. That is the goal for the sake of which all things strive" (*De Anima* II.4 415a27-28)[26]. A motivation, as prescribed by our biological functions, is to partake in the fine and eternal, by coupling. That man is 'naturally a coupler' can also take the meaning 'coupling' in the sense of 'in need of another person or group', whom we from nature seek to join in human activity with. We shall certainly see in upcoming discussions how human activity is dependent on the latter.

In the NE the 'completion' between two members of the opposite sex is not strictly biological, however. Though sex is mentioned several places in the *NE* (primarily during discussions on pleasure, affection and moderation), it is only in books VIII and IV that Aristotle describes coupling in light of love. A good spouse-relation is a relation based on excellence (1171a11-12), between two excellent characters, no different from excellence-based friendship proper, and must fulfil proper criteria for such friendship (excellence-based friendship). It is plausible that such a friendship can also incorporate a relation consisting of '*extreme friendship*', extreme to the degree that this type of friendship can only be directed to one person. Though Aristotle is not gender-specific when mentioning 'extreme friendship', it is still clear that a spouse-relation should be of a lasting kind, to one person, which makes possible for such a friendship to exist between spouses. Furthermore, he argues that the relation between husband and wife should ideally be one based on excellence (1161a23-24), both in relation to each other, that their relationship be one of just distribution (living together justly; 1162a30), of benefiting the other for the others own sake, and in relation to each being of excellent character in their own right. This singular and strong bond is then the background for biological coupling, thought to be strengthened even further by their delight in each other and in the activities they are the cause of. Their 'coupling' and nurturing, the '*causes*' of children, then 'binds them together' (1162a28) in a way not possible without children.

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[26] Reading Lear, Cambridge 1988 pg. 100.

The idea of kinship is not only meant to involve an intra-species categorisation, but is also descriptive of a possible bond between humans *qua* being human: Aristotle remarks that every human being is a 'kindred thing' and 'an object of friendship' (1155a23-25). A 'kindred thing' bears a likeness to you, likeness here meaning sameness, shared biology, shared needs, shared rational – non-rational soul – being of the same kind. 'Kindred' also carries the meaning of sharing a familiarity, a shared history, the history of the human species, but also more directly the history of direct predecessors and ancestors: 'An ancestor is also a benefactor' he says (1161a18), meaning that *good* has been passed on from previous generations to the next *ad infinitum* (or from an unmoved mover) to the present, in both a biological and an abstract sense, and has passed on their material goods in a particular sense. With benefaction Aristotle seems also to imply the good that comes with life itself, that mere existence is a result of our predecessor's good-inducing activity. Hannah in this sense is a product of her parents *sharing* each other. Benefaction, however, carries a wider meaning, from material inheritance to an organised society, to an intricate ontology carried on from predecessor to predecessor. In a simplified version, given that the good for man is an activity, benefaction here implies we bear direct lineage to our predecessor's good-inducing activity, both in an indirect social context and in a direct biological causal sense.

As mentioned, in the human case we are individuals of a species dependant on nurturing. This is also evident in our thought experiment. Already at birth, though Hannah is not yet aware of it herself, she is able to communicate how she feels to others. Certainly, Hannah's parents become fully aware of Hannah's needs by Hannah's crying out and being still as expressions of wanting, desiring succession of discomfort or pain, or satisfaction. Before long her affective states connect systematically to action in a way that signals her surroundings what she is affected by. This includes pleasure and comfort, having a reaffirming positive effect on parents as well. Nurturing however is not episodic as in the thought experiment, but a continuous existential commitment and a necessity for Hannah. Nurturing is then a determinate of which generic capacities, capabilities and dispositions she will be given at the start of her life. Even such a basic circumstance as receiving nourishment can have a great - or detrimental if not given - effect on affective, cognitive and even social capabilities later on in her life.

With nurturing we also understand a parent-offspring bond of affection and love, completing a strong motivation to care and love for one whom is existentially dependant on

you and a focussed and consuming reciprocal affection from the one who is all-dependant on the other. One observation considers the time it takes for parents to feel affection for their children versus other friends, or more to the point - lack of time needed: 'parents' affection to children is *instan*t' [1161b25 (my italics)]. While a human bond between two people, or infant to parent, will in all instances take time, the idea here is that parents' affection for children arises the instant they become visually or physically affected by their child (key is the notion of 'perception' as affection of the other, which will be treated later). Aristotle provides several explanations for these bonds. Two such aspects are the sense in which the parent is the 'source' of the child, and the sense in which children stand in comparison to the parent as 'another self': In 1155a5 it is mentioned that parents love children as being themselves. We will engage a general discussion of self-love later (4.1.4). The point here is that the parents' love for the children can be explained by a sense of self-love in the way that the parent is the child's both material and efficient cause, and also final cause in the sense Aristotle understands the seed to incorporate the final "genealogical" product containing the *telos* for becoming a specific type of human. The parent already knows him- or herself in addition to knowing, in an ideal situation, their spouse, and in continuation knows many of the capacities of the child. The mother, generally speaking, brings a *physical* nurturing to the child, being literally the material cause of her offspring's foetal growth. In addition, Aristotle states that maternal love for offspring is 'the greater' compared to fatherly love (1161b27), the reason being precisely that the child is *more* the stuff of the mother, the mother being *more* the material cause of the child. In continuation the child being *more* another self to the mother, they thusly *love* more[27] (1168a26-29). Aristotle observes also (1159a28-30) a great pleasure or elation in a parent's relation to the child. Love is then stated to resemble this pleasure, to resemble 'the delight mothers take' in their children: "She loves them and knows who they are" (1159a30). He states that love has pleasure in itself, a more complete pleasure than comes from 'such as honour' (1159a25-26). A mother knows a child in the same sense as above – like another self. To

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[27] Here I am making a somewhat controversial interpretation that the mother is not solely a passive vessel for the activity of the male seed as much focus has been given to Aristotle's defense of male *energeia* in conception as a basis for gender inequality. The controversy is partially rooted in the conception that the seed of the father is the 'active', 'animating', life-giving, *telos*–producing cause of the offspring (Meta. VII.7, 1032a24), the mother contributing nothing to this, when we know it is almost the genetic opposite today. Yet I will contend that the passive-concubine-notion of woman in Aristotle's biology is not a decisive theory, but at best a puzzle which needs to be pieced together with, for instance, the claimed necessity of male-female justice and excellence, seen as an ideal precursor to conception.

'know' a child means also to know why one is this way and not that, because one is a *source* of, and for, the child, and has had a hand in it being thus. Here Aristotle likens birthing a child to any production of a good, by suggesting that the 'source' has a closer relation to the produced good, while children feel to parents like something that the parent is the source of, i. e. the source or embodiment of relief, food, pleasure and love (1161b19):

> And parents know better what has sprung from them than their offspring know they sprang from *them*; also the source of a thing has a closer relation of belonging to what is sprung from it than the thing produced has to what produced it, for what comes from something belongs to something, as e.g. a tooth, a hair, or anything else belongs to its owner, whereas what it came from does not belong to *it* at all, or does so to a lesser degree. (1161b20-24)

> ....

> [F]or parents feel affection for children as something of themselves, children for parents as something that has come from them.

The sense of belonging in the above passage introduces a semantic background from which we can understand friends metaphorically 'belonging' to each other. Here, belonging pertains to a things coming into being via one's own existence, growth, processes etc.. For a child to have 'come from them' implies that the child's existence is caused by the parents, a 'coming into being' from parent-activity/coupling-activity. At the same time, a parent will not belong to a child in any causal way, and marks an individuation of the child *qua* object-of-self to the parent. This sense of belonging and not belonging is defining for the relation between parent and offspring. The offspring is continuously dependant on the parents *continuing* causation throughout the child's nurture-dependency. This dependency, in continuation, is a *responsibility* for the parent to further *cause* the child: As a father is responsible for an existence, *as a source* to the child, the *existence* (i.e. child), along with its generic capacity, is a furtherance (for instance via educating) under the responsibility of said source, the father (1161a17-18)[28].

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[28] This relation is as it should be when parents render what should be rendered to children (1158b23-24), looks after his/her children's interests (1160b25-26) and not treat their children slavishly – as they are then tyrants (1160b27).

There comes a point, however, when the existence of the child or progeny, becomes distinct and unique, perhaps even from birth. Indeed, a child from birth will become an*other* self resulting from the physical separation from the mother (1161b28). When understanding Aristotle's concept of being a 'source' we need to keep in mind that the transferred *energeia* is a transference of the same entity, in discreet objects (1161b33).

The concept of love seems based on a model of the type of loving we ideally observe in the nurturing parent, based on 'knowing' (the other) and a cherishing of direct bonds. Loving is an activity, whereas being loved cannot rightly be called activity (1168a20), thereby indicating that loving is closer to being happy since happiness is a type of activity (1098a6, 1098b31-99a7). The activity enables unequal parties to desire each other and in turn desire equality.

4.1.2 Shared Living

When laying out our common intuitions on friendship, Aristotle deduces that friendship is something both necessary and fine in itself (1155a30). We will come back to 'fine' (*kolos*) in 4.2.3. It seems, then, that this claim is based on friendship being essential to humans, both in the sense of individuals coming together and in the sense that civic friendship is necessary for human living. Necessity here indicates that social bonds are a primary need, and therefore tautologically useful. We have already seen how we are from nature dependant on nurturing and stand in a context of membership to a species. We are in addition 'civic beings' living in a political community, which in turn contains the social over-structure for all communities (1160a9). If we look at Hannah's development, her activities at every stage are dependent on a social macrostructure or political over-structure. It is then right to agree that she is a 'civic being' whose nature it is to live with others (1169a18-19).

That living together is necessary does not here denominate existential necessity, at least not exclusively. Our shared living is also a shared activity, and with shared activity it becomes possible to have shared goals that are unachievable without participation of others in varying scales. Shared living has an intuitive direction to it: an initial *endoxa* Aristotle puts forward says that we "make our way together" because it is i) advantageous and ii) provides for necessities for life (1160a10-13). That is, being together as we make our way is here understood as a means to an *end*. The thing we are making, however, can be understood in two ways. It can be both arriving at the destination of a good (that the *way* or progress in production is what we make) or that the company on the road is what we are making (that *our way together* is what we are making). Thus, 'together' can imply both

being a means and being an end. Living together, then, is a means to an end of gaining the object of shared living (1156b5-6).

Indeed, a well functioning society is definitely an end in Aristotle's view. A mark of a well functioning society is whether or not it produces just members of a decent character and which enables excellence in ethical living (see 3.2.1 for explanation of this dialectic). For Aristotle this implies that the political community does not seek advantage of the moment but takes regard to the whole life (1160a23-24). Not seeking advantage in the moment, but for what is finest and more lasting, is the mark of a good person, and such a person will make the same decision as the wise person for the sake of others under the same laws for the sake of the other. Members under such an over-structure, if it is successful, will do good acts and work hard at them. Wishing each other well as members of a political society will mean committing oneself to joint decisions on what creates good in others for their sake, while being concerned by how one contributes to letting such good have actual advantage for other members. Since goods easily fall on barren ground, a political member should also be concerned with others' states of character, the *polis* seen as a whole. A good person would naturally want to live in such a society. Aristotle claims that we generally desire to live together with what we 'understand' (1166a19). This implies that we desire to live with others who understand common reason and just grounds to live in a state which produces sameness in excellence, and whom have such capacities *as* owners of intelligence. In continuation, we also desire to live with the advantages of intelligence, in this case communal intelligence.

4.1.2.1 Decent People Are Dependent on Just Societies

Aristotle argues that though there might be a standard of justice or 'political' justice (the hypothetical justice that would exist amongst good people who have what they need and do their part in a state of equality, the state that wouldn't need a law) it will have different causes and solutions from state to state. A natural legal justice is thought to be the justice that exists between people who are both morally self-sufficient and self sufficient in terms of external goods, who both *do* just actions and *are* just. The reward of good people in a 'legal' state is honour, not because they act justly, and have capacities to do so even in difficult circumstances, but because it's difficult for them to do otherwise because they are just.

Aristotle mentions in book I that political expertise is one of the highest forms of excellence because so many other types of expertise fall under it. Habituation is not only the object of the individual's judgements but also the judgements of the community; so for

us to become rightly habituated we must also go about both listening to and changing our community. This is because Aristotle sees justice as the excellence that is closest to being a Form, and a Form not only defines 'what it is itself' but also what causes it. So being just and doing whatever makes just events just are one and the same. That means that if justice is rightly framed in laws etc. it will command and forbid the right actions at the right times for the right purposes and habituate people on the course to becoming self-sufficient in the matter, i.e. be just themselves. The aim of laws is to prescribe and educate us about the common good.

Justice is of both a general kind pertaining to general principles that will always be the case, and also to a 'complete' excellence, and a particular kind pertaining to particular cases and according excellences like the justice between specific roles in our society or between parent and child or master and slave. The ambiguities involved in both the terms 'justice' and 'injustice' are farther reaching than only this distinction, however, and create difficulties when the terms point to potentially similar events but at different classes of event. Aristotle wishes to clarify this seemingly difficult to ambiguity, by first looking at the types of people they point to in each case and redefining or expanding the terms along the way. The just are lawful, because they always follow, and are formed by, rightly framed laws. They are not 'grasping', meaning they 'spread the good around' as the good needs to be spread in order for the good to be good, and they are equal, meaning they distribute different goods along the lines of proper merits. This also implies where the unjust person goes wrong.

Aristotle states that justice is another person's good, meaning that it is good for each of us in its true form under the condition that it is directed towards others. That the excellence is complete means that justice will not be in its true form unless the other character-excellences are in place. Producing just acts in relation to others without fail is the test of the other excellences so to speak. Conversely, injustice is not a part of a vice but the vice proper. This taken into account, our actions will be just if they are the mean between our acting unjustly towards others and others treating us justly.

When we are being unjust proper we are acting out of a class of the state of being bad, like self-indulgence, cowardice or anger leading to unjust actions like harassment, dissertation or violence. However, when we are acting unjustly motivated by gain we are being *in*just, because the things we are acting for can be goods proper like honour, money

or safety. The first should be rectified, the second rearranged in terms of who gets which goods.

4.1.2.2 Three Loveable Qualities – Pleasantness, Usefulness and Excellence

Lasting harmony between friends depend on whether they have reciprocal interaction along the above three valuable qualities: that which is pleasant, the useful and that which is conducive to excellence [These qualities recall I.8 1099a24-9, II.3 1104b31]. A relationship is good if the parties that have vested interests in the other for the other person's sake, but not for selfish reasons alone. These three qualities comprise three different ranks of friendship (1159b10).

Each desirable/lovable quality can be ones main reason to be together with others or that which binds people together. Friendship based primarily on pleasure will last as long as there is pleasure to be had with the other. Friendship based on usefulness will last as long as the other is useful. One can have friendships based on both goods, being both pleasurable and useful at the same time. The common facet here, however, is that these friendships aren't based on wishing the other well, for their own sake. They are instead characteristic of wishing oneself well, for self-acquiring of goods and good-feeling. In this sense, then, pleasure- and utility-friendships are a means to an end, the other party being only *incidentally* involved in the production of objects of desire. In both cases we are friends, not to the one who is the source of use and pleasure, but to ourselves most of all (1167a15-17). Thus, we calculate in the sense that we wish to act in relation to whatever gets the other to produce the good we are after. We give in order to get.

This need not carry an entirely negative connotation, however. In both cases Aristotle gives examples of these types of friendships that are unavoidable or necessary. For lovers, for instance, the very perception of the other is the cause of their pleasure (1167a5). Indeed he claims that this is the first step of any physical relationship, regardless of whether the other is the incidental cause or primary reason for the affection. Also, as mentioned, communal friendship, including alliances of all different types will be for utility alone, yet such utility is fully capable of being decent if it is just and proportionate.

Character-friendship, Aristotle argues, is not of the type mentioned above. With this type of friendship, which should *also* be both pleasurable and useful, the other is not incidentally the cause of the object of desire. Instead the other *is* the object of desire. The main reason for the person being an object of desire is that s/he is desirable in a non-reductive sense (Bonaunet, 2008 p. 188). Character-friendship concerns the other as a good

person, not essentially as a good *for* the perceiver but a good *because* the person *is* good. He argues that people of excellent character are drawn to each other as equals and because they have and perceive each other's good qualities. Also, since they are good, they will be disposed to being a continuous source of good for each other and will work hard at the activity of being good for the other, for the others sake. I will continue to examine character-friendship understood as an active relation in section 4.2.2.

4.1.2.3   The Other As Lovable and As a Good

The loveable qualities of the other mentioned above are the good, the useful and the pleasant. However, these qualities do not necessarily make the person they belong to lovable. How then does Aristotle argue that a person in ownership of all three qualities truly *is* lovable, while others in ownership of only one or two are not?

The term 'lovable' is not used lightly in Aristotle's terminology. He states that objects of love are rarely encountered and therefore precious (1158a27-34, 1156b25). In addition he states that we praise those who love, the act of loving being something fine and good in itself (1159a35). We have also seen (in 4.1.1) that motherly love is closer to the mark when describing our *endoxa* of love, since motherly love appears to be an activity. Lov*ing* seems to lend more meaning than being loved. Also, love in a proper sense is thought to resemble motherly love, which is greater than even fatherly love because the offspring is partially the same stuff as the mother, the child being more 'another self' to the mother than the father (1159a30, 1161b27), enabling the mother better access to 'know who they are'. Love brings into equality (1159b2) the differences between people. We also love the other according to merit (1158b27) as a good in and of itself. Excellence between friends seems to *be* love (1159a31-b1).

Instead of friends being merely external goods in an instrumental sense (in that they are necessary for exercising ones good capacities), Aristotle argues that friends are also intrinsically a part of human happiness, i.e. are intrinsically good. I believe it is not off the mark to suggest that Aristotle's definition of love helps us understand why friends are intrinsically valuable to us.

Friends, we recall, are external goods in the sense that they are of benefit and a resource and necessity to a life worth living. They can also be goods in that they are pleasurable. They can thusly be represented as *orexis*, or an affective urge towards a good, in both the promise of pleasure and in their being instrumental in fulfilment of our *boulesthai*, or wished good. Friends understood as desired and lovable in themselves,

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however, will entail i) that one knows 'who they are' *as* good, ii) that they are both pleasant and useful, iii) that they are pleasant and useful for that which is good and fine, i.e. one's own good and fine activity and iv) being of this kind makes them rare and cherishable, dear to oneself and one's mode of life and v) that the great value of the good of the other, as desirable and lovable, is proportionate to the love you should give[29].

Indeed, Aristotle ranks friendship amongst the goods highest in the hierarchy of value. Friendship is not only a good in itself, but is also called the most necessary of goods (1154a4), enabling other goods of value, since without friendship, any other good would be of little worth. While the reasons for friendship that derive from pleasure and utility are accidental in nature, *kata sumbebékos* (Sherman, 1989 pg. 129), the friendships derived from virtuous activity enabled by good friends are of a lasting kind. This is because the virtuous activity is done with and for the friend *as* good, and not for the sake of pleasure and utility alone (1156a18-b24). A cherished friend will compel us to know who they are intimately in a way that one cannot know many people.

The true lovable kind, then, will be a rare breed, in part due to the demand of perceiving the other at length alone, and to them being people of accomplished good inducing activities in that they are persons whose desires such friends bring to life. The friends whom are appreciated for what they bring incidentally, on the other hand, are not lovable in the rare sense stated above, mainly due to the friendship not necessitating character excellence because one gets what one desires independent of the composition of the friend. Thus, friends in the latter sense do not depend on each other in order to act well, while a good character will depend on and be naturally conducive to, virtuous activity. Yet for most, since such a soul can only exist if the person has a 'complete excellence', this said soul is correspondingly precious and rare and merits proportionate love.

4.1.3   Perception I: Coming Into Being By Way of Others Coming Into View

What defines an existence as an 'animal being' and 'alive', in Aristotle's view, is determined by whether or not it has the capacity to perceive, and in the human case, the capacity to think (11170a17-20). Since the capacity of perception is thusly attached to primary human being, it follows that the first stages of enabling this capacity is an essential stage of development. My intuition is that, in the *NE*, there is also a central social context to perception-enabled capacities.

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[29] We shall see in section 4.1.4 that friends are also lovable as enablers of virtuous activity.

While perception is defining of animal life, it is difficult for us to see how it can be so defining for Hannah in her first stage of life. She is being taken care of and has little need of perceptive capacities in order to function by way of taking in nourishment and growing. While she does have working perceptive capacities that affect her and allow her surroundings to understand how she is affected, she has not yet developed the cognitive link between perception and thought. Yet there is still something happening with Hannah's senses that classifies as perceiving. Instead, perception in infancy seems more pertinent to her social context than to her natural surroundings. One example is Hannah's growing attachment to her parents.

It is not difficult to understand how perception *can* be crucial in early social development. For instance, it is said that infants are nearsighted until they are several weeks old, and though they see little they are capable of seeing the distance to someone's face when being held. In addition, empirical studies have also shown that infants quickly learn to recognise specific details of the face of the mother. In which sense could something like this be classified as perception under Aristotle's theory? The perceiving faculty that stands above all other senses, in Aristotle's view, is the faculty of sight (1171b70). However, at an infant stage we would only be capable of taking in a close object's "accidental form" and not its "intelligible form" (*DA* II4416b20-23) by way of sight, since we do not as of yet have the cognitive capabilities to attach an understanding of the objects form to the perceived object. So an infant's taking in someone's "accidental form", would be seeing someone's facial features but not understanding that they make up a semantic object or person, and can be likened to 'discerning' (*chrinein*, though *chrinein* is also often understood as 'judging', but not in the present case). The child does not yet make a cognitive connection between what she sees and what she sees *as* an object. Yet, while an infant will only recognise the features of a parent incidentally, it still gains familiarity with the parent in the sense of preferring the closeness of a recognised parent over an unfamiliar person. We also say that the child develops attachment by way of recognition through several senses. Though we cannot say that the infant has an intelligible recognition of the person, and cannot describe a clear cut transition showing when and how a child is capable of taking in a parents 'intelligible form', we *can* say that the infant is developing a faculty of recognition. Most important, in the present case, is that perception facilitated by the closeness necessary for early nurturing is giving the infant an extremely focussed, close and detailed experience of the parent or anyone whom is caring for it, necessitated by the

nurturing of the child. 'Discerning' then, in this case, has as its function an attachment, and has literally closeness between parent and offspring as its enabling variable, *because* of the child's needs for nurturing.

Compared to the parent, whose bond to the child is "instant" (1161b25) and on sight, a parent's coming into view is for the child gradual. And while the mother (from whom the child has come) 'knows the child' (1159a28-30), the child does not, or cannot, know the mother in the same sense. Yet the parent becomes intelligible to the child gradually and defines the child's becoming a *perceiver* in her own right, a perceiver who can with time induce another's intelligible form, and know *who* someone is, even to the degree of a parent to a child. Aristotle marks a clear transition in the infant stage, however, where the child becomes capable of sensing her surroundings affectively and through emotion: The child can feel affection for parent after a time when s/he has gained comprehension and/or the capacity to perceive (1161b26). This passage raises some doubts about when and at which stage an infant becomes capable of sensing the other with her full arsenal of sensing faculties, *including* her capacity to comprehend. It appears, though, that Aristotle has in mind a stage when perception and comprehension conflux. At this time there emerges an emotional bond of affection, perhaps love, in the child towards the parent.

From Aristotle's passages concerning sight and perception in the NE, it seems plausible that he relies on theory developed in other works. Let me then present a theory from De Anima that is at first glance quite out of context, as it concerns animal perception in general, and sensory organs in particular, but can explain a great deal about perception of the other from the comments above. Perception is viewed by Aristotle as a type of 'meeting of forms', i.e. the sum of the material, formal and final causes of the object meeting the form of the subject, via sensation as the mean. In *De Anima* he then writes,

> "As we have said, what has the power of sensation is potentially like what the perceived object is actually; that is, while at the beginning of the process of its being acted upon the two interacting factors are dissimilar, at the end the one acted upon is assimilated to the other as identical in quality with it (DAII.5 418a4-6).

This somewhat cryptic passage explains a process describing the perceiver (or more correctly her perceiving organs) before 'meeting' and taking in an object or form, as having a *capacity* to *be* potentially similar to what the object *is* qualitatively. So what does it mean to be similar? Though this concept obviously deserves to be discussed in depth, we can say in brief

that likeness here is defined metaphysically as being capable of falling under the same category of *quality*[30], quality in turn pertaining to what the object is in actuality in relation to opposing pairs of actuality, like whether something is hot or cold, light or heavy, soft or hard, shaped this way or the other, pertaining to the distinctions the senses can let us make out. So our sensory organs can pick up change by being able to juxtapose an opposing quality, rendering the quality in the object. We can also understand 'likeness' in a commonsensical way as one object becoming likened to the other object in virtue of shared 'incidental forms' under its 'intelligible form'. The potent and somewhat surprising notion Aristotle here puts forward is: that through perception, the perceiver has in her the capability to mirror, by way of opposed affective capacities, the activity of the object, the activity of the object being what the object does by way of initiating qualitative change, and by extension, sensing the objects form as a cause of change (what it truly is), thus accessing the objects form indirectly.

This way of looking at sense perception, not as a mirror of activity but as an apparatus undergoing simultaneous change *caused* by the observed activities, explains at the same time why it is that a perceiver will be dependent on continuous observation of the objects' activities, and a memory of said activity, to gain enough examples to discern or judge the objects form. When we then take another human being to be this type of perceived object, it becomes clearer why it takes such a long time and activity to 'get' the other's form. It then becomes even more surprising and unique that, under Aristotle's understanding, we can truly have access to someone else's form (especially said mothers instant access in 1161b25, 1159a28-30) as what this person truly is, by way of what the person *can* do capacitatively, *does* dispositionally and *is* intelligibly.

What is perhaps most significant, however, under this interpretation of the above passage, is a claim that by perceiving, the subject and object *become* more similar to each other. Dissimilar forms take each other in by a sort of 'assimilation', while in the next step of the process of perceiving they become similar in the first instance qualitatively, by the activity of the perceived other, affecting the subject in real time *qua* their initial qualitative *differences*, and secondly, by way of the subject sensing the juxtapositions of change from dissimilarity to likeness. It is also because of initial qualitative dissimilarity that the other is initially noticeable to the subject, the argument being that if the senses were in the same state as the sense-object then there would be no differentiation to be sensed.

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[30] See the beginning of 2.2; a quality can contribute or to, or diminish, the souls functioning as it should.

I have stated that a clear motivation to perceive one's friend is pleasure. Pleasure is clearly the source of affection between lovers as stated in 1171b30. More interestingly in the present case, however, is that pleasure is also derived from similarity (1156b18). When we observe each other, and affectively derive each other's 'form', we are in fact in the process of becoming more similar, and thereby deriving pleasure from the encounter.

Perception of the other thusly becomes both a means and an activity in its own right, necessitating both closeness and activity in order to 'know' the other, but when in active mode leads to likeness between subject and object along with pleasure in the process.

4.1.4 Perception II: Self-Perception, Active Perception and the Desire to Be a True Self-Lover.

As we shall see, a friend is partly defined as someone who can notice and perceive oneself in a light that is otherwise unattainable by the subject alone. From section 4.1.3 we can already see how perception stands as an incorporated category of living for the human animal. This, of course, could not be so if perception was considered solely as affection on the subject by an object. Under Aristotle's understanding, perception is also the *activity* of perceiving. Moreover, he claims a strong connection between perceiving the other and gaining understanding about oneself. I will presently venture a description of transition from passive perceiver of the other to perception in an active sense.

The thing in nature that perceives in the human case, is the thing that can judge good in others, i.e. an intelligence. Being animals of intelligence, we naturally seek out others through intelligence, seeking also to be perceived by a member with like perceptive capacities. An intelligence 'chooses what is best for itself', obeying that which the good prescribes, choosing 'for the sake of the fine' (1169a17-18). Intelligence is also what we *are* most of all (1169 b39-a2)[31]. When we then are active in relation to each other we desire to understand and judge one another as intelligence, i.e. I) one who desires what is best for him/herself in relation to the good and fine, II) one who has the capacity to perceive you as an intricate whole and III) one who's rational makeup desires the good the same way as the perceiver. As intelligence we also want to judge '*all* different kinds of nuances and merit' (1164b27), being capable of deriving them without losing a lot on the way, and desiring what is best amongst these. And as the intellect desires what is best for itself, it also desires

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[31] Recall also, from 3.3.1 that intelligence is itself in the last instance a perceiving faculty.

a good 'other' and a good 'self', a self that can maintain harmony between its logical and alogical halves, which can both perceive good, desire the good and act in accordance with it. As this self-interest *as* intellect is at the heart of *logos* for thinking social animals, what we perceive when we perceive others is one with the same desires, *if* they too are of the same character. When we then perceive by intelligence we know what the other is doing. He or she is distinguishing us as potentially good and a mutual good-seeker in return, and in extension we can surmise an understanding of ourselves as potentially good for the perceiver.

A criterion for truly 'knowing the other' is that we become capable of sensing, experiencing and thus 'knowing' the other's alogical states as well as their intellect, something that cannot be derived from *logos* alone. Aristotle understands the term 'sympathy' to be this type of sense. Sympathy is inhabited by "one who spends time with the other and makes the same choices…, or who feels grief and pleasure with his friend" (1166a7-9). We are sympathetic when we know and can connect with the other's alogical side. In addition, once we truly know the other, we should be able to express our sympathy in a truly ingenious fashion, to help the others alogical side feel acknowledged (1171b4). Good friends are ingenious at following each other and can join immediately in, and partake in, the joy and grief of the other. We can thus claim that friendships are concerned with each other's affective states and character (1155b10) not just as a common interest, but as a genuine compassion for the other's well being in the moment.

Getting to know someone, spending time together in shared activity and getting a thorough acquaintance and knowledge of one another's intellect and character is emphasised as being "very difficult" (1158a15-16) to achieve. Aristotle wouldn't emphasise its difficulty if it such mutual acquaintance could happen through mere passage of time in another's company, say as class mates or as colleagues. Spending time together is a prerequisite for friendship, but it is not sufficient. Without engaging in query, and taking time to listen, without engaging each other's different attributes, i.e. without shared *activity*, one does not get to know someone well (*sic.*).

As we have seen, we as perceivers are changed through our sense-perception of the other. In addition it seems there is a close connection between getting acquainted with someone, gradually sharing a likeness to someone, and discovering one's own character and dispositions.

In an interesting passage, he describes a capacity of self observation that is intimately connected with activity as a perceiver:

> ...and if the one who perceives that he sees, the one who hears perceives that he hears, the one who walks perceives that he walks, and similarly in the other cases there is something that perceives that we are in activity, so that if we perceive, it perceives that we perceive, and if we think, it perceives that we think; and if perceiving that we perceive or think is perceiving that we exist (for as we said, existing is perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one is alive is pleasant in itself (for being alive is something naturally good, and perceiving what is good as being there in oneself is pleasant); 1170a29-b4

This is a description of a perceiver who perceives him-/herself, both in *energeia* and as a perceiver (an argument similar to the *cogito*). Aristotle adds that the aim of such perception is pleasure in perceiving one's own *energeia as* action. If we liken the passage to Hannah's running, we see that Hannah derives precisely this type of pleasure, the pleasure in perceiving her own *orexis* (pull/reaching out) to run. The pleasure in the present case, however, is a pleasure of life itself. One's own exercising of one's own life and person *as* good is a true pleasure worth anyone's pursuit. Aristotle has here set the mark for desires concerning our own *energeia*. This goal is supported when stated elsewhere that the *phronimos* or person of practical wisdom and excellence, candidate for happiness, appears to *be* more the self-lover (1168b30).

As we have seen, and shall see in 4.2, perception of the other's form is exceptionally difficult (1158a15-16). But difficult as it may be, Aristotle argues that the more difficult object to 'grasp' is oneself: "We are better at observing others than ourselves" (1169b35). The process of active perception of one's own activity is exceedingly difficult outside of simple self-sensation of affective states. If we were to go at it ourselves we would have little to go on outside of being informed by our own pleasures and pains, lead by emotion, not from sensation by the intellect. Watching others' reactions to oneself puts self-perception in a different light. Understanding that the other is an intellect, we can see how intellect reacts by comparison to our own affective states. Thus, in order to be informed by *nous* (intellect) we depend on activity with the other.

Being alive then, as intelligence sensing one's own activity affectively in addition to through the eyes of others, is something naturally good. Aristotle also argues that it is something naturally pleasant:

> ...and if being alive is desirable, and especially so for the good, because for them existing is
> good, and pleasant (for concurrent perception of what is in itself good, in themselves, gives
> them pleasure) and if, as the good person is good to himself, so he is to his friend (since the
> friend is another self): then just as for each his own existence is desirable, so his friend's is
> to, or to a similar degree. But as we saw the good mans existence *is* desirable because of his
> perceiving himself, that self being good 1170b4-10

One's own being, then, is a good in itself, for each and every person; however, for those who *are* good, i.e. of good character, their existence is desirable to all. They are themselves life that is good. Such life is not good in relation to the good person only, though he/she finds living pleasant. Sherman, (Clarendon Press, 1989, pg. 125-26), discusses friendship in light of two senses of representing external goods: The other being good in themselves and being good for other goods that are to advantage for those who are friends with the good person. The existence exemplified above will be good in both senses. How this person is good in relation to others is plain to see. The way his/her existence is good, objectively, is not so straight forward. As stated in the citation, the good person's existence is desirable because the good person *perceives* himself. From what we have deduced from the prior discussion on perception, let me venture an interpretation (it has to do with becoming what you do, and the relation between action and character): since the good man perceives his own *energeia* with pleasure, and since the perceptive vessels change in relation to said *energeia*, and since this change is attached to the affection pleasure, a sign that the vessel and the activity are becoming similar in "quality" and "intelligible" form, we can deduce that the man is enjoying an existence in activity because he is enjoying becoming similar to his own form (I interpret this argument as an argument supporting the determinability of character traits once established). And since said self is good, he perceives becoming what is good in action[32]. The good person is an external good in and of itself because his/her form is in activity *as* the thing it should be – the good and fine activity of the soul in accordance with reason.

Self-love, then, will incorporate observing oneself as active perception of a good, well-functioning being. As mentioned, Aristotle here lays out the goal of our own *energeia*. The upshot of this notion is that the need for the other, for friendship, is a constant facilitating necessity, whether one is in a stage of emerging character capacities or of full

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[32] In addition, the *phronimos* gains pleasure from what is good, intellect and emotional soul being as it is – in harmony in relation the good, the pleasure then being double in nature.

character excellence. Even friends of complete character-excellence, self-sufficient in most areas, will depend on others in order to act virtuously.

Aristotle argues that the starting points of all friendship-relations start with oneself (1168a5-8). This will also be true of the relation self-love. The true 'lover of self or self-lover' is developed in IX.8 and can be rendered in the following argument: i) that people should love the one who is most a friend. ii) The one who is most a friend is the one who wishes the most good things for the person to whom the good things are wished, for the others sake. iii) The one who does this the most is our self in relation to our self. So a self-lover is one whose soul is not conflicted in relation to desires, reasons and actions in relation to the fine, because s/he has good-feeling towards him-/herself. In contrast, one whose logical-alogical faculties are in conflict will not be lovable, or indeed be a lover of himself, because such a person is in faction with himself – and does not appear to be disposed towards friendship, even towards himself (1166b19-26). As Aristotle states, each relation, i.e. each type of social bond, derives from or 'belongs to' the decent person in relation to himself – a self that desires things in relation to his/her whole soul for the sake of the thinking part (1166a13-14), and from this relation 'extends to others' externally the relations the good person has to himself internally (1168b5-8). The relation character excellence most depends on, as we have examined in chapter 2 and 3, is the alogical soul's capability to listen to and act in accordance with reason, the fine and the good. Thus, the internal relation the good person extends to others is the capability to act in view of what those of similar souls think is fine and good. We can then take the term 'being of one soul' as meaning 'sharing the same set of values', 'sharing a desire for what the soul senses as fine' and 'mutually acting in relation to the values we share'. We could not enable these bonds to 'extend to others' if friends were not similar-souled.

4.2   Social Interaction as Action and Development.

Through the descriptions above of the preconditions for social bonds, and an understanding of the ontology under which Aristotle's concept of friendship resides, we should now have some idea of our intrinsic social existence and which capacities friendship-states are dependent on. It is very clear, however, that friendship under Aristotle's definition is based in activity, shared activity, liv*ing* together (*suzēn*), exchange of pleasure and benefit and, as I will argue, exchange of goods and excellence. I will here present the main concepts of active friendship, understood as transference of goods, giving and taking, in relation to each other as well as in relation to the final good. I will then continue to draw a more concrete description of stages of

friendship that Hannah goes through, and examine critical entries determining whether Hannah's decisions are indeed *good* for Hannah.

Since our social development in Aristotle's ontology is teleological, we should first see if we find traces of development along such a path. Initially in the opening chapter of book VIII he promisingly shows that friendship is of different kinds for children, people in their prime and the elderly (1155a15). But we quickly see that these three types are not teleological, with elderly friendship as the goal. On the contrary, as elderly our physical dependency on others and constrictions on mutual activity leads this type of friendship to become more utilitarian, not necessarily for the sake of the other. So friendship in the prime of life is what Aristotle has in mind as the possible candidate for true virtue-friendship. We should not write off the possibility of finding clues on developmental stages, however. As we have already seen in 2.1.3 that Hannah is born into nurture-dependency which we can clearly describe as a primary stage – a stage of coming into existence no less. By perceiving and recognising her (to her) incidental world, Hannah recognises the features of her progenitor. She becomes a perceiver in a process which eventually requires intelligence in order to perceive (1161b26), not only incidental features, but also intelligible features of a parent laying out further boundaries for her intelligible world. Simultaneously she is an individuated and separate being, undergoing her own development. Once she has the capacity to perceive and comprehend her parents, her capacity to feel affection will simultaneously come into being.

Hannah is at this time engaged in her own character development with others, extended to peers rather to parents.

The next clue we have of a stage is a childhood/youth stage comprised of three notions: i) that friendships of this stage are mainly pleasure friendships (1156a35-37, 1156a33), ii) that this stage is typified by character development, the other being someone who can who can help in avoiding mistakes (1155a13) and iii) and is a stage where we can gain benefits from growing up together (1161b35, 1156b26, 1161a4, 1161a25). There are some teleological notions in each of these. As for i) the pleasure-friendship, this type we see as predominant in childhood.

Aristotle marks another transition:

> Friendship between young seems to be because of pleasure, since the young live by emotion, and more than anything pursue what is pleasant for them and what is there in front of them; but as their age changes, the things they find pleasant also become different. This

is why they are quick to become friends and to stop being friends; for the friendship changes along with what is pleasant for them, and shift in that sort of pleasure is quick. The younger are also erotically inclined, for erotic friendship is for the most part a matter of emotion, and because of pleasure; hence they love and quickly stop loving, often changing in the course of the same day. But the young do wish to spend their days together, and to live together, since that is how they gain the object that accords to their own friendship. 1156a32-b6

Here we see a change in maturity from activity we can identify as playground fun and games of early childhood to a more advanced exchange of pleasure in the form of erotic love in adolescence, as lead by the predominance of the emotional side of the soul at that point in life. It is evident that this description of "change" can span over several years. And it seems that what is cultivated and developed is the emotional side of the soul's increasing capacity for pleasure in another human being. We see precisely this transition in our thought experiment: once Hannah's other-oriented capacities develop in her school setting, her pleasure for 'what is in front of her' (i.e. her lunch) decreases, while what is around her (fun and games) increases rapidly. And though what Aristotle observes in adolescent bonds seems fickle in nature, he still argues that adolescent's have true lasting bonds, due to their objective to be pleasant with each other. The notion of love and pleasure still play an explanatory role, however. It is interesting to see, then, that in his further discussion on character-friendship, Aristotle likens character- with pleasure-friendship due to character-friendship being a great source of pleasure (1158a18-20). Hence, between utility- and pleasure-friendships, the one grounded in pleasure is the closest to character-friendship (1158a18-20). It seems then that these youths are not too far off the mark in their development toward friendship for the sake of the other, between good characters, by way of pleasurable engagement.

Elsewhere Aristotle explains that the starting point of such friendship is like sensing beauty – and can be likened to good will (1167a3-4). The notion of good will is developed as the affection or emotion that occurs when observing decency or excellence. The other then *appears* to be a fine character, or courageous, or generous, or in some other ownership of a character excellence. Aristotle likens this approach to how we act when we root for contestants in sports (1169a19-22), like cheering, wishing a good outcome for the other person, or wishing goods bestowed upon them. Sensing an appearance of a good character-state causes an affection of pleasure at the sight, again a sign that the appearance of a well functioning other arouses desires for us to liken them, or mimic them, in what we believe to

be unequivocally good activity. To press the argument a step further, such well-wishing can manifest itself in a cognate wish to be like the good character, also to approach them with the knowledge that if one's own character is good, shared activity and reciprocal acknowledgement *will* liken us to them. Aristotle also states, that characters of similar merit will have a 'sense' for each other, making the distance for the one to approach the other shorter, in Aristotle's assumption that each of us gains pleasure in 'noticing similarity' (1156b18; Braodie/Rowe pg. 212).

The acquaintances between decent characters cause them to wish each other well in a different manner than that stated above. They do not passively gaze upon each other with admiration. Instead they a) wish good things upon each other, for the others sake (like everyone else) but b) in addition, are disposed to *do* something about it (1157a33). Aristotle is clear in his argument that wishing the other well is not simply an affection, like enjoying the triumph of a sports champion, but a disposition, manifest in action, to *do* a similar feat oneself, or *act* in the knowledge of one's own specialties and excellences, because of one's own affinity to be of like kind. I must emphasise, though, that a) and b) are not exclusive but inclusive. The person of character-excellence will not instinctively attempt to up-show the champ at the site of his/her accomplishment, but will authentically wish and cherish the other's triumph for the other's sake.

The next observation we need to make at the present stage of social development is that we need peers and superiors to help us in avoiding mistakes (1155a13; recall also from 4.1.4 that we are dependent on others in order to be perceived by intelligence). It is critical to our character development that we have friends around who know who we are and recognise our actions. This can't be done through casual play alone. Since we at this stage are 'led by emotion' (1095a4), yet when live together (*suzen*) or choose to live together (from the passage above), each youth will depend on the other to observe and inform the other when they engage in bad reasoning or bad acts, playing collectively in the role of reason. And it would seem that friends at this stage are capable of listening to 'collective reasoning' partly due to the knowledge of continued pleasure if they listen to one another.

A relation that contributes to our understanding of young people is the relation 'brotherhood'. The relation 'brotherhood' is often likened to friendship in that it entails knowledge of the other and a mutual sympathy toward each other. Both brothers and youth who grow up together 'come from the same source' [(1161b31) and perhaps also have the same education and/or playground in the case of young friends]. Brothers, however, in

contrast to young friends, do not go their separate ways due to the one not getting what they want from the other. The relation is extremely robust under Aristotle's definition in that brothers "belong to each other" (1162a12-13). They have been there to feel affection for the other since the birth of the younger. Their source is also a biological and generic source, not the incidental source that is education. Friends are likened brothers, in that they in general are in tone with one another (1161a27-28), while the camaraderie of adolescence is likened to brotherhood in that they are frank with one another, and prone to share due to both necessity and desire. Indeed, because a friendship of this kind survives both positive and negative experiences, *because* of the lack of gravity in youthful pleasure-relations, one can learn both through play, necessity and desire advanced social capabilities, sharing and self-truth.

In order for friends to help each other better their characters and avoid mistakes, they must truly know each other's character. Yet recalling the position that knowing someone's character is exceptionally difficult (1158a15-16), how can someone so young be capable of help in this area? Aristotle states elsewhere that being of the same age contributes greatly to friendship (1161b35), meaning a) that they are around the same point of social, intellectual and emotional development, and b) that they share a common proximity in action. Another explanation is given to us in that being of the same source, i.e. upbringing, contributes to likeness of character, or at least evidence of how the same source affects the capacities that reside in each friend. Growing up together, going to the same school, having the same teacher, coming from the same neighbourhood, greatly informs us of our peers as 'other selves'. In the passage above we saw that the pleasure-friendships of children are of a fickle kind. However, this generalisation cannot be counted as Aristotle's final view on the matter. In youth, there are also those whom establish lasting friendships. Growing up together enables them to get to know the other's character and time to experience the others 'lovability' (1156a26) through the longest and most secure scrutiny (1162a15). Youth also have a keen sense of what it is to be a 'true friend'. Aristotle allows for this to happen, especially when he likens those growing up from the same source with brothers coming from the same source (1161b31, 1162a12-13), and with brothers' tendency to be comrades (1165a28). Their relations are typified by frankness and sharing (1165a28). So youth who value each other, are capable of wishing each other well, sharing the goods they like the most, engage each other in activity for the sake of pleasure (but with activity for activities sake as pleasures function), and are honest with each other, prizing also

honesty in regard to oneself. And as stated, these friends whom 'live by emotion' help each other avoid mistakes (1155a12-13). For the 'true friend' will not let the other 'go wrong' (1159b7-8) and knows that helping your friend with his or her character is what the most important (1165b25).

Living with those whom are 'lovable' to you, and their returned recognition of one's own 'lovability' establishes a *suzen* (shared living) that encourages character-training. Aristotle calls it 'living with the good' (1170a11-12).

4.2.1 Development Through Giving and Receiving: From Interaction to the Creation of Value.

We have yet to look at how a developing character-friendship is encouraged through utility. In Book II.7 and IV.3-8, Aristotle emphasises character-excellence in relation to giving and receiving as social interaction. Our virtues and how good we can become is for Aristotle dependent upon virtuous activity with others. Indeed, just as important to our 'becoming our form' as our disposition over inner affections and our ability to be disposed over the entirety of our soul are our intimacies, pleasures, dependencies, well- or ill-wishing, justice and our usefulness and pleasure given to others. Giving and receiving in different areas constitute different excellences (1158b18), like open-handedness, munificence, greatness of soul, or being able to give eagerly yet take in a leisurely manner. As stated in 4.1.2.2, amongst the goods we desire, friends rank amongst the greatest, both as a means to other goods in life and as a good in and of themselves. We desire nurturing and affection, to be perceived as 'another self', to be like-minded with others and to activate what is potentially good in us in *energeia* – in action. Action and activity, best encapsulated by the actions of giving and receiving will therefore demand further notice.

In treating Aristotle's models for friendship, we observed that parenting a child can be seen as a model for friendship – the relation between the progenitor and the progeny. This model is also helpful in illustrating social utility in transference of goods. The parent is the 'maker of' the good in the child that is life. I take this to mean that a function of a friend to another is to be a progenitor for the goods in the other. But while the parent and child are in a sense a 'giver' and a 'getter' of the good that is life, a friend will be both the progenitor and progeny of goods given and taken. Also, in the creation of goods in others (not only in desiring them), we can assume that goods take two forms: goods in themselves for the sake of the receiver and goods for the sake of or enhancement of other goods (for instance, wanting something in return). But how can we conceptualise a transfer of goods

from one to another by simply engaging each other? What happens physically? What happens metaphysically?

First off, it may be superfluous, or perhaps simply wrong, to ask of Aristotle to explain what happens *physically* in the productions of goods. We must keep in mind that the object of character-friendships, the utility the good represents, is one's firm disposition to act in accordance with human virtue. So the good produced is a 'firm disposition'. From our discussion of dispositions in 2.2.3, a disposition is whatever makes 'our soul worse or better'. And a soul's good condition depends on whether our alogical-logical faculties are working well in relation to the human good. This entails that the *product* of character-friendship is continued virtuous activity.

Yet contributing to the other's becoming good is still a *poesis* (production) like any other good inducing activity and is likened to the craftsman loving his/her work. The simile is apt because, like the craftsman, the contributor to good in others should function well at his/her craft by being inventive and ingenious in his/her work, not only loving what is produced but loving the work itself. The maker also 'loves what he has wrought' (1167b31-68a5). In Broadie's commentary of this passage (Oxford 2002, pg. 421) she emphasises that what the maker is loving in this case is the maker's *ergon* or function, being the function of the change in the subject by the maker, i.e. loving i) that the good has been enhanced by the function, and ii) that the cause of the good is his/her activity. It is thus the increment of good that the maker produces what s/he loves *qua* his/her activity. One is a lover *as* a source, and *because* one is a source. "Loving what one does is loving ones existence" (1168a5-8), existence *in* 'another self'. Yet, if my interpretation in 4.1.3 is sound, we also know that this love derives from allowing access to 'knowing who someone is' as separate and individuated from oneself, which enables Aristotle to add 'for the sake of the other' as a suffix to the notion 'creating goods in others'. One does not only love because one is a source. One also loves the activity of bestowing the good, feeling it enriching to create a good that is separate from oneself, which now belongs to the other. Bestowing goods in others by working on a relationship is rewarded by us 'knowing' the other as another self *because* our contribution is a necessity for virtuous activity. According to Aristotle it is the *existence* of his/her work in the benefactor we love (1168a10). Bestowing goods as a 'maker' of goods affects us with delight in the one in whom the making occurs (1168a10-11, Broadie 2002, pg. 421-22, Meta IX.8 1050a30, Phys, III.3). What one is *making*, since we are contributing to activity under the *archē to kolon* ('the

fine' as final cause), is the enablement of one's own fine activity by the other. The process of change is an actuality *in* the subject, however. Friend's *poesis* of good dispositions is thus the good of the other, while the contribution to *to kolon* is the reward of the contributor. In this sense it is therefore the contributor that 'gains' the finest good. This also explains how it is that character friends 'compete' in doing good to each other (1162b7-9).

The fine, *kolos*, are ends that friends will commonly agree on. They share not only a propositional judgement about what is advantageous (1167a27-28), but also what is good to both. Friends will thusly share a common view or agreement of what *to kolon* consists of. Thus, when 'going forth together' they know they are going the same way. By affirming that the other's activity is in alignment with their shared perception, they affirm each other's disposition to fine action. Though their goals are the same, it does not mean that they have the same dispositions in accordance to the good. They may be characters of 'complete excellence (1145a1-2), 1098a17-18), but will most likely excel in different areas, for instance the one excelling in being open handed, the other in wittiness, thus causing pleasure and utility in the other which again causes the other to desire to become better in that area. They thus enforce each other's good activity, making sure that 'the fine survives the passage of time' (1168a16).

4.2.2 Hannah's Decision

Hannah does not strike us as someone whom is in conflict between her desires and activities, in general or under the circumstances of her decision. She knows her class-mates and team mates, and they know her different sides and strengths by learning and playing with her. In their training they've seen each other getting better, each one's disadvantages being compensated for, and becoming individual techniques. Being brought up together and being the same age has contributed greatly to their camaraderie, as those who 'live' together are natural comrades (1161b25). The observations made by teachers and friends have let her see her own talents while affirming that the pleasure she gets from running is good for her to feel.

Hannah has had the benefit of being praised for what she displays in track and field. However, it was her own discovery that the sport itself could be a worthwhile pursuit in itself. Indeed, though running around in the school yard was a great joy, also for others, in that she was quite good at such games, the aim of getting better at training systematically gave her an entirely new drive, her team-mates, coach and parents affirming this aim as good and worth-while. Hannah does seem like someone whom has had quite a lot of affirmation that she is good in her discipline. Our initial worry that she might not get the

needed affirmation for further growth might be misplaced in her case. Through observation of others she has become quite apt at 'knowing herself'. Indeed she knows herself so well that she immediately realises her dilemma, knowing precisely the lengths of her stamina and the time it takes to bring it up again. She sees clearly that she must sacrifice her stamina for the team relay or pace herself for a chance to win her individual contest.

Before her competition she is quite confident. Indeed she appears to know quite well what she is capable of and deeply desires the honour that can come from exercising her capacities in a contest. It appears that this craving is a part of her dilemma.

The other part appears to be a realisation she is making while considering the dilemma, something she has only recently started to mull over. She notices her own confidence in running, which in itself is a joy for her. At the same time she knows who her team-mates are, the fun they've had in practice, what they can do when they push, help and support each other. Fun as it is to run, it's more fun to run together. They've often been told the values of pulling together, though previously this seemed a little odd to Hannah, as she did best in solo-competition. She realises that the honour she has felt from previous personal victories, which she now desires, will come about from this one individual victory. However, presently this benefit seems small in comparison to the communal good she desires in a shared victory. This realisation alarms her somewhat, though she is not unsure and decides to let up the gates in the relay. This action is extremely easy for her, second nature. She has no doubt in her *orexis* to run and displays this thoroughly. Once decided, it was easy to forgo her honour, which seemed small, in order to benefit the others (1169a33-4), and herself. Indeed she feels as if she is getting the better deal out of it.

We noticed she is extraordinarily attuned to her situation. Indeed we are impressed that she is attuned to her circumstance in a way that is, for her, represented truthfully. Her self-perception is correct: both her emotions and her intellect are informing her of her own self as a person deserving of honour and praise for what she does well, based on her hard work and her dedication. Her cognition and sensing of values of each hypothetical outcome is spot on: In this new circumstance she sees clearly the value of individually claimed honour in comparison to honour claimed collectively. The latter she has been told, but has not been previously *felt*. She perceives the collective effort more clearly than she's done before in her track career: she knows the others so well that she knows what effect she can have on them. And she is right: her strength, stamina and determination inspire her

teammates to such a degree that they too went to their very limits, and won the race. Thus Hannah's decision was *good* for her.

The question still remains, is Hannah's decision the decision of 'the good person'? Her choice incorporates what Burnyeat, as described in 3.3.3, describes as a sense of 'strong' learning. Hannah has gone from knowing *that* a team effort is fine, to having sensed and anticipated it *a priori* by way of *phantasia* in a practical decision by *understanding* which value such an outcome would bring. She *understood* also through an entirely new feeling *a posteriori*, a feeling representing a new type of value that we can only imagine strengthens her abilities in ethical living. The question still remains, what end were Hannah, and especially her team-mates influenced by. Certainly it was winning, especially, for her team-mates. But it seems this honour became downplayed by the team as a whole. I wouldn't call the end Hannah acted in relation to truly *Kolos*, because honour was a steering desire, which is fair considering honour cannot outplay its role in her development until much later. However, Hannah's decision is a part of what inspired the others in the first place. It is a good she knew she could give them, and given they are of like types, which it appears they are, Hannah has here set an example of 'good inducing' that the others probably will wish to liken. Though too early to call action in accordance to the good and the fine, Hannah is definitely on the right track.

5 Summary

In this thesis I have shown how Aristotle's psychology of desire can only be fully appreciated in light of his astonishing breadth and depth of theoretical mechanisms on which his psychological theory is based. The *NE* is a source of a genuinely deeper understanding of the frame in which we, as I have argued, must discuss human desire. It is indeed quite pointless to discuss motivation or indeed philosophy of action without expanding our view outside the analysis of particular actions, to instead explore what it is that the human animal desires - through the modality of the animal in motion. The psychological mechanisms available for extrapolation in the *NE* rely heavily, to a surprising extent, on his metaphysics, his 'first philosophy' for explanation, as they do biology, logic, scientific theory and ethics.

It is not enough to look at these mechanisms in an isolated sense. This has been done often and is the flavour of the day in classical investigation on Aristotle's theory of desires. The problem we face when extrapolating Aristotle's arguments on the make-up and functions of the soul, is that it is not necessarily difficult to describe emotional, cognitive and social faculties that Aristotle lists readily in his texts – it is that it is unclear how they attach themselves to the functions he describes. The problem is figuring out how they work together in the manner he conceived them functioning – how they are tied together and causally influence each other – in action. In this paper I have developed many of the listed faculties of the soul that needed developing, and in addition provided solutions to their bunched-togetherness.

In order to complete this line of inquiry, we must now synthesise the three faculties of development that I constructed for the sake of structure in the paper.

The first two main chapters (2 and 3) explain the interaction between thinking (*logos*) and sensation (*aisthêsis*) in active relation to their objects – the perceived good. Perception (*aisthêsis*) is not a faculty divided in labour between the logical/alogical halves of the soul. Both the intellect and our emotions must be actively involved in order for us to sufficiently perceive complex human goods. Our main discovery in chapter 2 was that emotions and thoughts are causally linked. The logical/alogical parts of the soul influence each other causally under Aristotle's theory of the four causes. Thoughts can invoke influence on emotions causally under Aristotle's description of efficient cause. We made the potent discovery that emotions are exclusively sensations attached to thought, that thought qualifies emotion. Our emotional development incorporates us becoming 'systematic understanders' of which emotions have which causes, thus gaining a capacity

to reflect on which objects affect us positively and negatively. Emotional development can thus lead to an ability to effectively perceive value in situations that are otherwise difficult to discern.

Our intellectual development 'feeds' our discerning ability. By desiring to 'know' what 'is' we develop *nous* (intellect) and *phantasia* (imagination) in our systematic understanding of the world. The intellect evolves along two distinct paths of development, as intellect by nature is divided in two distinct functions, one for inquiring into systematic knowledge of universal, the other an empirical knowledge of which particulars represent which goods. We have a genuine capacity unique in nature to be puzzled by our surroundings. This capacity is 'what we are the most'. One good for man is then engaging in solving the puzzles as they are represented to him/her in perceiving the good. Our main discovery in chapter 3 was that our intellect plays a crucial role in discerning both 'solutions' to puzzles of a theoretic nature, but also in discerning the relevance of particulars in practical situations, and is a perceptive organ in its own right. The two distinct developmental paths do not exclude each other. We learn both toward and from universal truths, but without an attempt at ethical living and using our knowledge to develop practical wisdom, theoretic excellence is of little worth.

Perception, *âisthesis*, of goods is a developing faculty in its own right, but is intimately attached to the metaphysics of the gradual individuation of the perceiver. We *become* a perceiver in gradual steps from birth. The main discovery of chapter 4 is that we are dependent on others in order to become self-perceivers, and indeed self-lovers. To tie this realisation back to the first two chapters, our senses are causes of pleasures in a most significant way, in that we can learn that a sensation of a *good* is a *cause* of pleasure. We can thus only learn to systematically take pleasure in activities for goods we desire *together* with others, making such activity a desired good in its own right. To become a perceiver we must understand an objects intelligible form. We desire to understand other's intelligible form, and through activity with them, our own.

Our thought-experiment, Hannah, has gone through a development that has enabled her to discern the ethically good in her last transition, represented by her decision to engage in her teams good at a personal cost. This decision was made upon the desire of a good that Hannah perceived was of greater value. When answering 'is it then the good that Hannah loves, or what is good for Hannah?' we can answer that Hannah has, with her decision, brought these two in alignment.

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