Rejected Cultural Biases Shape Our Political Views:

A Migrant Household Study and
Two Large-Scale Surveys

Eero Olli

Dissertation for the degree of philosophiae doctor (PhD)
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Abstract

The main research problem of *how we should understand the relationship between individuals, social structures in institutions, and cultural biases* is approached from two different angles: from a study of migrant households as institutions and from several surveys that focus on cultural biases at the individual level. Cultural theory, building upon the work of Mary Douglas, describes four ways of organizing, also known as ways of life or cultures—namely hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic ways of organizing.

Many concepts and stereotypes emphasize the differences between the majority population and migrants. In contrast to these, the present thesis shows how *migrants' ways of organizing their households are actually familiar to us*, even when these migrants come from distant countries. The author suggests that this familiarity provides a common cultural basis for communication and interaction, even between peoples who are commonly seen as being radically different.

The bulk of the argument given above is based on a qualitative study consisting of in-depth interviews of seventeen migrant households presently living in Norway. The households originate from Vietnam, Chile, and Sri Lanka, and eight of them are presented in detail. They are first described according to their internal organization (based on their economic decisions, their justifications for the division of housework, and their behaviors during interviews) and their external social relations (how they justify giving and receiving support from others). Households' stated preferences are compared with theoretically-based predictions of attitudes toward institutions, trust, social support, the distribution of resources, blame, the view of democracy, and political decision making. Contrary to the expectations of mainstream political science, this study finds *a strong relationship between a household's way of organizing and its views on society and politics*. Rather than relying on the country of origin as a basis for categorization, migrant households' relations with the state and the majority society can be better understood by knowing how they organize their households.

Cultural theory is primarily a theory about institutions, but sometimes it also makes claims about people. In addition to the arguments made about migrants, this thesis also argues that people are not just miniature institutions and suggests two theoretical improvements to cultural theory. First, people do not only support one cultural bias, they can also *reject* or support the other cultural biases. Second, at the level of the individual, the effects of cultural biases are not additive, nor are they independent of each other; *biases must be studied in combinations*. Biases are better understood as a package of meanings rather than existing as separate items. In short, cultural biases are patterns of meaning that are not easy to summarize and analyze numerically, and the relevant number of biases is of course an empirical question.

The argument presented here about cultural biases is based on quantitative data extracted from the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey, which consists of representative samples from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland (n=4833). Data are also extracted from the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey, which consists of representative samples from 12 environmental organizations and from the general population in Norway (n=3106).

Acknowledgments

I want to express my gratitude to every household that unselfishly participated in this research and opened their doors to a stranger who wanted to write about them. I also wish to thank all those people within the migrant communities, as well as those from various schools, public offices, and religious communities, who have taken the time to talk with me and help me. Many of you deserve to be mentioned here, but to preserve the anonymity of others, I will only express my collective gratitude to you all.

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I thank the Department of Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen for having faith in this project, for providing me with the necessary infrastructure during the first years of the project, and for providing support for the biannual PhD seminars at Solstrand. I would also like to thank the second IMER program within the Research Council of Norway for funding the household study; the Centre for Combating Ethnic Discrimination, which was my previous employer, for supporting my efforts; and my present employer, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud, for allowing me to take several leaves of absence in my effort to finalize the thesis. I would also like to thank NSD, SSB, MMI, and IMDi for access to data and background materials.

Last, but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to Trine Haaland, my family, and my friends for being supportive of me and for being there for me when I needed you.

Preface

I started my research on cultural theory as a graduate student back in 1992 with the idea that, for a variety of reasons, this theory must be wrong. Over the years, I have grown into the belief that cultural theory has got something right, even if the research methods are often not quite right. Therefore, I find myself repeatedly seeking out the problematic, gray areas where the assumptions made essentially hide some underlying lack of clarity. In light of this, I do not aim to explain political views, but to make a few methodological improvements and increase our understanding of the relationship between individuals and cultures.

Part of the motivation that guides my research is based on the fact that those institutions that finance research, as well as the academic career system which is based on counting publications, require researchers to constantly generate research findings. This pushes researchers to select safe topics and safe research methods. I think there are too few publicized efforts at exploring the more problematic areas of inquiry, or areas where methodological standards do not yet exist. This kind of exploration often involves high degrees of uncertainty, as questions are raised about many of the assumptions that are commonly taken for granted. I have chosen to emphasize this type of exploration because I believe that the development of social science benefits when these kinds of explorations are made public. Displaying many of the uncertainties and choices opens up the text to a true peer review process.

Since 2003, I have been working at the Center for Ethnic Discrimination and the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud, and research on cultural theory has been a something between a hobby and an obsession. Cultural theory has given me a perspective that I believe could be valuable for many people working with migrants. This thesis is an attempt to put into place the foundations for a cultural theory that is based on research of individuals rather than just institutions. In cooperation with others, the next step will be to create real-life applications for cross-cultural communication and organization.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

The Research Problem

In previous research, I have suggested that a model which specifies the relationship between an individual on the one hand and a way of life on the other hand is necessary for a meaningful coding and analysis of survey data (For more information see Olli 1996). In addition, I have argued that the rejection of a cultural bias at the individual level is important, and suggested that cultural biases are not simply additive (Olli 1999). This thesis takes several steps further along the same path by asking the following: *How should we understand the relationship between individuals, social structures in institutions, and cultural biases*?

Within the politically relevant arm of cultural theory, there are two main strands of research: The first one uses organizational-level data and successfully explains institutional stability, change, and conflicts. The second one uses representative sample surveys to explain individual perceptions of risks and political choices. The institutional research is mostly case-oriented and qualitative, while the survey research is quantitative. In this thesis, I will relate to both strands of research and suggest major improvements for the ways we should understand an individual's relationship with cultural biases.

The first part of the thesis is a qualitative study of migrant households. The study shows how the households' political views are closely connected to the way the household is organized. This study allows me to apply the institutional strand of cultural theory to households in Norway. In addition, it demonstrates the use of a typology as an alternative to the nationality-based stereotypes of migrants.

The second part of the thesis attempts to sort out some of the problems of using cultural theory in surveys by suggesting a better way of operationalizing cultural biases. I start by presenting a theoretical critique of how cultural theory is used at the individual level. I then explore a variety of ways in which cultural biases can be operationalized at the individual level, with the goal of developing a new operationalization of cultural biases as combinations at this level. Finally, I try this new operationalization out by using it to explain party preference in the Nordic countries.

The third part of the thesis uses this new operationalization to discuss several topics. First, I demonstrate that three of the assumptions commonly used in survey research on cultural biases receive so little empirical support that they should be seen as fallacies. Then I discuss the nature of rejection, in the light of the evidence available from a household study and surveys.

In Figure 1 below, we can see an overview of the three parts of the thesis. The qualitative part uses the internal organization of households and the pattern of giving and receiving help through their social relations to explain political views, while the quantitative part uses cultural biases held by individuals to explain party preference as a proxy for political views.

There are several reasons for combining qualitative and quantitative methods to improve the operationalization of cultural theory. First, using two different methods helps me to make assumptions and choices explicit, thus making it easier to criticize and improve the operationalizations by rendering them more transparent. The more common approach, where two or more theories are compared based on their abilities to explain political views, would typically hide much of the operationalization, thus making improvements difficult.

Second, I firmly believe that operationalization should be a reflection of the theory and its intended use. The qualitative operationalization in Part I could have been much more formal, but my interest in cross-cultural communication and practical work with migrant families convinced me of the utility of having an operationalization where the researcher interacts with with the family. Why make it difficult if easy works? How simple can we make it and still use it on Vietnamese, Tamil, and Chilean households in Norway? The quantitative operationalization in Part II moves in the opposite direction, toward increasing complexity, because I believe that the operationalization of cultural bias at the individual level should reflect the way cultural biases actually work at the individual level. Because the individual-culture relationship is not well defined, I explore many different operationalizations in Part II. Since households are institutions, I can avoid many of these problems in Part I.

Third, the use of two different methods allows for a triangulation that cannot be done from only one viewpoint. My two operationalizations are not an attempt to transfer or recreate the same operationalization with a different type of methodology (maximizing similarities). I am trying to create two different operationalizations independently of one another. In this sense, I am increasing the difference between the operationalizations in an effort to create two independent viewpoints that both stand on their own. The differences and similarities in findings tell us something more about how cultural biases work in institutions and in individuals.

Figure 1: Overview of the Research Design



Before I present cultural theory in more detail, I will briefly sketch the research problems as they appear in the different parts of the thesis.

Part I: A Qualitative Study of Migrant Households in Norway

In the first part of the thesis, I will explore the importance of institutions for our political views by engaging in a qualitative study of migrant households from different ethnic backgrounds. The unit of study is the household, the most common institution found in society. This allows for a contextualized operationalization of cultural theory and avoids some of the pitfalls of methodological individualism. This part helps to formulate some new hypotheses by asking *how a household's view of politics and society is related to the way the household is organized.*

Cultural theory's claim that there are only four fundamentally different, yet stable ways of organizing, the hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic and fatalistic way of organizing, is interesting for both migration researchers and for political scientists. First, for migration researchers the novelty lies in a new perspective that can counteract the essentialism in many of the concepts used when dealing with migrants. It is *an alternative way of conceptualizing migrants* and our social interactions with them.[1] I present cultural theory as a theoretical alternative, or addition to, the present thinking regarding immigrants, which seems in many ways to be locked into the concepts of ethnicity and nationality (or country of origin).

The hierarchical household often uses traditional gender and role based division of labor. The egalitarian household is organized as a flat structure where all are equal, and participate in the decision-making. The individualistic household relies upon a network organization and bilateral agreements. The fatalistic household lacks a reliable support structure and copes with external events, rather than plans for future.

These four ways of organizing can provide an explanation for the common elements that people use when they create social interactions with people they do know. If the application of cultural theory is simple enough, it can have sizable and practical use value for professionals who deal with migrants without knowing them personally.

Second, the claim which points to only four ways of organizing is interesting for political scientists because it provides a partial explanation for the origin of political preferences. Part I of the thesis contributes to political science generally by proposing that *household structure is an important source of people's political views* and a more important source than country of origin. To understand political culture, we must study how institutions are related to values (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1992:517). This attempt is general in nature, and not limited to migrants.

The Research Council of Norway's second research program on International Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER) provided the financing for this household study. Therefore, I have written the first part of the thesis for a particular audience—i.e. people who study or deal with migrants in their daily lives.

Migration research is most relevant for a general study of the individual-culture relationship. Migration places individuals in a new setting where the individual-culture relationship is bound to change. In migration research, the individual-

[1] A joint introduction to current thinking about the internal and societal processes concerning migration can be found in Lithman and Sicakkan (2006, 2005).

culture relationship has been studied for decades. Cultural theory's understanding of the individual-culture relationship can be strengthened by learning form the insights from migration research.[2] In addition, I believe that the different origins of the households make my conclusions more general than if I had only studied ethnically Norwegian households.

Cultural theory helps us to see the organizational commonalities among society's most common institution, namely the household. In politics, and often in research, cultural differences between people from different countries are emphasized: Migrants are presented as some special kind of people or framed as the *other,* which we then use as means for defining who we are (Gullestad 2001, 2002). Stereotypes, or overly simplified images of a person based on their cultural background, are so strong that social contact does not automatically alter them (Durrheim and Dixon 2005; Andersson 2000:294). By showing that the organizing principles in migrants' households are familiar to us, rather than strange or different, I have chosen a research strategy that counters the tendency of stereotypes.

Cultural theory, along with my analysis, gives us some guidance for how to deal with migrant households we do not know personally. Writing this introduction a few months after the 22/7 terror attacks in Oslo makes me even more certain in my conviction that it is useful to study what is common in households from many countries rather than simply emphasizing their differences. Culture is not just about difference and conflict; competence in the different ways of life makes it possible to communicate and interact with people from different backgrounds.

By itself, the first part of the thesis is an operationalization of cultural theory that is designed to deal with households in Norway and to be useful for both practitioners and researchers in the field of migration. However, in relation to the rest of the thesis, Part I serves as a study of how the institutional version of cultural theory makes sense of the ways in which households are organized and their views on politics and institutions of the welfare state.

Part II: Operationalizing Cultural Bias at the Individual Level

The overarching goal of Part II is to *find a working operationalization for cultural biases at the individual level, as measured through the use of survey techniques*. Much of previous survey-based research on cultural theory has a rather unclear view of the relationship between individual and culture (Olli 1995, 1999). I believe that there are several theoretical problems that need to be solved before empirical research on the individual level will be successful.

First, I try to answer the question of *what is wrong with existing survey-based research on cultural theory*. Since there are several problems, we should give up many of our assumptions and try to take as little as possible for granted. Second, I try to find out

[2] In some ways, migration provides us with an real-life laboratory, where we can study what happens when an individual or family is inserted into in a new society and cultural setting.

how to measure cultural biases in two different surveys: one covering all five Nordic countries and the other covering the members of environmental organizations and the general public in Norway. Third, I explore a variety of possible ways to operationalize the relationship between individuals and cultural biases, and then present an empirical method for finding out which *assumptions perform better than others*. Based on this analysis, I suggest that a combination of two top-ranked cultural biases is probably a useful simplification of an individual's cultural bias. However, before this new operationalization can be trusted enough to use in theoretical work, it must be *evaluated*. I do this by using it to explain preferences for Nordic party families.

If you are not interested in the measurement and operationalization of cultural biases, then you can skip Part II. In doing so, however, you will just have to trust me when I say that the combination of two top-ranked biases is probably the best way to use cultural theory at the individual level.

The main weakness of Part II is that I use only one variable, namely party preference, as the dependent variable. I have chosen this variable because it carries meaning in most countries and is not reducible to just one dimension in any of the Nordic countries. Choosing a one-dimensional variable would probably lead to a different operationalization of cultural biases. Nevertheless, I believe the multi-dimensionality is necessary when studying the possibilities that lie in the use of cultural biases as combinations.

In short, the second part is both an independent attempt to solve some methodological problems that have hampered survey research on cultural theory, and a necessary preparation for the analyses in the third part. Let us now take a look at Part III.

Part III: Discussions

The two first parts of the thesis prepare the grounds for the discussions in the third part of the thesis. The topics taken up in the discussions are closely connected to the problems presented in the beginning of part two. The household study is an institutional corrective to the tendency toward the implicit use of methodological individualism in the survey methods. I seek empirical evidence from all five samples in the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey (NOS99) and from both samples in the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey (NEPS95), in addition to, evidence from the household study.

By taking up two important discussions, Part III contributes to exploring the main research problem—i.e. the relationship between individuals, social structures, and cultural biases. First, I *empirically test three major assumptions* that underlie most survey-based research on cultural theory: the dominant bias assumption, the independence assumption, and the additivity of effects assumptions. The lack of clarity about these assumptions will lead to several methodological flaws in the data analysis. Establishing the status of these assumptions is therefore important.

Second, I once again raise the question of *what the rejection of cultural bias is all about.* This discussion has both methodological and theoretical consequences insofar as our understanding of the nature of the rejection of cultural bias is intrinsically connected to our understanding of the individual-culture relationship.

At this point, the research questions that guide the remainder of this volume have been laid out. As a recap, these questions are as follows: How should we understand the relationship between individuals, social structures, and cultural biases? Can cultural theory's typology be an alternative way of conceptualizing migrants? How are a household's views of politics and society related to the way the household is organized? What is wrong with existing survey-based research on cultural theory? How can cultural theory be operationalized at the level of individuals? Can we trust the three major assumptions that underlie survey-based research on cultural theory? Finally, what is the rejection of cultural bias all about? I will now move on to present cultural theory since it is the foundation this thesis rests upon.

Introduction to Cultural Theory

Cultural theory is based on the works of Mary Douglas,[3] who created it as a tool for comparing religions and the societies where these religions appear (Douglas 1996a). An abstract conceptual framework depicts structural similarities across different societies, institutions, and cultures, which also makes it suitable for describing immigrants in today's increasingly multicultural society.

I will first draw quick images of four different types of households, and the political views that match these ways of organizing because these images can give the reader a sense for what the theory can be used for. Afterwards, I will present the theory behind the four different types of households. However, I will wait until Chapter 7 (page 278) to present the individual-level problems in the theory since these problems are not relevant for the household study in Part I.

Four Ways to Organize a Household

This thesis proposes that cultural theory can be successfully used to understand how social interaction in some migrant households is constructed. Cultural theory is

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[3] One should note that "cultural theory" is not a label chosen by Mary Douglas herself, but by Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, who in the book *Cultural Theory* collected and summarized the ideas and arguments of those using Mary Douglas's heuristic grid-group schema as a fairly complete but still disputable theory (1991). There is no value judgement made on my part of other cultural approaches, even if the name "cultural theory" might sound somewhat totalitarian. It reflects the lack of cultural approaches in American political science at that time.

a theory about forms of institutionalized social interaction.[4] It claims that there is a connection between social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases (mental constructs), and that only certain combinations of these work well together, while the rest do not. These well-working combinations, which can be used to create long-lasting institutions, are called *solidarities* or *ways of organizing*. Many institutionalists have worked with two cases (market and hierarchy), and some have added a third one (club, clan, collegium, enclave, or clique) that is based on a small group with a flat structure.

The smallest units in society that can be considered to be institutions are households.[5] According to cultural theory, we make greater gains by using a typology of four different ways of organizing: hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic. I will here exemplify these by presenting four ways to organize a household and four different views of politics and society. No single household is likely to rely on just one solidarity, however, and often, one is more prevalent than the others. I will give a few examples that will hopefully help promote an understanding regarding the kind of role this theory can have in describing migrant households.

A household that organizes itself based mainly upon the *hierarchical* way of organizing is likely to divide the world into different spheres, with different rules: hence, you get a division of labor based on gender, generation, and so forth. In these households the members know who does what and when it should be done. Traditions are important and are often used to justify and define roles and rules. A good person is one who lives up to these roles and rules. In this household, one might hear the mother say to her children, "You should do it because your father says so!"

A household that organizes itself based mainly upon the *egalitarian* way of organizing is likely to have a division of labor that emphasizes equality: everyone is supposed to perform every task, at least sometimes. Their ideal household is a collective, with a flat structure, and a low level of role differentiation. The egalitarian way of organizing rejects the division of the world into different spheres; instead, it emphasizes the unity of the world. The household makes its own rules: in some sense it is sovereign; rules and roles are not just adopted from the outside, they are carefully created within the household. A good person maintains a consistent role across different contexts. Justification is often rooted in a collective decision. In these families, one might hear one of the parents inviting the children to a discussion: "Let us all talk about this…"

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4 The references are omitted from the presentation of the theory for the sake of clarity. This relatively new version of cultural theory is best presented by Michael Thompson (2008, 1996; 1999). In Chapter 3 due respect is paid to the original authors (Douglas 1982b, 1986; Gross and Rayner 1985; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Thompson 1996; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994).

5 However, cultural theory can also be applied to individuals with small modifications. More about this can be found in Bird Spotting Individuals (on page 93) and in Chapter 7.

A household that relies on the *individualistic* way of organizing is more flexible and dynamic. The social structure is more like a network of individuals, than a collective. Division of labor is based on skill. Rather than being governed by fixed rules, it is controlled by bilateral agreements. They do not care much about what makes a "good person," as moral pondering is left to others. What matters is that things get done. Authority has only a minimal role, and parents bargain with their children. In these kinds of households one might hear the mother saying to her children: "If you do it, I will give you…"

In a household where the *fatalistic* way of organizing is dominant, the division of labor is random. Their conception of time is guided by the short-term: the focus is on coping from day to day. Long-term plans are commonly unrealistic dreams, because outside forces have considerable influence on the household, even on daily routine tasks. Thus, the safety net provided by the fatalistic solidarity is not reliable. In this kind of household, one might overhear the mother saying to her children: "Not again! Haven't I told you thousand times…"

The individualistic, egalitarian, and hierarchical ways of organizing each form a social structure through which resources are distributed, hence forming safety nets based on different rules: individualistic solidarity prefers balanced exchange (I help you, you help me); hierarchical solidarity thrives on resource transfers that emphasize social roles and status differences (helping the deserving poor); while the egalitarian solidarity emphasizes in-group solidarity and equality (helping fellow humans) In contrast, the combination of unaccountability and asymmetry of transactions that defines the fatalistic solidarity usually means that one cannot demand help from others.

Cultural theory is not just a typology of ways of organizing, but a systems theory, which shows how these different ways of organizing relate to each other in a social system and how they are simultaneously in conflict and dependent on each other. Common to other systems theories, there is no simple causation, but rather a system in perpetual change, which moves from one state of balance to another state of balance. In this thesis the systems theoretical aspects are downplayed, as more emphasis is put on the typology of four ways of organizing as a useful simplification.

Four Different Views of Society and Politics

These four ways of organizing emphasize different aspects of social interaction: they each have their strengths and weaknesses, forms of rationality, forms of solidarity, and ideas of justice. The value of cultural theory for a political scientist lies in its ability to predict people's norms and values, their understanding of society, and their behavioral patterns. If we know a household's preferred way of organizing, we should be able to tell quite a lot about its political views and behavior.[6]

A *hierarchical* household is likely to think of the society as a body. We all have our own important role to play, and it is important that everyone plays his or her role properly. Politics is about ruling and it is best left to those few with special skills. Democracy is mainly about choosing leaders. The hierarchical household is likely to divide the world into distinct public and private spheres. In the public sphere, the wise politicians should have all the power, whereas the private sphere belongs to the family (and perhaps to moral authorities like the Church). The hierarchical household believes that human nature is weak, so strong institutions are needed to teach people their proper place and to ensure that they stay there. The ideal state is like a strict father bringing up his children. Blame is often placed on victims and deviant individuals. Justice is viewed as procedural justice, and therefore doing things by the book is important. Social support should be properly regulated by experts, so that the deserving poor get the help they need, while deviant individuals (criminals, drug addicts, or whomever they choose to blame) are sorted out.

The *egalitarian* household is likely to think positively of other people, while the blame is placed on the institutions and markets that corrupt people. They blame the harsh markets and the inhumane bureaucratic institutions when people end up unemployed or in the welfare queue. The ideal state is like a nurturing mother caring for her children. Everyone is equal and it makes no sense that one person is more qualified to make decisions than any other person. Where hierarchy trusts institutions, egalitarians trust collective decision-making. They value participatory democracy highly, and enjoy a roundtable discussion. The good thing about elections is that each person has only one vote, but unfortunately, money also rules here and public opinion can be manipulated. The egalitarian household wants to be part of as many decisions as possible and does not think that teachers are better qualified than parents to teach children. They believe that sharing the limited resources amongst everyone is only fair, since resources are finite and justice is about end-equality.

The *individualistic* household is likely to look at resources as unlimited, were there not all of these public rules and regulations limiting their availability. Therefore, the state should not be that concerned with taxation and income redistribution, but should let human ingenuity roam free, so that we can increase the size of the cake, rather than argue about how to divide it. Individualistic households look at people as strong and resourceful, while the state is simultaneously keeping the best people down, and pampering the others. Social welfare recipients are viewed as lazy: they just have not tried hard enough; human nature is primarily selfish, and lucrative welfare systems remove the incentive to work. Individualistic households prefer a night watchman state, which only provides people with fundamental security. The

6 A very similar claim has been made by Wildavsky, who refers to grid and group, "these two 'inches of facts' enable individuals to 'generate miles of preferences' (quoted from Grendstad 1999b:464).

society is not viewed as a collective, but rather as a market-place where individuals compete with each other—the best ones should win.

Fatalistic households are left alone to cope with their lives. Where the three previously described ways of organizing are active—their adherents believe that their way of organizing is best and would like to convince everyone else of it, too—fatalism is a passive way of organizing. The world is a random and dangerous place, in which the best thing one can do is keep one's head down, in order to avoid the hardest blows. Their plans fail and, consequently, their experience tells them that planning is futile. Where the three active ways of organizing have a form of solidarity that can be trusted, the fatalist lacks trust in his or her peers.

> "It doesn't matter who you vote for," they tell themselves, to the never-ending dismay of those who belong to the three other solidarities, "the government always gets in". (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:192)

Fatalists are likely to be a part of the growing population of non-voters, and their lack of trust makes cooperation and collective action difficult. Even reciprocal agreements, which the individualists prefer, are difficult to form because the level of trust is low.

These ideal-type positions on political issues are much more informative than just knowing from which country people are. Now it is time look more closely at the theory behind these positions, and at the four ways of organizing a household.

Social Relations, Cultural Biases, and Behavioral Patterns

Cultural theory takes its starting point in an often-found match between social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases—that is, norms, beliefs, and perceptions (see Figure 2). To uphold a particular set of social relations, a particular behavioral pattern is required, which, again, is easier with a supporting cultural bias.

> Values and social relations are mutually interdependent and reinforcing: Institutions generate distinctive sets of preferences, and adherence to certain values legitimizes corresponding institutional arrangements. Asking which comes first or which should be given causal priority is a nonstarter. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:21)

For example, if you want to sustain a group with a flat structure, everyone needs to behave in a manner that prevents uneven distribution of privileges, which is much easier if there is a shared belief in equality.

Figure 2: Three Connected Aspects of Social Organization



This correspondence can be observed on several levels: in the society, in organizations, and on the individual level. The claim is that a social system will be in a stable state[7] only if social relations, peoples' behavior, and cultural biases support each other. In other words, change is normal; what needs an explanation is stability.

Four Ways of Organizing—Ideal Types of Social Organization

According to the theory, there are four stabilizable states: the hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic ways of organizing, where social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases support each other.

Mary Douglas describes *two analytical dimensions* that can be used to describe both social relations and cultural biases: grid and group. *Grid* is the degree of all encompassiveness and specificity of social rules and regulation. Grid is closely related to Durkheim's notion of regulation (Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999:4). In high-grid situations, very specific rules and norms govern many aspects of life. In low-grid situations, these rules and norms are few and non-specific. *Group* refers to the degree that the individual's life is absorbed in and sustained by group membership. In an extremely high-group situation, the group is the only source of identity and membership is relevant for all aspects of life. Thus a person would join others in "common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation" (Douglas 1982c:202).

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[7] Stability is always relative to the subject of study. Cultural theory is probably at its best in explaining institutions, which indicates that we are talking about changes that happen over years or months. There are, however, examples of rapid changes, where institutional structures collapse or are "taken over" by a competing cultural bias in matters of weeks or days (Price and Thompson 1997; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1996:60).

By intersecting these two dimensions, grid and group, we get a four-fold classification of *ideal-typical ways of organizing:* hierarchal, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic. One should note that these four ideal-typical and stabilizable states of ways of organizing are not created by the grid and group dimensions, which are just tools to identify them.

Supported by Social Structures and Social Relations

Each way of organizing is characterized (or supported) by a particular type of social structure: hierarchy, enclave, ego-focused network, or isolation.

In the high-grid-high-group corner, in Figure 3, we find *hierarchy*. It is characterized by a strong sense of belonging to a group, a well-defined boundary, clearly defined roles stating everyone's duties and privileges, a clear division of labor, and an uneven division of power (and access to resources). Social contact is controlled by the various roles, in other words, hierarchies are ascription-oriented. Hierarchies are divided into different spheres of influence.

In the low-grid-high-group corner, we find the *enclave*. It is a social structure defined by a strong sense of belonging to a group and a well-defined group boundary, but it differs from hierarchy in that it lacks the internal differentiation of roles, all members being more or less equal in several aspects. Social contacts are not restricted by roles, and any one member is allowed contact with any other member of the group. Therefore, the patterns of social contact are very similar within the same enclave.

Figure 3: Two Dimensions and Four Social Structures



In the low-grid-low-group corner of the diagram, we find *the ego-focused network,* which is a social structure characterized by a lack of group boundaries. Everyone has their own network, and these differ from each other (i.e., the patterns of social contact differ from person to person). Contrary to hierarchies, where social status is defined by one's social position (role), in ego-focused networks the size and quality of the network defines social status. Contacts who give access to new networks are especially valuable. In contrast to hierarchies, these networks are achievement oriented.

In the high-grid-low-group corner of the diagram, we find *isolation*, which is a social structure characterized by social control inflicted by outsiders, combined with a lack of support within the group. The three other forms of social organization all provide support and help to their members, whereas isolates are left "outside." This can happen as a result of exclusion from one of the three other ways of life, or by one's own choice. This lack of support makes them vulnerable to all kinds of restrictions and manipulation by others, and they often perceive themselves as not being in control of their own lives.

Supported by Four Different Behavioral Patterns or Strategies

Cultural theory, with its four ways of organizing, can also be formulated with the help of concepts focusing on patterns of transactions and behavioral strategies. In Figure 4 we see how we can intersect degrees of competition with degrees of symmetry of transactions to get four different behavioral patterns.[8] Behavioral patterns are very similar to behavioral strategies. No single act is enough to create a pattern, therefore, people are on one level free to act as they want. Nevertheless, cultural theory claims that unless people's patterns of behavior support their preferred way of life, they are actually undermining it, and hence creating change (whether on purpose or not).

The *hierarchical behavioral strategy* is characterized by little competition and asymmetric transactions. For example, a hierarchical shopkeeper might be required to provide a job for his cousin, instead of picking the person with the best qualifications. In this way, the rules governing behavior limit competition and create a difference in rank between the shopkeeper and the newly employed cousin. The cousin is perhaps not the best qualified, but he will be loyal to the honorable shopkeeper. In a hierarchy, the pay is dependent on the cousin's situation in life: a married man with responsibilities obviously deserves more than a careless youngster. Transactions are used to define people as different, not similar; therefore, there is a distinctive division of labor. Hierarchies are good at getting things done by the book, and in large scale organizing.

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[8] Michael Thompson has, in his later work, replaced competition by degrees of accountability as the second dimension, and the four ways of life or organizing are presented as four solidarities. This new way of presenting the theory is more efficient. I do, however, find the division into social relations, behavior and cultural bias useful for my purposes.

Figure 4: Types of Behavioral Patterns

Transactions		**Competition**: Unfettered	**Competition**: Fettered
	Asymmetric	Fatalistic	Hierarchical
	Symmetrical	Individualistic	Egalitarian

Similarly, the *egalitarian behavioral strategy* is also a strategy for collective organization, but instead of rules governing who is doing what and when, egalitarians trust in collective decision-making. In addition, the egalitarian behavioral strategy is characterized by limited competition, but here the transactions are symmetrical, as behavioral patterns help to define people as similar, not different. The egalitarian shopkeeper is not running the shop on his own, the whole family takes part, and they make decisions as a collective (Read more about how the Herreras run their business on page 190). Everybody does a bit of every task to emphasize his or her equality and lack of rank.[9] Another example would be the egalitarian work crew at the dock, moving cargo in and out of the ships: the group shares work and pay, and they organize the work themselves. Each member of the crew is dependent on his fellow worker for safety and future employment (Mars 1994). The egalitarian way of organizing is in many cases less effective than the hierarchical and the individualistic, because of the commonly high use of time spent in collective decision-making. However, it has an advantage in rapidly changing environments, where collective action is needed, but where doing things the same old way does not work anymore.

The *individualistic behavioral strategy* relies on competition and symmetrical transactions. As there are few rules to govern behavior, the individualistic shopkeeper does not need to consider the family's opinion, but can pick and choose freely among the applicants. The relationship between the worker and the shopkeeper is a reciprocal relation: work is traded for money. Honor, loyalty, and tradition are of less importance here. If somebody offers the worker a better

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9 There are of course also power differences within an egalitarian organization, but they are likely to be hidden from the view of outsiders.

position, or if the shopkeeper finds a better worker, new negotiations are likely to take place. Gerald Mars presents many salesmen working in individualistic jobs, where they are free to organize their work as they want, and where co-workers are actually competitors, as only the one who makes the sale gets rewarded. The individualistic behavioral strategy is effective in getting things done, even if the other ways of organizing are often appalled by the consequences (for example, by the unintended social and environmental costs).

The *fatalistic behavioral strategy* is to keep one's head down, as unfettered competition and asymmetrical transactions leave the fatalistic worker vulnerable. There is no shopkeeper cousin providing a secure job, nor a collective that shares the burdens. Gerald Mars has described some jobs that are governed by fatalism, like the supermarket cashier, who does not have any freedom in his or her work (1994). There are many different mechanisms of control to ensure that the work is done correctly: customers treated politely, no money is missing or any merchandise taken. There are no possibilities for socializing or trying to organize the work differently—you either do it the way management has decided or not at all.

Four Different Cultural Biases

Cultural biases are the values, norms, worldviews, and other mental constructs that give people guidance in their lives. Cultural theory characterizes four different cultural biases that are supportive of the previously mentioned four ways of organizing. These four cultural biases can be seen in Figure 5.

The hierarchical cultural bias is characterized by orderly, well-defined concepts and traditional social roles, which justify the elaborate division of labor. Nature is seen as a place that can be understood, if properly studied, thus making it possible for experts to understand and predict risk. The year is divided into seasons, months and days, every season marked by specific festivities and rules. People are seen as weak, and strong institutions are seen as necessary in their ability to provide guidance for people and order in society. Institutions are trusted more than people. Honor, tradition, and sacrifice for the greater good are hierarchical values.

The egalitarian cultural bias is characterized by its rejection of the hierarchical differentiation. Egalitarian cultural bias sees all people as one, and traditions and rules that create walls between people (or lift some people higher up) are seen as unjust and ready for demolition. Humans are good by nature, and corrupted by hierarchical institutions or exploited by markets. People are trusted more than institutions; however, those who associate themselves with the wrong kind of institutions, are not to be trusted. Therefore, in some egalitarian groups there is suspicion and distrust of outsiders, and strong trust of insiders. Nature is seen as fragile, and expert knowledge is usually connected to institutions that cannot be trusted, therefore environmental risks are seen as high. Small changes can produce large and potentially catastrophic changes in the natural balance. Equality, empowerment, playing it safe, and collective unity are typical egalitarian values.

Figure 5: Four Cultural Biases—A Typology



The *individualistic cultural bias* is characterized by rejection of both the hierarchical emphasis on tradition and order and the egalitarian emphasis on community. Community is seen as a false promise of safety: in the end, it is every man for himself. Fair exchange[10] is the true basis for cooperation—everyone should contribute and receive in equal amounts. Individualists are the prototypical entrepreneurs. They not only see new business opportunities but, for several reasons, also have the courage to act upon them. Firstly, because there are fewer rules governing behavior than typically exist in a hierarchy, and since there is no need to ensure that everyone behaves in the same way, as there is in egalitarianism, individualists see more opportunities around them. Secondly, nature is seen as robust and predictable. Third, risks are perceived as low, regardless of whether they are social, environmental, or economic. Fourthly, there is really no need to wait for the hierarchical experts to tell a person what to do—people know themselves best. Individualists are likely to trust anyone, until they prove themselves to be untrustworthy. Moreover, as most transactions are completed in a short time the required level of trust needed for cooperation is lower than in egalitarianism and hierarchy. A common belief is that everybody who tries hard enough will succeed. Similarly, present results are the true measure of a person's value—"you are only as good as your last one." High rewards for taking chances and succeeding, accepting failure, and importance of balanced exchange are typical individualistic values.

The *fatalistic cultural bias* is characterized by some randomness and belief in sheer luck. Where the hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic cultural biases are easy to describe, the fatalistic cultural bias is more elusive. Because external events have a big influence on people's lives, there is not much belief in planning for the future.

[10] I previously called this for *reciprocity*, which was not precise enough. In the context of household interviews the typical balanced exchange resembles what Sahlins calls balanced reciprocity, between generalized and negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1972), but individualistic bias does not limit it self to balanced reciprocity. In extremely competitive individualistic contexts, negative reciprocity is likely to be the ideal. All these forms of reciprocity are covered by what Polanyi calles exchange (Polanyi 1957)

Random traits from the other ways of life are used as a way to dress up. A fatalistic household might borrow from the hierarchical bias by arguing for the importance of upholding traditional Christmas dinner and then present a long list of excuses for why they have served something else the last years. There is only a low correlation between trying hard and succeeding—some people are just luckier than others. As life is seen as a lottery, the most likely way to riches is through some form of lottery.

Keeping track of Different Dimensions

It is easy to lose track of the different dimensions and aspects involved. If we are studying social relations, we operate with grid and group and denote the items in the typology as hierarchy, ego-focused networks, enclaves, and isolation. If we are studying behavior, we borrow the dimensions from transaction theory: degree of competition and symmetry of transactions. If we are interested of mental constructs, we usually talk more about the four cultural biases—hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian, and fatalistic biases—and less about the dimensions. This division is partly a result from different approaches to the data. If one's interest is in institutions, social relations tend to be emphasized. If one's interest is in discourses and the logic of arguments, cultural biases tend to be emphasized. Similarly, survey data is relies on the measurement of cultural biases, rather than social relations.

There are also alternative ways to present the theory, where the dimensions forming the four ways of organizing are not from purely analytical dimensions like grid and group. I share Michael Thompson's view of the different ways of organizing as the theoretical starting point for claiming that grid-and-group are not necessary components of the theory (Thompson 2008:137).[11] Earlier he has presented the degrees of accountability and degrees of symmetry of the transactions as an alternative to the grid-and-group dimensions (Thompson 1996).

Because the most important claim in the theory concerns how behavioral strategies, social relations, and cultural biases go together, the strongest applications of the theory are the ones that manage to collect data from all three aspects. A relatively stable combination of matching behavioral strategy, social relations, and cultural bias is called *a way of organizing,* type of social organization, form of solidarity, or just culture by people who work with cultural theory. Even if it can be useful to conceptualize the ways of organizing as cultures, in the field of migration research it would create unnecessary misunderstandings. I prefer to use "way of organizing," because the term "culture" is used as component of "ethnic culture," "sub-culture," and many other terms.

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11 See page 289 for alternatives to grid and group.

In Figure 6, below, we can see a summary of the four ways of organizing. Each small circle or triangle is a person, while the arrows depict social relations. The hierarchical way of organizing consists of several spheres of life, each supplying the people with different roles and social relations. We have the egalitarian way of organizing, which consists of an enclave with a boundary separating it from the others, and symmetrical social relations that do not give a power privilege to anyone. We have the individualistic way of organizing, consisting of ego-focused networks, where everyone has their own private social network, which then together creates a social web. Last, we have the isolate way of organizing, consisting of people with social relations that do not carry well-defined obligations of support and help.

Figure 6: Four Ways of Organizing



On the macro-level these four ways of organizing are in conflict with each other, by default, because they define themselves in opposition to the others and they distribute blame to the others. On the other hand, each one of them has weaknesses, which makes them vulnerable and dependent on the other ways of organizing (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4). This creates a pattern of change in search of a balance, and a tug of war between the four ways of organizing.

Now, one should not take these four ways of organizing to be anything more than a typology that can be more or less useful. The usefulness in this case is connected to a way of describing households and their relations with the rest of society that is independent of ethnicity and country of origin, and in their ability to explain political views.

So What?

So, what is the point—why do we need another perspective or another typology for this study? So far, the empirical field of migration studies has been dominated by perspectives connected to flows of people (inflows, outflows, push and pull factors), or ethnicity, culture, race, and identity, all of which emphasize the difference between "them" and "us."

As Portes points out:

> Theoretical breakthroughs do not arise out of additional data, but out of the ability to reconstitute a perceptual field identifying connections previously not seen. (Portes 1997:803)

Cultural theory is important as a new perspective, which enables one to see the world in a new light, less clouded by ethnicity, race, and religion. It is a new way to look at the people living here, allowing them the possibility to change who they are. Nevertheless, pure novelty is not enough.

> A strategic problem in building scientific explanation is to decide on the most important dimensions of analysis. Progress is made when we discover that certain dimensions are more productive than others. (Kemper and Collins 1990:32)

One of the most important characteristics of social life is its inherent richness and variability, a fact that calls for "thick description," as societies are rich in detail and information. Part I of this thesis is an exploratory attempt to avoid this thick description when dealing with migrants, even if they have a cultural background unfamiliar to us. Non-familiarity does not imply difference. My main empirical finding is that, with the tools provided by cultural theory, migrant households do not look that different from majority households. Being minorities these households are of course under different structural conditions, and sometimes subjected to direct, unintended, systemic, or structural discrimination.[12]

I believe that cultural theory can be useful for the study of migrants, even if, as Caulkins contends

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[12] Discrimination is not the topic of this thesis. Good discussions and definitions can be found elsewhere (Olli and Kofod Olsen 2006; Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004; Craig 2005).

> … much remains to be done before grid/group theory can become a convincing tool for cross-cultural research. (Caulkins 1999:125)

The biggest challenge for cultural theory, in my opinion, is operationalization, that is, how to measure cultural theory in surveys (see Part II), and how to measure the ways of organizing in different contexts.[13] In Part I will operationalize cultural theory for the use in households. Tamils, Chileans, and Vietnamese come from different societies, from different social conditions, for different reasons, and with varied personal backgrounds (education, language skills, work experience, religious beliefs and affiliations). If I can use the operationalization on so diverse households, it probably can be used on households with other backgrounds, too.

The theoretical starting point for cultural theory is not atomistic individuals, but rather social relationships between individuals—an approach that is also shared by many sociologists (see Kemper and Collins 1990:33).

> It is not exaggeration to say that the main task in theorizing, analyzing, or explaining is what to leave out. The power of a theory is determined by how much is accounted for by how little. (Wildavsky 1989b:61)

The great potential in cultural theory lies in its ability to overlook some aspects of life, while allowing us to focus on others that might be more familiar to us. Thus we might be able to bridge the gap between "us" and the "other." Or, to be more precise, it is a tool for jumping over the gap. It does not provide any clear-cut answers, but can be used to grasp the lifestyle and behavior of the "others." Moreover, if we are able to overlook the aspects of race, funny accents, and limited Norwegian skills perhaps we are able to meet the "others" more as people, rather than representatives of an ethnic group.

What Has and What Could Cultural Theory Be Used to Explain?

"So what—another typology" is a common and justified response. A theory gains its worth from its ability to explain phenomena. As Douglas writes, the grid and group dimensions are very general:

> All the arguments taking place in families, churches and sports clubs are about whether the institution shall draw its group boundary closer, or relax it, apply its rules more strictly, create more rules, or relax them all. (Douglas 1982a:5)

[13] Caulkins's study was based on a survey. Creating a cross-cultural survey with high validity, regardless of the topic, is a very difficult task, because of the necessity of standardization of questions. I have chosen, in the household study in Part I, to use face-to-face interviews in order to adapt my questions during the interviews. Nevertheless, in Part II of the thesis, I will examine a operationalization from a Nordic, five country survey, which is a cross-cultural, multi-lingual survey, even if the cultural differences between the Nordic countries are small in the global scale.

Because cultural theory is quite abstract, and because it defines the relations between the concepts rather than the content of the concepts, it can be adapted to quite various topics. For me it seems a great advantage that the theory takes account of both macro- and micro-phenomena. Douglas has used it to analyze religious practices and beliefs, as well as the inner life of organizations, and on topics like consumption styles (1996a, 1986, 1996c). By deconstructing the battle between environmentalists, governments, and corporations, Schwartz and Thompson show how the competing worldviews, arguments, and modes of action are logically connected to the type of organization (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). The theory has proven itself useful for topics ranging from risk perception to various political and environmental issues[14] and on many fundamental aspects of human life, some of which are not normally considered social constructions.[15]

Even if the theory is primarily about social institutions and organizing, it has been used on individuals, for one of the elements in the theory, behavioral strategies, can be studied through what people actually do. I will give here three examples of studies that are concerned with the way people behave. First, poor people are often lumped together into one category. Wildavsky and Thompson show how the poor make use of different behavioral strategies, thus creating a need for variation in policies designed to help them (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986a). Second, we often think of cheating as something that is not predictable, but Gerald Mars shows us how the strategies people use to cheat in their jobs are closely related to the way the job is structured (Mars 1994). Third, Dake and Thompson have studied British households and show how common household tasks, social relations, and resource management follows a pattern characterized by cultural theory (Dake and Thompson 1999, 1993).

What Could Cultural Theory Be Used for in the Study of Migration?

The old racism which focused on biological race has been replaced by a new form of racism, or cultural racism, which emphasizes the incompatibility of some cultural forms or religions.[16] I show how the cultural traits of migrant households are neither connected to the country they are coming from, nor are they that different

[14] There are many available examples of these (Dake and Wildavsky 1991; Douglas 1982c; Ellis 1993; Grendstad 1995b, 1995a; Grendstad and Selle 1996; Grendstad 2008; Ney and Thompson 1999; Ney 2009; Olli 1999; Rayner and Malone 1998; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1996, 1997a; Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999; Thompson, Verweij, and Ellis 2006; Thompson 2008; Wildavsky 1989a, 1987, 1985; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Kahan, Braman, et al. 2010; Verweij and Thompson 2006; 6 and Mars 2008; 6 2011)

[15] Examples of these are taboos (Douglas 2002b); form and structure of religious belief (Douglas 1996a); human needs and wants (Douglas 1998a, 1996c); what is acceptable risk (Douglas 1985, 1992); perception (Douglas 1982c); eating and drinking habits (Douglas and Gross 1981); fairness (Wildavsky 1989b); what is a legitimate argument (Frølich 1996); esthetics (Douglas 1996b); and view of nature (Schwarz and Thompson 1990).

[16] New racism is discussed in by many researchers (Hernes and Knudsen 1990; Schierup 1992; Brox 1997b; Back and Solomos 2000; Christensen 2001; Romm 2010).

from the ways of life we know from the households of the majority. This can provide a theoretical and practical platform to *combat cultural racism*.

The four ways of organizing could be used as the core of an introductory course in *cross-cultural understanding and communication*, because they emphasize the commonalities between cultures, while the more common approaches to culture emphasize the differences that make each culture special: language, religion, traditions, et cetera (Kim and Ofori-Dankwa 1995). Focusing on differences is not necessarily the best starting point for improving the quality of social interaction and policymaking. It is difficult to create social interaction if one does not understand which common principles are available for use. Possessing information only about differences can lead to paralysis, as one loses sight of the common points of departure.

> If there are an infinite and unrelated number of cultures, hence, of cultural premises, no intelligible answer to the question of preference formation can be given except "it depends." History is uniqueness. However, if the types of viable cultures are limited in number and interconnected, formed and reformed along the same dimensions, a comprehensible answer can be given: people continuously construct and reconstruct their culture through decision making. The values people prefer and their beliefs about the world are woven together in their institutions. By conceiving cultures as theories about conceptions of the good life (desired values) and the way the world works (beliefs about facts), [that] are related to patterns of social relations, we can begin to connect cultures to preferences. (Wildavsky 1989b:60)[17]

One of the theory's main advantages is its *high degree of abstraction*. It helps us to gaze behind the level of cultural symbols and thereby shift the focus from the content of symbols to the structure and working of social systems. Therefore, all households can be compared regardless of language, religion, size, goals, and so forth, if the right information is available.

One of cultural theory's strongest points is that it assumes that *people are rational*, that a person's behavior ultimately makes sense to that individual in one way or other. In addition, cultural theory insists that there are multiple rationalities. Each of the four ways of organizing has its own rationality, its own way of reasoning and perceiving the world. This is an improvement compared to the single-minded approach of rational choice, which corresponds closely to the logic of individualism in cultural theory. In addition, the way cultural theory limits the rationalities to only the four ways of life makes the variation large enough to be useful (see the empirical material starting on page 145), while it saves us from problems connected with the singular not-in-my-tribe kind of arguments.

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[17] The quote above is checked, and the original contains an error. I have added [that].

As a community organizer once stated, cross-cultural meetings create anxiety and uncertainty in people.

> Both we, and the new residents with different backgrounds are afraid when we are going to meet new people. It is a social situation with high uncertainty. We are scared to death to say something wrong. But we must be honest, I believe. It is difficult to come alone to a group for everyone. It is not easy to organize in a multicultural context because people with different backgrounds have different views of organizing. (Loga 2011:105)

There seems to be some difficulties with organizing across ethnic boundaries.[18] There is a whole range of possible misunderstandings connected to community organizing (Loga 2011:110-114). This is unfortunate, as sometimes experiences of misunderstanding lead to less trust and less willingness to participate in the local community. I suggest that the four ways of organizing, as stereotypes of organizing, can be helpful for communicating in a ethnically diverse context on how a particular task or project is organized.

Cultural theory can be used to *build trust in local communities* by demonstrating how the lifestyles of the 'other' are not that different from the lifestyles found among 'us'. There is a large body of American literature pointing out how increasing ethnic diversity leads to a reduction of generalized trust (Putnam 2007), while the European literature largely rejects this.[19] Many different explanations have been proposed for what is the true cause of the reduction in trust. However, the general impression is that contact with people different from us is avoided as long as possible, and it is in the presence of some mechanisms that create pressure toward social contact when we first start to learn from each other (Frølund Thomsen 2012; Wood and Landry 2008). I suggest that the four ways of organizing are a source for trust that can be utilized to build predictable interaction across what are commonly seen as cultural or ethnic boundaries. What Putnam calls 'hunkering down' in these ethnically diverse communities, looks to me very much like increasing fatalism.[20]

Cultural theory allows us to reformulate common *conflicts*. Let us say that two families with different cultural backgrounds become neighbors and eventually find themselves in a conflict. Instead of framing it just as a cultural conflict (which suggests that the solution is either the assimilation of the minority family into the mainstream culture or that the Norwegian family becomes more tolerant), with the help of cultural theory we can portray the actors in a different manner. If they adhere to two different ways of organizing, "negotiations" between them will be difficult, regardless of their ethnic background. Cultural theory can predict what

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18 Many authors mention such problems (Hagelund and Loga 2009; Loga 2011; Ødegård 2010, 2011; Segaard 2011; Wollebaek and Segaard 2011; Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes 2011).

19 Putnam's claim has been tested in Europe by many (Torpe 2003; Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and Scheepers 2009; Rothstein 2011; Lolle and Torpe 2011; Ivarsflåten and Strømsnes 2011).

20 "Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation." (Putnam 2007:149)

traits these families find problematic in each other and what they can find in common, given that we know what kind of way of organizing they prefer.

Cultural theory's typology is quite extraordinary, for it allows us to study how migrants relate to the majority society with regard to cultural issues, behavior, and social relations. In addition, it claims that all of these are related to each other. So it becomes possible to understand why differences in belief systems lead to differences in behavior, or why the lack of social contact inhibits migrants' integration into the majority society, or why certain aspects of the majority society's culture just do not fit into a household's way of organizing. In addition, cultural theory offers suggestions as to which sections of the majority society a migrant household will find familiar and easier to relate to, thus offering some guidance toward improving integration.

The Content of the Thesis

The main goal of this thesis is to develop our understanding of the individual-culture relationship. This book is divided into three parts: the migrant household study, the operationalization for survey use, and the discussions.

Part I: A Qualitative Study of Migrant Households

Part I is a study of migrant households in Norway. It starts with Chapter 2, where I contextualize my research in relation to the field of migration studies. I take up several discussions concerning the conceptualization of migrants, including the difference between them and us, the essentialism in nationality-based stereotypes, and how the majority population uses social stereotypes. In Chapter 3, I operationalize cultural theory for a qualitative study of households' internal organizations, and make theoretically-based predictions about their political views. Chapter 4 is the methods chapter for the household study. It starts out with a summary of research design and then moves on to discuss the household samples by looking at how they were sampled and gained access to, how the interviews were conducted, and how the analysis was prepared and reflected upon. The chapter ends with a discussion on validity and reliability.

Chapter 5 is a presentation of eight households, where I show how cultural theory *allows us to describe and categorize how a household is organized internally and how they give and receive help through their social relations.* I analyze their ways of organizing: their history, their division of labor, their manner of making decisions and making ends meet, their social relations, and their ways of receiving and giving help. I compare the way of organizing in each household with their own stories about the institutions of the welfare state, politics, and society in general. In addition to introducing empirical evidence to the theory, the intention of this chapter is to create images of households that the reader can relate to, regardless of his or her national background. When described in this manner, these households seem rather familiar, as most of us have experiences with several ways of organizing.

Part I of the thesis ends in Chapter 6, where I present three different analyses that all confirm the strong relationship between a household's way of organizing and its statements concerning politics and society. In every one of the eight households, one way of life dominated. I show that knowing how a household is organized helps us to predict and understand how that household relates to the state in terms of norms, values, understandings, and behaviors, regardless of the household's ethnic origin. *To a large degree, each household expressed political views that are consistent with the way their household is organized.* Country of origin does not seem to be closely related to either a household's way of organizing or its views of politics and society.

When interviewed as households, the political views of the migrants were quite coherent. I suggest that when the questions are presented in a real-life context, these views are more coherent than some survey research suggests. In addition, I suggest that the coherency in a person's opinions follows the four ways of organizing rather than following a political ideology. Organizing a household can provide its members with social skills, social relations, and social experiences that influence their relations with the rest of the society. Moreover, the way a household is organized can shape its members' understanding of concepts like human nature, democracy, trust, institutions, resources, roles of the state, justice, blame, and social support. However, I cannot establish the causal direction with this data.

Part II: Operationalizing Cultural Bias in the Surveys

Based on survey data using Dake's cultural bias items, Part II is an operationalization of cultural theory. In Chapter 7, I discuss the unfinished business that cultural theory has at the micro-level. First, we lack good measurements of concepts that are central to cultural theory. Second, cultural bias is measured without a model of the individual-culture relationship. Third, there is some confusion about the appropriate level of analysis, which sometimes leads to jumping between levels of analysis. Fourth, the meaning carried by cultural biases is assumed to behave like a number in statistical analyses.

In Chapter 8, I construct scales for measuring cultural biases from data found in a 1999 survey of the general population in each of the five Nordic counties. In this chapter, I will discuss reliability, construct validity, and the acquiescence problem as they relate to the Nordic-level survey. In the end, I give some suggestions for improvement.

In Chapter 9, and based upon the choices made in the Chapter 8, I construct a scale for measuring cultural biases from the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey, which contains a large sample of members of environmental organizations and a general population sample. Unfortunately, reliable scales could not be made from this survey because it failed to contain enough items for measuring cultural biases. Therefore, based on the suggestions given in the previous chapter, I make new scales by adding items not originally intended for the cultural bias scales. The new scales include items on growth, trust, and the environment, and thus cover more domains than the original scales. Despite of this, they have acceptable levels of reliability. In addition, they are less influenced by acquiescence.

Chapter 10 presents the use of individual-level cultural combinations as a possible solution to the micro-level problems. Since using cultural bias combinations is still a new approach, I conduct an empirical exploration to find the set of choices that works best. I use a broad approach in this chapter. Instead of choosing one set of assumptions and moving into depth in light of these assumptions, I remain open and examine multiple assumptions. I make hundreds of versions of the same cross table, one for each possible set of choices, and thus empirically explore the various predictive abilities of the different assumptions. I discuss the different assumptions and demonstrate that the combinations using rejection perform better than those that only deal with support; that knowledge of indifference does not increase the power of the explanation if we already have knowledge of rejection and support; and that sometimes two biases is enough for a good explanation, while sometimes all four biases are needed.

Based on the findings in Chapter 10, I suggest using two different operationalizations of cultural bias combinations: *cultural space*, which uses all four biases, and the *two top-ranked biases*, which uses those two cultural biases where the respondent deviates most from the country average.

Chapter 11 is about applying the two suggested cultural bias combinations as an explanation for party preferences. First, I discuss the Nordic party family preferences by focusing on a series of figures of cultural space that use all four biases simultaneously. This opens up for some new questions and insights concerning party families. Second, I use the two top-ranked biases to predict party family preferences at the Nordic level. This gives new insights into how cultural biases are used for generating political preferences. The cultural space differentiates between 81 cultural combinations, which makes it rather impractical to use because several thousand respondents would be needed for establishing reliable results. Therefore, the two top-ranked biases approach seems to be a better choice, as it can be used in surveys with only one-thousand respondents.

Cultural biases give meaning to the world around us. Overall, both of these cultural bias combination variables make sense of people's party family preferences. This strengthens my belief in the operationalization of cultural biases as cultural combinations rather than as four additive and continuous scales. By the end of Chapter 11, the preparations for the analysis are completed, and we have a tool that can be used for further analyses.

Part III - Discussions

Part III turns the gaze back toward cultural theory and uses the empirical material from the household study and the surveys to discuss theoretical matters. In Chapter

12, I empirically test three assumptions that are commonly used in analyses based on survey data about cultural biases. Since there is always a random element in sample surveys, I perform these tests in seven separate samples from five different countries as a way to increase our trust in the findings. Cultural theory was once expected to give great explanations of people's political preferences. However, 20 years of survey research has not yielded the expected results. I suggest that the reason for this has been the reliance on analytical techniques that rely on three fallacies.

First, *the dominant bias assumption* does not receive empirical support and should be considered a fallacy. People do not have one bias that dominates over the other biases. Therefore, we should avoid calling and thinking about people as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic.

Second, *the additivity of effects assumption* does not receive empirical support and should be considered a fallacy. Even if people have and use several biases, we cannot simply add together the effects of two biases. Cultural biases do not behave like numbers. The process of adding together two meanings can create a third meaning, which is different from the simple sum of the first two meanings.

Third, *the independence of effects assumption* does not receive empirical support and should be considered a fallacy. The effect of a bias depends on the other biases. Therefore, we should avoid analyzing the effects of a bias one at the time. Given these fallacies, I suggest that the best way to use cultural biases at the individual level is through the use of combinations of cultural biases, which I have explored in Part II.

I Chapter 13, I discuss *what rejection is* when found in institutions and in people. Rejection is easily found in the household interviews. Households use it in their stories to make sure that I understand what kind of household they are. Rejection is used as a way to emphasize the dominant way of organizing within the household. In addition, there is rejection based on previous negative experiences. In households, rejection is clearly less important than support for cultural biases, as rejection does not seem to serve as a basis for organizing.

Based on the surveys alone, I have information only about cultural biases. In both the Nordic sample and in the NEPS95, people commonly reject one or several cultural biases. Interestingly, the environmentalists reject a larger number of biases when compared to the rest of the population.

Rejection allows individuals to relate to institutions. I suggest that the inclusion of rejection in cultural combinations can be a good way to deal with four cultural biases at the individual level. In addition, the measurement of cultural biases should allow for rejection.

Cultural theory, in its present form, is mostly about institutions, and it has great potential for including individuals when the theory incorporates at the institutional and the individual levels the idea of rejecting cultural biases. I hope that by creating a theoretical opening toward individuals, we can utilize the present developments in cognitive and social psychology without giving away the importance of institutions.

Finally, in Chapter 14, I summarize selected findings and make some final remarks about the individual-culture relationship, the meaning of rejection, and the use of stereotypes from cultural theory in the field of migration. I close the thesis by giving some directions for future research.

PART I: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Part I is a study of migrant households, which serves four purposes. First, it is a proposal for an alternative way of classifying migrant households by using cultural theory. Cultural theory can help to break down stereotypes based on nationality or ethnicity, and provide us with an alternative classification as a basis for building social interaction with strangers.

Second, cultural theory makes claims about a required compatibility between social relations and cultural biases. In this study, the households' internal organization and their social relations are compared with the households' views of politics and society. The connection is strong and confirms the predictions made by cultural theory. This suggests that political scientists should remember to look at the household and family as sources of values and opinions.

Third, this is a study of one particular type of institution, namely households. All households included in this study are actually small family units consisting of a mother, a father, and their children. Since cultural theory is about institutions, it should work well on households. This institutional angle will work as an empirical corrective to the survey research in Parts II and III. Although surveys deal with only a small slice of reality, it is still easy to be carried away with the results from statistical analyses.

Fourth, this study broadens the scope for using cultural theory as a way to empirically study households. The most recent and relevant household study was done in Great Britain by Dake, Thompson, and Neff (1994). My study shows that their approach can be transferred to the Norwegian context and to migrant households from different continents, thus suggesting that their approach can be applied in many different settings.

In Chapter 2, entitled *Making Sense of Migrants*, I give an overview of how migrants are conceptualized by the majority and in the media during public debates. These conceptualizations point to a tendency towards essentialism when we use ethnicity on the level of nation-states to label migrants. However unfortunate, social stereotyping is necessary, and the four ways of organizing can provide us with an alternative stereotype.

Entitled *Operationalizing Cultural Theory,* Chapter 3 transforms cultural theory from an abstract theory to a particular context so that it can be used on households in Norway. Similarly, I present a number of predictions about the connection between political views and the different ways of organizing. I then move on to Chapter 4, entitled *Doing Research on Migrant households*, where I present the qualitative research methods that have guided my research on the migrant households.

In Chapter 5, which is appropriately called *Eight Households*, I present and discuss eight households in detail. Each household is given 10 to 18 pages of space for discussion. I present a selection of their own stories about the internal organization of their households, stories about their social relations, and accounts of their views of politics and society. Each story is given an interpretation. In the end of each household interview, I provide a summary where I count the number of internal traits and compare these traits with the predictions made concerning their political views.

Finally, Chapter 6, entitled *Findings from the Household Study*, wraps up Part I by analyzing and summarizing the findings from the household interviews. First, I go through what we learned about life and social relations within each household. Second, I compare these with the predictions made about political views. Third, I discuss how these findings can be used to improve how we deal with migrants.

Chapter 2

MAKING SENSE OF MIGRANTS

The Need to Understand

One of the most central needs for human beings is to make sense of the world and people around us.[21] However, society is in flux, and the world around us changes rapidly. Migrants bring these global changes right into our own neighborhoods.[22] Civil wars and other atrocities in countries far away have consequences here in our community, as there are people, thousands of them, who have moved here over the years and made Norway their new home.

We cannot pretend that the people living in Norway are ethnically homogeneous. We no longer live in isolated nation-states, if we ever did.[23] This thesis contributes to an understanding of "them"—those people we assume are different from us—by offering an alternative perspective, and by presenting some concepts for a rudimentary understanding and communication between individuals with different cultural backgrounds.

Cultural theory centers on the different ways social interaction can be organized and institutionalized. This thesis proposes that cultural theory can be used to unravel some of these inter-cultural knots and function as a toolkit that helps us to relate to and to interact with people we do not know much about.

In this chapter, I will argue that we need new ways of thinking about migrants, and that cultural theory provides one promising alternative. I will not attempt to present an overview of migration literature as this has been done by many others.[24] I will

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21 "Tajfel was proposing that it was human nature to wish to understand the human world and that the simplifications of categorization were necessary to do so" (Billig 2002:176).

22 Fuglerud represents here a common view of fluidity: "Migration and exile are today phenomena with significance beyond themselves. Even for us, who are still permanent residents, they reflect feelings we can recognize: insecurity, loss, quest, and homelessness. Perhaps that is why migrants today are a 'symptom' of the state of the world in general, and express a fragmentation and fluidity that is common for everybody" (Fuglerud 2001:218 translation by EO). However, I believe there to be order in the chaos, and hope that this thesis will demonstrate the presence of order that can be found in households and society.

23 http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2011-04-28-06.html

24 There are several good overviews of Norwegian research literature (NFR 1993; Knudsen, Aase, and Akman 1995; Fuglerud 2001; Fuglerud and Eriksen 2007; Holm-Hansen, Haaland, and Myrvold 2007; Hagelund and Loga 2009; Rogstad and Midtbøen 2009; Brekke et al. 2010; Seeberg

mainly relate to migration research done in Norway, as there are dangers in importing concepts, descriptions of problems and solutions from the rather hegemonic American research literature (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).

A second goal for this chapter, which mainly deals with questions related to our thinking about and knowledge of migrants, is to create a context for the household interviews conducted in 2001 and 2002. Therefore, I have chosen to present some information that is relevant for the whole period my informants are telling about, sometimes going ten or twenty years back, rather than just the situation today.

I will start with a critical note by presenting some false assumptions about culture and migrants, and how the concepts of 'them' and 'us' are more important than we like to think. Second, I present concepts one needs to know in order to follow the public debate or read policy documents. Third, I will discuss labeling migrants in more general, and ask if new labels can make any difference. Fourth, as I believe social stereotyping is necessary I will present how the majority population sees immigrants, how media portrays migrants, and how the concept of immigrant household is used in everyday language. Fifth, I look at the essentialism in nationality and ethnicity, connect these with myths of similarity, and ask what is normal in Norway.

False Assumptions about Culture and Migrants

In general discussions, culture refers to those aspects of human life that can be learned and transferred from person to person (Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 1997).[25] Obviously, there are cultural differences between people from different countries. The interesting question is how we respond to these differences. Selmer describes three incorrect assumptions that the Danes often make about migrants. I believe that Norwegians tend to make the same assumptions. First, culture and traditions are static, do not change, and consist of a set of rules that determines how an individual should handle any situation. Second, there is a consensus regarding a culture. In other words, a given group of people will share it and agree upon it. Third, each culture is separate from any other culture. Minority cultures are like islands in a sea of the Majority culture (Selmer 1992:188-189). These three assumptions should be considered incorrect, or at least, as making communication across cultural borders difficult. In addition, these assumptions will lead to research in which all minority behavior can be at least partially explained by minority culture,

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2011; *Norsk nettverk for migrasjonsforskning* 2012), overviews and analyses of migrants living conditions (Bjørnstad 1990; Djuve and Hagen 1995; Aasen 1996; Blom and Ritland 1997; Gulløy, Blom, and Ritland 1997; Dahl 2002; Kirkeberg 2003; Dahl 2004; Østby 2004; Øia, Grødem, and Krange 2006; Aalandslid 2007; Bråthen et al. 2007; Henriksen 2007; Blom 2008b; Blom and Henriksen 2008; Løwe 2008; Aalandslid 2009; Blom 2010; Henriksen 2010; Hirsch 2010; Løwe 2011; Olsen 2011), and analyses and overviews of the majority populations attitudes towards minorities (Ritland 1996; Brox 1997b, 1997a; Blom 1998, 2004; Carlsen and Langset 2005; Blom 2006; IMDi 2007a; Blom 2008a; Ellingsen, Henriksen, and Østby 2010; Hellevik 2010; IMDi 2010, 2011).

[25] "Culture" also has a more specific usage within cultural theory. See pages 18 and 96.

which in the age of nation states is often understood to be identical with country of origin.

A much more useful set of assumptions would rely on the understanding, first, that ethnic and national culture and traditions are dynamic and ever-changing, and do not provide guidance in all situations (cf. Werbner 1990). Second, that people share a culture to a varying degree and can disagree about its content. Third, cultures borrow content from each other and the influence can be in any direction. Fourth, one's culture and national origin are not identical: One's birthplace does not change, but one's' cultural make-up will change with experiences; we have only one birthplace, whereas we can participate in several cultures.

To learn to coexist peacefully and cooperate with our new neighbors and co-workers we have to learn more about them and their patterns of social interaction. One possible approach is to construct new concepts and typologies that can help to create order and understanding.[26]

In addition to integration in general, I believe that ways of organizing have a high use value, if it is possible to operationalize them in a way that allows practitioners (teachers, social workers, doctors, etc.) to interact more effectively with immigrants. Similarly, it could be used to improve communication about organizing in culturally diverse local communities. However, this is something that must be done in cooperation with the practitioners, and will not be part of this thesis.

Them and Us

The categories presently used to describe our migrants have both weaknesses and strengths. The biggest weakness in my view is the distinction made between *them* and *us*.[27] The following quote by Gullestad is one of the intellectual cornerstones of my work:

> Simultaneously, while the dichotomized division into "them" and "us" now seems natural and self-explanatory, there are many situations open for new metaphors, new categories, and new interpretations. (Gullestad 2002:119)

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[26] Lithman presentes this as a question:

> Is it possible to construct typologies, and hence move towards an understanding of modalities? The answer to this question relates to another—is it possible to arrive at a more systematic understanding of the relationship between culture, meaning building, on the one hand, and social relationships, as depicted in the form [network analysis] above, on the other hand. It is anticipated that work along these lines will lead to a better understanding of migrant situations (Lithman 1988:262).

[27] Everyone interested in how images of the Other permeate European culture, customs and beliefs should have a look at Said's *Orientalism* (2003). Anderson has analyzed how being labeled as the other, influences the immigrant youth (2000).

Gullestad is explicitly suggesting that there are other alternatives. However, even if her criticisms of the present categorization are elegant and necessary, the alternative she presents is not useful for policy purposes.

> What is needed are not new and substantial categories to put people into, or any new labels to stamp them with, but rather new forms of *social musicality*. I define social musicality as the ability to listen, and to form one's responses based on what one hears. It is a presupposition to be able to treat each other with dignity. (Gullestad 2002:216)

Gullestad's suggestion is insufficient for policy-makers who need help organizing the world. Social musicality can be a good metaphor, but it does not provide us with an alternative to ethnic categorization.

What kinds of conceptual alternatives are there? There are authors who suggest that we should dispose of essentialized conceptualizations and learn to live with the ambiguity present in the postmodern world (for some examples of this, see Bauman 1996; Gressgård 2003). This is a suggestion appropriate for academics, who make a living from their ability to deal with ambiguities and distinctions (or the lack of them) in our surroundings. Similarly, there are suggestions for how we must give up our stereotypes and treat every person as a true individual. Both of these suggestions put demands on people that are difficult, if not impossible, to meet in real life situations. Teachers, doctors, social workers, and other professionals have only limited time and resources to invest in each case.

Conceptualizing Migrants

There are some concepts concerning migration and migrants that must be understood in order to participate in and understand the debate.[28] The first ones relate to categorizing individuals, while the second set of concepts relates to the minority-majority relationship.

Migration refers to the process of relocation from one country to another and the changes in social structures this brings along. *Migrants* are the people who move from one country to another. If focus is on the leaving of a country, they are labeled and counted as *emigrants*. If focus is on the receiving country, the people moving in are labeled and counted as *immigrants*. I often prefer to use the concept of migrant, rather than immigrant, even if those I have interviewed are in Norway to stay permanently, because it contains internal tension—these households are both emigrants and immigrants. In addition, the concept of immigrant seems to

[28] A recent Official Norwegian Report gave an authorative overview of how these concepts are used in official policy documents (NOU 2011:14: 26).

suggest the insertion of something new or something strange into the majority society. Here the built-in tension seems to be between the internal and the external.

We need to distinguish between *citizens* and *non-citizens*, which is the distinction made by the public authorities. For the state, all citizens presumably have the same rights. This concept emphasizes the relationship an individual has to the state: we live in a democracy where citizens govern themselves. Non-citizens are a residual category consisting of people with residency permits (refugees, family reunion, work permit, study permit, etc.) and those who do not have residency permits (tourists, asylum seekers, illegal residents, etc.). Non-citizens do not have a complete range of political rights; however, many of them have a wide range of social rights.

It is important to be aware that *nationality* is not the same as citizenship. Nationality refers to "membership" in a nation, which "is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991:6). However, as a collectively imagined community it is as real as any other social construct. Because of the success of nationalism, and the subsequent standardization as a part of state and nation building in Europe (Rokkan 1987), there is confusion regarding the meaning of these two concepts. This confusion can be removed by accepting the partial overlap between citizenship and nationality as concepts. Having citizenship and a passport are the obvious official signals of nationality, but not all citizens are nationals or all nationals citizens.[29] In other words, migrants granted Norwegian citizenship are not automatically included in the social life as nationals, even if they have full rights in the eyes of the state.

The same phenomena can be seen if one looks at how this concept is used in the media. In Norway, *norsk* (Norwegian) refers to a person who has both citizenship and nationality, *etnisk norsk* (ethnically Norwegian) refers to both cultural background and whiteness (Vassenden 2007:20-21), and *norsk statsborger* (Norwegian citizen) is used, more and more, to distinguish the majority population from those who have citizenship, but who are not nationals.[30]

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[29] Sicakkan and Lithman explain how these terms have different meanings in different languages:

> The English language has a distinction between nationals and citizens, the later being the wider term. If being a national connotates having a nationality, being a citizen relates to being fully vested with rights to participate in the political life. In Swedish, the term *medborgerskap* (in spite of its historical roots tying it to rights in the medieval city) denotes nationality, as does the Norwegian term, *statsborgerskap*. The French *citoyen*, while like citizenship building on the legacy of the city, is permeated by the republican heritage of the French revolution, and has even more clearly than citizenship allusions to everybody's claim to political participation. (Sicakkan and Lithman 2002:19)

[30] An example is the following quote from *Dagbladet* (a national newspaper) describing a second-generation migrant: "The 25-year-old, born in Norway, with Norwegian citizenship, has only contempt for the values in the Norwegian society (Hultgreen 2002)."

This person is not part of the imagined community, as he demonstratively removes himself from it by rejecting its values. This is something he can do because his identity and loyalty is connected to

The second set of concepts relates to the minority-majority relationship: *Assimilation* refers either to a process, or an ideal, of creating a homogeneous population, where the minorities gradually become identical to the majority population in terms of language, religion, economy, self-identity, and cultural traditions. *Segregation* refers to a practice, or an ideal, in which different populations are kept separate in order to prevent them from mixing with each other. Racial segregation was the public policy in the southern United States until the 1960s and in South Africa until the 1990s. Religious segregation is practiced by Israel in the occupied territories. *Integration* often refers to an ideal, or a process, in which minorities keep their identity and some of their cultural traits, while they become full participants in the majority society's economic, political, and social life. The content of these concepts is highly politicized and contested.[31]

Ethnicity as the Starting Point for Integration?

There are some real problems connected with immigration and the adaptation of immigrants into the majority society. During the summer of 2011, the terrorist bombings in Oslo have spread their shadow over Norway. I am afraid that uncertainty and the level of conflict between the minorities and the majority population could grow in the future. In a situation where political violence in the Middle East and European cities is practically a daily news issue, it is vital for the future of democracy that the state be able to create confidence in the population of its ability to deal with the integration of minorities.

Both the majority population and the minorities need to feel secure and safe. The universal welfare state is an important safety net that also helps to create strong legitimacy for the state and its interventions. The future of the universal welfare state also depends on its legitimacy among all population groups. If one or more large voter group loses faith in the welfare state as a fair and reliable means to distribute privileges and burdens, we may see some reductions in its degree of universality, which could further a society of first and second class citizens and a harsher political climate within the society.

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another ethnicity. In Norway, there is a common expectation of a collective loyalty to the Norwegian nation, whereas people with a non-Norwegian ethnic background might have problems with this, even if they are loyal to the Norwegian state. This points toward a way out of the traditional thinking concerning national states and into new forms of belonging in our increasingly globalized society. The meaning and boundaries of being *Norwegian* have become unclear.

[31] Many political philosophers and ideologues use these concepts, but give them a content that reflects the rest of their concepts. An overview of these different views of integration can be found in Høibø (2004). Another way to define a concept is to list subtypes. Diaz, for example, divides integration into 1) Communicative integration (language skills and mass media consumption), 2) Structural integration (participation in economic life), 3) Political integration (political participation + naturalization), 4) Social integration (social contact with majority population), 5) Family integration (family networks that cross nationality boundaries), 6) Residential integration, 7) Personal integration (personal satisfaction with life in a new community) (Diaz 1995).

Last year the government published two important official reports concerning migration: *Welfare and Migration* and *Better Integration: Goals, Strategies, and Policy*. The first one discusses the sustainability of the welfare state in light of global migration. The main conclusion is that as long as migrants are working in sufficient numbers, they will not challenge the economic base of the welfare state, nor its legitimacy in the majority population. When attempts are made to differentiate between migrant groups, the approach taken is largely economic, and migrants are treated as individuals whose behavior is influenced by their resources and opportunities, and only in minor degrees by culture (NOU 2011:7). The second report discusses integration policy, and the immigrants' situations in much greater detail. When attempts are made to differentiate between migrant groups, it is largely done by differentiating groupings based on country of origin, since this is the categorization available in the data. Common for these is that cultural diversity is presented as enriching the society, but as a potential threat to the welfare state to the degree the majority perceives the migrants to represent cultural difference (NOU 2011:7:12). Nevertheless, the policies do not deal with this perception of cultural difference in the majority population; instead they target employment, housing, social welfare, and other sectors. However, it is suggested that dialogue should be used as a strategy for dealing with conflicts early, and locally. This is promising, particularly as the goal is not to solve disagreements, but to find ways to live with the differences (NOU 2011:14:352).

In the political debate in Norway, the goal of assimilation was dropped in the 1970s. Since then the official policy has been integration. Brochmann describes the assumptions behind this approach:

> The starting point is that society is divided into different groups that are in a relation to the society as a whole. Migrants are seen as members of ethnic groups, not just individuals, which also means that one intends to integrate whole groups, and not—as in the assimilation school—only equal individuals. Individuals also get rights connected to the group they are members of (or are assigned to). (2002:32)[32]

In many ways, this kind of approach reproduces the national stereotypes and reinforces the nation-state's grip over its population. An individual's degree of belonging in one of these ethnic groups varies more than the integrationists like to think. In Norway, what the majority society considers to be an ethnic group is usually defined by the country of origin, regardless of any internal divisions within that country. Similarly, the local myth is that Norway is traditionally an ethnically homogenous country.[33]

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[32] Unless otherwise noted all quotes and citations, and particularly those marked with "Original text" in the footnote are translated by me.

[33] The Sami and the Finns are excluded when the myth of Norwegianess is constructed. Even if the Sami are considered a native minority and the Finns (kvener and skogfinner) a more recent one,

A few years later, the integration policy started to emphasize diversity through inclusion and participation, and officially targeted the whole population, not just the migrants. A major improvement was that the decedents of migrants are no longer considered immigrants; nevertheless, the ethnic groups are still defined by their country of origin (St.Meld.nr. 49 2003-2004).

Professor Stein Ringen writes: "First, we are fumbling for understanding. We have not yet managed to formulate a reassuring idea of multicultural and mutual integration. Secondly, we are fumbling for how to do it (2005)." Perhaps it would be positive for the future of democracy in Norway to change the assumptions behind policies of integration. Is it necessary to assume that ethnicity or religion is *the* starting place for group formation and integration? Some authors even believe that sustaining ethnic groups will lead to marginalization (Favell 1999:220). I am not suggesting that we deny a person's right of ethnic belonging, but merely questioning the necessity of prioritizing this assumption in policy formulation. This is particularly important in Norway, where we can find an ethnically segregated labor market combined with the notion of equality as a dominating principle in the policies of the welfare state. Otherwise, one ends in a paradox: all groups are different and unique, and have the right to sustain their own cultures, but people should be treated as if they were the same—in this case, Norwegian—in all respects. Why not, instead, use cultural theory as a structuring perspective? Given that a household's view of politics and society is related closer to the way it is organized than its ethnicity or country of origin, it would make more sense to start our thinking and conceptualization from the different ways to organize a household. This is especially true since we know that the different ways of organizing create different responses to the same policy (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986a). In addition, a person can choose a way of organizing, allowing for a classification that encompasses change instead of locking people into a pre-defined category.

Thoughts about Labeling Immigrants

Immigrants are commonly categorized, analyzed, and understood in terms of their country of origin. This is particularly useful in understanding how the push factors in forced migration are closely connected to the activities of nation-states (wars, violent conflicts, different forms of oppression and mistreatment) or lack of action, like failing to provide protection to vulnerable groups. Thus, categorization based on countries is clearly useful in trying to understand causes for migration. However, after migrants are in their receiving country—in this case, Norway—one should take time to ask if this categorization is useful for the purposes of understanding these people and their present lives? It is a common error to assume that the

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they have been subject to a similar assimilationist policy, which tries to eradicate their language and identity (Kjeldstadli 2003:446).

national state equals society (Andersson 2007). For many reasons, other levels in the society are more appropriate.

Does it matter what we call immigrants? Willy Shanti, a migrant himself, expressed his frustration with labeling, in a newspaper interview, after participating in the documentary film *Velkommen hjem* (*Welcome home*):

> I participate in the movie because it is important for me to get people to understand that migrants are not a homogeneous group. We are individuals; different people. I hope the media will stop using the "immigrant" concept—it is so negatively charged … Immigrants are people who breath and struggle with the same problems as Norwegians: bank loan, income tax arrears and such. (Garvik 2002)

Writing about migrants is not easy. It is an area filled with prejudices and value-loaded concepts. Examples of these are all concepts connected to race and the previously much used Norwegian concepts "foreigncultural," in the sense of "strange," (*fremmedkulturell*) and "remote-cultural" (*fjernkulturell*).[34] On the one hand, we researchers want to picture a certain group of people, but at the same time we know that no group of people is actually uniform and easily subjected to description. Moreover, migrants as a group are much more diverse than the majority population when it comes to regular background variables and their experiences of different political and social systems are more varied.[35]

> The question is, thus, how can one exchange information and knowledge that enriches, rather than cements, our stereotype attitudes about each other. (Sørheim 2001:199)

The labeling of phenomena or people is an important practice that influences how we think and what kind of information we are able to convey and understand. There is a long-lasting interest in conceptual discussions within the field of comparative politics. One of these philosophically loaded discussions can be roughly summarized by dividing the academics into two camps: the *lumpers* and the *splitters*. The lumpers believe that it is useful to include many similar items under the same label, as they basically refer to the same thing anyway. The splitters react strongly against this kind of lumping together of disparate items. They believe that it is better to create very specific categories and then divide these into increasingly

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[34] A good presentation of these concepts is provided by Gullestad. She claims that the *fremmedkulturell* was born in the end of the 1980s and, during the first years, used mainly by right wing extremists. Now both concepts seem to have become part of the general vocabulary (2002:92-93). However, I have found a student paper from Kristiansand Lærerhøgskole with the title *Fremmedkulturelle innvandrere* that dates back to 1978 (Hoven 1978).

[35] Migrants are diverse (SSB 2001a; Djuve and Hagen 1995; Byberg 2002; Gulløy, Blom, and Ritland 1997; Tronstad 2004; 2006; IMDi 2006; Bråthen et al. 2007; IMDi 2007b; Aalandslid 2008; Blom 2008b; Blom and Henriksen 2008; IMDi 2009; Søholt and Astrup 2009).

detailed subcategories, until we are able to locate the uniqueness of the subject of the research (Hexter 1979).

A third technique for dealing with labeling is to try to increase understanding with respect to what the *process* of labeling entails.

> An increased awareness of how and why we label people and generalize, and the consequences this can have in practice, is necessary to understanding the society we all are a part of. (Sørheim 2001:189)

How do lumping, splitting, and increasing the awareness about labeling apply in this thesis? The utility of lumping and splitting as concepts lies in their ability to help us see the negative consequences of our concepts. These negative consequences cannot be totally avoided, but one should try to find a good balance between lumping and splitting. The concept of immigrant (*innvandrer*) suffers from lumping together people with very different backgrounds, who do not form a social group, but who are often subjected to treatment as members of a group. Therefore, this is a concept that can be useful in understanding the way they are treated by others, but of little use for addressing any of the issues migrants themselves have. If we then narrow our focus to *country of origin* and talk about people originating from Chile, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, who are currently staying in Norway, we should be very aware that each of these countries, internally, consists of several ethnically distinct groups. Most migrants from Chile come from the "majority" population, but not all. Most migrants from Vietnam belong to the ethnically Vietnamese majority population and not to the Chinese minority. However, many of the migrants from Vietnam, living in Norway, belong to Vietnam's small Catholic minority, but again, not all, as the Buddhists are almost as numerous, and we can even find a few Protestants among them. Most of the people in Norway who come from Sri Lanka belong to the Tamil minority group and have fled civil war and discrimination in Sri Lanka. However, there are also Singhalese people who came here as labor migrants before 1975. In addition, Tamils have varying religious affinities; they are divided into Catholic and Hindu communities. As such, one should always keep in mind that country of origin is not the same as ethnicity, nor does it tell us much about a person's religious or social background.

One could also rely on *ethnicity* as a concept and talk about the Vietnamese, Chileans, and Tamils, but this also has weaknesses. It seems to convey that everyone under these labels is the same in some important respects. It is difficult to keep in mind that not all Vietnamese are the same, if we first use the same label. Similarly, it will undercommunicate any changes after their arrivial to Norway. It is conceivable that some of these people—for example, from Chile—do not have a Chilean self-identity, do not socialize with their former compatriots, and have a lifestyle similar to the Norwegian majority population. Ethnic labeling implies belonging to a community (Anderson 1991). Is it then still right to label this person Chilean if it only signifies a person who once *was* Chilean? In addition, many of the people in my sample are refugees, some of them political refugees, and have an ambiguous relationship to their "nation"—some of them are proud of their ancestry, while others rather distance themselves from it.[36]

The third alternative—increasing awareness—can be achieved by several means. Scholars may carefully state the definitions and limitations they use and write a text that conveys their meaning in a precise manner. Unfortunately, this seems to be an option only within academic discourse. Public discourse has neither the space nor the interest for this kind of subtlety. Therefore, it seems that one viable solution is to develop new stereotypes that can supplement or replace the old stereotypes.

Can New Labels Make a Difference?

The issue of creating new stereotypes is raised in this thesis, which tries to fill the gap left by the literature that shows the perils of ethnic stereotypes but fails to come up with any alternative. We need stereotypes; it is impossible to deal with people who are not close and familiar to us without stereotypes (Macrae, Stangor, and Hewstone 1996). Cultural theory is able to provide stereotypes that are practical (that help us to simplify the world enough to make intentional actions possible) and simultaneously open enough to allow people to move within and between these stereotypes.

There is also an important epistemological difference between stereotypes that are static and unchanging (as ethnic stereotypes easily become) and stereotypes that are dynamic by nature. Static stereotypes contain a permanent set of characteristics, and therefore a closer inquiry into the carrier of the stereotype is unnecessary by default. In contrast, dynamic stereotypes are only guides and in no way make superfluous further inquiry.

Someone could argue that, given this difference, the categories of cultural theory are not true stereotypes, as the main function of a stereotype is to simplify observation and reasoning. However, already in the 1980s researchers demonstrated that cultural theory's categories are intimately connected to the processes of perception, reasoning, and making judgments (for details see Douglas 1982c; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Bloor 1982). What matters is that cultural theory can replace ethnic and other stereotypes in a person's mind with categories that are simplified enough to be useful, while flexible enough to make room for variation.

Can new labeling actually change how minorities are treated or is it purely an academic exercise? One answer is given by Eriksen:

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[36] The concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) could be applied: The loyalty of political refugees has often been directed toward their "nation" rather than state. They have tried using voice, but were forced to exit. These could lead us to expect that their sense of ethnic belonging is strong.

> Historically, prejudices have been most effectively fought by groups labeled less worthy, who have protested and demanded their rights. (Eriksen 2001:69)

Eriksen is probably referring to well documented cases, like the Civil Rights movement in the United States, in the 1960s. Blacks in the southern U.S. shared a great deal: they had a shared social status, a similar work situation, a shared history of enslaved ancestors, and they were collectively subjected to discrimination. Migrants in Norway are not in a similar situation, even if they are subjected to discrimination. They are not *one* group with a shared history: their internal differences make it very difficult for them to organize and represent themselves as migrants; the only thing they have in common is that they live in Norway and are treated by the majority population as migrants. In addition, there is no reason to believe that migrants themselves have any fewer prejudices about each other than Norwegians have about them.

Migrants often use ethnic or national characteristics as a basis for organizing, but most of these ethnic groups are too small to have sufficient influence. Simultaneously, the organizations that represent migrants[37] are unfortunately too dispersed, and therefore have difficulties mobilising for collective action.[38] For how does one represent people with backgrounds ranging from army generals to pacifists; from communists to right wing populists; from professors to analphabets; from state treasury managers to beggars; from those who have different religions and believe in different Gods to those who believe in no God at all; those with different sexual preferences and family patterns; those who speak different languages and write using different alphabets, those who left their homes in urban conglomerate cities to those who hail from the barely inhabited high mountains. What kind of voice can such a mass of people have and, perhaps most importantly, what kinds of voices will disappear? Who are the minorities within the minorities that cannot make themselves heard?

However rosy the dream of finding new labels is, one should not forget the realities of life. Merely having new labels and categories that on paper can be proved preferable to the old ones does not yet mean much. One has to assume that change will be difficult.

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[37] An example of this would be *Kontaktutvalget mellom innvandrerbefolkningen og myndighetene*, which represents migrants in many public matters, especially in public hearings. In 2004 there were eight national organizations empowering and representing migrants interests (Svein Ingve Nødland 2005).

[38] Migrant women in Norway are poorly represented, and use unformal channels (Predelli 2003). Language skills are considered the most important threshold for invidiual participation in organizational life in Norway (Enjolras and Wollebæk 2010).

> It is probably possible for all of us to see through our cultural prejudices if we are honest with ourselves, but it takes much stronger medicine to change them. Even if the head says yes, it is often possible that the body will say no. (Eriksen 2001:64)[39]

Many concepts are so deeply socialized that changing them takes time and conscious effort. New concepts find their way into everyday language only if they are commonly found useful.

There are many ways to deal with people different from "us," and there are many ways to find out who is different from "us." In the United States race has traditionally been used as a way to distinguish between people, and still today they have a research tradition in the social sciences that focuses on racial issues: are people discriminated against on the basis of their race and, if so, in which ways, and what can be done about it (Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004). For those of us who have grown up in what we like to think of as the color-blind north it is difficult to accept the categories of African-American, Latino, Native-American, or white as legitimate, or even useful, in our everyday lives.[40]

The state of affairs in Norway, however, is not any better, even if race is firmly rejected by practically everyone in the public debate. Unfortunately, in the Norwegian debate, we have merely replaced race with *country of origin*, which then works as a proxy for having a cultural heritage vastly different from ours.

Policymakers cannot change the migrant's situation through simple allocations of funds or changes to laws. The most important changes needed have to do with the way the majority (and the minority) relates to the "other," which is the next topic under scrutiny.

Social Stereotyping is Necessary

Social stereotypes are part of our everyday lives whether we like it or not. We rely on the use of social stereotypes when we meet people and try to find out who they are, what kind of role they play, and how we should respond.

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[39] Original text: "Det er nok mulig for oss alle å gjennomskue våre kulturelle fordommer dersom vi er ærlige overfor oss selv, men det skal atskillig sterkere lut til å for å forandre dem. Selv om hodet sier ja, kan det ofte være at kroppen sier nei."

[40] European researchers have been critized for accepting American problems as a staring point for their own research (Andersson 2007; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).

> Information about the individual helps to define the situation, enabling others to know what they may expect of him. (….) If unacquainted with the individual, observers can glean clues from his conduct and appearance which allows them to apply their previous experience with individuals roughly similar to the one before them or, more important, to apply untested stereotypes to him. (Goffman 1990:13)

In contrast to everyday language, where *stereotype* has a negative connotation—because it implies that something is an oversimplification—social psychologists view it as an extremely useful and even necessary mechanism of thought and perception. A social stereotype can be defined without a normative implication as

> a cognitive structure containing the perceiver's knowledge, beliefs and expectancies about some human social group. (Mackie et al. 1996:42)

Stereotypes are important because they influence many aspects of our daily lives: they influence what information we look for, what gets our attention, what we remember about others, as well as how we behave. In addition to influencing our thinking, the stereotypes we use in an effort to define others influences how they respond to us. Usually this is quite unproblematic. However, the majority population often has the power to caricature minorities into stereotypical characters and roles against those people's own definitions or interests.

Stereotypes have long been studied by social psychologists, who use two different but complementary approaches: the first is individually-oriented and focuses on what is going on inside the mind of a single individual; the second, collectively-oriented, considers stereotypes to be part of the fabric of the society, shared by people with a particular culture. These two approaches span one of the most common discussions within the social sciences, the relative balance between individual and culture:

> Rather the pivotal point of distinction between individual and collective approaches lies in the assumed importance of shared social beliefs, above and beyond that of individual beliefs, as determinants of social behavior. (Stangor and Schaller 1996:5)

However, social psychology has not been able to develop a single approach that unifies these individualistic and the collective approaches.[41] That is why I turn to cultural theory to give a theoretically and empirically founded alternative to commonly used stereotypes about migrants. At the same time, even if the ways of organizing could be seen as sub-types of ethnic stereotypes, they are probably more

[41] There are of course attempts to build bridges between these two approaches, like Tajfel's "Cognitive aspects of prejudice" (1969), but the two approaches have still only few points in common. Another example is Lakoff's work within cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987, 1996).

useful as an alternative source for stereotyping. It then becomes an empirical question as to which contexts the ethnic stereotypes are triggered and which contexts the stereotypes based on cultural theory are triggered.[42]

Being an Immigrant in the Eyes of the Majority

There is little research available regarding how the majority population thinks about and relates to immigrants, except for studies of problematic areas like racism. There are a few fresh exceptions like Sandbu's study of what the majority knows of the muslim minority (2007) and Vassenden's study of how the majority population in an ethnically diverse neighborhood conceptualize diversity and being Norwegian (2007).[43]

Nevertheless, I will try to establish a chain of thought, even if it is somewhat indirect. I will first look at where the majority population gets their information about immigrants—information which influences what kind of stereotypes they use. Second, I will argue for the necessity of stereotypes as practical tools for simplifying the world. Third, I will argue that because we use Nationality, Ethnicity, and Country of Origin, this leads to an invalid and unhelpful essentialism in our thinking about immigrants.

Here, I am not aiming to provide a full account of either the people's or the public institutions' principles of categorization. I only wish to create a backdrop for the household interviews and point to some problems connected with these concepts.

The Majority Population's Sources of Information about Immigrants

Our ideas about cultural differences are heavily influenced by our contact with immigrants and by the sources of information about them that we have available. I will use Hernes and Knudsen's analysis from 1990 because it refers to the same time period as my household interviews. They show that Norwegians have only limited contact with immigrants in their own neighborhood, as only three out of ten actually share a neighborhood with immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen

[42] Social stereotyping vs. Framing: Framing is a cognitive process that is difficult to influence, whereas social stereotypes should be possible to change.

[43] Since 2005, IMDi has conducted an annual survey of opinions toward migrants and integration, and some of the questions within the surveys are relevant for my purposes (IMDi 2011). On an annual basis, SSB has, since 1993, included in an omnibus four questions that measure attitudes toward migration policy and immigrants, but I find them to be mostly irrelevant (Lie 2002). A larger set of questions were presented in several European countries (Blom 2006). There are also several studies of local communities, which are much more fruitful for my purposes because the studies adopt a more open qualitative approach (Høgmo 1997; Eidheim 1997; Aasen 1996; Bø 1984; Ritland 1996 ; Seeberg 2007; Vassenden 2007; Ødegård 2010; Loga 2011).

1990:50).[44] In addition, and more importantly, of those who actually have immigrants in their neighborhood, 52 percent had never had any contact with them, while 30 percent had contact daily or weekly (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:51). This indicates to me that even if it were possible to have contact, one or both parties often reject this opportunity.[45]

If many Norwegians do not have much face-to-face contact with immigrants, where do they get their information concerning them? As we can see in Table 1, the mass media is by far the most important self-reported source for the large majority of the population in 1990.[46] Only relatively few people report that they get significant amounts of information directly from immigrants themselves. This is an important indicator of what kind of contact the majority population has with the immigrants. Only 16 percent have so much personal contact that they consider it a sufficient source for at least some of their information regarding immigrants and their situation. By implication, the rest—84 percent of the population—have either no contact or else the nature of the contact is so impersonal that it does not give them information about immigrants.[47]

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[44] This number is declining. In 2005 and 2010, 22 percent and 12 percent of the population, respectively, say they have no migrants in their neighborhood. (tnsGallup 2011:52). Yet the number of immigrants in Norway roughly doubled between 1990 and 2005, from 170,000 to 350,000 (Tronstad et al. 2006 Figure 1). In 1980 in the greater Oslo region, there were 14,000 non-European, first generation migrants. By 2011, this number has increased to 110,000. Similarly, in the greater Bergen region in 1980, there were 2,000 non-European first generation migrants and 17,000 in 2011 (SSB statistikkbanken Table 07110).

[45] The same conclusion can be drawn from Ritland's study of the mechanisms behind residential segregation in Oslo (1996). She demonstrates that the majority population's attitudes toward migrants influence whether they want to live in a part of Oslo with a high or low proportion of migrants. Similar conclusion can be made about participation in voluntary organizations in local neighborhoods (Loga 2011:104, 105, 111).

[46] Because the relative number of migrants is rising it is likely that the relative number of people who have direct contact with migrants is also rising. Jarl Stave Botnen, a Norwegian historian, claims that Norwegians are much more positive to migrants in 2003 than in 1972, because people have more direct contact, which allows them to see that what is written in the media is not always correct (Bore and Seglem 2003). The proportion of the majority population that has no contact with immigrants has decreased from 28 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2010 (IMDi 2011).

[47] A similar situation can be found in Denmark: "When we consider that 85% of the Danish population has no or only little contact with migrants, one can assume that the reception of stereotype stories of migrants in the media helps to create stable images for consumers of these stories." (Fuglerud 2001:128).

Table 1: Majority Population's Sources of Information Concerning Immigrants

Question: We receive information concerning immigrants and their situation from many sources. Have the following sources given you much, some, a little, or no information about migrants and their situation?

Source	Proportion answering much or some. Percent.
TV	77.1
Newspapers	71.0
Radio	60.3
Magazines	22.2
Norwegian friends and acquaintances	21.1
Through work	18.6
Weekly papers	17.5
Migrants themselves	16.3
Books	12.7
Education at school	6.2

N=2045 for all sources (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:51 Table 3.3.).

The low level of personal contact makes stereotyping even more important, because there will be only few possibilities to collect empirical evidence that would allow one to reconsider the stereotypes one is carrying. However, the media do not determine the stereotypes used. In a Danish study the author claims that public discourse does not determine our views, but that it delivers and filters information about the migrants (Fuglerud 2001:128).

What does it mean to be an immigrant? What do Norwegians think of when they use or hear the concept "immigrant"? In Table 2 we see how the majority population determines whether a person is an immigrant.

These answers reveal only a little about the cognitive processes underlying the identification of immigrants. However, it is an excellent source of information on what constitutes an immigrant. What distinguishes an immigrant from the majority population in a person's mind? Skin color and language are the two most important distinguishing traits. Language skills are likely to improve, making immigrants more like the majority population year by year. However, their skin color will change only very little, and so people with a dark complexion will always be identified as immigrants, even if they may have been adopted as children or were born in Norway of parents who have become Norwegian citizens.

Table 2: Identifying Immigrants

Question: How do you determine if a person is an immigrant?
No alternatives are given to respondent. The mentioned alternatives are marked.

Indicator	Percent.
Color of skin, dark	86.0
Language, do not speak Norwegian	66.1
Clothing	20.6
Color of hair, facial features	18.3
Way of being, behavior	11.6
Other aspects of appearance	9.0
Other	4.8
Do not know, cannot mention any	2.6

N=2045 for all sources (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:172 Table A2.1.)

Skin color is such an important signifier of being an immigrant that Norwegians tend not to consider other Scandinavians and Western Europeans as immigrants.[48] *Bergens Tidende* (a regional newspaper) published a large story about the British being the largest minority group in Bergen (2003:front page and p.2). This was newsworthy mainly because the public tend not see the British as immigrants. Nevertheless, during the last few years, more than a hundred-thousand labor migrants from the old Eastern Europe have moved to Norway.[49] This is likely to reduce the significance of race as more and more of the migrants look just like the majority population.

Another example shows how immigrants and Norwegians are used as mutually exclusive categories. In the autumn of 2003 there were two local Progress Party (Frp) chapters in Spain: *Foreningen Alfaz del Pi Frp* and *Foreningen Torrevieja Frp* (Frp 2003).[50] The following story is from the time before these local party chapters were established during the spring of 2003. The Norwegian community in Spain is mainly located in three villages, where they have their own local radio channel in Norwegian and a bakery delivering typical Norwegian baked goods. The people interviewed appeared not to be interested in local Spanish politics. The main political issue seemed to center on the question of "allowing the funds to follow the patient"—or, more precisely, the possibility of transferring their pensions and health care rights in Norway to their new home.

48 This applies, not just to Norwegians, but probably also to most Western migrants in Norway. I have been told that SSB has never received as much negative feedback from respondents as they got for their special migrant quality of life survey in 1996. The negative feedback came from Western migrants (French, British, Scandinavian and US citizens) who rejected being categorized as "migrants" (Results from this survey are published in Blom and Ritland 1997; Gulløy, Blom, and Ritland 1997).

49 Citizens of EU member countries have the right to move to Norway as labor migrants. In 2010 there are 138,000 migrants living in Norway, from the old Eastern Europe or from countries that were accepted into EU in 2004.

50 The Progress Party is represented in the parliament. They are usually described as a right-wing party with populist tendencies.

In a radio interview for NRK, one of the Norwegians behind the plan for a local Progress Party chapter in Spain reveals some insight into how he understands the concept of immigrant:

Journalist:	But you are immigrants. Is it not a paradox to support the Progress Party so strongly and simultaneously be an immigrant?
Man:	Am I an immigrant?
Journalist:	In Spain you are an immigrant.
Man:	((laughter)) I do not feel myself like an immigrant. I have come to Spain to be able to enjoy the winter in a comfortable climate. (Frøysa 2003:02:30-02:50)[51]

I find it deeply fascinating that this Norwegian living in Spain is unable to see himself as an immigrant. One would think that living in Spain would give him personal experiences that would make this connection natural. He positions himself as a non-migrant through one claim: his motivation for migration was to enjoy the comfortable climate, which he apparently believes excludes him from the category of immigrant. There are other possible interpretations: immigrants are commonly seen as having non-Norwegian ethnicity and darker skin color, which makes it difficult for him to conceptualize that Norwegians, too, can be immigrants.[52]

The ambiguity and insecurity surrounding the question of how to deal with and relate to people who are not originally from Norway has increased because today's migrants come from many parts of the world. The world is changing faster than people's social competence, which often relies on images in the media.[53]

Images in the Media

In the public debate in 1990's Norway, the generalized migrant is increasingly a marginalized asylum-seeker, rather than the hardworking labor migrant from the 1970s (Fuglerud 1996). Typically when immigrants are presented in the Norwegian media in a positive light, their migrant status is under-communicated, while if the story has a negative spin, they are presented as migrants (Lindestad and Fjeldstad 2005).

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[51] Original text: Journalist: Men dere er innvandrere. Er det ikke en paradoks å være så tilhenger av Fremskritsspartiet og samtidig være innvandrere? M: Er jeg innvandrer? Journalist: I Spania er du innvandrer. M: ((latter)) Jeg føler meg ikke som innvandrer. Jeg har reist til Spania for å nyde vinteren i behagelig klima." (Frøysa 2003: 02:30-02:50).

[52] There are other authors who make the same, or very similar, claims: Gullestad claims that "visible differences" are a starting point for continuing discrimination (2002:70). In addition, Lindestand and Fjelstad (1999) report that people with origins in the United States and Europe react if they are considered "migrants" in Norway, because the concept has negative connotations and is usually used only of people from "non-western countries" (Gullestad 2002).

[53] According to Fuglerud (2001:120), Reidar Grønhaug (1979) uses differences in social competence to explain discrimination of migrants. The driving forces are social rules and individual social competence.

Norwegian media present only a few different images of migrant families. One stereotypical presentation is the "authoritarian family," which has become associated with many of the negative aspects connected with the oppression of women and the second generation's lack of freedom to make important choices. This stereotype has been exploited by people who dislike immigrants and is often used in arguments against family reunions and in support of increasing efforts to control immigration. In circles more positive to immigration this stereotype is rejected, with the consequence that some of the conflicts—first versus second generation, for instance—that can arise in this kind of household have not been taken seriously. The exception to this is the public attention toward forced marriages and honor-related violence.[54]

In 2002, Trond Kvist made a documentary film, *Welcome home* (*Velkommen hjem*), in order to bring greater nuance into the migration debate, and to display, among other things, conflicts in migrant communities. He says that,

> the authority structure in families is often extreme. It is dangerous, because many youth are struggling in their relation to the Norwegian society, at the same time as they are trying to relate to their parents who do not even want to be "Norwegian" (Garvik 2002).[55]

With the help of cultural theory it is possible to reformulate this problem as a conflict between two ways of organizing: a hierarchically organized household, where the parents emphasize authority, honor, respect for the elders, and so forth; and an anti-hierarchical way of organizing, preferred by the children, who have been influenced by the individualistic segments of Norwegian society. Therefore, the conflict within the family can be seen as a conflict between two styles of organizing that tend to conflict. By reformulating the conflict this way, it is possible to move away from the paradoxical situation in which one is supposed to have respect both for the parents' culture and the children's right to choose for themselves (which the hierarchical culture does not allow). This opens the way for interventions that do not disrespect the religion or culture of the parents.

Cultural theory helps us to understand that some of these conflicts are not cultural or ethnic conflicts but rather structural conflicts. If the media would portray these conflicts by using concepts from cultural theory, we might witness a reduction in the anxiety that people have with diversity, as well as an increase in the trust that people have in their own social competence.

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54 (IMDi 2008; Bredal and Skjerven 2007; Bredal 2006, 1998; BFD 1998; BLD 2003, 2007)

55 Translation by EO.

"Immigrant Household" in Everyday Language

The concepts we invoke in our everyday language carry meanings and internal structures that influence the way we think and argue. However, we seldom stop to think how this influences us in practice. The concept of an "immigrant" is not just a category on its own; it is also a part of, for example, an "immigrant household." A closer look to the structure and use of this concept is warranted.

A prototypical structure refers to a conceptualization of the abstract term through a prototypical case (Lakoff 1987, 1996:74; Lakoff and Johnson 1980): A sparrow would be a prototypical bird. It resembles a bird more than a penguin or a duck does, though all undoubtedly are birds. When we think and argue, we often use a prototypical case to judge whether the argument is valid. For example, practically everybody would claim that the statement "birds can fly" is true, even though it is common knowledge that penguins cannot fly. Membership in a category can be gradual, and a sparrow is just more of a bird than a penguin is.

I would claim that, in Norway, the prototypical household is a family consisting of a couple and one or more children. This becomes apparent if we think of the modifications used: "single-parent household" is often used, but there is seldom a need to explain that something is a two-parent household. Linguists call this markedness. The normal meaning does not need to be marked, whereas deviations from the norm must have a mark (Lakoff 1996:59). In this case, the marker is needed to describe a "one-parent household." By default, when "parent" is used, children are assumed to live with that parent.

A different, but equally interesting, case is the "immigrant household," where "immigrant" is the marker. "Immigrant household" suggests to many minds a large family. The expectation is that there are more children, and perhaps even several generations under the same roof (this in addition to the previously demonstrated expectations that go together with "immigrant", like darker color of skin and poor language skills). The non-marked case would be a household which by implication refers to a majority household.

Reasoning about households is likely to have a bias toward majority households consisting of two parents and one or more children. This bias can be avoided as long as we are aware of it, which is just as well, since in my thesis I am trying to break some of our inherent expectations concerning minority households. However, mindful of the difficulties involved, I have decided not to deal with households composed of fewer than two parents, despite having interviewed two single parent households, one full-time and one part-time father.

By choosing not to present these single-parent households among the ones included here, I am coming into line with the stereotype of immigrant households as two-parent households. This is unfortunate, in that it strengthens the image of immigrant households as consisting of two parents and their children, but it had to be done in order to limit the variation in my inevitably small sample. In my first round of interviews, in the spring of 1999, which I used as a pilot study, I interviewed different kinds of Kurdish households, but the variation in age and the composition of the households was so great that it was difficult to compare their ways of life with each other, as they were in different stages in their lives and their life-projects.

Essentialism in Nationality and Ethnicity

There are several essentialistic traits in our thinking about nationality and ethnicity. When we talk about the majority population, we take it for granted that our searches for identity, and the choices that form whom we are, are for the most part completed during youth and early adulthood. We make important choices about what to study, where to live, what kind of work to apply for, and who we would like to have as our friends. These choices heavily influence who we are and how we will live our lives. It is easy to forget that immigrants have to make several of these choices during their first years in Norway.

An example of this kind of false essentialistic reasoning runs like this: There is one Vietnamese culture. One's culture is given by place of birth. This culture determines how people live. As a result, for the Vietnamese, the way they live is determined by their culture, and it is impossible to change this.

The false conclusion is that migrants are what they are and should be left alone, because they cannot be changed. Additionally, there seems to be no possibility for people to cross cultural borders. Fortunately, none of the three premises holds, and therefore the conclusion is also erroneous.

Another example of how culture has become essentialized in the Norwegian debate over immigrants is provided by Gullestad, whose analysis of the much used and innocent-sounding phrase "secure about one's own" shows how it has several fixed traits:

> To be "secure about one's own" [culture] implies holding to *something which is not chosen*, and which is relatively *constant.* Security is connected to stability and represents a form of resistance toward comprehensive changes in society. (Gullestad 2002:66)[56]

Similarly, the commonly used phrase "living between two cultures", which describes the tension that the decedents of migrants live in, assumes that there *are* two monolithic cultures. According to Gressgård, this is actually a dilemma between two values—namely freedom and community, even if the nation-state is used to frame the debate as if it were about culture (Gressgård 2007).

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[56] Original text: "Å være 'trygg i sitt eget' er underforstått å holde fast ved *noe som ikke er valgt,* og som er forholdsvis *uforandrelig*. Trygghet er knyttet til stabilitet og representerer en form for motstand mot omfattende samfunnsendringer" (Gullestad 2002:66).

Thus, it looks like the tendency to essentialize national culture and ethnicity is present in the Norwegian debate. One way to examine this essentialism is to shift our attention from leaving a country or culture to becoming a citizen or member of the receiving society.

Norwegian Myths of Similarity

One would think that the importance of equality in Norway would create conditions in which the integration of immigrants into civil society would be easy and straightforward. Unfortunately, the reality is rather the opposite. Marianne Gullestad shows how "in the hegemonic thinking in Norway, *immigrant* is in conceptual opposition to *Norwegian* and this has become during the last years a central and organizing conceptual contrast. (2002:71)" [57]

After the Second World War, there was a long period of social democratic dominance in Norwegian politics and a significant reduction in the differences in living conditions between the socio-economic classes. Today, Norway is one of the countries in the world with the smallest disparity in conditions of living between the rich and the poor.[58] According to Gullestad:

> While cleavages between different social classes have become more unclear, the cleavage between "us" and "immigrants" has become more clear and fixed on the conceptual level. (Gullestad 2002:84) [59]

Social Democratic ideals about equality and the importance of welfare have been important for the development of the welfare state and have helped shape the society during the last century. However, it looks like there has been a price to pay. While in English one can separate between *equality* and *similarity*, this is difficult in Norwegian, because the one word, *likhet,* is used for both denotations. This creates a pressure towards being similar, as on some level equality is also about similarity, and those dissimilar cannot be equal to the majority.

> The logic of similarity means that people in many informal settings have to consider themselves similar, in order to feel themselves equal. (Gullestad 2002:82)

Gullestad argues that there are two basic strategies for dealing with difference. First, people try to emphasize the similarities and downplay the differences. Second, they will try to avoid whatever is considered too different. Gullestad's own fieldwork in Bergen demonstrates how city dwellers consider people living in the countryside, outside Bergen, as too different to be included in social life. There is, then, a

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57 Original text: "I den hegemoniske tenkning i Norge står 'innvandrer' i begrepsmessig motsetning til 'nordmann', og at dette i de senere årene er blitt en sentral og organiserende begrepskontrast."

58 UNDP ranked Norway first on Human Development Index and second on Human Poverty Index (UNDP 2001:tables 1 and 4).

59 Original text: "Mens skillelinjene mellom ulike samfunnsklasser er blitt mer utydelige, er skillelinjene mellom 'oss' og 'innvandrere' blitt mer tydelige og bastante på begrepsplanet."

tradition of exclusion directed at persons considered different that it is not limited to the immigrant. However, in today's society immigrants embody difference and are often the subject of exclusion.

According to cultural theory each of the four ways of organizing does exclude someone or some groups, either for explicit reasons or as an unintended consequence of behavioral patterns.[60] However, that does not mean that we should accept the systematic marginalization of and discrimination against large groups in society. If one accepts the systemic aspects of cultural theory, the best one can hope for is the following: first, to distribute the exclusion more evenly (different groups are excluded in different arenas, so that no single group carries the sole burden of exclusion), and second, to have social mobility (groups that have been excluded and discriminated against have the possibility to improve their conditions over time).

What is Normal?

> There is no such thing as the "typical Sami," or the "typical immigrant." It just looks like that to us who are not familiar with the variation within. (Hovland 2001:251)

We often use our ideas about normality to form useful stereotypes of other people. We construct these stereotypes around our notions of what is normal, and in this context, normality has several different flavors.

First, our idea of what is normal among "Norwegians" is related to how we perceive the majority population. However, since we have knowledge of many different lifestyles, we are hesitant to claim that there is only one way to be normal in Norway.

> It has been pointed out (Appadurai 1998) that anthropologists, journalists, and the like, have a tendency to ascribe persons born under distant skies a higher degree of cultural *authenticity* than persons in modern, Western countries. "Natives"—a designation almost exclusively used of persons born outside the industrialized part of the world—are assumed to represent their culture and history in its original, true form. While we understand ourselves as formed by complexity, diversity, and historical turbulence, the native is assumed to represent tradition and continuity. (Fuglerud 2001:196)

[60] Groups defined by one the three active ways of organizing would reject groups defined by the other three active ways of organizing. If the groups are not defined by ways of organizing, the pattern of exclusion is an empirical question.

Therefore, our stereotype of Norwegianess is related to aspects of life that are perhaps not so important! It is related to things like *nistepakke*, *nisselue*,[61] and, perhaps, a love for homogeneous equality. The national symbols are essential for us when constructing a national identity, but they do not tell us how Norwegians actually live and what they do, or what kinds of values and preferences they have (except a liking for *lefse*[62] or for skiing under the blue sky in the intense Easter sun).

Secondly, the notion of normality becomes something different when connected to our stereotypes of minorities: let us say, people who come to Norway from Vietnam. Because most of us have very little contact with people from Vietnam, we form our stereotypes based on what we have learned from the media and perhaps heard from friends and acquaintances (who might or might not actually know anyone "Vietnamese"). But because we have no knowledge of the variations within the group, we tend to assume that the stereotype actually represents what is normal, which makes the media image of immigrants perhaps more important than the media image of the majority population (as most people in Norway can compare their stereotype of a Norwegian with several real persons).

> It will be completely meaningless to write a "cookbook" about immigrants. Migrant population is definitely more diverse within than between many immigrants and Norwegians. Similarities and differences, significant for social interaction, are not dependent on whether one is an immigrant or ethnically Norwegian. (Sørheim 2001:191)

If we were able to give more weight to how people live—their lifestyles and ways of organizing—perhaps our ideas of normality would also change. There are many ways to be normal in Norway, and perhaps cultural theory's concepts can be used to create a typology (or range) of normal families that we can use to describe this variation.

In some ways, this search for lifestyles is also a movement toward lifeworlds.[63] Fuglerud has stated that if you want to get to the core of globalization, you have to study a person's lifeworld, consisting of home, family, and social network.[64] I agree with him, even if I do not apply the phenomenological perspective. However, I do share the belief that social scientists should pay more attention to people's everyday

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[61] *Nistepakke* is a "lunch pack" of sandwiches, wrapped in paper, made at home in the morning. *Nisselue* is a red stocking cap, made of wool, with a sharp pointed top, that children wear for Christmas.

[62] *Lefse* is an old-fashioned, large, thin, sweet wheat tortilla usually filled with butter, sugar, and cinnamon, before it is folded and cut into sandwich size pieces. It is very mild and delicate both in taste and texture, which I find fairly typical of Norwegian cooking.

[63] "Lifeworld" refers to a person's experience of his or her social and physical environment. This is a phenomenological concept derived originally from Husserl, brought into sociology by Schütz, and later developed further by Berger and Luckmann (who emphasize it as a social construction), and by Habermas (who emphasizes its connection with language and as a prerequisite of understanding) (Lübcke 1989; Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 1997; Habermas 1998).

[64] See Fuglerud's presentation at the Metropolis Conference, in Oslo, 9th-12th April 2002.

life experiences—which are indeed at the core of the empirical material collected for this thesis, even if I, unlike the phenomenologists, rely on cultural theory as an organizing perspective.

What Should We Demand of a Better Classification?

I present here my five criteria for a good classification of migrants. Any theory that fulfills these criteria can be a promising alternative to the present categories or stereotypes. The criteria are laid out in the open, so that readers can form their own conclusion. These five criteria are based on my personal academic viewpoint. I could have argued in a more academic manner for these. However, just because it is possible to find references to authors or books where similar issues are dealt with, the choice of these is still first and foremost a personal academic viewpoint. Social scientists too often try to hide their personal choices behind scientific jargon.

Human unity. The first criterion states that the same categorization should be used for all members of the society, and not separate "us" from "them" without a justification. In other words, the categorization should transcend our present categorizations based on country of origin, ethnicity, culture or religion which lead easily to discrimination.

Content change. Second, the categories should not be fixed in content. In other words, their content should be able to change and evolve together with the rest of the society.

People change. Third, the categories should not lock people into them. These categories must allow for and reflect that people change their beliefs, behavior, and friends over time. Therefore, re-categorization must be possible.

Gradual Membership. Fourth, the categories should not be mutually exclusive. There should be no need for old-fashioned either/or categorization. Rather, we must embrace the utility of categories based on family resemblance or gradual membership (Floor 1989; Lakoff 1987). If we cannot allow for changes in content, people, and gradual membership, the categories will increase essentialism, rather than reduce it.

Helpful in everyday situations. Fifth, the categories should help us to make sense of what people do. The whole idea of stereotypes relies upon their utility. If they guide us in the wrong direction, we should dispose of them. We should use a particular stereotype only if we do better with it than without it.

In our increasingly global world, there is an ever growing need for tools that allow us to relate to people and cultures we do not know intimately. Cultural theory can be one of those tools. The first four of the above criteria are theoretical and will be evaluated in the next chapter (see summary on page 103). The fifth criterion, being helpful in everyday situations, is an empirical criterion, which will be demonstrated through the presentation of households in Chapter 5.

Low Politics

Political scientists are sometimes accused of preferring high politics over low politics as an area of research. High politics has very few direct consequences on most people's welfare in Oslo or Bergen, with the exception of the processes that lead to forced migration and, potentially, a residency permit in Norway.[65] However, even for the present situation, it is important what immigrants themselves do to cope economically and socially. Therefore, efforts should be made to find out how immigrants view and use some major public institutions. The households will be queried about their experiences with schools, the municipality, the social welfare office, the police, the UDI,[66] political parties and the parliament, and citizenship.

Even though migration research is often done by researchers who genuinely believe that they are contributing to a better society by collecting and analyzing information about immigrants, there are some critical voices:

> In Norway, the author Naushad Ali Qureshi and the journalist Atta Ansari. (1996) have pointed out that migration researchers are almost never immigrants themselves, and typically choose to concentrate upon "problematic" immigrants. The understanding of who are the problematic ones and who not is derived from the official migration policy (Fuglerud 2001)

Qureshi and Ansari do have a point, as the funding for research is more easily available for topics that aim to present a solution to a "problem." This makes absolute sense from the viewpoint of providing "useful" research to the community. Unfortunately, this "usefulness" can also create a skewed image of immigrants as people with difficulties and special needs. My thesis focuses on regular households in Norway and their ways of solving everyday life problems, such as finding a job, making ends meet, helping friends, taking care of children, and their experiences with the institutions of the welfare state. These households will hopefully appear familiar and rather boring in their lack of exoticism, as their ways of solving problems are probably not different from what can be found in many "Norwegian" families.

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65 There are many indirect consequences related to the finances of the state and the institutions of the welfare state.

66 The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration.

Writing about Real People

However, we must not only look at the migrants from the outside. The migrant's own understanding is crucial for increasing the success of any policy interventions (Sørheim 2001:203). How can we hope for any policy to work as long as we fail to understand the lives of the people these policies address?

The main sources of information in the first part of this thesis are the in-depth interviews with migrant households. By talking with real people, instead of dealing with people hidden in statistical figures, theories that normally stand alone in their brightness and clarity become tarnished by real life issues. Theoretical models become muddled by peoples' choices that follow their own creative minds instead of the paths neatly laid down by academics.

One difficulty in writing about real people and their lives is that they will always know more than the interviewer. In several ways, they have epistemologically privileged knowledge about their own lives, and a few hours of interview is not going to grant more insight into their lives than they themselves already possess. Even if one takes into account that I interview several families, and have a theoretical perspective that opens the material for analysis, my newly gained knowledge is about something else: it is theoretical and conceptual knowledge; it is not about them and their lives.

Primarily, my ideas and interpretations are part of a social scientific and policy related discourse. Even if there is potential for creating change in the ways we treat immigrant households, this is dependent on others accepting the ideas put forth here and using them actively. Contrasted with my informants' understanding of their own lives, my understanding is of lesser importance, as their own understanding and choices have immediate and real consequences in their lives. The value and importance of my research lies not in changing the lives of the people I have interviewed, but, instead, in transforming it into general knowledge. New knowledge is often old knowledge in a new context, with new packaging, delivered to a new audience.

Now that my research is contextualized and related to some of the central topics of research in migration studies, it is time to operationalize cultural theory in detail so that it can be used to study migrant households in Norway.

C h a p t e r   3

OPERATIONALIZING CULTURAL THEORY

In the introduction, I presented sketches of hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic households. This chapter presents an operationalization of how the four ways of organizing can be observed in a household's internal organization, in the patterns of help in their external social relations, and how it can be used to create predictions of a household's views of society and politics. There is also a discussion of some principles regarding the use of the theory and how it is related to other theories about culture, and how well it fits to my five criteria for a better classification.

Four Ways to Organize a Household

Cultural theory is a theory focused on institutions, and households are treated in this thesis as small institutions. The following presentation is an operationalization of cultural theory used on households in the Norwegian context. I have utilized previous household research based on cultural theory[67] and empirical observations from majority households I know and from migrant households I have interviewed for this thesis.[68]

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[67] I am indebted to Dake, Thompson and Neff, who conducted a large research project in Great Britain, where they studied household consumption patterns for Unilever (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994). They studied 128 households and used a triangulation of methods to ensure a reliable classification based on cultural theory. Each of the three researchers collected data and classified the same households in order to evaluate the reliability of their classification, which proved to be very good. Unfortunately, the report they wrote was for internal use in Unilever, but a summary of their findings and research methods is published (Dake and Thompson 1999).

[68] Because households are the unit of analysis, I am writing of them here as if they were one actor, but obviously a household does not think or act. The real actors are the people, thus my approach hides some of the internal differences and conflicts within the household, which is positive, as my interest is in the institutionalized patterns of action and the justifications used to uphold them on a household level. However, the internal differences are of importance and could be utilized to study conflicts between generations, or conflicts between the spouses, both of which are excluded from this thesis.

The following ideal-typical households represent a contextualized version of cultural theory, that is how two-parent families with children, living in Norway, in the beginning of the 2000s, can construct their family life based on four different ways of organizing. Other family constallations are excluded in order to allow for a well-controlled comparison during analysis.

Table 3 contains an overview of four different types of households' characteristics as predicted by cultural theory. On top of the table are theoretical aspects that characterize the ways of organizing. Further down are characteristics of households. In this table it is very easy to see how the ways of organizing differ from each other. However, I will present each way of organizing on its own, because it makes it easier to see how they have an internal consistency.

The Hierarchical Household

A household that relies predominately on the hierarchical way of organizing, hereafter called simply a *hierarchical household* often has a gender-based division of labor.[69] The hierarchical household divides the world into different spheres of life, which determine the division of labor and the division of competence and power. People are bound by social roles—like father, mother, son, and daughter—which define who they are and how they should act toward each other in any particular situation. Tradition is usually important, as it both defines roles as well as the behavior that goes with them. Tradition is also a guideline for a family's life and organization at large. Therefore, the society strongly influences how a hierarchical household lives. They are seldom isolated from the society; however, they are probably very conscious of which part of society represents the "good" tradition. In many situations the hierarchical household would behave in a way that emphasizes the order within the household, for example, at meal times they would have clear duties and fixed seats.[70] Some activities, like meals, are for the whole family, while other spare time activities are chosen to fit their roles: football for the boys, swimming for the girls, and card games for the father.

The hierarchical household's life is orderly, and their use of time is often fixed. They prefer regular working hours, habitual activities in the evening, and know each other's weekly program by heart: *Every Sunday we go to church and on Saturdays we visit someone*. When I call to make an interview appointment, even the children know who the person in the family is that I need to talk with, and this person can make an appointment with me on behalf of the rest of the family without consulting them.

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[69] Dividing household work according to traditional gender roles helps to sustain the hierarchical way of organizing, whereas the other ways of dividing household work would reduce hierarchy in a household, both immediately and even more over time.

[70] Mary Douglas has written extensively about meal times in *Food at Social Order* (1984).

Table 3: Four Ways to Organize a Household

Grid-Group	High-grid-high-group	Low-grid-high-group	Low-grid-low-group	High-grid-low-group
Accountability	High	High	Low	Low
Transactions	Asymmetrical	Symmetrical	Symmetrical	Asymmetrical
Social structure	Hierarchical group	Enclave, flat group	Ego-focused network	Isolation
World	Divided into spheres with different rules[71]	One inter-connected unity	A flexible resource, personalized	Unpredictable
Moral	Differentiated by spheres	Universal but limited by collective decision	Liberal, keeping contracts	Not in this world
Characteristic[72]	Hierarchical	Egalitarian	Individualistic	Fatalistic
Division of housework	Traditional gender roles	Equal tasks	Skill, negotiations	Random
Time use	Fixed pattern	Shared	Appointments	Random
Use of space	Specialized, orderly	Shared	Practical	Random
Basis for a legitimate decision	Positional authority	Consensus	Act first, talk later. Bilateral agreement	Does not exist = power
Responsibility	High, but restricted by different roles/spheres	Shared	Low, only from contracts	Low
Ascribed roles & positions	Respected	Critical	Down-played	Wanted/feared
Attitude towards achievements	Down-played	Critical	Important	?
Measure of auccess	Social positions	Internal criteria, moral life, consistency	Results, size and centrality of social networks, income	Any of the mentioned
Justification for women's participation in labor force[73]	Critical, necessity	Equality	Self-realization	Necessity (?)
Pet name	Traditional 1940's	Hippies 1960's	Yuppies 1990's	?

71 Douglas has presented the idea of dividing the world into separate spheres (2001).

72 The main source for these indicators is *Cultural Theory* (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990) and the household study (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Dake and Thompson 1999).

73 Division of housework, time use and Justification for women's participation in labor force, are from Dake, Thompson and Neff (1994 ch.8 pp.12-20).

Typically, if the household can afford it, one can find the father in wage labor, hence filling the man's role as the provider of the family, while the mother stays at home taking care of the children, hence emphasizing her role as caretaker.

The separation of life into different spheres is often visible in the hierarchical household's use of space: there is one area for children and one for adults; there is one place for eating dinner and another for watching TV; there are areas that are available for "outsiders" and there are areas that are private; most items seem to have their own place; and keeping the house neat and well organized is a high priority. Especial care is placed in the presentation of the house to guests and outsiders.

The legitimacy of a decision is dependent on a correct procedure, which often includes finding the right person (defined by their roles) to make the decision. Different roles entail different areas of authority and expertise, as the world is divided into different spheres of life, which have only limited contact with each other. Thus, men make certain decisions, women make others. If the household is struggling with a difficult moral issue, they might solicit help from a priest (or somebody else), who is an "expert" on the issue.

Responsibility is defined in detail by their roles. Parents have a responsibility to raise their children to become good members of the society, which often entails being respectful of authority. Children are expected to be respectful of their parents. Because roles are important, it is more important to fulfill every detail of one's role than to try to achieve success in other ways. Honor is a concept used to describe a person who lives up to his or her role. One of the worst things that can happen is the loss of honor, which equals being seen unfit for a social role or position. If you lose your honor, you are actually losing your role—you simply no longer know who you are, and neither do others quite know how to behave around you.[74]

Success is connected to the possession of social roles that are highly valued by the society. For example, to be a doctor or a priest would be a great success. The success of one family member rubs off on other family members. Having a doctor in the family will raise the whole family's social status. Additionally, in some situations the roles build upon each other: fathers are ranked higher than their sons, thus, being the father of a doctor is better than being a doctor (in certain situations). Consequently, if possible, many hierarchical households send their offspring on to higher education, where their children work hard, as they are not studying just for themselves but on behalf of the whole family.[75]

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74 It is possible that a person who loses his honor then becomes taboo for the rest of the society (for taboos see Douglas 2002b).

75 *Honor* and *shame* are concepts that can be important in a hierarchical household, whereas the egalitarian and individualistic households cannot understand what it all is about. Particularly, the idea of one household member's actions bringing shame upon the whole household is not present in individualism.

Examples would be the modern working-father-housewife-and-two-children household that was viewed as ideal by many in Norway in the 1940s and 1950s, and Parson's ideal of the industrial family from 1955 (Leira 2002:15-23). Where the concept *head of household*[76] is used, whether in research, public statistics, or public policies, it seems to be a normative statement claiming that the hierarchical household is the norm, a proper household, and all other forms are deviations. In contrast, cultural theory does not give any of the four ways of organizing a priviledged position, they are all ideal.

I will later present two households which use, predominately, the hierarchical way of organizing: the Nguyen household from Vietnam (see page 147) and the Natan household from Sri Lanka (see page 160).

The Egalitarian Household

Egalitarian households are characterized by equality and lack of social differentiation.[77] Instead of emphasizing roles of father and mother, and their authority over their children, everybody is an equal member of the family. Therefore, where the hierarchical household uses a division of labor to emphasize its members' separate social roles, the egalitarian household's members boost their equality by sharing the work evenly among themselves. Preferably, everyone does a bit of every task.

Members of the egalitarian households prefer to do things together, hence they spend a lot of time together. Similar to the hierarchical household, they like to share their meals, but they are not likely to have fixed seats or the same person preparing the meal every time. They act regularly as one unit: they go, for example, camping together or they visit other households together.

Inside the egalitarian household the unity of behavior is visible: spatially the home is one unit, there is no clear separation between private and public parts of a

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[76] "Much confusion has resulted from the use of the term 'head of household' to cover a range of different but often overlapping concepts. The term has been used variously to identify: (a) a census reference person; (b) the household's chief decision-maker; (c) the person who is entitled to claim certain benefits such as land or membership in a co-operative on behalf of the household; and (d) the person whose characteristics provide the best indication of the status of the household as a whole. ... In order to avoid confusion in the future the term 'head of household' should be replaced by a more specific term, wherever practicable" (Saradamoni 1992:237).

[77] The egalitarian household presented here is probably lower on the group dimension than what has been typical for cultural theory. These households are not located in the extreme lower right-hand corner of the grid-group diagram, but rather a bit toward the middle (See the discussion in Douglas 2003). This is probably due to the general individualistic characters in the society. It is also possible that the extreme egalitarian households have so strong a boundary around their household that it would make it difficult for them to trust an outsider, and thus by self-selection they are opting out of the research project.

home;[78] children can play almost anywhere; because everybody does everything, the results are sometimes mediocre;[79] there is less emphasis on order, and more on displaying the family itself (nostalgic[80] mementos from holidays).

The egalitarian household often presents itself in opposition to the hierarchical and individualistic households' ways of organizing. It often considers the hierarchical households hypocritical for their lack of personal consistency—as the reliance on social roles in a hierarchy reduces the personal involvement in decision-making, and, what is worse, the idea of different spheres of life allows one to have conflicting roles (if lived out in the same context). The individualistic households are considered inferior in moral issues and lacking the all-important collective quality, to the degree, that they seem to be falling apart.

Where the hierarchical household is guided by tradition, the egalitarian household rejects tradition, and is instead guided by its own internal discussions. Typically, traditions that emphasize differentiation and rank are rejected or changed in a way that emphasizes their unity and equality. Even roles like father and mother are subjected to a critical re-evaluation. However, it is quite possible that they end up following some traditions, but they would emphasize that it is their own decision.

The legitimate form of decision-making is a consensual round table discussion—everybody must be heard, and they prefer to argue until they can obtain agreement. The rules and decisions within the egalitarian household are made by its members as a collective. Therefore, responsibility is also shared. If things go wrong, they all have a part in it.

The parents consider it positive that the children are included in the decision-making. It is important that the children internalize the rules and behave because they "want" to, and not because they are afraid (as they suspect the children in the neighboring hierarchical household to be). However, it is fine to manipulate the children into this collective agreement.

When I call to make an interview appointment, both spouses can talk on behalf of the family, and have an overview of the other person's schedule, but before we can make a decision about the time and day, they need to consult their spouse—"Dear, is Wednesday evening a good day for us?"

Success is connected to moral issues—being a good person who lives a morally worthy and consistent life. Acceptance in the eyes of the rest of the society is not important. As the household is an enclave, it becomes its own judge as to the criteria of success and the ultimate source of moral code. Whatever moral code the

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78 Where the hierarchical households would have been horrified by the idea of showing their bedrooms to me, the egalitarian households took me on a tour showing me every room of the house.

79 Even if one of the family members has better skills in one area, which could result in either higher quality or more efficiency, the egalitarian household finds it preferable to share the work.

80 Caulkins describes nostalgia for places and people as typical of egalitarianism (Caulkins and Weiner 1998).

household follows, it should not contribute to differentiation within the household. Therefore, it would actually be a bad thing for one of the members to be more moral than the others in the household. It is better to be just as moral as everybody else is.

Where hierarchy is concerned with rank, the egalitarian household is concerned with intimacy or closeness. It is a privilege for a guest to be treated as a family member (and special treatment would define one as a stranger). They would not put much extra care in organizing and cleaning before the guests arrive: it would be like putting on a false face. Similarly, as an additional means of underlining everyone's equality, there should not be a large difference between meals served for members of the household and meals served for guests.

The egalitarian household would typically justify women's equal participation in wage labor—it promotes equality both in terms of money and career, but it also chances to bring the father back into the house, allowing him greater participation in childcare. In Scandinavia, the growth of the welfare state, particularly public schooling and provisions for childcare and care of the elderly, allowed women to enter the labor market in large numbers. In the 1970s several of these "new" families appeared in Norway.

The egalitarian household is not just an ideal-type, it resembles the ideal household of some feminist researchers, for example, the new "shared-roles dual-earner family" first presented by Liljestrøm in 1978 (Leira 2002:15-23). Since politics is a struggle between the different ways of organizing, family policies typically favor one type of household over the three others. From a cultural theoretical viewpoint, successful policies cater for all four types of households.

I will later present two households that rely predominately on the egalitarian way of organizing: the Garcia household from Chile (see page 178) and the Herrera household, also from Chile (see page 190).

The Individualistic Household

The individualistic household is characterized by its looseness—there are few rules and few permanent patterns. The household members value their personal freedom too much be held back by too many rules. Each member of the household has its own social relations—its own social network. Thus, family life has a less privileged position in people's life than in the hierarchical and egalitarian households. They are likely to spend less time together with the whole family than the egalitarians, because they have their own hobbies and friends.

Household work is divided according to people's skills, based on the idea of efficiency (results count, not who is doing the job). Therefore, if the mother is the best cook, let her cook; if the father is the best mechanic, let him fix the car.

However, the opposite could apply, too, if father is the best cook. Nevertheless, the division of labor is negotiated between the involved parties. It is not just a tradition as in hierarchical households or a collective decision as in egalitarian households. Ultimately, household work is subject to negotiations. "What do I get for doing these chores?" is a question that would be inappropriate in both hierarchical and egalitarian households (though for different reasons).

While egalitarian households are concerned with equality, individualistic households are concerned with self-realization: each and everyone should have the right to live out their full potential. Therefore, the mother's participation in wage labor is justified by her right to a career, and, in addition, by the emerging possibilities for personal development.

Where the hierarchical household has a strict division between work and private life, the individualists' social networks do not separate clearly between work and leisure. Contacts are things that requires you keep them alive—an occasional cup of tea, game of tennis, or trip to the mountain will ensure a good work relationship too.

In individualistic household, the content of most roles is a question of individual preference and negotiation, not tradition. Individualistic households share the egalitarian household's preference for making their own choices, and defining their own lives as they themselves please.

Legitimate decisions are bilateral agreements—contracts between the involved parties. Everyone should be responsible for themselves and for themselves only. The willingness to take responsibility without prior agreement is less frequent than in hierarchical and egalitarian households, where you can rely on social roles or moral arguments.

Individualistic household finds results to be important, whereas many rules and regulations are nuisances on its path. It often utilizes an "act first, talk later" principle. Individualists consider themselves special, worthy of special treatment, and, consequently, not deeply bound by rules made by others. Therefore, bending the rules a little is not such a bad thing, especially if it produces the best results.

Success is not connected to roles, as within the hierarchical household, but to good results and size and type of social network. Therefore, where the proud hierarchical mother would mention that her son is a doctor, the individualistic mother would rather qualify her son as a "good" doctor: a successful one, one that gets results, or makes money, as money is believed to be a proxy of success.

Success lacks permanency, and it needs to be displayed constantly. There are two principle ways to display success. First, one needs to display the social relations. Therefore, being seen with the right people at the right places can be important. Second, consumption must be conspicuous If you make lots of money, you must be successful; therefore, this money should be spent in a way that is visible to others. Egalitarian household is likely to view this cornucopian consumption style as immoral, while the hierarchical one is appalled by the lack of good taste.

When I call to make an interview appointment, the person on the phone would have to check in his or hers calender for a vacant time slot, and the spouse would not automatically be included in the interview. "Dear, I have said yes to an interview next Wednesday. You can join us if you want."

An example of this kind of household would be "the yuppies" in the 1990s. It does not seem to represent an ideal for most people, but rather how things have become for many families in the majority population in Norway: Parents have their jobs; the children have their hobbies. The family eats together if and when their tight schedules allow for it, as everybody is busy trying to make as much out of every day as possible. Parents do not have direct authority over their children; they cut deals with them instead—"If you clean your room, you will get a new cash-card for your mobile phone."

Research on this kind of household is available in the writings of Becker (1991), who looks at the household's economic behavior, and Verdon (1998), who rejects all kinds of collectivistic approaches and takes atomism as an axiomatic principle for reasearch on households. However, it is a mistake to assume that all households behave like the individualistic household—a view that is supported by research pointing toward the development of increasingly different types of families, as opposed to a single dominant type (Boh 1989; Syltevik 2000).

In this thesis three households are presented, who rely predominately on the individualistic way of organizing: the Nga household from Vietnam (see page 206), the Lorca household from Chile (see page 218), and the Maheswaran household from Sri Lanka (see page 231).

The Fatalistic Household

The fatalistic household is characterized by being controlled by external events and by the randomness of its behavior. It might use rhetoric from one of the other ways of life, but if one observes its behavior, it is somewhat random. Typically, this happens when forces outside the household control their lives more than they themselves manage to do. In these situations, it is rational not to try to stay in control, as the costs would be high and the benefits negligible (it knows from experience that their plans tend to fail).

The use of time in a fatalistic household is somewhat random, because of the low interest in planning and the low priority assigned to keeping even those few plans they devise. Consequently, it can be very difficult to make interview appointments with them.[81]

A typical trait is a discrepancy between actual and claimed behavior. The members of the household can talk about one kind of division of labor, but in the end it is random who does what. They might talk warmly about the traditional holiday meal (perhaps indicating hierarchy), but when shopping they fail to get all the ingredients and end up making something similar. Inside a fatalist household, one would find abandoned projects that are still there taking up space (i.e., a visible of lack of completion), lack of order, no clear division of space by activity, and the TV in a prominent place (rather than the dining table or another space for people to interact).

One of the households I interviewed, the Siva household, uses the space in their apartment in a fatalistic and happily random manner. In the dining room, half of the dining table was buried beneath piles of stuff, while the other half was actually used for dining, and in the corner of the room stood two large rolled-up carpets. Clearly, this room was not just a dining room, it also served as a storage space. In addition, a footstool rested upside down (Siva 2002). A hierarchical household would never allow for this lack of "order," especially in the presence of a stranger. A busy individualistic household might also be cluttered with ongoing projects, but there would be a reason or explanation given.

The fatalistic household is not very concerned with legitimizing their decision-making, as decision-making is not a priority—what happens happens. In the same manner, the members deflect responsibility by referencing outside events—since it was not their own decision, they can hardly be blamed for it, can they?

Fatalistic household has, in its own view, a healthy fear of social positions and power, and contrary to hierarchical and individualistic households, it tries to keep its distance.

Hierarchy puts its faith in systems and skills; egalitarians trust in each other and in high moral standards; individualists, on the other hand, count on their own self-reliance; fatalists, though, trust in luck, as the most likely way to make significant progress in life is lottery.

Planning and economic management, the ability to channel the necessary resources to a task, is often seen as a precondition for avoiding problems:

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[81] As an example, one of the families I interviewed, failed to be at home when I arrived for the second interview (Siva 2002). I rescheduled the next day, making a new appointment with the father in the house. However, when I arrived the mother in the house greeted me and hoped that it would be okay for me to do the interview with her instead. She explained that the mishap the previous day was "caused" by their having forgotten to buy something, whereupon remembering they had to rush out to the shops before they closed. Lack of trust and low accountability is typical for fatalistic cultural bias.

> Households that have the habit of planning are likely also to be future oriented, and to be reasonably confident that they have the resources necessary to bring their plans about. … Households that do not have the confidence to plan at all are probably "problem households" not, like these, able to manage a succession of ordinary problems one way or another by pulling their various resources together. (Wallman 1984:217)

Fatalistic household is characterized by a lack of trust in the future; there is often a lack of planning, or if there are plans, it does not manage to put enough resources behind the plans for them to succeed.

Often fatalistic households are described as focusing on survival, without the luxury of having power over their own life. Hence, women's participation in wage labor is not a question of equality or self-realization, but one of necessity. However, I believe that this image of fatalism is too pessimistic. Not all fatalistic households are struggling to make ends meet; nevertheless, they do share an unpredictable environment.

Fatalistic household is easily considered a failure by the rest of the society, and the rate of "failure" is probably higher than in the other ways of life. It might even think of itself as failures in life, like the Truongs, who are the only fatalistic household presented in this thesis (starting on page 243). However, the fatalistic household would more often put the blame on the unpredictability of circumstance and the various hardships of the world. Nevertheless, failure is not a defining characteristic of a fatalistic household. Rather, failure is one of many sources of randomness (and a way to conceptualize external pressures upon the household). Another source is the lack of predictable income, common, for example, to many artists. They do not know when they are going to sell their next work of art, or how many gigs they are playing next month. They might be successful in their line of work but the inevitable unpredictability makes it difficult to plan ahead. Instead, each day is lived as it comes.

Fatalism is a fully functional strategy, just like the four other ways of organizing, and in some situations the best adaptation to outside events. Particularly, I would expect people who become long term clients of the state (dependent on the social welfare office) to, little by little, become more and more fatalistic, as significant elements of control over their own lives are taken over by social workers. This was one of the theoretical hypotheses I wanted to explore, but in my sample, the households are doing well, and hence their experiences with the social welfare office are limited.

Even if it is not fair, one could draw a caricature of the fatalistic household as the lottery-loving, TV-watching, non-voting (what is the point anyway?) household. These are the people manipulated by institutions based on to the other ways of organizing[82] and often ignored by political scientists (because they neither vote nor respond to surveys).

What is fatalism?

Fatalism requires a more detailed presentation than the three active ways of organizing, because it is less familiar to most people. I will present here two discussions regarding fatalism. Firstly, a discussion about the role of belief in fate, and, secondly, a discussion about distinguishing fatalism from a subordinate position in a hierarcy.

There has been disagreement amongst cultural theorists concerning the content of fatalism: specifically, what is the nature of the isolates—are they really fatalists or not?

Douglas claims that labeling isolates as fatalists masks the real causal direction:

> Their belief that nothing that they can do will change events, is a ploy, a justification for their not having views and not going out to demonstrate or take political office. *The symptoms of fatalism are claims to justify withdrawal, they result from isolation and they uphold it.* At some point everyone has to be a fatalist (Douglas 1998b:12. Italics by EO)

The counter position is taken by Wildavsky:

> It was Wildavsky who insisted that the cognitive style of what Mary [Douglas] calls isolates or "atomized subordinates" is always and everywhere fatalism, strictu senso. In much of her writing, Mary has suggested that isolates' thought styles are eclectic, non-coherent, limited in reflexivity, conservative in tastes only through lack of experience rather than principle, difficult to generalize about, and so on… [83]

The belief in fate does not seem to be the most important trait; rather, it is the randomness, which could be explained by several factors. First, isolates, or fatalists, are heavily influenced or controlled by outside forces, so their plans often fail. Second, since it makes less sense to make plans, they plan less (or just in the very short term). Third, since they lack the power to enforce commitments they are likely to avoid social commitments. In sum, there is less order and more randomness.

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[82] The hierarchical social welfare system justifies its own existence by providing help for these "needy" people. The individualistic businesses create afternoon soap operas to capture the fatalistic housewives as a special market segment. And the egalitarian moralists complain about the fatalists being exploited by the immoral individualists and falling through the bureaucratic safety net. (Thus, if there were no fatalits, the egalitarians would have invented some, in order to blame the others).

[83] Email from Perry 6 to the cultural theory discussion group at November 22nd 2002.

Thompson, in agreement with Douglas, claims that isolate households often try to present themselves to the outside world as if they belong to one of the three other ways of life.[84] For example, they might talk a lot about the importance of upholding traditions, but if you look closely enough at what they actually do, they do not succeed in this. Their lives have too many little random episodes that change the content of the traditions. In some sense, the will is there, but the ability is not (either through a lack of "self-discipline" or they are controlled too much by outside forces).

To summarize, today's understanding of isolates is in conflict with Wildavsky's understanding, which saw belief in fate as the key. Isolates are better understood as random in behavior and opinion, non-coherent in tastes and styles, and as having social relations with low levels of internal commitment, which leaves them without reliable support. Belief in fate does occur among isolates, but it should not be used as the only trait distinguishing them from other ways of organizing, as it is something used to justify their present situation.

The second discussion focuses on the fatalistic belief in a lack of personal control. How is this kind of position different from the lowest rank in a hierarchical social organization, where people constantly tell you what to do, how to dress and so forth?

One difference has to do with social solidarities, or helping each other. You can ask a fatalistic household for help, but you do not know if you will get any. If he or she has the possibility to help, they often will, but it is an option, not something mandatory. In a hierarchical social structure, the social relations and roles one possesses also define the rights and obligations one has. It should be clear to everyone what kinds of claims for help can be made, by whom, and in which situations. If one does not help, when help is mandated, one's social position is endangered, which creates a strong incentive to help (or to fulfill any commitment). For an isolate, the situation is asymmetric: they have obligations, but only few rights. They might be forced to fulfill obligations (by the other ways of life), but they are left without the means to force others to fulfill their obligations. In some sense, each person is on his or her own.

There are hence several distinctions between a low rank hierarchy and isolate social positions. During a change, one can also imagine a situation where the group starts to break apart either from the top or the bottom. This could happen starting from the top if the higher ranks do not fulfill their obligations. For example, the higher ranks can decide to cut off their obligations towards some lower ranks, making them unwilling but de facto isolates. An example of bottom-up breakdown would be the corrosion of trust: if the lower ranks do not believe that they are taken care of, they might stop fulfilling their part of the commitments. This particular variation can be seen as a perverted form of hierarchy. Based on cultural theory, I would expect that such social organization is not stable, and strong measures are

[84] Personal communication 18.11.2002.

needed to keep it working, which in extreme cases could mean the use of violence to ensure compliance.

Four Kinds of Helping Relations—the Four Solidarities

Social relations can be described in many ways. I narrow the discussion concerning social relations by focusing on the social rules guiding the flow of help through external social relations. Cultural theory claims that the obligations and rights people have rise out of their social relations. Social relations have embedded in them sets of rules and norms, which define responsibilities and rights, and which channel and control the flow of help. In short, social relations carry help. These helping relations can be structured in several ways. Each of the four ways of organizing carries its particular form of *solidarity*, which defines who is eligible for what kind of help and for what reasons. Hence, my use of the concept of solidarity is more narrow than Thompson and Rayner's, as they present the four solidarities and four ways of life as interchangeable concepts (1998).[85] Nevertheless, I have chosen to use the term *way of organizing* to describe the households' internal organization and the organization of the flow of help through external social relations. Therefore, in my use of the term, solidarities are a component of a household's way of organizing.

The stratified collectives (hierarchies) use *hierarchical solidarity*. It is one's social status that determines who is helping whom and in what ways. There is no need for symmetrical exchanges because the collective takes care of its own (provided each member acts appropriately; that is, in the manner specified by his or her rank and stature). The participants contributing resources do so because it is the right thing to do; they are helping others in order to build or sustain a community. They do not expect repayment, and will deny that they are helping others in order to gain repayment. However, it is likely that the people who can control significant resources in the community will soon have a high status position in this community. In this sense, repayment is in the form of status and respect from other community members. This kind of help is also ritualized in various ways. People will know what is required of them to be eligible for help, and the helpers know when they "have to help."

The bounded collectives (enclaves) use *egalitarian solidarity*. Membership in the group is the important trait for releasing resources. All members are treated equally, thus position is not important. The group members help each other collectively; there is

[85] There is a discussion concerning what is at the core of cultural theory. Mary Douglas claims that the social relations have primacy (even if only in a modest degree), whereas Thompson and Rayner (1998) claim that social relations do not have primacy. The latter have proposed the use of the term solidarity instead of the term way of life, because emphasizes cultural theory's focus on process and its the dynamic character, and it ties cultural theory to the tradition of Durkheim, Maine, and Tönnies.

a form of internal altruism. There is no expectation of repayment, because helping group members is like an investment, it will contribute to the common good. Moreover, because the difference between common good and private good is not that great, the "cost" of participation does not become apparent. Providing help outside the primary group is a way to express equality—we are all the same.

The *individualistic solidarity* is characterized by ego-focused networks. There is no "membership" that grants access to the resources; access is based on personalized contacts and symmetrical exchange. Behavior here is more instrumental, as the role of the collective is marginal. Even if there is not an elaborate social stratification as in the hierarchical solidarity, social status is sought. Not all transactions are between equals. The network size and one's network-centrality create the basis for an individual's success and social status. Even if the relations here resemble market relations, one should distinguish them from regular trade, because in a regular market, the means of trade are monetary. In an individualistic social system, other mechanisms often apply. People do help each other, and they expect something in return, but the time frame is looser and the form of return is not necessarily determined when the first transfer of resources takes place. Trust, therefore, is important. A good business relationship between two merchants can build up individualistic solidarity between them. However, we can find this kind of solidarity almost everywhere where small services between friends are exchanged; it is by no means limited to markets. We all have done small deals between friends: "I will baby-sit your children, if I can use your car."

The isolates have a problem with solidarity; at least that is how *fatalistic solidarity* looks from the outside, as the level of voluntary commitment in social relations is low. Their lives are largely controlled by outside forces, and their opportunities to make their own choices are limited. Therefore, making commitments becomes impossible; or, rather, it becomes impossible to keep commitments. Consequently, they do not expect others to their keep commitments either. This does not mean that there are not resources that flow between households; just that the obligations regarding who should help who and how much are not fixed. The starting assumption is that one's choices are restricted. However, if there is an opening when help is called for, help might be given. There is no reason to assume that isolates are any less generous than those in the other ways of life, which stories of extreme generosity by isolates confirm. The important aspect is that you cannot trust that your friends will be there for you when you need them. It is possible that they will help, but you just do not know—maybe they will, maybe they will not. There is research pointing toward this kind of social support system. Wellman writes, "many community ties are not supportive. … These ties are purely sociable—or even destructive" (Wellman 1982:75).

Fatalistic solidarity is characterized by the lack of dependable social support. Isolates do, of course, have friends and ties to other people, but these ties do not translate into obligations.

Therefore, each of the four ways of life corresponds with one form of solidarity that determines who helps who, in which ways, as well as what triggers such help and how it is justified. These mechanisms are important in defining the social relations people have. All of us have experienced discussions where there is disagreement concerning help and its repayment. Let us say that person A helps person B. Person B can suggest a suitable repayment. If A accepts this it could indicate individualistic solidarity. If A refuses, A is trying to convert the transferred resource into a social bond and obligation upon B, which could then pull B into a system of hierarchical or egalitarian solidarity. It is also possible that B does not offer a repayment, hence rejecting the individualistic solidarity and implicitly claiming that the relation between A and B is such that either egalitarian or hierarchical solidarity should be applied. All these alternatives are likely to create tension and make the relation between A and B unstable over time.

Negative Consequences of Social Capital

One of Portes' important additions to the Social Capital literature[86] is the emphasis on the negative consequences of Social Capital. Most studies, so far, have emphasized the positive aspects of Social Capital and downplayed that social relations also have negative aspects.[87]

> Recent studies have identified at least four negative consequences of social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward leveling of norms. (Portes 1998:15)

How do these four negative consequences relate to cultural theory? First, the exclusion of outsiders is a negative consequence connected to the hierarchical and egalitarian solidarity, both of which are based upon the formation of groups or collectives. It is impossible to create an *us* without simultaneously excluding *them*. There are of course different degrees of exclusion and different rules governing entry into the group, and it is these that one should look at, not at the principle of exclusion itself, if one hopes to improve the situation for those presently excluded.

Second, the excessive claims aspect is recognized in relation to entrepreneurship in that it makes it difficult to create successful firms. In cultural theory terms, it is an argument claiming that individualistic behavior is difficult when crowded by social relations that are hierarchical or egalitarian:

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[86] The origins of social capital is often contributed to Bourdieu, Loury, Coleman and Putnam (Portes 1995; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000)

[87] Portes attributes this to sociologists wanting to fix positive traits to our sociability and negative traits to "homo economicus" (Portes 1998:15).

> Weber … stressed the importance of impersonal economic transactions guided by the principle of universalism as one of the major reasons for Puritan entrepreneurial success. Thus, cozy intergroup relation of the kind found in highly solidary communities can give rise to a gigantic free-riding problem, as less diligent members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands backed by a shared normative structure. (Portes 1998:16)

Granovetter similarly recognizes the negative effects of social relations: Excessive claims can be detrimental to entrepreneurship, as it heavily limits the possibility of reinvesting any profit.

> More generally, immigrants have an advantage over natives in achieving the right balance between what might be called "coupling" and "decoupling". Chinese in China, despite the obvious presence of Chinese culture, can suffer from excessive claims [from kin]. Thus Won suggest that it has been typical of entrepreneurs in China to "leave their native homes to conduct business" so that "relatives will not be abundant in the communities in which they work" (Granovetter 1995:145).

A firm that has to employ a large number of relatives might be burdened by employees who are loyal, but not necessarily the best ones for the job at hand. Relatives are also more difficult to get rid of, making it more difficult to adapt to changes in the market situation. In addition, as in the case of the Herreras, excessive claims from relatives make it tempting to hide one's wealth (see page 194).

Third, the limits on individual freedom are integral to both isolation and hierarchies. These social relations put many demands upon the ways people should behave. That is what high-grid is about. One could also ask whether egalitarian groups put lots of limitations on individual freedom. Typically, in an unstructured group, the limitations are few, or at least they are consensual. One can hardly consider self-made rules to be severe limitations on individual freedom. However, in extreme egalitarian enclaves, like some religious sects (Sivan 1995), there are severe constrains on individual freedoms.

The fourth negative consequence—downward leveling of norms—is typical for enclaves. An example could be a socially excluded ethnic group that creates its own measures of success that separate it even further from the majority population.

While the development of social relations that carry obligations is needed to create predictability in the flow of resources, which again has numerous positive consequences, one should not fall into the pastoral syndrome, where researchers

> … nostalgically compare contemporary community networks with the well-integrated solidarity networks supposed prevalent in pre-industrial communities. (Wellman 1982:69)

There is nothing inherently better about any type of solidarity or way of organizing, as there are many ways to build a good community. Nevertheless, one should keep in mind that there are always negative consequences to social organization. Wellman pointedly reminds us that "Communities are not necessarily nice things" (1982:78).

Cultural theory subsumes the different sources of social capital (Portes 1995). Enforcable trust is a result of the hierarchical way of organizing. Bounded solidarity results from egalitarian organizing. Reciprocity is typical for individualistic way of organizing. Value introjection is part of cultural biases in every way of life. Now that we have seen how ways of organizing can be operationalized in relation to households' internal life and their helping relations, it is time to turn to their views of politics and society.

Predicting Views about Society and Politics

People's values, opinions, and understandings of how society and politics work are central topics in political science. Cultural theory gives many predictions about these issues, and the main goal for Part I of this thesis is to study how much we can understand of migrant households' views about politics, society, justice and so forth, if we know their way of organizing the household. Cultural theory claims that the origin of preferences are the social relations people have:

> Preferences are formed from the most basic desire of human beings—how we wish to live with other people and others to live with us. ”The real moment of choosing,” as Mary Douglas puts it, ”is ... choice of comrades and their way of life.” From this choice about how to relate to other people are derived the myriad preferences that make up everyday life. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:57)

There are empirical and theoretical reasons to expect that households' relations to public and political institutions are influenced by their way of organizing. Lotte Jensen, who has studied social housing in Denmark, emphasizes how different ways of organizing provide people with democratic skills and experiences:

> Experiencing a specific way of life is at the same time learning its techniques and mastering the skills needed to cope with particular social interactions and situations (Jensen 1999:174).

I claim that home is perhaps the most important arena for learning these skills. By understanding the migrants' ways of organizing at home, we have much better tools for understanding their behavior in the society at large. A study of migrant households is a necessary step in understanding the processes involved in adapting to life in a new country and becoming a member of the civic society and polity.

Ways of organizing can be used to describe a households' preferences, which are then confronted with its experiences with the welfare states institutions. Experiences must be interpreted and made sense of, a process influenced by cultural bias. Therefore, the four ways of organizing are intermeshed with political behavior on many levels: they influence preferences, they define common sense, they teach people social skills, and they influence the interpretation of their experiences.

Patterns of Common Sense

Political ideologies are sometimes defined as consisting of a view of human nature and the ideal society, a description of the present society, and roadmap for how to get from the present society to the ideal society. Even if I have no aspirations to describe the four cultural biases as political ideologies, cultural biases cover many of the same topics and offer an alternative approach for describing how regular people reason.

Reasoning about political issues is often based more on common sense than deep or detailed knowledge of the issues (Lakoff 2006, 1996, 1987; Douglas 1986). Common sense is shared; which makes it a phenomenon that can be described with the help of cultural theory. In order to narrow the discussion I will present, under four headings, predictions based on the four ways of organizing. Under the first heading I discuss views of human nature, understanding of the role of institutions, source of sovereignty and trust. The second encompasses the scope and nature of the democratic game and the private-public boundary. Under the third heading I discuss what constitutes justice and fairness. And the fourth heading contains views concerning distribution of resources, social support, and blame.

Some of these predictions are based solely on theoretical arguments about cultural biases, while others have solid empirical evidence backing them up. My role is to select some previously stated ideas, systematize them, and use them to make predictions about how migrant households look at the world outside. I am particularly indebted to the compilation, by Hofstetter, of fifty-seven predictions based on cultural theory (1998:55).

Human Nature, Role of Institutions, Sovereignty and Trust

For a political scientist, perhaps the most useful predictions concern human nature and the role of institutions, in that these are central features of many political arguments. The predictions I have mentioned in the first chapter (on page 9), will be here laid out in more detail. As the reader will see, the four ways of organizing supply four quite different views concerning human nature, the role of institutions, what is the sovereign, and what can be trusted.

Table 4: Human Nature, Institutions and Trust

Predictions	*Hierarchical*	*Egalitarian*	*Individualistic*	*Fatalistic*
Concept of human nature (1)	Sinful, but malleable	Born good	Self-seeking	March of destiny
View of institutions	Trusting	Skeptical	Limiting private freedom	Careful
Trust (2)	Procedures	Participation	Successful individuals	Low
Sovereignty (2)	Institution	Collective	Consumer	Who cares?

Source: Hofstetter (1998:55) refers to (1) Thompson, Ellis , and Wildavsky (1990) and (2) Rayner (1991).

Hierarchical

The hierarchical household is likely to view human nature as weak. As some might say, "we are born sinful." A lack of trust in human nature could be a problem, if there were not trust in strong institutions. Because human nature is weak, we need to subject ourselves to the control of strong institutions that form us into good citizens and "loyal subjects to the crown," as some might say. Institutions teach people what their proper place in society is (something that some people need help to understand) and help to enforce order in society. Without institutions like churches, schools, courts, police, and the army the country would be in chaos.

> Hierarchists trust authority. They trust the wisdom and knowledge of those who fill the clearly demarcated positions within the stratified whole, confident that they will do all they can not to disgrace those positions (and that they will get their well-deserved come-uppances if they do). ... Trust is thus primarily directed upwards, thereby granting its downward counterpart, deference. Institutions, rules and procedures that work with this vertical grain—maintaining status distinctions, order and stability, thereby shaping citizens into responsible and loyal subjects—are trusted, and those that work against this grain—those that seek to institute equality of opportunity (individualism) or equality of outcome (egalitarianism)—are distrusted. (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:191)

Institutions are the carriers of sovereignty. No single individual should be given powers that can threaten institutional traditions. Institutions and rules are there to limit people's power and freedom, and to ensure that even the King does the "right thing"—the King is an institution—not a person with large powers.

> A hierarchy installs countervailing powers: the husband balanced by the wife, the lord by the bishop, Emperor's secular power balancing Pope's spiritual authority, Registrar and Matron facing each other in the hospital. A big school may have two or more heads of houses who can combine to confront the headmaster. Industrial units may have the general manager balanced by the project manager. (Douglas 2002a:18)

Obviously a hierarchical household is expected to trust institutions and the guidance given by institutions. The solution to many problems is to increase the power of institutions. Collective action is trusted under proper leadership.

Egalitarian

The egalitarian household is quite different. It believes that humans are born good, but corrupted by institutions—overly competitive markets and rigid hierarchical institutions break down the good in people. Institutions are evaluated according to how they promote equality through ideology and practice. Most institutions are not to be trusted; they are effective tools in the wrong hands.

> Egalitarians trust those who have not been corrupted by inequitable and power-hungry institutions: markets and hierarchies. Convinced that humans are essentially caring and sharing, they strive to promote conditions where these qualities can blossom: equality of condition, decentralization, symmetrical exchanges, small-scale enterprises and so on. Anything that is seen as horizontalising is trusted; anything that is seen as working against that horizontal grain—markets, top-down structures, concentrations of wealth and power, and "bench science" ("you can never change just one thing" is the founding assumption in the holistic science that upholds egalitarianism) —are distrusted. (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:192)

Egalitarian household is a believer in collective action, just like a hierarchical household, but it prefers a direct form of collective action, which it sees as the only reliable way of getting things done. Sovereignty belongs to the collective, not an institution with traditions, but the group of people that together form the collective.[88] The collective can make their own rules, and they are not bound by traditions or rules that limit their powers. Egalitarians will often see increasing equality as the solution to problems, and would like to convert many hierarchical institutions to more their own liking.

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[88] There are also other, more extreme, forms of egalitarian institution building, like some religious sects that manage to institutionalize their egalitarian structure (Sivan 1995).

Individualistic

The individualistic household is expected to view people as strong, resourceful, and fundamentally selfish, while institutions and the numerous rules limit people's freedom to make use of the available resources.

> Individualists trust others until they give them reason not to: the ”tit-for-tat” strategy that is uninvadeable in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game. They are therefore great cooperators, which makes nonsense of the idea that there is a polarity between competition and cooperation. In consequence, individualists are inclined to distrust the state when it is perceived as an intervening, freedom-limiting force. Indeed, they distrust all forces (they can be egalitarian as well as hierarchical) that tend to solve problems through extensive regulation and control. Individualists trust experts on the basis of their ”track-records” rather than their diplomas, degrees and certificates and, most of all, they will trust those arrangements that seek to harness man's self-seeking nature for the benefit of all: markets. They are happiest with guidance from the hidden hand, rather than the all-too-visible hands of hierarchy and egalitarianism. However, *some* non-market institutions are trusted by individualists: those that enforce the law of contract, without which transaction costs would spiral to the point where their beloved markets failed. An alliance between individualism and hierarchy is therefore quite workable, provided that the hierarchical solidarity confines itself to this law enforcing role (which, of course, it won't). (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:191)

The individualistic household is not a believer in collective action. It believes, ultimately, as Margaret Thatcher put it: "There is no such thing as society" (Thatcher 1987). The individualists trust the market and Adam Smith's hidden hand, which ensures that the added up results of these private acts are for the common good. Their main solution is to increase competition and let the market sort things out. This is their method for evaluating institutions based on their results. Traditions that are not effective should be allowed to die out. In this sense, the true sovereign within the individualistic way of organizing is the individual consumer/producer acting in his own self-interest.

Fatalistic

Where each of these three active ways of organizing look on their own solution as the best one, the fatalistic household is likely to view them all as equally misguided, as it knows that the world is a random and dangerous place that cannot be trusted. Its views are more random, and it is difficult to find characteristics that can be used to define it. One candidate is low levels of trust in other people. If you cannot trust your own ability to implement your plans, you expect the same of your fellow humans, too. Thus, the importance of voluntary commitments is low. It is only natural to expect that others also suffer from similar unexpected blows of bad luck, or conversely, strokes of good luck. Consequently, collective action is a waste of time; it is better to just stay home.

> Fatalists are "fickle isolates," convinced that people are not to be trusted and that nature operates without rhyme or reason. "Defect first"—winning strategy in the one-off Prisoners dilemma game—makes perfect sense in the fatalist's social context. "It doesn't matter who you vote for," they tell themselves, to the never-ending dismay of those who belong to the three other solidarities, "the government always gets in." (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:192)

Institutions are not built upon the fatalistic logic, therefore they are something different and strange that cannot be trusted. Institutions are powerful actors that can at any time turn their attention toward the household, which is not likely to be positive—getting the attention of the headmaster, police, or tax-revenue service never leads to any good, or have you heard of anyone who got his money back after a tax audit. The best course of action is to keep one's head down. Questions of sovereignty are irrelevant for the fatalist, as the only thing that one can really trust is the unpredictability of the world.

The Scope and Nature of the Democratic Game, and the Private-Public Boundary

Each of the four ways of organizing has a different view of what democracy is about, and where the boundary between the private and public should be. An overview of this is presented in Table 5.

Hierarchical

The hierarchical view of political decision-making is captured by Jensen in the following manner: "*We* are entitled to decide what *they* must do. *They* are entitled to decide what *we* must do." (Jensen 1999:177)

The differentiation of roles does include differentiation of political decision-making, which gives two different views, depending on one's position in life. The authority to make decisions belongs to only a few people, who can legitimately make decisions about what *others* must do.

Table 5: The Scope and Nature of the Democratic Game

	Hierarchical	*Egalitarian*	*Individualistic*	*Fatalistic*
Collective action	Under proper leadership	Only reliable way	What is in it for me? Inefficient, carrying dead weight	No point
Political decision-making[89]	We are entitled to decide what they must do, They are entitled to decide what we must do	We decide what we want to do	I decide what I want to do	They decide what I must do
Scope of democratic game[90]	Limited to the public sphere	As encompassing as possible to minimize influence of others	As limited as possible to maximize individual influence	As limited as possible to minimize the influence of others
Actor role	Rule-based decision maker	Participate in collective decisions, mediate individual ideas and communal purposes, create a communal sprit	Make individual decisions, alliances, or exit	Wait for decisions made by others
Capabilities required	Formal authority, knowledge of roles and rules and their appropriate interpretation	Empathy, ability to grasp complex information, formulate views, and negotiate	Entry fee, self-confidence, bargaining skills	Obedience, indifference

> For the same reasons that they approve putting people and products in their properly ordered place, hierarchists approve of differentiating the public and private spheres. They frequently harbor an expansive view of state functions, hence their conflict with individualists, but they insist, contra the egalitarians, that politics is not for everyone and everyday for the rest of us, but rather reserved for a qualified and privileged few full-timers and for one day every four or five years. Where hierarchists draw the line between the public and private will vary, but the boundary is likely to be well defined. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:217)

Politics is seen as a set of rules that everyone must follow, which ensures that decisions are made in a proper manner. The role of the actor is that of rules-based decision-maker. The capabilities required by the participants are possession of formal authority, knowledge of roles, rules and their appropriate interpretation (Jensen 1999:177).

89 (Jensen 1999:174)

90 The source is Jensen (1999:177). However, because of an improved understanding of hierarchy since her publication, I have changed the hierarchy from all encompassing, to a limited scope.

I believe that Jensen's view of hierarchical politics as all encompassing (Jensen 1999:177) is not precisely formulated, as a hierarchical household divides the world into different spheres with different rules. Hierarchical politics can indeed reach most areas of life, but there are clear limits for the reach of political powers—there are other sources of authority in society, like religious authorities, who have their own independent areas of power.

Egalitarian

The egalitarian take on political decision-making can be summarized as follows: *"We* are entitled to decide what *we want* to do." (Jensen 1999:177)

As sovereignty is given to the collective, the collective becomes the only legitimate body that can make decisions on their behalf.

> Egalitarianism is characterized by the absence of externally defined mechanisms for conflict mediation. Since there are no externally imposed rules to justify preferring one perspective over others, or to define one role as more authorative than another, the only road to group coherence is negotiation. (Jensen 1999:175)

The lack of rules and dependence on negotiations often leads to long and difficult discussions. According to Jensen, the participants are required to involve themselves in collective decisions, mediate individual ideas and communal purposes. The capabilities required for participation are, firstly, the capacity to empathize, as well as the ability to grasp complex information, articulate views, and negotiate. Participation is indeed challenging. However, there is one important mechanism that helps the group to achieve consensus—the norms of equality—there is a strong pressure in the group for conformity.

Where hierarchy divides the world into several spheres, each with their own set of rules, egalitarians reject this:

> Egalitarians desire to reduce the distinction between the political and nonpolitical. Defining the family or firm as nonpolitical or private, egalitarians believe, is a way of concealing and hence perpetuating unequal power relations. Egalitarians view the public sphere, in which all can actively participate and give their consent to collective decisions, as the realm in which the good life can best be realized. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:216)

Because egalitarians give the collective sovereignty, and reject rules limiting the use of powers, they can aspire to control all areas of life in society. In other words, the boundary between public and private becomes unclear and the public sphere can, at least in theory, grow to overtake private spaces. The scope of the democratic game is as encompassing as possible to minimize the influence of others.

Individualistic

The individualistic idea of political decision-making can be summarized as: "*I* decide what *I* want to do." (Jensen 1999:177)

Collective decision-making is discarded and replaced with individual self-regulation.

> Because the individualists seek to replace authority with self-regulation they are continually accusing others of politicizing issues. Their interest is in defining politics as narrowly as possible so as to maximize behavior that is considered private, and thus beyond the reach of governmental regulation. Hence their reluctance to admit that the egalitarian charge that private resources influence public decision making, for this admission would imply capitulation. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:216)

The individualistic view of the proper scope for the democratic game is that political decision-making should be limited as much as possible to the maximization of individual influence and freedom.

The individualistic households want to keep their options open: they prefer to make individual decisions, and to make their own alliances, instead of being told what to do. At the same time, they like to keep an exit open, just in case. A primary capability required for an individualistic form of democratic participation is the ability to pay the entry fee (nobody should be joining the game for free). In addition, you need a good portion of self-confidence to make your own alliances and decisions, and you need bargaining skills in order to cut the best deals (Jensen 1999:177).

Fatalistic

The fatalistic view of political decision-making is that "*They* decide what *we* must do." (Jensen 1999:177)

While the three previous views of political decision-making provided at least some impetus for political participation, here people do not have much reason for even selecting their representatives.

> Fatalism and individualism are forms of *individualized* action. Individualism builds on the active choice of personal alliances. Fatalism, by contrast, builds on the absence of choice, the absence of alliances, and hence the absence of supportive networks. (Jensen 1999:175)

It is a rather dark view, and all the other ways of organizing are trying to "help" the fatalists to change their lives, while the fatalists see no point in this project.

> If egalitarians see the political sphere as the realm in which human beings most fully realize their potential, fatalists regard the political with nothing but fear and dread. Fatalists respond to their plight by trying to get as far away from the harm's way as possible. Unlike individualists, however, fatalists do not discriminate sharply between the private and the public spheres. Whether called public or private, the blows come without apparent pattern or meaning. The task of fatalists becomes personal or at most familial survival, and they cope as best they can without trying to distinguish between the sources of their difficulties. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:217)

The fatalists would prefer to keep the scope of politics as limited as possible to minimize the influence others have on their lives. The fatalistic citizens do one thing—they wait for others to make the decisions. The capabilities needed for a fatalistic style of democratic participation are obedience and indifference (Jensen 1999:177).

Ideas of Justice and Fairness

Ideas of justice and fairness are central elements in a cultural bias, which justifies both behavioral patterns and the social relations.

Hierarchy views fairness as *equality before the law*. As long as everybody is treated according to the rules, they are treated properly. People are not necessarily treated the same, for it is quite possible that several sets of rules might apply. Justice is about applying the rules without bias. Laws are contracts we are bound by.

The egalitarian collectives find this view unjust, as they consider justice to be *equality of result*. People have different abilities to act upon their rights. Rules that in reality sustain inequalities are not fair. People have rights that are more fundamental than the contractual approach promoted by hierarchy.

The individualistic view of fairness posits an *equality of opportunity*. Everybody should have a fair chance, and those who work hard should, obviously, be rewarded. People are lazy and one must not reward laziness. Justification is based on results—not rights or contracts—and removing incentives will lead to the decline of society.

The fatalistic bias lacks a consistent view of fairness and justice. However, one could say that neither is expected.

Distribution of Resources, Social Support and Blame

Political beliefs concerning the distribution of resources are connected to beliefs about nature and to the understanding of what is a resource. Norway is a welfare state known for taking care of the weak. I will focus on the households' views of social support: who should get it, how do they justify giving it, who should receive it, and what kind of consequences does it have for the receiver. Justifying the provision of support is closely connected to blaming. These two arguments enforce each other—it is when one can point out the source of a problem, that one knows what kind of support needs to be given.

Table 6: Distribution of Resources, Social Support and Blame

	Hierarchical	*Egalitarian*	*Individualistic*	*Fatalistic*
View of Nature	Robust within boundaries	Fragile	Robust	Unpredictable
Scope of knowledge	Almost complete and organized	Imperfect but holistic	Sufficient and timely	Irrelevant
Distribution of resources	Carefully planned according to one's position and responsibilities	Resources are limited. Therefore, it is important to share them equally	Resources are limited only by human ingenuity and public regulations. Free enterprise and production is more important than distribution	
Social Support	For the deserving poor only. I am an accountable citizen	Positive	Makes people lazy	Yes, please
Blame (5)	The victim	The system	The non-productive individual (or extreme distortions of the market)	It is the poor that get the blame

Hierarchical

Hierarchy views nature as having boundaries, and as the source of resources. Both nature and society are orderly entities that can be understood by experts. Therefore, it is a sound course of action to allow experts to make solid plans regarding how to harvest resources from nature without destroying it, and to have experts to draft plans for how the resources should be distributed in the society. We know from earlier that hierarchy is keen on differentiation, using rules to limit competition and to create order, and justice is about following the rules. People are not merely acting their roles; they are living them. It should not come as a surprise then that hierarchy blames those individuals who break the rules: deviant individuals who do not follow the rules, and even worse, who by their behavior demonstrate that the roles and rules that are so central in the hierarchical construction of the world are not absolute. Who is looked upon as deviant differs from society to society, but a hierarchy needs its deviants. This is one way to understand why so many fundamentalist religious groups—whether Christian, Islamic, or Jewish—have problems with homosexuals, single mothers, or others that do not fit neatly into the "order."

In a hierarchy, it becomes natural to support those people who are not breaking the rules, and to punish those who are eroding the social order. Giving and receiving help is one way to emphasize peoples' positions and responsibilities. The other ways of organizing sometimes accuse hierarchy of blaming the victim. Hierarchy has a strong moral commitment to helping the deserving poor (like widows, orphans, and morally worthy individuals who have lost their jobs), while those deviants who have brought the misery upon themselves (like drug addicts, criminals, and weirdoes) should not get help. Therefore, you need an elaborate system of rules to determine who should get help and who should not, and of course, you need the professional helpers who enforce these rules. We can see how hierarchy prefers to create a strong institution to help the weak.

Sacrifices for the greater good are viewed as a triumph by hierarchy. A good person should always put the good of the collective, which usually equals the good of the institutions, before his or her own good.

Egalitarian

The egalitarian view of nature is that it is fragile and limited. Fragility means that it can easily lose its balance, while it is practically impossible to know the limits for a safe utilization of resources. Therefore, caution is necessary, and one should err on the safe side.

Similarly, resources in a society are limited, and since justice is about end-equality, they should be shared justly, which, of course, is equally. Everybody should be able to have their share, regardless of their starting point in society. Because everyone is equal, it does not make any sense that some people are more qualified than others to make decisions about distribution. This power belongs to the collective, not to a set of rules created by some distant expert behind his desk who does not understand what is going on in people's lives.

Blame is not placed on deviants, but on systems, oftentimes on harsh markets and on the inhumane bureaucratical institutions that corrupt people. The naturally good humans can hence be corrupted by the promises of better life based on hard competition, which creates many losers and few winners, or they can be brought down by the overly rigid demands put on them by institutions.

The egalitarian triumph is fellowship of man—the real life displays that prove we are all the same.

Individualistic

The individualistic view of nature is that nature is robust. Therefore, you need neither the experts to tell you what to do, nor the caution called for by the egalitarians. More importantly, resources are not limited to natural resources. The true resource is human ingenuity and labor. Absolutely anything can be a resource. Resources are thus infinite. The only limits are the rules and regulations put there by the state. Therefore, the focus should be on setting free human ingenuity and hence increasing enterprise, rather than trying to share the resources—"instead of fighting about how to share the cake, let's make a bigger one, large enough for everyone." The proper role for the state is to provide the best possible conditions for human ingenuity, so that the resource pool can be maximized. Everything else, like taxes, labor unions, environmental regulation, and so forth, is just slowing growth and the inevitable progress. Individualistic politics are not about distributing limited resources, they are about creating growth.

> I think we have gone through a period when too many children and people have been given to understand "I have a problem, it is the Government's job to cope with it!" or "I have a problem, I will go and get a grant to cope with it!" "I am homeless, the Government must house me!" and so they are casting their problems on society and who is society? There is no such thing! There are individual men and women and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. (Thatcher 1987)

Individualists do not care much about social support, as they believe that everyone who tries hard enough will succeed, and that humans are selfish by nature. In addition, social support destroys the incentives for people to get out and make a living. Social support is actually a problem, because it is a disturbance in an otherwise perfect market. The individualists do not see any fairness in taking money from those who have earned it themselves through hard work, risk-taking, and ingenuity, and then giving it to those who are too lazy to work. It is a form of collective action forced upon people against their will, and not in the best interest of society. Therefore, we are beginning to see the targets of individualism's blame: the non-productive individuals living off of others, as well as the rules and regulations that distort the infallible hidden hand.

Fatalistic

Similar to the other ways of life, the fatalistic ideas about distribution of resources are also connected to their views of nature. As nature is seen as a random, unpredictable place, so is the distribution of resources seen as random and unpredictable. Therefore, you do not really need any kind of rule-based institutions, collective decision-making, or markets to take care of the distribution of resources. While the other ways of life are competing in order to make the world the kind of place they believe it to be, the fatalists do not have the need. The world is already a random and unpredictable place; it does not need any help by the fatalists. In this sense their views, just like all of the other ways of life, justify a course of action, which, in this case, is a lack of action.

Distribution of resources is something that others do, and in the same manner, social support is something that is handed out, not earned. A fatalistic household is more than happy to receive social support; which is just like any other source of money. For households relying on the other ways of organizing, living off of social support creates problems for them: hierarchical households abhor the breach of role it entails (unless the receivers are cast in the role of the victim); for the egalitarian household it demonstrates a pitiful lack of collective support; and for the individualistic household it proves a lack of the required personal skill and initiative. For the fatalistic household, receiving social support does not destroy their social relations; it is behavior that proves to the household that the world is the way it expected it to be.

The fatalistic households are in some sense less specific in their blaming. Where the other ways of life blame parts of society, the fatalistic household blames bad luck. The ways of bad luck are mysterious and work in many ways, hence, practically anything can be the cause of its miseries. However, since it really is about bad luck, you cannot really blame people personally. This way the fatalistic household can reduce the responsibilities it and others have—it was just bad luck.

Now that I have presented some theoretical aspects of cultural theory and operationalized it in relation to households, social relations that carry help, and their views of politics and society, it is time to look at some guidance regarding how to use the theory properly, before I show how it relates to other theories about culture.

Using Cultural Theory

This subchapter will focus on how to use cultural theory properly. I will first show that it is not about identifying and putting people or households into four boxes. Then I will discuss how cultural theory relates to causal explanations, and finally, whether it is about organizations or ways of organizing.

Using Cultural Theory to Describe Systems Rather Than Labeling Boxes

Since cultural theory names four ways of organizing, perhaps one can use it to label individuals or households, just like spotting species of birds. I do not believe so, for several reasons.

There are some applications of cultural theory in which the assumption seems to be that the four cultures are out there, and all we need to do is rigorous analysis to unravel the hidden structures in society. Personally, I am in favor of an ontologically more open approach. I would rather see cultural theory as a useful tool able to help us create different viewpoints that can help us to understand what people do with their lives, and how they give meaning to the world around them. One can look at this is as an attempt to exchange the underlying Durkheimian ontological structuralism in cultural theory with Weberian epistemological stereotypes, following the example given by Innvær (1999).

Sometimes cultural theory has been used merely to recognize the four different types, which would be a serious case of lumping, as Hexter would call it:

> … historians who are splitters like to point out divergences, to perceive differences, to draw distinctions. They shrink away from systems of history and from general rules, and carry around in their heads lists of exceptions to almost any rule they are likely to encounter. They do not mind untidiness and accident in the past; they rather like them.
>
> Lumpers do not like accidents; they would prefer to have them vanish. They tend to ascribe apparent accidents not the untidiness of the past itself but to the untidiness of the record of the past or the untidiness of the mind of splitting historians who are willing to leave the temple of Clio in shambles. Instead of noting differences, lumpers note likenesses; instead of separateness, connection. The lumping historian wants to put the past into boxes, all of it, and not too many boxes at that, and then tie all the boxes together into a nice shapely bundle. The latter operation turns out to be quite easy, since any practiced lumper will have so selected his boxes in the first place that they will fit together in a seemly way. (Hexter 1979:242)

If the theory would not go any further than providing a typology of four types, it would probably be of less use, especially if the internal cohesion is arrived at through observing only what fits into the boxes. The value of the theory lies in its ability to present the different ways of organizing in interaction with each other, in informing us about the requisites needed for each type of household to thrive, and in the predictions we can make about these households' preferences and behavior in the society.

Bird Spotting Individuals

Bird spotting individuals[91] is likely to be useless, because individuals are part of several social settings, and one should not assume that individuals are consistent across different social contexts.[92]

> People, in cultural theory, are not dense little spheres—hierarchical, individualist, egalitarian, fatalist or autonomous to the core; they are every bit as plural as the other scale levels. (Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999:13)

There is no reason one cannot have roles based on the different types of social organization. Only seldom do roles conflict. An example of a conflict like this could be a parent who behaves according to different logics when at work and at home, and then meets a spouse or a child at the workplace. Nevertheless, the theory works, because these are understood to be two different settings, with two different sets of rules, and a family member's visit at the workplace is not likely to have any long term consequences for the organization of the workplace or at home.

A second way to think about cultural theory is that it can represent different voices in a discussion.[93] Individuals can choose to use whichever voice they want to bring into a discussion.

Cultural theory is originally about institutions, not individuals, and should therefore be used with utmost care on individuals.[94] When applied to individuals it can be understood as a combination of preference for and competence of the four ways of life and their actual social relations. I will come back to how to use cultural theory on individuals in Chapter 7. In my previous work, I have demonstrated how this kind of shift in perspective is necessary when one changes the level of analysis from institutions down to individuals (Olli 1996, 1999). Therefore, trying to fit a person into one of the four boxes is not advisable.

Bird Spotting Households

Bird spotting households can be tempting, but is not recommended. If the theory is only used to label households according to their preferred way of organizing, one is likely to make several misjudgments. First, there is no strong reason why a household should use only one logic of organizing (see figure on page 257). Perhaps a single logic dominates one part of the household's life, without having

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91 For example Lockahart and Coughlin have attempted to establish people as individualists, hierarchists, egalitarians and fatalists (Boyle and Coughlin 1994: 196)

92 The exemption being fanatics who are trying to force the whole world to fit only one way of organizing (Lockhart 1997).

93 There is a body of work based on this kind of approach of various types of discourse analysis (Harrison and Burgess 1994; Hoppe 1993; Pollock, Lilie, and Vittes 1993; Thompson and Rayner 1998; Frølich 2001).

94 Steve Rayner believes that we should refrain from using concepts like individualist or hierarchist altogether (Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999:12).

the same importance in other areas. Second, it is also likely that households change: their social relations change; their situation in the labor market changes; children are born and grow older; parents grow older; and there is a continuous process of learning. Change often starts in a single area, before spreading into other areas of a household's life. Change is an inherent part of social life, and one should not make the mistake of assuming that one knows what kind of household one is dealing with, based on answers to only a few questions. Third, it is possible that the households "resent" the ongoing change and try to cling to the way of organizing that has dominated in the past. This is likely to occur when events outside the family can push the family in a new direction. I have seen how a family's answers bear a slight inconsistency, and there are attempts to give reasons for the new behavior based on the old cultural bias (Lorca 2002b). The family in question recognizes these changes, and welcomes them, but at the same time is unwilling to let go of their previous justifications.[95] One can still describe households in terms of cultural theory, it is just not as simple as spotting the species of a bird, as species are mutually excluding by definition, while households can utilize several ways of organizing.

Trying to identify an individual or household as belonging to one of the four ways of organizing does not utilize the potential in cultural theory.[96] Just because there are four labels, does not mean that that is all there is. Cultural theory is a systems theory, which opens for a study of institutions as dynamic systems. Attaching fixed labels is a type of simplification that can be useful and even necessary in some situations, but often not sufficient for understanding what is going on. The real utility of cultural theory lies in trying to understand the households' choices, preferences, and interaction with their surroundings.

When I advocate the use of the four ways of organizing as stereotypes, it is because I believe they will be useful as stereotypes. However, one must always keep in mind that using stereotypes is not the same as using a theory. Even if one borrows labels or categories from a theory, one does not automatically apply the theory.

High Complexity Defies Explanation of States

One typical trait of cultural theory is the complexity of description that it is possible to utilize in almost any social situation. We have the three elements: social relations, cultural biases, and behavioral patterns. These three can be in concert with each

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[95] This could be a case of "stolen rhetoric": that is, using arguments that actually support another way of life, which can be either conscious (to achieve short-term gain) or unconscious (often problematic).

[96] This is a topic repeatedly brought up on the e-mail discussion list for topics related to cultural theory (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/culturaltheory/) by Steven Rayner, Steven Nay and others who believe that the value of cultural theory lies in its ability to explain rather than just typologize.

other, forming the four different combinations also known as ways of organizing. These four ways of organizing are mutually dependent and in conflict with each other. Thus, the possibilities for clash and change are numerous. When we also add the differences caused by language, religion, values, norms, and habits, there is a plethora of future possibilities available.

Thompson has laid out the consequences of treating cultural theory as a theory about complex systems (1996). In a situation with high complexity, explanations no longer look as they do in a situation of low complexity. Social science (and especially quantitative methods) has long used models that are best characterized by simplicity. The statistical techniques are complicated and require professional training to be used, but this has nothing to do with complexity. In quantitative methods the question is still, basically, how much does A effect B. By adding causal factors, the complexity of the model does not change. It remains only two points in time, and B is assumed to have only one path of change, and, in addition, multiple regression typically assumes that all the causal factors are additive (See pages 428 and 441).

What Is It About—Organizations or Ways of Organizing?

There are several accounts concerning the exact nature the content of the low-grid-high-group corner of cultural theory's two-dimensional space. The core issue seems to be what cultural theory is about. Mary Douglas emphasizes organizations and considers cultural theory a theory about organizations and institutions (Douglas 1986). Therefore, the label *enclave*, and the understanding of this way of life, is connected to a particular form of social organization. Michael Thompson considers cultural theory, in its newest form, which focuses on social solidarities, to be a theory about ways of organizing, rather than a theory of organizations, for in any organization one is likely to encounter more than one solidarity, and the organization itself is best described through the dynamic between these solidarities.[97] In other words, where Mary Douglas in her work emphasizes social relations, Mike Thompson emphasizes cultural bias and behavior, hence effectively downplaying social relations. It is difficult to settle this discussion, as both approaches have merits and weaknesses, and the usefulness is dependent on the research problem, making this a pragmatic choice of placing emphasis rather than a substantial one.

My own understanding has changed during this research project. Presently, I am in favor of using ways of organizing as a central concept. Most people can handle more than one way of organizing, and they can separate areas of life into different contexts each organized according to its own rules. When dealing with households and their everyday lives, it is more useful to consider the four ways of life as

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[97] Personal communication 17.12.2002.

principles of organization that can be applied within the same household, and perhaps many of the domestic disputes are actually disputes about which way of organizing should be used to define a situation.

Now that we have learned what kind of theory cultural theory is, it is time to look at how it is related to other theories about culture.

Relating to Other Theories about Culture

What about Culture?

What has cultural theory to do with culture? Most readers are probably, by now, baffled by the use of the concept *culture* as it is often understood, as consisting of language, religion, beliefs, and so forth. Particularly because the way cultural theory portrays people does not seem to fit into the regular view of culture. In the following, I will try to relate cultural theory to mainstream views of culture.

Among social anthropologists, views of culture can be divided in many other ways, but I believe Eriksen's presentation of the two opposing views of what culture is, captures the main debate. According to the first view

> Culture can be defined simply as those *customs, values, and ways of being, which are transmitted*, even if in somewhat changed form, *from generation to generation.* (Eriksen 2001:60 emphasis by EO)

In order to understand how cultural theory relates to both of these definitions we need to specify the concept of culture somewhat more. The Norwegian Dictionary of Sociology uses two distinctions to classify this first type of culture (transmitted customs, values, etc.) into further subcategories (Ekegren 1997): nature-culture and culture-society.

The nature-culture distinction uses culture to refer to everything created by humans: anything that is not biological, physical, or "natural" in some way. This is obviously too wide a definition for practical use, but there are many variations based on this one. We have the national cultures: Norwegian culture, Vietnamese culture, and so forth. These concepts are used often, and without enough thought with respect to what is behind them. Other much used variations based on this view of culture are the subcultures, which can be distinguished from others (the mainstream culture) by their "cultural" traits. Examples of this kind of subculture are youth culture or organizational culture. Common to these is the inclusion of society in some ways into the culture. Cultural theory also includes social relations, but it would claim that these national cultures are too wide as concepts, as the "real" cultural units are smaller, since every society is divided into institutions which often compete or are in conflict with each other over resources and influence in society.[98]

According to this view of culture, customs are one type of behavioral pattern, values are one part of a cultural bias, and ways of being are probably not far away from a way of organizing. According to cultural theory, a viable way of organizing is formed by three components: behavioral patterns, cultural biases, and social relations, which is not mentioned in the first definition (even if it is implicitly included, as society is not nature). Cultural theory thus departs from the most common theories about culture by including social relations as an integral part of the theory. In many theories, culture explains social relations, but in cultural theory, the social relations are part of the framework itself, and are understood as having an effect on both cultural biases and behavioral patterns. This is invaluable in my view in trying to get rid of explanations based on peoples' origins.[99]

The culture-society distinction gives us concepts like popular culture or high culture. This usage of the concept culture is in sharp contrast with the way it is used in cultural theory. Cultural theory is not about separating culture from society; rather, it claims that social relations, cultural biases, and behavioral patterns form a whole, a self-sustaining institution, and where changes in any one of the three will have consequences upon the two others.

So far, we have discussed culture in terms of customs and values that are transmitted from generation to generation. Let us turn our focus to the second competing view of culture, which focuses on communication:

> Another definition says that *culture is what makes communication possible*; in other words that culture are those patterns of thought, habits and experiences that a people have in common, and that permit understanding of each other. (Eriksen 2001:60 emphasis by EO)

This definition is based on the semantic view of culture, which emphasizes the communicative potential of a culture.[100] This has some theoretically interesting aspects for the field of migration research. According to the Durkheimian structuralism underlying cultural theory, there are hidden structures that influence how we organize our lives, and there is a limited number of different types of structures (in contrast to a common use of ethnic or nationalistic cultures that allows for hundreds of different cultures). If there are only a limited number of structures, cross-cultural communication would be easier, as there would be some common elements that can be used as a basis for communication.

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98 There are descriptions of national cultures based on surveys, as the levels of support for the different ways of life do vary between countries (Grendstad 1995a, 2001). In addition, national political cultures (and ideologies) can be described with concepts from cultural theory (Mamadouh 1999).

99 "The Vietnamese, they do…" is a type of explanation that displays a lack of understanding rather than a scientific explanation.

100 Badie (1983) has pointed out how the works of Mary Douglas can be used based on this view of culture (according to Frølich 2001:66).

"How is communication possible?" has been one of the main research problems for philosophers of language. To oversimplify, the answer is usually based either on a commonly shared culture or in pragmatism, which focuses on the repeated acts of communication that allow for learning and feedback. Cultural theory encompasses both directions by claiming, firstly, that the theory is not about individuals, but about social organization and cultural biases that are more or less shared. Secondly, it is the behavioral patterns, these repeated behaviors that sustain and build social relations and cultural biases. Therefore, cultural theory can be used to study behavior and focus on the acts instead of the symbols. I believe that the similarity between pragmatics and cultural theory is more than just superficial, as cultural theory would claim that "culture" exists only as long as it is lived or acted upon. It is in the face-to-face interaction that meaning is created and sustained. The existence of a symbolic level is not sufficient for a way of organizing (or culture) to be present, according to cultural theory.

> When we meet foreigners, we often try to establish a common starting point by asking each other about work, family, and other factors that can make further communication possible, *common cultural denominators.* (Eriksen 2001:64)[101]

These common cultural denominators are often thought of as education, job, family situation, and other common experiences. I would suggest another set of common cultural denominators to be added to the list: the four cultural stereotypes from cultural theory. If it is, as I believe, that there are different cultural logics (ways of organizing) out there, then recognizing the cultural logic the other person is using is perhaps the second best possible tool, after sharing a common language, for improving communication. Ways of organizing can be seen as social languages. It is possible to translate between them, but obviously, people speaking the same language are more likely to succeed in any organizational task.

To summarize, cultural theory is related to both main traditions of research on culture. Cultural theory challenges the first tradition, which focuses on norms, values, and behavior, by claiming that it is necessary to include social relations into the theoretical framework. Cultural theory supplements the second tradition, which focuses on communication, by suggesting that the four ways of organizing provide alternative platforms for communication, as four different forms of social language.

[101] Original text: "Når vi treffer utlendinger, forsøker vi ofte å etablere en felles plattform ved å spørre hverandre ut om jobb, familieforhold og andre faktorer som kan gjøre videre kommunikasjon mulig, altså *kulturelle fellesnevnere*."

Cultures in Change

There is a scholarly debate that questions how static and how changing culture is.[102] One of the strengths of cultural theory is that it is a theory about the dynamics in a cultural system, and it defines how different ways of organizing will relate to each other. Cultural theory claims that change is the normal state of affairs. The four stable ways of organizing do not really exist in pure and static forms, but are, rather, under constant pressure from both internal and external sources. Therefore, what needs an explanation is not change, but the fact that sometimes cultural forms appear relatively stable. Hence, my second criterion for better classification, contents change, seems to be possible to meet.

Cultural theory is concerned with the internal dynamics in such a system, and how the different ways of organizing will try to overpower each other. The theory does not try to explain who wins the competition, rather it claims that in a well balanced society all four ways of organizing are in a healthy competition, thus helping to counter the weaknesses each one of these ways of organizing would have on its own (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Ney and Thompson 1999).

One explanatory variable that is on the border of being left out of the theory is economic survival. It is often present, but somehow it is not part of the "system." I believe that this is because, as I mention above, the theory does not try to explain who wins the competition. Nevertheless, institutions and organizations based on the four ways of organizing are competing with each other and the way they utilize resources differs. Barth has described how culture and "survival" go hand in hand:

> Simple cultural traits are useful as adaptations to particular surroundings and means for providing a living. Groups with different cultural traits can thus live in the same area, and still depart culturally from each other, because these cultural differences represent an adaptation to each group's utilization of resources in the area. On the other side, competition concerning resources between the populations with different cultural traits, can set in motion a mobilization of collective action on the basis of ethnicity. (Barth 1994:181)

There is a similarity between "adaptations" used by Barth and by Douglas. In some of her later work Douglas seems to incorporate the idea that the way of organizing depends on what one wants to achieve:

[102] See (Alexander and Seidman 1990; Ehn and Löfgren 1982; Eckstein 1996; Wuthnow et al. 1984; Barth 1980; Hinton 2000).

> Each culture is good for different organizatorial purposes. When a complex coordination has advantages, it makes sense to develop the top right pattern and cultivate the values and attitudes that justify it. When individual initiative is needed, it makes sense to develop the bottom left pattern and the values that go with it. When concerted protest is needed, it makes sense to sink individual differences and go for the egalitarian group. And so on. (Douglas and Ney 1998:103)

By combining these two, one could then hypothesize that a minority group would choose for its basis of organization that one of the four ways of organizing that maximizes their gain. However, which one this will be is dependent on a combination of factors. First, what is that minority group's situation in the society, in other words, what are they trying to achieve by organizing as an ethnic group? Second, what enables them to see themselves as a unit or group, as some ways of organizing might be difficult to combine with their original basis for organizing. Third, how their opponents are organized.

While Barth claims that competition for resources is the basis for ethnic mobilization, cultural theory helps us to understand the forms ethnic mobilization can take in a given situation.

Majority vs. Minority Culture

A minority society is constituted as a minority in relation to the majority (and sometimes to other minorities). Therefore, the minority's social organization should not be studied only on its own, as long as there are social bonds and connections to the majority society.

Cultural theory is a neo-Durkheimian theory, which claims that the structures do matter. The four ways of organizing are in an inherent conflict, but often also dependent on each other. These four ways of organizing are not connected to any particular ethnicity; rather, the theory claims that in any society we are likely to find all four present, which for a social scientist can be a preposterous claim, especially since this argument is presented as a postulate without much support (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). For many years, this was the part of the theory that I could not accept. Recently I have started to think of it more as of a toolbox that can be used on any society, similar to the economists' ideas of supply and demand. Most economists would claim that mechanisms of supply and demand are present in all societies (although in very different forms and degrees), and at very least, any system of transactions can be described through the analytical concepts of supply and demand. In the same way, these four ways of organizing can be observed in any society. They are what they are only in relation to each other, and they are formed by each other's presence, just as supply is formed by the presence of demand.

Therefore, in theory, it is possible to find all four in the majority population, which in this case is Norwegian, and all four in each of the minorities, which in this case are Chilean, Vietnamese and Tamil. However, it is an empirical question whether one or several can be found, but one should not hide the fact that one's expectations easily influence the findings. I am not expecting to find all four ways of life within each minority, since the minority's ways of organizing have to relate to the majority's institutions (and ways of organizing). In other words, the minority can substitute missing forms of social organization within their own ranks with majority institutions. For example, the egalitarian households often blame the system (hierarchical or individualistic institutions) for peoples' problems, but this only makes sense if there are institutions present to which blame can be attributed. For a minority it would be easier (and much more credible) to blame such majority society institutions.

The relative importance of the four ways of organizing in the important institutions of society is an empirical question, which would be interesting to study even if it is outside the scope of this thesis. I would hypothesize that the relationship between the minority and the majority populations could be better explained if we knew the composition of the major social institutions in both the majority and minority institutions. There are several theoretically interesting possibilities. The stereotypes one group holds of another are likely to be formed by the dominant way of organizing (if such exists in the majority and/or the minority). Let us just assume, for the sake of argument, that some institutions in Norwegian society are based upon the egalitarian way of organizing, whereas we have a minority that is heavily hierarchical. One could understand the relation between these two social groups better if we knew what kind of problems hierarchical institutions have with egalitarian institutions. Perhaps many of the problems considered ethnic or religious can be better understood as structural problems. This does not reduce their ethnic or religious qualities, but it opens up a new way to approach these problems, and, potentially, to find new and better-crafted solutions.

Similarly, there can be several fractions based on competing ways of organizing within an ethicic minority group. The ethnic majority is likely to overlook these minorities-within-the-minority and treat the ethnic minority as if it were a single institution, following only one way of organizing. If we then build upon the example from above, there could be a significant individualistic segment of the population within a predominately hierarchical minority. For example, individualistic migrant entrepreneurs can be mistakenly treated by the majority as hierarchical (and similar to the rest of the ethnic group). These entrepreneurs are also likely to be in potential conflict within the dominant, hierarchical, way of organizing within their own community (for not keeping the traditions), as well as with the hierarchical institutions in the majority society (for not adhering to rules and regulations). However, at the same time, these entrepreneurs are likely to be an important source of resources within the minority community, providing it with jobs, income, and services. The entrepreneurs are likely to be dependent on the unity within the migrant community for inexpensive labor, startup capital, and perhaps a market for their products. This is a built-in paradoxical relation within cultural theory: The different forms of organizing are in conflict with each other, but they cannot in the long run do without each other.

The interesting questions thus become how these complex relationships are organized in a particular case, how they are sustained, and how they change over time.

People have multiple and overlapping group memberships. We all belong to many different communities: our ancestry, the country and city where we live, our neighborhood, our workplace and professional guilds, our religion, and our pastime hobbies can provide us with a myriad of belongings. Each of these could be described in terms of grid-group or as more or less based on one of the four ways of organizing.

Each large social unit can contain traits of all four ways of organizing, and the larger the unit the more likely it is that all four ways of organizing are present.[103] The authors of *Cultural Theory* postulate that each society must have at least five[104] ways of organizing present (see the requisite variability condition in Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4). The argument is based on deficiencies in each way of organizing: each one is too single-minded to create a well functioning society without the presence of the others and the correction they can provide.[105] In this sense, cultural theory supports a normative position embracing conflicts and liberal democracy as a way to institutionalize these conflicts.

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[103] Nevertheless, there are some attempts to find the cultural position of a nation (Grendstad 1995a; Mamadouh 1999) or of minority groups (Caulkins and Peters 2002).

[104] The authors come to five ways of life because they include the hermit, who is in a reflexive position in relation to all four ways of life, seeing them all, but not being bound by any one of them. I have excluded it because it is not really a way of organizing, as there are no rules. Hermits are voyeurs, more than participants. They do not engage in power relations; they do not allow themselves to be subjected to power used by others, nor will they enforce their will upon others (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:10-11).

[105] The authors argue, theoretically, that each way of life has something unique to provide for the others. In addition, there is an empirical argument later in the book, which shows how a lack of a way of life will lead to the collapse of a society. However, this argument relies on a selection of cases: societies that did collapse. Despite, my scepticism, I am not able to come up with any good counter examples of societies that have lacked one or several ways of life. I suspect that there is something tautological about the argument, especially if one compares the four ways of life to concepts like demand and supply. The fact that one can find them in all societies is not empirical evidence of the theory being right. It is rather a consequence of the way the theory has been constructed.

How Does Cultural Theory Match the Five Criteria for Better Classification?

In Chapter 2, I listed five criteria that a better classification of migrants should meet. Four of these can be answered theoretically: The first criterion—human unity—can be met by cultural theory, at least on the level of theoretical ambitions. Wildavsky writes:

> The predictions made in the preceding pages—to the extent people adhere to these four ways of life, they will view the world from the corresponding, culturally induced frames of reference and therefore arrive at the preferences ascribed to them—are meant to be universal. No matter what the material or technological position of people, or where they are located geographically, or in what historical time they live, their objectives can be derived from their cultural frames of reference. (Wildavsky 1989b:72)

Cultural theory ultimately treats all people the same: anybody can live their lives according to one of the ways of organizing; however, the theory does not claim that it knows what it means in the different societies.

The second criterion—allowing the concepts to change their content—is also matched.

> This claim of universality manifestly does *not* mean that history is irrelevant. On the contrary, only history can give us the cultural context. Only history can tell us as well which means or instruments of policy are available and which ones will, based on the experience of these particular people be, seen as relevant to their circumstances. (Wildavsky 1989b:72)

The ways of organizing are relational and abstract concepts that must be contextualized in a society. Over time their content will change—what constituted egalitarian behavior in the time of the Vikings might not strike us today as egalitarian, but seen in its own time and society it carries a particular meaning.

The third criterion demands that people must not become locked into one category—they need to be able to switch from one way of organizing to another, or else ways of organizing become essentialized categories, similar to ethnicity. As we have seen, and I will later show, people and households can slowly move from one dominant way of organizing into another.

A description of a person's position based on cultural theory is based on knowledge, preferences, and social relations. Few would argue against the assumption that knowledge and preferences change over time. Changing social relations, however, requires a serious effort. It might not sound like a difficult demand, but on the household level it would mean finding new friends and a change in the way the household's internal life is organized. All of us who have been married know how difficult it can be to make these kinds of changes. Nevertheless, it is possible, and so it is that cultural theory also meets the third criterion; people are not locked into one category, and they can change.

The fourth criterion—allowing for gradual membership—is also met by cultural theory, as it is not about putting people or households into boxes. Households apply the different ways of organizing in different degrees, and they mix them in different proportions. Cultural theory says that mixing two ways of organizing is a more unstable constellation than relying on only one, but there are situations where it actually is the best choice.

Households can be presented as having different degrees of the four ways of organizing, and they can thus be drawn on map with the four cultural biases (Figure 7 on page 146). The four corners represent the ideal-typical cases of hierarchy, egalitarian, individualistic and fatalistic ways of organizing, whereas most real life cases are not in the extreme corners but somewhere in-between.[106] Hence, gradual membership is ensured, and essentialism is easier to avoid.[107]

Cultural theory has a categorization that is flexible enough to encompass people from different cultural backgrounds, while it gives specific guidance as to how to translate knowledge (or experiences) from one context to another. Therefore, it provides us with a better balance between theoretical simplicity and practical use-value than its alternatives. In addition, membership is not fixed, people can gradually move from one category to another, in contrast to other stereotypes based on ethnicity, skin color, or country of origin.

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106 This map is only two dimensional, just like a grid-group diagram. If the cultural biases really are a four dimensional cultural system then presenting them on a flat, two dimensional surface will mask some of the differences. For example a location somewhere between hierarchical and individualistic bias, will on this map always determine the relation to fatalism and egalitarian bias. In a four dimensional space, there is a independent relation to each of the four cultural biases.

107 However, not all authors using cultural theory agree that there are dimensions that form a continuum:

> Some readers may want to know why we use the term "discriminator" rather than the more straightforward "dimension." Those already familiar with cultural theory may wonder what has become of the labels "group" and "grid," that for many years, have been associated with these two "dimensions of sociality." The reason for our change is that dimension signifies a continuum, while discriminator signifies two qualitatively different states. If, as we are now arguing, it is the different patterns of relationships that are crucial, then it would be wrong to speak of dimensions. If, as can easily be demonstrated, you have to first dismantle one pattern before you can put together another, then that transition from a highly patterned state, through an unpatterned one, to another highly patterned state. This is not a transition that can be represented in dimensional terms, because the midpoint in a dimensional transition would be a mix of the two patterns, not a total absence of them both. (Dake and Thompson 1993:footnote 14)

The fifth criterion—requiring the categorization to be helpful in everyday situations—is the most difficult to answer, and can be answered only through an empirical study. I hope that after the reader has read the rest of Part I, she will agree with me, that cultural theory's classification is definitely helpful. However, before I present the households we must have a look on the research methods used.

Chapter 4

DOING RESEARCH ON MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS

Interviews, or even social science it self, are sometimes motivated by assumptions like this:

> There is among us [researchers] a vogue of the assumption that the hinterlands of the mind are more variegated and colorful than its surfaces, that what a person hides from the world will somehow be less dull than what he shows. (Reisman and Benney 2004:16)

However, cultural theory being a neo-structuralist theory, what is shown is just as important, and perhaps even more interesting, that what is hidden. I have in my operationalization of cultural theory attempted to utilize what the interview subjects want to share and show, reducing thus the requirements to enter the realm of things hidden. Nevertheless, cultural theory is also interested in the hidden, the hidden structures that become so apparent when brought into the light, but which we fail to see, until they are pointed out to us.

This chapter will present a more detailed account of the research process, in order to allow for an evaluation of my work by others. I will start by giving a short summary of my research design and methodology, after which I will go into more details about sampling households, gaining access to them, interviewing, preparing for the analysis, reflections over the analysis and, finally, discussing the validity and reliability of my research.

Summary of Research Design and Methodology

To answer my research question, *how is a household's view of politics and society related to its way of organizing,* I use a household's internal organization and its social relations carrying help as a source to determine its way of organizing, and compare its views of politics and society with the predictions given in cultural theory.

I have interviewed seventeen migrant households from Vietnam, Chile, and Sri Lanka. Common to all households is that they live presently in Oslo or Bergen, and still have, or had in the recent past, children in a local school, and speak good enough Norwegian to be able to communicate with me without an interpreter.

Usually two visits to each household were required to cover all the questions I wanted answers to: In the first interview, I focused on work and housing history, as well as the household's internal life (including division of household work, recourse management strategies, and ways of making important decisions). In the second interview, the focus was on the household's external social relations, patterns of assistance, and their relation to and use of the welfare state's institutions. Commonly a visit would take a whole evening, resulting in two hours of taped, and later transcribed, interview. A few households refused the use of a recorder, and from these I only have my notes.

In my thesis, I do not present all seventeen households. In an effort to show how the ways of organizing work in practice I present eight households in detail. Each household is allocated twelve to eighteen pages, which should be enough to show how the different parts of a household's life are connected to each other. I have left out households that are "duplicates" of these eight, and two divorced households.

I have gained access to these households mainly through two sources: either by directly addressed letters or by letters delivered by trusted persons in the Chilean, Vietnamese, and Tamil communities.

Presentation of the Development of a Research Problem

This research project is inspired by some unconnected observations regarding nationality and background, including my own. My own background is somewhat cross-cultural: My father is Finnish, my mother Norwegian. I grew up in a Swedish-speaking region on the southern coast of Finland. I spent my childhood summer holidays in Norway, and at the age of eighteen I moved to Norway to study. I am in a fortunate position in that I can choose my identity and affiliation according to what suits me and my needs best in most situations.

The first observation concerns the people with whom I am expected to socialize. In Norway, I tend to be lumped together with other Finns, because of my name. Norwegians assume that I have a lot in common with other Finns, and that I would love to spend more time with fellow Finns. However, I do not!

The second observation is connected to the unfortunate tendency to explain too many of the immigrants' choices and too much of their behavior by their country of origin. Like most other Finns, I make my own choices and have my own preferences and interests that have formed my life history. I sincerely believe that my background has influenced my choices, and who I am, but I do not think that it is the key to understanding my life history, apart from the obvious—emigration is easier and Norway is the easy choice for a receiving country.

The third observation is connected to mistaken exotics. Somehow, people who are not part of the majority population are seen as carriers of their respective national symbols, like music, literature, clothing, flags, and sports, but they are not seen as regular households and families whose main concern is making ends meet. Most minority families face the same challenges and worry about the same things as majority families. Unfortunately, the public discourse and most of the research seems to focus on the exotic and special, rather than on what is common and mundane.

I have worked previously with survey methods and cultural theory, but this theory does not easily translate into reliable measurements on an individual level, as the theory's core statements are concerned with social institutions. Therefore, I was also interested in finding out how cultural theory can be observed in people's daily life, instead of using a non-contextual survey that removes people from their social setting into an imaginary social laboratory.

My first research problem asked, in its simplified form, why do some migrant families in Norway succeed in making a living and becoming a part of the society, whereas others struggle and have problems? This was the theme I received funding for, and which has formed my research design.

Among the households I gained access to, none is struggling, and therefore I could not supply an answer to my first research problem. As long as there is no variation in the phenomena to be explained in the data one cannot, and should not, use the material to explain why some families make it and others do not.[108]

For three years, I worked on this project as an explorative project, until I decided that I should use these households' views of politics and society as the dependent variable. This lead to the formation of the current research question.

Choice of Methodology

Originally, one of my intentions was to create a test of cultural theory, a promising theory that my own research had shown is not yet very well suited to survey research (Olli 1996, 1999). Therefore, it seemed that qualitative methods would give

[108] This is a principle firmly established in Comparative Politics literature.

> We can also learn nothing about the causal effect from a study, which selects observations so that the dependent variable does not vary. (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994:147)

The argument made by King, Keohane, and Verba is difficult to refute. Thus, to my disappointment, I had to abandon the scrutiny of this causal explanation. Fortunately, there are other scientific endeavors than testing of causality, as Geddes points out:

> This is not to say that studies of cases selected on the dependent variable have no place in comparative politics. They are ideal for digging into the details of how phenomena come about and for developing insights. (Geddes 1990:149)

a better picture of what the theory really can do, until the problems with operationalization of cultural theory for survey research are solved.

By comparing households with different ethnic backgrounds, it should be possible to create a relatively general test of cultural theory. As some of the authors behind the theory make claims of universality, it must prove useful in such cross-ethnic sample, if these claims have any merit. Cultural theory is much more than just a typology, but if this typology allows us to see beyond the ethnic boundaries, one important step toward understanding the process of integration has been achieved.

In addition, the choice of putting households in the focus is an attempt to press cultural theory to its limits. Households are among the smallest social units that could be called institutions. Simultaneously, households are also clearly created and sustained by individual choices. Can we really see the structural traits specified by cultural theory working within the households? If not, the obvious conclusion would be that there is something wrong with either cultural theory or my research.

Qualitative research often favors a more open approach, more congruent with the ethnographic method, where theorization is usually done after the collection of data (Holstein and Gubrium 1994). In addition, sometimes the role of theory is rather modest:

> The theory or concept of interest at best may be considered a conceptual template with which to compare and contrast results, rather than to use as a priori categories into which to force the analysis. (Morse 1994, p.221)

However, in my view, this kind of approach has some weaknesses. First, it is difficult to create cumulative research, if every research project creates its own concepts and categories. I have chosen to examine the use-value and the boundaries of cultural theory's applicability, rather than try to create a theory that fits my data. Second, this kind of research often lacks transparency, which can make it difficult for others to evaluate. I find it intellectually more appealing to start with a clearly formulated theory, which guides the design, the collection of data, and the subsequent analysis. My project is based on cultural theory as a perspective, and it should be evaluated based on the use-value of the research, rather than its theoretical refinement or for the intellectual challenge it poses.

My research problem concerning whether ways of organizing can be used to categorize migrants in Norway, and how they can help us to understand the households' internal life, social relations, and use of welfare states institutions, requires some understanding of the way migrants look at the world. I need to understand what options they see available, and how they justify their own choices. These considerations are practically impossible to fulfill with the help of quantitative methods. Only qualitative methods give enough room for people's own understanding and logic (Fontana and Frey 1994).

However, I was never inclined to do the kind of fieldwork typical to anthropology, for something similar to network analysis is probably better suited in an urban setting.

> There is often in our societies a close correspondence between spatial frame, recruitment of personnel to the interaction in this frame and the interaction itself. "Family life in the apartment" may be a label of one example of this, and a guest, a stranger, transforms the situation into an event which can be labeled as "having guests." (Lithman 1988:242)

It would be very difficult to become a "genuine part" of a social setting. Lithman points out that there are few non-defined action spaces available in an urban setting, thus the researcher needs a more formal entry into almost all social settings. In addition, I wanted to compare three different ethnic groups, but to do so would have placed excessive demands upon me to learn their respective languages. Therefore I have chosen to remain a "guest" and utilize this to my advantage by also analyzing how they treat me.

Reasons to Study Households

I believe there are at least three good reasons to study households: they are units in which resources are shared; they are social agents with strategies; and the safety net provided by the welfare state is for households, not individuals.

First, in much of political science the starting point is an assumption that we can understand a great deal of what goes on in a society just by studying individuals. I believe that households are an important social unit for the exchange of material and informational resources that influences the process by which individuals relate to and integrate into the rest of the society.[109] A household is a social unit that brings the individual into contact with the society, and vice versa, in terms of sharing both material and informational resources.[110] Therefore, if we do not understand what kind of role households play it is difficult to have a proper understanding of how the process of integration works.

Secondly, households are agents with strategies that need to be studied:

[109] One example of this can be found in Werbner's study of Pakistani entrepreneurship in a declining industrial city in Britain (Werbner 1990).

[110] A great example of research showing the household-society interaction is in Sandra Wallman's *Eight London Households*, where she and her research team present results both from a survey-based study of an urban community and in-depth studies of a number of households (1984).

> Undoubtedly, men, women and children within a household may differ and even struggle with conflicting goals. But exclusive focus on these internal disagreements makes us lose sight of two other important considerations. First, households can still act as units despite internal differences. Hence, it is possible to theorize at the level of household strategies. An exclusive consideration on individual motivations would do away at the possibility of understanding how these small social units pull resources to organize a process as complex as international migration. (Portes 1997:816)

I believe that the households' strategies are significant, and the four ways of organizing a household are useful in describing and understanding these strategies.

Thirdly, we often think of the welfare state as a safety net for individuals, but the safety net is for households, not individuals. Social support is only given when the household as a whole is unable to sustain itself and has depleted any valuables, like property or a car, that they might have had.

A Typological Comparison—Not a Cultural or Ethnic Study

Rath and Kloosterman are critical of studies that only contain one ethnic group; they would rather study single actors and their social embeddedness (among other things).

> … [Many] researchers have approached these important questions from an ethno-cultural perspective showing a certain preference for case studies of ethnic groups. This more parochial approach to immigrant entrepreneurs and to immigrants in general, will—in the end—primarily re-ascertain essentialists conceptions of ethnicity and not contribute to the interrelationship between immigration and its wider context. (Rath and Kloosterman 2000:13)

I will try to go beyond these ethnic studies by using a typological comparison. Instead of focusing on ethnical groups and comparing them with each other, I use cultural theory's typology to create categories of households that can be compared with each other. There are thus several layers of comparison: first, between the categories of cultural theory—comparing hierarchical households with non-hierarchical households and so forth; second, comparing within the categories of cultural theory (i.e. comparing one hierarchical household with other hierarchical households); third, comparing households with the same ethnic background. This design makes it possible to understand how ways of organizing interact with ethnic background.

This is not a study about ethnicity or ethnic groups. Many studies are interested in how "groups" like Roma or Pakistanis adapt to the society as a "group," whereas I am more concerned with the household's present life than their origins. Their origins should not be forgotten, because it affects their social relations and the choices they have made, but I am trying to turn the focus away from phenomena like language, religion, and ethnic traits back to peoples' choices and the structures they have to relate to. I agree with Barth's old claim that ethnic relations are formed partly by their usefulness for groups in trying to survive economically in a society (1994:181). Ethnicity is not the ultimate cause—the uncaused cause—it is something that is used to mobilize collective action when needed.

Simultaneously, there is a strong individualistic tendency in our society, both in politics and in research, especially since the 1980s, and a lot of weight is placed on our own choices and their consequences. In this sense, I am part of my own time, wanting to study people behaving within structural constraints, which of course do not disappear even if they are not in focus. There are several important constraints present in migrants' lives, starting with the laws and practices regulating their entrance into Norway, the rights and obligations put in place by the government, the economic situation, and last but not least, the way Norwegians treat immigrants in their private and professional life, sometimes creating situations best characterized by exclusion and discrimination. None of these structural constraints are in the focus, and I am not trying to evaluate their relative importance in the migrants' lives. I am more interested in how the households have dealt with these constraints.

However, I should confess my preference for a form of neo-structuralism, present in cultural theory, evident in a search for structural aspects of social life, that transcend national, ethnic or racial categorizations. It is also evident in my belief that there are very few elements of human life that can be properly understood in isolation, rather these elements "only make sense *in relationships* with other elements (Bloch 2003:531)." Therefore, I have opted to cover a rather large number of aspects in each household's life.

Household—Setting the Boundaries

This is a study about households and their lifestyles. Therefore, an understanding of the concept of household is paramount. There are numerous possible definitions, and as Berge says in his thorough discussion of the concept: "It is difficult to imagine that one simple definition of household would satisfy all interests" (Berge 1988:7).

My definition follows one of the standard definitions: A household is one or several people who live in the same housing unit (Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 1997:121). Notice that a household and a family are not necessarily identical, especially migrant families, as most of them have very close family members in other countries. Therefore, sometimes, when they talk about their family, it is difficult to tell whether they live under the same roof or are separated by an ocean.

Berge narrows the discussion around the household to two main points:

> … one is to identify the members of the household. The other is … how large changes in a household can be accepted before one has to consider it a new household. (Berge 1988:9)

These two points, membership and continuity, are central issues, and I have chosen to allow the households to declare themselves who belongs to the household, and where and when is the origin of the household.

The person or persons I interview are allowed to define who *belongs* to this particular household. There is very little disagreement about what is the core of the household, but the fringes of the household are often something that needs to be defined for the household to run smoothly. For example, imagine a person who sleeps in the guestroom regularly. At what point will he or she be counted as a member of the household? For most households, membership is connected to kinship (either you are born into a family or you marry into one), but there are several gray areas: The first aspect concerns meals. If one's definition of household membership is connected to sharing meals (which used to be common), one will soon face problems with people who live under the same roof but do not share meals, a practice that has become increasingly common in Norway, and has prompted cries for saving the family as a structure.[111] The second important aspect of a household that can be used to constitute membership is the degree of resources shared or contributed. Thus, a person who simply sleeps there, but does not contribute any resources (food, time, money) to the household, is not a member, but rather a guest. The third aspect used to define membership in a household is permanency. How long must the guestroom lodger stay until he or she is counted as a member of the family? The fourth aspect used centers on the type of bond between the household members. A lodger in the guestroom can stay a lodger if there is a contract that stays a contract, without becoming a social bond with obligations beyond the original contract. He or she will bring a fixed amount of resources into the household over many years but cannot expect much loyalty or help from the other members of the household, and vice versa.

Since this is not a study of how households construct their boundaries, I have not explicitly explored these gray areas in the households. I have relied upon their answers regarding who lives there, and I have tried in the interviews, at the same time that I approach their history of housing, to ask questions about how many people there were and who was living there at the time. Instead of my defining rigidly who are members and who are not, I have chosen to listen to their own

[111] Time use surveys that households spend less and less time together and eat fewer and fewer meals together (Lømo 1999). This has prompted media attention: "Especially from cities there are reports of families falling apart because the parents are not able to stretch themselves far enough. When parents have to choose between overtime and family time, they often pick what gives economic results, and that is not the family" (Apenes and Engh 1999). The Norwegian state began, in 1998, to support families through "cash for home care" policy (*kontantstøtte*). Some of the proponents of this policy argued for it to be a policy to counteract the present trend of families falling apart.

definitions and ask, rather, what does it tell me about a particular family that they describe a certain person inside or outside the household.

Berge's second point, the question of the *continuity* of a household, is equally important. I allow my informants to define where the household started. As my sample consists of households with children, they consistently define their household around the children, usually starting from their marriage, which is not surprising if we consider procreation one of the main functions of a household:

> The most important task of a household is maybe to provide security for and distribute welfare among its members. It also provides the immediate environment for family life and the procreation and socialization of new members of the society. (Berge 1988:7)

In my interviews the households themselves emphasize continuity, rather than discontinuity, even if for me it seems like there are several discontinuities present. A somewhat typical life history is one in which they marry each other after finishing their studies and work for a few years, but because of their political activities they are forced to flee. Then follows a few years long disruption: leaving their country of origin; possibly spending some time in a refugee camp; perhaps enduring a separation from spouse and children; and possibly a long waiting time in a refuge center in Norway. The family starts to rebuild itself either when they find normal housing in Norway or after a family reunion, if they were separated. In some sense, the household as a unit fails to provide its members with security before the migration and during the migration (a time period of one to four years). If they had been safe and secure they would not be forced to leave. On the other hand, the household has acted together in a time of hardships and left in search of security. Perhaps the fact that they ended up in Norway shows that these households are able to provide security to their members by exiting under an external threat.

For practical purposes several of my households are establishing themselves for the second time. When they arrive in Norway, they usually have no or very few possessions that will help them to establish a home, and the introductory programs for refugees and social services assist them in establishing their new homes. They themselves view it as the same household in a new home and in a new society. None of the interviews pointed toward the establishment of a *new* household in Norway.

In one of the households, the couple had once been close to divorce: she moved back to their country of origin, with one of the children, but came back to Norway after a year. In this case, too, continuity was emphasized, and it took some active probing on my part to establish what had actually happened. Not that they were trying to hide the facts, but I had difficulties in understanding their story, because they framed it in terms of continuity.

It seems to me that in most of my cases family unity is strengthened by migration, whether it is forced or voluntary. One could argue that these households will hide their internal disputes from me, something I find likely. Nevertheless, I was asking many "non-dangerous" questions about everyday decision-making, which did bring up tension in several cases. In addition, the migration is often presented as a story of heroic undertaking by the family. How many Norwegian families can present such deeds that help them to see their family in a good light? I therefore choose to believe that the internal disputes are probably downplayed but not completely hidden.

As a counter argument, one could say that only the strong families succeed in migration, or that it is only the families with few internal problems who choose to talk to me. If the first argument is correct, the causal relation I am suggesting does not hold. If the second argument is correct, the causal relation can hold, for the families with internal problems can also have their unity boosted by the migration. Since I cannot evaluate these claims, I leave this issue for others to solve.

Sampling Households

In order to effectively compare households, they must have some similarities that can be controlled for. The choice of these commonalities will influence the possibilities for theorization later in the project (Ragin 1987). The sampling process can be divided into three stages (Flick 1998:63): first, households are sampled for interviewing (my seventeen households); second, transcribed interviews are selected for a closer presentation and analysis (the eight cases that are presented more closely); and third, particular stories and aspects of the households' lives are selected for presentation and analysis.

The Sampling Criterion

This thesis uses theoretical sampling with a gradual definition of the sample structure (Flick 1998:65). The aim is to get maximum variation in the ways of organizing among households from three different countries of origin.

Table 7: The Theoretical Sampling Population

		Household's Dominant Way of Organizing			
		Hierarchy	Egalitarian	Individualistic	Fatalistic
Country of Origin	Sri Lanka				
	Chile				
	Vietnam				

In Table 7 we can see the theoretical sampling population that will later serve as a guide for comparisons. Since this thesis is about the ways of organizing, it is necessary to try to get as much variation in these as possible.

How many cases do I need? In Table 7 we see how the theoretical sampling population consists of a cross-tabulation of twelve different possibilities, however, it is not certain that they all are present in a local community.[112] In an ideal research project, I would have four to eight cases for each of these possibilities, as a way to exhaust the variation within each one, but this kind of "total" research is not possible within the limits of a PhD. My aim is to explore this theoretical space as widely as possible, and my cases should thus be seen as cases exemplifying one combination within the theoretical sampling population.

My interest is not in the countries of origin but in the ways of organizing. I have enough cases within each way of organizing to show how there is some variation within each way of organizing, but at the same time many commonalities. The fact that the cases come from different countries of origin does not weaken my argument, quite the contrary. However, it is impossible for me to tell what part of the variation is connected to the country of origin and what is specific to the particular household. Therefore, one should not try to read any of my statements about singular households as claims about "Chileans," "Vietnamese," or "Tamils" in Norway.

Country of Origin: Country of origin influences migrants in several ways. It is used as a proxy for past experiences in the country of origin, and for membership in a more or less coherent ethnic group. Country of origin is also connected to large differences in unemployment and use of social services (Djuve and Hagen 1995). At the same time, it is important to realize that people with the same ethnic background can be very different in many aspects. In the Norwegian debate, perceived racial characteristics are usually not mentioned at all, as it would implicate the majority population in politically incorrect thinking and behavior. These perceived racial characteristics are often included under the heading of ethnic background.[113]

I chose to focus on people from Chile, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, because they have communities consisting of several hundred to a few thousands people in both Oslo and Bergen, and they, in general, arrived a long time ago.[114] I declined to use

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[112] Cultural theory would expect that in their countries of origin all four ways of organizing are represented among households. However, reasons for deciding to leave, and actually succeeding in migration, can be connected to ways of organising, leading to the absence of one or more ways of organizing among the households in Norway.

[113] This is so dominant a perspective that it was even visible in the name of the previous government body charged with dealing with racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination: the Centre for Combating Ethnic Discrimination (SMED 1999).

[114] The source for information about Oslo is *Oslo Statistikken*, while for Bergen, I have been able to obtain some statistics through the City of Bergen that are based on the public registers at 1.1.1999. The public registers (Folkeregisteret) have been read by SSB and processed further by City of

European migrants, in order to challenge cultural theory as much as possible. These three countries belong to the Latino, Chinese, and Indian cultural spheres. Today, having completed the final stages of the research, I wish I had included Norwegian households in my sample, as it would have helped to emphasize the similarity of households across the "us" vs. "them" dichotomization.

Other Requirements for Participation

I have tried to reduce variation in the following variables: life cycle and location, time in Norway, and language skills.

Life cycle and Location: I have selected households that have, or recently have had, childrens in school in Bergen or Oslo and still have one or several children living at home. Having children puts certain demands upon the tasks a household needs to perform. In addition, this gives me households that are similar in age composition, and hence potentially able to participate in the labor force, and it ensures that they have had similar contact with the institutions of the welfare state.

I started this research project by conducting during the spring of 1999 a pilot study in which I interviewed Kurdish households in Oslo. I had hoped to use these interviews later, but a few problems indicated otherwise. The members of the households were of different ages: there were young single men, couples with children, and elderly couples without children. They were in different stages of their life cycle, which made it difficult to compare the justifications they used, as they were justifying different acts and choices.

Time in Norway: I want informants who have been in Norway for more than ten years. This is long enough to establish social networks and become familiar with a new location. Since I am not examining the early-arrivals-do-it-well hypothesis, there was no particular reason to study groups who have arrived to Norway later.

Language skills: I interviewed only people who speak sufficient Norwegian to complete an interview in the language. I have done all of my interviews without an interpreter present, which, on the one hand, ensures the household's anonymity and privacy and can give me a more "honest" look into the household's internal life. On the other hand, an interpreter can also lend a hand in elucidating what people "actually mean" by their statements.

The following influential aspects are *not standardized* for:

Bergen and by the author. Migrant populations consist of persons with two parents born abroad, in other words, the children of first generation migrants are counted as migrants.

The number of migrants living in Oslo and Bergen

	In Oslo 1.1.1998	In Bergen 1.1.1999
From Sri Lanka	3721	736
From Vietnam	3667	1091
From Chile	1538	1070

Type of visa: Several researchers in the field have suggested to me that I should choose either refugees or non-refugees. I find this dichotomy hard to apply. It is a formal categorization used by the Directorate of Migration, and not necessarily a precise description of the migrants' experiences. The migration by Tamils, Chileans, and Vietnamese can be characterized for the most part as forced migration. However, some of the people I have talked with have arrived in Norway later as a result of a family reunion, which blurs the line. Many of the Tamils originally arrived on a student visa, but subsequent events made it impossible to return. Originally, they did not fulfill the criterion for refugee status, but knew that it was possible to obtain a student visa, if one was able to pay the school fees. Nevertheless, the reason they wanted to leave was more connected to the need to get out of a country where they were oppressed, rather than wanting to come to Norway. To conclude, one can look at my sample, for the most part, as being a result of forced migration, even if some have never had an official refugee status.

Family in town: For me one of the interesting aspects of migration is how people are inserted into a new society and how they try to find their new place. There are big differences in the kind of ethnic or family based social network a migrant arrives to. Some people have a large family who can help them adjust to life in Norway, while others do not.

Foreign Citizens Are Less Willing to Participate in Research

There is a decreased willingness to participate in research among foreign citizens than there is in the majority population, according to Kval and Bjørklund, who completed a nationwide survey on participation in the 1995 local election (1996). Migrants who have Norwegian citizenship did not have a low response rate (Kval and Bjørklund 1996:54). The participation rate (people who sent back at least a partially completed survey) was 42 percent. If we only look at the citizens of countries included in my research, they are even lower: Sri Lanka 30 percent, Vietnam 39 percent and Chile 36 percent (Kval and Bjørklund 1996:55). Kval and Bjørklund suggest that the low response rate is caused by skepticism toward this type of registration, which sounds reasonable to me, as a history of problems with the authorities is often part of the reason for leaving a country. The low response rate is not caused by language problems, as the questionnaire was translated into many languages, including, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Tamil.

There is also some conflicting evidence. Rogstad found, in a recent phone survey conducted in several languages, that Pakistani, Bosnian, and Turkish (which were the only three included) migrant groups had a higher participation rate than the majority population (Rogstad 2004). However, this phone survey did not include migrants from Sri Lanka, Vietnam, or Chile. In addition, Rogstad is focusing on people's country of origin, not on their present citizenship.

There are several possible explanations for the finding by Kval and Bjørklund. First, perhaps the citizens have been socialized through a longer stay in Norway to fill forms and voluntarily give information. A counter argument to this is that the response rate has dropped from 1991 to 1995: for Sri Lankans by 19 percent, for Vietnamese 11 percent, and for Chileans 12 percent. This suggests that it is probably not a socialization effect, but rather something else. Second, it is possible that trusting the Norwegian state increases the propensity to apply for citizenship. In other words, if you do not trust the state, you might not want to apply for a citizenship either. Third, it is possible that it is a "wearing out effect." One might be inclined to fill out one questionnaire, but after a few years in the country, and with countless forms to complete, one is less likely to be willing to contribute. This wearing out effect can also explain the low participation by the majority population in the Rogstad phone survey, as it seems likely that the majority population is more often approached by pollsters and sales people than migrants are. Unfortunately, these questions are not possible to answer here.

Gaining Access to Households

The process of gaining access to households has been difficult. I will therefore present the approaches I tried, failed, discarded, and succeeded with. The two most important channels for gaining access to the households in this thesis have been schools and snowballing. I will, then, in the following, call these the school sample and the snowballing sample.

The first school I contacted cooperated in all possible manners, and I mistakenly ssumed that it would be as easy with the other schools. Some other schools I contacted sent my request up the ladder, to the city's school administration, which was fully preoccupied reorganizing their administrative structure. I received a reply, in which they politely made it clear that they do not wish to facilitate research that focuses on migrants only. Unfortunately, at that stage in the research project including a significant number of Norwegian households in the interview process was not an option.

The school sample was collected by sending letters[115] to thirty-nine parents with names indicating Vietnamese, Chilean or Tamil origin. This resulted, after mailing one reminder, in eight households that were willing to participate and matched the sampling requirements.

It offers some comfort that Elisabeth Both, the author of the classic text in family research, *Family and Social Network,* also had difficulties finding households to interview. In order to get interviews with twenty households, their research team contacted forty-two different agencies, ranging from medical offices to churches

[115] I have provided an example of the introductory letter in the appendix on page 511.

for referrals (1971:15). Had I known the difficulty of the task earlier in the research process I would probably have opted for a different method of selection.

I received a low rate of acceptance to participate, as expected. Participation in this kind of research (to share one's life history, including details about one's social and family life) takes both time and courage. In addition, it is not in people's direct self-interest, even if there can be positive experiences connected to being a subject for research.[116]

To get access to more households I had to make new plans. Two parallel processes were started: one formal approach and one snowballing approach. The formal approach was to gain use of the official records of addresses. I defined a sample and managed to get the necessary permission from the national privacy protection agency (Datatilsynet).[117] The work of selecting the addresses is privatized out of the national record office (Folkeregisteret) to three companies that charge an arm and a leg for a half a day's work.

Simultaneously, I worked with snowballing—that is, finding households through social networks. I made appearances at different "ethnic" arrangements, like large parties, social gatherings after the Sunday mass at a Catholic Church, parents meetings with their childrens mother language teachers, and so forth. My goal was to spread information about myself and my project in settings where levels of trust were already high. In addition, I have enlisted help from people who are themselves part of these ethnic communities. These intermediaries would give a few selected households an envelope containing the same information that was sent to the school sample. These households would then mail a pre-stamped letter back to me, confirming or denying their participation, hence making it possible to avoid contacting households that have already been contacted.

Because the snowballing approach was already producing results, when the time came to hire one of the companies to make the list of addresses, the formal approach became the backup plan. Another reason for dropping the formal approach was its similarity to the procedure used with the school sample. Whereas, with snowballing, I could target specific cases to fill gaps in my theoretical sample population: I needed fatalistic households and Chilean households. In addition, after I had done my first initial analysis of the school sample, I realized that too many of these people were community leaders or else otherwise very successful in their lives. Later on I tried to correct this self-selection bias toward success by asking intermediaries to avoid these community leaders and to focus on "regular" families. The snowballing method produced nine of the interviewed households.

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[116] There are at least two immediate positive experiences. First, there is somebody who is willing to listen for hours to what one has to say. Second, being subject to research means that somehow one is framed in a social setting as interesting, or important. Because of the anonymity, it mainly applies to the interview setting, but I would expect many of the families to talk about it with their close friends.

[117] The official translation is the Data Inspectorate, which does not help to understand what they do.

The proportion of positive responses through the snowballing was much higher (77 percent) than through the school (21 percent). The numbers are not quite comparable though, because the response rate for the school sample is calculated based on all contacted households (lack of response is counted as a decline to participate), while the snowball sample includes only received letters. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the snowball sample has a much higher positive response rate: these households were initially contacted by someone they knew, they felt perhaps social pressure to participate and more trust to my research. In addition, because the intermediaries knew my selection criteria, they could decide against inviting households that did not fit my sampling criteria, which I was unable to do with the school sample. In other words, in the school sample, some of the lack of replies, i.e. declines of participation, are probably cases that did not fit the explicitly stated criteria for participation. Unfortunately, I do not have more information about this.

Table 8: The Sample

	Answer	*Chile*	*Tamil*	*Vietnam*	*Total*	*%*
School	Yes	1	4	3	8	47
	No or no reply	13	8	10	31	
	Proportion yes	7 %	33 %	23 %	21 %	
Middlemen/Snowball	Yes	3	5	1	9	53
	No	1	0	2	3	
	Proportion yes	75 %	100 %	33 %	75 %	
	Total yes	4	9	4	17	

After I had conducted the first round of interviews with the Tamils, I could see that many of the Tamil households were hierarchical, but there were also individualistic and fatalistic households. Through an intermediary, I was able to find one Tamil household that was a good candidate for the fatalistic category, but, unfortunately, I was never able to complete this interview (it is not included among the seventeen households). At this point, I could see how much time each household took, and I decided to cut down on the number of households to interview. My four Vietnamese households use three different ways of organizing, which is a sufficient spread. In the Chilean community, I targeted different households in order to get high variation with as low a number of cases as possible. I ended up with four Chilean households divided between three ways of organizing.

Selection Bias and Representativeness

I have not followed the principle of randomness, because in qualititative research it does not make much sense. Case selection is based on how much can be learned from each case.

In Table 9 the combinations present in my material are marked with an X. We can see how the households I have interviewed do not cover the complete theoretical sample population, despite my attempts to gain maximum variation. However, as it is not known if all the ways of organizing are present in each of the three migrant communities, it is impossible to know if open cells are an indicator of a lack of representativeness or an indicator of how common certain ways of organizing are in migrant communities.

Table 9: Representativeness in Relation to Theoretical Sample Population

		Household's dominant way of organizing			
		Hierarchy	Egalitarian	Individualistic	Fatalistic
Country of origin	Sri Lanka	X	X	X	
	Chile		X	X	
	Vietnam	X		X	X

Nevertheless, we can see that the material is rich in information, as the number of possible comparisons is high. If we try to keep either country of origin or way of organizing constant during comparison, each case can be compared with other cells on the same line or same column. The obvious limitation in my material is the presence of only one fatalistic household. At one point during my research, I had reasons to believe that I had three fatalistic households in my sample, one from each country, unfortunately, two of them dropped out during the process. One of them told me that they did not want to participate anymore when I tried to make an appointment for the second interview. Their first interview is now excluded from analysis and the transcript deleted. The second fatalistic household that dropped out agreed originally to be interviewed, but I gave them up after ten to twelve failed attempts to make an appointment.

The isolate households are characterized by their short-term planning of time use. For my part, trying to make an appointment for an interview proved a major obstacle. If there was a specific person to whom I should speak, usually no one could tell me when he or she would be available. Because others "control" their lives, life becomes unpredictable. When I finally managed to get the right person on the phone, some actually refused to make plans for the next week, because they did not yet know what would be going on next week. If I want an appointment on Wednesday, I should call back on Tuesday (but it is of course unknown if he or she will be in on Tuesday, and nobody else has the competence or the authority to answer on his or her behalf). From a purely theoretical view, the remedy is simple. They expect the world to make decisions on their behalf, so I should just announce that "I will come Wednesday at 7 pm. If you are not home I will wait." Most likely they would be home waiting for me.

I find it difficult to force people into an interview. In addition, and supporting my private view, my license *for the use of sensitive data for research purposes* requires explicit written statements of voluntarily consent from the households, prohibiting any kinds of aggressive interview practices.[118] I believe that I, therefore, have a slight systematic self-selection bias, reducing the number of fatalistic households.

Making Interviews

Evaluation of qualitative interviewing requires that the researcher give a description and offer some reflections on the process. In the following, I will discuss the interview situations and the style I have chosen to conduct them in, discuss the topics I have chosen for the interviews, and discuss the fact that I have performed the interviews in Norwegian, not in the native languages of the households.

The Interview Situation and Style

The definition of my *role* in the field influences the kind of information I am able to get access to (Flick 1998). I believe that the best I can do is to present myself as *a migrant* from Finland and as a researcher who is genuinely interested in their experiences and opinions. My own migrant experience gives me an outsider's view of Norwegians, to which my informants can often relate. In addition, I have chosen to make my informants experts, and present myself as a *learner* (Fontana and Frey 1994:367). I am counting on their having had more experience of Norwegians than I have had of them. In other words, they are in a better position to know what needs to be explained to a "dumb Norwegian." The challenge is to balance the role of the researcher, who is to be taken seriously, and the learner, who needs everything explained to him.

My experience, so far, has shown that two processes influence the interview in opposing directions. On the one hand, there is a lack of trust. Some of the migrants come from countries where there is no clear limit to the authority of the state (consequently, there is also no clear separation between public and private); where corruption is the norm, not the exception; where there is no separation of powers; and perhaps they have fled from the use or abuse of public force. In these cases I cannot win their trust by referring to the legal protection of data collected for

[118] Lisence of permit by Datatilsynet, dated 19th of February 1999.

research purposes, or other formal mechanisms. I believe that the trust must be won on a personal level; I hope this can be achieved through presenting myself as a migrant trying to help other migrants. On the other hand, several have been very interested to talk to me. I believe that they appreciate being taken a serious interest in, and being able to explain what life in Norway is like.

There are several different types of interviews and, subsequently, a need to make a choice between them (Flick 1998). Because of the large number of questions, most likely, two (or more) separate interviews are needed, which allows me to utilize different strategies.

> The researcher should keep the first interviews with participants broad, letting the participants "tell their stories." He or she can then use subsequent interviews to obtain more targeted information and to fill gaps left by the earlier interviews. When the researcher no longer feels uncomfortable in the setting and can relax and focus on what is happening, instead of on him- or herself, then the stage of productive data collection begins. (Morse 1994:229)

In my pilot study, I collected life histories, which was not as helpful to me as I had hoped, because the information available for analysis was too unfocused. I have therefore chosen to utilize a narrative oriented technique, *Episodic interviews,* as presented by Flick, which

> use[s] the interviewee's competence to present experiences in their course and context as narratives. Episodes as an object of such narratives and as an approach to the experiences relevant to the subject under study allow a more concrete approach than does the narrative of a life history. On the other hand, and in contrast to the narrative interview, routines and normal everyday phenomena can be analyzed with this procedure. (1998:111)

This way I, as researcher, can influence the creation of stories during the interview, while allowing the storytelling to flow as freely as possible. The tool used by the research is the invitation to present narratives of situations.

> Special attention is paid in the interview to situations or episodes where the interviewee has had experiences that seem to be relevant to the question of the study. … In several domains, the episodic interview facilitates the presentations of the experiences in a general, comparative form and at the same time it ensures that those situations and episodes are told in their specificity. (Flick 1998:107)

For example, I could ask a household to tell me of situations where they have helped somebody else and where they are being helped. The completion of the life history schema and the social relations schema help me to ask a series of questions connected to a particular time period or particular persons. This style of interviewing requires that the questions be formed in the interview situation, while the interview guide is reduced to something akin to a checklist.[119]

Questions Covering Three Domains

In most cases a few months passed between the first and second interview of a household, which allowed me to analyze some of the material before the second interview. Thus, the second interview contained some follow-up questions tailored to each household based on their previous answers.

The interviews focus on three different domains of life: the household's internal way of organizing, their external social relations, and their experiences with and views of institutions of the welfare state. To adequately cover these three domains, a the large number of topics needs to be discussed: first, their life, work, and housing histories, their reasoning concerning household economics, decision-making, and division of labor; second, the social network of family, friends, and neighbors, the flow of resources in social networks, and the justifications used for helping people; third, their experiences with and views of public institutions, like schools, migration officials, police, parliamentary politics, local politics, the municipality, the social welfare office, and so forth. By covering a wide range of topics, it is possible to understand more of the choices these migrants have made, and how these issues influence each other. The downside is that it has been impossible to exhaust any of the topics. For example, networks could have been studied in much more detail,[120] but the time these families are willing to spend with me sets a practical upper limit of around four hours of taped discussion for each family. I believe that I have found a good balance between detail and depth, in covering three interrelated domains with enough detail to be able to see patterns and connections beyond the singular narratives given to me.

The appendix contains examples of my interview guides and the household history schema, and the schema used to register their social relations.

In survey research there is often a focus on a few variables, for example, on how a particular attitude influences voting behavior. In a situation where still little is known about how migrant households adapt to their life in Norway, how they behave and look at themselves as new citizens, it is probably more important to know how and why the family has bought their new house, how and why they have changed jobs. I believe that major singular events in peoples' lives give them experiences that influence how they think and what they do, and to get a grasp of these experiences can give us a much more realistic understanding of the processes political scientists are interested in. Unfortunately, more realistic is also less

[119] These schemas and the interview guides are available in the appendix.

[120] See the appendix in Finset (1981) for an example of a more thorough interview guide for network analysis.

theoretical, messier, and less generalizable. However, cultural theory offers us one alternative way to organize the information, allowing us to deal with people, simultaneously, on a detailed and on a theoretical level.

Do We Really Understand Each Other?

What Level of Language Skill is Sufficient?

As I have stated earlier, I have used sufficient language skills as a selection criterion. Partly because if one looks at the interview as a dialogue that develops between two people, a good understanding of the issues and concepts that are of interest is of major importance for the interviewer (Fog 1994). This raises the question: what level of language skill is sufficient to qualify for participation? The question is academic, as I have not needed to drop any households due to a lack of language skills.

Some households were difficult to understand. To my surprise, however, the household that I considered to have the poorest language skills was actually one of my best informants. However, it required careful, repetitive listening to appreciate the richness of information conveyed. These stories were rich in detail and contained insightful reflections about migrants' positions in Norway.

How can I know that I actually understand what they say? It is not given that the meaning of a word is identical for the participants, even if the sound of the word is the same.[121] One possible answer is that participation in the dialogue, and more particularly in the turn-taking in the conversation,[122] allows for a means of checking the level of understanding in a dialogue. When the participants in a conversation agree upon whose turn it is to speak, and when the turn is given to the next speaker, there must be some common understanding present. Hence, even if understanding is not perfect, it is possible to evaluate to what degree participants in a dialogue understand one another, given that one is willing to accept a pragmatic view of the nature of language (Olli 2001).

It has been claimed that narrative competence is fairly universal. In other words, everybody uses stories and should therefore understand the underlying structure in a narrative: the beginning; the presentation of a context or setting; the presentation of the actors, who do something meaningful; the ending. It might sound trivial, but when interviewing individuals with different cultural backgrounds and varying competence in Norwegian, it is a useful structure to focus upon. Thus, if I do not

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[121] One of the central postulates in semiotics is that the relationship between the signifier (sound/word) and the signified (meaning) is free. Hence, one needs to question what seems obvious.

[122] Turn-taking is a discourse analytical concept refering to how the participants in a conversation take turns in talking and listening. Usually one conversation consists of many turns.

understand the narrative structure in a story, I know that clarifying questions are needed.[123] Understanding the narrative structure can be seen as a prerequisite for understanding the actors' motivations.

In summary, even though it is possible to doubt whether two people understand each other in conversation, at least two sources can be used to confirm the presence of at least some mutual understanding: the shared turn-taking in a conversation and the presence of a narrative structure.

Preparing for the Analysis

Anonymization of the Households

Providing anonymity for a household, anonymization, is difficult when one is dealing with real communities consisting of a few thousand people or less. The number of families and households is much lower. If one then tries to match these to level and type of education, type of family members in Norway, the number of children, work history, housing history, or any other facts that are presented, only families without any minority social contacts are able to keep their anonymity. Therefore, it is necessary for me to change many basic facts, as their combination gives away the household's true identity.

In social science that involves personal contact with the research subjects, the researcher has a dual obligation. On the one hand, the researcher has responsibilities toward the research subjects, who have volunteered information and allowed the researcher to establish a relationship with them. On the other hand, there are demands that must be fulfilled for a work to be scientific. There are ethical obligations that must be balanced against each other. I will show how this balance has been achieved in this thesis, and its potential consequences.

> Self-censorship, the practice of omitting selected facts and features of one's research findings, has been practiced by data gatherers for as long as the ethnographic tradition has existed for normative reasons. This usually involves deleting experiences that reveal personal, sensitive, or compromising features about researchers or their subjects. (Adler and Adler 1993:250)

Self-censorship can pressure the researcher to reduce the cumulative value of his or her research. It can also reduce the possibilities for control, reanalysis and critique by other researchers. Research that uses self-censorship can itself be cumulative, but it will be of less cumulative value for other researchers. The only solution here

[123] One should note, though, that even if the narrative structure is clear, it is not given that I understand why people do what they do, which is perhaps an equally interesting question.

is to be open about what kind of characteristics are subject to changes due to anonymization, and perhaps more importantly, what kind of principles are used when these characteristics are changed.

Fortunately, self-censorship is not the only option. Adler and Adler present four alternatives to self-censorship (1993:263). The first alternative is to disguise the informants by *changing the attributes* that can be used to identify them. I will use this technique extensively. In Table 10 below, characteristics of households and people that can be changed are listed. Names of households and other informants are always changed. Names of politicians and other public figures, are not changed. I would like to add one important technique to this list of disguising, namely, omission. By omitting information, it is possible to hide features that I view as inessential to the central argument of this thesis, but which would, if disclosed, reveal the identity of my informant to the informed reader. Almost anything can be omitted: information about the part of the city where they live, hobbies, organizational involvement, the type of car they drive, and so forth. Obviously most of the information I have about a household is omitted, but it is important to be aware that this is intentional.

Second, and a less used alternative for anonymization, is to create *fictitious pseudonymical characters* to which real people's thoughts or behaviors could be attributed. I did seriously consider to create fictitious households that are composites of several households, but rejected this as it would make the evaluation of the analysis in chapter 5 difficult.

The third alternative for anonymization is to *attribute the opinions to less vulnerable characters*. This is a solution that I believe will conflict with the norm of truthfulness and will not be practiced here.

The fourth alternative is to *involve the subjects* in the decision-making. This is potentially a good solution, but subjects might not be the most competent to make this decision, because the circumstances in which the subjects make the decision might change, even if they do not see it as a possibility. In addition, the subjects do not know how the published research will be used by others. In addition, it will reduce the researcher's responsibility, and put it instead on the research subject. Even if they have given me permission to use their name, I have chosen not to, because what they say can be taken out of context and used against them. It is, quite simply, an unnecessary cost for participating in research.

Table 10: Attributes Changed in Anonymization

Information	*Anonymization through*	*Example*
Names of informants	Pseudonyms for households, no use of first names	Mr. and Mrs. Natan
Important dates	Approximations	1983 = (mid 1980s)
	Small changes are possible[124]	1983 = 82, 83 or 1984
Number of children	Can be changed by 1	1 = 1 or 2
		2 = 1, 2 or 3
Education	Change branch/profession, keep level of education	Janitor = painter political scientist = lawyer Teacher = midwife Medical engineer = electrical engineer
Occupation	Change employer	Hydro becomes Statoil
	Keep white-collar, blue-collar, service, management, self-employment and full-time housewife as status	Accountant = computer support Bakery worker = fishery worker
Health	Change type of problems but keep consequences	Back problems = knee problems
Relatives	Small change in numbers	4 cousins = 3, 4 or 5 cousins
	Changes in gender	Brother = sister Father = mother
Locations	Change to similar part of city, city, town, or country with regard to size, distance, and perceived social status	Åsane = Fyllingsdalen Stavanger = Trondheim Ørsta = Volda Sweden = Denmark Canada = USA

The Transcription of the Interviews

All interviews were recorded, later transferred to a computer as sound files for transcription by my assistant, Jon Audun Kvalbein. These trancripts were checked against the recordings by me.[125] These twenty-five transcripts describe seventeen different households.[126] In addition, I have detailed notes from some interviews where the household did not allow me to use a recorder.

The required precision of the transcripts should determine the choice of transcription rules. There are obvious differences between speech and written text, and these rules allow for a predetermined and controllable way of transferring oral

[124] It might look insignificant, but there are large fluctuations, for example, in the number of people admitted from year to year. Some years only two people from a particular country moved to Bergen.

[125] Details about the equipment used are in the appendix on page 519.

[126] Eleven consist of both a first and second interview, while six contain the first interview only, as I decided against using these households further, before completing the second interview. (See more about case selection on page 137).

presentations into written texts. Silverman presents a precise method for transcription (Silverman 1993:118), whereas Kvale (Kvale 1997:105) emphasizes the intended form of analyses as a criterion. Too many details can make the transcript hard to read, and too few will lead to the loss of information. However, the purpose is simplification, as removing unnecessary information facilitates analysis.

The level of precision needed for the analyses in this project is not quite the same as in psychology, but on the other hand, information about turn-taking and hesitation is important. I have chosen to use a simplified version of the system described by Silverman.

In Table 11, below, the reader can see the meaning of the layout and some special characters. Transcription notation is used to describe speech, and the meaning it conveys, not grammar.

Table 11: Notation Used in Transcription

Talk	*Notation used in writing*
The end of one unit of speech	.
A change, small insertions and the like	,
A question	?
Always note when:	
Two people talk at the same time, start of overlap	While [A says this [B says this
A new speaker takes over without a normal break between the speakers	=
Transcriber could not understand what was said	( )
Transcriber guesses a word	(enter the guess)
Register only when it seems to have a meaning:	
One second pause	#
Three second pause. Use one # for each second of pause.	###
LOUD SPEACH	CAPITALIZE
Talk that is emphasized by other means	Underline
There is a lo:nger sound than what is normal	:
Audible inhale	.hhh
Audible exhale, very long	Hhhhhh
Comments on other things	((Children make lots of noise))
Parts removed by the author	(…)

One example is needed to clarify.

Mr: Norwegians are always quite ##[difficult, but

Mrs: [nice and easy. When we lived in Oslo

Mr: = our neighbors would not help us.

We can see, in the first line, how the husband hesitates for two seconds and, in the second line, how the wife steps in to try to help. They both talk at the same time, which is indicated by the two "[". In the third line, we see how the husband takes over without any pause after the wife's speach. From the absence of a period sign after "Oslo," we can see that the wife was not done, while the equal sign on the third line shows that the normal pause between two turns in a dialogue was not present. Even if the husband hesitated to bring up a problematic aspect, he insisted on presenting his version of the story.

This notation technique reveals the household's behavior in an interview situation in a manner that cannot be accomplished with a regular presentation of what was said.

The language has been changed slightly, in order to make the quotes easier to read. Their use of imagery and most of their syntax is preserved, without changing their level of language proficiency. In addition, I have removed the small sounds people make while searching for the right word, and the sounds used to keep the conversation going ("aa…"). This kind of "polishing" is a normal part of transferring language from oral to written form. Only very few professionals, such as skilled politicians and bureaucrats, are able to talk using "written language," which, of course, is horrible in conversation, but lends itself to precise quotations in transcription.

All quotes have been translated from Norwegian into English by me.

Reflections on the Analysis

The analysis is an integral part of the thesis, particularly Chapter 5, where the eight households and the results from the analysis are presented (pages 107 to 254). Here I will only present some reflections on the analytical process itself.

Analytical Steps during the Reading of the Transcripts

I have explored different analytical schemes and tools, and ended up working on a folder for each of the households, which contains the transcript, the year-by-year overview of their life-history, the social relations schema, photographs and other printed materials. The printout of the transcript is then, little by little, filled with comments and analytical remarks. In addition, I have used, extensively, a single document containing full transcripts of all the interviews, because it allows me easily to search and compare particular aspects across the households.

The process of analysis goes in small circles. I usually read the interviews many times, with a different aim and focus each time. This presentation is just to give a sample of how the process has been, as the readings and my methods of working have also changed during the research process. Some households were analyzed in this manner rather soon after the interviews were completed, whereas other households were placed on hold and the reading spread out over months, depending on which chapter I was working on. In addition, analysis of one household often gave me new ideas, which required tracing back and rereading sections of other interviews, which in turn frequently forced me to change one of the earlier interpretations. Each of these readings is cumulative in nature, as the results of the previous readings are available to me in the process of interpretation.

Tools for Interpretation

Ehn and Löfgren present techniques for interpreting data, which are useful to discipline and stimulate interpretation (Ehn and Löfgren 1982:107). Here I will try to show how these apply to my interpretation of the interviews. However, in the analytical section I will just apply them, without explaining what I am doing.

This first technique is *perspectivation*, looking at the same text from different viewpoints. I have not really used this, as I have positioned myself as a learner in the interviews, and during the interpretation I try to keep in mind that they are treating me as a learner.

The second technique is *contrasting*, which I use frequently in this thesis. Particular aspects of the household's life stand out when seen in contrast to other households. I typically contrast across one of two analytical dimensions: country of origin or ways of organizing. This makes it very obvious that the same thing can be done in several ways.

The next technique is *homologization* (i.e., making things similar). I group and present the households according to their way of organizing. For example, by presenting the Maheswaran, Nga and Lorca families as three individualistic households, I highlight their similarities, despite their country of origin.

The last one, *testing*,[127] as an interpretative technique, is applied by trying out different interpretations on a particular episode told to me. An example of this can be seen in my reading of Mr. Natan's story of helping an old man, on page 165.

Mostly I have to rely on what the households tell me: for cultural bias this is fine, as these kinds of mental constructs are easiest to approach directly through what my informants tell me; for households' external social relations, it would have been better if I had other sources or other types of information than just what they tell me; for the households' internal behavior, I obviously use what they tell me, but also what I can observe during the interview and analysis. Discourse analysis is well suited to this, because it defines speech acts as a form of behavior. Thus, the transcripts are analyzed for certain aspects of the household's behavior during the

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[127] Original text: "Prövning" in Swedish.

interview.[128] Discourse analysis can, according to Engeström, be simplified into the following sequenses:[129] First, one selects sequences to be analyzed. Second, actions with these sequences are described. Third, planning of turn-taking and packaging of actions is studied. Fourth, the timing and taking of turns is analyzed. These phases lead to a study of the kinds of identities or roles present, given the empirical evidence (Engeström 2002). In this way, the transcripts allow me to see whether the household has one person who controls the topics and the manner in which the stories are told, if there is a specific person to tell a particular story based on role or skill, or if the household shares the telling of stories.

Otherness

Researchers doing research on migrants face one of the most fundamental questions in the philosophy of social sciences:

> How can others, especially quite different from us, know us better than we know ourselves? (Fay 1996:21)

Some people argue that it would be better if Tamils did research on Tamils, Vietnamese on Vietnamese, and so forth. I disagree with such a position and agree with the following four counter arguments put forward by Faye: First, we are too enmeshed in our own activity to reflect and understand what is going on. Second, the activities and feelings involved are often confusing and contradictory, allowing an outsider a better perspective. Third, others can more easily grasp the connections and causal patterns in our lives. Fourth, self-deception is common: we will rather not know what is going on. Hence, "being one" is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to "know one".

> … the deep assumption of the thesis "you have to be one to know one" is mistaken: no strict connection exists between knowing and being. (Fay 1996:22)

Actually, some of the best social science research has been written from the position of other. An example of this is *Democracy in America*, written by Alexis de Tocqueville (1997), who, in being French, was able to see what was particular to the American form of democracy in early 19th century. In this manner, otherness becomes something that I can carefully utilize for research purposes rather than an obstacle for gaining knowledge.

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[128] I am assuming that their behavior during the interview tells me something about the patterns of behavior when I am not present.

[129] This is a simplified presentation. Readers who are interested should consult other applications or a introduction to discourse analysis (Gumperz 1992; Vagle, Sandvik, and Svennevig 1994; Scollon and Scollon 1995; Mathisen 1997).

Narratives and Judgment

My interviews provide me with some factual information, but primarily they are a narrative about a household: its history and current form and function. Therefore, some attention to narratives is needed. The following two quotes by Fay can provide a starting point for discussion:

> We do not impose a narrative form onto our lives: in the first place, the experiences of agency are inescapably narrative in form; in the second place, our acts are acts only in so far as we see them embodying some narrative. (Fay 1996:197)

Thus, narratives are used to give behavior meaning. Acts are intentional behavior, and it is the presence of a narrative structure that allows us to impose intention upon an act. Narratives have, thereby, a double relationship with life:

> We tell stories *in* acting and we continue to tell stories afterwards *about* the actions we have performed. (Fay 1996:197)

In my interviews, I try to get the actors themselves to present fragments of their own life history through a series of small focused narratives. The informants are hence allowed to present themselves in their own narrative constructions, which convey their own understanding.

Narratives are of high value because they involve justifications and moral positioning:

> Interviews share with any account an involvement in moral realities. They offer a rich source of data which provide access to how people account for both their troubles and good fortune. (Silverman 1993:114)

I probably focus more on the justifications given than the acts themselves, because the justifications are so closely connected to cultural bias. In addition, justifications of one's own acts require that the storyteller see himself from several positions.

> … the storyteller's point of view remains *within* the world, moving from one particular place or person to an other, and resisting all claims to ultimate Truth by reminding us that truth is relative to where we situate ourselves, to where we stand. (Arendt 1965:52 quoted from Jackson 2000:56)

Therefore justifications, understood as providing reasons for passing a positive judgment over one's own behavior, require an awareness of others and their reasoning. Without this awareness, there would be no need to justify.

> … judging requires active social engagement—thinking *one's own thoughts* in contexts other than one's own" (Jackson 2000:59)

Justifying is an act that requires positioning in relation to others. In this way their justifications are not just information about themselves, they are simultaneously information about their relation to the rest of the society.

In addition, because usually more than one person from the household participates in the interview, the narratives can be treated as joint narratives. Families "jointly narrate and thus restructure and reconstruct domains of their everyday life" (Flick 1998:124). The stories told are the "official" versions of what has happened and how the family views its own past. There is also a group dynamic present, which helps to crystallize the household's position. If the storyteller does not succeed in presenting the household's moral position precisely, the other members can help with details or even with a new story.

Being a Participant

I have tried to systematically record my observations concerning the layout of the home, use of space, et cetera. In addition to these readily observed aspects, there are some aspects of the interview available to me because I am one of the participants.

The transcripts are not complete recordings of an event. It happens sometimes, when I look at a transcript and compare it with an interpretation of the interview, that I cannot pinpoint my understanding of the story and its deeper meaning to one particular quote or even a series of quotes. My understanding can be based more on the gut feeling of a participant, rather than the reading of hidden messages in between the lines. The migrants are not hiding the messages; the interview situation is a situation for sharing the stories and meanings that go beyond the possibilities of a transcript.

This is a powerful means of checking the quality of transcription. Quite often, when my original interpretation is in conflict with the transcription, a careful listening to the recorded interview reveals small clues of meaning that have been discarded in the transcription. In these cases a careful re-transcription is always performed.

Even if cultural theory is a neo-structuralistic theory, I have allowed myself to bring in observations and experiences that are quite phenomenological in nature, and cannot be separated from my own participation in the events. I believe that this will help the reader to understand my interpretation of the events. Nevertheless, I do believe that a careful analysis of transcripts will reveal much of what is relevant for a cultural theoretical interpretation, even if some other aspects are available only to the participants, as cultural theory relies upon the existence of shared (and sometimes contested) structures. However, one should not assume that there is only one correct interpretation, as in almost any situation even the participants themselves can disagree about what is really going on.

Selection of Cases and Stories for Analysis and Presentation

Here I will argue for reasons selecting the cases I did, or more precisely, argue for reasons for excluding certain cases. In the end of this section I will argue for why I have selected the particular stories within the cases for presentation.

The issue that still needs to be addressed concerns how I *picked my eight cases* out of the seventeen households interviewed? I have chosen to explore the theoretical sampling population as widely as possible (see Table 7). There are, therefore, cases I can leave out of the thesis. Because I did not standardize for the number of adults in a household to begin with, I have two single parent households, one two-generational household, and one mixed marriage that can be excluded.

I interviewed two ex-husbands, who have custody of their children either full or part time. The most important reason for excluding them is the lack of the same options for the internal organization of the household, which the rest of my households have. Even if single parent households are also institutions, and can be studied with the help of cultural theory, a new theoretical discussion and operationalization would be warranted.

One of the households I interviewed consisted of two parents, their children, and two grandparents, who owned the apartment they lived in. Even if there were many interesting dynamics to study, they were clearly different from the other households, and are excluded to keep the comparisons as simple as possible.

I have also excluded households that consist of mixed ethnic origins. I have excluded one household in which the mother was from Norway. Moreover, two of the already excluded single parent households had been mixed marriages. These mixed marriages were quite interesting, as they brought a new dimension into the analysis of households' external social relations, and one could potentially study the differences in social relations between husband and wife. Nevertheless, I have chosen to keep my focus on two-parent households in order to facilitate comparisons.

The last one of the totally excluded households is a household that asked to be excluded. In these excluded households only the first interview was performed, as this already gave enough information to rule out them. None of these above mentioned five households are used in analysis or presentation.

In addition to these excluded households, there are Tamil households that are analyzed, but not presented in full, because I did not need more Tamil households. Typically, these households resemble in many ways households that are already included in the presentation and analysis. In addition, two of these households were difficult to anonymize because of their life history or their present position in the community.

To summarize, I believe that my selection of cases for analysis and presentation is justifiable. I had only four Vietnamese and four Chilean households, and I ended up excluding one of each. The rest of the excluded households are Tamils. The principles used for exclusion are related to household structure (single parents, mixed households, two-generation households) or the households being more or less duplicates of the presented households. Selection bias does not seem to be relevant as long as the exclusion criterion is based on household structure. However, this can reduce the direct applicability of the results from my research to households that are not typical two-parent households.[130]

Selection bias could result from my excluding the duplicate cases. However, I believe, not to the degree that it poses any problems. The main reason for not using these cases more is that I did not need several hierarchical Tamil cases. I have picked the one hierarchical case with the richest stories and best quotes. I have also chosen not to use a Tamil household that was a borderline case between hierarchy and fatalism, even if the fatalistic traits presented were of theoretical interest. Including borderline cases would add realism, but also make the analysis less clear.

Selection bias may also enter when *stories* for presentation are selected. Because the number of aspects covered regarding the households internal life and the list of predictions about society and politics are quite long (see page 78), I have been forced to include most of the relevant stories and statements. Whenever possible, I have selected the stories and aspects of the households' lives that can be interpreted in terms of cultural theory. However, I have not systematically selected stories that support my interpretation of a family's way of organizing. Stories that point to a competing way of organizing are always included! In other words, stories and statements with no clear interpretation in terms of cultural theory are excluded when the same topic can be covered by a story that has a cultural theoretical interpretation.

This will lead to a systematic overrepresentation of stories that can be interpreted in terms of cultural theory, which will make the theory look more present in peoples' lives than it would if all stories were included. Nevertheless, the high frequency and range of statements that can be interpreted in terms of cultural theory leaves me with no doubt that cultural theory is a useful tool.

Having a selection bias in favor of a theory is not a problem as long as the thesis is explorative in nature. Actually, I prefer to think that by excluding non-relevant statements I have managed to keep the focus on my research problem.

[130] There are many new family constallations, like single-mother and part-time dad families, stepfamilies, same-sex famlies, and transnational families) that are increasingly important and common (Bäck-Wiklund and Johansson 2003). However, including different family constallations would have added one more analytical dimension, which would have recuired many more cases.

Evaluating Research—Validity and Reliability

Validity and reliability are much-used criteria in the evaluation of research, even if their usage and definitions are contested. Therefore, clarification of my own usage and understanding of these concepts is necessary.

A Question of Validity

There are two different arguments for not explicitly reporting the methodological steps in research. First, the *quality is obvious* argument:

> Ideally, the quality of the research will give knowledge so strong and convincing in itself that it carries its own validity, like a beautiful work of art. In such cases, the research procedures are transparent, results obvious and the conclusions from the study are convincingly true, beautiful and sound. External certification or official proofs of validity become then secondary. Relevant or valid research will then be research that makes questions concerning validity unnecessary. (Kvale 1997:177)[131]

Second, the *lack of criteria* argument:

> We have the unappealing double bind whereby qualitative studies can't be verified because researchers don't report their methodology, and they don't report their methodology because there are no established canons or conventions for doing so. (Miles and Huberman 1984:244)

These arguments can easily lead to a situation in which evaluation becomes impossible, because not enough information about the research process has been reported. What should be reported is thus dependent on the research tradition and the perspective one applies.

Denzin and Lincoln categorize the dominant methodological paradigms or perspectives for evaluation of qualitative research into four different positions: positivism, postpositivism, postmodernism and poststructuralism (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:479-481). I will, in the following, position my research in relation to these perspectives, and present briefly what I consider the best way to evaluate the qualities of this thesis.

Positivism claims that the criteria for evaluating research should be the same whether it is quantitative or qualitative. Commonly these criteria can be reduced to internal validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:480).

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[131] My translation.

While these criteria are central in the evaluation of quantitative research, I believe that they do not give enough credit to the strong sides of qualititative method. One of the more interesting attempts within this tradition is by King, Keohane and Verba, who show how causal inference can also be applied in qualitative research (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).

The *postpositivists* claim that qualitative research must be evaluated from its own premises. The most central representative of postpositivism is grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994; Corbin and Strauss 1997), which according to Denzin, is the most used qualitative interpretative framework in the social sciences today (1994:508). The authors of grounded theory methodology are trying to create a several step system that allows the attachment of qualititative methods to "good science" models. I find this approach unsuitable for my purposes, as they emphasize how the theory should grow from empirical observations, through careful conceptualization and interpretation. My own approach is too rooted in one theoretical perspective to truly follow their lead. This should not come as a surprise, as the grounded theory methodology was originally created as a reaction against functionalistic and structuralistic theories (Strauss and Corbin 1990:275), which are the intellectual roots of cultural theory. However, I find the authors insistence on rooting knowledge in time and space, and their questioning as it pertains to how the theoretical concepts apply in a given situation, most valuable.

According to Hammersley, *postmodernism* rejects criteria of validity:

> … the character of qualitative research implies that there can be no criteria for judging its products. (Hammersley 1992:58; quoted from Denzin and Lincoln 1994:480)

However, there are other moderate postmodernists, like Kvale, who argue that

> even if the idea of an objective, universal truth is rejected, the possibility of local, personal and societal forms of truth, which focus on everyday life and the localized narratives, is embraced. … Reliable observations, generalizations from one case to another and valid arguments are elements of our daily social interaction. (Kvale 1997:160)

I find Kvale's epistemologically modest position in many ways more credible than the alternative positions.

The fourth paradigm or perspective, *poststructuralism*, distances itself from the other perspectives and demands an entirely new set of criteria, like "subjectivity, emotionality, feeling and other antifoundational factors" (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:480). Cultural theory is a neostructuralist theory and does not easily fit into this kind of emotional framework.[132]

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[132] Mary Douglas has explicitly rejected the use of emotions in theory building (Douglas 1998b)

I have tried to follow the advice given by many, and make the research process as transparent as possible.[133] My own position is close to Kvale's, who has worked on these issues in connection with interview methods over many years (Kvale 1997, 1996, 1995, 1989). Kvale argues for building seven stages of validation into the research process itself: thematization, planning, interviewing, transcription, analysis, validating, and reporting (Kvale 1997:165). The reader should already be familiar with how I have thematized, planned, interviewed, and transcribed my material. The analysis is presented in the fifth chapter (see page 145), and will not be discussed here beyond the reflections I have already made (on page 132). Here I will just present my view on validating.

The competing perspectives are present not just in the field of qualititative research in general but also in my own research practice. While doing my interviews, analysis, and writing of the thesis, I have leaned upon two particular ideas of what is a legitimate basis for validation, that is how my research should be evaluated. First, this thesis needs to be accepted by the research community, represented by a committee, because it will be submitted as a part of my PhD. This has influenced both the form and the style of my writing. However, I hope that my research has validity beyond the demonstration of solid craftsmanship. Second, as for myself, pragmatic validity is the ultimate criterion for validity (Kvale 1997:173). In other words, I consider my own research valid to the degree that the theories and ideas presented can be used for practical purposes. The potential value lies in the ability of cultural theory to provide a perspective that practitioners and policy makers can use to solve their daily tasks. This kind of pragmatic validity criterion does not require that cultural theory is the only perspective, or that it is the best perspective, but it requires that it proves its usefulness repeatedly in everyday situations.

A Question of Reliability

Reliability is more straight forward to deal with than validity. Reliability is about consistency in my work, during interviewing, transcription and analysis. The combination of taping the *interviews* and performing two interviews with each household has allowed me to review the interviews, change my approach, and tailor questions to each household. In addition, in some cases, I arranged a third interview to check some issues I was uncertain about, or if I first in the aftermath realized, what the question was that I really should have asked.

The quality and consistency of *transcription* has been dealt with earlier (starting on page 130), so I will just summarize here that all interviews used for analysis have been transcribed by an assistant following my written guidelines, and checked by me for consistency.

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[133] Similar advice is given by several authors in *the Handbook of Qualitative Research* by Denzin and Lincoln. See, for example, Miles and Huberman (1994:439)

The reliability of the *analysis* a more difficult issue to address, as it depends on a combination of many aspects of my work: which households are included and which are excluded, which stories within each household are included and excluded, whether the operationalization of the theoretical concepts is applied in a consistent manner, and so forth. The selection of households and stories has been dealt with previously, and I will leave the reader to be the judge of whether the operationalizations rising from the theoretical chapters are used wisely in Chapter 5, where the analyzed households are presented.

My households are representatives of themselves, and not informants giving me more or less true accounts of a social reality. Therefore, traditional issues concerning the reliability of my sources are not much of a concern, however, I will try to address this in the following.

Trusting the Sources?

For many the reliability of the sources is a valid concern, and should therefore be given some attention. Especially since I do not have information from several sources, it is impossible to evaluate their "factuality." However, the interview situation itself is structured around a few important principles that can give some guidance.

First, the principle of anonymity: The informants are promised full anonymity, and I believe that the ones who have decided to participate trust me on this issue.

Second, the principle of no-consequence: I have made it clear in the letter of introduction that there are no positive or negative personal consequences resulting from the interview. Because of the anonymity, no authorities will know about their participation and they will not be rewarded nor punished for anything they will tell me.

These two principles together should remove most important hidden instrumental interests for participation and for telling me a "false" version of what has happened.

So, why would a household participate at all if there were nothing to gain? I have in the introductory letter emphasized the chance to present *their version* of the story: to be able to give a personal account of their lives in Norway. Being part of a research program, their own stories can then influence the way the majority population will think about them.

It seems to me that the threshold for accepting to be interviewed is high, but once I am "inside," they volunteer information gladly. Therefore, I believe that the selection bias is a more serious concern than the possibility of households misinforming me.

I focus in the interviews on concrete actions and events: housing, work, division of labor at home, management of household economy, social relations, and public

institutions. This reduces the possibility of misunderstanding as the talk is centered on concrete events, institutions, and behaviors. Is it possible that they misrepresent issues like this? The large majority of the information I am getting is likely to be reliable, but it is possible that information is omitted or polished for any number of reasons.
It is also possible that events went wrong for reasons other than they give me. Fortunately, this is also a minor reliability problem in the analysis as long as the households themselves believe in what they tell me. I am analyzing the logic people use, and even if it would be possible to construct competing historical accounts and explanations for some events, what matters for my purposes is the account they themselves use. Some households have pointed out how they have reinterpreted an event afterwards. In these cases, it can be difficult for me to give a reliable account of their logic in the past, if they themselves do not point out the change for me.

People often want to make a good impression in an interview. I suspect, therefore, that there are stories that are not told. I try to counteract this by asking probing questions, within the boundaries of politeness, when I notice holes and gaps in their stories. A second consequence of trying to make a good impression is the possibility of exaggerating the hardships and one's own ability to solve them. However, this is not a problem, because it just makes the moral aspect in the stories clearer and, hence, easier to recognize what kind of self they are constructing in their stories.

Interviews are Social Constructions

Ehn and Löfgren point out how

> "Soft data" are simply soft, diffuse, and often as contradictory as life itself; memoirs, interviews and observed behavior have an authentic character, which should not make us forget that even they are constructions or models of reality. (Ehn and Löfgren 1982:119)[134]

Similarly, my transcripts consist of several layers of social construction. The first is the household's own active presentation of themselves and the behavior they display for me during the interview. The household is actively presenting to me an image of themselves, and their manner of doing this is interesting information. In other words, I am interested here in what Goffman calls the front stage (1990).

The second layer of social construction enters through my own participation in the interview. Being a political scientist, it is easy to forget that the interview is a social happening, in which I, as a researcher, am an active participant. In other words, the interview should be seen as an joint construct (Mishler 1986:ix). I am actively

[134] Original text: "Mjukdata" är just mjuka, diffusa och ofta motsäkelsefulla som livet självt; memoarer, intervjuer och observerade handlingar har en autentisk karaktär, som dock inte bör få oss att glömma att även de är konstruktioner eller modeller av verkligheten.

forming the situation to something I understand to be an interview, even if I allow the household the freedom to present themselves.

The third layer of social construction is inserted into the the material during the process of transcription by my assistant and during the analysis by me. Hence, the material is again being formed and influenced by me. However, I do not see this as a weakness. Without such structuring processes, the material would not be better suited for my research purposes. Thus, the question to pose is not how accurately the transcripts reflect reality, but how well suited they are to answer my research question.

Overall, I do believe that the reliability of my research is sufficient for my research purposes. This is not to say that the data is reliable for all research purposes, as the data is formed and structured by me for the needs of my research problem. The conclusions made based on my research have, therefore, hopefully at least, the kind of trustworthiness that arises from good artisanship.

Now that I have presented my research design, how the sample has been put together, how I gained access to the households, how the interviews were done, how the material has been transferred from speech to transcripts, my reflections over the analysis, and the validity and reliability of my research, it is time to move on. I will not attempt any conclusions at this stage, but trust that benevolent readers will read the rest of my analysis before passing their judgment. It is finally time to look more closely at the eight households.

Chapter 5

EIGHT HOUSEHOLDS

Similarity and Difference

In this chapter, eight migrant households are presented in more detail. Three aspects are focused on: first, a household's *internal organization*; second, its *helping relations* with the society outside the household, with emphasis on who it knows and who is helping whom. These two aspects are used to establish each household's way of organizing. Third, I present each household's *views about politics and society* as expressed in relation to its experiences, and evaluate whether these fit the predictions given its way of organizing. The goal of this chapter is to make these eight households come alive for readers, and let them see how cultural theory can be used both to describe and conceptualize the similarities between households and the differences between them.

Previously, I have claimed that one should not look at a household as if it belonged in one of cultural theory's boxes. At the same time, it is useful for the comparison and overview to present all eight households simultaneously, on a cultural bias scheme (see Figure 7), which allows for gradual membership. As I have repeatedly pointed out, none of the households are consistent across all arenas.[135] Moreover, this figure ignores many of the internal tensions (assuming that cultural theory is right) or the lack of fit between theory and data (assuming that cultural theory is wrong).

The social mobility of these households, after their migration, has been mostly upwards, or else they have been able to maintain their pre-migration position. However, for many households it has taken ten to fifteen years to arrive in a social position it feels comfortable with, and which matches its aspirations and experiences from its country of origin. Only one household has experienced a downward shift; nevertheless, it seems to be quite happy with its situation. It views migration as a clear break with their past, and it emphasizes its present safety and the richness of its family life.

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[135] Choosing different arenas of life could have changed my interpretation of them. However, I believe that the ones I have picked are simultaneously central in their lives and accessible for me as a researcher.

Figure 7: Overview of the Households' Position

The family histories presented here are just small glimpses into their life stories. It is by no means an attempt to recreate the world the way they see it: rather it is a mix of facts concerning their lives, with some analytical comments. Most of the transcripts are long (typically 30-40 pages with single spaced text), so each presentation here can be only a brief summary, to give the reader an idea of what kind of family it is.

Statements, stories and observations are not exclusively about a household's internal life, its external social relations, or its relation to politics and the institutions of the welfare state. Therefore, the reader should not expect these categories to be mutually exclusive in the presentations. Placing a statement under one heading is caused by my belief that it can be used to illuminate this particular category, but I will use it to throw light upon the other categories, too, if possible.

The households are described in a clockwise sequence as seen, above, in Figure 7, starting in the top right quadrant—that is, first households that have many hierarchical, then egalitarian, individualistic and finally many fatalistic traits. Presented next to one another households with similar ways of organizing but different ethnic backgrounds helps us see how treating these, or any other, households solely based on their ethnic origin is not sufficient.

The Nguyens: Loyalty and Stability

The Nguyen household is a typical example of a household in which the hierarchical way of organizing dominates.

Quick Summary

The Nguyen household fled their home in Vietnam in 1978 and, after a hazardous boat trip, ended up in a refugee camp, where their first child was born. In the early 1980s, they were sent to town, where Mr. Nguyen had a brother. Mr. Nguyen found a job very soon after his arrival, and the family bought their first apartment. Mrs. Nguyen studied, and took care of their several children. Now she has a permanent position in a health care institution, while he is still in his original job. In the early 1990s they built a house with more space, and soon after this, his mother, from Vietnam, moved in.

The Household's Internal Life

Clarity and order are the two words I would use to describe both their house, and the interview situation itself.

The house they live in is large, orderly, and conspicuously clean (which probably says as much about me as about them). I have the feeling that everything has its place: the collection of good brandy is displayed in a glass cabinet, for instance, and the elegantly framed pictures of the family on the wall.

The house seems to be divided into a public part and a more private part. The layout is such that there are parts of the house I did not see on my way to the living room, where the interview took place. Both Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen participated in the interview from the beginning to the end. In addition, it was very clear when the interview started and when it ended. The children were presented to me, and then sent back to the more private parts of the house.

Household Economy

The Nguyens share a bank account and have a good overview of their consumption, thanks to the care with which they plan their spending. When they are getting something expensive, they prefer to save first and then buy: they are willing to wait. Nevertheless, they have taken out loans, for example, to buy a car.

Now their economic situation is good, whereas soon after they bought their house their economy was much tighter. During that period they both tried to cut back on their expenses, and to work more overtime, so as to make ends meet (Nguyen 2001:00:57-00:59).[136]

One of the big expenses last year was a nearly two month trip to Vietnam for the whole family, which required a lot of saving beforehand and required that the parents take an unpaid leave from work.

The Nguyens are already saving for their retirement through a private pension plan, and they have a life insurance policy. They pay tuition for the private school their children attend, and they hope that their children will help them after they are done with their studies (Nguyen 2001:00:49). There is, thus, an emphasis on long-term financial stability.

Making Decisions

Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen give slightly diverging accounts of how they make decisions. Mr. Nguyen says that they discuss and always come to an agreement; Mrs. Nguyen says she cannot decide alone:

> Mr: Always when we have problems, we must sit together and find a solution.
>
> Mrs: I cannot decide on my own. If I really want something:
> — Oh, I really want that beautiful jacket.
> I never decide alone. I often ask my husband.
> — Very beautiful, he says, but would you mind waiting for a while?
> — OK, wait a little bit.
> And then we do it. I get it anyway, but I often talk with my husband, and then we both agree. (Nguyen 2001:01:25)

Mrs. Nguyen's last line matches her husband's in the statement "and then we both agree," and it is important for them to find this agreement. However, it sounds like a ritual they go through. She knows that she will probably get what she wants, but she does not want to do it without her husband's approval. Needs are not adjusted downwards; they are just postponed, until they have the resources to fulfill them: careful planning and a long view.

Tradition and Respect

The Nguyens emphasize tradition. When I asked if they were Catholic, he replied:

> Mr: Yes, we are. I would say that we are <u>real</u> Catholics, because our relatives, her parent's congregation in Vietnam is Catholic. (Nguyen 2001:00:25)

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[136] References to interviews contain information about time given in hours and minutes, which makes it possible to find these quotes both in the transcript and on the corresponding soundfile.

Being Catholic is not just a question of faith and conversion; it is also about lineage and tradition. He is thus separating the Nguyens from others who have converted more recently.

They are also proud that their children still respect their parents

Mr: He has never acted against me. Yes, it is true. Because I have taught that to all my children since they were small. He can do like this, do like this, and do like this. NEVER would I give them money [( )

Mrs: [(are not that strict with them) but they are like that.[137]

EO: They still have respect.

Mrs: Yes.

Mr: = [Yes.

Mrs: [Respect ( ).

Mr: During the day they are occupied with work, but evenings and weekends we use most or our time with our children. It is important. (Nguyen 2001:00:57)

Mr. Nguyen does not bargain with his children, nor buy their support. In the discussion we had just before this excerpt, the Nguyens were explaining how the children get money for their needs, but not for everything they want, and if the parents say no, it is respected because the parents are respected. He seems to be opposed to the practice of parents buying the offspring's support (hence taking a stand against an individualistic way of raising children). Mrs. Nguyen, realizing how this might sound strange to me, modifies the statement by claiming that they are not that strict with them—the children are just like that. I interpret this as an indication of their awareness that they have more rules than the average majority household does. On the one hand, they are very proud of having these rules and, most of all, that the children respect their parents; however, they do not want to look too different from the majority either.

Husband and Wife have Clear Roles

Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen have roles that influence their social relations with the outside world. Mrs. Nguyen has two female friends, both of whom belong to the majority population. Sometimes they meet at the Nguyens, and the women call each other sometimes. However, Mr. Nguyen does have considerable influence on what she does with her friends:

Mr: They often call my wife and ask if she can come out.
I say
— No. ((Laughter))
She will ask me
— Why? Say: Yes, she can come along.

[137] Please have a look at the notation used for transcription on page 131.

> I say
> — No thanks. It is more important for the whole family to be home together. (Nguyen 2002:01:18)

His justification is typical of high-group: it is important for the family to be together. The fact that Mr. Nguyen is asked at all, again, is typical for high-grid: the household members have different roles with different responsibilities and duties, and in this case Mr. Nguyen is in a position where he can decide, not just suggest, that Mrs. Nguyen should stay home. In a low-grid (egalitarian or individualistic) household, it would be unnatural for one of the adult members of the household to control another in this manner. I believe that Mr. Nguyen's little laugh is conveying an ambiguity created by the interview situation: on the one hand, he is proud to be "the man of the house"; on the other hand, he is aware that this also a breach of the majority society's norms.

The Importance of the Family

While several households claimed that the family is important, the Nguyens also seem to translate this into action. Several times they mentioned how they spend a great deal of time together, and how that means that other things have to come second. Unfortunately, I do not have real time use information, which makes it impossible for me to evaluate whether they spend more time together than other households. Spending time "together" can mean quite different things to different households.

Life in Society

Social Relations

Since the death of Mr. Nguyen's brother, who was adopted into a majority household as a child, the Nguyen household does not have any blood relatives in Norway. This majority household, however, is now considered to be kin, and they visit them often and regularly. They also support financially and try to keep in contact with relatives (and one friend) back in Vietnam.

The Nguyen family has as much contact with majority households as with households originating in Vietnam. They have contact with three majority households in their neighborhood, and with two of his and two of her colleagues. The main source of contact with the other Vietnamese households is the Catholic Church, through which they keep in touch with around ten families, with whom they share their Sunday mass, children's Sunday school, holidays and other festivities (Nguyen 2002:00:43). The Nguyens also keep in touch with a group of five Vietnamese families: three living in other parts of Norway, one in Sweden, and one in Denmark. These families originally met through the church. In addition, the

Nguyens know, through kin in Vietnam, one Vietnamese family in Germany, with whom they keep in touch.

The pattern seems to be that the majority households they keep in touch with are neighbors, whereas majority individuals are colleagues. None of the majority households they keep in touch with requires particular effort, since they are all in physical proximity. In contrast, practically all non-related Vietnamese they have contact with are households or families they know through the church. Some of these even live abroad.

Helping the Deserving Poor

The Nguyen household saves in order to be able to regularly send money back to Vietnam. They send significant amounts of money to their parents and to their siblings three times a year. In addition, they are helping five youths, who are studying to become priests, and two children in an orphanage. They justify the help they are giving in the following manner:

> Mrs: You just have to. Right? Have to think a little bit. If we give, we will receive. We can say it like that.
>
> Mr: Yes, because earlier we…
>
> Mrs: = Received a lot, you know, when we came here
> (…)
>
> Mr: We have a job, we are grown-ups, have a house to live in, and we have children. Now, there are others who are in need. And, before we came to Norway, we lived in a camp for a year. They gave us food. Many Norwegians give money, not directly to me, but through Caritas[138] in Norway. They get food, now we have to pay back. Not to the Norwegians, but pay to others, and the poor.
>
> Mrs: = We cannot give to the same people who gave to us, but to the poor, kind of indirectly.
>
> Mr: = We have learned a lot—about what Jesus said—what we are supposed to do. We do the right thing, because we have money. Thus, we have to give. However, when we give, we will also receive. (Nguyen 2001:01:04)

There are two indicators of a hierarchical solidarity here. First, and most importantly, there is considerable asymmetry in the transactions. They received when they needed, now they are in a position to give, therefore they must give. It is not a question of equal exchange. It is rather a way to position themselves as morally righteous, something that would be impossible if they did not give while

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[138] *Caritas Norway is* the Catholic organization for humanitarian aid abroad. It is a continuation of the Catholic Refugee Aid (*Katolsk flyktninghjelp*), and a member of Caritas Internationalis. It is organized under the Catholic congregations in Norway. Caritas' main task is support development, human rights and humanitarian aid in poor countries; to motivate Catholics in Norway to solidarity with the economically poor in other countries; and to increase the awareness of the causes of poverty. The most important domestic task is to help congregation improve their charity work among refugees, migrants, children and the elderly (*Caritas Norge* 2002).

being able to do so. Second, one should notice that they are giving to future priests and children in an orphanage—in a word, the deserving poor—which is typical for the hierarchical solidarity.

The Nguyens both give and receive help through their social networks. He is willing to help neighbors without being too concerned whether the help is mutual and equals out:

> Mr: Often he [the neighbor] wants to pay me some money, but I tell him:
> — I do not want to take any money, because money means nothing for me. We humans must help each other because we were refugees, we fled out, and then we (). We can help. We work, we make enough money. (Nguyen 2002:00:28)

Mr. Nguyen is more concerned with his image, how others look at him, than whether the help he gives is reciprocated. This would not be likely in an individualistic household, whereas in a hierarchical household it makes perfect sense. It is one way of defining one's role and position in the society. There seems to be in the majority society an expectation that refugees (and perhaps the Vietnamese) need help, but the Nguyens, by helping others, are proving this image wrong. Helping others is the "price to pay" for being a full and worthy member of the society.

On the other hand, there are families the Nguyens receive more from than they give to, particularly the previously mentioned majority household that is treated as kin. They have repeatedly helped the Nguyens with important things, like getting a bank loan for the house, while they themselves do not seem to need help (Nguyen 2002:00:28). Again, we can observe an asymmetry in the transactions, indicating a hierarchical solidarity.

The group of five Vietnamese families, living in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, that keeps in touch with each other, also functions as a bridge back to Vietnam. When one family is going back, they will bring with them messages, money, and medicine on behalf of the others (Nguyen 2002:00:33).

Mr. Nguyen points out that they try to make sure that, when they send money, it is spent on something important, not on gambling and such (Nguyen 2002:00:39). There is hence an element of control (and a strong sense of appropriate and inappropriate) involved with the gifts, indicating high accountability.

Other families have told me that the expectation of gifts is a big burden, making it almost impossible to visit Vietnam. When I put this to Mr. Nguyen, he claims that this is caused by people exaggerating how well they are doing. He is also judgmental about people who work little (Nguyen 2002:00:41) and, perhaps even worse, people who waste their money when visiting Vietnam:

> Mr: We are staying free, but we need to eat. We save money for family and relatives. We don't have money for restaurants and stuff.

> ###[139]
> We would never go out to a restaurant for a dinner or cup of coffee in Vietnam. We just buy food, and then my sister will make dinner and the whole family will talk, eat, and enjoy themselves. We buy the coffee and make it. But the others, there are many I know; they all go out to restaurants and make lots of noise. Well, there are differences from man to man, aren't there. Nevertheless, I do not like that kind of things. Because we have money, we have to save it and use the money well. I know many like that.
> ##
> Yes, there are many differences. (Nguyen 2002:00:42)

Here Mr. Nguyen is blaming (pinning moral strategies and the responsibility on) individuals, not the system—deviance, in other words—which points toward a hierarchical cultural bias. Moreover, the behavior he is criticizing (conspicuous consumption, for instance) would probably be "just the ticket" for an individualist. Thus, the critique is a way to position himself morally.

Loyalty and Responsibility

Loyalty is important for the Nguyen family. Mr. Nguyen has been working for the same company since his arrival in Norway. The owner of this company helped him significantly in the beginning and a relationship of trust and loyalty has been built up.

EO: There are not that many Norwegians who are in the same job after 20 years.

Mr: No. That is right. There have been many, who worked with me, but they quit and moved to other places. I, too, have received offers to start at other companies. But I say always no, because (…) the boss is very kind and has a large heart. First time I came to work, it was hard because I could not speak Norwegian and not that much English, either. Nevertheless, they received me well: In the morning we worked, and in the afternoon he would drive me to [my Norwegian classes]. I would be there for two hours, and then he come and picked me up for more work at the factory. I will never forget that, therefore I say that I cannot leave. He is very kind to me, pays well, and helps me when I have problems.

EO: That is great.

Mr: Yes. It is not easy to find a boss who is kind. But they know I am a foreigner: it is difficult to come to Norway; to find a job, and to learn the language. It is difficult, because when we came to Norway, we can't be bothered to sit home and take money from the social welfare office. We have to find a job, make money and have a life. It is important. Norway is the right country to come to: Here is freedom; we can do what we want. We must work all the time, make money and have a life. We must

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[139] Each # signifies a pause lasting one second. Please have a look at the notation used for transcription on page 131.

build this country together. My wife and I, we work all the time, make money, have a life and buy a house.

Mrs: We can say that we have made it on our own.
((husband laughs)) (Nguyen 2001:00:15)

There are several interesting features in this quote. The status differences between Mr. Nguyen and his boss are emphasized. It is not a relationship between two equals, nor is it presented as a relationship of a mutual contract. The relationship between Mr. Nguyen and his boss resembles a traditional client-patron relationship, and Mr. Nguyen is happy because his patron is "kind and has a large heart." The loyalty seems to derive from the very beginning of the relationship, when Mr. Nguyen was on the receiving end. In some sense, the boss' act of kindness[140] created a lasting bond. Calculations of utility do not seem to apply, this relationship is about loyalty, and he emphasizes the loyalty by letting me know that he has rejected several job offers. Thus, it becomes evident that Mr. Nguyen values his own loyalty highly.

The second point of interest is his responsibilities. He does not want to live on Social Security: It is clear that he is proud of being able to make it on his own, but one should notice particularly that this is connected to the responsibilities that arise from freedom: the need to make money, and to build the country together. He is not only concerned with his own welfare, but with his and his wife's role in the society. They should be active members that contribute to the society; their work should become part of something larger. In addition, after presenting his responsibilities, he closes the topic by explaining how they work all the time, hence fulfilling the very same demands he just presented. To sum it up, the Nguyens presented themselves as both loyal and responsible members of society, both being typical hierarchical values.

Politics and the Welfare State

What kind of experiences do the Nguyens have of politics and the institutions of the welfare state? How do their attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions given of hierarchical households?

Expectation of Accountability and Trust in Institutions

Mr. Nguyen passes quickly over my questions about the municipality and the police with an answer of "no contact", which I find a bit surprising, given that he is a home owner, and has certainly dealt with several city authorities (Nguyen 2002:00:57). Not much later I find out that Mr. Nguyen has no problems with the

[140] It is possible that the boss acted out of selfish motives, but somehow this does not sound right. At least, it does not seem to be what Mr. Nguyen believes.

police, but he does not think highly of them either, since he has contacted them three times without receiving any help. He wanted the police to check a suspicious truck loitering at his workplace late in the evening, and their home has been burgled twice while they were away on holiday (Nguyen 2002:1:06). This fits with the hierarchical idea of accountable authorities—because the police did not respond, they can be criticized.

It is striking how much more engaged Mr. Nguyen is with UDI.[141] He tells me a long and elaborate story of his experiences with UDI. It took him three years to get his Norwegian passport, which he needed in order to visit his sick father in Vietnam. After two years of repeated, Kafkaesque, contact with the local police and UDI, and despite the efforts of a friendly police officer, Mr. Nguyen ended up leaving Norway without a valid passport, which of course created problems on his return. Nevertheless, his personal contacts allowed him to negotiate solutions, and phone calls between police and migration officers solved the problems at the borders (Nguyen 2002:00:52).

I find it fascinating the way he is trying to be a law-abiding citizen, trying to do the right thing, while the bureaucracy is repeatedly unable to deliver what it has promised. In the end, he disregards all advice and just leaves the country without the legal documents, and trusts that any problems can be resolved on the spot. Of several possible interpretations, the first one seems most credible. First, it could indicate a tremendous belief in hierarchy; a trust in the state and its institutions, even after it has failed to provide him with a passport—it will not let him down when he returns. In a hierarchy, the state should act accountably toward those who behave appropriately and responsibly. In this story there are two competing hierarchies: his family, requiring a visit, and the state, not permitting this. Not surprisingly the family wins, and Mr. Nguyen acts against the guidance of the state. The second interpretation is based on this being a case of a hierarchical strategy that breaks down when it does not fulfill its promise. Mr. Nguyen thus feels forced to change his strategy to a rather extreme individualistic position, trusting that he knows enough people who work for the authorities, and that he will be able to convince the border guards of his identity and of his right to enter Norway. The third interpretation is fatalistic resignation: Mr. Nguyen lost the control of the outer events (the Kafkaesque passport application procedure) and decided to let go of control and just follow the flow.

This trip was clearly something out of the ordinary, perhaps even outrageous. Could this have been a normal act in one of the other ways of life? It does not seem rational based on the individualistic way of organizing, despite that supporters of individualism accept higher levels of risk than supporters of other ways of organizing (Douglas 1992). Nor does fatalism seem credible, since he was confident that he would get home. Even rudimentary knowledge of migration authorities should make one realize that such passportless travel is a hazardous venture in a

[141] UDI stands for the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration.

globalized world with numerous asylum seekers. Hence, it seems like the most credible interpretation is based on his strong belief that authorities are accountable, which is typical for hierarchical way of organizing.

School is Best Run by Professionals

The children attend a private school, because the parents believe that there is a quality difference between private and public schools.

> Mr: Well, I am not saying there is anything wrong about the public schools, but we chose it because I am busy working all the time. I, too, went to a public school in Vietnam. A private school is always better than a public one. In a public school, the parents have to pay much more attention. Whereas in a private school the children will succeed. Therefore, we have to send them to private school.
>
> EO: So, you are used to that from Vietnam.
>
> Mr: Yes. However, it costs money. I pay. It is something I just have to do. It is the better for my children's future to have such an education. ##################### (Nguyen 2001:1:10)

The Nguyens assume that in a public school parents need to be more involved than in private schools, and this seems to be the starting point of their reasoning. It could be tempting to interpret their preference for a private school as an individualistic tendency, but that would be erroneous in this case. The children go to a Catholic school, which represents more hierarchical values than does the public school. In addition, this quote reveals a second hierarchical trait: In a perfect hierarchy, the world is divided into distinctively separate spheres of life, which do not often touch upon each other: there is the men's vs. women's sphere, public vs. private sphere, religious vs. secular sphere, children's vs. the adults' sphere, and so forth (Douglas 2001). I see this as explaining why the Nguyens are deferential and believe it is positive for the parents not to engage in the children's schooling: it is a different sphere, and best run by the professionals, the teachers. In contrast, the egalitarian way of organizing rejects this kind of separation of the world into different spheres and demands that the same rules apply everywhere.

Somewhat more hidden is the belief in the school as a means to a better life for the children, as education will help them to achieve positions and behave honorably in their positions, which fits to the hierarchical constitution of human nature—born in sin but redeemable through firm, nurturing and long-lasting institutions.

Accountability in Politics

Mr. Nguyen pays attention to politics and thinks that parties do not deliver what they promise, which makes politics much less important and interesting than it should be. In a hierarchy, it is important to be trustworthy, as authority relations are two-way relations: If a politician does not "deliver" (i.e., he is not what he appears to be), he loses respect.

When I inquire about what is important about politics, Mr. Nguyen replies:

> Mr: What is important, for example, is to help the elderly, help children in schools and kindergartens, and almost anything. What is not important, is to read about refugees. It means nothing to us—refugees, refugees— We do not care at all. We live in Norway now. Some people say we can have it easy with taxes and (housing). The Progress Party is OK. It is, even if many say it is not. (Nguyen 2002:0:55)

The Nguyens are now citizens but, to my surprise, they show little sympathy for new refugees. In addition, they support the Progress Party, which is known for its disregard of politicians, its populist policies and dislike of migrants. The issues mentioned by Mr. Nguyen as important (the elderly and schools) are, however, issues promoted by the Progress Party. Therefore, based on his issue preferences, voting for the Progress Party is an informed choice.

There seems to be a moral paradox in having received asylum and material help, while not wanting to grant this to others.[142] However, this paradox can be partly solved if this view is presented in a hierarchical setting, for in a hierarchy asymmetrical social relations are preferable and the world is divided into separate spheres.

Citizenship

The Nguyens have a pragmatic view of citizenship. They are Norwegian citizens because it makes traveling easier (Nguyen 2002:0:52). There are no signs of a deep-felt belonging to the Norwegian state, even if they want to be seen as contributing to the society in the form of working and paying taxes. This kind of pragmatism does not fit my expectations of a hierarchical way of organizing; rather, it seems to belong to an individualistic way of organizing. Is it possible that in being a hierarchical household their traditional identities (including a transnational Catholic identity) are so strong that they prefer, or even need to downplay, the symbolic meaning of Norwegian citizenship?

Resentment against Accusations of Not Paying Taxes

Mr. Nguyen does not mind paying taxes, and is troubled by people who think that he does not pay his taxes.

> Mr: Well, I am very happy to live in Norway. Now I have to pay taxes. Because, I am certain to get in a hospital. I know many people who say that I come to Norway and pay nothing.
> [I tell them]
> —Don't fool with me. Stop that. Make contact with the Revenue Authorities and check. (Nguyen 2002:00:56)

[142] It would only be non-paradoxical if all migrants behaved irresponsibly.

In this quote, there is a tension between his claim that the majority population often assumes migrants to be free riders in the Norwegian welfare state and his own pride.[143] In the hierarchical way of organizing roles are important, and this quote can be seen as a rebuttal of the majority population's claim that he does not fulfill his role as a citizen, which of course comes into conflict with Mr. Nguyen's pride in doing things right. To resolve this dispute he directs the majority critics to the authorities to find out about the "truth." Both pride and a combination of trust in and duty toward the authorities are typical of the hierarchical way of life. In general, both egalitarian and individualistic ways of organizing are predicted to be less concerned with these sorts of outside criticisms.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

In the summary of each household I select those traits that either have clear interpretation in cultural theory, or clearly are relevant for the discussion. I will for the sake of simplicity indicate support for a particular way of organizing are marked with capitals (H, I, E, or F), while aspects that indicate rejection are marked with lower case letters (h, i, e or f). These marked traits are counted and used for the analyses in the next chapter. By indicating these traits here, and not during the presentation of the stories, I avoid counting two similar stories of lojalty as two separate traits.

Most of the signs in the case of the Nguyens point toward a hierarchical household: The orderly housekeeping; their behavior during the interview (H); their careful and long-term plan for household economy (H); the postponement of consumption (H); their strong social bonds to Vietnam (even after 20 years in Norway they still have numerous obligations)[144]; the importance of loyalty (H); spending lots of time with family members and participating in social activities as a family (H); and the importance of children respecting their parents (H).

How do the Nguyen household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions made about hierarchical households (on pages 78-91)? There are several predictions that cannot be checked, but the ones covered by the Nguyens in the interviews do fit the hierarchical predictions. Their view of human nature and the role of institutions, as presented in their discussion about schools, fits the hierarchical predictions (H). Even if there are some traits that are difficult to interpret, like Mr. Nguyen's story of his passportless trip to Vietnam, there is a strong trust in institutions. Their preferred form of support is for the deserving poor (H), and they want to make sure that I do not think of them as beneficiaries

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143 The same resentment against accusations of not paying taxes and living off social support also came up in the first interview (Nguyen 2002:01:13).

144 Even if I have included it here, I have not calculated this as a trait, as it is a rather ad hoc interpretation, and not discussed in the theory chapter.

of social support (H)—both of which fit the predictions. One of the themes running through the whole interview is the importance of and expectation for accountability, as one would expect from a hierarchical household (but not from an individualistic or fatalistic household). The police and UDI were not accountable enough (H), but Mr. Nguyen still trusted the institutions to deliver in the end (H). Politicians are criticized for their lack of accountability (H). Finally, Mr. Nguyen does not want others to view him as someone who lacks accountability (i.e, does not pay his taxes).[145] The general conclusion is that the attitudes and behaviors revealed by the interviews fit the predictions given regarding hierarchy.

[145] This is so closely connected to the not receiving social support that I have regarded them here as a joint indicator.

The Natans: the Community Helpers

The Natan household comes next, because its salient feature—helping others—suggests that it too is a household in which the hierarchical way of organizing is predominant. To start with, I thought it to be a predominately egalitarian household, however, much did not fit. Mary Douglas's new improved presentation of hierarchy,[146] made me realize that I got it wrong. I had to redo my previous analysis, which allowed many of the tensions to be resolved.

A Quick Summary

The Natan Household consists of Mr. Natan, Mrs. Natan and their two children. Mr. Natan migrated to Norway in the early 1970s, for work. Toward the end of the decade he met his future wife, in Sri Lanka, they got married and she moved with him to Norway. He had a business in Sri Lanka; she has professional training and was a state employee before moving to Norway. Now they are both working in the service sector. In the mid eighties, the Natan family bought a four-bedroom house in a suburb and has lived there since. The exceptional stability of employment is striking: They have both been in their present jobs for two decades.

Reasons for Moving:

Mr. Natan was a labor migrant and came to Norway for work and, I suspect, a bit of adventure. He did not have to leave, as he had a successful business based on his craft in Sri Lanka. He moved because his good friends moved to Norway somewhat earlier, and he wanted to be closer to them. They had knowledge of the Norwegian labor market that made it possible to plan for a year or two's stay in Norway. For me there was something adventurous and romantic about this particular migration, and it seems like his friends are very important to him, almost like family. All of which suggests that, to begin with, it is individualism we are dealing with.

Mr. Natan arrives. Not surprisingly, Mr. Natan was able to get work based on his craft; he was a labor migrant. He worked for the same company for several years, in a small coastal town, but he got "a bit bored of just one type of work" and wanted to do something else.

Later he moved to the city and worked in a related job, in a new field, in a small company, and rented an apartment through a friend. Two years later he managed to get a job in one of the big production companies based on his trade. However, only a short while later he switched to a very different job, where he is still able to use

[146] These ideas were first presented in her Marianist Award Lecture titled *A Feeling for Hierarchy* (draft dated 2001) and have been further developed in *In My Grandmother's House* (draft dated 2002a).

his technical skills, but where he can now meet and work with people. He never applied for this job but was asked to take it. He has been working in the same job ever since (Natan 2001:00:19). He has remained for almost twenty years in the same firm, just like Mr. Nguyen; however, there is one important difference. Where Mr. Nguyen emphasizes loyalty, Mr. Natan talks about how he really enjoys his work and the people he meets.

Mrs. Natan spent the first years in Norway tending their first children, and learning Norwegian in school. Having worked as a bureaucrat in Sri Lanka, she managed to get a job in a public office in Norway. Unfortunately, the line of work was not quite what she was trained for (Natan 2001:00:20). However, with the exception of a maternity leave, she has stayed within the same office, though her job description has changed over the years.

The Household's Internal Life

The Interview

Both interviews were done with Mr. Natan—the first at his workplace and the second at his home. Mrs. Natan was home during the second interview but did not participate; however, she was the perfect host and served us tea and cookies. This indicates a relatively strict division of labor.

Resource Management

The most obvious feature of their resource management is the surplus of resources. Mr. Natan spends a lot of time helping other people and is proud of this. The most important resources they have available are their knowledge of Norwegian society, their many contacts, and, in some cases, their time and labor. Time, however, is a scarce resourse, which sometimes creates tension at home:

> Mr: And sometimes, these meetings come in between us. Family problem,
> you know. They are angry because I am gone too much. Kids react, too.
> So, therefore we have to think of both parties. (…)
> But I am not thinking of myself, so that everybody can say
> — he is the best.
> Not like that. I think,
> — I am a regular man, I do my part and help some other people. (Natan 2002:00:17)

There is a delicate balance between helping people outside the household and spending time with the family. Mr. Natan is justifying this domestic conflict by rejecting the idea that he is helping others in order to secure a position among Tamils. He is a "regular man" doing his part.

They also have had periods with a tight household economy. For example, soon after they got married, they borrowed money from a bank. Mr. Natan mentions postponing expenses as a strategy for making ends meet during those tight periods:

> Mr: Let's say I want to buy new shoes—I do not really need to— because I can use these shoes one more year. This way it is possible to save some. (Natan 2001:00:37)

There is a similarity in strategy with the Nguyen household, who also postpone expenses. Cultural theory suggests that hierarchical households' needs are fixed, and that managing is done by ensuring that one's income is sufficient to cover the more or less fixed needs. However, all households exert some control over their expenses. The hierarchical consumption style involves brand consciousness, brand loyalty, preference for quality and long term investment,[147] rather than fashionable items (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Douglas 1996c). Similarly, in order to save, Mr. Natan postpones the quality purchase, rather than buying cheap shoes now. This is what a household based on hierarchical solidarity would be expected to do in order to control their expenses.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Natan have a fixed income, with no or few possibilities for extra income. Even though they have good salaries, they are not able to save any money, because they have large food and car repair expenses (Natan 2002:00:28). Spending extra on food is one way of emphasizing the importance of the family, as it is here a joint activity. In addition, preparing both Indian[148] and Norwegian food is a way of affirming that they belong to both cultures. This was something that was emphasized in the interview, and used to justify their large expenditure on food. Their needs, cultural theory would say, are fixed for them by their "station in life" and both Mr. and Mrs. Natan currently present and justify their way of life in hierarchical terms.

Perhaps seeing the other explanations that could have been used, and what kind of solidarity they would help to build up, makes it easier to see what is going on in the Natan household. Had the explanation for their large food bill been that they dine out a lot with friends and colleagues, it would have been the sort of conspicuous consumption that helps to sustain the individualistic way of organizing. Had the explanation been a willingness to take on the extra cost of organic produce, it would have suggested a form of moral consumption that fits well with the egalitarian way of organizing. Had the explanation been a lack of planning, or caring, leading to lots of takeaway meals and a fair amount of waste, it could have indicated the consumption style that helps to sustain the fatalistic way of organizing. Thus, when using cultural theory to interpret a social situation, one always has to keep in

[147] One of the classic examples of an ad relying on the hierarchical style of consumption is an ad explaining how you do not own one of these watches—you merely keep it for the next generation.

[148] I am uncertain why Mr. Natan talks of Indian food and not Tamil food. Is it because he thinks they are both the *same*, or because he is trying to help *me* to understand what kind of food they are eating?

mind the other alternatives in order to "rule out" as well "rule in" the various kinds of social order that the agents are trying to build, and, in a sense, defend.

Household Work—Division of Labor

Mrs. Natan takes care of the household economy. She keeps the overview and does the accounting. Mr. Natan knows and accepts that she makes the decisions. Mr. Natan pays the regular, monthly bills, whereas Mrs. Natan takes care of the issues that run on a yearly basis, like income tax forms. This division into different areas of competence is typical in a hierarchical household; however, Mr. Natan justifies this particular division by referring to her better skills (Natan 2002:00:26). Other parts of their division of labor, such as Mrs. Natan preparing the tea and cookies, are taken for granted, to such a degree that they did not need explaining. Even if skills-based arguments are typical of the individualistic way of organizing, the overall division in the Natan household seems to be gender-based, and divided into different areas that restrict the spouses responsibilities and are seen as "appropriate" and "correct," all of which is typical of the hierarchical way of life.

Social Relations in the Society

The Natan family is central in the Tamil community, being one of the first ones to arrive in Norway (priority and precedence loom large in the hierarchical solidarity), and because of their involvement in local Tamil organizational life. Mr. Natan is also highly respected in the community because he helps so many people.

The household has a large and rich social network. The Natan's relatives have spread into several western countries, and they both have close family in the city, as well as back in Sri Lanka. They have also "adopted" a young relative who lives in the city. The family bonds seem strong, even if they do not help their own family much, because they do not need help. However, they occasionally help, financially, one sister in Sri Lanka, because they know she needs it, even though she refuses to ask for help.

In addition to their family they have lots of contact with people both near by and far away. They keep in touch with more than forty non-kin people in town, and these people are from at least seven different sources: They keep in contact with two neighbor families, and one older man who lives close by. They both have contact with several co-workers outside working hours. Many of these people they keep in touch with through Tamil organizations, the Catholic Church, or the Hindu congregation. In addition, there are twelve people in other parts of Norway; most of them also Tamils. Friendships, unsurprisingly, are considered very important, and Mr. Natan has old friends from school, now living in England, whom he tries to meet five or six times a year. In addition, there are friends living in Sweden, India, and of course back in Sri Lanka. Mr. Natan is careful to point out that some of these friends are Singhalese, and not Tamils.

The strength of the group dimension is related to the amount of time spent in different social settings. Mr. Natan is immersed in social life through institutions:

> Mr: I meet lots of people—at [names several organizations], and at work. I spend my whole life with other people. Always. I am seldom alone. I am alone when I sleep, otherwise I spend my life with people. (Natan 2004:00:05)

However, because he spends so much time in these other institutions, it brings the household downward on the group dimension. It is the sum of the roles and institutional identities that makes Mr. Natan Mr. Natan.

Children Are Free to Be Norwegian

Mr. Natan has been in Norway long enough to have had extensive contact with the majority population, and he is aware that he himself is both Tamil and Norwegian, while his children are probably more Norwegian than Tamil. He would prefer their children to participate more in the Tamil community, but accepts that they make their own choices:

> Mr: Yes, the whole bunch live with their Norwegian friends. Whereas, I live in both camps. But they do not join me. If I ask them,
> — Would you like to come with me, there is a wedding today?
> They answer,
> — You go! It fits for you. I get bored there. You sit there many hours with them, I cannot do that.
> — Would you like to join me in the temple?
> — Sorry, I do not have time.
> (…)
> I say,
> — to accept, to accept, if I do not accept, it is your life. You are the ones to decide. ####### (Natan 2002:00:48)

This appears at first sight to be a low-grid position, as he is not trying to enforce a tradition upon the children. The emphasis on the children making a *choice* is important, a choice that would be meaningless if one's social identity were a result of just birth or outside forces. Nevertheless, if they choose to be Norwegian in the same sort of way that he chooses to be both Tamil and Norwegian, this can be seen as an orderly and consistent way of coping with inevitable change. How else could a hierarchical household deal with the inevitable except by keeping the children from having contact with the majority population?

Festivities and Parties

Mr. Natan seems to prefer a dinner with his friends over large parties. He explains how their Norwegian friends call and invite themselves over for dinner in a rather informal manner.

> Mr: But our other countrymen, most of them, when they have a celebration, a birthday or a christening they invite. Then we go and eat there, and give presents, and then they come to my birthday. Right? However, especially I do not want these birthday parties at home. I tell all our children when they are ten, twelve years old, they can celebrate ten times. After that they should just forget about it. On such a day one should rather give money to the poor, SOS-childrens' village, Caritas or the Red Cross.
> — Give money to them, pay 200.-
> — Ok.
> But then sometimes they do not accept that:
> — No, must have the money. We want to have a party.
> Then must give money. They need the money.
> A period from twelve to fifteen years, they accept this. After fifteen years they want to have a party. (Natan 2002:00:33)

There is something egalitarian about this reluctance to celebrate birthdays and give the gift money to good causes instead. Hierarchical households are expected to emphasize birthdays and other rituals that help to structure the world. On the other hand, it is clear that he sees the money as going to the "deserving" poor, which is indicative of the hierarchical solidarity. In addition, there now emerges a picture where the children's lives are divided into phases—young children who have parties, older children who do not, and teenagers who again have birthday parties. The need to classify, so that one can find the appropriate set of rules to apply, is also typical in hierarchy.

Helpers are Beyond (and Above) the Capitalist Economy

For Mr. Natan helping others is not just a nice thing to do, it is an important part of his identity and of the meaning of life:

> Mr: To help other is my hobby, or my interest, and what all my life is about. (Natan 2002:00:20)

Mr. Natan told me relatively early in the second interview a story about him changing a ruptured car tire for an old man in heavy rain. The point of the story was actually how this situation was resolved:

> Mr: I know that he would give me a 500 or a 200 crown note. I could see him getting ready to do it.
> — I'm done. You can drive now, I said.
> Then I took my bags and run away. He looks at me,
> — Arrgh.
> Because his is angry, he wants to pay.

> I do not want to take any money, right. Sometimes I just can't tolerate that kind of stuff. (Natan 2002:00:22)

Mr. Natan is thus putting himself in the position of the helper, who does not want any reward. By running away he maintained transactional asymmetry, removing the car driver's opportunity to get even. Therefore, in some people's eyes, the car driver now "owes" him.

My interpretation here relies on my understanding of the interview situation: Mr. Natan is explaining to me who he is and why he does what he does. Just one act does not define a person, but because Mr. Natan chooses to tell me about this particular act, it signifies that this act is of importance. It is something I need to know about, in order to understand who he is.

Let us interpret this situation in terms of cultural theory. Individualistic solidarity is based on symmetric exchange, and because the driver did not know Mr. Natan, there were few possibilities for returning the favor later. Therefore, for the driver, paying cash would have closed the situation in a good way, according to the individualistic solidarity. However, Mr. Natan does not help because he wants to be paid; he helps because it feels right, because he wants to help. If he had accepted the money, the meaning of the situation would have changed for him. The point is not to create a debt for the driver, which Mr. Natan could then in some convenient situation collect. The driver is unknown, and there will probably be no more contact between them. Mr. Natan rejects the individualistic way of closing a transaction, and hence declares and defines who he is. However, he simultaneously rejects the driver's understanding of the situation. Instead of trying to sort out a common understanding, Mr. Natan chose to just run away. Only by running away could he maintain the asymmetry that is so important to him.

In hierarchical solidarity these unbalanced situations are preferable, because they help to define and keep up the social stratification. This man deserves help because he is old. Moreover, by helping him, Mr. Natan can define himself as the helper. However, in this case, the situation is characterized by ambiguity and the actors' inadequate knowledge of each other. Hence Mr. Natan's rather undignified running away—what else could he do?

Can this transaction be interpreted in terms of the other two forms of solidarity? If it is a situation characterized by egalitarian solidarity, one could see this as a case of in-group altruism extended to a stranger. It becomes a way for Mr. Natan to establish himself as part of the whole society, and abolish whatever ethnic or racial boundaries exist. Following the same logic, perhaps the old man was angry, because he did not want to be included in the same group with Mr. Natan. Paying would have allowed the old man to maintain a distance.

The situation could also be interpreted in terms of fatalistic solidarity. Mr. Natan helped because he had the opportunity; without any attempts to use this situation to build social obligations. However, it does not seem likely that the old man would have protested if he was relying on the fatalistic solidarity.

These four interpretations show how one situation, by itself, can be given several possible interpretations. There is no one definite answer. One act can have different meanings to different participants and different observers. Nor is there any a priori reason to assume that Mr. Natan and the driver agree on the interpretation of the situation. Actually, it is rather likely that the tension between them (especially the closure-by-running-away) is caused by their lack of agreement upon what this situation is about.

The above example, of Mr. Natan running away, which clearly does not constitute an institution, shows how the interpretation of a single act is often left open. We need more information about the participants before we can choose one interpretation.[149]

Mr. Natan believes that Tamils are not that good at running businesses—at least not compared with Muslims—based on examples from Sri Lanka, London, and Norway (Natan 2002:00:36). That does not bother him, however, because he sees running a business as something that would not really fit with his identity and the social relations he wants to uphold:

> Mr: In the same time, you are thinking, I am not this person. I told previously, I want to help. But, for example, if I am running a shop, and you come shopping, but you have no money:
> — I can come and pay tomorrow.
> — Sure, just serve yourself. No problem, you are back tomorrow.
> But, if I say
> — No, put it back. Get out of here ((in a harsh voice)).
> That kind of person can survive. They become rich. But I, for my part, say
> — Go ahead, just come back tomorrow. If you will not pay, I will not ask you. That kind of person I am. I do not want to put pressure on you.
> (Natan 2002:00:40)

In this case, the preferred form of social relations outweighs market economics. Mr. Natan is not a businessperson; he is a helper. Moreover, he would sacrifice the success of his business in order to uphold his preferred type of social relations.

Mr. Natan has an extensive social network that can be utilized to help others. He is the trusted man who helps others to overcome their lack of cash by providing security for transactions.

> EO: What about people in the city? You probably know lots of people through the congregation?
>
> Mr: = Oh Yes, Oh Yes. I can go out without any money and shop in town. Nobody would ask me for money. #### I know bookshop, pharmacy, record- and instrument shops and others. If you say my name, you will understand. I tell you—just say my name, and you can get it without money.

[149] Cultural theory is better in explaining behavioral patterns than single acts. It is a theory of institutions, not people's intentions.

> I have helped many Tamils, too, because they did not have money right away. So, they get credit. I help them, because they need a trusted person to provide security. So, that if they do not pay, the shop will come to me. I guess I have helped around fifteen to twenty. (Natan 2002:0057)

Even if the helping seems to be a gift without any expectation of return, there is an element of "pay-off" in the sense that the acquired goodwill among friends helps to build up the community and the Tamil organizations (Natan 2002:01:52). The asymmetry, you could say, generates enforceable trust.[150]

Therefore, even if the first example by itself is difficult to interpret, the additional examples steadily increase the likelihood that his definition of himself as a helper is based on the hierarchical solidarity. In addition, he is distancing himself from the individualistic solidarity.

Respect is Eroding

Respect is an important issue for Mr. Natan: during the second interview he invoked the concept twelve times, whereas equality was not mentioned at all.[151]

Respect (like dignity) is present in all ways of organizing; it just has different flavors. In individualism, respect is connected to abilities and achievements, and people are likely to get a second chance, since failing is part of the game: one who never fails, is not trying hard enough.[152] In hierarchy, respect is connected to the social roles and positions, that is one loses respect for not living up to one's role. In an enclave respect is earned and is more like a personal trait. Where in hierarchy the leaders demand respect for their positions, in enclaves people are leaders because they are respected.[153] In enclaves respect is connected to being a righteous and consistent person[154] as the "unity of the world" makes it difficult to sustain a lifestyle where the person does not appear as consistent across all areas of life.

Mr. Natan tells how, when he came to Norway, people still respected the elderly and gave them a place in a queue or a seat on the bus. He thinks that today there is not enough respect for the elderly. Today's youngsters will not even give a bus seat to an old lady with a cane in her shaking hands (Natan 2004:00:30). This is offensive in a hierarchy in several ways. First, it is disrespectful toward this

[150] Enforcable trust is one of several types of social capital (Portes 1995:Figure 1.3.).

[151] Tamil organization coordinator (Natan 2002:00:12), In Hindu congregation and elections (Natan 2002:01:11), Children at school (Natan 2002:01:13) , Possible asylum institution (Natan 2002:00:52), Majority population respects Tamils (Natan 2002:01:27), Mr. Natan takes care of how he behaves at parties so that people cannot come the next day and say that he was a foolish drunk the night before (Natan 2002:01:32).

[152] Extreme individualists in California like the following proverb: "If you're not living on the edge, then you're taking up too much space."

[153] The hierarchical leadership resembles Weber's traditional and legal leadership, while the egalitarian leadership resembles Weber's charismatic leadership (Weber 1990).

[154] Chong has analyzed leaders in civil rights movements, and shown how the pressure to be the person one claims to be is stronger than threats of violence or imprisonment (Chong 1991).

particular old woman, because she is old and should be respected for this. Second, because this person deserves help (as old age is not caused by deviant behavior); it is a breach of the hierarchical helping codex. Third, the behavior is signaling that "I am just as worthy of this seat as this old lady," which is a rejection of the hierarchical ideas of stratification and rank.

Politics and the Welfare State

Mr. Natan is politically highly aware and has enough knowledge of Norwegian politics to be involved in many different issues. Because of his position in the community and his contacts, he gets involved in issues concerning applications for asylum, student loans and the like.

Citizenship Makes Traveling Easy

Mr. Natan got his Norwegian citizenship fifteen years after he moved to Norway for the following reasons:

> Mr: #### it is easier to get into the society. Easy to travel in and out of the country, because of visa and stuff. ### and ### For example, if we get in trouble abroad: If we have a Norwegian passport we will get help from the embassy right away. (Natan 2004:00:02)

Mr. Natan's reasons are mainly connected to the ease it facilitates when traveling. One should also note that he trusts that the Norwegian state will help him "right away," which fits well to the hierarchical predictions about trusting institutions.

Participation in Majority vs. Minority Organizations

Mr. Natan is active in several Tamil organizations, whereas he did not mention participation in any majority organizations. The Tamil organizations are community organizations, which provide children with linguistic and cultural tutoring and adults with cultural and religious practices. In terms of state- and nation-building, all of these organizations can be used to create an ethnic identity for the Tamil minority in Norway.

Voting is a Duty

Mr. Natan votes because it is his duty, and voting is very important for him (Natan 2004:00:06), just as one would expect of a hierarchical household. Voting is part of being citizen, and being a citizen you have to do what is required of a citizen.

However, there is one story that does not fit the hierarchical predictions. Mr. Natan thinks that people should be more involved in politics and not let politicians decide so much.

Mr: Today politicians decide everything. People no not make decicions. Politicians decide, and people just pay. That's right, we do not react. In many cases, I have noticed, people do not react. When politicians make decisions, they just accept, accept, without asking why. There is very little resistance. Politicians do lots of good things, but sometimes bad things, too, but regular people they do not ask. (Natan 2004:00:12)

This story displays a preference for more participation, which could be interpreted as support for the egalitarian type of participatory democracy. It does not fit the hierarchical idea of *they should decide what we should do.*

Mr. Natan used to be a Labor Party voter, which fits well with his hierarchical preferences. However, when the Labor Party changed their economic policies during the 1990s Mr. Natan changed to the Socialist Left Party. I was surprised because my previous research showed that support for hierarchy is one of the best indicators for not choosing the Socialist Left Party, while support for hierarchy is common among voters of the Labor Party, Conservative Party and the Christian Democratic Party (Olli 1999). The Socialist Left Party displays an anti-business sentiment and explicit caring for the weak groups, which can at least partially explain Mr. Natan's party preference. However, there are many reasons for choosing a party that we did not discuss. Voting for the same party in every election shows loyalty.

UDI is not Accountable Enough

The only state institution Mr. Natan has a negative relation to is UDI:

EO: What about UDI?

Mr: UDI?

EO: Yes.

Mr: = Well. ##### I do not know. UDI, I hate UDI. ((laughs)) It is that simple. They do not work swiftly. And they only make trouble. However, I do agree that many people decive UDI, too, don't they? I think so. Nevertheless many cases are very clear, but they take lots of time. (Natan 2002:01:53)

Mr. Natan seems to be a bit uncertain about what to say, and takes a small pause before he expresses his negative feelings. He modifies his critique of "Norway," by showing how migrants themselves share some of the blame. However, he thinks that UDI should be better in discerning between the easy and complicated cases.

Mr. Natan gives an example: It took two years to get a new work permit for a priest, who already was working in Norway. Mr. Natan understands that asylum cases take a long time to process, but he thinks that for a simple work permit, two years is too long.

On the surface this sounds a bit like a critique of systems, which is expected of egalitarian, but not of hierarchical, households. However, Mr. Natan directs the blame on people who do not fulfill their roles within the system in a satisfactory manner:

> Mr: There are many [state officials] who do not know the system. What one permits, another one does not, right? There is difference between people, in treatment. (Natan 2002:01:56)

Mr. Natan's choice of "problem" is as expected of a hierarchical household, as justice in the hierarchical way of organizing is primarily procedural justice, which becomes visible in how the state officals treat people in a consistent manner according to the rules. Both individualistic and egalitarian cultural bias would look at this inconsistency in treatment as positive, however, for different reasons. Individualism would emphasize the efficiency and flexibility, whereas egalitarianism would emphasize the importance of taking humane considerations.

School Uniforms

Mr. Natan thinks that the Norwegian schools are good, because they do not push the pupils too hard; pupils are supported, instead of made to compete too much. However, he thinks pupils and university students should wear school uniforms, in order for them to be distinguishable, so that one then knows how to treat them (Natan 2002:01:42).

Emphasizing less competition is to reject the individualistic bias, but could go with both the egalitarian and hierarchical way of life. His support for the school uniform seems to be a hierarchical trait, especially because it is connected to displaying social roles and positions. Had he argued that uniforms create equality among pupils, who presently are under difficult pressure to purchase expensive clothing, it would have been an egalitarian argument.

Human Nature is Weak

Cultural theory predicts that hierarchical households view human nature as weak, which is a reason for having strong institutions. Mr. Natan tells a story of Norwegian households and children, which confirms his hierarchical position.

> Mr: Children go to school in Norway. This child wants to go home after school, when it is two or three o'clock. But he is standing there outside the school and thinking:
> — if I go home father or mother will not be there. They are not at home. The first one will come home at seven, and the last one at ten o'clock.
> So the child is hanging out on the streets, meeting friends. That becomes his life: if he meets good friends, he will become good. If he meets other kind of friends his life will be ruined. This policy is much better in Asian countries. When the school is over children start running home, because mother is waiting for them at home with food. Here, the

> mother is working, because both mother and father have to work, to make ends meet. (Natan 2004:00:26)

There are several hierarchical traits present. The future of the child is ruined if there is not enough institutional support, so that bad friends can have influence instead. It is good for the children and the society to have mothers at home tending the family. In addition, it is possible to see this as a critique of an individualistic household, where the parents have their own lives and arrive home whenever it suits them. Similarly, he is identifying economic pressure as the cause of the eroding family.

You Can Trust Institutions

When I inquired about what Mr. Natan thinks of a society where everybody competes with everybody, where they do not help one another, he replied with the following story:

> Mr: Yes, helping each other, that is something else. For example, I experienced three days ago, in front of the bus station (…)
> My car stopped in the the middle of the road, and I am standing there with the lights blinking. People just drive by, without stopping to check what it is, if I need help or not. They just do nothing. They are thinking:
> — It is not my job.
> They do not have this kind of caring, to come out and help. Or they do not understand how much a person standing there is stressing, because they have not experienced it themselves.
> Luckily a policecar came and stopped.
> — Do you need some help, he asked.
> — Please, I could use a push.
> Then he pushed the car. It started right a way. I said,
> — Thanks a lot
> He said,
> — my pleasure [in English]
> because he thought I could not speak Norwegian.
> That is great. It is one way to do it. But regular people, they do not think.
> (Natan 2004:00:23)

In this story there are several interesting features. Mr. Natan is critical of the low level of accountability among most people, as they neither respond to the situation based on a role (it is not my job) nor with caring. Mr. Natan is thus listing here the typical justifications used in hierarchy and in egalitarianism. Moreover, he recognizes that, regrettably, most people do not live by these justifications. Luckily, and as expected in a hierarchical story, the rescue comes from a police officer, a representative of an institution. Institutions are what you can still trust!

A Global look at the World

When I inquired as to whether Mr. Natan has problematic or conflictual relations to other people, my mind was on the people close to their household, while his response was linked to Sri Lanka. It is sometimes difficult to remember that many migrants come from countries that have seen war, and where "conflict" has more bloody and serious connotations than in peaceful Norway:

> Mr: Do you mean in Sri Lanka: we have a conflict, a war, you know. But otherwise, for example here in town, sometimes there are conflicts, battles for power. Right? ### In an association, or such, they say nothing, but talk behind your back. At the same time, if they come and want power, or positions, they won't work, they just complain. It is propably like that everywhere, and... (Natan 2002:01:07).

One should notice that Mr. Natan is not making these conflicts in organizations personal, as they are connected to power plays within the organizations. He continues with a detailed description of one example, where he emphasizes his willingness to step down and leave his position despite the negative consequences it would have. He was trying to give the opposing fraction an opportunity to save face, through testing the mood in the crowd. Nevertheless, the opposition insisted the matter be vited on, which lead to a strong show of support for Mr. Natan. Again, we can see hierarchical traits emphasized: avoiding competition and saving face.

Social Welfare Office is Not for Me

Mr. Natan thinks that the Tamils do not prefer to be dependent on the state, but when they have problems with residency permits or asylum rights, they sometimes have no choice (Natan 2001:00:48). When I inquired specifically about the social welfare office, Mr. Natan's response was loaded with values:

> Mr: Social welfare office I have no experience of, not at all. I am sorry, but I have no knowledge. I just know how it functions, and all that.
> Personally, I do not need any social support.
> — If I do not work I get welfare money.
> No, none of that. (Natan 2002:01:56)

His response is defensive: he is making sure that I do not mix him with the people who do receive social support, which is very similar to Mr. Nguyen's response. For both of these hierarchical households the most important thing about the social welfare office is that they do not want to be seen as welfare recipients, who are seen as low on accountability and rank. In a hierarchy roles are important: being a welfare recipient does not fit with their own ideas of who they are and how they should be treated by others.

Welfare State and Abiding the Law

Mr. Natan is critical of the welfare state, or more precisely, the lack of it. The first part of his critique is connected to how people relate to the state: people complain because things like cars are so expensive, because of taxes; simulaneously, people are good at giving money, but they do not know why they give. Thus, there is something lacking in people's attitude, which is a typical hierarchical critique. The second part of his critique is connected to the lack of performance by the state: there are people who are struggling economically; and there are people dying while waiting in a queue for an operation (Natan 2002:01:59). This can be interpreted as based either on the egalitarian or the hierarchical view of the state, which has a responsibility for citizens' well being. Even if hierarchy is usually supportive of systems, it cannot be blind to all shortcomings.

However, there is one area where Mr. Natan thinks that the state is doing too much:

> Mr: Yes, at the asylums. The state does not need to take care of the asylum-seekers in asylums, and give them food and money. Send them straight to work, let them earn money and make their own living, just like they do in England. When people sit many years in asylums, they become angry and tired of each other. (Natan 2004:00:19)

Not all institutions are good. Asylums make people into something less than what they really are, and living many years in an asylum does affect one. This is where Mr. Natan draws the line for the public influence. Giving asylum seekers the freedom and responsibility for their own well-being does seem like an individualistic solution to too much hierarchy. However, it is possible to see this in hierarchical terms as the state casting the asylum-seekers into a role that does not fit them.

Because of his role in the community Mr. Natan has had significant contact with the migration branch of the police, however, never with the criminal police (Natan 2002:01:48).

Even if Mr. Natan helps migrants with their applications, he makes it clear to me that he has refused to help people get into Norway:

> Mr: But I could not help, because it is very difficult nowadays. I cannot take alternative routes. I want it right, because I do not want to destroy the respect. It is very important. (Natan 2002:00:53)

Mr. Natan is concerned about abiding the law and maintaining respect. However, his statement is ambiguous, and I am not certain whether the respect refers to the respect for the law or to the respect the majority population has for the Tamil minority.

Integration Requires Equality on Several Fields

The following statement by Mr. Natan is loaded with typical hierarchical concerns: balance, rank, and place in society:

> Mr: [Tamils are working at] Gilde, a meat factory, and cleaning for cleaning companies. So, they always go for it and work hard. They want to work more. Right? So that they will be equal. When you are talking about integration, one needs a balance with people you are living with. If you are rich, there is no balance between you and me, but then there is no integration. So, you need a balance with the neighbors. He must consider me to be on the level he expects, right. Thus, those who are going for it, they get a place in the society they live in. (Natan 2001:00:49)

Mr. Natan has a clear view of what is needed for a successful integration into Norwegian society: First, integration requires a balance with the people you live with. Second, integration is measured through contact with neighbors. Third, the majority population is the judge of the Tamil's success. Fourth, the Tamils have succeeded as well as they have because they work hard.

Compulsory Norwegian Education for Migrants

Mr. Natan realizes that in the dominant political discourse the Progress Party (Frp) is understood to use negative attitudes against migrants as a strategy for gaining popularity.

> Mr: (…) I have a bit mixed feelings about Frp. Sometimes they have issues that I totally agree with them. Oh, yes—totally agree with them. I cannot just say that they are againts migrants and such, because they have some good issues. For example, they say that all migrants should be forced to participate in Norwegian education. That is very positive, isn't it? Many who come, just sit and make money, and they watch movies and TV, and that is the way they live. They have no contact with Norwegians or like. That is bad, isn't it? They just sit there, and think about money. That is not OK (Natan 2002:01:34) .

One should notice how he is criticizing Frp very indirectly (mixed feelings), and how this is even modified by his showing how on one migrant related issue he actually "totally agrees" with Frp.

Being judgmental about migrants who isolate themselves and live off social welfare signals that Mr. Natan is very well integrated.[155] Mr. Natan's opinion about forcing migrants to participate in Norwegian education is as expected, for the hierarchical way of organizing typically blames deviant individuals, and finds it reasonable to use institutions to transform people. Individualistic cultural bias would reject this as nonsense, as people are robust to change, and will just follow their own self-

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[155] It can also be seen as a response to the anti-migrant sentiments. By displaying this critical attitude, he is taking the majority populations side on this issue.

interest. The expected individualistic response would be to remove the benefits that make it possible for people to sit home and watch TV, as it is in people's own best interest to be forced out into real life, where they need to take responsibility for themselves.

Trust in Politicians

Mr. Natan trusts Norwegian politicians in general, much more than politicians back in Sri Lanka, where politicians just take care of their own families, and "if one gets elected to an office, one becomes rich, multimillionaire, right? All of them!" (Natan 2002:01:38).

This kind of anti-establishment attitude is common to the egalitarian solidarity. It defines the group as different from the establishment, which helps to sustain internal cohesion in the group. However, hierarchical households can also show anti-establishment values, especially if the elites are misbehaving, according to the hierarchical standards, and hence unworthy of their positions and undeserving of respect by the people, which seems to be the point in Mr. Natan's critique. Individualistic households can also be anti-establishment, but not on the grounds of elites becoming rich, as it is rather expected of the elites.

A Summary Compared with the Predictions

Both the household's internal organization and their social relations support an interpretation of the household as one that relies on the hierarchical way of organizing in many situations. The Natan household has many hierarchical characteristics. One of the central aspects in a hierarchy is the lack of competition, which is replaced by a different type of social order. Mr. Natan is very concerned with how he is portrayed (H). He emphasizes the stories that portray him as the helper (H), and prefers social bonds over market relations (i). He dislikes the idea of being presented as somebody important or central, as he wants to be portrayed as a regular person. Nor is he interested in me elaborating the positions he has hold (H). He does not accept being portrayed as a receiver of social welfare (H). All of these fit well with rejecting competition as a means for success, and with knowing one's place within the social order. Modesty is a tasteful way to downplay achievements in a hierarchical way of life. Even if the general division of labor is gender-based (H), they use skill-based justifications for it (I). There is also something egalitarian about trying to avoid celebrating birthdays (E). In sum, in the Natan household, there is a clear hierarchical way of organizing, with a small egalitarian component, while the pro- and anti-individualistic traits balance each other out.

How well do the Natan household's political views and preferences fit with the predictions made about hierarchical households (on pages 78-91)? Mr. Natan fits relatively well the predictions given about hierarchical views concerning politics and society: human nature is weak but can be saved by institutions (H); preference for school uniforms and supporting compulsory language education (H); rejecting competition (i); trusting institutions more than people (H); accusing institutions of a lack of accountability (H); integration being finding the right balance with your neighbors (H); fear of being seen as a welfare recipient, and concern about the erosion of respect (H). However, there were two topics that do not fit with the hierarchical predictions: Mr. Natan's emphasis on people's lack of participation in politics is closer to the egalitarian predictions about the nature of the democratic game (E); also, his anti-establishment attitude seems more egalitarian than hierarchical (E); while letting asylum seekers work and earn their own living fits better with the individualistic predictions (I). Despite these three non-hierarchical preferences, the overall image fits the hierarchical predictions.

After these two households with many hierarchical traits—the Nguyens from Vietnam and the Natan household from Sri Lanka—it is time to look at households that are lower on the grid and use egalitarian solidarity in many situations. I have chosen to include two households with egalitarian backgrounds, both from Chile. The Gracias are social organizers with regular jobs, whereas the Herreras are entrepreneurs.

The Garcias: Equality as a Solution

The Garcia household is an example of a household that uses egalitarian solidarity in many situations. However, each family member is allowed a large degree of freedom, so it is a rather moderate case.

Short Summary—Community Organizers in a Creative Chaos

Mr. and Mrs. Garcia are from Chile. He had a good high-tech job, she worked as an organizer and educator, traveling around. At the end of 1980s they moved closer to his father, who was then sick, but it became clear very soon, given the political and economic situation in Chile, that they would be forced to leave. Mrs. Garcia and their two children received refugee status in Norway, and a few months later, Mr. Garcia was able to follow. As a part of their Norwegian studies they both got themselves a trade, she in healthcare, and he in construction. She currently has a steady job, and is happy in it. He spent several years working in the food industry in a poorly paid job. Later he moved into construction, but after an accident, he is partially disabled. They have been living in their own four-room apartment in a green suburb since the beginning of the 1990s.

Household's Internal Life

During my first visit to the Garcias I was thrown into the middle of a Latino household that buzzed with life and with a "creative chaos." Where the Nguyen household's home was orderly and everything in its place, here activities, and not appearances, seemed to be the focus point.

The layout of the apartment was relatively open, with no doors between the kitchen and the living room. I was shown every corner of the apartment,[156] thus they were not using the apartment to create boundaries between themselves and their guests.[157] The apartment was filled with small memorabilia: one could follow the household's life over years by looking at items on the walls and shelves. Each one had a little story of the family life connected to it. However, the items provided meaning only after the stories were told. As such the display was mainly for the family, not for outsiders. This points toward a form of nostalgic attitude considered an indicator of egalitarian bias (Caulkins and Weiner 1998:28).

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[156] The parent's bedroom was next to the living room, and they even left the parent's bedroom door open the whole time I was there.

[157] Their teenage children, however, were more private, and made sure to keep the doors to their bedrooms closed.

Everybody Does Household Chores

Household work is divided amongst all of them, and the children are responsible for their own rooms. Mrs. Garcia says that her husband is capable of taking care of all types of housework, which emphasizes equality in egalitarian terms; everyone shares every task. In the Garcia household, who does what varies on a daily basis. It seems that the main principle in practice is the availability of time: whoever has the chance to cook dinner does it (Garcia 2002:01:45). For the egalitarian way of organizing, the ultimate equality in the division of labor is that everyone does every task according to their capacity. The Garcias have designed their everyday life close to this, if one would only listen to their justifications.

Closer scrutiny shows that they do divide tasks between them. When it comes to household economy, Mrs. Garcia is responsibile for overall planning and for the apartment, whereas Mr. Garcia is responsibile for the car. He saves money by reading the advertisements carefully and having an overview of the prices in many stores. Because he now has extra time, he can drive from store to store and shop for the best prices. She says that they have been poor, especially after they moved out of Chile. Because they had to leave everything behind them, and start empty-handed, they were "thinking like the poor" (Garcia 2002:01:57).

Mrs. Garcia tells a story of how her husband sometimes behaves as if the money was burning a hole in his pocket, in other words his control slips sometimes:

> Mrs: (…) There are no big problems with money. We have a little bit of problem with him getting back with five or six types of fruit, when he was only supposed to get four (…) (Garcia 2002:01:55).

This quote reinforces my impression of the needs being actively managed, because she is blaming him for not being able to limit his shopping to their defined "needs." Having four different types of fruits is good for the household, but more than that is extravagant and something that they cannot afford to do. The point is that there are boundaries, which he sometimes oversteps.

The Garcia's economic management strategy focuses on keeping the expenses down and on setting limits on their needs. This behavior is supportive of the egalitarian way of organizing.

Equality as a Solution

Equality is a central issue for the Garcias. They pass numerous judgments and provide multiple justifications that establish equality as the most important guideline for creating a good life. They emphasize several times that their concern with equality is not anything they have learned in Norway, but something they have brought with them from Chile. This makes me suspect that they have met Norwegians who assume that migrants are not concerned with equality. They take pride in this issue, and want to be sure that I understand that it is *their* issue: their contribution to Norwegian society.

Equality is presented in several ways in relation to the life of this household. Mrs. Garcia explains how her mother was always "under" her father, whereas she and her sister both have jobs and are much more independent (Garcia 2001). There is a clear shift in the gender roles from generation to generation, and Mrs. Garcia and her sister have managed to fulfill her norm of equal standing between the genders.

This brand of equality is not just equality of inherent worth, but also equality of contribution to the household's resources. The women should be strong and independent: able to take care of herself and the children, in case the man cannot (Garcia 2001:00:45 and 00:40).

She emphasizes that she wants to make her own decisions, which could as well have been an individualistic preference. However, her stories about men, women, and work, viewed together, are arguments against a hierarchical division of labor drawn from an egalitarian point of view.

Mr. Garcia never showed any resentment that he was in Norway working below his previous experience: Before moving to Norway, he worked in a high-tech company, whereas in Norway he has worked in a factory and as a construction worker. Nevertheless, he seemed happy to work in construction. The social status connected to work does not seem to be an issue, which could be a sign of egalitarian bias, as the group's internal well-being is considered more important than external status.

To summarize, the Garcias are proud of their consistent emphasis on equality and the ways they have been able to create a household where this equality is manifested in the daily practices.

A Loose Interview Setting:

The interview itself can also be analyzed as in indicator for their preferred way of organizing. The previous observations are confirmed as the whole interview was structured loosely. In the first interview, which was mainly conducted with Mrs. Garcia, Mr. Garcia was several times in and out of the interview, without any explanations—it just happened. In the second interview, their teenaged children were present and participated actively. They were not just children; they were members of the family life, who were treated more as equals by their parents than by me, who was trying to keep the parents talking.

There was often no immediate message on the surface, as she talks in circles and presents examples rather than clear answers to my questions. Sometimes it was difficult to understand where she was heading. However, looking at the transcript of the interview, I can see each story as an example with a point. It appears that she is trying to give me a more direct access to her experiences. It is impossible to say if this is the result of a communicative preference or a technique to compensate for using a foreign language, or else a reflection of the egalitarian bias, which commonly trusts personal experience more than abstract knowledge. Nevertheless, this style fits well with their egalitarian way of organizing.

The Garcias share the telling of the story—observe what the quotes on pages 181 and 158 look like. They both know where they are heading, but do not allow the other one to tell alone, or perhaps they are helping each other with the language. Nevertheless, it results in a moderately chaotic discussion, which indicates a low grid. A hierarchical household would not like to present itself in this way to the outside world.

Social Relations in the Society

The Garcias have a high number of friends and acquaintances. They have extensive social contact with neighbors and friends, and a Chilean group in the Catholic Church acts as an especially important arena for social contact. They list eighteen people with Chilean background (some of which actually represent a whole family), one from Sri Lanka, and five from the majority population. They have little contact with people living outside the town, with the exception of Mrs. Garcia's sister and their four friends back in Latin America. Their connection back to Chile is alive, and one of the positive sides of living in Norway is that now she can help her mother financially. Mr. Garcia does have kin, a sister, in town, while Mrs. Garcia has no relatives in Norway.

Friendship is important to them: they have very close friends to whom they are devoted:

Mr: (…) For example, I have few friends in town. I do not have many, but I have the best ones!

Mrs: Best friends.

Mr: The best ones. I have the four best ones (…) I would do whatever they need from me. I know for sure that they would do the same for me.

EO: You said that you have four very good friends, but are they also friends with each other?

Mrs: Yes.

Mr: = Yes. I can see that I do various things for them, but I know they do the same, too.

Mrs: It all comes back.

Mr: = No, it does not come back, but lets say that we have a problem, immediately they would help me. And when a friend has a problem I would call at once and ask, "No problem, what do you need, where do you want me to pick you up? No problem."

Mrs: No that is great. Sometimes it is it just like a family. (Garcia 2002:01:35)

This, together with other examples they provide, makes it clear that they go quite far in helping each other, and the logic seems to follow the egalitarian solidarity, as they do not make "contracts," but trust that everyone will do their share. As Mr. Garcia points out above, it is not about "everything coming back," but about being able to count upon the other's help when needed.

This group of friends shares many kinds of activities and help, everything from cooking food to spending the night at the emergency room with a friend's sick child (Garcia 2002:01:37). In addition, they get involved with more intimate family issues, like giving advice concerning one of the daughter's boyfriend's character (Garcia 2002:01:31). I wish I had asked them what the friends do not get involved in, as they seem to be present in most areas of their lives.

Neighbors are also important, and two of them function practically as extended family for the children, who can go over to the neighbor's when the parents are not home. The setup is loose, and the children eat wherever they happen to be. One of these close neighbors belongs to the group of Mr. Garcia's four best friends, while the second neighbor is a woman from Chile.

Their social relations are mainly with Chileans: all of their best friends are Chilean; the people they have close and multiple relations with all seem to be Chileans. However, they do have contact with the majority population and migrants from other parts of the world, as neighbors. Actually, the majority of the listed neighbors they have regular contact with are non-Chileans, but there seems to be a qualitative difference between these "normal" neighbors and the Chilean neighbors, many of whom they also know through church activities.

They are concerned with the boundary between important and unimportant people. There is pressure for more social contact than they feel they are able to keep up with, so they are by no means isolated as migrants. Mrs. Garcia claims that she cannot remember the names of all these people, which could indicate an ego-focused network, where I would expect to find so many people that it could become difficult to keep track of them. However, it seems better understood as an egalitarian household trying to set up some boundaries in a rich social space:

EO: If you do not remember their names, they are probably not that important.

Mrs: No, but you know what, we know many people. And people come and talk about so private things that it does not interest me, but they still come and talk. [Talks about the church group, which is very important for them] Other people who know us come, too. They might invite us home, but that becomes like a compromise. We cannot cover their need for friends, because of lack of time: Perhaps we talk on phone; we have our jobs; and the Catholic Church; and we are parents. Otherwise, we would just go around and around.

EO: You cannot be friends with everybody.

Mrs: Oh no, I cannot visit everybody. On Monday, my colleague,—a friend—will be operated. I must go, because I am her best friend. (…) She is at a hospital. I have to go. (Garcia 2002:00:41)

They are very close to the people they consider friends. He worked for the same company for fourteen years in Latin America and still keeps in touch with three of his colleagues, notwithstanding his having lived this long in Norway.

Despite that they know different people through their work and children's activities (it is he who takes their son to the sports activities), all of their friends are common friends. When I inquire about this, Mrs. Garcia suggests a physical therapist who is only his friend, but he immediately refutes this and says it is a professional relationship and hence not a friend (Garcia 2002:00:45). Having only common friends shows that the household acts mainly as one unit (high-group), instead of a collection of individuals, each of whom have their own set of social relations.

Despite this contact with old friends, their social map is dominated by members of the congregation and neighbors: people with whom they can have weekly or even daily face-to-face contact. In fact, there is really no room for other people, and the rest of the chart depicting their social relations is glaringly empty.

Tight Organizational Bonds

They take part in several non-governmental organizations, which help people in Latin America. After explaining how an organization they are members of helped to build a chapel, they continue:[158]

Mr: = But it helps lots of different things, not just this…

Mrs: = Right, there are different zones, different...

Mr: = In Argentina. In southern Chile. In (Barbareiso), Santiago.

Mrs: = Also in North. Like that time with the chapel…

Mr: = They make parties…

Mrs: = in the city. [here in Norway]

Mr: = in the city. And we work for free through the whole night on that party. First, during the day with preparations and organizing, and then at the party we charge money, and make, for example 20-30 000 crowns, which we would send to different organizations. (Garcia 2002:01:15)

This organization now has their own Internet pages and gets many requests for help. They prefer to give help for self-help: to send help just once and then let the local people run and develop it further (Garcia 2002:01:22). This fits well with an egalitarian way of organizing, where distrust of institutions and experts leads to the preference for direct contact between people. In addition, if you are trying to emphasize the equality between the receiver and the helper, you cannot really take

[158] Notise how they share the telling the story.

charge of the projects and tell the receivers what they should do. Instead, an egalitarian way of giving aid often relies on empowerment as a strategy.

When I inquired whether this was a formal organization, with a leader and everything that entails, they answered:

> Mrs: We have a leader, something like
>
> Mr: = a coordinator.
>
> Mrs: = a coordinator. He does not like that we call him for a leader. Everybody have to take responsibility for something. So he says:
> — What shall we do? There is a party coming up. Who will arrange this?
> And everybody contributes. (…) So, it is very democratic in our group ((laughter)) (Garcia 2002:01:23).

As cultural theory expects from an egalitarian household, they view this flat structure as a democratic ideal. They prefer participation in this kind of organization, with a coordinator rather than a leader. However, this form of organization requires that everybody accept the obligations that participation puts upon them. Contrary to the other cultural biases, the egalitarian bias has difficulties in seeing the costs of participation as costs.

They meet these people from the Catholic Church often and in several types of activities: there is a study group, which discusses religion and relatively private issues connected to family life; there is the weekly Sunday mass; and there are the activities to help the needy in Latin America. One might easily be lead to think of this as a typical hierarchical setting, nevertheless, it seems egalitarian in the sense that there is no clear separation of functions: religious practice, mutual aid between families, social meetings, and aid to Latin America all seem to mix together in the Chilean church group, which thus becomes a solution to many kinds of needs and practices. The social relations within this group are multiplex, and not confined to a predefined set of relations.

There seems to be a high willingness to take part in group activities for morally worthy goals, like helping others. The receivers are not specifically selected for their past behavior or roles, which would have indicated a more hierarchical solidarity. Commonly, the receivers are collectives and regular people, which would be more typical for egalitarian solidarity.

Politics and the Welfare State

Personal Experiences

Like many other migrants the Garcias come from a state that has abused its powers and terrorized its population. Violence leaves marks that do not go away easily. For

Chileans September 11th is the date of the 1973 military coup, which put General Pinochet in charge of the state, and began an era of terror (Martínez and Díaz 1996).

Despite (or because of) their negative experiences with the Chilean state, the Garcias are positively inclined to the state in Norway. After they arrived in Norway, the refugee office (*Flyktningekontoret*) helped them a lot: with housing, Norwegian courses and so forth. In addition, for two years they lived in a municipally owned flat.

Surprised by the Caring Police

The Garcias have positive experiences with the local police. They told me three different stories. First, how one of their children is involved in Red Cross (Røde kors hjelpekorps) and has helped police search for missing persons (Garcia 2002:2:45). The second story also revolves around one of their children: the police gave a lecture at school, for the first grade about traffic safety and the dangers of IV-needles left in the local park by drug addicts (Garcia 2002:2:47). The third story involves the parents: They had locked their house keys in the car and needed help to get into their home and into their car. After the police solved the situation, they wanted to pay the police, and were surprised that it was neither expected nor possible. She emphasized that they were not expecting the police to take bribes, (which is common in Chile); nevertheless, they expected that the police as an institution would charge for helping people (Garcia 2002:2:56).

These types of stories about the police were typical for the Chilean households. Several households gave, enthusiastically, examples of their surprise when they experienced for first time that the police *cared* about people in Norway. They present the Norwegian police force as caring, non-corrupt, and trustworthy, in contrast to the Chilean police force.

Social Welfare Office is for Those Who Are Alone

When I query Mrs. Garcia about her relationship with the social welfare office, she begins by personally distancing herself from it: "I do not want to get involved with it" (Garcia 2002:02:19). She has a social network that she can rely upon if she needs support.

> EO: You have managed without. That is good, but
>
> Mrs: = Of course there are elderly people. I think about our culture. There are people who have to go there, because they came alone to Norway, and they did not manage to talk good Norwegian, and have no family. That is OK, of course. It is the last chance, when one has nothing else. It is good to have an office that can worry about people like that. And it is the same office that helps unmarried women, isn't it. (Garcia 2002:02:19)

Thus, Mrs. Garcia speaks positively regarding the social welfare office's existence, but does not want to be associated with it herself. In addition, she emphasizes the importance of the social welfare office, as a security net, when one has "nothing else." She is saying, implicitly, that social relations and families should carry the responsibility when possible. What is the point of being a member of a group if the group cannot take care of its own? The egalitarian bias takes pride in taking care of a group's members, just as the hierarchical bias does.

Blame the System

Blame is a good indicator of how people relate to institutions. The Garcias blame the system in general, that is, both private and public support systems. At one point Mr. Garcia had an accident, and in the aftermath everything seemed to go wrong: the hospital made mistakes; the insurance company did not want to pay enough during the early stages, when all the bills were coming; and now that he has started with work-training his income has been reduced by 40 percent compared to what he made while he was home sick (Garcia 2002:00:10). Mr. Garcia is unhappy about his present situation, because of the drop in income. He recognizes the lack of incentive to work: he made more money being "sick" than he is making in the work-training program; therefore, he thinks there is something wrong with the system.

I find this interesting, for they could just as well have chosen to emphasize the fact that he has had a long sick leave, during which time the public healthcare and social insurance systems have been important in sustaining the family. After many years in Norway their expectations have risen to a Norwegian level. Moreover, this egalitarian household, as predicted by cultural theory, is eager to blame the system.

Violence and the Non-Accountable Headmaster

The Garcias had their children in a public school, where one of their children was subjected to violence that was not properly dealt with by the school. Mrs. Garcia made personal contact with the headmaster, which did not induce the results the Garcias had expected. We can see how they, being resourceful, are addressing this problem at the level of systems. The problem was the school's poor response, not the individuals who used violence. Finally, they solved the problem by exiting the public school system and entering their children into a private catholic school (Garcia 2002:02:56-03:01).

Their response could have been quite different. With cultural theory it is possible to describe many alternatives, especially if one takes into account both the school's way of organizing and the Garcia household's way of organizing. First, the Garcias could have chosen a more hierarchical approach and blamed the deviant individuals (the violent kids), if the headmaster had been responsive. By being the person in charge, while not taking responsibility, the headmaster more or less made it impossible for the Garcias to use a hierarchical strategy. Basically the headmaster confirmed the egalitarians negative expectations of a hierarchical system. Second, the Garcias could have just accepted, fatalistically, that the world is an unjust place, where this kind of thing happens (as you do not expect the authorities to be responsible or just), and all you can do is absorb the blows when they come. Third, the Garcias could have chosen an individualistic approach, which bypasses the institutions (like teaching their children street survival skills).

Dreams that Reduce Fears

Mrs. Garcia tells me that her future is *here*, however, she will never forget the Spanish language. Old people turning senile tend to forget languages other than their native language. She gives an example of a Finnish woman who lost her second language (Norwegian) with senility, thus, today, the only way to communicate with this woman is in Finnish. Therefore, she would like to start a clinic or a retirement home, where both Spanish and Norwegian are used (Garcia 2001:01:55). This dream offers resolution to a fear: being a native Spanish speaker, Mrs. Garcia fears one day losing her ability to speak Norwegian and ending up in the care of a welfare state that does not speak Spanish. It also represents a change in the welfare state. The population changes and the welfare state should change too, in order to take care of its own.

Being risk averse is part of the egalitarian cultural bias, whereas seeing possibilities and underestimating the risks is part of the individualistic cultural bias. Had Mrs. Garcia used the individualistic cultural bias, she might have presented her dream in different words, as a business opportunity rather than a solution to a fear.

The Nationality Issue

Mrs. Garcia is concerned about the way the majority population treats her family as foreigners, especially her children.

> Mrs: Yes, do you know why? We are the foreign Norwegian people. We—
> me and him ((points to husband)). He is born here ((points to son)).
> Nevertheless, we are all foreigners. (Garcia 2002:02:07)

It sounds like she does not think that it is possible for them to become "Norwegian." On the other hand, she does not view this as preferable either, as she thinks that we all should be in solidarity with each other and help each other, but keep our own respective languages and cultures (Garcia 2002:02:18). It seems natural to her that since the population is now multilingual, the services for older people should become multilingual too.

They consider it important to keep Spanish as their language at home . One of the family members has been involved in a Spanish-speaking radio program (Garcia 2001:00:51). Mrs. Garcia has been involved in the Chilean community, organizing many events. The Garcias are involved in activities that help to sustain their identity as Chileans in exile, and hence reduce their need to become "Norwegian." They are part of a vivid Chilean community that provides them with all the social support and belonging they need.

Mrs. Garcia does not think that several cultures in one society creates problems, whereas there is a potential problem with letting previous terrorists into Norway (Garcia 2002:02:16).[159] Thus, the problem is not on the level of collectives, but instead with a system that is unable to exclude the individuals willing to use means that do not fit into an equality based society.

Leftist Party Politics and Same Rights for Everybody

Mrs. Garcia says straight out that they do not follow politics, however, in my view, she has clear opinions of political issues (Garcia 2002:02:01). They are not members of a party, and they alter their vote between several parties on the left of the political landscape (Garcia 2002:02:04). She shows a good knowledge of the different institutions and their functions. She follows politics on the news and is able to comment upon the cuts in the city budget:

> Mrs: = For example, I heard the seven o'clock news this morning. There is an economic problem, the city has to reduce its budget on care, kindergartens, everything, kindergartens, schools, everything. ((Whispers)). For the fosterkids it is the future. Moreover, the care of the elderly that is what we do: always at work, heavy work, but it is thanks to the elderly that the country is what it is. Now they want to cut it down again. I think that when they cut the budget: perhaps a patient will not get his wheelchair; perhaps one has to wait longer to get to the physical therapist; and perhaps the retired people, who can't cook themselves, will not get food delivered at the door; perhaps people in diapers will get only one daily visit by the auxilliary nurse. Of course, if I think about our country, it is not the same. But here we pay high taxes, which we do not do down there. (Garcia 2002:02:29)

She has very detailed ideas about the consequences of the budget cuts, because she works in health care and will meet some of these cuts firsthand in her work. She is presenting the consequences for people, rather than relying on what the experts are saying. This story also has a moral built in it: because the tax level is high, it is wrong to reduce the level of care; it is immoral for the community not to take care of its weakest. She also uses this story to explain to me differences between Chile and Norway.

Her knowledge and interest seems to be beyond what I would expect from an average Norwegian person who claims to be uninterested in politics. She also shows some political refinement in discussing principles rather than simply issues: for example, she dislikes Carl I. Hagen for lumping all migrants together.

[159] This interview was conducted three months after the World Trade Center bombing in New York, while terrorism was a major issue in Norwegian media.

Mrs. Garcia thinks that the most important political issue in Norway is getting the same rights for everybody living here (Garcia 2002:02:05). Given their successful egalitarian experiences and preferences, it should not come as a surprise that they believe that the rest of society could be organized according to the same egalitarian principles.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

There is a general pattern that fits the egalitarian way of organizing internally in the household and in their social relations: they emphasize that everyone shares the household tasks (E); they control their economy by keeping the expenses (and needs) down (E); they justify their household organization through equality, see economical gender equality as important (E), and critique the gender based division of power at their parents' homes (h); the interview setting was loose, the children were automatically included and both parents share the telling of the stories (E); the help given is shared among a tight group of friends or given to regular people (E); they emphasize how help is not about "all coming back" (i); and they are concerned with the boundaries for involvement and all their friends are family friends (E). The household's internal equality and flat structure is mirrored in their preference for organizing their social life. A large part of these tight multiple social bonds are built around ethnic organizations, which provide them with the resources they need.

There are many topics they did not touch upon in the interviews, but their political views and behavior fit consistently with the egalitarian predictions. Even if they do not say that they consider participation important in a democracy, their own behavior makes this very clear: The Garcias are "ethnic" community organizers; their public participation is oriented toward their own ethnic community through a number of organizations, where they have time-consuming positions (E). They view the flat structure as an ideal. They see equal rights for everyone as the most important political issue (E). They have a positive view of the state, and are willing to increase the scope of public involvement (E). She prefers a social network for social security but does find the social welfare office important for others (E). They are eager to blame the system (E). Even their being surprised by the caring police confirms their general distrust of institutions (E). The story of the headmaster not responding shows a critique of hierarchy (h).

The Garcias display some criticism of hierarchy and individualism combined with a strong support for egalitarianism in the household's internal organization and helping relations, while their political views show strong support for egalitarianism and some criticism of hierarchy. Thus, the Garcias as a case confirm the predictions made by cultural theory.

The Herreras: Entrepreneurship for the Whole Family

The Herrera household is an interesting case. They are a tight family that spends a lot of time together and relies on the egalitarian way of organizing in many situations. They have chosen to run their own business, which makes their resource management style very prominent in the interviews. I have chosen to include both the Garcias and the Herreras, despite that they both come from Chile and rely mainly on the egalitarian way of life, because it allows me to show how they differ, yet in many ways still resemble each other.

The first part of my presentation of the Herrera household is structured after concepts from cultural theory: the subchapters focus on social relations, behavioral patterns and cultural biases. This slightly different view follows cultural theory closer than the presentations of the other households. Nevertheless, the themes covered are the same—the difference lies in the order of discussion. The second part of the presentation, similar to the other presentations, deals with their views of the welfare state and politics.

A Quick Summary—a Tight Family that Works Together

The Herrera family owns and runs a family business, where four of the family members and some of their spouses work. They operated a similar firm back in Chile. They came to Norway at the end of 1980s as political refugees, because Mr. Herrera's participation in leftist politics forced them to flee. After arriving in Norway Mr. Herrera worked in a factory for many years before he started his own firm on the side. After some years his company was solid enough to provide a living and he could leave his factory job. Mrs. Herrera stayed at home and took care of their, and a few other families', children. A few years ago the firm diversified their production and expanded, allowing them to hire several family members.

The first interview was conducted with Mr. Herrera only, because the rest of the family was traveling. The second interview was conducted with the whole family, and gives a lively picture of the household's internal life.

Social Relations

In the beginning of every interview I ask: Can you just tell me a little bit about who you are? This prompts very different types of answers. Here is a slightly longer quote, which will give us a glimpse of one way to create an identity through social relations.

Mr: Yes ((laughs a little)). It is not easy, but I will try. I am man. I come from Chile.[160] I had a difficult situation in the 80s, and some friends, they helped us to come here. When I came here, I started to feel like a person. I started to feel I had my rights. People listened to me. Moreover, I met very kind people, Norwegian people. I am Catholic (), so I started there immediately I came to town. I helped to organize a group at the church. There my faith became very strong. I worked very hard with the church, and I met some families from downtown. My family came some months after me. I lived in a suburb, but when my family arrived, we moved to downtown. I thank my God for arriving to this particular place, and meeting this Norwegian family with Colombian children. They could talk a little Spanish with us. I went to school, but I did not learn anything until my family came, because I was very nervous and in a bad situation. (Herrera 2002a:00:03)

We can see how his self-presentation is actually a story about friends, family, and the church. He establishes himself as a person through a description of his social relations. The first thing he does in Norway is join the church; however, he is not complete, not able to perform well, until his family arrives.

The Herrera family's social relations are built around their company, the Catholic Church, and their home. Like many Chileans they go regularly to the Catholic Church, and this provides them with a network of friends and acquaintances. Like most family firms, this one also consumes all available time, and while I suggested that we could conduct the interviews at their home, they insisted that we do them at their firm, which is a place where the family members are together, and a location they use, not only for work, but also for socializing.

The second interview situation was informal and people, some unknown to me (but obviously very familiar with the Herreras), moved in and out during the interview. I had made my appointment with Mr. and Mrs. Herrera, but during the interview their daughter (indicated later by "D") and her husband and a friend of the family joined in. They all knew who I was and the purpose of my visit. In many ways this resembled the setting of the interview with the Garcia household (on page 180). The children are a part of the family and therefore have a "natural" right to be present and participate just like their parents.

The Herreras have multiple social relations with each other, as they are both family members and colleagues at the same time. When I asked them how they separate between family life and the company, the daughter in the family answered:

D: There is no difference ((everybody laughs)).
(…)
When we are here [at the company] all we siblings talk, and work, and then we have cigarette breaks; when we get home, we call each other to find out what to do today. It is actually the same. (Herrera 2002b:00:14)

[160] He is first a man, and only after that is he from Chile.

The family is a tight family, united both in their work and in leisure. The fact that they need to consult each other in order to find out what to do indicates Low-Grid-High-Group. In a high grid, many of the events they would participate in would not be "voluntary" in the same sense.

Even when there are events that could disrupt their tight social life, they manage to find a way to keep it going. When Mrs. Herrera and the Herreras married daughter went to Chile for a long holiday, to visit family, the daughter's husband moved into the Herrera's house, so that neither he nor Mr. Herrera needed to be "alone" while the women were traveling (Herrera 2002a:01:07).

Their first apartment in town was provided by the refugee office. These apartments are intended only as a temporary solution for refugees, and they are available only for a few years. The Herreras characterize these first years as a happy time, and they had a very good social network of neighbors, who later wrote a letter to the refugee office requesting an extension in the Herreras lease (Herrera 2002a:00:31). The Herreras were eventually able to buy their own apartment downtown, but did not manage to keep these old neighbors as friends, because they spent their time working or in church related activities.

Another indicator of the Herreras willingness to integrate into the community is how they, following advice from a friend, opted against putting their children in catholic school, because they believe that it is better, for the children's integration into the local community, to go to a school located in their own neighborhood (Herrera 2002a:01:10).

In the mid-90s they sold their apartment and bought a house in a suburb, where they now live, and have only limited contact with their present neighbors, which, according to them, is typical for this neighborhood (Herrera 2002a:00:35). It shines through that Mr. Herrera feels that becoming increasingly similar to Norwegians is not merely positive.

Even if nowadays they do not have lively contact with their neighbors, the new house has a very large living room, "in order to have parties" (Herrera 2002a:00:39). They have many friends who try to help each other as much as they can. An indicator of their number of friends is the moving-in party they had in which more than fifty guests crowded into their new living room (Herrera 2002b:00:41).

Behavior

Households Tasks

The Herreras divide the household work between all members of the household, without having fixed tasks or fixed times when the work should be done. They claim that it is difficult to explain how, but everything does get done in the end

(Herrera 2002b:00:25). This indicates a low grid within the household. On the other hand one of the daughters emphasizes that Mrs. Herrera likes to have control, and tells how things used to be:

> D: For us the difference is that there used to be kids in the house. There was lots of hubbub. Previously we had to clean the house every Saturday. In addition, I had to wash or vacuum during the week, too. Right? This way the house was not a mess. You could say that with children in the house you cannot have it the way you would like to have it. Where as now it is a pleasure to be at home, everything is on its place, and is clean and nice, and there is no washing of floors in the middle of the week.
>
> Mrs: No, that is not necessary. (Herrera 2002b:00:27)

So, there are some standards that need to be met, which were, previously, difficult to meet without having fixed days and fixed tasks, where as now, they can allow the housecleaning to “happen.” The women in the household tell me that Mr. Herrera is, little by little, doing much better with the household work, and the only thing that he does not really do is the cooking (Herrera 2002b:00:24). The household seems to prefer an egalitarian way of organizing, and Mr. Herrera’s increased participation in the household work is now changing their behavior towards that direction, too.

Management of Resources and Consumption

Three people own the family company jointly. The main motivation for starting the company was to take care of the family: to create good jobs for the family members and to create a chance for a good life. “If we work, we work for ourselves” (Herrera 2002a:00:49). The company does not make much money, so they would probably still be economically better off by working for others, but they hope that little by little it will get better.

The company’s internal life is informal and based on meetings where things are settled, and people have their fixed work tasks. Mrs. Herrera is the “boss,” but on paper, it is Mr., and not Mrs. Herrera, who is the owner. The reason given was practical—the bank was willing to give Mr. Herrera a loan because he had a job. Mrs. Herrera comments upon this:

> Mrs: It is my idea. It is much better that he can do it. It is the same for me. It does not mean anything. (Herrera 2002b:00:19)

The formalities are not important to her: The family or household is one unit, no matter who is listed as the owner on paper. Had this been a hierarchical household, the justification would probably have been more in terms of the right thing to do, instead of it not making any difference. Thus, the impression of a predominately egalitarian household is strengthened.

The company is still young, and they are not able to take full salary out, yet.

Mrs: Nobody has a fixed salary yet.
(…)

D: So, for example, if mother needs 2000, she will get 2000. If father needs 5000, he will get 5000. But everybody is trying to avoid taking the money, right? ((Laughter)) To be able to pay the bills, right? (Herrera 2002a:00:20)

There is a strong loyalty toward the family and the family company. People are investing their time and effort—large parts of their lives—into a collective endeavor that they hope one day will be a profitable and solid company, but it still requires them to keep their demands low and sacrifice consumption for awhile. One should also notice that justification for the amount of salary paid is based on need, not contribution, which points toward an egalitarian way of organizing.

Their behavior is justified by their belief that happiness is not dependent on material well-being. The daughter in the family describes poor people in Chile:

D: They manage because they laugh of their own tragedies. ## They are actually very happy people, even if they are poor. I saw that when I was in Chile. Poor people are the happiest people I have ever seen. More than anyone I have seen here in Norway. True, they have neither this nor that. So, down there a little means a lot, but here. (…) So, they are happy with what they have. (Herrera 2002b:01:13)

Small Is Good

There is only a thin boundary between the family economy and the company economy. Mr. Herrera prefers to earn only enough to pay for the house and a simple living, because if it looks to relatives like they have a lot of money, it will become a problem, and Mr. Herrera is tired of sending money to relatives back in Chile. Mr. Herrera's style of economic management is now focused on the expenses instead of income.

Mr: I am getting tired of trying to make lots of money. I do not believe in it. It is much better to manage well the money you have. Because you end up thinking too much: how to watch for [the people working for him. In the family company] there are no problems. We do not need to watch after the people here. That is why. (Herrera 2002a:00:51)

For the Herreras a small family company is preferable to a big company, which needs a lot of supervision, since the additional surplus does not motivate them (as the relatives would make claims for it). This is an example of how tight social bonds carry claims for resources, which can become a burden (see page 76). In contrast, the individualistic way of organizing limits the claims others can make without reciprocation, which makes it easier to run a business.

Social Support Created Money Problems

Now that Mr. Herrera is looking back he recognizes that they had problems with their household economy, because of the way they managed their money, and not due to any lack of money.

> Mr: Even if I had an old car, I had a small flat, and I still had never enough money. Later I bought a new house, a new car, and still had more money. And at that time, my mother was also alive, and I had to help her with everything, but still. ######## (Herrera 2002a:00:55)

Mr. Herrera claims that the "free money" they received after their arrival in Norway led them into a spiral of purchases on credit cards. They spent too much money and never had enough:

> EO: You said previously that it does not matter how much money you have, it is how you manage it. Do you think that you manage your money different now than you did 10 years ago?
>
> Mr: I take much more care now.
> Previously, yes, we just spend, spend, spend on credit, credit, and credit. It was a time when we had lots of things. We used on garden; money for spending; we had a video camera— Nothing luxurious. We used lots of money: my girls were small; we traveled a lot to Denmark and to Sweden. ((Talks Spanish to someone)).
> Luckily, when we sold our apartment, I paid around 70.000 [for our debts] at that time.
>
> EO: Did I understand you correctly: you sold the apartment and paid off the credit you had?
>
> Mr: Yes, fortunately, during a few months. But I had to choose; therefore, I learned to say <u>no</u>.
> And my Norwegian friend said:
> — <u>No</u>, Carlos, you have to...
> Because, I remember the first period, when I got money from the refugee office, it was 8000 and something, and I did nothing. Then I went to my friend (at that time) and complained to him:
> — Huff, I do not have enough money.
> — How much do you get?
> — 8000.
> He said:
> — You, know what. I work the whole month and make 8000.
> #
> There was something wrong, wrong. But he understood, too. You know, I could not work then, because I had to go to school.
> #
> I said,
> — No, I have to work.
> — No, he says, I am sorry but you have to wait...
> — No, but I do not have enough money, only 8000.
> We were sending money to my father and to her mother, but still.

> But he said:
> — I earn, I work the whole month. ((Moans))
> While I got 8000 for free and slept well, too. That is how it was. Yes.
> ########### (Herrera 2002a:00:56-01:00)

It is unclear why this support from the refugee office should lead to extensive spending, but it is possible that it distorts realism in household management. Perhaps the phrase "easy come, easy go," describes the process that lead to their phase of mostly unsuccessful spending. Especially during an establishment phase, in a comparatively rich country, one can be lead into false expectations regarding one's future income and standard of living: that is, if we are making this much money already, we should be making much more when we start working…

Their past spending could be interpreted as fatalistic behavior in a situation in which they have little control over their lives. However, I have too little information concerning this phase of their lives to reliably choose between the different interpretations (false expectations vs. fatalistic spending). I can only suggest that it is possible that this household has moved from an egalitarian way of organizing in Chile to a fatalistic way of organizing as refugees, and then back again to an egalitarian way of organizing after managing to get their lives back on track. A study of these kinds of changes would be most interesting from a cultural theory perspective.[161]

Nevertheless, now, Mr. Herrera blames the system for the economic problems the household experienced, which fits the egalitarian predictions. The same behavior could easily have been used to confirm the individualistic view of people as selfish and lazy. Individualists are expected to blame the non-productive individual, which does not seem to be the case here.

Making Big Decisions

I always try to inquire into how the household makes big decisions, but Mr. Herrera managed to tell about tell about *how* they bought their house before I even asked. Obviously, the *way* it happened was important for him.

> Mr: I just went to talk with the lady in the bank, and
> she says,
> — of course, what would you be interested in? You can see here. Here are some prospects. (…) You earn so much money. Of course you can buy. When do you want to buy? (…) I have a prospect here, look at the picture.
> I liked it.
> And my wife said,
> — oh yes, this is my house.
> I said,

[161] There are also other interesting questions: Why is this the only household that shows this kind of behavior? Had there been more information from this period, one could compare them with another credit card spending household relying on fatalistic solidarity (on page 243).

> — Wait until we see some other locations too.
> — NO, I like it!
> — No.
> — Yes.
> — What does it cost?
> She said,
> — just buy it, just buy it. Sell the apartment, and we can buy it. (Herrera 2002a:00:35-38)

Mrs. Herrera is the person in charge both at home and at the family firm. This story presents her as a charismatic leader. There is no rational weighing of different alternatives against each other. The decision is based upon a gut feeling: the wife's immediate response to the sales prospect.

Later on I get back to the decision-making as a general topic and Mr. Herrera explains:

> Mr: When we need to make decisions, we talk very much. That is good. And all of us, the whole family. [And sometimes] we invite [my friend] to join us and ask:
> — what do you think? (Herrera 2002a:01:03)

This emphasis on discussion with the whole family is close to the ideals of egalitarianism. Decisions are based on consensual agreement, and because there are no clear authorities, the decision-making process is based either on argumentation or charismatic leadership, as in the first example. Seen together these two examples come close to an ideal typical household, relying on an egalitarian way of organizing.

Helping Others and Being Helped:

Acts of help define a household's social relations, and the Herreras, like many other cases, use their social relations to define who they themselves are. Most of the people who have a relationship with the Herreras that includes helping each other are "Chileans" and a few "Norwegians" from the Catholic Church (Herrera 2002b:0047).

The Herreras used to be receivers of help when it came to language and information.

> Mr: For example, when I had to go to an office, to the bank for a loan, I needed help. Now I can do everything myself. But earlier, hhhhh, they had to do everything for me. (…) Especially, when you cannot talk, you stand there, and do not know anything. Now we do need help very seldom. (Herrera 2002b:00:48)

Helping others seems to be common, especially when it involves the people who belong to the same church group (Herrera 2002b:00:46), but the Herreras prefer to tell me about more random and surprising acts of help. These stories involved unknown people receiving or giving significant help without any demands of mutuality. There is also an important social dimension: these people are pulled temporarily into the family or corporate life, or at least entertained thoroughly. Some of the stories also have a return gift, which involves taking part in social events, art performances, or something else out of the ordinary. The common element seems to be a shared social experience—a feeling of connecting with strangers. Could it be that the moderate egalitarian's form of payback is some form of social inclusion?

When I try to ask them about the mutuality of helping, they deny the expectation of mutuality, and refer to God:

> Mr: No, we get from the boss upstairs. We are content. We are content. (…) We have to help, the people who need help, because God has given us so much. (…)
>
> Mrs: We have received a good gift from God: to live in Norway. (Herrera 2002b:00:51)

It seems to me that they separate between helping their friends in the church group, who they help regularly in such ordinary ways that it is not so interesting for them to talk about it, versus helping strangers, which seems to have a potentially different moral dimension. The moral underlying these stories seems to be that one should not expect or demand a reward for helping others, as it is one's duty (in order to balance out their own good fortune). This connection between acts of mercy and their own good fortune indicates that there is a moral unity: acts in one domain help to balance out acts in another domain, which is typical for egalitarian solidarity.[162] They are also clearly rejecting the individualistic solidarity based on balanced exchange.

Cultural theory emphasizes justifications because the same behavior can carry different social connotations, and as we have seen, the Herreras' egalitarian justification for providing help is quite different from the hierarchical justification given by the Nguyens, who would rather give to the deserving poor (on page 151). As we saw earlier Mr. Natan helped a stranger to change a tire. There is a superficial resemblance, as both Herreras and Mr. Natan helped strangers, but Mr. Natan emphasized that the man was deserving (old) and that he himself ran away. There is no way members of the Herrera household would have run away, since for them the point is to build bridges to these people. Where Mr. Natan defined himself as the helper (and thus in some sense above the receiver), the Herreras avoid ranking themselves in relation to the strangers they help.[163] A temporary intimacy is a way to define the receiver and the provider of the help as equals.

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[162] In a hierarchical system, the different domains can remain separate and acts within one domain do not necessarily transfer to another.

[163] Sometimes it can be difficult to see the differences in underlying structures as they both use "Catholic" vocabulary.

Cultural Bias

Dreams

Mr. Herrera has a dream of working less. The money is not the most important thing, neither is the company. Mr. Herrera wants more spare time. He does not specify here what he would use the free time for, but other parts of the interview indicate that social life (family and church) is a high priority.

> Mr: (…) I do not have time for everything. ((Laughs)). No, I should not complain. That is how life is, and I believe that I do not have that much more time left. And my philosophy —I have my own philosophy— which I have told to everyone in my family: When you get old, you should work less. I should work less and make more money. But first, I need to work some more. Therefore, perhaps one day I will do nothing, and still make money. This is the dream. We will see. ######### ((Loud laughter in the background)) (Herrera 2002a:00:45)

The loud laughter in the end is revealing. The family members seem very safe with each other, and free to laugh at each other. This is something I would not expect to see in a hierarchical household, where this kind of behavior would be most improper. Again the impression of an egalitarian household is strengthened.

The Herreras tell me about another dream: they hope to retire to Spain, because they believe that when they become senile they will only speak Spanish (Herrera 2002b:01:44). Thus, they seem to share the Garcia's fear of not being able to communicate with their caretakers (on page 522). It does not really matter how well integrated one currently is if one loses the ability to talk Norwegian later.

More Rules

When I inquire about differences between Norway and Chile, the Herreras say they have learned more rules in Norway. For example, Chileans often arrive too late, instead of arriving on time like the Norwegians (Herrera 2002b:01:22). Another rule they mention is that one is supposed to make an appointment before visiting someone:

> Mrs: We do not have so much time. Now, I like these Norwegian rules, I do. If you want to visit a family, you call them ((laughter)), then we can plan. (Herrera 2002b:01:20)

The Herreras offer these new rules as examples of changes in their lives in Norway. They are, thus, depicting their household moving upwards on the grid dimension. The opposite movement can be seen in the Lorca household, where they have moved from an underground activist household (high-grid-high-group) in Chile toward a more individualistic household in Norway (more about the Lorcas on page 218). Arriving in Norway can trigger changes in opposite directions.

An Egalitarian Household

The Herrera family can be seen as an enclave that runs its own business. This may sound paradoxical, as individualism and markets are in many ways connected to each other. There are, however, several examples showing how companies can be dominated by any of the ways of life (Mars 1994).

Since the Herreras run a business—which is one of the preferred ways of making a living for individualists—is it possible that this is an individualistic, low-grid-low-group household? It does not seem likely, considering how much time they spend together and how many different types of activities they share together, both of which point toward high-group.

Given that it is a high-group household, could it be a high-grid household, pointing toward hierarchy? Especially since they themselves explain how they have learned new rules in Norway. Despite some movement upwards on the grid dimension, they are still relatively low on the grid, given the flat structure in the firm and household, the non-planned time use, the critical tone used, and the looseness of the interview situation (people joined and left the interview without any warning).

The Herrera household belongs to the low-grid-high-group corner of the diagram. Enclaves are typically thought of as having a strict boundary separating the inside from the outside. In this case the boundary seems to consist of two concentric boundaries. The innermost is the family/non-family boundary. The second boundary separates the Chilean church group and their friends from everybody else. However, because this household runs a business, they need a large social network, and in some aspects the size of their social network matches an ego-focused network. Nevertheless, the activities that sustain their social network seem to be group activities, which do not fit well with the individualistic way of organizing. In addition, the justifications they gave for helping others do not fit with the individualistic solidarity.

The Herrera household utilizes a way of organizing that allows them to turn the family's strong sense of togetherness into a family company. They have been able to find a livelihood that allows them to reinforce their identity as separate from the majority population.

Caulkins and Weiner have described three egalitarian manufacturing firms in Mid-Wales that resemble the Herrera's company (1998).

> … all these firms have found ways to create a sense of commitment and ownership, rather than alienation, in the work organization. … As the pace of privatization increases throughout Europe, these egalitarian firms may become increasingly important models for avoiding some of the excess of both the bureaucratic and traditionally entrepreneurial types of firms. (Caulkins and Weiner 1998:31)

Caulkins and Weiner believe that by studying the everyday practices of unusual businesses, one can avoid the homogenizing assumptions of the business schools and management models. The majority population seldom accepts that they have something to learn from migrants, but I believe that in the case of the Herreras the lesson is obvious: there is more than one way to run a business.

Welfare State and Politics

So far I have shown how the Herreras, both internally and in their external social relations, depend on the egalitarian way of organizing. Does this influence their relations to the welfare state and its institutions?

The Herreras trust the police in Norway, even if they are not very effective, while in Chile the police are both violent and corrupt. Nevertheless, if you paid them, the Chilean police could often retrieve the stolen property (Herrera 2002a:01:14). Sometimes, using cultural theory does not add much to the interpretation: even if one interprets the corrupt Chilean police force as lacking in obedience to rules (hierarchical deviance) and excelling in privately enforced bilateral agreements (individualistic corruption), the main message is that the Herreras trust the Norwegian police, and not the Chilean police. Obviously, cultural theory does not determine people's attitudes; however, it can give people a framework for interpreting their various experiences.

Welfare and Blaming the System

When I inquire about their relation to the welfare state, Mr Herrera tells me the following story that makes it apparent how he appreciates the welfare state's inclusiveness and the substantial coverage it provides.

> Mr: [My wife] was operated, and she had to pay for it. I will never forget this. I paid more for parking the car at the hospital. I paid 200 for parking. She paid 190 crowns for a big operation. It is totally amazing, and it happened here in Norway. Not in my country. In my country, you do not have any chance if you do not have money. I am very satisfied with these things. I was at hospital once too, and paid nothing. (Herrera 2002a:01:34)

There is thus a big difference between Norway and Chile in the options and possibilities available to people with a low income.

Mr. Herrera is happy to pay taxes, because the welfare state takes care of important functions like healthcare. However, he is not happy about all other payments, like paying for the yearly vehicle tax, or the road taxes. Nor does he like to pay for a TV license, especially because he does not watch the Norwegian public channels (Herrera 2002a:01:38). Here is a tension between preferring a universal welfare state funded by general taxes, which gives universal and substantial coverage for people in need, and preferring a consumer state, where citizens are consumers of public goods and only pay for those goods they utilize. The first one requires solidarity with the rest of the population, while the second lacks it, as the justification is based on one's own private usage of the goods. I find it interesting that the two areas presented by Mr. Herrera—driving a car and watching TV—are both characterized by their solitary nature, their lack of social involvement.[164] In addition, by stating that he does not watch the Norwegian channels, perhaps he is implicitly saying that is not interested in paying for programming targeted at a community he does not feel himself a part of.

Mr. Herrera thinks that the welfare state is sometimes too kind, especially with people who cheat (Herrera 2002a:01:30). Mr. Herrera is again criticizing the system and not the people, a typical egalitarian trait. We should also remember the previous discussion of how the Herreras received income support from the refugee office, which distorted their economic management strategy (See Small Is Good on page 194). Together these points could seem contradictory. However, they do partially fit with the egalitarian predictions: positive toward distribution of resources and the welfare state, while still finding many problems in the institutions. However, Mr. Herrera's critique is voiced in both egalitarian and individualistic terms (road taxes and TV license).

No More Political Participation

Mr. Herrera was active in the socialist party when Allende became president, more than thirty years ago. Mr. Herrera is not yet able or willing to face the memories of the ensuing conservative military coup (Herrera 2002a:01:22). Consequently, I refrained from touching on this topic any further. However, it is clear that certain experiences forced them to leave Chile and still define their relationship to politics.

> EO: What about Norway, have you been interested in politics here?
>
> Mr: Nope. Nothing. I do not want anymore. I have done so much. I did so much over there. If my father had not picked me up, they would have killed me. He sent me away.
> Here I am not interested. There is no need. (Herrera 2002a:01:24)

Mr. Herrera harbors a great deal of resentment toward politics, and now he does not want to have anything to do with politics. There have been many Chilean political groups in Norway, but he has kept his distance from all of them.

> Mr: (…) But I do not make contact. I do not make contact with them. I just talk a little bit, but not with them. It was enough. I have had enough. (Herrera 2002a)

[164] One of the explanations presented for road rage is that drivers are isolated from each other's social signals while in their cars. Thus it becomes difficult to solve small conflicts through social means, like apologetic gestures, and so many people react with rage instead. Similarly, I believe that watching the TV is in most cases not a form of social activity, even if it might feel as such for the viewer. This is in contrast to talking about watching TV, which obviously is a social activity.

His involvement in Chile forced him to leave the country. He lost friends and relatives, and almost his own life. Now he just wants to have a normal life, without any politics.

In addition to just being fed up there is a second key point in the first quote: "*Here* I am not interested. There is no need." Mr. Herrera does not elaborate on why he feels there is no need, but it seems reasonable to interpret this to mean that the state of affairs in Norway are such that there is no pressing need to change them. One can trust the police, and the universal welfare state takes care of those who need help. Injustice is a strong motivator, and in Norway Mr. Herrera does not find a cause that would bring him back to politics.

Political refugees are among the people in Norway who have sacrificed most for their beliefs. Considering this, it is surprising how little visible migrants are in Norwegian politics. Is this because the lack of available political space and discourses, or are many of them, like Mr. Herrera, tired and content to finally be in a safe harbor?[165]

How does this fit the predictions about the views of the nature and scope of democracy in egalitarian households? Mr. Herrera is vehement in his justification of his own lack of participation. Only the egalitarian households put extensive demands on participation in collective decision-making. The other ways of organizing are expected to have a lower degree of participation in politics, so their supporters do not *need* to justify their lack of participation in the same manner. Thus, Mr. Herrera is indirectly confirming the predictions. He seems to believe that he really should participate, but he has his personal reasons for not doing so.

Citizenship, Race and Roots

Mr. Herrera gives an example that shows how being Norwegian is a racialized topic, and how it is possible for a migrant to use that to his own advantage:

> Mr: One day, they were sitting at work. (…) They asked me
> — When will you become Norwegian?
> — Not now, but there is improvement.
> — What kind of?
> — See, I have ordered blue eyes; they just have not arrived yet.
> ((Everybody laughs))
> They never asked again. (Herrera 2002b:01:41)

Mr. Herrera seems to believe that turning the tables is effective: instead of defending his choice to postpone accepting Norwegian citizenship, he makes of it a joke that mirrors his view of the majority society's treatment of him. Thus, he effectively confronts his workmates with some uncomfortable sides of the racial

[165] This could be a very interesting study. How do political refugees, who have been political activists in their home countries, view and participate in politics in Norway? They have experiences and a vocabulary that make it possible to discuss fairly ideological and specific topics.

aspects of being Norwegian. This is a pun that hits the target; at least he seems to believe so, as "they never asked again."

EO: By the way, about becoming Norwegian. I almost forgot to ask you about citizenship.

Mr: = No, we will, we will become.

Mrs: = I. I [will become Norwegian.

Mr: [will become

Mrs: Then I will change my name too. ((Everybody laughs)) No, I will not use Norwegian names, no.

Mr: = But for example I will.

Mrs: = I want to have a long name. (Herrera 2002b:01:42)

Many Chileans use multipart names that refer to several close relatives. Thus, having a long name is a sign of whom one is related to, but also a marker that is a source of identity and separates her from the majority population. Mr. Herrera, however, prefers to use just one name.

The Herreras are not Norwegian citizens; however, they do have plans to apply for a Norwegian citizenship, because they are worried about losing rights in the future if they are not citizens. They do not quite trust that the universal coverage of the welfare state will continue to include non-citizens in the long run. However, being Chilean is important for them, and they have not yet applied for a Norwegian citizenship.

Mrs: Every year we say, we shall, we shall. (Herrera 2002b:01:42)

If they did not have mixed feelings about giving up their Chilean citizenship and taking Norwegian citizenship, they would manage to find the time to send in the applications. While many of the other households gave reasons connected to different forms of belonging to a society or else practical issues, the Herreras did not mention a single practical issue. Issues of belonging are touched upon only through exclusion: the stories of racialized difference and how they deal with it. One should also remember how the social life of the Herreras is not oriented toward the majority population, but toward their Chilean friends and the Catholic Church.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

Overall, the Herreras are an egalitarian household. They prefer to share the household work and Mr. Herrera's increased participation shows that justifications are followed up by behavior (E). Their decision-making is either collective or based on charismatic leadership (E). Their life is organized around the firm; they share both work and leisure (E). The children took part in the interview as family members and the whole interview situation was a bit chaotic (E). They had, early on, a period in which their economic management strategies broke down, as they spent more than they could afford, while they were receiving public support (F). Now their economic management strategies are clearly egalitarian: they manage their needs down, pay salaries only according to need, and avoid demands for support by keeping their company small (E). This is further justified by stories which show how poor people can be the happiest ones, making consumption morally conspicuous. They also reject an expectation of symmetrical exchange in their helping relations, hence rejecting individualistic solidarity (i).

How do the Herrera household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions made about egalitarian households (on pages 78-91)? The picture is complicated by the Herrera's personal experiences, which clearly influence their views concerning the welfare state and its institutions. However, they rely in many aspects of their lives on egalitarian solidarity and they prefer the egalitarian way of organizing, which reflects their relation to the welfare state through an eagerness to blame institutions (E). They are positive to the welfare state in general and to the redistribution of resources and the availability of healthcare to all social groups (E). They are critical of a system that is too kind to those who cheat (E). In addition, Mr. Herrera needed to explain why he does not participate in politics, indirectly showing his support for a participatory form of democracy (E).

Some of the criticisms the Herreras presented, like the TV license and road taxes (I), resemble what one would expect from a dominantly individualistic household. However, the solutions to the problems facing the society seem to be more rooted in their egalitarian way of organizing.

Overall the Herrera household is based largely on the egalitarian way of organizing, both internally and in their social relations. This relates to their view of society and politics largely as predicted by cultural theory. Despite some individualistic voice, their overall view of society and the solutions to future problems are more egalitarian than individualistic.

The Ngas: Entrepreneurs See Opportunities

The fifth household, the Nga household, from Vietnam, differs from the previously presented households, which rely predominately on either hierarchical or egalitarian ways of organizing. The Ngas rely mainly on the individualistic way of organizing. It is particularly interesting to contrast this household with the more hierarchical Nguyen household, since they both have their roots in Vietnam.

Quick Summary

Prior to leaving Vietnam Mr. Nga had a job matching his technical education, Mrs. Nga worked as a teacher, and together they had two children. In the early 1980s they had to flee; and then one year and several refugee camps later they arrived in Norway. Soon after their arrival, the refugee office helped them to buy an apartment with a loan from the state housing bank. Not that much later they had their third child. Mr. Nga worked in a food factory for two years before he managed to get a job in construction. A few years later family reunification brought Mr. Nga's mother, along with their oldest child, to town. Mrs. Nga began work in a service profession. In 1989 they bought a house in a suburb to accommodate the growing family, but unfortunately, in a rapidly falling market, they failed to sell their apartment, and were forced to sell the house and move back to their apartment. In the 1990s Mrs. Nga developed a health problem that partially disabled her, and Mr. Nga, after ten years, got formal qualifications for his job. A few years ago Mrs. Nga started a small food related company. Presently, their daughter is married and the Ngas have become grandparents.

The Organization of the Household

Household Work

The Nga household’s way of organizing household work has changed, because of Mrs. Nguyen’s disability.

> Mrs: = Previously, while I was working: after I was done at work, I cleaned and cooked at home. My husband worked, and did not do anything at home. [After I got sick] my doctor told him, I need help. Now he is very good. He washes the floors, vacuums, and often he cooks. I do only very easy things, nothing heavy. (Nga 2002a:00:56)

Strict division of labor at home is not necessarily an indicator of preference for a hierarchical way of organizing, because sometimes it is not a result of choice. Their pattern of division of work is dictated by her disability. In an individualistic way of life one of the legitimate justifications for the division of labor is skill, which could be the case here. However, it is difficult to interpret this with sufficient certainty.

Another trait pointing away from hierarchy and toward individualism is the lack of a regular dinnertime, as Mr. Nga's working hours vary a lot.

The Layout of the Home

The Ngas have an apartment in which you can see that people live there. There seemed not to be a division of the apartment into clear zones with different activities. The hallway was filled with things (children's sports equipment, spare parts to the car, and so forth) that gave away what kind of activities they are engaged in. The living room was the heart of the home, and there you could see the importance of their hobbies. On my second visit it seemed like a guest had been sleeping in the living room, for there was a partly hidden mattress on the floor. In addition, it looked like some things were just stored in the corners. The style seemed to be quite an eclectic mix of items looking either expensive or practical. There were no family pictures, or any references to their past, as far as I could see. This family is living in the present, and does not care much for what other people think. At least they did not bother to change things much in order to make an impression on me.

The Interview Situation

The interview situation was relatively loose. Both Mr. and Mrs. Nga did other things during the interview: They had things to do, and had to divide their attention and presence. In addition, there were several phone calls, which they decided to take. All of these elements indicate a low-grid position.

Mr. and Mrs. Nga could each represent their household individually, and they did not check up on each other as to whether the other's representations were correct. They did not rely on support from one another, or from some external authority, for their opinions. These indicators point toward low-group.

Making and Spending Money

The Ngas are interested in making money. They have multiple sources of income: in addition to his job, the family runs a small food business, and they do some business related to festivities.

Mr. Nga works in construction, which is a seasonal business. Therefore, during parts of the year he has time available to help in the family company. Mrs. Nga is partially disabled and receives some benefits to compensate for this. The family company was a way to create a job for her, in which her disability is not a problem.

I tried to find out if this family company represented a dream, something they have wanted for a long time. However, they rejected this. Their attitude to it is quite pragmatic.

> Mr: No, it was not that important. We can work and make some money. That is it. You know, we can manage fine without the company. (Nga 2002b:00:13)

Another reason for starting the shop, and having their son work there, is to teach him about work and the realities of life. This matches individualistic cultural bias, which blames people for not trying hard enough. They are seriously trying to teach their son to become self-sufficient:

> Mrs: He knows how to use money. It is important that he works, right, a bit heavy or a bit hard work. He said, a few times, that he wanted buy this or that, which would cost loads of money. But he was not working, right? He did not know how to make money. That is what we need to show him: how to save money, and how to make money. (Nga 2002a:00:56)

The Ngas are quite concerned with saving, as it provides security: if anything would go wrong, they have the means to deal with it (Nga 2002a:00:50). They prefer to make the money first, before they spend it, and if they need something more expensive, they will save for it (Nga 2002a:00:42). They keep the saved money in a separate account, because otherwise they would just use it up.

Allegedly, many of the Vietnamese-Norwegians think that the first-generation-in-Norway is almost obsessed with saving, because of the boat refugees' experiences of extreme poverty and lack of safety. They are making sure that if anything goes wrong they still have their basic needs covered (Tranh 2002).

The Nga household, too, is saving, but they distance themselves from the other Vietnamese's practice of saving. They point out that even if saving is important, one should *use* the money:

> Mrs: Money. Future. Right? If I die when I sleep (could happen any time), money does not mean anything. I don't think that we should use lots of money or waste it, but we should use it for things that are important in life. That is OK. My daughter, she exercises, and we have to pay money, but that is quite OK. (Nga 2002a:00:34)

Saving is justified by future safety, whereas the justification for the use of money, she offers is in the present, not in the future.

In the following quote, Mr. Nga emphasizes that being able to prioritize what to spend the money on determines one's well-being.

> Mr: I have a friend who makes good money—the same as me. We work in a same group, same company, same salary, same team. But he has almost no money. When he gets his salary he goes right out to town (…) or then he uses it on slot machines. Right? And the he has no money. He has no children, no family, no house, but he has no money. He earns the

> same as I do. I earn the same as he does. But I save the money—I buy good music, good TV. (Nga 2002a:00:47)

The blame is not put on deviant individuals or the system, but on an individual who is not trying hard enough to make the right choices.

These traits combined, point toward individualism, as individualistic households are characterized by their freedom in consumption: they can decide themselves what they spend their money on, which allowes both for conspicuous consumption and for the ability to reduce consumption in areas that are not considered important. Both traits can be seen in the Nga household's consumption. They spend lots of money on their hobbies, and have, consequently, filled their house with extravagant equipment. This spending is visible, as the equipment is used at social events. Thus, following the logic of the individualistic way of organizing, they are spending money in the area of their lives that is most visible. However, their own justification is that it is easy to spend money on these hobbies, because they can make money with them (Nga 2002a:00:37). They have also chosen to have an old car, because it is not as important as their hobbies.

Making Money from a Hobby

Mr. Nga is involved in a hobby project that could become a business, but he says that there is no money in it—the income covers the expenses, but no more (Nga 2002a:00:31-00:35). This hobby grants him invitations to many social events in town and sometimes even further away. Because he is not working full time all year round, he is able to spend considerable time on this hobby during slow seasons at work. This hobby reveals that he, along with the rest of the family, are actually quite well connected, as they know practically everyone (or 80 percent according to their own words) in the Vietnamese community.

Following an entrepreneurial strategy, they seem to be quite pragmatic about making their ends meet, and obviously enjoy the wheeling and dealing that attends both this hobby project and their food business. This became clear during the interview, when there were several small interruptions that were necessary to keep the wheels running smoothly. In the individualistic way of organizing status is displayed through the size and centrality of social networks. Thus, these small interruptions are accepted more easily, because they are the marks of a busy, high status person.

Their External Social Relations

The social relations available to the Nga household are predominately Vietnamese, which is probably connected to their limited Norwegian language skills. They are not able to create the kind of social relations they would like to have with members of the majority population. Their social activities make it apparent that they have a large social network in the Vietnamese community. Mr. Nga mentions parties where attendance is anywhere from 50 to 200 people, but when I try to find out who these people really are and what kind of contact the Ngas have with them beyond festivities, these people become suddenly unimportant.

The only relatives the Ngas have in Norway are Mrs. Nga's niece and brother, who also live in town, and whom they meet perhaps once a month for dinner.

Another important source of social contact is the Protestant congregation, where almost every Sunday they would meet with people. However, through the church they have closer contact with only four households: two majority households and two Vietnamese households.

Symmetrical Assistance

The Nga household is not deeply connected to anyone through mutual assistance. They, of course, have contact with their relatives in town, but it does not entail important transfers of resources. The Ngas claim that helping each other is important for the Vietnamese (Nga 2002b:00:22), but when I try to find out what kind of help they give and receive, the importance of this is reduced. They give a hand when somebody is moving or something extraordinary is happening (Nga 2002b:00:25). Their friends and relatives would not hesitate to ask if there was something important, but they would not ask for help in the regular day-to-day problems of life (Nga 2002b:00:20). Thus, one reason for not helping each other is the lack of need.

Justification of assistance allows us to see what kind of solidarity they are relying upon. Mr. Nga states that assistance should be symmetrical:

> Mr: =Yes, that is very… If someone gets help three times, and gives nothing back, right. Then, you know, this is not a good man. And in the future, we would not have any contact. That is common. (Nga 2002b:00:29)

Lack of reciprocation would actually lead to termination of the social contact. The combination of a large peripheral network of contacts, and a solidarity based on symmetrical exchange, makes it understandable that their hobby is treated as a small business, instead of something that is used to build a complicated set of social interdependencies. If we compare this with a hierarchical way of organizing, we can see how his insistence on symmetrical exchange does not allow the Ngas to rise in a social hierarchy (compare with the Natans on page 165). Nor are the Ngas burdened by their social responsibilities, like Mr. Herrera, who refrains from earning more money because of the claims made by family and friends (on page 194).

None of the households I investigated that were closely involved with the Catholic Church showed tendencies toward individualistic management of economy. However, I cannot see any traces of Weber's protestant asceticism in the Nga household (Weber 1964:214, 1989). Perhaps, it is more important for the accumulation of resources that they have the freedom to choose what they want to spend their money on, as their resources are not bound by social obligations or rules.

Politics and the Welfare State

How does the Nga household's individualistic way of organizing influence their relation to the institutions of the welfare state?

Social Welfare

The first year, upon arriving in Norway, the Ngas were dependent on help from both the social welfare office and refugee office. They are proud of finding work so soon after their arrival and being able to make it on their own, which allows them to be quite judgmental about those people who receive benefits without working.

Mr: The social welfare office is quite fine. I think, you know that we do not go through them any more. We came to Norway in mid-80s and the next year we were working. Just one year we lived through the social welfare office. We were happy with the assistence. They helped a little when we came and did not have a job. So, the first year, we felt quite happy.

Mrs: But, I am not happy, because...

Mr: =Now. Previously it was fine.

Mrs: It is a long time since I came to Norway—it was fine—but not anymore, right? Because, the system in this society makes people lazy.

Mr: A little bit lazy.

Mrs: A little bit lazy: do not want to work. Because, they pay very well: electricity, rent and such, LOTS of money. I know. But when you work, right, or, my husband works and pays lots of taxes. These taxes cover THAT. But they pay to many who do not want to work.

Mr: ((says something short in Vietnamese))

Mrs: You know, I know many families that—They do not want to work—the whole family, right, gets lots of money (social benefits). Yes, they have a nice car, have a house, and stuff. The social welfare office pays the rent, right. And they use electricity and pay for the food and everything. But if we are working, right, we pay of everything. And we have to pay more taxes. Right. Not happy.
I do not agree how we pay to them. It is OK, right, but people get lots of money. They do not want to work, because it is enough for them.

EO: So, what you mean is that they pay too much?

Mrs: = Yes, too much. (Nga 2002a:00:58)

There are a several interesting points in this lengthy quote. First, they did get help and they are happy that people can get help (also Nga 2002a:01:06). Second, they think that excessively generous help will corrupt people, and make them lazy. Third, they as a family managed to resist laziness. They survived the system and can now afford to be judgmental. Fourth, they resent the level of payments, because it comes from their tax money.

Even if Mrs. Nga says that the system makes people lazy, echoing Mr. Herrera, she puts more emphasis on the people "who do not want to work."[166] Implicitly, she is saying that because the Nga household could make it, these other households should also be able to make it, if they just tried harder.

In the individualistic way of organizing, it is typical to blame peoples' lack of effort. The Nga household's way of blaming seems to fit this pattern quite well, as they are also judgmental about people who get social support and use it "right away on beer" (Nga 2002a:01:07). The individualistic way of organizing is built upon the individualistic solidarity, which is characterized by symmetrical exchange (see presentation on page 74). They are reciprocating for the help they received by being good citizens who pay their taxes. However, the people whom the Ngas consider lazy and those who "buy beer" are violating the assumption of symmetry, as they are not likely to become "good citizens" and pay back the society.

Mr. Nga thinks that Norway helps migrants much more than the United States, where you can get help only for a few months. In addition, in the U.S. you get food stamps, which can only be used for food (Nga 2002a:01:08). I believe that this story was told as an example of how the state can make sure that people are kept more responsible for their own well-being, by keeping the duration of the help limited. Could the judgmental attitude demonstrated by Mr. Nga be based on a hierarchical bias? The food stamp program seems to be a typical hierarchical mechanism of control: deviant people are forced to comply and use their resources in a proper way, in this case, on food. However, limiting the time support is available also fits with the individualistic logic, as it forces people to try to support themselves.[167]

Several of the predictions about the individualistic household's relation to politics and the society can be recognized in the Nga household: Social support makes people lazy; symmetrical exchange is the basis of all solidarity; the blame is put upon the non-productive individual; and human nature is seen as primarily selfish.

School and Language

Parliament has ruled that the motivation for providing education in peoples' native languages is based upon the necessity for one good language as a prerequisite for all

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[166] She uses this frase four times in this quote.

[167] In a later interview, Mr. Nga claims that the reason why so few Vietnamese are unemployed, lies in their social obligations: they have family back in Vietnam that depends on their help (Nga 2002b:01:02). In such a situation, one must prioritize a steady income rather than any future hopes concerning education, self-fulfillment, or status in the Norwegian society.

learning. Thus, native language teaching is not aimed at sustaining minority languages, but instead toward ensuring that they will learn sufficient Norwegian. When a child's level of Norwegian is considered sufficient, the school will not get state support (through the municipality) for language education. There has been resistance toward these new rules among teachers, and it has taken two years to implement these new rules started in the municipalities.[168]

The Ngas have two children in the public school system. The youngest one just lost his right to extra Vietnamese education, because he is too good in Norwegian.

> EO: Did the children get education in their mother tongue?
>
> Mr: Yes, we did get, but not anymore. But in our family, we talk Vietnamese at home. That helps a little.
>
> Mrs: He is 13 years, right. Because he is good in Norwegian, he does not get any more.
>
> EO: Yes, I know they changed the rules.
>
> Mrs: We wanted him to learn more Vietnamese. Right? We have applied, but they have not promised. They say he is good in Norwegian.
>
> EO: Do you think it is too bad that the children become a little Norwegian?
>
> Mr: No.
>
> Mrs: No.
>
> Mr: But it is difficult. We understand: the young ones who are born here in Norway; they must have Norwegian culture. And we wish for a mixed culture: Vietnamese-in-Norway. But it is a bit difficult. But, since he [lives in Norway ( ).
>
> Mrs: [The boy is 13 years. He does not have a problem with native tongue. But, the boy who is 18 does—Yes. ((Laughs apologizing)) Because, he only played with Norwegian children, not with Vietnamese. (Nga 2002a:01:04)

The parents are quite well informed about the rules, and are trying to apply for what they want. They hope for a mixed culture, where the children have traits from both Vietnamese and Norwegian culture.

I find it interesting that there are clear differences between their children's ability to speak Vietnamese: Obviously, their daughter, who was almost ten years old before she came to Norway, speaks good Vietnamese. However, they feel like they have not quite succeeded with their son, who was born in Vietnam, but does not speak Vietnamese well. Whereas their youngest son, who was born in Norway, does not have any problems with Vietnamese.

In this area, too, they fit with the predictions about individualistic households' relations to politics and society, as they look at themselves as responsible for their children's language skills. There is no need for collective action, institutional solutions, nor blaming anyone else.

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[168] Personal communication with several native language teachers.

Naturalization

The Nga household applied for and received their Norwegian citizenship soon after the required seven years of residency. They gave three reasons for naturalization: first, it is beneficial for Mr. Nga's work; second, it makes traveling easier; and third, provides a sense of belonging.

> Mrs: We think, true, we live in Norway. We must apply for [citizenship]
>
> Mr: We live so long in this country. We work, make money, and pay taxes. Therefore, we should be with them. (Nga 2002a:01:20)

This shows a very pragmatic attitude, which Mr. Nguyen comments upon citizenship confirm:

> EO: Does it mean something for you?
>
> Mr: No, not for me, but for the children. The children. For them it is better to have Norwegian citizenship. They are born here, grew up here, and know the culture. It does not mean much for me, but for the children. (Nga 2002b:00:50)

Not surprisingly, when I inquired about the importance and meaning of traditions, Mr. Nga explained that traditions are important, and children have to know their background, so that they can themselves choose which parts of the tradition they want (Nga 2002b:01:07). This kind of emphasis on mixing and choosing traditions fits well with an individualistic cultural bias.

Politics

The Ngas discuss politics only with other Vietnamese, because they feel they lack the language skills (Nga 2002b:00:30). They do not discuss politics regularly, however, before important events, like elections, they can discuss politics for several hours (Nga 2002b:00:48).

The Ngas think that there are only small differences between the parties, and it does not matter much what they promise before elections, because there are many parties at the parliament who need to work together (Nga 2002a 01:12).

They are also concerned with migrants who demand too much from the society—things like their own churches, schools, and so forth (Nga 2002a 01:15). It looks like they would like to limit the state's involvement, particularly if they should be paying for other's collective action.

Overall, it is difficult to find traits in the Nga household that go against the predictions concerning an individualistic household's relation to politics and society.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

The Nga household shows several individualistic traits in their way of organizing the household internally and in their helping relations: The layout of their apartment was hobby oriented, with an eclectic mix of styles and items (I); during the interview both parents had independent opinions and presence (I); their economic management style is pragmatic and focused on making money rather than saving it, and they have some traits of conspicuous consumption (I); they have a large social network that is connected to one of their hobby projects (I); and they emphasize the symmetrical exchanges in helping relations as a requirement for having contact at all (I).

How do the Nga household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? In their views about politics and society several individualistic traits are present: social support makes people lazy (I); the blame is put on non-productive individuals (I); humans are selfish by nature (I); people should take responsibility for themselves, like they did (I); limited food stamp programs force people to take responsibility;[169] and children's language skills are the parent's responsibility (I).[170] There were no traits that could be interpreted as rejection of the individualistic way of organizing.

We can thus see how their individualistic way of organizing fits quite well with their individualist views of politics and society.

In Contrast to Nguyen

So far I have presented two refugee families from Vietnam: the Nguyens and the Ngas. The Nguyen household had many hierarchical traits: the importance of proper presentation; the emphasis on loyalty, tradition, and authority; and a long-term view of life. The Nga household is quite different. They seem to rely much more on the individualistic way of organizing: personal preferences and hobbies are important; they take responsibility for their own actions; they blame people for lack of effort; they see opportunities and go for them; they like wheeling and dealing; and they embrace change. They seem like two totally different households even though their backgrounds are very similar and they currently share somewhat similar work situations; the main difference is Mrs. Nga's disability, whereas the Nguyens have two full incomes. The Nguyen's housing situation is better, as they managed to buy a house of their own, where Nga had to back off and sell the house they already bought.

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[169] I am not giving them points for this story because it duplicates the prediction concerning social support and the one concerning responsibility, which both are already counted as indicators.

[170] I am giving them one *E* for this because it fits with the individualistic view of the scope of democratic game and actor role.

How can two households be so similar and still be so different? One of the keys to understanding their present situation is the difference in their social relations: The Nguyens are involved in a group of households, which support each other in several ways, and they also have more private contact with the majority population. The Nguyens are involved in supporting others in a setting where it can be seen and appreciated. The Nga's pattern of assistance is more particularistic, and in some ways their "business" relations seem to be more important in their lives than their friends and family, at least when it comes to the flow of resources.

There are many signs indicating that the Nguyens are more hierarchal and the Ngas more individualistic; however, they display somewhat similar attitudes toward social welfare. They both emphasize responsibility and differentiate between the deserving (like themselves) and the not so deserving receivers of social welfare. However, their manner for distancing themselves from the welfare recipients was different: the Nguyens relied on we-are-not-one-them arguments, while the Ngas used a they-are-bad-and-lazy argument.

They share some of the same experiences from Vietnam, the flight from their country of birth, the dependency on social welfare after their arrival in Norway, as well as the quick entry into wage labor and self-reliance. Nevertheless, the way they have made ends meet, after the first years, is quite different.

They both live in a society where, lately, there has been much focus upon the misuse of social welfare, and the costs and problems related to immigrants. Therefore, they both have a "need" to establish themselves as different from those people, who, in their view, are misusing the system. However, there is a difference in the way they build their own character through their stories. The Nguyens emphasize the way they are now helping others by participating in different forms of voluntary work and private aid. They do not want to be seen as free-riders. The Ngas emphasized their reluctance to pay taxes, hence focusing on the flow of resources and the lack of symmetrical exchanges, more than on the public perception of them. Thus, it is possible to see how the organization of their household and their social relations are related to their view of social support in a manner consistent with cultural theory.

Compared with Herrera

The Herrera household is also engaged in business; however, their style of organizing is predominantly egalitarian. What do the Ngas and the Herreras have in common? They both are low on the grid dimension. Most of the Vietnamese households I have had contact with, however, seem to be high on the grid. The Nga household's focus on getting things done, rather than how they look, and their easy going, informal approach to other people, resembled in many ways the lifestyles I have seen among the Chilean low grid households.

How does the Nga household differ from the Herrera household? From the viewpoint of cultural theory, the biggest difference lies in the way they have organized their daily lives. Where the Herreras have extensive involvement with each other, virtually around the clock, and work together as a group, all helping as much as they can, the Nga's activities are more diverse. Mrs. and Mr. Nga each have their own projects. In addition, their son works a little for them, but none of these seem to be joint projects. Each project belongs to one of them, and the others are called on to help when needed. The Nga household's businesses are more like extended hobby projects, if one goes wrong they can always rely on other sources of income. Whereas the Herrera's business is their only source of income, which will create a real-life difference both in the nature of the business and in the importance the business for these two households. They also differ in their external social relations: the Herreras are deeply involved with their church group and have many tight bonds with people, while the Ngas seem to have looser contact with their church group and friends.

We have now seen how the Nga household's individualistic way of organizing differs from the Nguyen's hierarchical way of organizing and from the Herrera's egalitarian way of organizing. How would the Nga household compare to another household that relies predominately on the individualistic way of organizing?

The Lorcas: With the Right to Make it

Similar to the Ngas, the Lorca household relies in many situations on the individualistic way of organizing. The family members each have their own lives, which are then coordinated. It is informative to compare them with the egalitarian way of life that emerges in two other households originating from Chile, the Herreras and the Garcias.

A Quick Summary

The Lorca household came to Norway at the end of the 1980s, as political refugees from Chile. Mr. Lorca was working in his profession, which required higher education, before their escape. In Norway they have lived in several cities before moving to their present hometown. Both Mr. and Mrs. Lorca have now completed higher education in Norway. He has not been able to find a job that matches his qualifications, and is now working below his level of merit, even if it is in the right branch. She started a company, but after a few years she sold it. They are renting a section of a house in a suburb, where they live with their daughter and son.

The Interview Situation

My main contact within the household was Mrs. Lorca. I did meet briefly with Mr. Lorca but he showed no interest in being interviewed. Participation in my research project was her decision and her responsibility, not a joint project. Therefore, all my interviews are with Mrs. Lorca only. During the first interview, Mr. Lorca was home, but chose to stay in the living room, while Mrs. Lorca and I conversed in the kitchen.

Household's Internal Life

Time Use

The Lorca household consists of individuals who have their own lives and their own plans, in addition to the things that the whole family does. When I inquired as to whether they always know what the other person is doing, she answered

> Mrs: Yes, we usually inform each other. (Lorca 2002b:01:10)

They make time use decisions independent of each other, and the household is not the social actor. This is different from the egalitarian togetherness that we saw in the Herrera household.

Household Work

The division of housework is quite flexible. The spouses do not have set tasks, but rather agree during the day who will shop, cook, and so forth, based on who has the time to do it (Lorca 2002b:01:12). Their division of household work is characterized by flexibility and short-term agreements, which are typical individualistic traits. However, for Mrs. Lorca, the most important aspect was the justification: division of work was based on "100 percent equality," which they practiced already in Chile—it is not something they have taken up in Norway (Lorca 2002b:01:10). When I pushed a bit on *what* equality is, she answered:

> Mrs: I do not look at gender differences as a reason for someone to be considered more <u>important</u> than the other. Both a man and a woman are humans; both should have duties and rights. #######
> (…)
> I think it is foolish, or confusing, to try to consider both as similar, based either on gender or anything else. In addition to the gender differences, the individuals are <u>different</u>. We have different skills, if we only look at it practically. So, the reason for the husband to go to the mall shopping, is that he drives a car, right? So, it is faster. I stay at home and wash the floor. But, if I had a driver's license, perhaps I would have driven to the mall. We are thus trying to utilize the possibilities that we have, as people. Depending on the issue, one is always more skillful than the other one, no matter what. (Lorca 2002b:01:14)

We can se how equality is justified in relation to differences and skills. Equality is not created by spending an equal number of hours on household tasks, instead, their respective skills are taken into consideration, and tasks are allocated to the person who has the better skills and more time to do them. What at first sight could look like an egalitarian justification based on equality is actually an individualistic skill based justification.

Economic Strategies

The Lorcas have shown a remarkable willingness to go after opportunities. They have moved from one city to another when they viewed it as advantageous for study or work. In large parts of their lives, future possibilities have counted more than their present social relations.

The Lorcas think that they have the right to make it. They are talented people with higher education and a drive to move forward. Even if they have not succeeded in Norway careerwise, they have not given up. Mr. Lorca's present job is an attempt to gain a foothold within the company, which they hope will lead to an advancement into a position more fitting of his skills and experience. In a similar manner the Lorcas envision a bright future for their children. While most of the households I have interviewed have been quite settled in (and happy with) their housing and work situation, the Lorcas are determined to improve their situation to a level that is more congruent with their aspirations. There is something very individualistic about their willingness to move and grab the chances that open for them.

When I inquire into whether they have control over their household economy, she answers:

> Mrs: Yes, over whatever is possible for me. I have never had any problems. I can pay all my bills. What is difficult, of course, is to have a decent standard of living. And to have a better life. But then you need more income, and that is out of my control. (Lorca 2002b:00:45)

Cultural theory claims that the economic strategy fitting the individualistic way of life involves managing income upwards, whereas Mrs. Lorca is managing her expenses. However, she would *like* to manage her income and expenses upwards, which is a statement that would fit to almost everyone with low income. More is needed to identify the individualistic strategy of management.

Mrs. Lorca claims that both she and Mr. Lorca bring money into the household, and that they do have a budget:

> Mrs: Yes. We have not been that disiplined, and I put the blame on him, not on me. ((Author harks)) I even make it in writing. So, I write a budget, and he forgets about it. (Lorca 2002b:00:44)

The husband does not keep the budget, which indicates that the group pressure is not strong enough to create accountability. It is possible to interpret her business activities as a way to gain control over their income and manage their own lives. It requires entrepreneurship and risk taking, which are typical of the individualistic way of organizing. My interpretation is that they are running their household using the individualistic strategy; however, they have not been successful in creating the income they had hoped for.

They have also shown the ability to cut down on their needs when it is necessary to reach a goal. There was a period, some years ago, when the whole family, including their children, was living in one room at a dormitory, in order to send money for the medical care of one of the grandparents in Chile. In some ways this shows the individualistic ability to cut down on one's needs. On the other hand, it shows how strong the family loyalties are. However, this is not a counter indicator of the individualistic way of organizing.[171]

What distinguishes the Lorcas from the more egalitarian Herrera household, who also run a business? First, the Herreras run their business as a collective project, whereas Mrs. Lorca's business is her own, and her husband has nothing to do with it. Second, Mrs. Lorca says that they are not able to save any money, but they would

[171] Cultural theory actually does not say that the loyalties are weak. It says that the group pressure is weak, and that the obligations constructed by roles are weak. There is nothing that says that family is not taken care of. However, while egalitarian and hierarchical households would probably unite in their dislike of sending elderly people to retirement homes, instead of taking care of them within the family, the individualistic households would probably insist upon the choice: No one should be forced to sacrifice their lives, just because one is family…

like to earn and spend more money. Mr. Herrera, in contrast, says that he is not interested in having any more money, because other people would make claims on it.

Social Relations

Mr. and Mrs. Lorca have few relatives back in Chile and keep in touch only with their parents and siblings. They have no relatives in Norway, so relatives make up only a small part of their social relations. Most of their social contacts are by their own choice. Mrs. Lorca has daily contact with a cousin who lives in Europe; however, this is a self-selected relationship, as there are other kin who are closer. This cousin is more like a good friend to her.

The Lorcas have a large social network: They keep in touch with ten to twelve families among their neighbors; in the city, they have five common friends, and Mr. and Mrs. Lorca each have their own respective circles of friends; from every location in Norway where they have once lived, they keep in touch with either families or individuals. In addition, back in Chile, there are three friends with whom they keep in touch. It totals up to forty-five people that they consider friends. One should note how these people have arrived in the Lorca's lives, little by little, through daily social contact, and from numerous different sources. The majority of these people are Norwegian, especially the ones living in town, whereas the bulk of people living further away have Chilean origins.

The friendships play a very different part in their lives:

> Mrs: I think, I have more friends than he does. It has to do with his personality. Sometimes, he says that it is not that he is not their friend, but it is they who seek him as a friend. He simply does not preoccupy himself with it. My husband is a man who would survive alone, whereas I would not make it alone. However, the others like him, because he is so stable. And it is true, he almost never calls out, whereas they call and invite him out and stuff. (Lorca 2002b:01:40)

She is a very social person and spends a lot of time and effort in maintaining social relations, which have certain qualities she demands:

> Mrs: I am very concerned with justice and respect. If something collides with my understanding of what is respectful and just, I let them know. [She makes a parallel between the social map[172] with concentric rings I am drawing, and circles of intimacy] If they have been [close] and behaved in a way that I cannot accept, then I place them further out, until there is little or no contact.
> (…)
> Most people are not used to be criticized. I have had some conflicts,

[172] See page 519 for an example of these schemas.

> because I let them know, and people don't like that, even if I am not angry or say it in a mean way. In those cases, I just prefer to place them outside. (Lorca 2002b:01:41)

Social relations are intentionally maintained or cut off; they are not a permanent feature of life, but rather something that must be sustained. The Lorcas do of course have some long-term friendships, some of which go back twenty years. To summarize, they uphold those social relations they want to keep.

They are not deeply involved in ethnic organizing: While both the Garcia and Herrera households spend lots of time in activities with other people from Chile, by way of the Catholic Church and a few other organizations, the Lorcas have a much more varied social network, with less multiplex relations. Even if they do have quite a few Latin American friends, their friends do not belong to one particular group and know each other mainly through the Lorcas.

Politics and the Welfare State

Despite all the egalitarian voice used, the Lorca family has shown enough individualistic traits in the way they organize their home and their social relations that it seems justifiable to treat them as a predominately individualistic household during the evaluation of the predictions about views about society and politics.

A Life that Disappeared

The Lorcas are political refugees, whose previous lives have disappeared. Theirs and other political refugees' stories point toward experiences and qualifications that they keep hidden in Norway, either by choice or by necessity. The following quote is long, but it gives a glimpse into a world that is usually hidden from us.

> EO: Can you tell a bit more about what you did before you left Chile?
>
> Mrs: Before I came to Norway the first time?
>
> EO: = Yes.
>
> Mrs: Well, I was done with high school very early, and I come from a family where everybody is a party member. So, I became politically active very young. And that is the way it went. In the beginning, like other young people, I was thinking that I have to work hard now, and then later life will be easier, right. So, I postponed all those things that young women usually do, until we had beaten the dictatorship: studies, work, even boyfriends, parties and such. I was very active and involved in the organization, had several promotions, and had a <u>lot</u> of responsibility in the end. You could say that I had a career at home. I have many years of political experience.
>
> EO: See, I had the feeling that there should have been something [on those empty years on the timeline]...

Mrs: Oh yes, something.

EO: = I felt that there was something...

Mrs: = Formally, I don't have anything I can show, right. So, usually I just tell people that I got married, had children, and stayed at home, which reflects very negative on my husband. For it was not like that at all, but that is what I must say.

EO: = So, you were a full-time activist?

Mrs: Yes.

EO: For how many years?

Mrs: If I count in all years: fifteen years. (…) The last six years of those years, I was even on the payroll. That was the level [I was] in those poor structures.
So, that is it. That was my life. (Lorca 2002b:00:10)

She is a very talented and highly skilled woman, who has many years experience working with people under extremely difficult conditions. This is clearly something many employers would appreciate, but she does not feel comfortable letting people know what she has done. Secrecy was such an integral part of their safety during this period that it is still difficult to trust people with this kind of information.

Meeting the Norwegian Police

The Lorca household came as political refugees. The following story will give an example of how the state does not always act in a unified manner, and how the migrants' responses are heavily influenced by their previous experiences. The Lorcas did not behave as the Norwegian bureaucracy expected when something went wrong at their arrival in Norway:

Mrs: It is hard to leave your native country, and to leave everybody, and travel to the unknown. It is not easy. Even if there are so few other possibilities, you think about them, so it is not easy.
So, we had stopped crying only a few hours earlier over the image of our families, mothers, and everybody else in our hearts. Then we were taken by the police at the airport and arrested with the kid, who was only two and half years. I was so, We were so, provoked that we told to the police,
— We want to go back. We did not come here to be treated like this.
And, they did not understand anything.
You see, we were expecting something else. I can understand it now, but back then both parties were quite confused. When we got a translator, I told him:
— You know what, we are going back. (…) We were previously told <u>this</u>, <u>this</u> and <u>this</u>, which has not happened. It looks like that this is not valid any more. Therefore, we will go back. We have all our lives fought against being humiliated. We do not need to travel abroad to be humiliated. Not like this.
Then the policeman understood nothing. They expected just the

opposite; you are supposed to be down on your knees begging for a chance to stay as an asylum seeker.
And it was a misunderstanding, but we were verbally treated very harshly. And we had a small child, too, that cried all the time. We spent four and half hours in a room, and the police went in and out, while we were in reality imprisoned.
Then a new message arrived; there had been a mistake. Lots of talking: we had to clarify. And they changed their attitude: they wanted to help us with our luggage and the baby, and give all kinds of help. However, it was a shocking first impression of the police: They were watching out for the colored.
After that, we have never had any problems with the police. Not, that we have done anything illegal, either. It is a question of principles. I believe that the police force is an organ that is supposed to control the society. It functions by displaying force, and it is supposed to defend the established. Therefore, I always assume that the police is not on my side, as an individual, to start with. However, if I am a victim to someone who breaks the rules, then they are on my side. Nevertheless, if the confrontation is between the system and me then the loyalty of the police will be to the system, I think. (Lorca 2002b:00:34-00:39)

The decision to leave their native country and family behind and move to Norway required a leap of trust. They had been promised a safe place, however, upon their arrival the conditions were far from their expectations. The trust that they had based their decision upon was violated. Norway was supposed to be different from Chile, while the behavior of the police showed that it is not that different.

Despite their experiences Mrs. Lorca does trust the police to do its job: to catch criminals and enforce control in the society. However, she still sees herself in opposition to the system. She can go to the police if she has a problem, but it is not "her" police.

The problems they had during their arrival were actually caused by an error on the part of UDI. Mrs. Lorca recognizes the necessity of having UDI. However, she thinks they could do a better job, for example, in their own case (Lorca 2002b:00:40).

Social Welfare Office

During their first year in Norway, they were dependent on the social welfare office, like other refugees. However, they were not happy with the way the system worked.

Mrs: It looked very dark for us back then, because we were dependent on social welfare. There were no, or very few, possibilities to build a social network. It was ridden with conflicts. (Lorca 2002a:1)[173]

[173] Due to a technical failure, the first interview with Mrs. Lorca is not recorded. The references are to page numbers in my notes, which she approved next time we saw each other.

They were pushed toward the isolate corner of the grid-group diagram by the social welfare office, because the control systems removed their freedom of choice needed to sustain their own social networks.

> Mrs: The social welfare office decided everything, even what was in the refrigerator. I am sorry to have to say it, but it was shitty. (Lorca 2002a:1)

Having only limited freedom was difficult for the Lorcas, and they resented this on a personal level. The fatalistic way of life is the only one that fits easily with the kind of treatment they received from the social welfare office. The Lorcas refused to adopt the fatalistic way of organizing, and managed to gain control of their own life.

> Mrs: It was important to us to make some money, and not just receive. We have never liked the social welfare office, and just receiving money. (Lorca 2002a:1)

Making money is a way to establish self-respect and gain the freedom to consume in ways that help to create social relations.

The Lorca's attitude toward social welfare and behavior is very similar to the one displayed by the Ngas, who also rely heavily on the individualistic way of life. They both were critical about the effects receiving social welfare has on people. However, the Ngas were happy about it when they got it, while the Lorcas experienced it as something negative.

A very different case is the Herrera household, who lost control of their own spending during the period in which they received social welfare (See Social Support Created Money Problems on page 195). While the Lorcas "hated" the control the social welfare office exercised, the Herreras did not even mention this. Considering the way the Herreras spent the money, it is possible that the social welfare office subjected them to less control.[174]

Political Parties Just Administer Social Democracy

Mrs. Lorca has chosen not to get involved with politics in Norway:

> EO: Do you feel engaged in Norwegian politics?
>
> Mrs: I have chosen not to, because, on the one hand, I have changed my views. I am not longer a member of the party I was active in. On the other hand, I do not identify with any particular party, because of ideological reasons, political issues, and the ways they conduct politics. I am not happy with any one of the parties. So, I have my political views, and prefer voluntary organizations to political parties. (Lorca 2002b:00:16)

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[174] The Lorca and Herrera households are refugees from Chile, however, they came to different cities, which could explain the two apparently different practices by the local social welfare office.

It does not seem likely that she will find a party to identify with, as she sees problems on several levels: ideology, choice of issues, and behavior. Notice, also, how Mrs. Lorca thinks that all Norwegian parties are social democratic, and that the ideological range in Norway is much smaller than in Chile.

> Mrs: (…) even Carl I. Hagen would be considered a leftist by the extreme right in Chile. And those who belong to the left in Norway, would be considered gravitating towards the right by socialists in Chile
> (…)
> The bottom line is that there is not much difference between them. Which could be connected to that political parties around the world today are basically just administrators. (Lorca 2002b:00:19)

Mrs. Lorca views the parties as merely competing over how to administer the social democratic order. They do not provide people with real alternatives. In this way, political ideologies and programs are obsolete. At the same time, election campaigns are becoming more Americanized, and we are asked to trust persons more than parties. In addition, when the party programs do not differ, differences in trust are the only basis left for choosing between politicians. This is a dilemma for Mrs. Lorca, because she does not trust politicians.

Even if Mrs. Lorca is critical of the political system, she thinks that the Scandinavian welfare model works: at least there is a functioning democracy in Norway.

Schools Do Not Differentiate Enough

The line between private and public can be seen in the household's relation to school. Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households will prefer to maximize the private space and limit the public areas of influence. Mrs. Lorca's ideals of upbringing seem to fit this:

> K: Children should be raised up at home, not at school! (Lorca 2002a:4)

This is quite different from the hierarchical Nguyen family, who prefers to let teachers, the trained professionals decide (on page 156).

Mrs. Lorca tells me the following story to show how the public school does not provide her daughter with enough challenges and possibilities:

> K: On a meeting for parents, the teacher complained that my daughter wants to answer every time, while there are twenty-five other students, too. My daughter answered that he could wait a few seconds, but if the others do not want or do not KNOW she cannot take responsibility for that. (Lorca 2002a:5)

Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households dislike (and view) institutions limiting individual freedom, which seems to be the case here. Two of the most central individualistic traits are low accountability and high competitiveness, while in hierarchy competition is curtailed by elaborate rules, and in egalitarianism by norms of similarity. Thus, in a hierarchical or egalitarian household this story would have been told as an example of improper behavior, whereas in an individualistic household it is an example of the right kind of competitive spirit and good skills, which will justly allow a person to improve his or her condition.

Mrs. Lorca has clear opinions about the strong and weak sides of the public school system. She thinks that her children are lucky because they have attended school in Norway. The Norwegian schools have a higher standard than schools in Chile, particularly when it comes to taking care of the weak pupils, the schools' social profile, and the variety of experiences the schools provide the children. However, she is worried about budget cuts reducing the possibilities schools have to offer the children.

> Mrs: (…) I have never believed that my children should be brought up only by the school. In addition, when it comes to education —not only upbringing—also education is someting me and my husband share with the school. It is not only the school that will educate my children. That is my principle. Therefore, my opinions differ from those who grew up in Norway, and can compare themselves with their parent-generation, and the possibilities they had and so on. #
> That is what I think. However, the school has a rule about treating children equally, which is a problem for me. Even considering all the possibilities the schools are giving [for the children]. What are we supposed to do with the children that have more potential? That is a great weakness. (Lorca 2002b:00:28)

Mrs. Lorca is making a point of her involvement in educating their children in order to release their potential. These kinds of arguments are rooted in an individualistic bias. She even argues against the principle of treating children equally, which is one of the core egalitarian principles.

Her ambivalence is clarified when she argues for talented children to be helped in furthering their development.

> Mrs: It is not only about helping the individual to develop and enjoy, it is also about society. The children with special talents should be considered individually, because they will later contribute to the society through whatever they are good at. This kind of weaknesses in the system, make me sympathize for the private, or at least private options for this should grow larger and larger. #### (Lorca 2002b:00:30)

Mrs. Lorca believes that giving the talented better follow-up would be best for the whole society. This argument is based on the idea that people's contribution to society is dependent on their talent or their skill. The results for the society count, and not the principles involved; hence, a cost-benefit analysis would show that the present investments are smaller than the future rewards. She is here confirming two of the predictions made about individualistic households. First, she trusts successful individuals more than institutions. Second, the well-being of our society depends on the contributions of individuals. Institutions limit freedom, and hence reduce the potential individuals have to create resources.

Again, the structure of the argument fits the individualistic way of organizing. However, there is an internal tension in her arguments, as she still believes that the best would be to improve the public school system in order to make it more resistant toward pressures against privatization. She is trying to reconcile the best from both the individualistic and egalitarian arguments (Lorca 2002b:00:31).

Does this represent a problem for cultural theory? The answer is a double no. First, several signs point toward a household that has changed their style of organizing from strict egalitarian to more individualistic. We are observing change, not a problem. Second, one must separate institutions from arguments. Cultural theory claims that it is difficult to create lasting institutions based on two competing ways of organizing. However, there is nothing that inhibits making arguments that support two ways of organizing simultaneously. Actually, arguments in any kind of regime (a temporary cooperation or combination of two ways of organizing) need to satisfy supporters and institutions from both ways of organizing (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4).

Double Standards in Competence Evaluation

The individualistic view of justice emphasizes the importance of skills, rather than other, hereditary characteristics—everybody should have the possibility to advance in life according to their skills, independent of their social background. Consequently, recruitment based on hereditary principles, like ethnicity, is unjust and discriminatory according to individualism, as people's skills are disregarded.

As one would expect from an individualistic household, Mrs Lorca seems to share this position. She comments on how the competence migrants have is not recognized, no matter how high it is:

> Mrs: What goes wrong? One is never considered good enough with the language. No matter how long we have lived in Norway, we are not good enough. However, a Norwegian is highly skilled after one year in Chile. (Lorca 2002a:p.4)

There is, then, a double standard that the Norwegians do not recognize themselves. A Norwegian living in Chile becomes a highly skilled specialist in the local language and culture after only one year, whereas migrants permanently living in Norway will never achieve a "good enough" competence in Norwegian culture and language. Moreover, even the competence migrants possess with regard to their previous homelands is not utilized; when information about Chile is needed, people ask a Norwegian "expert" on Chile, instead of a migrant. Because Mrs. Lorca is not treated justly by the majority, she interprets this as a message: "you are not truly welcome." This kind of belief could easily become a factor impeding integration into the majority society.

The Lorca household's view of justice seems to fit well with the prediction that individualistic households understand justice to mean equality of opportunity.

Native Language Education

The children in the Lorca household do not receive extra education in Spanish in school, because of their good Norwegian skills.

> Mrs: The situation is paradoxal. The reason I did not do anything about it is that I admit my children's native language is Norwegian. (…) However, there is no reason in the world why they should forget their Spanish. Quite in the contrary. (Lorca 2002b:00:33)

Mrs. Lorca has given up her dream of going back to Chile, and she recognizes that her children are more Norwegian than Chilean.

Becoming a Member of a Society and the Fear of Strangers

When the question of membership in society must be settled, hierarchy emphasizes tradition and background, preferring controlled inclusion, with institutions providing help for adaptation. Egalitarianism emphasizes similarity, which can lead either to the inclusion of migrants, because we are all humans, or to the exclusion of migrants, because they can never become like us anyway. Individualism, though, is more open and resorts to an evaluation of skills. In a truly individualistic society there should be no reason not to treat a migrant as a member of the society, if he or she possess the right skills. Mrs. Lorca's statement is close to what one would expect in an individualistic household:

> K: The fear of the strange was different in Chile. We are all foreigners, a mix of backgrounds. We are used to it. There the Spanish accent determines it, not your looks, nor your last name. If you speak fluent Spanish you are Spanish. Period.
> Here, the name means still too much. The multicultural society is quite new. (Lorca 2002a: p.3)

Mrs. Lorca feels that Norway does not allow migrants to become real members of the society, in contrast to Chile, where language skills are sufficient for inclusion into the society.

A Change of Lifestyle Requires a Change of Views

The Lorca household seems to have changed from being a highly disciplined family with a double life that allowed them to both sustain a cover and to be political activists. They acted upon something they believed in, even if they knew that it would endanger them. They were dependent on trusting each other and the people around them for their lives. The need for secrecy was real and they had their cover-up stories to keep track of.[175]

After their arrival in Norway the setting has changed completely: They are safe; they are not dependent on other people in the same way; their lives are out in the open; they are not dependent on elaborate minute planning to coordinate secret meetings; and they can associate themselves with people of their own choosing. The individualistic traits have become more prominent over time; however, they still use some justifications from the egalitarian way of organizing. Their present behavior and manner of organizing their social life seems to point toward a more individualistic way of organizing. Their life situation has changed radically, and they have responded to these changes.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

To summarize, the Lorca household's internal organization and their helping relations show many individualistic traits: the appointment Mrs. Lorca made for the interview did not include Mr. Lorca, as they merely inform each other of what they are doing (I); there is a critique of traditional gender roles (h) and many references to equality (E); however, the division of household work is ultimately justified by skill (I); they are willing to move and go after opportunities (I); their economic management is characterized by Mr. Lorca's lack of accountability and Mrs. Lorca's entrepreneurship (I); they have also shown an ability to reduce consumption when needed (I); they have a large social network consisting of those social relations they want to keep (I).

How do the Lorca household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? The Lorca's views of society and politics are also quite individualistic, but with some other traits, too: Mrs. Lorca sees herself in opposition to the police and the system (h); she rejects the control the social welfare office was trying to enforce (f), because of the limited possibilities to build social networks (I); she thinks children should be raised at home, not at school (I); institutions limit freedom (I); she rejects equality as a principle in schools (e), while she prefers to build upon the public school system (E); society benefits if the talented are encouraged (I); and justice is about equal opportunity based on skill (I). As several of these other traits criticize alternatives to the individualistic way of organizing, they actually strengthen her individualistic arguments.

[175] Cultural theory does not have a ready interpretation of a family that lives a double life. The hidden part of their lives is probably the more "real one," which dominates the overt one.

The Maheswarans: a Career Builder and a Homemaker

So far we have met two predominately individualistic households, the Ngas from Vietnam and the Lorcas from Chile. The next household, the Maheswaran household, shares more similarities with these two than with the hierarchical Tamil household presented earlier.

Quick Overview

Mr. Maheswaran had to flee Sri Lanka because of his student political activities. Like many others he came to Norway on a student visa and worked hard to make a living. Here he met his future wife, who is a second generation Tamil in Norway. Mrs. Maheswaran is the homemaker, whereas Mr. Maheswaran is the breadwinner and career builder. Mr. Maheswaran is a hardworking entrepreneur, who has worked his way up in a corporation. They now live in a beautiful house in a suburb.

I have chosen to include them in this presentation, because they are a good example of how a husband and wife team does not always agree. While their behavior, cultural bias, and social relations fit the individualistic way of life in many ways, I believe that Mr. Maheswaran is more individualistic than Mrs. Maheswaran. Where several households portray themselves as one cohesive unit, in this household the husband and wife seem to have somewhat different preferences and social relations, which they bring into their common household.

The Internal Life of the Household

Mr. Maheswaran has made a good career, which he is proud of, and he is not afraid to show it (as egalitarian households might be). Not only has he risen to a high position in the company, he can also demonstrate his success by showing that he earns more money than his peers, thus revealing two individualistic traits: competiveness and the use of money as a proxy for success.

> Mr: I am a person who always sets goals. I have achieved to become the best paid person in the whole corporation in a comparable position. So, now is time for the next step. I cannot just sit in the same place, same position, forever. I have to move on.
>
> E: Does it become boring?
>
> Mr: No, not boring, I enjoy the work, but I have to develop myself. (Maheswaran 2004:02:55)

Where the hierarchical household's career orientation is toward loyalty and job security, the individualistic household is concerned with work as a means for self-development.

In some ways there is a typical gender based division of labor in the Maheswaran household: he is the male breadwinner and she is the female caretaker, working part-time by choice.[176] However, when Mrs. Maheswaran describes their division of labor, it is quite flexible, changing on a day-to-day basis, and the justifications used are not connected to gender. Instead, the justifications are connected to skill: the person who is better at a certain task, or who has time available, takes care of it (Maheswaran 2002b:00:37). The justifications are similar to the ones used by the Lorcas (on page 219), who also rely on the individualistic way of life.

The Maheswarans own a house in a suburb. The house was not lavishly decorated; however, it is stylish, with many objects of art, and few signs of family life. I did not observe any family pictures on the walls of the one floor that was shown to me. The layout was open with no clear division between the kitchen and the two living rooms, one of which served as the TV lounge. The house seemed clean and well organized, especially considering that they have small children.

Food Habits are Enforced by a Global Grandmother

Mr. Maheswaran tells me that he has changed, and that his household meals are served at flexible times, depending on other activities and how hungry they are. Usually they serve Norwegian food (Maheswaran 2002a:01:05). Mr. Maheswaran compares himself to his brother's household, which consists of Mr. Maheswaran's brother, his Tamil wife, their children, and grandmother Maheswaran. Mr. Maheswaran makes a point about how his brother's household has a very strict schedule: breakfast, lunch, and dinner are served at the same time everyday, and the food should be from Ceylon. Mr. Maheswaran's changed habits create some tension when grandmother Maheswaran comes for a visit, as she expects to eat at fixed times. In terms of cultural theory this can be interpreted as a conflict between a high-grid and a low-grid household. Alternatively, one could describe this as a conflict between Tamil and Norwegian cultural practices.

Grandmother Maheswaran travels from country to country, spending a few months with each of her children and numerous grandchildren, spreading love and strict food habits. To my surprise, grandmother Maheswaran and others in her generation seem to be more transnational than their grown-up children. Some of those with global lives are not executives, students, or tourists, but grandparents, who are following their family all over the globe.[177]

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[176] See Fraser (1994) for a presentation of the concepts.

[177] In another family I was witnes to an interesting discussion, which showed that, among these global grandparents, healthcare is shopped for on a global basis, as one of the grandparents was planning for surgery in India. I expected them to prefer the Norwegian, or at least Western European, hospitals, however, for this particular problem, they were confident that it was best to go to India.

Economy

The Maheswaran household has several distinct features typical of the individualistic way of managing a household economy. Mr. Maheswaran has a good salary, which they can live comfortably on, even if it is fixed. Therefore, Mrs. Maheswaran does not really need to work, however, when they anticipate extra expenses, she works extra. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:12-01:18). In other words, her work is a way to manage their income. Other individualistic traits are their ability to cut down on their spending when needed (on page 234), his strong sense of entrepreneurship (on page 237), and the lack of an upper limit for spending (see below).

They both have an overview of their economic situation, but Mrs. Maheswaran pays their regular bills. He seems to be the big spender, while she tries to limit his spending:[178]

> Mr: I want this and that, and then she says,
> — No, that is enough.
> Then we stop. When I need something, I cannot take all decisions, because I can be wrong, too. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:22)

While we discuss how he would like to spend 200.000 crowns[179] on a new high-status hobby, Mrs. Maheswaran changes the topic back to our previous discussion:

> Mrs: When I think about it, most of the decisions we make, when you want something then… If I say,
> — No, we will not buy this.
> You still buy it. It is always like that. ((everybody laughs a bit.)) I actually have many examples. This applies at least sometimes. However, we both did agree upon buying the couch. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:23)

Mrs. Maheswaran is pointing out how Mr. Maheswaran is not quite as accountable as he would like to present himself. Low accountability is typical for individualism. What is more revealing, she is challenging her husband in front of a stranger, a behavior that would be rude in a hierarchical household.

Mr. Maheswaran's dream of investing in this new hobby shows that he is not dissuaded by excessive demands (see page 76), like the Herreras, who had to hide their wealth from their relatives (on page 194). The demand for symmetrical exchange that is part of the individualistic way of organizing makes it easier to consume publicly. Mr. Maheswaran seems rather happy to show his wealth to the outside world: he is a successful company man, with his company car, new house, beautiful wife, and children.

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[178] This accountability issue is also present with the Lorcas (on page 220), who, however, have much less money to spend.

[179] This amount is comparable to one year's low-income salary after taxes. In 1999 the average income after taxes for a migrant household (with children) from Asia, Africa, Central- or South America was 325 000 NOK (SSB 2001a).

According to Mr. Maheswaran, the majority population assumes that migrants are poor people coming to Norway for economic reasons. However, this is not always right. Even if he himself has had cleaning jobs in Norway, he grew up in a wealthy family, where the family's private driver drove him to school everyday (Maheswaran 2002a:00:34).

Goal Orientation

Mr. Maheswaran is very goal oriented, and advises people to stick to their goals. He has made a good career in the company, even if he had to start from the bottom (Maheswaran 2002a:01:01). This goal orientation also applies to the household economy:

> Mr: For example, if I have 100 crowns, I will live for those 100 crowns. I will not spend more than 100 crowns. Or if I decide, this month I will save 50 crowns, then I will save it, and live on the other 50 crowns. I always plan like this. I have always done it like this. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:51)

When they decided to buy a house, they moved first to a student home, because this allowed them to save enough money. The individualistic way of life makes it easier to temporarily cut down on needs and, thus, on expenses, in order to reach a goal.

So, Who is a Tamil, Anyway?

Mrs. Maheswaran is a second-generation migrant, who had to create her own place both in the household and in the society. At home Mr. and Mrs. Maheswaran speak mainly Norwegian, as this is their best common language. She is trying to learn more Tamil, and their children do get some extra Tamil language education (Maheswaran 2002a:01:31).

Mrs. Maheswaran tells about her identity:

> Mrs: We visited Sri Lanka, and I felt myself like a stranger there. I thought that I would get a better relationship to the country, but I was simply a stranger. ( ) the language and everything, people, too. I feel myself more like a Norwegian. People treat me like a Norwegian because of the language. ## When we have Tamil visitors, we speak mostly Norwegian. And a Tamil couple we have very close contact with treats me like a Norwegian. It is not like being a real Tamil. (Maheswaran 2002b:00:10)

In order to be a full member of the local Tamil community one needs to know the language, whereas her language skills are limited. It seems like she feels it a burden that other Tamils need to speak Norwegian around her.

> Mrs: But I actually feel more…, when I am with Tamils, I feel like I am one of them. However, at the same time I do feel a bit distanced, because of the language, as I do not understand everything they say. And when I am

> with Norwegians, I feel myself completely Norwegian. And suddenly, I just forget that I am not. Right? (Maheswaran 2002b:00:13)

Mrs. Maheswaran lacks an easy identity: Her limited Tamil skills separate her from the "real" Tamils, and at the same time, her appearance separates her from the majority population.[180] This is a situation that many second-generation migrants meet (Andersson 2000).

The Household and their Friends

Getting Away from the Relatives

Mr. Maheswaran had to leave Sri Lanka, because he had publicly opposed the government as a student. However, he had time to plan and organize his departure, and had a choice between several different countries and schools. He comes from a hierarchical family, which he found difficult during his youth, as it constricted his freedom (Maheswaran 2002a:00:10).

> Mr: I was accepted to schools in England and in Australia, but I chose Norway, because I have no relatives here. Whereas I do in the other countries. ((laughs)) (…)
> There are relatives, and I have always wanted to stand on my own feet..
> (…)
> So, I thought, —Oh no, if I go to England or Australia, then I will be with relatives again, and they will watch after me again, and stuff. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:08)

This youthful quest for freedom and independence is a typical anti-hierarchical and individualistic behavior.

After the death of his father, Mr. Maheswaran, being the oldest, assumed some responsibility for his siblings, and has even managed to get one sibling and his mother to Norway.

Being a second generation migrant, Mrs. Maheswaran has most of her family in Norway: her parents and her siblings, of whom several are married to members of the majority population. Some of her uncles and aunts live in town, too. Her kin consists of three family units living in the neighborhood, and four in other parts of town. In addition, her distant family lives all over Europe and North America. Mr. Maheswaran's family is considerably smaller: his mother lives with his brother in another city in Norway; and his two other siblings live in Western Europe. Overall, his closest relatives are on the other side of the country, while hers are in the same suburb.

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[180] The next story she tells is connected to looking different, and how people do not know how to address her in some situations (Maheswaran 2002b:00:14).

I will present their large network of friends starting from neighbors and moving away in physical distance. Some of their friends live in the same neighborhood: one majority family with small children, like the Maheswarans; one Tamil family, who are mainly Mr. Maheswaran's friends; and one helpful man, who migrated to Norway from Southeast Asia. Mrs. Maheswaran still has good contact with her friends from school and the neighborhood she grew up in, as well as two colleagues. Mr. Maheswaran has two Tamil friends from the time he was living in a student dorm, and there are six people from his work, half of them Tamils, that he keeps contact with outside working hours. In other parts of Norway there are four people they keep in touch with: she has a friend from her student years, and he has three friends that go all the way back to Sri Lanka.

The Maheswaran household's current social relations show a balance between family and friends. There are a total of thirteen families (kin and non-kin) and nineteen individuals that they mention in their social network. One pattern is that all family units are either kin or neighbors, whereas non-kin social relations are mainly individuals (with the exception of the two families in the neighborhood). Households that relied upon egalitarian and hierarchical ways of organizing had many, sometimes even mainly, households on their list of friends. Another individualistic feature is the lack of common friends—the friends are presented to me as either his or hers.

They mentioned one household, whom nowadays they have a somewhat difficult relationship with, because of a work related problem. Interestingly enough, the Lorcas also mentioned a problematic relationship, whereas none of the hierarchical or egalitarian households mentioned a problematic social relation. This is probably a question of what they present and what they keep out of my view.

Finding Help without Social Relations

Mr. Maheswaran arrived in Norway alone, without support from either relatives or friends, so the staff at the folk high school managed to find him a place to stay for the first few days.[181] He believed that the only solution for housing was the market:

> Mr: They arranged for me to stay for the first two days with an older man. After that I had to walk around and knock on doors ((laughs)) and ask ((coughs)). How can I manage to knock on every door? ((laughs)). But I did. When I have come all the way from Sri Lanka to Norway, I must be able to. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:18)

In order to stand on his own feet he must do things he has never done before. After a few complications, the story ends with the school staff finding an apartment

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181 Many folk high schools do have a special course for immigrants who want to learn norwegian language and culture. The folk high school movement is a characteristically Nordic phenomenon which started in the middle of the 19th century in Denmark, followed by Norway, Sweden and Finland. Folk high schools provide opportunities in general education, primarily for young adults. These schools are different from secondary schools, high schools and higher education.

for him. This time his newly acquired social relations provided him with a better solution than he was able to find through the market.

Entrepreneurship

Mr. Maheswaran shows many signs of individualistic entrepreneurship.

> Mr: I am considering changes now. I am a bit tired of working. I have worked for many years. I ponder whether I should stay and build upon my current job, or whether I should quit, and start my own business. I have been thinking, but I haven't got that far yet. I have just bought a house and stuff. So, there are many things I should, but I am always on alert. ((laughs.)) Yes, everybody says that. ## I have succeded on one path, and must keep it very safe because of the small children, you know. If I did live alone, I could try out lots of things— experiment all the way. Anyway, I am very happy now. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:09).

There are at least three individualistic traits here. First, Mr. Maheswaran is always "on alert," and ready to grab the opportunities that emerge in front of him. He believes that most people are not on the alert, even if they claim so. This is a variation of the individualistic household's inclination to blame people for not trying hard enough.

Second, risk-taking is typical for individualism. We can see how Mr. Maheswaran is willing to take chances and experiment with projects; however, his recent entry into parenthood requires him to create a secure environment for the children. Nevertheless, two years later, he has indeed started his own company (Maheswaran 2004).

Third, and perhaps a little more hidden, is his willingness to move on. Even if Mr. Maheswaran has climbed the career ladder, starting from the bottom and finishing at the top of one company, he does not feel bound to them in the same way as Mr. Nguyen, who relies more on the hierarchical solidarity (on page 153). Mr. Maheswaran's loyalty is toward his own opportunities, while Mr. Nguyen's loyalty is toward his first employer.

Different Relationships of Help

Mrs. Maheswaran explains to me that they have different types of relationships that involve helping each other. Her parents have helped them a lot, and this is not something that is calculated and reciprocated. However, when she talks about babysitting for her siblings, she is a bit upset that they do not babysit as much for her. In other words, babysitting for each other should be based upon a reciprocal exchange relation (Maheswaran 2002b:00:43).

> EO: You are there for quite many different people: your siblings and his brother..

> Mrs: Yes, we are very much like that. I am there for the people on my side of the family, and he is there for the people on his side. But, it has always been like that in his family. I think they are more connected than I am to my family. But it is surely because their childhood. Right? They have stronger bonds in some way. And then they have lived in Sri Lanka, and experienced much war. In addition, his mother lived here a few years, and the bonds are stronger then. (Maheswaran 2002b:00:49)

Everything is relative: Mr. Maheswaran emphasizes how he has changed, and how he tries to avoid social control by the kin (on page 232 and 235). Nevertheless, Mrs. Maheswaran emphasizes how his bonds are still stronger than her own. They both show individualistic bias, but his family is tighter, and shows hierarchical characteristics. Therefore, he prefers to keep a certain distance, to gain enough space to be comfortable. One should also notice how the spouses feel responsibility mostly for their "own" kin: she helps her relatives and he helps his relatives.

Helping other people is not limited just to kin. Mr. Maheswaran regularly sends funds to an organization in Sri Lanka that helps orphans from the civil war.

> Mr: I feel like I must. I am doing something for my country and people. I am doing well, so I have to give something back. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:54)

Mr. Maheswaran has a clear Tamil identity and loyalty; however, he made it clear that he does not support the Tamil Tigers. His choice of receiver fits well with the hierarchical solidarity, while his justification "to give something back" is a typical individualistic justification.

Politics and the Welfare State

The Maheswaran household has shown clear individualistic traits both in their internal organization and in their social relations. Now it is time to see if their views of society and politics fit the predictions about individualistic households.

Mrs. Maheswaran is a second-generation migrant, and in many ways more Norwegian than Tamil. Her experiences resemble the majority population's experiences, even if her appearances do not—a condition Cathrine Sandnes, who was herself adopted from abroad, describes as being "white inside" (Sandnes 2004). In order to keep the focus on the first-generation migrants, I will, in the following, focus more on Mr. Maheswaran's experiences.

Relaxing the Name Law

According to Mr. Maheswaran, the Tamils have had some problems with their names and name traditions in Norway; however, the increase of possibilities for changes in the new Law of Personal Names has made things easier.[182]

On the visa application forms Mr. Maheswaran had to fill out at his arrival in Norway, he was asked to fill in his first, middle and family name, which is a structure that does not fit well with the Tamil name tradition, based more on the father's name. Therefore, the name in his passport is not really *his* name. However, Mr. Maheswaran and his brother are now using Maheswaran as their family name (Maheswaran 2002a:01:38).

Student Years and Work Permits

Mr. Maheswaran's school credits from Sri Lanka were not accepted, and in order to gain access to college in Norway he had to go through the high school system for a second time. Unfortunately, because of a lack of information, he ended up in a program that did not allow him to continue on to medical school.

He is very resourceful and managed to hold sometimes three jobs simultaneously, while studying for a Norwegian high school diploma. He used some of the money he made to provide for his brother, because this was a precondition for getting a student visa for his brother.

Mr. Maheswaran's experiences with the Norwegian authorities started as negative, while now he is more positive. During the first years there were many practical problems with being a migrant, as applications to school, a student visa, work permits, tax forms, and so forth, were all dependent on each other. In addition, they all took too long to process, which created problems for making a living. However, Mr. Maheswaran thinks that the state now has a more realistic understanding, as those who want to work can work, which reduces the pressure on the social welfare system (Maheswaran 2002a:00:32).

In the early 1990s the Maheswaran brothers decided that they could not go back to Sri Lanka, and applied for asylum, which was granted in just three months. Obviously, their need for protection was real. However, the timing of their application was influenced by their problems in getting a visa to visit their relatives in England (Maheswaran 2002a:00:48).

Citizenship—from Visa to Loans

Like many other migrants, Mr. Maheswaran says that the original reason for applying for Norwegian citizenship was that it made it easier to travel abroad.

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[182] The name law—or The Law of Personal Names, became valid January 1st 2003 (Ot.Prp. 19 2004-2005) .

> Mr: In the 90s I was thinking OK: In Norway there is no problem to have a Sri Lanka citizenship, as long as I have my residency permit—not a problem. But if I travel abroad, I can do it without applying for a visa. Having a Norwegian passport makes it easy. (Maheswaran 2004:02:00)

Later, other aspects became important. He has now started his own business, and it is easier to get a large loan from the bank when you are a citizen.

Social Support

Mr. Maheswaran has relied upon the social welfare office only once: the one summer he did not apply early enough for summer jobs, he got a 3000-crown loan, which he, like any other student, had to pay back in the autumn, when he got his student loan.

Cultural theory would predict that in an individualistic household social support is viewed negatively: people are guided by their natural self-interest, and social support will destroy a healthy structure of incentives.

Mr. Maheswaran's statements fit well into cultural theory's predictions. He thinks that the medically disabled should be allowed permanent support, and refugees should get a starting package, but there should be more restrictions:

> Mr: But they should not give social support over prolonged periods, so that people will not want to work anymore. Otherwise, I think that everybody will go to the social welfare office to get some money. (Maheswaran 2004:16:20)

If everybody uses the social welfare office, then human nature is indeed both selfish and lazy, which is as predicted of an individualistic household.

Not so Long-Term Politics

Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households have a short-term perspective on the economic matters and they have little interest in giving forms of support that are not reciprocated.

Mr. Maheswaran fits this prediction well as he thinks that the biggest mistake in public politics today is the state oil fund:[183]

> Mr: I personally think that the oil fund (.hh) should have been used here in Norway to reduce taxes and gasoline prices, instead of that my grandchildren will have it a little better (they are saving for the long term). But, I am not having it that great. Why should I worry about my grandchildren hundred years down the line? The state should use some

[183] The oil fund is the Norwegian state's way of saving some of the currently high tax revenues from oil- companies for future generations (which is an argument used to sell it to hierarchs and egalitarians), and to prevent overheating of the economy (which is an argument individualists can accept, because it prioritizes the present).

> money now, invest more money into the society. (Maheswaran 2004:09:35)

The individualistic cultural bias cares about the present, not the future generations, because history shows that progress and growth are almost inevitable. Thus, saving for the future is counterproductive: it is better to invest the money now, in order to create growth in the economy.

Norwegian Political System has Weaknesses

Mr. Maheswaran sees several weaknesses in the Norwegian political system. First, he tells me in a very engaged manner how people in Sri Lanka are more politically interested and engaged than Norwegians. There 75 percent of voters participated in the election, while only 61 percent[184] participated here in Norway (Maheswaran 2002a:00:35). It is clear that he has a good knowledge of politics, and that he feels strongly about it. This should not be a surprise, for even though he came to Norway as a student, he was actually fleeing because of his student political activities.

Secondly, and as expected in an individualist household, he is critical of the political system because it is not able to produce results. Politics is similar to business: if the leaders are not able to deliver results, something is wrong. In addition, the scope of politics is too large, as it limits the possiblities for people to make their own choices.

> E: So, you think that people should be allowed to decide more.
>
> Mr: Yes, today's political system in Norway is not good enough. They must change the whole culture. I think politicians cannot get things through because of a lot of rules and regulations. (Maheswaran 2004:13:20)

The blame is placed on rules and regulations, which fits well with predictions about individualistic views of institutions. An egalitarian household could have joined in in blaming the red tape, but the criterion for evaluation of a political system would have been the sufficient participation of the people, not just the ability to produce change. A hierarchical household would have probably emphasized how these rules and regulations actually are the core of the political system.

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

The Maheswaran household shows the type of consistency between a household's way of organizing and their view of society and politics that cultural theory predicts. The Maheswaran household shows many individualistic traits in their internal

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[184] The average electoral participation in the 1999 municipal elections was 60.4% in Norway. (SSB 1999). The average electoral participation in the 2001 parliamentary election was (SSB 2001b) 75.5% in Norway.

organization and social relations: their flexible, skill-based internal organization of the household (I); their strong sense of entrepreneurship, with an emphasis on goal orientation; their being on alert for opportunities (I); their economic management strategy, in which income is increased to match the expenses, the ability to cut down on spending when needed, his lack of accountability, and the willingness for visibly high consumption (I); their view of careers as a means for self-development (I);[185] their social relations, which consist of a large network of people, with a mixture of different helping relations, however, with an emphasis on symmetrical exchange (I); friends are not shared (I); and they are critical of, or at least distance themselves from, a fixed dining schedule (h) and controlling relatives (h).

How do the Maheswaran household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? I did find, several traits that do fit the predictions: a view of social support as corruptive (I) and people as self-interested (I); a priority for present generations, together with a critique of long-term planning (I); a view of the scope of the democratic game as too large (I), combined with a critique of the political system's ability to produce changes, because of too many rules and regulations (h). There are no traits that fail to fit well with the predictions, as the critique of hierarchical solutions just emphasizes why the individualistic solutions are better.

[185] This is connected to the justification of division of household work, and thus a trait about the household, not politics and society in general.

The Truongs: What Happens, Happens

The Truong household is included as an example of a household that relies on the fatalistic way of organizing in many situations.

Quick Summary:

The Truong household is a couple from Vietnam with two children born in a refugee camp before the family's arrival in Norway in the early 1990s. They have both studied a trade in Norway and easily found work related to their education at the end of the 1990s, but due to bad business both have been laid off at least once. Currently he is employed in a factory, because it pays better and it is probably a stable company. She has been unemployed for the last two years. Nevertheless, they own their own apartment in a suburb.

The Household

The Truong household relies regularly on the fatalistic way of organizing. Their way of organizing can be identified based on cultural bias (their fatalistic attitude to life), behavior (time use and help), and their social relations.

Mrs. Truong is my main informant in the household, perhaps because, being unemployed, she has more time available. I had a chance to talk with Mr. Truong during both interviews, and he seemed eager to participate and help, but left soon due to other engagements.

Due to a request by the Truongs, the interviews are not taped. My notes contain the main statements only and not a complete word-by-word transcript as I have for most of the other households. However, the statements are reconstructed and presented as closely to the originals as possible. The references after quotes are to pages in my notes, and not to the duration of interview.

Random Time Use & Division of Labor

Mrs. Truong likes their household's random schedule:

> Mrs: We don't have a fixed schedule. We take it as it comes. I do not want a fixed schedule. It is a sick thing. (Truong 2002:4)

Mrs. Truong prefers to take things as they come, which fits well with the fatalistic lack of planning. Simultaneously, she protests against a more hierarchical fixed schedule, which strengthens this interpretation.

However, their division of labor at home is not random, as one would have expected of a fatalistic household: she does most of the domestic work, while he makes the money, cleans the house, and drives their children to various activities. It seems like two constraints have influenced their division of labor heavily. First, he has employment, while she does not. Second, he has a driver's license, while she does not. In a fatalistic way of organizing, these kinds of external constrains are expected to have a large influence (others in Mrs. Truong's situation might just acquire a drivers license). However, this same division of labor could be justified in several ways. Unfortunately, I do not have enough information about their justifications, and therefore this particular interpretation in terms of cultural theory is only tentative.

Making decisions is an important part of the household's division of labor:

> Mrs: HE does not want to make decisions. In the beginning, I liked that in him, but not any more. The one who makes decisions must take responsibility. (Truong 2001:1)

She was making a point of how his dislike for making decisions, something she considers a personality trait in him, attracted her in the beginning, however, now she has started to see the flip side of the same behavior: the lack of taking responsibility. She does not like being the one who takes responsibility in the household.

Mrs. Truong manages the household economy alone:

> Mrs: He is not so good in planning. He gives all his salary to me. (Truong 2001:1)

Mr. Truong has, hence, no economic freedom. I do not know if this is his own choice (allowing Mrs. Truong to make all the financial decisions) or if it is Mrs. Truong who requires it because "he is not so good in planning." Nevertheless, the image of a household relying on the fatalistic way of organizing starts to emerge.

Resources and Consumption: Buy First and Worry Later.

Economically they rely on his salary and her unemployment benefits. They have a fixed income, and exorbitant expenses. They have a light-hearted relationship to the household's financial situation in both the long- and short-term:

> Mrs: We have been making money all the time in Norway. First, when we went to school we got a grant. Then later when I have been taking courses through the unemployment office, they pay us. Also, the state educational loan fund has paid for studies. And then we make money through working. Financially we have been fine. (Truong 2001:2)

Nowadays their largest single expense is housing. In addition to their home, their children are a strong economic priority, and I got the impression that they would go quite far in providing for their two children's education and hobbies.

The Truongs have recently purchased a nice apartment. Even if they had some extra savings, the extra security provided by the municipality was necessary to get the loan from the bank.[186] Several statements make it clear that frugality is not a priority:

> Mrs: It does not matter if the apartment is expensive or not. The most important thing is that it is spacious. (Truong 2001:4)

The apartment is beautiful, decorated in a style that one would expect to find in a Norwegian interior decorating magazine. When I probed a little more on the subject, I found that Mrs. Truong had always wanted to become a designer, but her lack of language skills put a stop to her dream in Norway. Mr. Truong's dream had been to become an artist, but he did not have good enough grades in the Norwegian school system to get an education in fine arts. The Truongs are a couple with broken dreams and good esthetic sense.

The few items present in their living room look like designer objects. I was curious about how they can afford such nice things, especially as they had purchased the apartment only recently, and she was still unemployed.

> Mrs: I buy only a few, but perhaps a bit expensive, things that I really like. I have many credit cards, and I buy first and worry about the money later. (Truong 2001:3)

Mrs. Truong does not calculate their spending, and has no real overview, which can be problematic when the bills start to come. Moreover, they had a tough period a short while ago, because they had shopped too much with their credit cards.

The interaction in the Truong household is a textbook case of a fatalistic strategy for making ends meet: he avoids decisions and responsibility; she dislikes being left with the responsibility, and solves it with credit cards—buy first and worry later. As a consequence, the constraints on their economy are now external. The real boundaries and limits of their spending are enforced by the credit card companies.

Isolate Social Relations

For a Vietnamese family the Truongs have a relatively small social circle. They keep in touch with family both in Vietnam and in Europe. They give some help to the family members in Vietnam, whereas their European relatives are not in need of any help.

The main source of face-to-face social contact seems to be the Catholic Church, and they keep in touch with four families in their church, beyond the organized activities. In addition, they keep in touch with two families they met in the refugee camp. One of them lives in town, while the other lives in a remote part of Norway.

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[186] This is a program for all low income families.

Mr. Truong's best friend in Norway, a refugee from another Asian country, moved down to Central Europe four years ago; however, they still keep in touch. When they became friends, they were both new to Norway, and lacked a common language, nevertheless, they managed to communicate enough to become friends (Truong 2002:2). In addition, he has a few colleagues he considers friends:

> Mr: I have some Norwegian collegues in town, one or two of them are friends, but I do not invite them home. I do not want to. They have their lives, I have my life. So why bother? We call sometimes, and I have visited them a few times. One of them did help me with moving here. We talk, we talk about women… (Truong 2001:2)

I find it interesting that he emphasizes the separateness of their lives, while the same person is also intimate enough to talk about women. This friend can give emotional support if needed, however, the relationship does not involve the rest of the family, and it is confined within the workplace.

She does not have close friends in the same way. Her answers give us several explanations for this:

> Mrs: I have no friends left in Vietnam. One loses many things when one leaves a country (Truong 2002:3).
>
> Mrs: I do not have good Norwegian friends because of the language (Truong 2001:3).
>
> Mrs: I am not unhappy even if I do not have collegues or friends. I need it, but I have a problem with taking contact. I cannot do anything about it. (…) I am not easy to talk with. People are different. God created us different. (Truong 2002:2)

To exaggerate a bit: Mr. Truong emphasizes the separateness of his and his local friends' lives—"why bother?" Whereas Mrs. Truong has no close friends, and cannot do anything about it. Thus, it looks like they lack the will or the ability to create new social relations, which makes change difficult. She considers her lack of friends to be a personality trait, in the same way that she considers his reluctance to take responsibility a personality trait. By labeling something a personality trait (given by God), she makes it a permanent, unchangeable feature of life.

In addition, there are many people they wanted to list as ambiguous or conflictual social contacts. The number of these persons is close to half their non-kin social contacts, which is far beyond the ratio in the other households I interviewed. One should also notice that all positive social relations in town are through the church or his work. All other local contacts are negative or indifferent according to their own account.

What is the significance of the high proportion of ambiguous or negative social contacts? Is this a feature that could be used to identify other isolate households or is it just a random feature? One could argue that in a hierarchy these negative relations are kept private and out of public view, while egalitarian institutions are likely to collectively exclude these people, and individualists would not bother to sustain these relations, so they would just disappear. Perhaps isolates do not have the same kind of control over their own social relations. It is possible that isolates have social relations forced upon them (just as the rules are forced upon them) and they are quite happy to talk about these, in contrast to the other ways of organizing.

Broken Dreams

Two typical traits of the fatalistic way of organizing are, firstly, that the households are forced to do things against their will and, secondly, that they believe more in fate than their own ability to control their lives, as events have their own logic that overwhelms their plans. The Truongs have been subjected to several experiences in which important decisions have been made outside the household: being forced to leave their homes in Vietnam; as boat refugees they had no control over whether they would survive or where they would end;[187] they did not get into the schools they wanted in Norway; and Mr. and Mrs. Truong both have been fired. In the stories they told me they find themselves most of the time on the receiving end of the events.

There were many broken dreams in this household. For example, they have one unsuccessful voluntary relocation behind them. While they both were unemployed, they decided to move, because he wanted to live closer to his relatives in the EU. They sold their first apartment and moved out of Norway, however, after a few months it became clear that Mrs. Truong and the children did not like the new social setting, and they moved back to Norway.[188]

Another example is Mrs. Truong's failed attempt to become self-employed. She wanted to start her own business, and everything was ready, with the exception of a bank loan for the start-up costs. Unfortunately, the bank was not willing to lend her the funds, so she saw no other alternative than to give it up (Truong 2001:2). As one would expect, the fatalistic solidarity (isolate social relations) does not carry enough long-term social obligations for this type of help to materialize. Had the Truong family been part of either the hierarchical or the individualistic social networks, they might have been able to find enough backing for the project to succeed, either through loans from friends or through friends willing to provide the bank with the required security for the loan.

This kind of a streak of broken dreams and unmet aspirations is characteristic of the fatalistic way of organizing. All these broken dreams have influenced Mrs. Truong's view of herself. She considers herself a failure in life, and repeatedly called

[187] I am not suggesting that any experience will automatically define what kind of cultural bias one aquires, as different people give the same experiences different meaning. However, it seems likely that such extreme experiences make it easy and perhaps efficient to turn to the fatalistic bias, while others choose to resist and fight against the events they are faced with. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990)

[188] I suspect that had they relied on some other way of organizing, they would have stayed for longer, or never left in the first place.

herself a loser. Nevertheless, she thinks that the children have the possibilities to succeed where she did not. Their children go to a private school, and take music and other lessons, which all cost extra:

> Mrs: I am a loser, so it is important for them to have a good education. Ten to twenty years from now, education will be the most important thing to give. (Truong 2001:3)

My Destiny

Belief in destiny is one of the hallmarks of the fatalistic way of organizing. Mrs. Truong herself states:

> Mrs: Happiness does not come to everyone. Every person has a destiny. (Truong 2001:4)

Destiny helps to explain both the good and the bad things that happen. This is quite different from the individualistic way of organizing, which believes that everyone can succeed if they just try hard enough. If one shares this belief, the natural conclusion for failing is that the person is to be blamed, whereas the fatalistic belief in destiny removes some of this blame, as it is all a question of luck or predestination. What happens, happens.

Do Not Expect Help

Helping others is an important form of behavior that defines social relations. The two following quotes crystallize the Truong household's position toward helping others:

> Mrs: People can ask me for help: if I can help, I will; if not, I say no. People must not expect me to help them no matter what. (Truong 2002:4)

Her first statement displays a conditional willingness to help: If helping each other works out, that is fine, and she is glad to help, but on the other hand, if it does not work out, nobody should be able to demand it from her. She is thus positioning herself in opposition to both the egalitarian and hierarchical solidarities.

In her second statement Mrs. Truong positions herself in opposition to the individualistic solidarity:

> Mrs: I do not want people to help me, and then expect to get some help back! I help someone, and then this person can help somebody else. That is when I feel that we are fellow humans. (Truong 2002:3)

The Truongs do not want their social bonds to be too inclusive, and by making it clear that helping others should not be based on exchange (individualistic solidarity) they are sustaining their own isolated style of social relations.

The Truongs have no social relations that include help as an important component. This stands in stark contrast to all the other households I have interviewed: to Mr Natan (hierarchical), who has earned his social position by helping others (on page

165); to the Ngas (individualistic), who refuse to have contact with people that do not reciprocate help (on page 210); and to the Herreras (egalitarian), who mainly help people within their own in-group, but who emphasize that everybody deserves help (on page 197).

Despite the Truong household's attitude toward helping others, they are not without social obligations. Mrs. Truong feels a strong obligation to help her parents back in Vietnam. Since they were both students, the Truongs have been sending money regularly to their parents.

> Mrs: It is my duty to help my family. (Truong 2001:2)

One should not make the mistake of assuming that the isolates are without social obligations: in an ideal-typical case of fatalistic organizing, the obligations that are present are forced upon the household from the outside and not by their own choice. In this case Mrs. Truong separates clearly between obligations toward family and obligations toward others. She prefers the non-committal isolate solidarity, while the obligations within the family are a duty that she has not chosen.

The opposite interpretation, this being a household so burdened with obligations that it is incapable of taking up any new obligations and therefore resists them, does not receive empirical support. The amounts they send to Vietnam are modest by Norwegian standards, and a household so burdened by their social obligations should show clear signs of a reduced standard of living in their home, something that was not the case.

Politics and the Welfare State

As we have seen so far the Truong household has many fatalistic traits. How do their views about society and politics fit into the fatalistic predictions?

A Norwegian Citizen Estranged from the Civic Society

Even if the Truongs are Norwegian citizens, they have a more negative view of Norwegian civic society than most of my other informants.

> Mrs: In the future I will live here. I belong here, therefore I must take Norwegian citizenship. I am from Vietnam. It is only a paper that makes it easier to be in the society, but I will not become more Norwegian. (Truong 2001:4)

Mrs. Truong feels a belonging to Norway, but even if it is possible to become a citizen, it is not possible to become one of them—that is, more Norwegian.

> Mrs: Typically Norwegian is "Norway is for the Norwegians." They do not care (...) they do not want foreigners to live in their country. (Truong 2002:3)

Mrs. Truong feels excluded and ignored by Norwegians. She feels like a stranger in the country that she is a citizen of and to which she has committed herself and her children.

Mr. Truong believes that Norwegians are not welcoming:

> Mr: The social welfare is very good, but people are not open. They do know very little about Asian countries. Norwegians are predisposed. At work people believe that things that go wrong is our fault. (Truong 2002:3)

Mr. Truong argues here for discrimination beging caused by lack of knowledge, and a negative predisposition. It is also interesting the way he contrasts Norwegian people and Norwegian institutions: "social welfare is good, but people are not open."

Mixed Identity

The Truongs are happy to be in Norway, even if they feel excluded, because it has given them safety and freedom, and they plan to stay here, because of the children, who now have Norwegian as their mother tongue.

> Mrs: We talk both Norwegian and Vietnamese with the children. I do not like to talk Norwegian at home. The children must learn where they come from. They have Norwegian citizenship, but they are not Norwegian. It is important with self-respect. (Truong 2001:3)

Again, the theme of not being Norwegian is highlighted. They are trying to remedy feeling left outside the society by giving their children a Vietnamese identity, too.

Politics

When I inquire about following politics Mrs. Truong replies:

> Mrs: I do not read Norwegian. So much has happened that I just want to take it easy. (Truong 2001:2)

The Truongs are not interested in politics (according to their own words), because they are not proficient in Norwegian. Therefore, the language barrier can also be a hindrance to political interest, not just participation. Nevertheless, I believe that the language barrier is one way of expressing their feeling that politics is an arena for the "Norwegians."

There is some similarity here to Mr. Herrera, who also has given up on politics in Norway (on page 202). However, Mr. Herrera was an active participant in Chile, and he has not given up on being part of the civic society in Norway. Nevertheless, they share the tiredness of large events and the search for a peaceful life.

Politics in Norway are also less important than in Vietnam:

> Mrs: Vietnam is a country with only one party. It is better with many parties. Therefore [politics] does not matter. (Truong 2001:4)

Mrs. Truong was also quite critical about the politicians, because she believes that while they have the power to change things they do not exercise it (Truong 2001:4). This argument relies on the fatalistic idea of one's own powerlessness, which requires that others have the power, in this case the politicians.

So far the Truongs fit the fatalistic predictions: they view politics as something other people do (they decide what we must do); they do not look upon themselves as political actors; and they seem to possess the necessary obedience and indifference to fill the fatalistic role. However, the interpretation is not strong. I suspect that it is difficult to have strong, reliable interpretations of the absence of activity, randomness, and indifference. Where a few key statements are enough to recognize patterns in the other ways of organizing, they are not enough to see the fatalistic pattern.

Their voting for the first time in the autumn of 2001 is the one trait that does not fit the predictions, as fatalists are not expected to vote. The Truongs chose the Conservative Party, for the following reasons: they believed that Labor had not done much for the poor; they wanted to try something new (which I interpret as a wish to change the government); and, in addition, they were happy with the Conservative government that was in power when they came to Norway (the gratitude-for-asylum effect is something I have seen in several families). In addition, the Truongs have shown some ambition for entrepreneurship, which can partially explain their preference for the Conservative Party.

Users of Social Benefits

There are a few fixed points in their relation to the welfare state. The first one is their own situation as newcomers to a society:

> Mrs: It is difficult to be a foreigner in a country. You have to start over again. It is a new country, new language. You start empty-handed. (Truong 2001:2)

The second one is their good knowledge of the institutions of the welfare state. When I inquired about their experiences with the municipality, they stated that they were quite happy with it, even if they had to call many people before they found the right one to talk to. For them it was important to get extra security, through the municipality, for a bank loan to buy their apartment. Another type of help they mentioned was a loan from the social welfare office, for the summer months, to unemployed students.

> Mrs: We borrowed money for two months from the social office. We had to write a contract and pay the money back. It is a right, so one just has to ask. It is not embarrassing.
> (…) But not for a whole life. We work and pay back through taxes.
> (…) the taxes are high in Norway. (Truong 2001:3)

I was surprised by this, because not many people are aware that the social welfare office is actually part of the city administration, and not a state agency. The right to social welfare is granted by the state, but it is the municipalities that administer it and cover much of the costs. Mrs. Truong even comes with a suggestion for restructuring the social welfare system. She thinks that the social welfare office should be closed and one should instead establish an office for social security and labor.[189] She argues for her suggestion by way of her own experiences and observations from the social welfare office:

> Mrs: It is ironical that everyone who goes there feels down already before they go there, and the laws and people who work there make it worse. It gives me a bad feeling. I have been there every summer, but I do not feel myself so good. (Truong 2001:3)

There is nothing particularly fatalistic about this, with the exception, perhaps, of the uninhibited proclamation regarding the frequent use she makes of their services.

In addition to social support there are other types of formal money transfers that she sees as a right, like the child benefit. As a parent she thinks child benefits are important for the household, and dislikes that they are paid only for sixteen years.

> Mrs: Child benefits. Children, they use much money when they become older. Now they cut out the child support when the kids become sixteen. It should continue to eighteen years. (Truong 2001:2)

Sometimes Mrs. Truong does not differentiate between receiving and making money:

> Mrs: We have been making money all the time in Norway. First, when we went to school, we got a grant. Then later, when I have been taking courses through the Unemployment office, they pay us. Also, the state educational loan fund has paid for studies. And then we make money through working. Financially we have been fine. (Truong 2001:2)

Mrs. Truong puts the unemployment office, the student educational loan fund, and their employers in the category of those who "pay us." For households that rely on other ways of organizing, it would be odd to mix different types of sources together. However, somebody using an individualistic voice would perhaps argue that "money is always money," but, like the Lorcas, they would probably resent the element of control involved (see page 224).

Summary of the Household's Way of Organizing and the Predictions

The Truongs are a household with a fatalistic attitude to life, partly isolate social relations, and behavioral patterns that sustain these. Nevertheless, if things had worked out better for them, they might have come out as individualists. The attempt to start a business shows that they do have some initiative and willingness

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[189] Actually, the newly created Norwegian labor and welfare organization resembles her suggestion (www.nav.no).

to try (I). They are, however, missing some of the crucial traits of individualists: the large ego-focused networks, where information and other resources can flow, and the ability (or willingness) to cut down on consumption. If the Truongs had cut down heavily on their consumption over a few years, they could have saved enough to get a start-up loan from the bank.

There are several traits in the Truong's way of organizing their household that point toward a fatalistic household: they critique the notion of a fixed daily schedule (h); decision-making is characterized by an unwillingness to take responsibility (F); their economic management style is light-hearted, based on the extensive use of credit cards, which leads to external constraints on their household economy (F); their social relations are characterized by separateness from, or the lack of, friends (F); there is a large proportion of ambiguous or conflictual social relations (F); there is only a conditional willingness to help, without obligations (F); they reject exchange (i); and there is a strong belief in destiny, which has formed their lives and their characters (F).

How do the Truongs fit the predictions made about the fatalistic view of society and politics (on pages 78-91)? When it comes to being a new citizen, it is interesting to see that they have knowledge of the political-administrative system and ideas about how things should be, but nothing implies that they actually think they could do something about it. The politicians are the powerful actors, who, for some unclear reason, do not use their powers for the good of the Truongs and others in need of help (F). The Truongs are thus left at the receiving end of the political process: they pay their taxes, collect their benefits, and let the flow of life carry them to an unknown future. They seem to have the obedience and indifference to fill the role of the fatalistic citizen (F).

Their view of resources and the distribution of resources is somewhat random. Thus, the lack of differentiation between types of resources actually fits the prediction (F). Moreover, in this case, it seems impossible to interpret their view of resources as hierarchical, egalitarian, or individualistic. In addition, their view of social support is neither hierarchical nor individualistic.

Overall, the interpretation of the Truong household's internal life and social relations as fatalistic is solid, while the interpretation of their political activities and attitudes is weaker. It is difficult to argue for a fit to randomness, but they do fit not any of the other profiles either, which would have been a strong indicator of lack of fit.[190]

We have now become familiar with the internal organization of eight households, their external helping relations, and their views of politics and society. We have seen two individualistic, two egalitarian, three individualistic households, and one

[190] To observe randomness one needs many statements from closely related topics, so that one can observe a lack of cohesion in the argumentation. While the other ways of organizing can be identified and presented through a good quote, it is almost impossible to depict randomness in the same way. Perhaps the impossiblity of finding the "right" quote is an indicator of randomness?

fatalistic household. Overall, the concepts of cultural theory allow us to see new similarities and differences between these households, and their views of politics and society fit the predictions given by cultural theory in general. We have also seen that the ways of organizing are not directly related to country of origin; in many respects, *households with the same way of organizing resemble each other more than households with the same country of origin.*

In the second chapter (on page 58) I presented five criteria for a better classification of migrants, of which the last one was being *helpful in everyday situations*. I believe that the presentation in this chapter has demonstrated how the categories of cultural theory shed light on many aspects of these households' everyday life. Cultural theory allows us to see the pattern that households are weaving into their presentations of themselves, their behavior and their justifications of their behavior. However, before cultural theory can be used to guide behavior, it must be operationalized into a particular context.

In the next chapter, we will look more closely at how these eight households' ways of organizing and their views of politics and society fit with the predictions given in the theory chapter.

Chapter 6

FINDINGS FROM THE HOUSEHOLD STUDY

This chapter contains four discussions. First, I briefly discuss the degree to which cultural theory allows us to describe a household's ways of organizing, understood as its internal organization and its external social relations that carry some form of help. These two areas are presented and discussed here as one subject area in order to keep the discussion brief. Second, based on information regarding the household's way of organizing, I will discuss cultural theory's ability to predict a household's views on politics and society. In relation to the eight households I have studied, these two discussions allow me to answer questions about *how a household's way of organizing is related to its views on politics and society*. The third discussion is about *the utility of cultural theory as an alternative way to categorize and deal with migrants*, and the final discussion sums up with a list of conclusions.

Describing Households

In the fifth chapter we saw eight households presented through the conceptual apparatus of cultural theory. How well do these households match the ideal-typical ways of organizing? How consistently are they applied in daily life? Did cultural theory enhance our understanding of these households?

We have so far, in Chapter 5, observed a good fit between each household's way of organizing and their views of politics and society. However, the presentation of households is rich in detail, which makes concluding difficult. Simplification is necessary to allow us to see the traits that are not specific to a particular household, but generic, and allow us to gaze beyond these eight households. I have argued that there is a dominant way of organizing in each of these eight households. However, in many of them there were also signs of support for several ways of organizing.

Cultural theory is not about bird watching! Putting households into theoretically defined categories simplifies the use of the theory, while in real life pure forms do not exist. Cultural theory is about social dynamics in institutions, not static boxes. It helps us to see why certain divisions of labor, certain justifications, and certain behavior go together, and why certain helping relations work for one household but not for another.

All four ways of organizing have their blind spots and flaws. Therefore, one should be careful not to use the pure or extreme versions of the four ways of organizing as *ideal* families. A household that is based on only one way of organization, while the other three ways of organizing are rejected, is fanatic by nature, and not a model to strive after.

Figure 8, below, presents a count of pro and contra traits mentioned in Chapter 5 concerning households' internal ways of organizing and their helping relations. Thus, it is a simplification that hides a particular indicator's centrality and the area of life to which it belongs. Pro and contra traits are counted separately from the summary of each household and presented respectively with positive and negative values. Pro traits support one way of life, while contra traits are either statements or behavior that is anti-egalitarian, anti-hierarchical, anti-individualistic or anti-fatalistic. For example, if we look at the second household, the Natan household, we can see that five traits are identified as supporting hierarchy, there is one pro egalitarian trait, and one pro and one contra individualistic trait. Similarly, the Nguyen household has six hierarchical traits and no other traits have been identified.

We can see in Figure 8, below, the count of indicators of internal organization and social relations for each household. Households are both different from and similar to one another. The Nguyens, from Vietnam, and the Natans, from Sri Lanka, are both dominated by the hierarchical way of organizing. The Garcia and Herrera households, both from Chile, are dominated by the egalitarian way of organizing, but we can see how the Herreras also have traits which reject individualism and support fatalism. The Ngas, from Vietnam, the Lorcas, from Chile, and the Maheswaran, from Sri Lanka, show clear individualistic traits. The Truongs, from Vietnam, rely predominately on the fatalistic way of organizing.

We can see that both hierarchical and individualistic households are from several different countries, while the egalitarian and fatalistic households have their roots in either Chile or Vietnam. However, I do believe that this is caused by the small sample. In a larger sample, I believe, there would have been more diversity.[191] However, even now, with only eight households in my sample, we can say that *country of origin does not determine a household's way of organizing*. Each household has organized itself over the years in the manner it prefers, through a series of more or less conscious choices.

[191] I have had contact with households that I suspect are fatalistic, but one has declined further participation in this project and in others it has been impossible to complete the interviews. See page 123 for more information.

Figure 8: Eight Households' Internal Organization and Social Relations (Count of indicators)



How consistent are households in terms of cultural theory? We can see that the Nguyen household organizes itself more consistently than the Natan household, as the Nguyens have only hierarchical traits, while the Natans are based on several ways of organizing. If we look at all eight households, we can see how they all have one dominant way of organizing. No household relies equally on two or more ways of organizing. However, in four of the eight households there is some support for a second or third way of organizing present. In other words, *relying on one dominant way of organizing, and borrowing a little from another, seems to be common.*

Can we measure the strength of a way of organizing? I find the measurement of strength based on a count of traits lacking in precision, as there are differences in the centrality and degree of a trait, and in addition, there are differences between the interviews. Moreover, it is possible that my operationalization of these four ways of organizing does not identify the threshold for inclusion in a way that is comparable across all four ways. However, even if it is possible to question the exact count of the various items for a particular household, I am confident that the dominant way of organizing is identified correctly for every household.

There are a few general observations concerning combinations of ways of organizing that can be made across the households. We can see that *there are no contra indications of the dominant way of organizing.* All households show consistency in relation to their dominant way of organizing. For example, none of the households relying mainly on the egalitarian way of organizing display anti-egalitarian traits. The same applies for all four ways of organizing. However, if a way of organizing is not dominant, there are sometimes traits both in favor of it and against it. This is the case in the Natan and Truong households, where we can find one trait supporting individualism and one trait rejecting individualism. These observations suggest to me that consistency is important in relation to the dominant way of organizing, whereas there is room for inconsistency when it comes to the non-dominant ways of organizing. More research is needed to find out about the nature of this consistency.[192]

Rejecting alternative ways of organizing is one way to strengthen the dominant way of organizing and build a case for consistency. This defines, for example, the case of the Garcias, who support egalitarianism and reject hierarchy. Similarly, we can see how both the Lorcas and the Maheswarans rely on individualism and reject hierarchy as a way of organizing.

Cultural theory enhances our understanding of these households' internal organization and their helping relations in several ways. First, these organizing principles do not follow from its country of origin. We can see similarities and differences across several countries of origin. Cultural theory makes it possible for us to relate to these households on the basis of features that are central in their present lives, rather than features that point back to their past. Second, it allows us

[192] Is it a structural feature that supports the theory or a methodological artifact caused by people succeeding to present a consistent "image" during the interviews?

to see how these households have more or less consciously chosen the way they organize their own lives. In addition, cultural theory shows how attitudes, norms, behavioral patterns, and social relations are connected to each other. This opens up possibilities for improving policy making as our understanding of households' political views and their responces to policy improves.

Predicting Households' Views of Society and Politics

How well does cultural theory allow us to predict a household's views of society and politics if we have knowledge of their way of organizing (internal organization and external helping relations)? Even if Part I is exploratory in nature, there is a confirmatory element built into the way predictions are either confirmed or rejected in this section. Here, I will present three different evaluation techniques: a variable-oriented approach, a case-oriented approach, and an approach that compares the various combinations of ways of organizing.

Matching the Predictions

Each household had views of society and politics that were consistent in terms of cultural theory. They all created a consistent image of society and household that functioned as context for stories involving their own household. It is not possible to predict details, but the dominant way of organizing used to structure a household's internal life and their helping relations also structures the household's view of society and politics.

However, if we look at the long list of predictions given in the third chapter (pages 79-92), one notices that most households do not have the kind of precision in their views that matches the precision used in the predictions. This should not come as a surprise as most people are not political philosophers and do not spend much time trying to create detailed argumentation that covers most of the important aspects of politics and society. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the fifth chapter, *all households do have arguments that echo or resemble the predictions given, even if in most households most of the predictions are not matched.* There are two likely causes for this: the limited time used for each interview and the difference between manifest and latent views. During the interview manifest issues and opinions are presented, whereas latent views are left in the dark. One should not expect a household to have clear opinions on all issues.

Is it cheating to have precise theoretical predictions of justifications, but only check some of them? No, I have organized my interviews around households' experiences with institutions of the welfare state. Justifications are something chosen by households themselves. This increases the reliability, as they present only salient justifications. They are not just responses to stimuli. In some interviews many justifications are used, while in others only few. The households differ, not just concerning which justifications they use, but also concerning how consistent their justifications are, and how many issues they justify.

I suspect that the level of precision in argumentation and the number of manifest issues and opinions presented by the households interviewed are within the boundaries of what can be expected. There is no reason to expect them to differ much from the majority population. However, more research is needed to determine these levels for cultural theory.

Looking at the Number of Indicators—a Variable Oriented Approach

An alternative approach is to focus on the number of indicators. Figure 9, below, contains two columns: the first column is identical to Figure 8, which focuses on the households' internal organization and their helping relations; the second column shows the count of indicators for a household's view of society and politics from the presentation in Chapter 5. A pro indicator is a prediction that gets a clear confirmation. Several statements confirming one prediction are counted as one incident. Similarly, a contra indicator is an overt rejection of one of the predictions.

If cultural theory helps to predict households' views of society and politics, a high number of indicators supporting a way of organizing should result in a high number of indicators of a corresponding view of politics and society. We can see in Figure 9 that there is a clear pattern: high numbers go with high numbers and low numbers go with low numbers. Thus, this figure confirms what we saw in the presentations and comparisons of these eight households in Chapter 5: *they display a pattern of internal organization, helping relations, and views of society and politics that fit into the four ways of organizing as predicted by cultural theory*. How strong is this pattern?

Because of the low number of households, there are clear limits to the utility of and the possibilities for a quantitative analysis. However, it is possible to measure the strength of correlation between the households' internal organization (including helping relations) and their views of politics and society. There are several possible ways to do this. However, none of them tells us more than what we can already see in Figure 9, as they are just alternative ways to further summarize this information.

Figure 9: Eight Households' Way of Organizing and their Views of Society and Politics (Count of Indicators)



We can summarize this along the four ways of organizing (as variables). In Table 12 we can see how households' way of organizing is related to their views of politics and society. If we assume that the four ways of organizing are independent of each other (i.e., one can get high scores on all of them simultaneously) and use Pearson's r the *correlation between a way of organizing and corresponding views of politics and society is extremely high*. For each of the four ways of organizing Pearson's r is 0.95, or larger, and statistically significant. In other words, many egalitarian traits in internal organization and helping relations are very likely to go together with many egalitarian views of society and politics. The same applies for each of the four ways of organizing.

Simultaneously, we can see in Table 12 that all correlations across ways of organizing (for example hierarchical traits going together with egalitarian views) are negative and none of them is statistically significant. In other words, it is unlikely that a household that does not show many egalitarian traits internally would display many egalitarian views of society and politics. The same applies for all four ways of organizing.

Table 12: Ways of Organizing and Views of Politics and Society (Correlations)

			Views of Society and Politics Hierarchical	Egalitarian	Individualistic	Fatalistic
Ways of Organizing	Hierarchical	R	**.98**	-.10	-.49	-.14
		Sig.	.00	.81	.22	.74
	Egalitarian	R	-.33	**.97**	-.36	-.21
		Sig.	.42	.00	.39	.61
	Individualistic	R	-.37	-.63	**.95**	-.38
		Sig.	.37	.10	.00	.36
	Fatalistic	R	-.20	-.19	-.35	**.95**
		Sig.	.64	.65	.40	.00

All Pearson correlations (r) are calculated based on the same 8 cases. Values of significance are 2-tailed. Items marked with bold are significant on $p<0.01$ level

The precise value of Pearson's r is of less importance, as it only describes these eight cases, than the general pattern that emerges. For every way of organizing, a high number of items within the household is likely to produce a high number of items supporting the same view of society and politics, and a weak rejection[193] of the competing views of society and politics (a complete correlation matrix is presented in Appendix on page 522).

Correlations on this level will only appear when there is a very strong linear pattern between the variables.[194] This level of correlation is normally alarming and possibly an indication of a tautological relation between two variables. Is the distance between variables sufficient? In other words, when I measure the degree of hierarchy within the household and the degree of hierarchy in their views of society and politics, am I actually measuring the same phenomena? I believe that my treatment of these issues in third and fifth chapter shows that the measurements are indeed of separate entities. A household's internal organization and its helping relations both contain elements of social organization and justifications of behavior inside the household. Whereas views of society and politics contain elements that could be viewed as attitudes or norms on issues outside the household. However, there is a close connection between justifying the help a household gives and receives and arguing for a proper way to organize social support. These correlations should be treated as a finding supporting cultural theory (social relations, behavior, and cultural biases are related), not an overlap of measurements. From a cultural theoretical viewpoint, it is only natural that there is a strong correlation, for these are two measurements of one way of organizing: one measures a household's internal organization and the other their view of society and politics.

In addition to the substantial explanation above, possible methodological explanations must also be examined. The most likely methodological explanation for these high figures is that I have only coded and counted items that can be interpreted in terms of cultural theory. Thus, the pattern that emerges does not contain what would be noise in surveys. However, this should not influence the pattern, only the levels. Another possible methodological explanation is the biased selection of households.[195] This should pose no serious problem, as the numbers describe my sample only and are not generalized to any population. Another possible, purely methodological, explanation for the high correlations is the biased

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[193] One should note, however, that none of these deviate enough from zero to be statistically significant.

[194] There is also a purely mathematical explanation for these extremely high correlations, as there are very marked differences between the score for the dominant way of organizing (5-6) and the scores for the non-dominant ways of organizing (-2-+2), while the mean is between these two extremes. Thus, no households score close to the mean and all households contribute to the Pearson's r. Because Pearson's r relies on squared distances, the contribution increases the further away we are from mean. Had the distribution been more even, including values closer to the mean, the correlations would have been lower too. Thus, the high correlation is symptomatic of a situation where there are nothing but marked deviations from the mean, and these deviations have a systematic relation to each other.

[195] I have excluded two of the hierarchical Tamil households I interviewed. Thus, it is possible that I am slightly overestimating the effects of hierarchy. In addition, the whole selection of households can be biased toward households that fit into one of the four ways of organizing; however, most of the households included were interviewed before I had any idea of their way of organizing.

selection of stories. However, I have systematically included, in Chapter 5, all stories that provide counter evidence to the dominant way of organizing, my initial interpretation of a household's way of organizing. Therefore, I hope that I have convinced the reader that the counter evidence is examined and counted.

A Case-Oriented Approach

In addition to the foregoing variable-oriented summary, it is possible to compare the degree of correspondence for each of the eight households (cases). In other words, how similar is each household's way of organizing when compared with their views on politics and society (i.e., making a row-by-row comparison between the two columns in Figure 9 on page 261)?[196]

In the first column in Table 13, we can see the count of observed traits, which equals the total number of marked squares for each household in Figure 9. I have 11 to 18 relevant observations for each household. The second column is the count of differences between the household's internal way of organizing and their political views, which is the same as the difference between the left and right side of Figure 9. The highest degree of similarity is found in the hierarchical Nguyen household, where the images are identical. For some households, there is only one item that does not match. For example, in the Nga household, there are five pro-individualistic internal traits that match the five the individualistic predictions concerning views on society and politics. There are no pro-hierarchical internal traits, although the household still fits with one of the hierarchical predictions on the views on society and politics. The highest number of difference between the households internal organization and their political views are in the Herrera and Truong households. Both have four observatiosn that do not match cultural theory. However, the Truong household has fewer indicators of views of society and politics present.[197] Therefore, we should make the count of difference relative to the number of observations.

Table 13 shows how similar the households internal organizing and their political views are. The third column uses as its baseline the total number of observed indicators for the particular household, that is, the lack of counter observations are excluded, while inconsistency is included.[198] If we look, for example, at the Truong

[196] To create a measure where 100% shows identical measures and 0% shows no similarity at all, we can calculate the share of identically colored squares. Each figure contains 32 small squares (ranging from –2 to +6 and multiplied by 4 ways of organizing).

[197] I suspect that this is partly caused by the difficulties in finding good indicators for fatalistic views of society and politics.

[198] By inconsistency I refer to the simultaneous presense of support and rejection of one way of organizing, as is the case for the Lorcas (egalitarianism) and the Truongs (individualism). An alternative way of calculating would be to remove these as one support added to one rejection equals zero (the expectation of a zero effect). I have chosen to include noise, as not to artificially increase the support for cultural theory.

household, where we have a difference of four items.[199] In total we have observed 12 relevant traits. The similarity between their internal organizing and political views is thus 67 percent.

Table 13: Similarity between Way of Organizing and Views of Politics and Society

Household	*Count of observed traits*	*Count of different traits*	*Per cent similar of observed*
Nguyen	12	0	100
Natan	18	2	89
Garcia	15	1	93
Herrera	12	4	67
Nga	11	1	91
Lorca	17	3	82
Maheswaran	13	3	77
Truong	12	4	67
Average	14	2	83

Counts are made from Figure 9.

We can see in Table 13 that on average the similarity between a households' way of organizing and their views of politics and society is 83 percent. This is an extraordinary similarity.

So far we have seen two quite different ways of describing the relation between a household's way of organizing and their views of society and politics. The main difference between the measure of similarity and the measure of correlation is that the measure of similarity shows similarity within each case, across four dimensions simultaneously, whereas the measure of correlation shows association for one dimension across the eight cases. Both the variable-oriented measurement of correlation and the case-oriented measurement of similarity show a strong relationship between ways of organizing and views of politics and society.

Is this strong connection between ways of organizing and views of politics a special feature of migrant households, or can we also expect to find something similar in majority households? One could argue that migrant households are less influenced by the common causes of political opinions, as defined by political scientists, and more by their culture. I, however, believe this is a false argument. I have chosen migrant households from three different regions of the world, so there is larger

[199] As there is internally one trait rejecting individualism and one trait supporting individualism, these are counted as two observations, but the expected effect of these is zero.

than normal cultural variation among the households. Households from one country utilize different cultural biases, thus making them different, despite their common origin. What we are left with is the fact that the household's present way of life or their way of organizing is a key factor in understanding their political preferences.

Similarly, perhaps the migrants do not understand the political cleavages in Norway, or they do not understand enough about the Norwegian political system in order to act and vote in their own interests. In other words, are they ignorant voters who use cultural biases as a substitute for knowledge of how to promote their interests? I do not think so. The migrants I interviewed did not show any misunderstandings about how the political system works, and I believe that their competence as members of the polity is more than sufficient for them to act in their own self-interest.

I do not believe that the strong connection between the way of organizing and political views is a methodological artifact. I am measuring four different cultural biases, and the households score differently on these four biases. Had I been measuring only one dimension, or if all households had scored high on the same dimension, it could easily have been a methodological artifact. Here, however, we have large variations between households and a strong pattern of similarity within households.

Nevertheless, in a semi-structured interview, the questions can be tailored and the answers interpreted more broadly than in a survey with fixed questions and response alternatives. Therefore, it is not surprising that the connection is stronger than what can be found in surveys. What would it look like if we drop the counts and focus on the patterns of combinations?

Looking at Combinations of Ways of Organizing

Both of the above methods rely on a simple counting of indicators, while they disregard the content of the indicators. Therefore, from a cultural theoretical viewpoint, a third approach, which focuses on the combinations of ways of organizing, is more appropriate. [200]

In Table 14 the households' way of organizing is presented as a combination of four ways of organizing. The items are in order according to their frequency in the household,[201] so that the dominant way of organizing is always mentioned first. Support is shown by use of a capital letter, and rejection by use of a small letter. Non-salient ways of organizing are not mentioned. For example, the Nguyens are

[200] See Chapter 10 for more details on this kind of combinatory approach.

[201] The frequencies rely on the same count of items from Chapter 5: Eight Households as Figure 8 and Figure 9. See page 521 in the Appendix for the scores used.

organized hierarchically (H) and their views of society and politics are pro hierarchical (H). Similarly, the Natans are organized hierarchically with a rejection of the egalitarian way of organizing (*He*), and their views of society and politics are pro hierarchical and rejective of the egalitarian style of organizing (*He*).

Table 14: Eight Households' Ways of Organizing and their Views of Politics and Society presented as Combinations

Household	*Internal organization and helping relations*	*Views of Society and Politics*
Nguyen	*H*	*H*
Natan	*He*	*He*
Garcia	*Eh*	*Eh*
Herrera	*Ef*	*E*
Nga	*I*	*IH*
Lorca	*Ih*	*IEhf*
Maheswaran	*Ih*	*Ih*
Truong	*Fh*	*F*

Looking at the combinations in Table 14 we can see that the relationship between a household's view of society and politics and their internal organization and helping relations is not deterministic, as one could easily believe looking only at the numbers. Nevertheless, there are four households out of eight (the Nguyens, Natans, Garcias, and Maheswarans) that have an identical pattern in their internal ways of organizing and their views of society and politics.

We can see that *for every household the dominant way of organizing is the same in both columns, while there is room for differences in the non-dominant ways of organizing.*

There are six households whose views of politics and society fit with the predictions supporting only one way of organizing; in other words, where the dominant view does not have visible competition. The Nguyen, Herrera and Truong households have views of society and politics that are based only on references supporting one way of organizing. The remaining three households strengthen their dominant views of society and politics by an explicit rejection of one or more other ways of organizing. The Natan household supports hierarchy and rejects egalitarian solutions. The Garcias support the egalitarian way of organizing, which is strengthened by their critique of hierarchy. The Maheswaran household shows support for individualistic solutions, while they reject hierarchy.

The remaining two households show support for more than their one dominant way of organizing. The Ngas and the Lorcas share views that are dominated by the individualistic way of organizing, but they differ concerning their secondary choice. The Lorca household brings in some egalitarian elements, while the Ngas bring in some hierarchical elements in their views of society and politics. The Lorcas reject hierarchy in their internal organization. It would, therefore, have been surprising if they had supported hierarchy in their views of society.

The same dominant way of organizing was present in both domains for every household, and the weaker traits were not reversed across domains. However, a weak support or rejection does not automatically lead to similar presence in both domains. Households are free to mix and play with the non-dominant ways of organizing, as long as they present a consistent image. However, the relationship is so strong that if we know enough about a household's internal organization and their helping relations it is easy to see what kinds of views are likely to be present, and what kinds of views are most likely absent. In other words, *knowledge of a household's way of organizing allows us to predict fundamental traits of a household's views of society and politics.*

The discussion over the last eight pages shows that, whichever method is used—the variable-oriented, the case-oriented, or the combinatory method—the conclusion stays the the same: *a household's way of organizing is very closely related to their views of society and politics.*

People Have Coherent Opinions

A relatively common view among political scientists today is that highly educated and well-informed people have coherent opinions and political preferences, while the rest of the people lack the information or the interest to form proper opinions, which can be seen in their response instability on most issues in surveys (Converse 1993; Kuklinski and Peyton 2007:4). Nevertheless, people have relatively stable underlying preferences that guide their opinion formation (Aardal 2007:71; Aardal and Valen 1995; Zaller 1992). I have two suggestions concerning this issue.

First, *I suggest that a person's opinions are more coherent than some survey research suggests, when the questions are presented in a real-life context.* Survey research often assumes that questionnaires are filled in alone, and that they represent people's true personal views. Cultural theory suggests that a person's opinions are formed by his or her social relations, in other words, one should be very careful in assuming that views expressed in one context can be generalized to all other contexts.[202]

Second, *I suggest that the coherency in a person's opinions follows the four ways of organization*, rather than political ideologies. In other words, people are rational and have cohesive preferences—they know what they want and how to proceed to get it—but political scientists have been looking in the wrong place.

[202] Survey research often excludes social relations as an explanatory variable, as it is difficult to estimate the effect of social relations on behavior in a reliable manner. Olli, Grenstad and Wollebæk have estimated that for members of environmental organizations the effect of social relations on private environmental behavior is in the same magnitude as all opinions seen together (2001).

We know from previous research that knowing what people think about the four ways of organizing gives a fairly good prediction of which party they will vote for, or at least which parties their choice is between (Olli 1999). This is also confirmed in Chapter 10 in this thesis. Is it possible that these kinds of opinions are more closely connected to political behavior than regular political opinions, because they are connected to behavior and social relations in their daily lives?

Where Do Opinions and Values Come From?

The empirical material in this thesis supports that there is a close relation between a household's internal organization, their helping relations, and their views of politics and society. However, it is not obvious as to what the causal direction is. There is no a priori reason to believe that the causal direction is from a household's internal organization to their opinions and values concerning society and politics.

There are several different views regarding where preferences come from.[203] One can argue, like many economists, for the priority of preferences, which, again, are the causes of all behavior and organization.[204] In this manner, the household is a laboratory or testing ground for one's political preferences and ideas about the good life. It is reasonable that one organizes one's own household according to one's own preferences.

However, one can also argue the other way around. Preferences do not just pop up out of nowhere. They are a function of one's social relations: Social relations are durable over time, and one's opinions have a tendency to fit one's social relations.[205] For a long time one of the most popular views was that it was one's social background, class position, or position in society that had the largest influence on political preferences.[206]

From a cultural theoretical viewpoint, this is largely a chicken-and-egg problem. As social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural bias are intertwined, it is impossible to claim as a general rule that one is the primary cause of another. However, if one is studying a particular change, it is sometimes possible to

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[203] For an overview of the literature on where political preferences come from see *Classics in Voting Behavior* and *Controversies in Voting Behavior* (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b; Niemi and Weisberg 1993a).

[204] See Douglas and Nay for a thorough critique of this view (Douglas and Ney 1998).

[205] This view is well presented by Wildavsky:

> People use what matters most to them – relations with other people – to make sense out of life. Cultures answer questions about life with people: How is order to be achieved and maintained? Is there to be leadership and, if so, by whom? How are the goods of this world to be secured and divided up? How are envy to be controlled, inequality to be justified or condemned? ... What, in sum, is the good (or, at least, better) life? (Wildavsky 1989b:63)

[206] "Your standpoint depends on where you sit" is often tributed to Miles (1978).

determine where the change started. For example, the Lorca household's values have changed over the years, and I believe this change is caused by changes in their social relations (see page 229).

One must not lose from sight that cultural theory describes a social system. Nevertheless, often for analytical purposes, it is necessary to isolate a small section of a larger system for analysis and argue for a causal direction in a particular relation, for example, for the use of regression.[207] Cultural theory can provide the mechanism needed to explain how a household's internal organization and helping relations influence its political preferences. The household's internal organization and its helping relations are lived and reinforced everyday, whereas politics are less central for people in their daily lives.

Cultural theory hence provides a model for political preferences and behavior, which connects many different aspects together. I have previously argued that cultural theory can, therefore, be used as a bridge between different theoretical traditions:

> Cultural Theory is a framework that allows us to include both *cognitive aspects* as a worldview, understanding of the society and nature, and *affective aspects* as evaluation of a policy or attitude towards a group in society. Thus Cultural theory bridges cognitive and affective aspects, which previously have been used in two quite different theory traditions in social psychology. (Conover and Feldman 1991) (Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO)

In cultural theory the cognitive aspects are closely related to the effects of cultural bias. In other words, not only our thinking but even our perception of the world around us is heavily influenced by the way of organizing we adhere to (See Douglas 1992, 1982c, 1985; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012). Our perceptions are dependent on our social constructions of the world, and in this way the world looks quite different for households relying on different ways of organizing. Each way of organizing also has a blind spot (that cannot be observed and acted upon), compared with the other ways of organizing (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990).

Cultural theory does not look at feelings toward groups or policies as the original source of motivation, but rather as a way to express one's own social position and way of organizing. Thus, both the cognitive and the affective elements can be treated within the same theoretical framework.

I have also suggested that

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[207] See, for example, the quantitive analysis in *Food and Culture* by Mary Douglas (Douglas 1984; Douglas and Gross 1981)

> Cultural theory can partly fill the gap between the *structural cleavages*. (Rokkan 1967) and the *Michigan model* (Campbell 1960) by explaining how social structures and positions get translated to ideological positions (Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO)

Both these models use social structures as a way to explain political views and behavior, but neither of them gives a good account of the mechanism. The structural cleavages model identifies groups based on socio-economic position (farmers, workers, and petty bourgeoisie), language, religion or other factors, or combinations of these. It shows sensitivity to historical particularity and different alliances among the elites, and shows how the cleavages in society are reproduced in the political system. Cultural theory could be used to enrich this by showing why certain alliances are more likely than others, or why certain elites are bound to be in conflict with each other.

The Michigan model is closely connected to survey research and converts social background and attitudes into political preferences. However, it does not give much theoretical guidance for how this happens. Cultural theory provides one account of how preferences are connected to social relations: how our social relations influence our preferences; how some political messages enforce our beliefs, while others are ignored. As cultural theory is both a theory of institutions and of people's relation to institutions, it can be a bridge between the structural cleavages and the Michigan models.

> Cultural theory can also partly fill the gap between the *rational choice* and the *Michigan model*, by explaining where the preferences come from, why people have biased perceptions and how different preferences (cultural biases) allow for different forms of rationality. (Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO)

Rational choice theory explains political behavior with preferences, but does not really give explanations for where preferences come from, while self-interest is often assumed to be the main motivation, and efficiency in goal attainment the only form of rationality. Cultural theory can provide a valuable contribution that opens up for different forms of rationality matching the four ways of organizing.[208]

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[208] Wildavsky comments upon rational choice theories in the following manner:

> Rational choice theories could be improved, their scope broadened, and their explanations made more powerful by asking not only "How do people go about getting what they know they want?" but also "Why do people want what they want in the first place?". The advantages of combining a theory of goal direction, which is the operational base of rational choice, and a theory of preference formation are manifold: a monistic conception of cause as self-interest is replaced by a pluralistic conception of culture allowing for a variety of motives for action; master objectives, which play out over a sequence of moves, supersede immediate objectives that cover only the next act; concentration on how institutional rules influence incentives, though valuable in and of itself, gives way to a parallel consideration of how individuals shape institutions; and the overwhelming concentration on material self-

The above arguments were originally part of an article that tried to predict party preferences based on survey research. Now, after a completed qualitative research project on people's political views and preferences, I believe even more strongly that cultural theory has earned its place among the mainstream theories in political science. It is a theory that contains institutional level aspects (formation and change in institutions, relations between institutions, the the four ways of organizing) and individual level aspects (like behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and perception). In addition, it explains how these individual level aspects are connected to the institutional aspects. Cultural theory thus focuses on many central issues of the classical individual vs. collective debate. [209]

Simplify Dealing with Migrants

I propose in the following that we can use Ways of Organizing as stereotypes that in many situations can replace stereotypes based on country of origin.

Use Ways of Organizing as Stereotypes

A good stereotype is simple enough to be easy to use, while retaining some important information that provides guidelines for behavior. I suggest that the four ways of organizing are useful as stereotypes guiding our behavior when dealing with migrants.

If one way of organizing is sufficient to represent a household, then ways of organizing can be useful as stereotypes. As we have seen in detail in Chapter 5, and in a summarized form in Figure 8, treating a household as relying on only one way of organizing is not quite correct, as most households have traces of several ways of organizing. However, every household did have one way of organizing that was dominant and manifested in many issues. Therefore, *relying on a stereotype based on one way of organizing seems like a useful way to construct interaction with a household, at least until more information is available.*

The next question we need to ask is whether this is better than relying on ethnic or country of origin based stereotypes. First, the households originating from Vietnam are different from each other: the hierarchical and very loyal Nguyen household is quite different from the individualistic and entrepreneurial Nga household, and

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interest, which discomforts so many social scientists who might otherwise be well disposed to rational choice explanations, opens up into a diversity of selves who construct a variety of interests in the service of different ways of life (or cultures) (Wildavsky 1994).

[209] There is a good presentation of how cultural theory relates to the classics in political science in *Cultural Theory (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:103-214).*

equally different from the fatalistic Truong household. To treat these three households as similar would disregard the different strategies they rely on for coping with their lives. Second, the households originating from Sri Lanka are different from each other: the hierarchical helpers of the Natan household are quite different from the individualistic consumers of the Maheswaran household. To treat these two households similarly would disregard their different view of life and the vastly different sources of solidarity upon which they build their lives. Third, the households from Chile are also different from each other: the egalitarian Garcias, who view equality as a solution, and the egalitarian business of the Herrera household resemble each other, as they both are group-oriented, but they both differ from the individualistic Lorca household, who prefers differentiation based on skill and talent. Thus, relying on country of origin based stereotypes does not look useful. Especially since, as we saw in Chapter 5, households relying on the same way of organizing resemble each other in their internal organization, their organization of external social relations, and their views of society and politics, despite their coming from different corners of the world.

I will therefore suggest that *if the aim is to create, or facilitate, social interaction, and not just emphasize the differences, stereotypes based on the four ways of organizing are preferable to the ones based on country of origin.*

I am not trying to reduce the importance of national symbols and the feeling of belonging. One should recognize expressions of national traditions and symbols, like the cueca danced by the Chilean people. These kinds of traditions have a value and they deserve our support and admiration. However, one must be careful not to equate these with the way we categorize people. Even if national symbols and even something that can be called a national culture exists, that does not mean that people from one country *are* the same, or are carriers of values, views, and norms to such a degree that would form the core of a person.[210]

People should be free to choose their identity and affiliation themselves. As long as others use country of origin as a proxy for who you are—he is Chilean, Vietnamese, or a Tamil—it is very difficult to change who you are or how others view you. People have a need to be seen as more than just representatives of their countries of origin. Traditions and national symbols are important for identity and belonging, but they should not determine how we deal with each other.

Cultural theory allows us to see commonalities across ethnic boundaries: the daily life of minorities is not as different as the majority sometimes wants to believe. Cultural theory gives several possible common starting points for structuring social interaction. As social interaction is organized according to a limited number of fundamental principles, creating social interaction that includes participants from many countries of origin is feasible. The difficulties are perhaps related to problems

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[210] More about the creation and role of this kind of unity can be found in Anderson (1991) and in Hylland Eriksen (1993, 2004).

of language and interpretation, rather than problems of understanding fundamental social rules.

Conclusion

After a research process, it is always a great pleasure and time of excitement when one finally arrives to the writing of the conclusion. Has the work produced something new and contributed to our understanding of society and politics?

One of the empirical findings is that the patterns of organization in migrant households are very familiar, and probably follow the same patterns that we know from many majority households. Cultural theory and its four ways of organizing can be used to describe a household's internal organization, those social relations that carry help, and to describe peoples' own political arguments.

Cultural theory seems like a promising way to *describe households'* internal organization and their external helping relations. Ways of organizing can even be used to form stereotypes that can replace the much-used country of origin, which does not determine a household's way of organizing.

There are some lessons that can be learned about ways of organizing: It seems common that a household has one dominant way of organizing and borrows a little from another way of organizing. Thus, support for several ways of organizing is commonly present, which can be confusing. It became clearer when I realized that I could not find any counter indicators for the household's dominant way of organizing. The rejection of other ways of organizing was used to strengthen the position of the dominant way of organizing. However, the pure forms of these four ways of organizing are not the same as ideal households.

The main finding is that there is *a strong relationship between a household's way of organizing (internal organization and their helping relations) and its views of politics and society.* A household's views of politics and society were structured according to the dominant way of organizing in the household. It should not come as a surprise that hierarchically organized households had views that supported the hierarchical way of organizing in the society. The same applies for all four ways of organizing, with a small reservation concerning the fatalistic way of organizing, as expectations concerning fatalistic political views are unclear.

Households showed a considerable degree of consistency in their views of society and politics; more than one would expect based on results from survey research. The consistency in their argumentation was built around one of the four ways of organizing, not a political ideology.

Ways of organizing are not just ways of organizing a household; they are also ways of organizing society in general. The patterns of organizing can be observed in a wide range of everyday practices, helping relations, and attitudes and opinions concerning society and politics. In other words, these patterns of organization cut across the private-public boundary, and the household seems to be a source for social practices and skills also applied outside the household.

Even if the migrants' origins give them particular language skills and many social contacts in their own language group, these social contacts do not automatically carry resources and become helping relations. The households seem to prefer helping relations that are organized through a form of solidarity that matches their dominant way of internal organizing. The households relate best to other households organized in the same way.

These findings are based on a close study of eight households as cases, as well as comparisons between them. I have demonstrated that cultural theory works well on households when seen as institutions. Next, in Part II, I will operationalize cultural theory so it can be used on individuals.

PART II: OPERATIONALIZING CULTURAL BIAS IN THE SURVEYS

The purpose of Part II is to provide us with a working operationalization of cultural biases as measured in surveys. This operationalization is required for the analyses in Part III. Thus, large sections of Part II are preparatory and technical in nature. Those readers who do not intend to conduct survey research of their own can probably read just Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 and skip the chapters in between.

In Chapter 7, entitled *Cultural Theory and Unfinished Business at the Micro-Level*, I present four theoretical problems and suggest some solutions to each of these problems. First, there is no well-established method for measuring central concepts in cultural theory at individual level. Second, cultural biases are measured without a model of the relationship between the individual and culture. Third, with the absence of a clear theoretical difference between individuals and institutions, sometimes the analytical levels become confused. Fourth, it is tempting to start making calculations on cultural biases just because they have a numeric representation in a dataset. These calculations should be limited to operations that appreciate the meaning of cultural biases.

Entitled *Measuring Cultural Bias in the Nordic Cultures Survey*, Chapter 8 will create scales for measuring the four cultural biases as continuous variables by using items inspired by Dake and Wildavsky's work. The data contains representative samples from all five Nordic countries in 1999. Because these scales suffer from yes-saying, or acquiescence bias, I will try to evaluate the degree of acquiescence and propose some solutions for it.

In Chapter 9, entitled *Measuring Cultural Bias in The Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey*, I create similar scales by using a different data source. This survey has representative samples taken in 1995 from the general Norwegian public and members of 12 environmental organizations. This survey has been scarcely utilized for cultural theory research largely because it fails to include enough cultural bias items for creating reliable cultural bias scales. Therefore, I create new scales by adding new items to the scales and evaluating their performance.

Combinations of Cultural Biases is the title of Chapter 10, where I exploit the data from the Nordic Cultures Survey in an effort to empirically test different operationalizations of cultural theory. The various assumptions concerning the relationship between the individual and culture are reflected in the variety of ways the data can be coded. I make alternative versions of the cultural combinations variable, and use these to make hundreds of tables. An analysis of these cross tabulations tells us which assumptions best explain party preferences.

Finally, Chapter 11, entitled *Party Preference and Cultural Bias*, opens up for a demonstration of how cultural combinations can be used to make sense of party preferences, when parties are grouped together by their ideology to party families at Nordic level. This demonstration is required in order to create trust in the approach based on cultural bias combinations; as in Part III, the analyses here rely extensively on these combinations. Indeed, it would be reckless to jump into the theoretically more complicated analyses without first exploring the actual viability of culturally bias combinations.

Chapter 7

CULTURAL THEORY AND UNFINISHED BUSINESS AT THE MICRO-LEVEL

By presenting a set of problems that need to be solved, this chapter tries to answer to the question as to why cultural theory has failed to live up to its expected value in survey research.

In his presidential address, entitled *Choosing preference by constructing institutions: A cultural theory of preference formation*, for the 82nd annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aaron Wildavsky established high expectations in the value of using cultural theory at the micro-level. Whereas Mary Douglas emphasized cultural theory as one about institutions, Wildavsky pulls cultural theory into the heart of political science research and suggests that cultural theory can explain the origins of the preferences that people act upon. For Wildavsky, preferences come from social relations:

> What is it that enables everyone to come up with reliable solutions to the problem of preference formation whenever it arises? The one source all human beings know something about is their social relations. (Wildavsky 1987:17)

While cultural explanations for political phenomena have often been complicated and required trained professionals, Wildavsky insists that the power of cultural theory lies in its simplicity:

> Overall, it cannot be too difficult to arrive at preferences on most matters, because everyone does it. ... Near universal preference formation requires that preferences can be inferred from all possible directions. ... By knowing who or what is involved, the arena or institution of involvement, the subject or object of involvement, people know whether they are supposed to have preferences and what these preferences ought to be. (Wildavsky 1987:16)

If cultural theory really is so accessible to anyone, then it should also be easy to research by deploying well-known survey methods. The great expectations and promises conveyed by the presidential address make it is even more disappointing that the results from survey research have been rather meager (Verweij and Nowacki 2010).

I will start this chapter with a brief summary of how cultural theory has been used in surveys. I will then present four different kinds of problems related to collecting data on individual level—problems that need to be solved before we can expect to obtain the results that Wildavsky was hoping for. First, we lack good measurements of those concepts that are so central to cultural theory. Second, cultural bias is measured without a clear model of how individuals and institutions relate to each other, which makes it problematic to use surveys without providing for a context. Third, given the prevailing differences on how cultural biases work in people and in institutions, we must be more careful about the level of analysis and the level of our conclusions. Fourth, many analytical techniques assume the ability to calculate cultural biases as if they were numbers.

Surveys and Cultural Theory

Cultural theory is one that operates best at the level of institutions, or what is also referred to as society's meso-level. Part I of this thesis is an example of such research as applied to migrant households. This chapter attempts to look at how, with the help of surveys, cultural theory can be used at the level of the individual. This chapter also looks into the kinds of theoretical and methodological problems that must be solved before one can enter into such an unholy union between cultural theory and individual-level analysis.

Much of the research derived from cultural theory is critical of methodological individualism and supportive of a variety of institutional explanations (Douglas and Ney 1998; Grendstad and Selle 1995). Nevertheless, in political science, population surveys have become a major tool because they allow us to answer questions about democracies, predict election results, and study changes in popular opinion.

> There are few areas in political science where scholarly knowledge has made greater progress in the past two generations than the field of political behavior. From Aristotle's time until the 1950's, the descriptions and explanation of public opinion were based on the impressions of political "experts". We could not systematically study what citizens actually believed, how they acted, or why they voted for one party rather than another. The advent of systematic, scientific public opinion surveys dramatically changed our knowledge of the average citizen. (Dalton and Klingemann 2007b:vii)

The development of survey methodology has coincided with the development of economic sociology and a philosophy of science called *methodological individualism* (Hodgson 1986; Hodgson 2007). The core of methodological individualism lies in a belief that individuals are the most basic and most important unit of study. Public opinion is simply an aggregate of individual opinions. Changes in prices are reflections of changes of the relation between total demand (sum of all individual demand) and total production. Similarly, institutions and the society as a whole, or at least the most important aspects of them, can be best studied by analyzing individuals.

In addition, the survey literature to a large degree disregards an individual's social relations as a context that shapes values and action (Achen and Shively 1995:7-8). When this literature deals with context, it does so mainly by discussing how wording, question ordering, and other questions in the same survey influence the results, or how using phone versus mail interviews influence the results (Schuman, Presser, and Ludwig 2004; Rockwood, Sangster, and Dillman 2004; Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004b). Thus, the contextual influence that is taken most seriously is the one provided by the interviewer. What seems to be lacking from the mainstream survey literature is an awareness of how the social setting the respondent is in when providing survey answers will ultimately influence the respondent's answers.[211] Will we actually give the same answers if we are alone or if there are other people in the room? Are the answers the same if the people present are co-workers or one's spouse?

Given that surveys have such a dominant position as the tool for making social *science*, it is not surprising that several attempts have been made to use cultural theory in surveys. Common to these attempts is that information is collected on the individual level. These attempts differ, however, concerning the level of analysis and conclusions, as we can see in Table 15. The references are not to surveys, but to publications and the phenomena they explain, as the same data can be used in several ways. Some research uses cultural theory on the level of society or institutions, for example to describe the cultural biases present in an electorate and a party system. Some research makes conclusions about individuals, for example how an individual's perception of risk differs according to his or her cultural biases.

The categorization presented in Table 15 can easily be contested, as several of the researchers move back and forth between their individual-level data and analyses and engage in calculations and discussions on several levels simultaneously. The use of regressions on individual-level data can be especially challenging because they usually require the presence of an individual-level causal mechanism.

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211 By mainstream survey literature, I mean literature that can be found in collections like *Questionnaires* and *Secondary Analysis of Survey Data*, which together contain close to two hundred important articles or book excerpts (Bulmer 2004; Bulmer, Allum, and Sturgis 2009).

Table 15: Examples of Research based on Surveys using Cultural Theory

	Individual-level analyses	*Higher-level analyses*	*Descriptive*
General population survey	Risk perception (Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Lockhart and Coughlin in Boyle and Coughlin 1994; Sjöberg 1995; Brenot, Bonnefous, and Mays 1996; Brenot, Bonnefous, and Marris 1998; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007)[212] Attitudes toward nuclear power (Peters and Slovic 1996) Environmental attitudes and post-materialism (Grendstad and Selle 1997) Environmental risk (Steg and Sievers 2000) Nanotechnology (Kahan et al. 2008) Gun control (Braman and Kahan 2001) Political ideology (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Swedlow 2008, 2009) Party preference (Olli 1999) Political knowledge (Michaud, Carlisle, and Smith 2009) Biased assimilation and credibility heuristics (Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan et al. 2008) Perception of police brutality (Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman 2009) Perception of rape (Kahan 2010a)	Foreign policy (Grendstad 2001) Party system (Grendstad 2000) Party space (Grendstad 2003b)	Socio-demographic composition (Grendstad and Sundback 2003)
Institutional population	Environmentalists (Ellis and Thompson 1997) Students and social relations (Boyle and Coughlin 1994)	Cultural bias in a party. Data from members of political parties (Grendstad 1995b) Environmental protection. General population and members of env. org. (Strømsnes and Selle 1996) Environmentalists (Ellis and Thompson 1997)	
Other population	Environmentalists and recycling (Olli, Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001)[213] Scientists' risk perception (Silva and Jenkins-Smith 2007)[214]	Social capital and entrepreneurship. Data from immigrant groups (Caulkins and Peters 2002)	

212 Boyle and Coughlin refer to work by (Lockhart and Coughlin 1992), which does not contain information about this survey. Perhaps their reference should instead be to (Coughlin and Lockhart 1992).

213 Their study consists of two samples: general population and members of environmental organizations. Only egalitarian bias is used.

214 Only hierarchical and egalitarian cultural biases are included.

To the best of my knowledge, the largest survey that measures the four cultural biases designed to test cultural theory is the Nordic, five-country survey from 1999 (Grendstad et al. 1999).[215] Another particularly interesting survey is a 1995 study on environmentalism in Norway, which contains two separate samples: one of the general public and one of the ten largest environmental organizations (Strømsnes, Grendstad, and Selle 1996). I will later use both of these surveys to test some of my ideas.

A commonality between most of the individual-level analyses in surveys with samples drawn from the general public is that they have failed to achieve those results that one might expect to find given the lofty claims made about the utility and importance of cultural theory. This is probably one reason why so few of these large-scale surveys have been undertaken during the last few years. I believe, however, that survey-based research informed by cultural theory contains a number of potential problems. I also believe there are at least some partial remedies to those problems. Whatever the case may be, conclusions about the utility of cultural theory at the individual level should be postponed until more information is available.

Problem 1: Lack of Good Measurement of Concepts Central to Cultural Theory

Describing Institutions or Groups

Political scientists using cultural theory typically study a conflict between two institutions and explain the competing policy positions by referencing the characteristics of these institutions. More commonly, however, institutions are described in a rather rough manner and lack the proper measurement of institutional traits. One possible cause for this is a tradition in organizational research where the discussions are mainly theoretical and the weight of empirical observation comes from their centrality in the argument, without any attempt at representativeness.[216] Describing these kinds of institutions usually requires intensive research strategies that either limit us to small sample sizes or require more resources than what is usually available.[217]

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[215] There is another study with a similar sample size, but it measures cultural biases as two dimensions (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007).

[216] There are several good overviews of research on organizations (Scott 1987; Greenwood et al. 2008).

[217] Some cultural theory research has in a systematic manner described and measured institutional traits (Douglas 1984; Peck et al. 2004; Caulkins and Peters 2002; Mars 2005).

Gross and Rayner's suggestion to measure both organizations and individuals (1985) is perhaps the most proper way of capturing cultural theory, but it is too demanding for practical use.

> Gross and Rayner stress that these indices [detailed inventory of questionnaire responses] need to be combined with extensive ethnographic fieldwork to cross-check their validity. Admittedly, this method is "expensive of time and resources and is therefore principally applicable to small-scale units. (Gross and Rayner 1985:115)" Perhaps for this reason, their methodology has not, as far as we know, been used in actual research. (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:192)

This kind of approach, where information is collected about many participants embedded in a situation of social conflict (involved organizations, involved companies, involved public officials and politicians, the local population, etc.) demands a large amount of resources. Like Boyle and Coughlin, I have not succeeded in finding research that uses the method described by Gross and Rayner.

According to cultural theory, three characteristics must be mutually supportive for an organization to be stable over time—i.e., to institutionalize or become and institution. These characteristics include behavioral patterns, social relations, and cultural biases, which are all mutually dependent on each other. Change in one is likely to cause changes in the two others (see Figure 2 on page 12).

The authors claim that some combinations of worldviews (cultural bias), social relations, and behavioral patterns will not be compatible in the end.

> The viability of a way of life, we argue, depends upon a mutually supportive relationship between a particular cultural bias and a particular pattern of social relations. These biases and relations cannot be mixed and matched. We call this the *compatibility condition.* ... Social relations generate preferences and perceptions that in turn sustain those relations. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:2)

In the above quotation, preferences are seen as a central component of an institution and thus context-dependent. Likewise, earlier in this thesis, we saw how closely connected each household's political views were to their internal organization.

A typical way to apply cultural theory at the institutional level is to study two of these three aspects (social relations, behavior, or cultural bias) within one institution, or perhaps compare them across a few institutions. Instead, institutional-level sources, like policy documents, are preferred and more often used rather than surveys that ask policy makers or voters what they believe to be good policies.[218]

Nevertheless, many projects have focused on single institutions by deploying surveys that are tailored to their specific target audiences, which is perhaps the safest way to use surveys within cultural theory, especially if one is trying to map out people's social relations. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain a person's position in relation to the four cultures in a way that is not limited to a particular context.

Can Cultures be Measured at the Individual Level?

In order to perform a quantitative analysis of a dynamic system in a manner that allows for a numeric representation of the dynamic system, time-series data from a sufficiently large number of points is required. Since such data is not available for social systems, we must simplify our theory prior to measurement and analysis.

For measurement purposes, cultural theory can be presented as a linear model, even if the theory actually posits that behavioral patterns, social relations, and cultural biases are all part of a dynamic system (Thompson 2008). In Figure 10, we can see the social relations model of cultural theory.[219]

Figure 10: The Social Relations Model of Cultural Theory

Social Relations (grid-group) → Cultural Bias → Attitudes, Behaviors

The cultural theory model depicted above has one big weakness for use at the individual level: It is very difficult to measure actual social relations with the help of surveys. As a remedy, Boyle and Coughlin propose using Wildavsky's idea of studying individuals' preferred social relations instead of their actual relations (1994:192). This is depicted in figure below.

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[218] There is a great body of research that uses cultural theory on the organizational level (Douglas 1986; Rayner 1986; Thompson and Wildavsky 1986b; Wildavsky 1987; Rayner 1988; Ellis 1991; Caulkins 1995; Sivan 1995; Frosdick and Odell 1996; Coyle 1997; Caulkins and Weiner 1998; Maesschalck 2004; Mars 2005; Verweij and Thompson 2006; 6 and Mars 2008; 6 2011).

[219] This figure is basically similar to one in presented by Boyle and Coughlin, but they label the cultural bias as worldview 1,2,3 and 4 (1994: 191).

Figure 11: The Preference Model of Cultural Theory

Experience in Social Relations → Preferred Social Relations → Cultural Bias → Attitudes, Behaviors

A somewhat similar logic can be found in Rippl (2002). She discusses whether cultural theory can be tested based on measurements made on individuals, and whether the empirical measurements of cultural biases using Dake's items relate to each other in the way the theory claims. When concluding the discussion concerning whether cultural theory can be tested based on measurements made at individual level, Rippl states that "a measurement on the level of individuals is not a direct measure of culture but a measure of processes that are connected to culture" (2002:151).

She considers this as sufficient for testing the theory. The measurements will be indirect, but some patterns should be detectable. Moreover, she writes that

> Empirical evidence for the influence of 'culture' is found in social (in contrast to individual or random) variations in value preferences in different segments (groups) of society, which are based on distinctly different experiences according to their position in the social structure. (2002:151)

By insisting that the measures used need to be tested and developed further, Rippl makes an important contribution toward improving the measurement of cultural theory. However, I believe she is not taking into consideration two important aspects. First, she does not present a clear model of how an individual actually relates to a culture. It appears as if Rippl has left one black box in her measurement model: the nature and form of those 'processes that are connected to culture'. However, reading between lines reveals the possibility that she is assuming that cultural bias in an individual is a miniature version or a reflection of cultural bias in society.[220]

It is also possible to construct a cultural theory that starts from individuals by simply disregarding their institutional attachments. The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School has borrowed from cognitive psychology in order to build their own version of cultural theory. They have tested mechanisms like identity-protective cognition, biased assimilation, group polarization, cultural credibility, cultural availability, and cultural identity affirmation. Since these mechanisms are present in individual-level experimental data, there is no need for institutions nor functionalism. Their approach is pragmatic and started from their interests in the

[220] The individual-culture relation is dealt extensively in (Olli 1995, 1996, 1999).

political conflicts around issues of risk. They begin with the individual-level measurements of two cultural bias scales,[221] and then divide the population into four classes based upon differences in cultural predispositions. They have successfully created an application tailored to explaining the basis for political debates in the US by showing how four cultural predispositions, as opposed to social background and other common variables, are more robust explanations for the nature of disagreement in politically difficult issues.[222]

Do We Really Need the Grid-Group?

There has been a lengthy debate among cultural theorists about the importance of grid-group. Originally designed by Douglas as a heuristic device, the grid-group concept later made its way into Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky's work entitled *Cultural Theory* (1990) as a starting point for theory building. The following quotation draws from Selle's reply to Wildavsky concerning the role of grid-group:

> Not only do the dimensions remain unclear, *but we are not really told very much about them*. In *Cultural theory,* we find surprisingly little about the dimensions themselves, i.e. the *theoretical basis* of the theory. ... The truth is that most of what is written within the tradition starts out from the four (or five) cultures and not from the dimensions as such. Instead of trying to specify how to move from the dimensions towards the different combinations of cultures—the most important and the most difficult question—most of the literature is mainly about the cultures, trying to relate preferences (and biases) to the different cultures, but *decoupled* from the dimensions as such. (Selle 1991:362)

Rippl uses grid-group as a starting point for her critique of the operationalization of cultural theory. In her view, the relations between cultural biases follow their placement in the grid-group dimensions. However, I am not convinced that it is theoretically wise to define grid-group as two dimensions that are unrelated to each other, and then place the four cultures or cultural biases as 'directions' with equal distances from these two dimensions. From this, one can then deduce that hierarchy and individualism are two opposite directions (with a strong negative correlation) and similarly that fatalism and egalitarianism are opposites (with a strong negative correlation) (Rippl 2002:152 H1 and H2).

I see the four cultural biases as independent from each other and, at least in theory, negatively correlated with each other at the level of institutions. However, given

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[221] The scales are hierarchical-egalitarian and individualistic-communitarian.

[222] See (Braman and Kahan 2001; Braman, Kahan, and Grimmelmann 2005; Kahan and Braman 2006; Kahan, Braman, and Gastil 2006; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman 2009; Kahan 2010b; Kahan, Braman, et al. 2010; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012).

that we are measuring biases on the individual level, the measures are going to be tainted by the individuals' multiple cultural allegiances.

> As cultural theory theorizes about social contexts, it is perfectly appropriate for a person to face one way in business, another way in the army and a third way at home. Predicting behavior becomes feasible by ascertaining cultural context from history. Of course, a corporate executive could be a vegetarian if she viewed her eating style as part of egalitarian family or club relations. (Wildavsky 1991:359)

The aforementioned executive spends her time in both individualistic and egalitarian environments, and her answers are likely to be a mixture of individualistic and egalitarian biases, which will contribute to a positive correlation between these two measures. Thus, individual-level correlations between two biases can also be a sign of people living their lives within a number of different cultural contexts.

There is a tradition of drawing the grid-group and four cultures in one diagram, as in Figure 12 below, so that the four cultures are presented in a two dimensional space (a Cartesian surface is the best you can hope for from a sheet of paper). I suspect that those of us in the research community have been fooled by the simplicity of this practice. I have yet to hear a convincing argument that explains why the four cultural biases are on the same 'plane' as the grid-group dimensions, or why the content of the cultural biases follows from the grid-group dimensions.

> One debate concerns whether the intersection of grid and group is most appropriately viewed as a typology (i.e. four basic categories in a 2 x 2 table) or as the coordinates of a Cartesian surface. The consequences of adopting one approach over the other are not trivial, particularly in any attempt to develop operational measures for empirical analysis. (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:193)

Cultural theory research in some of its formulations starts from grid-group. This makes sense on the level of institutions: The two-dimensionality of the the four biases is postulated because they are drawn in the grid-group space. However, it is quite possible that on the individual level the cultural biases are not related to each other as four trajectories in a two dimensional space. Perhaps it is better to regard them as four independent dimensions. The main problem with the two-dimensional model of cultural biases is that if you are moving away from the egalitarian bias, you are always moving toward the individualistic bias. I do not believe that this is what happens on the individual level—on the level of institutions, perhaps, but not in people's minds. Cultural biases are patterns of values and ideas. There are four distinct patterns that are in conflict with each other, but reducing the strength of one pattern does not automatically imply strengthening the other patterns. It can simply mean less patterning—a poorer fit with the patterns described by cultural theory. The lack of an egalitarian pattern should not be used as evidence of the presence of an individualistic, hierarchical, or fatalistic pattern.

Mary Douglas has called the grid-group a heuristic tool, and I believe it is best regarded as such, rather than the building block that everything else rests upon. It is a neat way to explain why these four patterns are more important than other patterns, but I would be careful to assume that grid-group is the 'cause' of the four cultures.

Figure 12: Grid-Group and Four Cultures



Instead of relying on Figure 12 above, I will be treating grid-group as two dimensions that describe social relations (Figure 3 on page 13), while I treat cultural biases as a typology of worldviews that people can support or reject in varying degrees (Figure 5 on page 17). In this manner, if cultural biases are measured as a scale, they need to be divided into four independent dimensions. The relationship between the social relations (grid-group) and mental constructs (cultural biases) is postulated in cultural theory. However, if we were to use this relationship to constrain our measures, we would be unable test this postulate within the very core of the theory. There is research focusing on a few institutions that finds the presence of this relationship between social relations and cultural biases. As far as I know, however, no large-scale surveys have been able to establish this in a convincing manner.[223]

Kahan and others at Yale claim that they are measuring grid and group, but the questions they are asking people show that they are actually asking questions about cultural biases, and they even refer to these as "two attitudinal scales" (Kahan

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[223] According to Boyle and Couglin, a study done by Kohn and Schooler (1983) is an exeception: a longitudinal study of the effects of the grid dimension in work settings on attitudes and personality variables (Boyle and Coughlin 1994: 193).

2012:8). Within the scales, no questions about social relations can be found, and several of the questions are identical or similar to those used by Dake (Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010).

As Thompson demonstrates in his recent presentation of cultural theory, it is possible to present the theory without the use of grid and group. Moreover, if one can remove both dimensions, one for sure should be able to add a third dimension. The most likely candidate for a useful third dimension is power or grip (Thompson 1982, 1996:82, 2008:143). Pepperday has recently suggested a reformulation of grid-group from two dimensions into three dimensions: competition, cooperation, and coercion. Coercion is in many ways the same as power. Out of these, he deduces a typology of four cultural biases. His formulation is different from cultural theory, and he calls it the Way of Life Theory, or WOLT for short, but he still ends up with the same four cultural biases (Pepperday 2009:Chapter 4).

Measuring Cultural Bias on the Level of Individuals

Boyle and Coughlin give a very insightful discussion about the content of cultural biases and how to measure them.

> The issue of how to measure worldviews (or even what a worldview consists of) is by no means resolved. ... We suggest that it may be preferable to conceptualize worldview in terms that clearly reflect the basic structure they are assumed to acquire from grid-group patterns: Fatalism and distrust are appropriate measures for the high-grid-low-group corner; scales of traditional morality or attitudes toward authority are reasonable for the high-grid-high-group corner; and distinctive orientations toward the environment are appropriate for all corners. But more specific attitudes toward political and economical policy issues may be too context-dependent to be useful for comparisons over time or across cultures. (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:215-216)

Boyle and Coughlin compare different methods for capturing cultural biases and relate these biases to each other and to socially defined groups, like Catholics or low-income farmers. Unfortunately, the General Social Survey does not provide a better way to connect people to social relations. However, as I stated previously, I am skeptical toward also using grid-group as a way to define the content and measurement of cultural biases. Nevertheless, it is important to continue with efforts to find some more or less harmonized way to capture cultural bias.

The most widely used approach for deploying cultural theory at the individual level was developed by Karl Dake, who proposes using 20 Likert-type items to establish respondents' position toward cultural biases (Dake 1991; Likert 1974). This instrument poses no questions about social relations or behavior, thus leaving out some important aspects of cultural theory.[224] Each of the four cultural biases is captured by five items that are supportive of only one bias. Thus, support for a statement is counted as support for particular cultural bias. This structure is based on measuring degrees of support rather than degrees of rejection, and is prone to measurement errors caused by acquiescence, as I will show later (see page 326).

A few example statements will make the question structure clearer. The first is one of the statements supporting individualism:

> Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.

People are asked if they strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, agree, or strongly agree with this statement. The logic behind the item is that people who support the individualistic cultural bias are more likely to agree with this statement. In addition, those who support hierarchical, egalitarian, or fatalistic biases will have reasons for disagreeing with the statement. However, disagreement cannot be used for establishing which one of these three other biases the respondent prefers.

A similar logic applies to this statement, which is supportive of hierarchy:

> Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.

Respondents who adhere to the hierarchical cultural bias thrive with higher levels of labor and role differentiation, while it is trait that clashes with the egalitarian preference for equality. It is a bit unclear if an individualistic bias would necessarily lead to the rejection of this, or if this statement can be reconciled with an ideal of rich and poor living harmoniously. Not all respondents will understand the concept of roles in the same way as social scientists. My goal is not to have a discussion concerning the content validity of these items, but to focus on the ways the structure of the answers to these items influences the results we get.

These items are abstract positions, and not reflections of a particular political issue. They are removed from particular political positions. In this way, they are much closer to ideological positions than they are to attitudes (Kuklinski and Peyton 2007; Converse 1993; Zaller 1992).

In cultural theory, a widely used concept is justification. People justify their behavior and way of life by making references to underlying principles (See for example Douglas 2001:9). Making judgments is very similar to making justifications with one obvious difference. Justifications are by definition directional and supportive of something, while judgments can be both positive and negative

[224] On the other hand, this makes it possible to test if social relations, behavior, and cultural biases relate to each other as described by cultural theory.

(Stoker 2001).[225] In some sense, one could argue that the cultural bias items suffer methodologically by being based on justifications rather than judgments.[226] However, the reason for this is built into the theory. If you make judgments on a one-dimensional scale going from A to B, rejecting A always entails accepting B. However, since cultural bias exists in a four-dimensional space, rejecting one bias does not necessarily imply a direction toward any of the other biases, as there can be different reasons (i.e., cultural biases) behind the rejection. In other words, the measurement of cultural bias is confined to a four-dimensional space where the dimensions are defined as support for or rejection of a bias.

I have previously argued that rejection of a bias is important information (Olli 1999). For example, if a respondent strongly disagrees with the individualistic statement given above, we can already start to make predictions about how they are likely to relate to several other political issues. In other words, the disagreement provides insights into the kind of attitudes he or she has. Moreover, I have suggested that combinations of biases are important, and their effects cannot just be added together (Olli 1999). Translating pro-egalitarian biases to political views obviously leads to different answers if we combine it with strong support for hierarchy or rejection of individualism. I will treat this issue separately later on in the piece.

I believe that when people make judgments, they start from cultural biases (knowledge and preferences). Judgments are made in a context, and they bring in the social relations into the process of converting cultural biases to value-loaded statements concerning political issues.

A new star among the attempts to measure cultural worldviews is presented by the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School:

> My collaborators and I take a pragmatic attitude. We are more interested in finding a scheme for measuring cultural worldviews that is internally valid and that has explanatory utility than in finding one that fits a profile dictated by axiomatic, abstract theorizing. (Kahan 2012:13)

They have created two scales: the individualistic-communitarian scale, which runs in same direction as the group dimension, with high values for individualism and called *the individualism-scale*; and the hierarchical-egalitarian scale, which runs in the same direction as group, with high values on hierarchy and called *the hierarchy scale*. These scales have consistently high reliability (Cronbach's alpha > 0.7 in every

[225] This is true unless one assumes the existence of a mental drawer where answers to these questions are waiting for the occasion to be used. See, for example, Taber for a presentation of the different models of memory that are assumed to be involved in responding to survey questions and related to judgments (2001).

[226] In the household study, I allow households to justify their behavior and choices, which gives much more information than a simple score.

survey). The reason they give for choosing this solution is that if you measure the four worldviews independently,

> it becomes theoretically possible for a single individual to exhibit multiple competing orientations—for example, to be simultaneously both a hierarchist and egalitarian … it is not uncommon for subjects to have high scores on competing scales. … This feature of the Dake scales makes them unsuited for empirically testing cultural theory. (Kahan 2012:7)

I see this empirical finding as one of the most intriguing findings in cultural theory, something that should be explained and researched. I am aware of the fantastic empirical results Kahan and his collaborators have received when researching the political controversies concerning risk-related issues in the United States, but I strongly disagree with the above argument. Kahan assumes here that a dominant cultural bias exists and chooses a measurement technique that supports his view. In this thesis, I will target the same question about the lack of consistency. However, I ask if the postulated dominance is present, and how the lack of it can be explained, rather than choosing a measurement model that hides the problem. In order to score high on individualism by using Kahan's measurement model, you need to simultaneously reject communitarianism; and to score high on hierarchy, you need to simultaneously reject egalitarianism. Even if one takes the pragmatic view and accepts that the scale's ability to discriminate between the heated moral issues is good, it remains an empirical fact that on the individual level, people have conflicting opinions. Simply taking an average of these conflicting opinions does not make them go away. This measurement model will give the same score for a respondent who chooses the middle point on every question as one who returns maximum scores on items loading on the opposite ends of the scale. Thus, we have lost the ability to test one central aspect of cultural theory, even if we have gained simplicity.

To sum up, there is still confusion and fundamental disagreement concerning how to measure an individual's position in cultural theory. Researchers measure either social relations, preferred social relations, grid-group, cultural biases as four dimensions, or cultural biases as two dimensions. In many ways, we are still in a phase of scale development and experimenting with different measurement techniques (DeVellis 2003). Until there is a standard questionnaire for cultural theory, researchers must develop their own questionnaires—ones that require a large amount of resources to develop and administer and are of limited use.

Problem 2: Cultural Bias is measured without a Model of the Individual-Culture Relationship

As long as the relationship between individual and institution is unclear, it is difficult to interpret the results from survey data. The source of this confusion is the different models of how an individual relates to the four cultures. As early as 1990, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky were aware of the critique against classifying individuals as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic.

> We often hear, in conversation and from readers of our work, because these people see part of themselves in all or most of these five ways, that our classification of individuals into five ways of life cannot be correct. (1990:265)

They do provide two different solutions to this dilemma.

> Given that individuals find themselves in different social contexts in different areas of their lives, the interesting question is how they cope with this situation. Is there a strain to consistency on the part of individuals or du individuals compartmentalize the rival ways of life (1990:266)?

These two different ways of understanding the relationship between individual and cultural biases require different operationalizations. In earlier work, I presented three different ways to code and analyze survey data, depending on the understanding of the relationship between individual and cultural biases (Olli 1995).

First, the *coherent individual model* assumes that individuals are carriers of one cultural bias, or at least that they tend to adhere to one particular way of life. As Douglas writes, “Personally, I believe the limits are real, that it is not to stay in two parts of the diagram at once” (Coyle 1994:229). Douglas has, for the most part, continued to use her model of the individual as coherent actor, which assumes that each person’s thoughts and actions are characterized by a single way of life. In *Thought Styles,* however, she acknowledges this as extreme (Douglas 1996b:99). Not surprisingly, several authors rely on this model. In her survey, for example, Palmer treats individuals as coherent actors (1996). Similarly, Wildavsky asks about the “relative proportions of hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians and fatalist in a population” (Swedlow 2002:273).

The consistency at the individual level does not need to be absolute.

> Yet for all the means by which biases are compartmentalized and morselized, most individuals do find themselves inhabiting one way of life more than others. As within Goethe’s Faust, there may be more than one soul dwelling within an individual’s breast, but the competing allegiances are not equally divided among the possible ways. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:267)

According to Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky we can have several biases within us, but one takes the lead. One cultural bias is the dominant one. I will later test this assumption about the existence of a dominant bias (see page 432).

Thus, context will not create short-term changes, as the cultural bias is likely to be the result of primary socialization. According to this model, many people can be coded as supporters of a cultural bias (individualist, egalitarian, hierarchic, and fatalist), and then one is likely to have a number of people who do not quite fit.[227]

Second, the *sequential individual model* accepts that people belong to several social contexts, and change of context will have a swift effect on a person's worldview. Thus, it is possible to be individualistic at work and hierarchical at home. We change out worldview when we change our roles. This model resembles Rayners mobility hypothesis, where "individuals may flit like butterflies from context to context, changing the nature of their arguments as they do so" (Rayner 1992:107).

Given this model, it is difficult to use surveys to measure cultural bias in general simply because there should be no general cultural bias on the individual level. Instead, cultural bias is utterly dependent on context and, therefore, all questions that seek to entertain questions of bias need to be tailored to particular contexts. Unfortunately, the questions posed by Dake are nowadays used in surveys to measure bias in general, independent of context.[228]

The following is an example of what I have called the sequential individual approach in cultural theory. In this example, Lockhart and Coughlin are asking about the consequences of this kind of understanding of the individual-culture relationship:

> … We need to shed light on how hybrid cultural biases actually operate across time and social context within societies. One possibility is that the actual or perceived variations among multiple spheres of life—for example, a predisposition towards individualism in the workplace versus egalitarianism (or hierarchy) in the family—can be directly traced to the primary socialization processes within these respective spheres. If this is the case, then an important related question is whether or not people apply cultural biases only within the context in which the socialization occurred, or follow additional, presumably more complex, principles of application. This knowledge is critical, for without some capacity to explain when people will act on particular cultural biases, cultural theory and

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[227] Palmer includes respondents who score in the top 15% in a bias as supporters of one bias (Palmer 1996).

[228] Dake was originally interested in nuclear risk. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the important work to test and validate these questions, by comparing them with interviews and observations, was done in the context of household consumption (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994).

> socioeconomics have only ex post facto utility. (Lockhart and Coughlin 1992:804)

Third, as a solution to the problems with changing worldviews, I proposed the *synthetic individual model,* which assumes that people can belong to several contexts, and their worldview is a hybrid or blend of their contexts. Cultural biases change slowly, which can then create tensions when people operate in several different contexts. It is easy to assume that people would then seek out social arenas that are not in conflict with their biases. Given this model, it is possible to use biases as scale variables, and a person's cultural bias can be described by their score on the four cultural biases (Olli 1995).

In Table 16, we can see these different cultural bias models at the individual level summarized according to the stability of individual cultural bias, the number of biases an individual has, and the role played by the institutional context. If the stability of individual cultural bias is low, we are then dealing with the sequential individual approach, given that the immediate context has a strong influence on cultural bias. If stability of individual cultural bias is low, and these changes are triggered by something other than the institutional context, we then have a situation that does not fit with cultural theory. If the stability of the individual cultural bias is high, we are dealing with the coherent or synthetic individual models. They are differentiated by the number of cultural biases on the individual level. The coherent model claims that one bias is enough, while the synthetic individual models claims that a person can relate to several cultural biases simultaneously.

Recently, I have recognized the need for a variation of the synthetic model—a variation that does not assume that the effects of the four cultural biases can be captured through summation. The logic of culture is more complicated than just adding values or biases together. I call this fourth model, the *cultural bias combination model.* In this model a person's cultural bias can be described, for example, as supporting egalitarianism (*E*) and hierarchy (*H*), rejecting individualism (*i*), and indifferent to fatalism (), which can be presented as *EHi.* Capital letters indicate support, small letters rejection, and a missing letter shows indifference to a bias. When making judgments the indifferent biases can be ignored, while all other biases must somehow be handled to create consistent judgments. I will operationalize the cultural bias combination model in Chapter 10 and use it extensively in Part III to discuss cultural theory.

Table 16: Models of Cultural Bias at the Individual Level

		Stability of individual cultural bias			
		High		Low	
		The influence of immediate institutional context on individual bias			
		High	Low	High	Low
Number of cultural biases at the individual level	Only one	Special case of coherent[229]	Coherent	Special case of sequential[230]	Against cultural theory
	One or several supported	Unknown	Synthetic or combination	Sequential	Against cultural theory

Thompson has resolved some of these dilemmas on a theoretical level by insisting that individuals are not the proper unit of analysis. Cultural theory is about relationships, and the smallest possible unit is a *dividual* (the relationship between two individuals), and the proper unit of analysis are the four solidarities. Nevertheless, you cannot talk to a solidarity and sometimes we need to ask questions to people in a particular context (Thompson 2008:19-20).

The Relative Autonomy People Have in a Culture—Knowledge, Preferences, and Social Relations

The debate over the autonomy of individual thought and action within a culture is an old but central debate.[231] Cultural theory is primarily a framework to be used on the meso-level,[232] but it is possible to build a bridge toward the individual level. It is too simplistic to put a person into one of the four categories; we should also take into account that people live their lives in different spheres and have various roles (Olli 1995, 1999, 1996). People's relations with these four ways of organizing can be described by their knowledge of them, by their preference for or rejection of them, and by their actual social relations. These three aspects together give us a picture of a people's ability and willingness to utilize the social resources around them.

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[229] This special case consists of settings where the individual is likely to meet only one kind of institution, each of which will have a strong immediate influence on the person's cultural make up. In some ways, this is what totalitarian regimes have hoped for: a populae that can be formed by the institutions.

[230] In this case, individual-level studies of culture are meaningless unless they are firmly rooted in an institutional context. This approach is valid if individuals only display traits of the institution they are currently a part of, and are unable to bring values or behavioral patterns from one context to another. However, these assumptions do not seem to have support in the research community.

[231] A good description of the main features of the debate can be found in Alexander and Seidman (1990).

[232] Thompson sees cultural theory as valid for all levels and having qualities similar to fractals (2008: f15).

People have varying levels of competence or *knowledge* about these four ways of organizing. Each way is a complete system of organizing, into which a person must be socialized. My first assumption is that even if a person is not able to verbalize the structural characteristics of her social relations, she is still able to bring her knowledge from one situation to another. In other words, an immigrant who has been socialized into a hierarchical way of organizing will find it much easier to participate in a new setting if that setting is also hierarchical. My second assumption is that people have varying levels of knowledge about quality (not everyone is able to grasp the nuances of the social life) and quantity (some people have experience of only one way of organizing, whereas others are fluent in all four). A person can be fluent in one way of organizing and bit rusty in another.

People also differ in their *preferences*. Knowledge of one way of organizing does not automatically provide a disposition toward it. It is easy to imagine how refugees might dismiss the way of organizing from which they have been fleeing, even if, or perhaps rather because, they know how it works. Rejections of ways of organizing are also important when we choose political parties because the rejections limit our options. Rejection is not just a lack of preference for particular ways of organizing. Indeed, rejection can be just as strong as or even stronger than our support for a way of organizing. I believe that rejections can have a more important role in our thinking and behavior than previously thought. I will return to this in Chapter 13.

In addition to these two mental characteristics, one should also describe a person's *actual social relations*. People do not exist in a vacuum. They have to find their place in a society. It is not a given that a person will be able to create and uphold the relations he or she desires, which might force this person into isolation. This is especially relevant for migrants, who almost by definition leave one set of social relations behind them and enter into a new set of social relations in their new home country.[233] However, in a survey-based approach it is difficult to capture social relations in a meaningful way.

Figure 13 below provides an overview of the knowledge model of cultural theory. In my view, this model provides a better description of how cultural biases work at the individual level when compared to the social relations model depicted in Figure 10 or the preferred social relations model depicted in Figure 11. Nevertheless, in the surveys I have, only two aspects of this model are available: preference for a way of organizing and present attitudes. For future research, this model would provide the means for a powerful test of how individuals relate to cultural biases and to institutions.

[233] However, we must remember that social bonds can be stretched over oceans, and some have relatives and friends (many of who helped/encouraged them to come to Norway) waiting for their arrival. In other words, both transnational communities and migration chains are important.

Figure 13: The Knowledge Model of Cultural Theory



A combination of knowledge, preferences, and social relations tells us how flexible and resourceful a person is. Troubles arise when one has the knowledge of a social system, but lacks the social relations needed to get the rewards. The obvious remedy is the acquisition of the necessary social relations, which is not always possible, especially if one is subject to social exclusion by the majority population. It also does not help to be inserted into social relations if one lacks the knowledge needed, or if one rejects the particular ways in which relations are organized. Some people are also more flexible than others. Social chameleons have knowledge of different ways of life and are able to participate and feel at home in many different social settings. Because each of these four ways of organizing has its own logic, and because each controls the distribution of resources and burdens, those people who are able to bridge two different systems of organizing are likely to be among the key players in the society.[234] Their opposite would be those who accept only one way of organizing and strongly reject all others, which is something we can find in politics both among supporters of the extreme right (pure individualism) and the extreme left (pure egalitarianism) (Olli 1995).

To sum up, in order to measure cultural biases and analyze survey data, a model of the individual-culture relationship is required. The knowledge model of cultural theory is promising, but the survey data available does not allow for the analysis of knowledge about ways of organizing nor knowledge about social relations. Therefore, in reality, I will be measuring only how the preferences toward cultural biases influence party preferences. I will be using the cultural combinations model to conceptualize how cultural biases work in the individual.

[234] Steve Nay calls these social entrepreneurs.

Problem 3: Jumping between Levels

In their book entitled *Cross-level inference*, Achen and Shively show that many of the phenomena social scientists are interested in actually involve two levels. In this thesis, these levels are referred to as the individual level and the institutional level. Nevertheless, we rarely have data from both levels. Therefore, we need theories if we are to make assumptions that allow us to use data from one level for making conclusions concerning the other level. Unfortunately, there are a multitude of ways of being wrong about cross-level analyses, both in the way the theories are constructed and in the way the statistical analyses are done and interpreted (Achen and Shively 1995:3).

In cultural theory the causality is commonly seen as going from institutions to people, like in *How Institutions Think* (Douglas 1986) or in the social relations model (see page 285). Methodological individualism understands this causality as working the other way around: individual participants' cultural biases make the institution. This is a position that I find difficult to accept. Therefore, we must be very careful when we make conclusions based on individual-level data. Nevertheless, the use of individual level data is necessary if we want to know how individuals are influenced by the institutions they participate in .

> Individual-level studies offer the only real hope of teasing out genuine contextual effects. Even with individual data, however, the task is not easy, and much of the theoretical and methodological foundation remaings unbuilt. Traditional sociological theorizing has often been muddled, and contemporary sociological studies of networks commonly emply ad hoc measures and methods with little connection to statistical theory. (Achen and Shively 1995:233)

As long as we do not know how the relationship between individual and culture works, it is difficult to use data collected on one level to say something about another level. I believe there is no inherent problem in using survey data to study culture so long as the level of analysis corresponds with the level of culture we are studying. A good example is Hofstede's study of national cultures by using surveys of IBM employees: When his research interest is the difference between national cultures, he aggregates the individual-level data to the national level; when his research interest is organizational culture, he aggregates the data to the level of organizations instead of searching for individual-level associations (Hofstede 2001).

One of the clearest expressions that reject the use of individual-level data to explain phenomena on higher levels is made by Rayner, who argues that "methodological individualism that extrapolates from individual behavior to social action has no place in cultural analysis" (Rayner 1992:86). Rayner's point has some validity, but it needs to be rephrasing and qualified.

Describing People or Institutions

How can we use individual-level data to describe institutions or anything else above the individual level? Assuming that the sequential individual model is correct, and we all shift our preferences when moving from context to context, it is rather impossible to use survey data that are not solidly rooted in a particular context or institution to make claims about the cultural level. Similarly, if the synthetic individual model is correct, and our cultural biases reflect the sum of our institutional attachments, we must be very careful of using the individual-level data to describe any higher-level phenomena because we do not know *which* institution is the cause of the individual-level biases.

The lack of a model for the individual-culture relationship, which I discussed previously, should stop us from making any conclusions across analytical levels. Using individual-level data to draw conclusions about institutions or cultures renders those conclusions as rather meaningless if we cannot define the direction of the causality. More research is needed to find out how people's cultural biases and institutions interact. Even if cultural theory, which is in fact a systems theory, rejects the idea of simple causal directionality, the direction of causality is a necessary assumption in many statistical procedures like regression analysis. The least we can do is to be explicit and consistent in our use of assumptions.

Aggregating from Hybrids to Pure Bias

Lockhart and Coughlin point to what they see as a troubling oversight within cultural theory: "If the persons who compose various groups are themselves characterized by hybrid biases, then how can the groups be pure in cultural bias?" (Lockhart and Coughlin 1992:803). This problem is connected with methodological individualism and its assumption that an institution is the sum of its parts, which makes the cultural bias of an institution just an aggregate of the members' cultural biases. Perhaps people's biases never have a one-to-one match with the institution's cultural bias. People are more or less adapted and more or less at home in an institution. Even if people's biases are hybrids, there can still be strong pressures within the organization to allow for only one type of cultural bias to dominate in its official documents and policies. It is quite possible, perhaps even reasonable, to assume that institutions are more than just the sum of its individual members. Thus, this is not a problem if we depart from methodological individualism and embrace an institutionalist perspective.

Another solution is to say that Lockhart and Coughlin rely upon the sequential individual model, where people's cultural biases are heavily context dependent, while most survey measurements are not. This disconnect could be a methodological rather than a theoretical problem. However, it is still possible that people actually have hybrid biases, in which case we simply do not understand the mechanisms behind the ways that changes in context influence the judgments we make.

Sum of Opposites is Zero, or What Happened to the Institutions?

One type of problem with aggregation, or a theoretical confusion between levels, arises when one aggregates too high up into the level of society. According to cultural theory, in every society you will find institutions relying on the four ways of life. Thus, assuming that the aggregates of all individuals' cultural biases relate to each other the way cultural theory claims they do is, in reality, not such a straightforward assumption. It would be much more true to the theory if individual biases were measured within the context of different institutions. If the institutional and social placement of the individuals is important, one should expect aggregate means across all institutions in the society to be close to zero. This is what happens in a normal survey, where the measurements are not connected to a particular context. If measurements are made in a particular context, there should be clear deviations from zero.

I am not claiming that all societies are the same. There is national-level research on cultural theory, showing that it is possible to also describe large-scale institutions with the help of cultural theory (Mamadouh 1999; Grendstad 1999b; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Braman, and Gastil 2006; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007).

To sum up, jumping between levels is possible as long as our assumptions, measures, and statistical techniques match each other. This requires a heightened awareness of the assumptions about the individual-culture relationship, direction of causality, and the measurement models we use.

Problem 4: Ignoring the Meaning Cultural Biases Carry

The fourth problem at the micro-level is that researchers have been deploying survey research as if cultural biases are somewhow devoid of meaning. I believe that cultural biases inherently carry meaning, and meanings behave differently from numbers. Previous research has measured cultural bias, in one way or another, and represented cultural bias through numbers. This alone poses no particular problem. However, when analyzing the effects of cultural biases, the researchers have used techniques that are well suited for analyzing numbers, but not at all suitable for analyzing meanings. The analyses are dependent on assumptions that have not been checked and unfortunately ones that often cannot be met.

Most of the research mentioned in the first column in Table 15 (on page 282), including my own, violates some assumptions.[235] For example, in an otherwise great article, Coughlin and Lockhart use four continuous cultural biases as additive variables in a multivariate regression that explains political attitudes (Coughlin and

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[235] I am concerned with claims made about the thoughts and behaviors of individuals. I am not making any claims about the institutional level. It is quite possible that these assumptions are valid when individual-level data is used to make claims about institutions or 'cultures'.

Lockhart 1998). Even if their results are consistent with cultural theory, I believe that the assumptions required to do multivariate regression do not fit with how cultural biases actually function at the level of the individual. They are breaking at least two assumptions.

First is *the additivity assumption*, which states that the effects of biases are additive at the individual level. In other words, you can add the effect of a hierarchical bias to the effect of an egalitarian bias, and this will be identical to the effect of having both egalitarian and hierarchical biases. However, holding two meanings can just as well become a third meaning, which might have an effect that differs from the sum of the two first ones. If the sum of biases does not work at the individual level, then using the average of these two to represent an individual's position is also questionable.

Second is the *independency of effects assumption*, which states that you can analyze the effects of one bias on its own: You do not need to know anything about the individual's position on the other biases. However, if the effects from interactions between biases are sufficiently large, then it does not make much sense to analyze the effects of one bias alone because in real life several biases are likely to be present anyway. Analyzing just one bias at a time greatly distorts the understanding of the true effects.

In Chapter 12, I will test these two assumptions, along with the assumption of a dominant bias, and empirically demonstrate that they are indeed fallacious.

Moving Forward

Despite of these obvious challenges, I believe it is possible to move forward and try to operationalize and analyze cultural theory in a manner that is clearer than the previous attempts. Many of the theoretical problems can be solved or made obsolete by allowing for the rejection of cultural bias and using combinations of cultural biases at the individual level.

First, we need a way to measure cultural bias. I will develop ways of measuring cultural biases and evaluate their reliability and validity in two different surveys: the Nordic Cultures Survey of 1999 (NOS99) and the Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey of 1995 (NEPS95). In NOS99, the cultural biases are thoroughly measured, but here only party preference can be used as the dependent variable. In NEPS95, the cultural biases are originally measured in a less reliable way (only two or three items per bias), but I will add new items that can be used to create sufficiently reliable measurements of cultural biases. The next two chapters will operationalize cultural theory in these two surveys and evaluate the quality of these measurements.

Second, I have chosen to present my own solution to how the analysis of cultural biases should be done, and not just criticize others. Assuming the four cultural biases are carriers of meaning and cannot be analyzed and understood in isolation from each other, one possibility is to analyze them as combinations. Since little work has been done on cultural biases as combinations, there are no precedents that point to the best practices for operationalizing the cultural biases Therefore, in Chapter 10, I will compare hundreds of different ways to operationalize cultural biases, and, by using empirical criteria, I will select some assumptions that seem to work better than others.

This will lead to a demonstration of two alternative ways of operationalizing the combinations of cultural biases, which will be used in Chapter 11 to analyze party preferences. I hope that such a demonstration will convince the readers that using combinations is a valid way to use cultural biases, which retains the meaning dimension.

Third, in Chapter 12, I will use statistical tests on my preferred operationalization of cultural theory—i.e., the ranked combination of two strongest biases—to demonstrate that the dominant bias assumption, the additivity assumption, and independency of effects assumption, are fallacies that lack the empirical backing to qualify them as robust assumptions for guiding future research.

Fourth, by using both qualitative data from the household study and quantitative data from the surveys, Chapter 13 discusses the rejection of cultural biases. The role and manner of rejecting cultural biases used in the households is compared with the effects of rejecting party preferences as they appear in the surveys.

Chapter 8

MEASURING CULTURAL BIAS IN THE NORDIC CULTURES SURVEY

In this chapter, I will build four one-dimensional scales for measuring the respondents' hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases in the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey (NOS99).[236] A lengthy discussion is included because, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, the measurement apparatus is not yet well established. This discussion will hopefully give readers trust in the measurements used and help us to improve future research. Since the measurements will not be perfect, it is useful to know about the weaknesses prior to any analysis in order to separate the effects created by research methods used from any substantial effects.

I will first present the items used and some of my choices in transferring the cultural bias items to scales that measure underlying dimensions. Second, I will discuss the reliability of the measurement and show that the responses are consistent enough to be used as a scale. Third, I will check the construct validity of these scales and show that they are measuring what we expect them to measure. Fourth, since these items are prone to yes-saying, I will discuss the acquiescence problem connected with the resulting scales. Finally, I present the manner in which these scales are constructed from the cultural bias items and give some suggestions for how to improve these items.

Cultural biases are not attitudes; nevertheless, the following quote about the measurement of attitudes applies equally to the measurement of cultural biases:

[236] The data file can be ordered from www.nsd.uib.no. The data is provided by the LOS Center, and is made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither LOS nor NSD are responsible for the analyses and interpretation of the data presented here. These analyses in this chapter, with the exception of those related to acquiescence, are made with the syntax file Nordic1999_Validity&Reliability.sps.

> The question has been raised whether the concept of attitude as here used and as measured by an attitude scale is not hypothetical rather than "real". It is just as hypothetical as the concept of intelligence which is measured by what it supposedly does. But these concepts are hypothetical in the same sense that the concepts force, momentum, volume, are hypothetical in physical science. No one has ever seen or touched a force or a momentum or a volume. They are measured by what they supposedly do. The legitimacy of these abstractions can be tested only in the consistency by which they operate in experience. (Thurstone 2004:291)

Several authors have discussed how culture, as understood in cultural theory, should be measured.[237] Since cultural theory has its roots in social anthropology, the great majority of those who employ Mary Douglas's concepts rely on qualitative methods and avoid the problems involved in reducing complex cultural elements to numbers. There are also authors who have advised against the use of methodological individualism in cultural analysis (Rayner 1992:86). Nevertheless, there is also a considerable body of work based on survey data that has more or less succeeded in measuring cultural bias. [238]

The 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey

The survey best suited for my purposes is the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey, which contains 20 questions on cultural biases and a question about party preference. The survey draws from representative samples from all five Nordic countries (*The Nordic Cultures Survey* 1999). When considering the potential that NOS99 has for helping us to understand the relationship between culture and the individual and how cultural biases relate to political preferences, it is surprising that this survey has not been used more frequently by other researchers.[239] Indeed, this is the largest multinational survey that employs items derived from or inspired by the items created by Dake and Wildavsky.

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[237] (Caulkins and Peters 2002; Grendstad et al. 1999; Caulkins 1999; Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Gross and Rayner 1985; Douglas 1984; Hampton 1982; Dake and Thompson 1999; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Olli 1995, 1999; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan 2012).

[238] See the discussion on page 280 (Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Sjöberg 1995; Marris, Langford, and O'Riordan 1996; Peters and Slovic 1996; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Brenot, Bonnefous, and Marris 1998; Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Grendstad 1999a, 1999b; Grendstad et al. 1999; Olli 1999; Grendstad 2000, 2001; Caulkins and Peters 2002; Grendstad 2003b, 2007).

[239] At least the following publications make references to this survey: (Grendstad et al. 1999; Grendstad 2001, 2003b; Grendstad and Sundback 2003; Grendstad 2007). However, Grendstad himself was the principal researcher behind the survey.

The survey was conducted as a computer assisted telephone interview in the local language by the national Gallup offices in each of the five Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) in late March and early April in 1999. The principal researcher behind the survey was Gunnar Grendstad with support from Lotte Jensen in Denmark, Gunnar-Helgi Kristinsson in Iceland, Lennart Sjöberg in Sweden, and Susan Sundback in Finland (1999). More information concerning the sampling procedure in each of the countries can be found in the appendix (see page 523).

In Table 17 we can see how each one of the samples from Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark are close to 1000 respondents and representative for the population above 15 years of age, according to Gallup. The sample size for Iceland was a bit smaller with 817 respondents.

Table 17: The Sample—Non-weighted and Weighted. NOS99.

		Non-weighted		*Weighted*	
		Frequency	Per cent	Frequency	Per cent
Valid	Norway	997	20.6	1002	20.7
	Sweden	1000	20.7	1000	20.7
	Denmark	1015	21.0	1015	21.0
	Finland	1003	20.8	1003	20.7
	Iceland	817	16.9	817	16.9
	Total	4832	100.0	4837	100.0

Gallup has assigned weights to Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, and Danish data to compensate for small sampling errors affecting age and gender. For Iceland, no such weights are use because the sample bias was accounted for in the gross sample. I will use these weights when the cultural bias scales are standardized.

The Items Used to Measure Cultural Bias

In Table 18 below, we can see a list of the 20 cultural bias items in this survey—items designed to measure four cultural biases. These are largely based on items originally selected from existing English language survey items drafted by Carl Dake and Aaron Wildavsky (Dake 1990; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Dake 1991) and later used in original or modified form by several other researchers (see footnote 238). The members of the international research team translated them into their own local languages. Small-scale pilot surveys were conducted in Finland and in Norway by using student samples and a focus group (Grendstad et al. 1999:7). The original items in English and their translations into Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, and Icelandic are available in the appendix on page 525.

Table 18: List of Cultural Bias Items in NOS99.

Variable name	Statement	Mean	Std	Mode	Valid N
rh1	One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.	2.7	1.38	2	4473
rh2	The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.	3.8	1.23	5	4707
rh3	Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.	3.7	1.30	5	4744
rh4	Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn.	3.7	1.32	5	4699
rh5	Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.	3.4	1.33	4	4333
re1	The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.	3.8	1.34	5	4665
re2	What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.	3.9	1.24	5	4599
re3	I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.	3.6	1.41	5	4588
re4	We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women.	3.8	1.32	5	4662
re5	Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation.	3.9	1.25	5	4547
ri1	Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.	4.1	1.12	5	4555
ri2	If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.	4.5	.81	5	4736
ri3	People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit.	4.2	1.11	5	4712
ri4	Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.	3.7	1.25	4	4452
ri5	In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.	3.6	1.33	4	4624
rf1	It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.	3.1	1.60	5	4713
rf2	Cooperation with others rarely works.	1.9	1.22	1	4678
rf3	The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans.	2.6	1.48	1	4674
rf4	Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.	1.9	1.25	1	4719
rf5	I feel that life is a lottery.	2.6	1.51	1	4714

Cases are weighted.

All the questions intended to measure cultural bias are Likert-type questions . The respondents were given five alternative responses to each of the 20 statements. These alternatives were strongly disagree (SD), moderately disagree (MD), neither disagree or agree (Nth), moderately agree (MA), and strongly agree (SA). These responses are coded from 1 to 5.

I will briefly comment on the distribution of the responses to these items at Nordic level.[240] Some of the items are probably too easy to agree strongly to. If the items do not differentiate well, we will lose information about either those who agree most strongly or those who disagree most strongly. The first five items are intended to capture hierarchical cultural biases, and next five are egalitarian cultural bias items. We can see that the egalitarian cultural bias items have some unfortunate distributions. First, the mode is 5 for each of the five items. The mode shows us the answer with highest frequency, which in this case is 'strongly agree'. Fortunately, the mean for each question is below 4, so the problem of having an 'extreme' response as the most frequent response is somewhat moderate. Among the individualistic cultural bias items, there are three items (ri1, ri2, and ri3) that have a mean above 4, which reduces the available variation and makes it perhaps impossible to detect respondents who have even stronger support for the individualistic bias. The hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic items are thus skewed toward agreement. The fatalistic cultural bias items are skewed the other way. There are two items (rf2 and rf4) that have a very low mean, below 2, and on four of the items the most frequent response is 'strongly disagree'.

The cultural bias items were presented to the respondents in a random order, thus the question ordering cannot have an systematic influence on the responses (Grendstad et al. 1999). However, it is possible that it has an effect on the individual level. This aspect needs further study.[241] Nevertheless, I will not discuss this here since for my present purposes, it is enough to know that the systematic effect of question ordering can be ignored.

The presentation in this chapter does not follow the order in which my choices are made. I will first construct the four cultural bias scales and later evaluate the reliability and the construct validity of these scales.

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[240] For those planning to create surveys of their own, a downloadable file is available at http://eero.no/publ/The_1999_Nordic_Cultures_Survey_Responses_to_Cultural_Bias_items.pdf . This file contains the distribution of the 20 cultural bias items one by one according to county, together with some comments concerning translations and other weaknesses. See also (Grendstad et al. 1999) for the documentation report for this survey.

[241] In the previous Norwegian surveys that utilized ct-items, the 1993 ISSP and the 1995 Environmentalism surveys, the question ordering was fixed. The fatalism questions have been the last ones. So, would respondents be more fatalistic if these questions came first? These surveys have used only a selection of Dake's cultural bias items, and questions relating to the same bias come together. This will probably create more consistency than if the items were presented in a mixed order. Unfortunately, the data file from Gallup does not contain information about the order in which the cultural bias items were presented to each respondent. If this information were available, it would have been possible to study the effects of order, which to my knowledge has never been done for the cultural bias items.

Constructing Scales

Scale construction is a technical exercise which tends to be carried out without an explanation. Several choices need to be made along the way. What level of measurement should we use? How do we deal with missing responses? How many missing responses can we accept? How do we optimize the quality of measurement against the number of respondents available? Should the scales refer to the actual responses given or to the respondents' relative positions? How are scales that are constructed with the use of simple methods, like the mean, reconciled with scales constructed through the use of advanced techniques, like factor analysis? These are the questions this section will attempt to answer, and in the end, I hope the reader will approve of the choices I have made. For the impatient reader, I will reveal here that a person's deviation from the national average will be used as the basis for their score on cultural bias.

Level of Measurement

The choice of statistical techniques used in scale construction and analysis depends on the level of measurement. The answers given to the cultural bias items in these surveys are, by their very nature, measured at the ordinal level. Indeed, it is difficult to argue that the distance from *strongly agree* to *moderately agree* is equal to the distance from *moderately agree* to *indifferent*. At the same time, there are several positions concerning what types of analyses can be performed on ordinal-level variables. According to Stevens, variables at the ordinal level do not have properties that allow the use of the mean, and one is restricted to using descriptors like median and percentiles (Stevens 1946). The limitations put forth by Stevens are sound and have guided social scientists for decades. Nevertheless, I have chosen to standardize the responses, which requires the use of the mean. According to Stevens, this is permissible first on variables measured on the interval level. However, by taking a cue from other practitioners, I argue that ordinal-level analyses can be justified by the fact that many social constructs are conceptualized as continuous ones. As Borgatta and Bornhsted suggest,

> … what makes an appropriate ordinal scale is not merely the assignment of ranks to observations. An ordinal scale is appropriate if we assume that only the properties of "greater than" and "less than" define the underlying construct. We doubt this is the case for most variables to social scientists. As it seems to us that most constructs are conceptualized as continuous and can be thought of as reasonably distributed in the population using a bell-shaped curve as model, we see no reason not to analyze the manifest data using parametric statistics, even though they are imperfect interval-level scales. (Borgatta and Bohrnstedt 1980:160)

As we can see in Figure 15 on page 316, the distribution of the standardized responses roughly follows the theoretical normal curve. I believe that the continuous nature of the underlying cultural bias permits the use of techniques that otherwise require interval-level variables with only small errors. In other words, we can use standardization in our construction of the scales and analytical techniques like significance testing in factor and regression analyses without violating this particular assumption.

Dealing with Missing Responses

Because some respondents have not answered all the cultural bias questions, *a minimum of three valid answers is required* for a value on any of the cultural bias scales. A respondent with only two valid responses to the hierarchical bias statements will have a missing value on the hierarchical bias scale. In Table 19, we can see how the number of valid responses varies depending on the set of cultural bias statements. For egalitarian and individualistic cultural biases, there are quite a few respondents with only three valid responses. If the requirement were four valid responses, we would have had only 95.3 and 95.6 per cent of cases with values on the egalitarian and individualistic bias scales. Therefore, the limit for inclusion is set to three valid responses, which gives between 98 and 99 per cent valid responses on the cultural bias scales.

Table 19: Number of Valid Responses to the Cultural Bias Statements (non-weighed). NOS99.

Valid	*Hierarchical Bias*		*Egalitarian Bias*		*Individualistic Bias*		*Fatalistic Bias*	
responses	Freq	Cum. %	Freq	Cum. %	Freq	Cum. %	Freq	Cum. %
5	3985	82.5	4084	84.5	4062	84.1	4399	91.0
4	627	95.4	519	95.3	557	95.6	307	97.4
3	156	98.7	158	98.5	162	98.9	82	99.1
2	39	99.5	45	99.5	32	99.6	25	99.6
1	15	99.8	16	99.8	7	99.8	9	99.8
0	10	100.0	10	100.0	12	100.0	10	100.0
Total	4832		4832		4832		4832	

Another relevant consideration is that the number of respondents is close to 1000 for each country, which is rather small to start with when conducting analyses country by country. This means that the cost of loosing respondents is higher than if the analyses would be performed at the Nordic level. Moreover, in the later analyses that use cultural combinations, multiple valid cultural biases are required for every respondent. Therefore, it is important to keep the number of missing values as low as possible for each bias.

Excluding Respondents with 20 Identical Answers

It seems unlikely that a respondent can answer seriously while having identical answers to every one of the 20 cultural bias items. Nevertheless, in Table 20 we can see that 18 respondents gave the same answer to all 20 statements. There are 5 respondents with missing responses only on the cultural bias items. They are of course not at all included in the analysis. In addition, there is one respondent who answered only do not know, four who only agree, and eight who only strongly agree. These 13 respondents are excluded from the analysis because it is likely that they did not answer seriously.[242]

Table 20: Respondents Who Gave the Same Answer to 20 Cultural Bias Items. NOS99.

		Frequency	*Percent*
Valid	Do not know	1	.0
	Agree	4	.1
	Strongly Agree	8	.2
	Missing	5	.1
	Total	18	.4
Missing	System	4814	99.6
Total		4832	100.0

Measuring the Relative Value of Cultural Bias

Several choices must be made when transforming these items to a scale. First, should the items be transformed into a fixed or a relative scale? These fixed scales are commonly just simple additive scales (Spector 1992). For example, given that the answers to each item are scored from 1 to 5, the minimum value for a scale consisting of 5 items would be 5 and the maximum value would be 25. Secondly, a scale can be made relative: Instead of measuring a respondent's position on a fixed scale, we are more interested in the respondent's position on the scale relative to other respondents. Examples of this kind of relative scaling techniques are ranking (the respondent belongs to the top 10%) or standardization (the respondent deviates so and so much from the average).

Had there been only one behavior or opinion that would identify a position on the hierarchical, egalitarian, fatalistic, or individualistic cultural bias scales, it would have been possible to calibrate our fixed scales in relation to behavior or opinion. However, cultural biases do not work in this manner. There is no one single opinion nor behavior that could be used to test and calibrate our fixed scales.

[242] Out of these 13 cases, 3 are from Norway, 6 are from Sweden, 1 is from Denmark, and 3 are from Iceland. The breakdown according to age groups is as follows: <30 = 2, >40 = 4, >50=2, >60=1 and >70 = 4.

Culture does not determine thoughts or behavior, even if it is more likely that certain behaviors or opinions go together with certain cultural biases.

The scores from 1 to 5 given to the responses are ultimately just random numbers, and it is safe to assume that the way respondents relate to language varies.[243] What is the difference between *agree strongly* and *moderately agree,* and what is the difference between *neither agree nor disagree* and *moderately disagree*? We do not know whether the respondents describing their relation to the statements are using the scale in consistent manner.

> The interpretation of scores falling between the extremes is problematic except in relative terms. The 'neutral' point on the continuum is not known. There is no evidence to suggest that it corresponds to the midpoint of the scale values. (McIver and Carmines 1981:28)

The most common way to make responses relative is to calculate standardized scores (z-scores).[244] The standardized score shows the respondents position relative to the mean, which is always zero.

> If we used the mean of the group as our point of origin, then each of the individual attitude scores can be expressed as a deviation from this origin. We assume that the mean represents the typical or average attitude of the group. The scores that are higher than the mean can be interpreted as scores that are more favorable than the average for the group and scores that are lower than the mean can be interpreted as scores that are less favorable than the average …. (Edvards 1957 quoted from McIver and Carmines 1981:28)

Which group should define the baseline for calculating the respondent's deviation? In this survey, it is possible to use either the Nordic average or the countrywise average for each cultural bias statement as the baseline for standardization.

Using the Countrywise Average as a Baseline

There are differences between the countries from item to item (See footnote 240). Some of these differences are caused by differences in attitudes and values in the population, some by differences in the item wording, and some by unrelated phenomena like sampling errors.

The scales measuring each of the cultural bias items have been constructed by using the average of the standardized responses to the questions (the z-score). These give

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243 There are differences between languages and there are differences in response styles between countries (Harzing 2006; Curtice 2007).

244 Every response is represented through its deviation from the mean divided by the standard deviation of the sample. Thus, some of the sample's typical characteristics are removed, and only the component that is relative to the sample mean is used for further calculations.

the average of 0 with a standard deviation close to 1 if the distribution is symmetrical. The data has been weighed prior to standardization to counter sampling error on age and gender.[245]

The *Nordic average* will better highlight the differences between the countries, as every country is likely to have an average that differs from zero, even if the average is zero for all respondents. The *countrywise average* will reduce the differences between countries as the average in every country will be zero. This average will also highlight the difference in attitudes within countries (as the difference between country average and Nordic average is ignored).

I will be using the countrywise average for several reasons. First, I am most interested in using cultural bias to explain party preference, which is mainly a national-level phenomena. Second, I am not very confident that all the translated statements are comparable with a high degree of precision. Using countrywise averages will reduce the differences caused by translation (assuming that the translation errors are related to the degree rather than the content of the statement). Third, I believe that cultural biases are by their very nature a relative phenomenon. An institution that is viewed as representing a hierarchical way of life in one context can be interpreted differently in another context.[246] Fourth, by using countrywise averages, the relative positions of groups defined by cultural bias are more similar. Thus, it is easier to compare groups that register high on the hierarchical bias in each country because I know their relative cultural bias positions within the country rather than their fixed cultural bias position. By using countrywise averages, I claim that the national context is more important for party preferences than the Nordic context. As always, a different research problem could have led to a different choice.

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[245] These weights are calculated by Gallup based on the information about the sampling errors in this survey.

[246] For example, The Officer's Club could be seen as an egalitarian sanctuary within a hierarchical army, a place for recreation where rank does not matter (until it is called upon). The same officers club could be interpreted as a rather traditional carrier of hierarchical values if they would receive a large group of egalitarian environmental protesters.

Figure 14: Cultural Bias by Country (Deviation from the Nordic average). NOS99.



Even if countrywise standardization has become a popular method for removing cross-national response bias from scale responses, this method does has some disadvantages (Harzing 2006).[247] In Figure 14, we can see the differences between countries when using the Nordic average as a baseline.[248] The disadvantage of using the countrywise average as the baseline is that these differences will disappear. We can see how Norway is less individualistic and less fatalistic than the other countries, while Sweden is more fatalistic. Denmark is much less egalitarian than the other countries, while Finland is more hierarchical and fatalistic. Moreover, Iceland is more individualistic and less fatalistic, which leads me to suspect that the financial crisis during the autumn of 2008 surprised many in Iceland and challenged the institutional climate. If my research problem would focus on differences between these countries, it would be a better choice to use the Nordic average as baseline and deal with the potential problems introduced by translation in more detail.

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[247] Harzing suggests that one should instead use a mixture of positive and negative statements, a larger number of response categories for the Likert scale, wording that reflects opposites rather than degrees (fixed answers), or rank statements (Harzing 2006: 260-261). Unfortunately, none of these suggestions are easily applicable to a secondary analysis of survey data.

[248] The bars show how the mean for a cultural bias within each country deviates from the Nordic mean (which is zero by definition).

In Figure 15 below, we can see the resulting distribution of respondents on these cultural bias scales after they are standardized country by country. Each of these scales has a mean of zero.[249] The most interesting aspect with these figures is the measured distributions' deviations from a theoretical normal distribution drawn in the same figure. The assumption of normality, or normal distribution, is not a direct requirement for any of the later analyses, but it confirms my assumptions about the level of measurement.

Figure 15: Distribution of Respondent's Scores on the Hierarchical, Egalitarian, Individualistic, and Fatalistic Bias Scales (Countrywise standardization) with a Normal Curve. NOS99.



In addition, the deviations from normality can tell us something about the items and the scale we are using. The distribution of respondents on the fatalistic bias scale lacks the left toe. This tells us that either there are no people who strongly reject fatalism or that our measurement tool fails to capture them. The hierarchical

[249] Since each of the countries has a mean of zero, their combined mean will also be zero. The mean for the fatalistic bias scale is -4.5E-4 in scientific notation, which equals -0.00045 and is for all practical purposes equal to 0.

bias scale quite closely resembles the normal distribution. The distribution of the egalitarian bias scale lacks the right toe. It looks like it does not capture differences among those who strongly favor egalitarianism. In other words, we will end up underestimating the effects of strong egalitarianism. In addition, the measurement of individualism has a similar weakness. The fall in the distribution of the individualistic bias is abrupt on the supporting side. Either very large parts of the population are supportive of individualism or we are not adequately measuring the strong support for individualism.[250]

One can also notice a pattern across cultures: The three active cultures are differentiated well between those people who reject the culture (that is those who have negative values on these cultures) while the one passive culture, namely fatalism, is differentiated well between those people who support it. I am not clear on how to interpret this. It can be just a coincidence resulting from the way the items are constructed (caused by the research methods used) or by something more substantial.

Use Average Value, not the Factor Score?

There are several ways to take the information from five items and combine it into a scale. First, we could simply use the average response as I am planning to do. Alternatively, we could use factor analysis to extract the dimension underlying the items. The result can then be saved as a factor score. In purely mathematical terms, the factor score can be a better measurement of the underlying cultural bias dimensions than a simple mean because the former uses information from all 20 items simultaneously and includes items in varying degrees so that those items with larger contributions exert a greater influence on the score. For example, the first fatalistic cultural bias item will contribute less to a fatalism factor than the other fatalistic items (see table 23 on page 324) because it correlates less (0.36) with the fatalism factor than the other fatalism items (around 0.6) . By contrast, in a simple mean or summary scale, all items contribute in equal proportions. In addition, if an item designed to measure hierarchical bias is actually influenced by fatalistic bias, this item will also be used to improve the measurement of fatalistic bias.

In Table 15 we can see a correlation matrix for three alternative ways of measuring cultural bias. On the top, we have a mean based on countrywise standardization of cultural biases. On the left, we have regression scores from both the varimax rotation, which produces orthogonal factors (uncorrelated factors) and oblimin, which produces factors that can correlate with each other. The order of factor scores reflect the biases they are identified as measuring. We can see that the mean of the hierarchical cultural bias items correlates with both the varimax and oblimin versions of the same measurement at a Pearsons coefficient that is greater than 0.9.

[250] For those interested in developing the cultural bias scales further, item-by-item distributions from all five Nordic countries are available. See footnote 240.

Similarly, the means of egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic items correlate at 0.9 or more with their factorizised versions regardless of rotation.

Table 15: Pearson Correlations between Cultural Bias Measures: Standardized Countrywise, Regression Factor Scores from Varimax and Oblimin Rotations. NOS99.

		Mean of Countrywise Standardized items			
		Hierarchical	Egalitarian	Individualistic	Fatalistic
Factor scores from	Varimax factor 3 = H	.92	.08	.17	.12
	Varimax factor 2 = E	.08	.93	-.06	.11
	Varimax factor 1 = I	.17	-.09	.94	.07
	Varimax factor 4 = F	.21	.10	.02	.89
	Oblimin factor 1 = H	.94	.14	.26	.24
	Oblimin factor 2 = E	.14	.95	-.07	.20
	Oblimin factor 4 = I	.28	-.09	.96	.14
	Oblimin factor 3 = F	.34	.18	.10	.92
Mean of Countryw. Standardized Items	Hierarchy	1.00	.19	.29	.31
	Egalitarian	.19	1.00	-.10	.23
	Individualistic	.29	-.10	1.00	.14
	Fatalistic	.31	.23	.14	1.00

We can see that the varimax rotated factor, which produces four orthogonal factors, has a variety of features that are similar to what we have observed previously. The individualistic and fatalistic varimax factors are positively correlated with the countrywise standardized measures of hierarchical bias (but of course, not with the hierarchical varimax factor). All other correlations with the varimax factors are low. The pattern produced by the oblimin rotation is very similar and somewhat stronger. Thus, the factorized solutions are comparable with the simple mean.

At the same time, however, one reservation remains when using the factor analysis: As the factorized solution requires five items, when we correlate the mean with a factor solution, we are excluding all respondents with only three or four valid responses. Stated differently, the disadvantage of using factor analysis is that it requires a higher number of items. There are only 3269 respondents who have answered all 20 items, while there are over 4700 respondents who have answered three or more items for each cultural bias scale. Information is lost for more than 1400, or roughly a third, of our respondents when using the factor solution. Therefore, since we are measuring the same concepts with both rotated factor solutions and the mean, which allows us to use many more respondents, the simple mean is clearly preferable to the more complicated factor score.

What does it mean when a hierarchical cultural bias correlates with individualistic and fatalistic cultural biases? There are at least two interpretations if we assume that cultural biases are a fixed trait of the individual, and if we assume that the measurement of biases is independent of context. First, this could be a measurement error and the true biases are independent of each other. In other words, the questions are not good enough to separate the biases from each other. Second, it is possible that there are certain combinations of cultural biases that are more frequent than others, and this is the reason why the measurements correlate with each other. However, a measurement error will also affect the frequencies of the combinations. At this stage, it is impossible to separate these effects from each other. If we change our assumptions, and assume that people's biases change from context to context, it is possible that these correlations reflect the kinds of institutions that people participate in.

Reliability of the Cultural Bias Items

One aspect that can limit the quality of data is *reliability of the measurement*, which refers to the internal consistency of the items used in one scale (Carmines and Zeller 1979). The reliability of a Likert-type summary scale is largely dependent on how consistently people answer the questions pertaining to the cultural bias items.

All these 20 items have the same direction, each one focusing on support for one cultural bias. Thus, people who are so called "yes-sayers" are likely to score high on all four cultural biases. Later in this chapter, I will come back to the measurement problems this creates. But first, I will discuss the reliability of the items used in each cultural bias scale.

Each bias is constructed by combining responses to five statements, which increases our ability to reliably measure a cultural bias.

> With a single measure of each variable, one can remain blissfully unaware of the possibility of measurement error, but in no sense will this make his inferences more valid ... In the absence of better theory about our measurement procedures, I see no substitute for the use of multiple measures of our most important variables ... (Blalock 1970:111)

For improving scale reliability, a higher number of items is better (given that all items are measuring the same phenomenon), and scales consisting of five items are considered relatively good in social sciences.

> … measures of social and political concepts do not usually go through the same process of development and assessment that is expected in psychometrics, and published reports of their reliability and validity are rare. Moreover, social science instruments tend to be much shorter than psychometric ones, and even a six-item measure is unusual. (Heath and Martin 1997:72)

The most commonly used measure of a scale's internal consistency is Cronbach's alpha (DeVellis 2003:28).[251] There is a rule of thumb saying that Cronbach's alpha should be 0.6 in order for a scale to reliably measure one underlying construct (Heath and Martin 1997).[252] I consider this a decent value for a five-item scale where the items are not repetitions of each other. These five statements refer to different domains, and one should not expect higher values from them.[253]

I will in later analyses use classifications that divide respondents into very small groups. Therefore, I have chosen to include in the analysis those respondents with only three valid items, even if this reduces the reliability of the scales.

In Table 21 below, we can see the reliability measured in Cronbach's alpha for four different versions of the cultural bias scales. The two first are unweighted. The first one requires valid answers on all five items, while the second one requires valid answers on only three out of five items. We can see how the reliability of the hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic cultural bias scales declines when we include those respondents who have only three or four valid responses. The reliability of the fatalistic cultural bias scale is not affected by the inclusion of these respondents.

The scales that accept three valid answers out of five items are at or just below the 0.6 threshold for a reliable scale. The scales with five items are slightly above, with the exception of the fatalistic bias scale, which is just below this threshold. Thus, we know that the five items included in each of the scales seem to measure one underlying dimension with satisfactory consistency. However, the consistency is reduced when we include those respondents who provided valid answers to only three or four items. For these respondents, the measurement quality is not as high as it is for the rest of the respondents.

Table 21 also shows that the difference between the reliability of the weighted and unweighted data is minimal. The only change is a small reduction of the five-item reliability of the individualistic and fatalistic cultural biases.

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251 Cronbach's alpha ranges from 0 to 1. If each respondent give totally consistent answers alpha equals 1. If each respondent give totally inconsistent answers alpha equals 0.

252 DeVellis argues that the 0.60 level is undesirable, but still acceptable for research purposes (2003: 95-96).

253 For measurements of less constrained phenomena like ideology, sometimes a lower alpha value is considered sufficient. There is a rule of thumb presented by Nunnally, who writes that for measurements of ideology, an alpha value of 0.5 should be considered as the lower limit for a scale (Berglund 2004: 576)

Table 21: Reliability of Cultural Bias Scales. NOS99. (Cronbach's Alpha and N)

Cultural bias scale	*Unweighted data* All 5 items unweighted	*Unweighted data* Minimum 3 valid items unweighted	*Weighted data* All 5 items weighted	*Weighted data* Minimum 3 valid items weighted
Hierarchical	.60 (3985)	.56 (4768)	.60 (3955)	.56 (4766)
Egalitarian	.65 (4084)	.60 (4761)	.65 (4060)	.60 (4764)
Individualistic	.63 (4062)	.58 (4781)	.62 (4040)	.58 (4783)
Fatalistic	.59 (4399)	.59 (4781)	.58 (4837)	.59 (4783)

All Cronbach's alphas are calculated on standardized items.

Reliability at the Nordic Level and at the Country Level.

The discussions and measures of reliability presented in the previous pages pertain to reliability at Nordic level, where all five countries are considered as one large sample and where the original one to five scales are standardized in relation to the Nordic means. However, I will later argue for the use of countrywise standardization of responses, which slightly improves reliability. In addition, many analyses concerning party preferences must be done country–by-country. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that our scales are created with the same procedures in each country in order to certify that the results are comparable between countries.

The Cronbach's alpha scores presented in Table 22 allow us to see how reliable the measurement of each bias is on a country-by-country basis. As the table shows, all four biases in the Norwegian and Finnish samples are measured with an acceptable level of reliability, while the measurement of biases in the Swedish sample are just below this threshold. In Denmark, the measurement of fatalism is under this threshold while the others are above it. In Iceland, only egalitarianism is measured adequately enough to be above this threshold. However, all biases are measured close to this threshold in every country. If Cronbach's alpha had been presented with only one digit, every one of the values below the threshold would have been rounded up to it. Therefore, I argue that the scales can also be used on national samples.

In addition to purely theoretical considerations, we can also compare the reliability of these cultural bias scales with the reliability of a four-question, left-right scale in Norway. Among the members of parliament, the reliability is exceptionally high with an alpha value of 0.93, while in the general public the alpha value is 0.56 (Berglund 2004:577). Thus, the cultural bias scales have a similar or stronger reliability than the best-known scale for measuring ideology among the general public in Norway.[254]

Table 22: Reliability of Countrywise Standardized Five-item Scales by Country. NOS99. (Cronbach's Alpha)

Country	*Hierarchy*	*Egalitarianism*	*Individualism*	*Fatalism*
Norway	.67	.63	.67	.61
Sweden	.56	.57	.57	.57
Denmark	.62	.62	.61	.57
Finland	.62	.70	.63	.62
Iceland	.58	.69	.57	.59

One additional reservation should be made. As with the factor analysis described a few pages ago, the calculation of Cronbach's alpha requires five valid responses to five items for each of the cultural biases. This causes quite a considerable drop in number of respondents, ranging from 8 to 28 per cent, depending on the bias and the country. Later in this piece, I will accept scales with only three valid responses. This will increase the number of valid responses quite a lot, but since the responses include less reliable measurements, this increase will come at the expense of reduced measurement quality. However, I believe that the large increase in number of valid responses outweighs any potential reduction in reliability.

Construct Validity

Perhaps the most important measurement issue in social science is ensuring that we are measuring the theoretical phenomenon of interest. So, how well are we able to actually measure the true underlying cultural bias? There are several approaches for evaluating the validity of a measure. *Criterion-related validity* is not very useful, as it requires comparing the measurement with external criteria. There are no variables in this survey that can be used as an external criterion for evaluating the measurement. *Content validity* depends on the extent the measurement reflects the content of the concept one is trying to measure. Do the statements cover only central aspects of a bias—i.e., are there questions that are actually measuring something else? Are there central aspects that are not covered? Content validity must be evaluated by the researcher; it cannot be measured (Carmines and Zeller 1979:26). Finally, *construct validity* depends on the level of consistency between the

[254] Alpha is related both to the number of items used and the mean interim correlation of the items used (Niemi, Carmines, and McIver 1986). From this we can deduce that the five cultural bias items have a lower interim correlation than the four item, left-right scale. Given the same interim correlation (0.245), alpha is 0.56 on a four-item scale and 0.62 on a five-item scale.

cultural bias measures and the theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the concepts (or constructs) that are being measured (Carmines and Zeller 1979:23).

Since I am relying on scales developed by others, I will here only discuss construct validity. A measure has strong construct validity when it relates to other measurements in a systematic manner as predicted by theory. According to Zeller and Carmines,

> Construct validation involves three distinct steps. First, the theoretical relationship between the constructs themselves must be specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the constructs must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be evaluated in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular measure (Zeller and Carmines 1980:81)

One way to establish construct validity of a multi-item index is to use factor analysis to study all 20 items and their relations to each other. I expect to find the following traits in a factor analysis of the principal components. First, there should be four clear factors that describe the four underlying cultural biases. Second, after the rotation all five items, measuring one cultural bias, should load on the same factor, while no other items should load strongly on it. Third, the fifth component extracted should be statistically unimportant and impossible to interpret substantively. Fourth, given that the four cultural biases are independent of each other, the emerging factors should not correlate with each other. This requires the use of non-orthogonal rotation, which will allow for correlations between the factors.[255]

In Table 23 on page 324, we can see how the items relate to the first five dimensions, which are also the only ones with eigenvalues over 1. The first factor can be identified as the hierarchical bias, as the five items with highest loading on this factor are the five hierarchical items. In addition, there are a two individualistic items that contribute to this factor, but their loadings are much lower than the hierarchical items. The second factor has high loadings on the five egalitarian items. However, these loadings are negative, making this the anti-egalitarian factor. The third factor loads negatively on the fatalistic items, which allows us to identify this as the anti-fatalistic factor. However, two of the hierarchical items contribute to this factor in the same direction as the fatalistic items, which is unfortunate. The fourth factor loads positively on all five individualistic items, which allows us to identify this as the individualistic factor. Finally, the fifth factor loads inconsistently on the cultural biases, as there are both positive and negative loadings on each of the four cultural biases. It cannot be identified as measuring cultural bias, but perhaps it is related to belief in political efficacy. Unfortunately, its contribution to explaining variance is not much less than those of the third and fourth factors. In addition, the first fatalism item loads twice as strong on this factor when compared to its loading on the anti-fatalism factor, making it the poorest item of the 20 constructs.

[255] In SPSS this can be achieved by using the oblimin rotation.

Table 23: Factor Analysis of Cultural Bias Items. The Structure Matrix after Oblimin Rotation. NOS99.

	Component				
	1=H	2=e	3=f	4=I	5
Eigenvalues	3.1	2.4	1.4	1.2	1.0
% of Variance	15	12	7	6	5
One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.	***.54***		-.40		
The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.	**.64**				-.26
Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.	**.61**				**.32**
Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn.	**.77**		-.20	.21	
Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.	**.39**		-.30	.27	
The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.		**-.65**			.27
What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.	.20	**-.72**			
I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.		**-.61**		-.21	**-.31**
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women.		**-.61**			
Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation.		**-.57**			**-.33**
Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.				**.53**	
If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.				**.72**	
People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit.				**.73**	
Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.	.30			**.59**	
In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.	.24			**.53**	.26
It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.	.21		**-.36**		**-.62**
Cooperation with others rarely works.			**-.66**		
The future is too uncertain for a person to make serious plans.		-.21	**-.69**		
Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.			**-.62**		
I feel that life is a lottery.			**-.59**		**-.29**

Extraction Method: PCA. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalization. The five strongest loadings on each factor are in bold. Loadings <|.2| are hidden.

One should also notice how these four factors differ in their contribution to explaining variance. Hierarchical and anti-egalitarian factors explain roughly twice as much as the anti-fatalistic and individualistic factors. These four identified factors together explain 40 per cent of the variation in people's responses to these items. The remaining 60 per cent of the variation in people's answers either comes from other sources or is purely random.

So far, we have confirmed several of the required characteristics of a valid measure. First, the four strongest factors are clearly related to cultural bias. Second, there are no 'foreign' items loading strongly on the factors related to one bias. One item, the first fatalism item, loads stronger on the fifth unidentified factor than on the anti-fatalism factor, which is unfortunate. There are also two hierarchical items that load on the fatalism factor. The third requirement is only partially confirmed. Even if the fifth factor is unidentifiable, it is still closer to the fourth in strength.

The remaining requirement concerns the correlations between the factors. The simple correlations between the extracted factors, which are identified as pro-hierarchical bias, anti-egalitarian bias, anti-fatalistic bias, and pro-individualistic bias, can be seen below in Table 24. We can see that the extracted biases correlate less with each other than what was found in our original cultural bias scales.

Table 24: Factor Analysis—Component Correlation Matrix

Component	*H*	*e*	*f*	*I*
H		-.11	-.22	.20
e	-.11		.14	.03
f	-.22	.14		-.13
I	.20	.03	-.13	

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

One cannot assume that an item is only related to one bias; some of the items can touch upon several biases, thus creating some degree of correlation between the factors. Hierarchical factors are moderately and positively correlated with the individualistic factor and with the fatalistic factor (or actually a negative correlation with the anti-fatalistic factor). The other four possible correlations between the factors are weak. When seen together, the correlations between these factors are acceptable. The measurement is not perfect, but the cultural biases seem to be phenomena that exist independently from each other.

The oblimin rotation searches for the factors that explain most of the variance without forcing the factors to be orthogonal. The correlations observed between factors are thus empirically sound: They reflect the underlying dimensions behind the 20 items.

Interpreting the meaning behind the negative factors, like anti-egalitarian or anti-fatalistic, is easy. First, the anti-egalitarian dimension can be seen as the egalitarian dimension, but with a negative direction; turning it 180 degrees would produce the egalitarian dimension as expected. Turning 180 degrees can simply be done by multiplying all loadings by -1. Second, it can be that rejecting a cultural bias actually has an independent interpretation when evaluated in combination with the other biases (Olli 1999). I will discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 13. Third, one could speculate that the lack of differentiation on the positive side of the scales, as we have seen in the discussion above, creates a situation where the items differentiate well between the people who reject a bias, but lump together the different degrees of support for a bias. However, this third alternative does not seem to fit the fact that in the factor analysis, we could identify both an anti-egalitarian and an anti-fatalistic factor, while these to biases differ depending on which side of the scale lacks differentiation. If we look at Figure 15 (on page 316), which shows what happens when we combine the items according to the cultural biases they are intended to measure, we can see how individualistic, hierarchical, and egalitarian bias measures have a long tail on the rejection side, while the fatalistic bias has a long tail on the supportive side.

Kahan and his collaborators have chosen to measure cultural biases with two scales that go from pro-egalitarian to pro-hierarchical, and from pro-communitarian to pro-individualistic (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan 2012). However, as we can see above, these two dimensions do not emerge in factor analysis. We have identified the two first factors as pro-hierarchical and anti-egalitarian. If the measurement model proposed by Kahan is correct, then all ten statements loading on the two first factors should have been loading only on one factor. Similarly, we cannot identify one communitarian-individualistic factor, as both fatalism and individualism items load on separate factors. The empirical variation in responses fits better with a four dimensional model than a two-dimensional one. I will come back to this in a discussion in Chapter 13.

Acquiescence and Cultural Bias

There is no theoretical expectation in cultural theory which points to cultural biases as being influenced by age and education. Nevertheless, my previous research has shown that increasing age increases support for each of the four cultural biases, and that simultaneous support for several cultural biases increases with age. In addition, education has a negative effect on the number of supported cultural biases.

> Social background is clearly related to cultural bias and cultural bias combinations. Older people seem to prefer hierarchy, while younger people show a tendency to prefer individualism or egalitarianism. Age also has a very clear effect on the number of cultural biases a respondent supports. Respondents who support four cultural biases have a mean age of 60 years, while respondents with only one cultural bias have a mean age of 37. Education has the opposite

> effect; increasing amounts of education seem to lead to a reduction in the number of supported cultural biases, even when controlled for the effects of age. It is significant that age and education have opposite effects, and I suspect that they are sources of different types of knowledge. While age can provide an opportunity to experience several cultural biases, education is theoretical and most often has a strong socializing effect on the prevailing cultural bias. (Olli 1995:126-127)[256]

These findings can be explained in two different ways. First, as I point out in the above quotation, cultural biases are a form of social competence that can be learned. The more experience we have from different social situations, the more willing we are to accept that there are may ways of organizing that could work. Second, all ten cultural bias items in the 1993 survey had the same direction, and some people tend to be 'lazy' and answer positively to many questions (Olli 1995:50), which suggests that this is a result of a methodological artifact, namely acquiescence. Acquiescence, or yes-saying, is the tendency to respond by agreeing with a statement even when one in reality has no opinion or holds an opinion that should contradict this statement. Without a doubt, acquiescence can be a severe problem in surveys.

In what follows, I will first present an overview of what the literature says about acquiescence as a phenomenon. By analyzing data from NOS99, I will then discuss how the different types of acquiescence influence the measurement of cultural biases. [257]

Acquiescence in the Literature

Acquiescence can be a problem in surveys measuring cultural bias because the most frequently used battery of questions (Dake's cultural bias items) are Likert-type items (Likert 1974). Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with statements that support a particular cultural bias. Thus, support for several biases can be the result of a respondent truly supporting many biases or the result of acquiescence, where the respondent selects the 'easy' answer by supporting a statement without actually relating to the content of the question.

There are several versions of acquiescence: It can affect only some people who are more disposed to it, it can affect only some of the questions, or it can affect many people as a general cultural trait. It is easy to concede that 'our understanding of how acquiescence works is far from satisfactory' (Schuman and Presser 2004:343).

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[256] These findings are based on an analysis of ISSP survey data from 1993, sampled from the general population in Norway, and based on 8 of Dake's 20 cultural bias items (see page 530).

[257] These analyses are done by using the script nordic1999_acquiescence.sps.

Research on acquiescence is somewhat limited,[258] possibly because it is a difficult subject to research. What is clear is that the lack of a proper theory behind the phenomena makes it difficult to build analytical models that compensate for acquiescence.

Acquiescence does not influence everybody equally. Unfortunately, it is difficult to identify those persons whose answers are influenced by acquiescence.

> Whether in fact acquiescent persons come mainly from the pool of people of those who would otherwise give random responses or mainly of those who otherwise give consistent answers over time is an important theoretical issue that we are unable to resolve. (Schuman and Presser 2004:328)

Schuman and Presser have estimated that with simple agree-disagree type questions, the acquiescence has a 10 per cent to 15 per cent effect on the marginal distributions (2004:343). Uncontrolled effects of this magnitude are somewhat devastating for survey researchers and can undermine published results.

The most commonly used technique to estimate the size of the acquiescence is to include different wordings of a question in a large-scale survey and then compare the distributions. The often used design is an agree-disagree question for half of the sample and a question with forced choice for the other half of the sample. For example, a question like "do you agree or disagree with the idea that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government?" can also be presented as "what do you think—do you feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government, or do you feel that women's place is at home?" (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a:237). In this example, the simplest measure of acquiescence is the difference between the proportions of people in each question who support women having an equal role.

What kind of consequence does acquiescence have for the measurement of cultural biases? If the effect is systematic and applies to all respondents, it should be possible to interpret the responses in light of an acquiescence effect. However, the literature suggests that the effect is not evenly distributed in the population. Particularly, the effect of acquiescence is expected to diminish as the level of education increases. One of the largest documented effects of education is made by Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber (2004a), who estimated a 2 per cent acquiescence effect among respondents with a college education, but a 25 per cent effect among those with less than a high school education. However, this effect was present only for questions related to government involvement in school desegregation. For the other four topics tested, education did not have an effect.

[258] A search for "acquiescence" in any of the search fields in the Article First database (15th of November, 2009) shows only 143 articles, and only a few of these deal with the effects of acquiescence in on Likert-type scales in surveys. Many articles deal with the effects acquiescence has on relationships between doctors and patients, husbands and wives, offenders and victims, leaders and followers, and many other topics.

Indeed, one aspect of acquiescence that makes it difficult to deal with is that it does not affect all issues. Acquiescence, for example, does not have a statistically significant effect on the women's equality issue, while on questions concerning government involvement in school desegregation, the effect of acquiescence is over 10 per cent (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a:230).

> There is also some evidence that acquiescence is diminished for persons who report feeling more strongly about the issue under inquiry, and also for individuals who report that they like to argue about political issues generally, but the evidence in these cases is too slight to suggest more than the desirability of further research on one or other possibility. (Schuman and Presser 2004:343)

The cultural bias scales are constructed from agree-disagree responses to statements that all have the same supportive direction, thus these scales seem to be particularly prone to the acquiescence effect. However, it is unclear if the cultural bias questions are the kinds of questions where acquiescence has no effect or a 10 per cent effect. It is quite unclear how strongly the respondents do feel about issues included in the cultural bias items. It is also possible that there are differences between items. As we could see in the presentation of responses to the cultural bias items earlier in this chapter, there are many items with an overly skewed distribution, where a large majority of the respondents support the items. This could be partly caused by acquiescence.

Acquiescence can also be seen as a general tendency. Some authors who study cross-cultural differences in an acquiescent response style use either a simple difference between agree-disagree responses or a more complicated structural equations model (Cheung and Rensvold 2000; Harzing 2006; Javeline 1999). Common among them is the idea that acquiescence is a phenomenon that influences many respondents rather evenly. One can thus see more yes-saying in polite cultures. A 'do not know' response in a polite culture might correspond in its intention to a 'disagree somewhat' response in an English-speaking country.

When examining the data from NOS99, I will look for three types of acquiescence—ones found in the literature review. The first is acquiescence connected to particular items used in the scales, the second is acquiescence present only among a few respondents, and the third is acquiescence as a general tendency.

Acquiescence Connected to Particular Items

There is no good way to measure acquiescence in this Nordic survey. However, by subtracting the percentage of respondents who disagree or strongly disagree from the percentage of people who agree or strongly agree, one can obtain an indication of *acquiescence balance*, which is a rough measure of acquiescence (Harzing 2006).

This measure is probably influenced mainly by differences in support and only to some degree by acquiescence.

In Table 25, we can see how acquiescence balance varies from item to item between each country and all five countries as a whole. Values close to 0 indicate a symmetric distribution, which is in many ways ideal for Likert-type scales, while 100 is the theoretical maximum value. Those items that have a very high or very low number are more likely to be influenced by acquiescence. In addition, if all items in a scale deviate from 0 into the same direction, then the likelihood of an acquiescence problem increases.

If we look at the first column under the Nordic figures, we can see that among the hierarchical items, the first one has a negative value while the rest are positive, which is good since it takes the average acquiescence balance down to 32.

The egalitarian items have an average acquiescence balance close to 49 per cent at the Nordic level, which is a bit too high. Practically all the items in all countries have a solid and positive acquiescence balance. This indicates that the egalitarian scale as a whole possibly suffers from acquiescence. Among the items under Denmark, there are two, re3 and re5, that perform differently from the other three.

The average acquiescence balance for the individualistic items is too high at the Nordic level and for every country. In particular, the first three individualistic items have a very high acquiescence balance. Almost everybody agrees on the second individualistic item: “If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.” However, it is difficult to say if this is because the question is too easy to answer, if it is because the Nordic countries are very individualistic, or if it is because this question is very prone to acquiescence. In any case, it would be advisable to try to change this item so that it more adequately differentiates between respondents.

The average level of acquiescence balance in the Nordic countries for the fatalistic cultural bias items is -32, making it the only cultural bias scale that is skewed toward disagreement. A good level of variation is found among the fatalistic items; some are slightly positive, while some are strongly negative. The first fatalistic item is the only positive one, even if it has negative value in Denmark.

Altogether, the data in Table 25 reveal a distinct pattern. The three active cultures—hierarchy, egalitarianism, and individualism—tend to have a positive acquiescence balance. By contrast, the only passive culture—fatalism—has a negative acquiescence balance.

Table 25: Acquiescence Balance by Cultural Bias Item and Country. NOS99.

Item	*Nordic*	*Norway*	*Sweden*	*Denmark*	*Finland*	*Iceland*
rh1	*-18*	*-19*	*-9*	*-16*	*-17*	*-32*
rh2	53	43	17	60	**70**	**78**
rh3	44	57	50	36	33	45
rh4	48	50	32	27	**78**	53
rh5	31	5	56	13	34	52
Average	32	27	29	24	40	39
re1	50	59	58	40	38	55
re2	54	43	56	35	64	**74**
re3	39	53	23	18	52	51
re4	48	42	62	35	30	**78**
re5	55	63	61	17	68	63
Average	49	52	52	29	50	64
ri1	67	61	**72**	64	67	70
ri2	**87**	**81**	**89**	**86**	**90**	**91**
ri3	69	57	**71**	67	**72**	**82**
ri4	45	28	59	31	41	68
ri5	40	25	47	46	28	58
Average	62	50	68	59	60	**74**
rf1	10	6	9	-27	58	1
rf2	-64	-56	-48	-65	-70	**-81**
rf3	-26	-36	-1	-21	-49	-18
rf4	-62	**-73**	-58	-52	-41	**-89**
rf5	-17	-39	-1	-14	-12	-21
Average	-32	-40	-20	-36	-23	-42

Acquiescence balance = (strongly agree + moderately agree) – (moderately disagree + strongly disagree) given in percentage points. Values >|70| in bold.

I have several interpretations of the item-level findings. First, if we look at Figure 15 on page 316, we can see the same skewness in the distributions of the cultural bias scales. We can observe that the measurements of the three active cultures tend to max out abruptly. One explanation for the skewness we see in the acquiescence balance is that the items are too easy to agree to: Too many respondents strongly agree with them. Second, it looks like the hierarchical and fatalistic scales have more variation, making them less prone to acquiescence than the egalitarian and individualistic cultural bias scales. Therefore, we should expect some acquiescence in the egalitarian and individualistic cultural bias scales.

Acquiescence among some Respondents

There is evidence from several studies that acquiescence occurs more often among the less educated respondents when compared to those with higher levels of education (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a; Schuman and Presser 2004:343). In Figure 16 below, we can see how the mean acquiescence balance is affected by age and education. Acquiescence balance here is a given respondent's total number of disagreements subtracted from his or her total number of agreements across all cultural bias items. Because of differences in the educational systems between the countries, and because of changes over time, the respondents' highest completed educational levels are recoded in only three categories: 9 years or less, 10 to 12 years, and more than 12 years. Unfortunately, the data does not include any information concerning the Swedish respondents' educational levels. Therefore, the Swedish respondents are excluded from the next analysis, which leaves us with 3757 respondents.

Figure 16: Mean Acquiescence Balance by Age and Education. NOS99



The line on top shows the respondents with less than 9 years of education. Among them, those below 30 years of age have an average of 6 more agreements than disagreements, while those over 60 years of age have an average 9 more agreements than disagreements. The group with most education is depicted by the unevenly dotted line on the bottom. Among them, all age groups below 50 years show an average of 2 more supports than rejections. When increasing the age to 70 years or older, the acquiescence balance goes up to slightly over 4. The affect of age thus seems to be in the range of 3 more agreements when controlling for the effect of education. The effect of education seems to be in the range of 4 more agreement when controlling for the effect of age. It also looks like increasing the level of education postpones the effect of age.

What consequences can this have on the distribution of each cultural bias? In the Nordic sample, support for cultural biases increases with age. In Figure 17, we can see how the mean support for hierarchical and fatalistic biases is lowest in the age group of 30 to 40 years and highest in the above 70 age group. Since the national samples are combined into one Nordic sample, with a Nordic average established after a countrywise standardization, each of the scales has a mean close to 0 and one standard deviation that is slightly greater than 0.6. The difference in support between these two age groups is a little less than one standard deviation. Egalitarian and individualistic biases are less influenced by age. The support for egalitarianism increases with age almost in a linear manner. The difference in the means from the youngest age group to the oldest is about half a standard deviation. The support for individualistic bias starts to clearly increase from the age group of 50 to 60 years. However, this effect is roughly one-third of the effect of age on hierarchical and fatalistic biases.

Figure 17: Mean Cultural Bias by Age Groups. NOS99



In Figure 17, one can also notice how the relationships between fatalistic and hierarchical cultural biases and age groups have the same form. I have no explanation for this similarity.

Estimating the Magnitude of Acquiescence

There are two other variables in NOS99 that have the same agree-disagree structure and are thus equally prone to the effect of acquiescence: "the so-called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated" and "the balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations". These items are intended to measure attitudes toward an ecological crisis and are anti-environmentalist in their direction.

I suspect that the effect of acquiescence is the same for cultural bias questions as it is for these anti-environmentalist items.[259] The four cultural biases are of course expected to influence the responses to these items, but that influence pertains to each cultural bias separately. When we are looking at the number of disagreements with all 20 cultural bias items at once, there should be no such relationship. Therefore, the magnitude of this relationship can give us a rough estimate of the magnitude of acquiescence.

To understand acquiescence, it might be useful to study not only the average level of support, but also how it affects rejection. Since the level of support is so high for many of the cultural bias items, we might be able to learn more by studying rejection. Acquiescence should reduce rejection: The greater the level of acquiescence, the higher the number of people who do not reject any more than one cultural bias.

In Table 26, we can see how the lack of disagreement with ecological crisis items is dependent on the lack of disagreement with cultural bias items and education. I am particularly concerned about our ability to measure cultural bias for those who disagreed only once or less with the twenty cultural bias items. The respondents in this column are either heavily influenced by acquiescence or they have an 'anything goes' attitude toward life and social organization.[260]

The opinions of the environmentalists have a prominent position in the political climate in the Nordic countries. As the direction of the ecological crisis items is the opposite of what is politically correct, it is not surprising to find that few respondents agree with these items. If we first look at those respondents with more than 9 years of education, 8 per cent do disagree with several cultural bias items and agree with both of the no ecological crisis statements. If we then compare these numbers with respondents who are candidates for being strongly influenced by acquiescence, as depicted in the second column, we can see that the proportion goes up to 21 per cent in agreement with both no ecological crisis statements. If we then look at those respondents with 9 years of education or less, we find that 11 per

[259] These are likert measured with two type items: "The so-called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated" and "The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations".

[260] If the respondents do not reject any kind of cultural bias, and these responses reflect their true cultural bias, then they truly support all four cultural biases. This universal support can be translated as reflecting an 'anything goes' attitude, othwise known as the hermit's position.

cent disagree with several cultural bias items and agree with both no ecological crisis statements. In the first column we can see how this proportion increases to 27 per cent agreement with both no ecological crisis statements for those who disagree with a maximum of one cultural bias item.[261] In other words, many of those 247 respondents who disagree with none or just one of the cultural bias items also agree that there is no ecological crisis. When compared to the rest of the sample, the likelihood of agreeing with both no ecological crisis items increases almost threefold, or 13 to 16 percentage points, for those who disagree with none or just one of the cultural bias items.

Table 26: Agreement with No Ecological Crisis according to Education and Disagreement with Cultural Bias Items. NOS99. (Count and Column percent).

			Count of Disagreement with the 20 cultural bias items			
			Disagrees with 2-20 items	Disagrees with 0-1 items	Total	U Sign.
More than 9 years of education	Count of agreement to no ecological crisis items	0	66.0	49.4	65.3	
		1	26.1	29.5	26.3	.02
		2	7.9	21.1	8.4	.000
		Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	
		N	3680	166	3846	
9-years or less of education	Count of agreement to no ecological crisis items	0	58.7	34.6	56.7	
		1	30.8	38.3	31.4	.04
		2	10.5	27.2	11.9	.000
		Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	
		N	905	81	986	

The uncertainty coefficient used here shows the effect of disagreement with cultural bias items according to agreement with no-ecological crisis.

By using an uncertainty coefficient,[262] we can estimate the degree to which acquiescence effects depend on the level of education. The strength of the relationship is significant in both educational groups, making it rather unlikely that the pattern of agreement with cultural bias items and no ecological crisis items is just a coincidence. In my view, the simultaneous lack of disagreement with cultural bias items and the lack of disagreement with no ecological crisis is likely to be caused by acquiescence. However, the effect is weak. Acquiescence seems to have a

[261] The ratio between these percentages allows us to compare the relative effects of acquiescence. For those with more than 9 years of education, 22.1/7.9 = 2.7. For those with 9 years of education or less, 27.2/10.5 = 2.6. The relative effect is thus equal in both groups.

[262] This measure is presented more in detail on page 368.

2 per cent effect on variance among those with more than 9 years of education and a 4 per cent effect among those with 9 years or less.

To sum up, some respondents are more prone to acquiescence than others. The elderly are more supportive of cultural biases. The magnitude of the effect of age is close to one standard deviation. Education reduces and postpones this effect. However, it is difficult to separate the acquiescence effect from the true effect of age and education. Moreover, the lack of disagreement with cultural bias items increases the lack of disagreement with no ecological crisis statements by a range of 13 to 16 percentage points among some respondents. If we can expect this kind of effect among those most prone to acquiescence, what about acquiescence among all respondents?

Acquiescence among all Respondents

Acquiescence is not just limited to some respondents, but can also affect all respondents. A regression analysis shows how these variables are related among all respondents. In Table 27, we can compare different regression models that explain acquiescence balance. Even if we only have 2777 respondents left in the analysis, partly because we do not have information concerning the Swedish respondents, the number of respondents is still high enough for performing the analysis.

The first model, where only age acts as an explanatory variable, explains only 4 per cent of variation in acquiescence balance. When we add educational level into the model, its ability to explain variation increases to 15 per cent. Within this model, the linear effect of education is twice as strong as that of age. The number of disagreements with the ecological crisis is a proxy for negative acquiescence effects. In the third model, we can see that it has an effect in the expected direction, suggesting the presence of acquiescence. The effect of this variable is almost as strong as the effect of age. The second new variable in the third model, a dummy for not knowing which party to vote for, contributes positively to acquiescence balance. Adding these two variables to the models barely strengthens their ability to explain variation, even if the effect is significant.[263]

The fourth model adds a dummy for disagreeing with a maximum of one of the cultural bias items. This variable is closely connected to the dependent variable and should be interpreted as removing those respondents who show little disagreement with cultural biases. Thus, we can interpret the coefficients for the other variables as valid for those respondents who actually do show some disagreement with the cultural bias variables. We can see that effect of education is increased and the effect of age is reduced, while the effects of the two other variables are small. When adjusting according to model four, there is a clear improvement in the ability to

[263] In analyses with this many respondents it is relatively easy to get statistically significant results.

predict variation in the dependent variable, but this does not mean much because the additional dummy variable is so similar to the dependent variable.

Table 27: Acquiescence Balance Explained controlled for by Age and Education. Regression Analysis. NOS99.

Model	R	*R square*	*Adjusted R square*	*Std. error of the estimate*	*Sign. of F change*
1	.21	.04	.04	5.94	.000
2	.39	.15	.15	5.59	.000
3	.41	.17	.17	5.55	.000
4	.49	.24	.24	5.29	.000

Model		Unstandardized coefficients		Standardized coefficients		
		B	Std. error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	1.23	0.33		3.7	0.000
	Age in 1999	0.08	0.01	0.21	11.3	0.000
2	(Constant)	8.05	0.47		17	0.000
	Age in 1999	0.06	0.01	0.15	8.7	0.000
	Educational level in 3 categories - N,D,F,I	-2.77	0.15	-0.34	-19.0	0.000
3	(Constant)	8.96	0.5		17.8	0.000
	Age in 1999	0.05	0.01	0.14	8.1	0.000
	Educational level in 3 categories - N,D,F,I	-2.67	0.15	-0.32	-18.3	0.000
	Count of disagreement with ecological crisis items	-0.86	0.14	-0.11	-6.0	0.000
	Don't know what to vote	0.98	0.32	0.05	3.0	0.003
4	(Constant)	8.04	0.48		16.6	0.000
	Age in 1999	0.04	0.01	0.12	7.0	0.000
	Educational level in 3 categories - N,D,F,I	-2.42	0.14	-0.29	-17.3	0.000
	Count of disagreement with ecological crisis items	-0.49	0.14	-0.06	-3.6	0.000
	Don't know what to vote	0.85	0.31	0.05	2.7	0.006
	Disagreeing with max 1 out of 20 cultural bias items	8.49	0.51	0.28	16.5	0.000

All the findings point to an acquiescence effect. Nevertheless, it does not resolve the acquiescence issue. It looks like there is a small effect among most of the respondents, and there is a slightly larger effect among those who do not disagree with the cultural bias items. Education elicits the strongest effect—one that is nearly twice as strong as the effects of age when controlled for other variables. However, as we can see in the fourth model, the effect of low levels of disagreement is in the same range as the effect of education. Both types of acquiescence effects seem to be present in the data.

What is more problematic is that one could also interpret these results as showing that support for cultural biases increases with age and decreases with education. In other words, we cannot reliably separate the effects of acquiescence from the potential effects of age and education on our measurement of cultural bias. Nevertheless, it looks like the positive effect of acquiescence is much smaller than the negative effect of education and slightly smaller than the positive effect of age. Therefore, we cannot dismiss the learning hypothesis. The findings are consistent with people learning about cultural biases, even if acquiescence is present in the data.

Summary of Measuring Cultural Bias in NOS99

The scale I will be using to measure cultural biases later in this thesis is a simple additive scale with the following modifications. First, the responses to every question are standardized within each country because it is possible that there are differences in the translations between the countries, and some questions are more prone to acquiescence than others. By standardizing the responses countrywise, we remove at least some of the item-to-item differences within countries and all differences between countries. Second, I require only three valid responses out of five cultural bias items because this strikes a good balance between the number of respondents being excluded from further analyses and the quality of the measurement. To compensate for the varying number of responses, the mean of the standardized responses is used to indicate a respondent's position on a cultural bias scale. Using the standardized mean gives us scales that are very similar to factor scores, but have the advantage of simplicity and including many more respondents.

The scales created are relative scales. I am not trying to measure the position on a fixed cultural bias scale; direct comparability between countries would require much more experimentation in each country.

We have seen that the reliability of the cultural bias scales at the Nordic level is on the border of what is acceptable, but reliability at the national level is slightly better. Given that there are only five questions to each bias, and each one covers several domains, I think that we cannot expect any higher consistency in people's responses. The limits to the scales' reliability are in reality set not by theoretical problems, but by the need to keep the questionnaire short in order to increase response rates and to keep the research within the budget.

The analysis of construct validity revealed that the items and the four cultural biases relate to each other as expected. The items load strongly on the biases they are intended to measure and weakly on the other biases, with a few exceptions. There is thus reason to believe that this survey allows us to make a valid measurement of the cultural biases.

It seems apparent that the measurement of cultural bias is influenced by acquiescence because it is a Likert-type scale with only positive items. In this chapter, I have looked at three different types of acquiescence. The first, is acquiescence connected to particular items. In this case, the analysis of acquiescence balance suggests that the individualism and egalitarianism scales in particular suffer either from acquiescence or from items that are too easy to agree to. The second type consists of acquiescence connected to particular groups. In this case, the analysis shows, as expected, that those with lower levels of educational are the most prone to acquiescence, and that acquiescence increases as age increases. In addition, having more than 12 years of education postpones the effect of age until one is 50 years old or more. For those respondents who are prone to acquiescence, it is possible that we obtain over 10 per cent more agreement than what is obtained from the rest of the sample. However, because this group is relatively small, the effect is also generally small. Third is the acquiescence among all respondents. The analysis shows that acquiescence is likely to have an effect that is much smaller than the effect of education, and slightly smaller than that of age.

How does acquiescence distort our analysis of the extent to which cultural biases affect political views? It is difficult to give a good answer to this question simply because acquiescence is still poorly understood. Political preferences are not influenced by acquiescence because agreement alone is not a sufficient answer to questions about party support; after all, you need to pick one party among several parties. Age and education will, however, have their own direct or indirect influence on political preference. Therefore, our measurements of cultural biases include a systematic error that increases the level of support of the three active cultural biases and reduces the level of fatalistic support. However, standardizing the responses to the cultural bias items has the potential to remove some of the effects of acquiescence, but it does not influence the reduction in variation caused by statements that are too easy to answer. In other words, we are probably slightly underestimating the effects of cultural bias.

Suggestions for Improvement

The discussions in this chapter have revealed some weaknesses in the cultural bias items and the scales based on these items. I believe that some of these problems are not inherent to cultural theory, but caused by a lack of systematic scale development (DeVellis 2003). The data in NOS99 are already collected, and they are what they are. I will, nevertheless, give some suggestions for possible improvements in these scales, hoping that they can be useful in future applications of cultural theory.

Consider Forced Choice Questions

There is one simple solution to acquiescence: Use forced choices instead of agree-disagree items (Schuman and Presser 2004:344). Unfortunately, this cannot be easily applied to Dake's cultural bias items. If cultural biases are actually only two-dimensional (only a reflection of the underlying grid-group dimension), then one could construct questions where respondents are forced to choose between hierarchical vs. individualistic answers and fatalistic vs. egalitarian answers (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:Figure 10.1 b). However, if cultural biases are four-dimensional, as I have argued, the rejection of one bias does not imply support for any of the remaining biases. Rejecting hierarchy does not imply support for individualism.

Instead, one could create more items so that all six pairs are covered: 1) egalitarian vs. hierarchical, 2) egalitarian vs. individualistic, 3) egalitarian vs. fatalistic, 4) fatalistic vs. hierarchical, 5) individualistic vs. fatalistic, and 6) individualistic vs. hierarchical. These pairs are identical to those conflicts pointed out by cultural theory—namely the cultural conflicts revolving around the four ways of organizing. In other words, people are asked to take sides in these conflicts. If one is interested in only a particular situation or social context, just a few questions with six answers each could give interesting information. However, a large number of questions are needed if one is interested in respondents' cultural dispositions across a wide range of situations.

Therefore, I suggest that one should try to develop a battery of items for survey questionnaires, where respondents are forced to choose one of the four presented alternatives (biases). Dake, in Great Britain during 1991 and 1992, engaged in some experiments with this type of questioning, but the details have not been published.[264] Below is an example of a question with a forced choice that focuses on the justification of behavior. These reflect how the respondents in the migrant household study justified their helping relations.

[264] The Survey of Public Opinions and Life Styles (rating version) by Dake and Unilever Research is presented in chapter 7 of *Household Cultures*. In the *Household Cultures* project, lots of efforts were invested in developing valid measures (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994: Chapter 7). They conducted two separate studies: a questionnaire-based study and a qualitative study based on a subsample of these households. These studies were then compared for consistency in classifying households by their way of life. A year later a revised version of the same study was conducted partly on new households and partly on the same ones, thus providing a test-retest of some of the households.

> Your family has a friend, who needs so much help next week that it will be a burden for you and your own family. Select the one of the following statements that best describes why you would choose to help your friend:
>
> I will help him if I can, but nobody can make any demands. (F)
>
> I will help him because I expect him to return the favor later. (I)
>
> I will help him because it is my duty.[265] (H)
>
> I will help him because everybody can end in a situation where one needs help. (E)
>
> I do not think I would help him.

By changing the who the recipient of help is, it is possible to see how the different solidarities apply in different social contexts. Examples of recipients could be parents, a sister, a cousin, or a distant relative; a workmate or the boss at work; a neighbor or perhaps the brilliant child of a poor neighbor; or a total stranger, a drug-addict, or maybe an acquaintance with same ethnic background. Recipients could also be organizations, such as the local sportsclub or the community reading program.

An additional advantage with this question structure is that each question will start with a short story that sets a context. This facilitates a study of how different contexts influence the utilization of particular cultural biases. If the sequential individual model is correct, we can utilize different ways of organizing in different settings. The present way of creating the cultural bias scales makes it very difficult to test the effect of context.

Changes in Item Direction or Difficulty

As we saw in Table 18, some of the items have very skewed distributions. The same items have a high acquiescence balance, as illustrated in Table 25. Changing the direction of these items, or making them more difficult to agree to, will improve the quality of the cultural bias scales.

I suggest reversing and rewording of some of the items, as depicted in the following alternatives:

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[265] In the literature, the deserving poor are often mentioned as the favourite recipient of assistance among the hierarchical respondents. However, my own fieldwork suggests that duty and obligations connected to roles are perhaps more important to migrants in Norway. This can either be a trait specific to Norway or connected to friendship as a context (how often are we friends with the 'deserving poor'?).

> Reverse rh4: The ability to question authority is one of the most important things that children should learn / Respect for authority is one of the least important things that children should learn.
>
> Reverse re5: Popular participation endangers good decisions in government and business.
>
> Reverse re3: I am against a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes / I support a tax shift that stimulates investments by corporations and people with large incomes
>
> Reverse ri2: Just because people have the vision and ability to acquire property does not give them the permission to whatever they want.
>
> More difficult ri3: Being successful in business is the best possible contribution people can give to the common good.

As always, any changes in items must be subjected to rigorous testing before their eventual inclusion into the battery of questions in a large survey.

Now that I have established the principles I will use in calculating the continuous cultural bias scales in NOS99, and suggested some improvements, it is time to see how well these same principles can be applied to a different set of data, namely the Norwegian Environmental Survey from 1999.

Chapter 9

MEASURING CULTURAL BIAS IN THE NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION SURVEY

By using the principles for measurement discussed in the previous chapter, this chapter will establish a way to measure cultural biases in the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey (NEPS95). Because several topics have been already dealt with in detail, I will be brief in this chapter. The key issue will be the extent to which I can improve the existing scales by including new items in the scales. I will first describe the survey and the items included in it that can be used to measure cultural bias in alternative ways before I evaluate the reliability of the items. Then I will briefly discuss the validity of these scales before presenting the distribution of these scales. Finally, I will chose between the alternative versions of the scales and establish which one I will be using in the rest of the thesis.

Because NOS99 has very few available variables, which severely limits the possibility of hypothesis testing, I have chosen to incorporate a second survey, the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey, into this thesis. NEPS95 is quite a bit different from NOS99. It is a postal inquiry with an extraordinarily large number of questions; the original data file has 357 variables.

NEPS95 consists of two parts: a sufficiently large survey of the general public (n=1019) and a survey of smaller samples of members from 12 environmental organizations (n ranges from 87 to 306, totaling 2087 respondents). (Strømsnes, Grendstad, and Selle 1996; *The Enviromental Protection Study 1995 (Population)* 2008; *The Enviromental Protection Study 1995 (Organisation Members)* 2008).[266]

The data files come in two parts, each of which corresponds with the one of the two sample component. I have combined these by renaming and recoding the variables so that they match each other when possible.[267] For many analyses, I will only use data from the general public, but for the study of the relationship between individuals and institutional cultures, the environmentalist sample is better suited

[266] The data file and documentation can be downloaded from www.nsd.uib.no. The data applied in the analysis in this publication are based on the 1995 Enviromental Protection Study, which consists of NSD0367-1 (population) and NSD0367-2 (environmental organizations). The data are provided by the LOS Center and prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither LOS nor NSD are responsible for the analyses/interpretations of the data presented here.

[267] This is done with the productionscript m95_recode3.spj, which calls several SPSS syntax files.

because it contains information about degree and type of participation in the organization.

The Cultural Bias Items in NEPS95

NEPS95 has fewer cultural bias items available than what is found in the 1999 Nordic survey. Luckily, other variables with well-defined relationships with cultural biases can be used to supplement the existing cultural bias statements. I will now present the scales I will be using, but without going into much detail about the other variables not included in the scale.

All scale development is done based on the general population survey only, but the choices made are also implemented in the environmentalist sample.[268] For example, the starting points for scale development are the standardized responses to the cultural bias items in the general population sample. The responses in the environmentalist sample are standardized in relation to the mean and variance from the general population sample. This ensures that values in both samples are comparable.

NEPS95 included only 2 or 3 items for of each bias, which did not give a high enough reliability for the measurement of cultural biases, and only the egalitarian cultural bias items perform well. Therefore, I will add new items to these scales. While these items are derived from questions not intended to measure cultural bias, they do cover domains that are well known and central to cultural theory. These new items cover topics like the distribution of wealth, the balance between continued growth and environmental protection, trust in different institutions, and attitudes related to environmentalism. The availability of items is decided by the main topic of the survey, namely environmentalism. Therefore, I am not suggesting that my selection of questions is transferrable to other surveys or other contexts. In this context, however, I believe that the questions I have chosen do in fact measure those concepts that I am trying to capture, even if there are some shortcomings with the questions. I will now present the items used and say a few words about the scales and their reliabilities.

The original cultural bias scales are based on Likert-type questions. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this type of scale has one main weakness, namely acquiescence. In order to counter this tendency, I have evaluated questions with a reversed direction and two questions containing a forced choice.

Table 28 presents the wording of these forced choice questions. The advantage with forced choice questions is that the respondents must choose between the cultural biases, which removes the effect of acquiescence and helps us to differentiate between people who give roughly similar answers on all items.

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[268] All calculations in this chapter are performed with g:\spss\M95_validity and reliability.sps.

Table 28: Wording of the Growth and Equality Questions in NEPS95.

	Indicator of CB
Which one of the following statements do you most agree with?	
Environmental protection must be prioritized even if it reduces economic growth.	E
It is possible to combine environmental protection with economic growth.	H
Economic growth must be prioritized even if it harms environment.	I
We use the concept "equality" in different ways when it comes to the distribution of goods in the society. Which one of the following forms of equality do you think is the most justifiable for the society as whole?	
Everyone should be given an equal share of the goods in the society.	E
Everybody should be given goods according to their contribution to the society.	I
Everyone should be given goods based on their position in the society.	H
None of these, do not know.	F

Responses to these forced choice questions are converted into dummy variables that indicate support for different cultural biases.[269] How do these new questions work with the old items?

Reliability and Content of the Revised Cultural Bias Scales

Going from bias to bias, I will compare the reliabilities of the old and new revised scales. In Table 29 below we can see the items used for measuring hierarchical bias. The two first items are from the original cultural bias battery, while the rest have been selected by me. In the third column we can see Cronbach's alpha which shows the reliability of a simple summary scale based on the original items, and, as seen in the final column, the reliability of the revised scale. The reliability of the scale only marginally improved after the inclusion of five more items. The strongest correlation between the single items is between the two trust variables (0.31). The wealth variable reduces the numeric reliability of the scale. Nevertheless, I have

[269] These items are first made with dummies that are linearly transformed so that the average in the general population is zero and the maximum values are between one and two. Regular standardization creates large maximum values when there are only a few respondents who choose a particular answer. Therefore, the standardized values were afterwards divided so that the maximum value is between one and two, which reduced the variation in the variable. Moreover, it allows us to keep a variable's contribution to the summary scale comparable with the contributions made by other variables.

chosen to include this variable because of the high face validity of the item. The weak correlations between this variable and the other items are caused by the fact that this is a dummy variable with a low number (37) of respondents agreeing with this item. Despite the poor performance when measured with correlations or Cronbach's alpha, it will increase the score for the extreme hierarchists.

Table 29: Items in the Hierarchical Cultural Bias Scale in General Population NEPS95

Hierarchical items	*Variable name*	*Cronbach's alpha*	*Name of the Scale*
One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.	rh1		
The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.	rh2	.48	2-item original H
How much do you trust the Church of Norway?	Zm272		
How much do you trust the Norwegian defense forces (military)?	Zm273		
Humans are meant to rule over the rest of the nature.	Zm199	.52	5-item H
Wealth should be awarded by position (dummy).	wealth_h		
It is possible to combine economic growth and environmental protection (dummy).	growth_h		
Humans will eventually be able to control nature by learning more about it.	zm201	.56	8-item H

In Table 30 below, we can see the items used in the egalitarian cultural bias scale. We can see that the reliability only slightly increases when increasing the number of items from three to ten. The largest correlations between the individual items are found in the first three items (.36, .37, and .38), and in many ways these three items are enough. The new items correlate between .09 and .28 with these three items, which is lower than the old items. Nevertheless, because there are several new items, the reliability of the scale increases. By including these new items that cover growth, wealth, trust, and nature, we are increasing the number of domains in which the egalitarian cultural bias is measured. All the new items have high face validity. Moreover, by including items for capturing growth and wealth, we somewhat counter the tendency of acquiescence (one-fifth of the total tendency for acquiescence).

Table 30: Items in the Egalitarian Cultural Bias Scale in NEPS95. (Cronbach's alpha)

Egalitarian items	*Variable name*	*Cronbach's alpha*	*Name of the Scale*
We must redistribute wealth more evenly to get more justice in the world.	re1		
I support a tax shift so that the burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.	re2		
A better division of labour between us is necessary for reducing unemployment	re3	.66	original 3-item E
Environmental protection must be prioritized even if it reduces economic growth (dummy).	growth_e		
Everyone should be given an equal share of the goods in the society (dummy).	wealth_e		
How much do you trust the environmental organizations? (only for general public sample).	m292m		
Egalitarian view of nature indicator	Znature_e	.65 [270]	7-item E
Humans seriously misuse nature.	m188*		
Human interventions in nature often have catastrophic consequences.	m191*		
The balance of nature is fragile and easy to disturb.	m200*		
If the current development continues we will soon experience a large ecological catastrophe.	m202*		
Environmental protection often requires taking action even if we do not know how serious the situation is.	m255*	.71	11-item E

Znature_e, which is used in the 7-item scale, is calculated by taking the average of standardized items marked with *. The 11-item scale uses, instead of Znature_e, the individual items marked with *.

I have also made modifications to this 11-item egalitarianism scale, where the last five items relating to nature are first combined into an indicator of egalitarian views of nature and then standardized in relation to the general public before it is entered into the egalitarianism scale. This has a marginally lower level of reliability (0.65 in general public), and it reduces the weight of the view of nature to a level comparable with other domains.

Turning our attention to Table 31 below, we can see the items used for the original individualistic cultural bias items and the revised scale. The original scale has a

[270] Cronbach's alpha underestimates the true reliability of this scale because it now includes a scale for nature, which is constituted by the items marked with *. This reduces the variability and number of variables that are included in the 7-item scale.

reliability of 0.39, while the reliability of the revised scale is increased to 0.53. The new items cover wealth, trust, and nature. Most of the many nature-related questions available in this survey differentiate egalitarian bias from hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic biases, but they do not thoroughly differentiate between hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic biases. The nature questions included here have been selected because they differentiate individualistic bias from hierarchy and fatalism, as only individualistic cultural bias accepts the idea that nature and even the human genome can be changed to fit our needs.

Three items out of eight help to reduce the effects of acquiescence: the forced choice wealth item and two questions with reversed direction: It is OK to tamper with the human genome and natural catastrophes are not forthcoming. The natural catastrophe item contributes only slightly to the reliability of the scale, but is included because its reversed direction reduces acquiescence.

Table 31: Items in the Individualistic Cultural Bias Scale in NEPS95

Individualistic items	*Variable name*	*Cronbach's alpha*	*Name of the scale*
Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.	ri1		
If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.	ri2	.39	original 2-item I
Everybody should be given goods according to their contribution to the society.	wealth_i		
How much do you trust businesses and companies?	m271		
Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to satisfy human needs.	m189		
Human skill and wisdom will keep earth fine.	m192		
If the current development continues we will soon experience a large ecological catastrophe (reversed).	m202r		
It is morally despicable to tamper with the natural human genome (reversed).	m253r	.53	8-item I

Moving on to Table 32, we can see the items included in the original and revised fatalistic cultural bias scales. The original 2-item scale had poor reliability (0.3) and needed to be improved. The problem with measuring fatalistic cultural bias is that in many issues, the fatalists can mimic one of the other biases. However, given the imperfections in survey measurements, it is very difficult to distinguish between a lack of pattern and poor measurement. Therefore, I have opted to use distrust to measure fatalistic bias. Hence, there are two new items based on a question concerning trust in institutions. The respondents are asked to what degree they trust 12 different institutions.[271] Respondents are then given the choice between very strong trust, strong trust, small trust, no trust at all, and do not know. I have converted the responses to these 12 items into two trust variables. The first one is based on a simple count of the "no trust at all" responses to the 12 institutions.[272] The second trust variable is a reversed average level of trust in institutions that are not trusted by the fatalistic way of life: political parties, United Nations, environmental organizations, and the government's environmental authorities.[273]

Table 32: Items in the Fatalistic Cultural Bias Scale in NEPS95

Fatalistic items	*Variable name*	*Cronbach's alpha*	*Name of the Scale*
It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.	rf1		
Cooperation with others rarely works.	rf2	.30	original 2-item F
Indicator of strong distrust to any institution.	Trust_f		
Level of distrust in the political parties in Norway, environmental authorities in Norway, environmental organizations, and the United Nations (UN).	Trust_f2	.51	4-item F

Construct Validity of the Revised Cultural Bias Scales

Factor analysis could be used as a test of construct validity for the items listed in Table 69 (see page 483), but only if all the items had the same structure. As we have seen, some of the new items are forced choice items rather than Likert-type items, and factor analysis would be "blinded" by this variation in structure. Similarly, any analyses of variance within the scales (between the items) will be negatively influenced by this variation in structure. Therefore, it is very difficult to achieve a high reliability score with these revised sets of items. Nevertheless, the content of the items is better than before. In other words, the values of the scale now provide a better indicator of the respondents' true position, even if the some mathematical properties between the items in each scale are not as good.

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[271] The institutions mentioned in the survey are as follows: schools and the educational system, voluntary organizations, press and media, businesses and companies, the Church of Norway, Norwegian defence forces (military), political parties in Norway, environmental authorities in Norway, courts and justice, our national political system, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN).

[272] This count has then been squared and the mean of the general sample has been deducted from it to make it comply better with the standardized variables. A regular standardization would have given this variable too much influence in the scale.

[273] The orignal 2-item F scale has a stronger negative correlation with trust in these four institutions than the other institutions. Other biases do not share this pattern (table not included).

Instead of a factor analysis, I discuss the correlations between the old and new cultural bias scales and show that the scales do in fact measure what they should. More important than these correlations here are the previous discussions concerning the content of the items used. In Table 33, we can see how the revised cultural bias scales relate to each other and to the old cultural bias scales. The correlations between the old scales and the revised scales are marked in italics. We can see that the Pearsons coefficients for these items range from 0.65 for individualism to 0.82 for fatalism. Their strong correlations indicate that they should be measuring the same hidden dimensions. One could hope for even stronger correlations, but the ones found here seem to be acceptable enough when considering the small number of items on the the original scales.

Table 33: Revised Cultural Bias Scales. (Correlation).

	Hierarcical - 5 item	Hierarchical - 2 item	Egalitarian - 11 item	Egalitarian - 7 item	Egalitarian - 3 item	Individualistic - 8 item	Individualistic - 2 item	Fatalistic - 4 item	Fatalistic - 2 item
Hierarchy 5-item	**1.00**	*.71*	**-.07**	**-.03**	*.07*	**.27**	*.20*	**.07**	*.27*
Hierarchy 2-item	*.71*	1.00	*-.02*	*.01*	.13	*.21*	.21	*.27*	.36
Egalitarian 11-item	**-.07**	*-.02*	**1.00**	**.92**	*.70*	**-.54**	*-.23*	**-.04**	*.08*
Egalitarian 7-item	**-.03**	*.01*	**.92**	**1.00**	*.83*	**-.50**	*-.25*	**-.06**	*.08*
Egalitarian 3-item	*.07*	.13	*.70*	*.83*	1.00	*-.34*	-.17	*.07*	.16
Individualistic 8-item	**.27**	*.21*	**-.54**	**-.50**	*-.34*	**1.00**	*.65*	**.07**	*.13*
Individualistic 2-item	*.20*	.21	*-.23*	*-.25*	-.17	*.65*	1.00	*.18*	.23
Fatalistic 4-item	**.07**	*.27*	**-.04**	**-.06**	*.07*	**.07**	*.18*	**1.00**	*.82*
Fatalistic 2-item	*.27*	.36	*.08*	*.08*	.16	*.13*	.23	*.82*	1.00

The correlations between the original and revised variables are marked in italics. Correlations between the revised variables are marked in bold.

More interesting are the correlations between the revised cultural biases (marked in bold). For the most part, it looks like the measurement of cultural biases using the revised scales is a success. As expected, we can see that the revised 5-item hierarchy scale has weak correlations with both the old and revised versions of the egalitarianism scale. The old measurements of fatalism and hierarchy did correlate a bit more strongly than they should have (.36), indicating that the old cultural bias items did not adequately separate fatalism from hierarchy.[274] By contrast, the revised scales exhibit very weak correlations between fatalism and hierarchy (.07). The only problem, which perhaps is a severe problem, is that egalitarianism and individualism now have a strong negative correlation (-.50). There are several possible competing interpretations of this. First, in Norwegian politics the egalitarian-individualistic dimension is very strong, and therefore these dimension end up being conflated in the survey. However, this is not a very credible interpretation simply because politics is not that important in people's lives. Cultural biases should be much more influenced by people's close surroundings, such as the institutions they take part in during their everyday lives. A second interpretation comes from the multiplicity of environmental protection questions in the revised egalitarian and individualistic scales. It is possible that environmental protection, as a domain, gets conflated with only one dimension—i.e., support versus opposition to environmental protection correlates highly with egalitarianism versus the other measurements from the other three. In other words, the Norwegian political landscape does not have four distinct dimensions of environmental protection policies, or at least the general public does not show that kind of refinement in their environmental opinions.[275]

The big question still remains: Is the strong negative correlation between individualism and egalitarianism a problem. It is difficult to find good theoretical guidance for answering this question because the importance of the correlation really depends how one defines the relationship between an individual's cultural bias and his or her institutional setting. If this is best described through the coherent individual model, then all correlations between cultural biases are likely to be negative, and the stronger the relationship the better. Likewise, if the synthetic individual approach gives the most accurate description, then the negative correlation is not a problem, as it simply tells us that those supporting individualism use rejection of egalitarianism to strengthen their support for individualism, and vice versa. By contrast, if the sequential individual approach gives the most accurate description, then the negative correlations are indeed a problem.

One reason for not using the revised 7-item egalitarian scale (alpha=0.65) or the 11-item egalitarian scale (alpha=0.71) could be that the reliability of the 3-item scale was sufficient (alpha=0.66). Do the new items add enough to warrant their inclusion even if reliability decreases slightly? I believe that by including views of trust, growth, and nature, the content validity of the measure increases, and in terms of content, the measure will be more comparable to the other cultural biases in this same survey.

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274 Compare these with the correlations from NOS99, which are even higher!

275 Factor analyses of environmental protection questions and cultural bias questions confirm this. However, these are not included here because it is not the topic of this thesis.

Distribution of the Revised Cultural Biases Scales

In Figure 18, we can see how the distribution of the hierarchical cultural bias scale changes when the number of items is increased from 2 to 5.[276] The changes are small and the form of the distribution seems acceptable in both samples. We can see a nice toe on both sides of the mean, indicating that we are capturing the full range of rejection and support for the hierarchical cultural bias. Since the reliability of the 5-item scale is far better than it is for the 2-item scale, the 5-item scale will be used for measuring hierarchical cultural bias.

Figure 18: Hierarchical CB 5-item and 2-item by Sample. NEPS95. Histogram.



In Figure 19, below, we can see the distributions of 11-, 7-, and 3-item scales that measure egalitarian cultural bias. On the bottom we can see how the scale based on 3-items does not separate the extreme egalitarians from the moderate egalitarians, particularly in the sample of environmental organization members. The greater the number of included items, the better the scale does in separating those with high scores on egalitarianism, but even the 11-item scale, as seen on the top, lacks a right toe in the environmental organization sample. This is probably not a problem unless we are interested in different forms of extreme egalitarianism. Particularly, we can see that both the 7- and 11-item scales have a nice toe in the general sample. What we do not know is if the extreme egalitarians in the environmental organization sample would have scored even higher with the inclusion of some even more extreme egalitarian items, or if this should be interpreted as a good measurement of egalitarian bias.

[276] This section is produced with the syntax file m95_all_Social_Background_and_CB.sps.

Figure 19: Egalitarian CB 11-item, 7-item, and 3-item by Sample. NEPS95. Histogram.



As expected, in Figure 19, above, we can also see that the environmental organization members are more egalitarian than the general public, which increases the criterion validity of both the 7- and 11-item egalitarian bias scales.

Moving on to Figure 20, we can see the distribution of individualistic cultural bias scales measured with 2 and 8 items. The 8-item scale has nice toes on both sides, which indicates that we are capturing the whole range of individualistic bias rejection and support.

Figure 20: Individualistic CB 8-item and 2-item scales by Sample. NEPS95. Histogram.



Figure 21: Fatalistic CB 4-item and 2-item scales by Sample. NEPS95. Histogram.



Finally, in Figure 21 we can see the distribution of 2- and 4-item fatalistic cultural biases in both samples. Both samples contain distributions with nice toes, indicating that we are capturing the full range of both rejection and support for fatalistic bias. While the distributions for the other cultural biases were quite symmetrical, here we find a small asymmetry in the 4-item scale. Its distribution is skewed toward rejection: There are only a few people who strongly support fatalism, while there are a large number who reject it. Nevertheless, the deviation from normal is so small that it does not have any consequences for later analyses.

Different Scales by Age and Education

One of the weaknesses with the cultural bias measurement designed by Dake and Wildavsky is the degree to which the scales are prone to acquiescence. Here, I will not try to establish the level of acquiescence, as in the previous chapter. Instead, in light of this weakness, I have tried to include items not prone to acquiescence: forced choice items and items with reversed direction. Can we see the effects of reduced acquiescence in the changed relationships between age, education, and the cultural biases?

In Figure 22 below, we can see how age and education relate to cultural biases measured by the old and by the revised scales and applied to the NEPS95 general sample. The old scale is drawn with a dotted line and the revised scale with a solid line. For most biases measured with the old scales, we can see that increasing age increases support for cultural bias, while education has the opposite effect. The exception is age and individualism, where the effect seems to be curvilinear: ages from 30 to 59 being the least individualistic. In general, however, increasing education reduces support for cultural biases. I have previously shown how this is at least partly caused by acquiescence. As hoped, we can also see that for all cultural biases, the revised scale (solid line) reduces the effects that age and education have on cultural biases, given the forced choice and reversed questions included in the revised scale. [277]

Deciding on which Scale to Use

In the previous pages, we have seen several ways to measure cultural bias in NEPS95. We have also seen the content of the scale, its reliability, its correlation with other cultural bias scales, its distribution in the general sample and among members of environmental organizations, and its relationship with age and education. Choosing a scale is easy for hierarchy, individualism, and fatalism. The 5-item hierarchical cultural bias scale, the 8-item individualistic scale, and the 4-item fatalistic scale will from now on just be referred to as the hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural bias scales.

The original 3-item egalitarian bias scale did have a sufficient level of reliability. So why should we change it? Well, the revised scales have new content (growth, wealth, trust, nature) and they include forced choice questions (growth, wealth) that are not influenced by acquiescence. The other cultural biases include these new aspects, so changing the measurement of egalitarian bias makes it more similar to

[277] Age and education still have an effect: The Pearson correlations for the revised scales range from 0.3 (hierarchy 5 item and age) to -.02 (hierarchy 5-item and education).

Figure 22: Cultural Bias Scales by Age and Education. General Sample in NEPS95.



the other ones. For me the most important reason for revising the scales is the increased robustness of my later analysis concerning cultural theory and rejection of biases. By including a second survey, namely NEPS95, I can ensure that my theoretical findings based on NOS99 are not just a one-time phenomenon. However, if my measurement of cultural biases in NEPS95 were just a subset (2 or 3 items) of the 5 items used in NOS99, my findings would quite possibly be applicable only to Dake's cultural bias items, without reversed items. Since I have a special interest in the rejection of cultural biases, it is useful to have an alternative measurement that at least to some degree attempts to correct for this weakness.

Choosing the best egalitarianism scale is not easy because the difference between the 7- and 11-item scales is small. Both the 7- and 11-item scales have sufficient levels of reliability, but Cronbach's alpha decreases when combining the 5 nature items into one indicator on the view of nature.[278] The 11-item scale does a better job in measuring extreme egalitarianism, but it has perhaps too much environmental protection content. Both the 7- and 11-item scales correlate negatively with individualism, but the 7-item scale correlates a little less (-0.50 vs. -0.54). Both the 7- and 11-item scales reduce the effect of age and education on the measured egalitarian bias. I will be using the 7-item scale to measure egalitarianism because it seems to balance the content better, and validity is more important than reliability.

One of the problematic issues I presented in Chapter 7 was the tendency for researchers to use techniques that are well suited for analyzing numbers, but not at all suitable for analyzing meanings. Without making references to meaning, I have now established a way for measuring cultural biases as continuous variables in two different surveys. So far, the only thing we know is that some respondents are more hierarchical than others, some are more egalitarian, and so forth. However, in order to understand the effects of cultural biases, we must consider the mechanisms of influence at the individual level. Do we find effects only above or below certain thresholds? Do the cultural biases work one by one? Alternatively, do cultural biases work together in an additive way or only in combinations, or perhaps both? In the next chapter, I will construct measures of cultural biases that allow us to deal with many cultural biases simultaneously, without making calculations of meaning.

[278] However, I believe that the calculation of Cronbach's alpha underestimates the true reliability of the 7-item scale because it does not relate to the 5 items that are first combined to form the view of nature indicator.

Chapter 10

COMBINATIONS OF CULTURAL BIASES IN PEOPLE

How can we convert the four cultural bias scales into a description of a person while still retaining the richness of meaning we saw in the household chapters?

> Most opinion studies, like most works of fiction, employ flat, abbreviated treatments of their subjects. We reject the reality of comic-book characters who are predictably heroes or villains, yet we too often settle for comic-book statistics on infinitely complex matters of opinion. It is the rare poll that allows us to see opinion as multifaceted, multi-layered, and intricate. (Bogart 2004: 272)

We need to find a way to combine information from these four scales into a label that represents a person's relation to these four cultural biases. The solution will be intertwined with our assumptions about the individual-culture relationship.

This chapter will discuss and compare different operationalizations of cultural bias in relation to different theoretical views about the individual-culture relationship. The main goal of this chapter is to choose a practical operationalization. The choice of operationalization can be based on theoretical considerations, on previous research, or on an exploration of what is going on in the data. As theoretical considerations do not give much guidance, and previous research has not systematically dealt with this issue, an empirical exploration seems to be the most fruitful avenue to pursue.

My analytical strategy is to create many alternative operationalizations of cultural biases, which can then be used to produce thousands of contingency tables. [279] This gives us an opportunity to empirically study how the assumptions we use influence our results and the performance of cultural bias as an explanation for party preference. This is an unusual strategy, but it will give me the opportunity to discuss the assumptions behind the individual-culture relationship.

We can learn something about the individual-culture relationship in general by comparing the performances of the different operationalizations. As such, I will be asking the following questions in this chapter. First, how can we label the cultural

[279] There is a windows command script Nordic1999_final_cutpoints.cmd that controls the whole process. This calls SPSS production scripts, which again call regular SPSS syntax files that are run multiple times with different parameters each time. See page 523 for more information.

biases that individuals have? Second, when dividing cultural bias scales into categories, what are the best cut-off points to use when assigning labels for support, indifference, and rejection? Third, how much can cultural biases actually explain? Fourth, is support for a bias sufficient, or do we also need to account for the rejection of a bias when studying political preferences? Fifth, does indifference to a bias really matter, or are political preferences mainly formed by our support and rejection of biases? Sixth, how many cultural biases do we use to make political choices?

In survey-based, variable-oriented research, there is a general tendency to search for the variable or model that thoroughly explains our dependent variable (Ragin 1987; Ragin 2008). In Chapter 12, I will demonstrate the fallacies involved in three common assumptions that are typically used by variable-oriented survey research on cultural theory. The dominant bias assumption is one such fallacy, which suggests that we need to use more than one cultural bias on the individual level. Similarly, the independency of effects assumption and the additivity of effects assumption are fallacies. Given these three fallacies, we should be looking for an operationalization that is not dependent on these assumptions. My solution to this quagmire is to replace the four numerical values with one cultural bias combination. I will then create labels for individuals in an effort to describe their cultural bias combinations.

Principles for Labeling Cultural Bias Combinations

The different methods for labeling become clearer if we start with a fictive respondent, Sarah, who is clearly more positive to egalitarianism (1.2) and slightly more positive to hierarchy (0.5) than the average respondent. Her preference for individualism (-0.1) is slightly below the average, and her preference for fatalism (-1.4) is far below the average.[280]

There are many ways to label Sarah, although we do not yet know which one to use. We could label her as *E* because she supports an egalitarian bias. We could label her as *f* because her rejection of the fatalistic bias deviates more from the average than the support for hierarchy. We could just as well label her as *Ef* or *HEif*. Instead of trying out random combinations, I will approach this in a systematic manner and go through the set of principles used to make the labels.

In order to create robust labels for cultural combinations, we need to take into account all four principles summarized in Figure 23: The selection principle, the number of levels to divide degrees of support for a cultural bias into, the ordering principle, and the number of biases to use in a label.

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[280] See two previous chapters how the cultural bias scales are calculated and what kind of values the scales have.

First, the selection principle is used to select which cultural bias should be included in the label. Are cultural biases about *support or about difference* in opinion? If biases are all about support, we should focus on the highest values. In other words, a positive value is always stronger than a negative value. If cultural biases are about differences in opinion, we should measure cultural biases in terms of deviations from the mean (0), in which case a strong negative value represents a stronger difference than a weak positive value. Using support as a selection principle will hide any effects of rejection, while using difference or the absolute value will allow us to see the effects of rejection as well. It is important to note that although I call this the selection principle, it is also used for the potential ranking of cultural biases.

Figure 23: Principles for Labeling Cultural Bias Combinations



Second, how many *levels* or categories should each cultural bias scale be divided into? One can use a label that indicates only support (one level), where capital letters show support, and the lack of a letter implies a lack of support. One can also use a binary system with separate labels for support and rejection (two levels). In the binary system, capitals show support (EH) and small letters show rejection (if). The difference between labeling by using one or two levels is that the latter enables us to distinguish between respondents who differ only in their rejection of a bias.

One can also divide respondents into three different levels: support, indifference, and rejection. In this trichotomous system, capitals signify support, a missing letter shows indifference, and a small letter shows rejection. In the neutral system, a separate letter indicates neutral relation to each cultural bias so that we can distinguish respondents according to what they are neutral toward.

Third, we must consider *how to order* the biases in the label. The biases can be either presented in a *fixed* HEIF order or *ranked by* preference. If cultural biases are selected based on support, they will also be ranked according to support. If cultural biases are selected based on difference, they will also be ranked according to the same principle. Using different principles for ordering and selecting would be contradictory, as they are both reflections of how we understand cultural bias.

Finally, we must consider *how many biases* should be use in the label: one, two, three, or all four cultural biases. For example, respondents could be labeled according to their single most significant bias, their two most significant biases, and so on.

Now that I have presented the principles behind the labeling, I can now start making labels for cultural bias combinations.

Labeling According to Levels

Making labels starts by assigning symbols to different cultural biases. In Table 34, we can see which letters and letterforms indicate the various cultural bias positions. The coherent cultural bias does not open up for rejecting a bias, hence the variable *coherent* contains only one letter indicating which cultural bias the respondent most strongly supports. The other labeling systems are dependent on particular cut-off points. In the *support* labeling system, a capital letter indicates support, while the lack of a letter implies rejection. In the *binary* labeling system, cultural biases receive two different values—support or rejection, as signified by a capital or lower-case letter. In the *trichotomous* labeling system, a lack of letter indicates an indifferent position in the middle of the scale. This emphasizes and clarifies the effects of support and rejection.[281] The *neutral* labeling system gives the area between support and rejection its own symbol, as it is conceivable that being on the middle of a cultural bias scale is not just absence of support or rejection, but a legitimate, neutral cultural position that should be given the same weight as support and rejection.

[281] A small change across the cut-off point does not entail a shift from support to rejection, from *H* to *h*, as there will be an area of indifference between *H* and *h*.

Table 34: Indicators for a Single Cultural Bias by Levels

Alternative Categorizations of Single Cultural Bias	*Positive*	*Indifferent*	*Negative*
Coherent Cultural Bias	*H, E, I , F*	-	-
Cultural Bias Support—Hierarchy	*H*	-	
Cultural Bias Support—Egalitarian	*E*	-	
Cultural Bias Support—Individualistic	*I*	-	
Cultural Bias Support—Fatalistic	*F*	-	
Cultural Bias Binary—Hierarchy	*H*	-	*h*
Cultural Bias Binary—Egalitarian	*E*	-	*e*
Cultural Bias Binary—Individualistic	*I*	-	*i*
Cultural Bias Binary—Fatalistic	*F*	-	*f*
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Hierarchy	*H*		*h*
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Egalitarian	*E*		*e*
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Individualistic	*I*		*i*
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Fatalistic	*F*		*f*
Cultural Bias Neutral—Hierarchy	*H*	*r*	*h*
Cultural Bias Neutral—Egalitarian	*E*	*g*	*e*
Cultural Bias Neutral—Individualistic	*I*	*d*	*i*
Cultural Bias Neutral—Fatalistic	*F*	*t*	*f*

Selecting and Ordering Biases

The next phase in labeling is to select whether we want to use support or difference when differentiating between opinions. If we look at Sarah again, she is supportive of hierarchy (0.5) and egalitarianism (1.2), making these her two strongest biases, while her support for the fatalism is by far the weakest bias. However, if we look at the absolute value of the differences, her rejection of fatalism (-1.4) is the strongest bias, while her support for egalitarianism is the second strongest.

If we select the labels for Sarah's biases according to support, we then get two biases—*H* and *E*—because these are the only ones above the cut-off point. The fixed order presents these as *HE,* while the ranked order is *EH* because the support for egalitarianism is stronger.

When selecting the labels by using the binary method, the fixed order of the biases would be *HEif*, and the ranked order would be *fEHi* because the biases are sorted according to their absolute values.

Labels can also be selected by using the trichotomous method. In this case, the fixed order of the biases would be *HEf*, and the ranked order would be *EHf*. When compared with the binary version, we can see that the trichotomous method obscures the *i* because it is classified as indifferent.

Finally, if we select the labels by using the neutral method, the fixed order of the biases would be *HEdf,* while the ranked order would be *fEHd*.

We can see that the way we understand how of cultural biases work—i.e. through support, rejection, or differences between levels of support—has significant consequences on which biases are selected for analysis and on the order of the biases. As seen in case of our fictive person named Sarah, very different labels can be used for representing the same individual.

Fixed combinations of biases that ignore the relative strength of biases at the individual level work well with the sequential individual model that sees people as strongly influenced by context—in most contexts, the institutional pressure would trigger a cultural bias change in the individual. Sarah's responses could be interpreted as showing that she spends lots of time in an egalitarian context behaving in an egalitarian manner and some time in a hierarchical context. The relative strengths of these biases are not so important because in the egalitarian context, she will be guided by a familiar egalitarian bias, and in the hierarchical context, she will be guided by a familiar hierarchical bias. In other words, in most situations of life our choices are constrained by the context in which we operate.

In its logic, the ranked preferences are closer to the synthetic individual model. A person will utilize his or hers complete social repertoire in an institutional context, and knowing the full range of their cultural preferences is needed to predict their behaviors and political preferences. Therefore, the order of their cultural biases is paramount for understanding their preferences and choices.

Each method for labeling cultural combinations is saved as a new variable. So, what kind of properties do these new variables have?

Cultural Bias Combinations as Variables

In Table 35, we can see the new cultural combination variables. There is one variable for each set principles or assumptions involved, and the variables' names reflect the principles used. One should notice that not all combinations are possible. Trichotomous and neutral combinations require rejection to be meaningful categories, hence they cannot be combined with support. The last column shows the label our example respondent, Sarah, has according to each particular variable. I will not present the content of these variables one by one, as I have already presented the principles behind them.

I have also included one cultural bias combination that mixes together several principles: *CultRankTriA1_3* selects the first bias according to its difference from the mean and keeps the remaining three biases in a fixed order. In some sense, it assumes that the first bias is what really matters. However, the other three biases have enough effect to be included in the label. Keeping the three least important biases in fixed order reduces the number of categories.

Table 35: Variables used for Cultural Bias Combinations, arranged by Levels, Ordering, N of Biases in the Label, and Selection Principle

Levels	*Ordering principle behind labeling*	*Number of biases used in label*	*Variable name*	*Selection principle: support or difference*	*Sarah's label*
Support	Only the strongest support	1	CoherentS1	S	*E*
	Fixed - HEIF	1	CultFixSupp1	S	*E*
		2	CultFixSupp2	S	*HE*
		3	CultFixSupp3	S	*HE*
		4	CultFixSupp4	S	*HE*
	Ranked	1	CultRankSupp1	S	*E*
		2	CultRankSupp2	S	*EH*
		3	CultRankSupp3	S	*EH*
		4	CultRankSupp4	S	*EH*
Binary	Fixed - HEIF	1	CultFixBinA1	D	*f*
		2	CultFixBinA2	D	*Ef*
		3	CultFixBinA3	D	*HEf*
		4	CultFixBinA4	D	*HEif*
	Ranked	1	CultRankBinA1	D	*f*
		2	CultRankBinA2	D	*fE*
		3	CultRankBinA3	D	*fEH*
		4	CultRankBinA4	D	*fEHi*
Trichotomous	Fixed - HEIF	1	CultFixTriA1	D	*f*
		2	CultFixTriA2	D	*Ef*
		3	CultFixTriA3	D	*HEf*
		4	CultFixTriA4	D	*HEf*
	Ranked	1	CultRankTriA1	D	*f*
		2	CultRankTriA2	D	*fE*
		3	CultRankTriA3	D	*fEH*
		4	CultRankTriA4	D	*fEH*
	First one by strength + rest by HEIF	1+3	CultRankTriA1_3	D	*fHE*
Neutral	Fixed - HEIF	1	CultFixNeutA1	D	*f*
		2	CultFixNeutA2	D	*Ef*
		3	CultFixNeutA3	D	*HEf*
		4	CultFixNeutA4	D	*HEdf*
	Strength of preference	1	CultRankNeutA1	D	*f*
		2	CultRankNeutA2	D	*fE*
		3	CultRankNeutA3	D	*fEH*
		4	CultRankNeutA4	D	*fEHd*

It is possible to use a different approach when making variables. I have also tried to keep support and absolute values as equal alternatives, and used them equally with all the other alternatives. The advantage of this manner of coding is that support is divided into three levels, just like rejection. Therefore, I call this the *S3* coding (see page 551 for more details). Theoretically at least, several levels of support should allow it to perform better in the analyses presented later in this piece. As it turned out, however, having a multiplicity of levels simply complicated the analyses because many of these variables did not help to explain party preference and added too much noise to the analysis. In addition, some of these variables were a poor match to the theoretical assumptions presented in Chapter 7.

Even if it is tempting to create categories that precisely reflect the individuals' cultural positions, there is a limit to how complicated our categories can be when using them in research. If we want to compare a few cases like families or parties, case studies can deal with high levels of complexity. However, simplification is needed if we are working on thousands of cases and surveys. One of the potential problems with these variables is the high number of categories they divide respondents into. In Table 77 in the appendix, we can see that some variables divide respondents into hundreds of categories according to their cultural biases. On one hand, it is highly interesting if we can actually do that while being able to predict party preferences in a precise manner. Perhaps this is the level of precision we should be at. On the other hand, however, statistical analysis requires a certain number of similar respondents before we can start to generalize.[282]

The real question is what is the best way to simplify cultural bias combinations? The answer probably depends on the research interest. Therefore, we need to know more about the dependent variable used in this chapter, namely party preference.

The Dependent Variable: Variations in Party Preference

In the surveys, party preference is the only interesting variable with enough complexity to meet my present research purposes.[283] Party preference can be coded as the simple choice between parties in each national parliament or as a proxy for political ideology that travels across national borders. Because of the possibility that certain cultural bias combinations affect only one of these, we should test them both. However, exploring party preference in detail will have to wait until next chapter.

[282] A crosstable with 400 categories for cultural bias combinations and 8 political parties yeilds 3200 cells. We need very large samples to deal with this kind of precision when working with cultural biases. Furthermore, on paper, a table like this would take perhaps 8 pages in this thesis.

[283] The respondents were asked "Which party would you vote for if the parliamentary election were tomorrow?"

Party preference can first be understood simply as choice of one out of several parties in parliamentary elections. As the survey is conducted in five countries, there are five national parliamentary party systems and elections, each of which will be analyzed one by one as a dependent variable (see list in Table 36).

Table 36: List of Party Preference Variables

Variable name	*Variable label*
N2_PARTY	Norway: Parliamentary party preference
D2_PARTY	Denmark: Parliamentary party preference
S2_PARTY	Sweden: Parliamentary party preference
F2_PARTY	Finland: Parliamentary party preference
I2_PARTY	Iceland: Parliamentary party preference
LSOC_dummy	Nordic Left-Socialist Party preference dummy
SOCDEM_dummy	Nordic Social Democratic Party preference dummy
CONS_dummy	Nordic Conservative Party preference dummy
LIBER_dummy	Nordic Liberal Party preference dummy
AGRAR_dummy	Nordic Agrarian Party preference dummy
CHRIST_dummy	Nordic Christian Party preference dummy
PROGR_dummy	Nordic Progress Party preference dummy
GREEN_dummy	Nordic Green Party preference dummy
TOTPARTY	Nordic Party Family preference (without don't know)
Don't know_dummy	Nordic No vote or don't know what to vote dummy

Second, it is possible to see parties as representatives of political ideologies. To analyze this conceptualization of party preference, I look at support for ideologically similar party families across the Nordic countries one by one. In addition, there is also one variable that contains all party families across all five countries. Finally, there is a dummy variable representing those who do not know what to vote for or those who state that they would not vote. [284]

Now that we have created the labels for cultural bias combinations and we know a little bit about the dependent variable, party preference, we can start to search for the best cut-off points for the cultural biases.

Empirical Exploration in Search of Cut-off Points

Cut-off points are one of the several aspects of operationalization that need to be discussed and decided upon before cultural bias combinations can be used in a reliable way. The first stage is to assign cut-off points that allow us to convert

[284] See Table 75: National Parties by Nordic Party Family on page 533. These ideological party families are taken from Grendstad (2003b).

values into labels. In other words, how strong does support have to be before it qualifies as support?

Since selecting cut-off points has not been explicitly treated in cultural theory literature before, here I will provide a thorough treatment of this topic. Since I later on want to use the cultural bias combinations to evaluate some theoretical questions, the cut-off points should not favor any particular assumption. I will first look for cut-off points for dividing the cultural bias scales into two, and then into three levels.

Dividing Respondents and Cultural Bias Scales into Two

For future analyses, it will be important to try to find out which cut-off point gives the most useful proportions of respondents. This can be done by studying the average improvement in our predictions of the respondents' party preferences.

In Figure 24, we can see how using percentiles as a 'rule' for dividing respondents into two categories on a given cultural bias produces a predictable number of people within each category. First, we order respondents according to their value on a cultural bias scale and then divide them into two groups. For example, a cut-off point of 50 will divide respondents into 50 percent that support and 50 percent that reject a given cultural bias within each country. Similarly, a cut-off point of 60 will classify 60 percent of the respondents as rejecting and 40 percent as supporting a particular bias. The actual value of the cultural bias that is used to divide respondents is calculated on a country-by-country basis.

Figure 24: One Cut-off Point Divides Respondents into Two



At this stage, there will be no difference between the support and binary levels because they both share the same cut-off points and they will be treated together.

The tables and figures apply also to support even if some of the labels only refer to binary.

So which one of the above cut-off points works best? To find the answer, I decided to try them all out. I tried 9 cut-off points on 4 cultural biases and made cross tables containing 15 dependent variables (5 national parliaments and 10 ideological party family variables), [285] which yields 540 contingency tables in total. Instead of printing them all out, I decided to just present their mean uncertainty coefficients, as pictured in Figure 25, below. [286]

Although the uncertainty coefficient (U) is not a widely known measurement, I have decided to use it as the measurement of association because among the nominal level measures of association, U is the only one that can be interpreted as the proportion of reduction in variance of the dependent variable when we know the value of the independent variable. In other words, the interpretation of U is similar to the interpretation of R^2 in regressions (Colignatus 2007; Garson 2008).

In Figure 25 below, we can see how the explanatory power of each cultural bias item depends on the cut-off point used. The figure contains two different sets of dependent variables. In the left column, the dependent variables are dummy variables for Nordic ideological party families. In the column on the right, the dependent variables are National parliamentary party preferences. A few main traits are worth noticing. First, when used alone rather than in a combination, the explanatory power of each binary cultural bias is low. In this case, we increase our ability to understand respondents' party preference by only a few percentage points. Second, cut-off points at 30 or 40 seem to work best for all of the binary cultural biases. However, I do not intend to use the biases one by one, but in combinations. Choosing a cut-off point can be made after we have seen how combinations of these binary cut-off points perform.

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[285] I have excluded the Don't Know dummy.

[286] Uncertainty coefficient is also know as Theil's U and as an entropy coefficient (*Uncertainty Coefficient* 2011).

Figure 25: The Explanatory Power of a Single CB by Cut-off Point. NOS99. (U)



In Figure 26 below, we can see a summary of 2245 cross tables that explore the relationship between cultural bias combinations, cut-off points, and the ordering principle used. The dotted lines show the strongest U that is present in a set of contingency tables, and solid lines show the average U for these contingency tables. The figures in the column on the left have preferences for Nordic ideological party families as the dependent variables. The figures in the column on the right have the national parliamentary party preferences as the dependent variable. On the upper row, the order of the cultural bias labels is fixed, while on the bottom row the cultural bias labels are ordered by their strength of preference. I will later return to this issue of label ordering. For now, the only task is to select a cut-off point that works for both of these approaches.

Figure 26: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias Combinations, by one Cut-off Point and Ordering Principle. NOS99. (Maximum and Mean U)



We can see in Figure 26 above that when the labels are in a fixed order, the cut-off points can be placed almost anywhere without destroying the analysis. The stability of the mean across all cut-off points is remarkable. The best explanation for national party preferences as a dependent variable is reached when the cut-off point is between 20 and 80.

When we order or rank the labels according to the strength of preferences, we find that the strength of the relationship between cultural bias classifications and party preferences is more dependent on cut-off points. We can see that the best mean results can be found from cut-off point 40 to cut-off point 70. For future analyses, I will be using the cut-off point 50 for the binary labeling, as these seems to perform well across all dependent variables and ordering principles.

In addition, we can see that the maximum values are quite sensitive for the cut-off point choice. However, these maximum values refer to just one contingency table among many and should not be used for selecting a cut-off point for general use.

Moreover, some of the high maximum values are probably a sign of trouble, which I will come back to later.

Dividing Respondents and Cultural Bias Scales into Three

I will repeat the previous analysis in order to find the best cut-off points for dividing respondents into three categories on each cultural bias. Each of the three cultural bias levels can be labeled in one of two ways—the trichotomous version and the neutral version. They both use the same two cut-off points because they differ only by how the middle category is labeled. Therefore, they are treated together here.

In Figure 27, we can see how our choice of cut-off points will divide the respondents into three different categories of varying sizes.

Figure 27: Two Cut-off Points Divide Respondents into Three



In order to evaluate the cut-off points, we need to see how the combinations of cultural biases perform. In Figure 28 below, we can see a summary of the explanatory power of cultural bias combinations when using two cut-off points from 1049 tables. The solid line shows the mean of the uncertainty coefficients for a given set, and the dashed line shows the maximum value.

We can again see how the analysis is less dependent on the our cut-off point choice when ordering the labels in a fixed manner. From cut-off points 15 and 85 to 45 and 55, there are only small differences in the mean performance, even if the highest single values can be found at cut-off points 30 and 70. Ordering by strength of preference (ranking) makes the analysis more dependent on the cut-off point choice, but it also gives us better overall results.

Figure 28: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias Combinations, by Two Cut-off Points and Ordering Principle. NOS99. (Maximum and Mean U)



If I would use only national party preference as the dependent variable, perhaps 45 and 65 would be the best choice. However, since I am attempting to find a good balance between both political preference types, it looks like 35 and 65 is a better choice. In all four sections of Figure 28, this cut-off point performs in an acceptable manner. It would not be the obvious choice for any of these cells alone, but it seems to work well enough for any combination of the assumptions used. Using a cut-off point that would clearly favor one assumption would make our discussion of the different assumptions' strengths useless.

In Figure 29 below, we can see how the number of cultural biases used in the labels has a huge impact on the mean strength of the uncertainty coefficient. Nevertheless, as we can see in the solid line, the strength of relationship is quite robust across different cut-off points when using only one cultural bias in the label. Perhaps this is the reason why cut-off points have not been given explicit treatment in previous research. However, as the number of cultural biases in the label increases, the effect of the cut-off point increases, especially if we order the biases used in the label according to strength. The suggested 35 and 65 cut-off point seems to perform well under all assumption combinations presented in Figure 29, which makes it look like a prudent choice.

Figure 29: The Explanatory power of Cultural Bias Combinations, by Two Cut-off points, Number of Biases, and Ordering. NOS99. (U)



I have included here only those cut-off points that were organized in a symmetrical manner around the middle point of 50 because they are easy to present in a graph. Nevertheless, I also ran the same analyses with non-symmetrical cut-off points like 10 and 30, 10 and 40, 10 and 50, and so forth. These non-symmetrical cut-off points behave in a similar manner and the symmetrical 35 and 65 cut-off point is the best overall choice.

To sum up, we have empirically explored what kind of consequences using different cut-off points will have given different sets of assumption combinations used to measure the relationship between cultural bias and party preference. Thousands of contingency tables have been compared, and summaries of these have been presented in several figures above (Figure 26 through Figure 29).

Two different sets of cut-off points have been selected. First, cut-off point 50 will divide the respondents into two equally large groups according to their view of one cultural bias, where half of them support and the other half reject this way of life. These views were consistent across all combinations of assumptions. Second, cut-off points 35 and 65 divide the population into three groups according to their cultural biases and performed well across all combinations of assumptions. They create a distribution where the lowest 35 percent in each country reject a bias, the middle 30 percent are indifferent, and the highest 35 percent accept a bias. A complete listing of the empirical cut-off points used for each of the cultural biases in each of the five countries can be found in the appendix on page 533. For the rest of this thesis, I will use cut-off points 50 for the support and binary versions and cut-off points 35 and 65 for the trichotomous and neutral versions.

We have also seen some extremely high values in the uncertainty coefficient for cultural combinations that divided respondents into a high number of categories. It is perhaps possible that some uncertainty coefficients are not comparable with each other.

Creating Comparability

One problem still needs to be solved. There is a risk that the uncertainty coefficients from different contingency tables are not mutually comparable because the U is also related to the number of cultural bias categories: The higher the number of categories, the higher the U. In particular, there are no low U values when we divide respondents into hundreds of categories, where each one has its own label.

Is this a problem? A high U can be interpreted as a strong ability to explain party preference. It is a problem because, as we can see in Figure 30, there is a strong curvilinear relationship between the number of cultural bias categories and U. Thus, the winner of the assumptions race would always be those cultural bias combinations that divide people into a high number of categories. The effect of the number of categories will mask the other effects from cultural biases.

I have tried three different remedies to this problem. First, it is possible to remove all categories that have only a few people in them, which is my preferred remedy. Second, it is possible to estimate the effect of the number of categories used. This estimate then can be used to adjust the U. Third, it is possible to remove from the analysis those cultural bias variables that have, for example, less than 40 categories. I will present these remedies in detail in order to justify my choice.

Figure 30: The Curvilinear Relationship between U and Number of Categories. NOS99.



Require a Minimum Number of Respondents in each Category

The first remedy modifies the cultural combination variables by reducing the length of the tail.[287] I have decided to require at least 10 respondents in each category in each country. For the joint Nordic sample, which contains all 5000 respondents, I have required two limits: In addition to at least 10 respondents in a country, at least 40 respondents are required in each category at the Nordic level.[288] Respondents who have a less frequent cultural bias combination are labeled as missing a cultural bias combination. This reduces the number of categories and respondents available, which reduces the U and increases the comparability between the contingency tables.

In Table 37 below, we can see the number of categories the respondents fall into for each of the cultural bias variables after the limits have been applied. These categories are counted both country-by-country and for all five Nordic countries together. In addition, the table contains the number of respondents in these categories. Preference is given to variables that keep as many of the respondents as possible.

[287] The analyses in rest of this chapter are stored in the script nordic1999_all2_analyse_crosstabs_UC_8.sps. The datafile used is created with the script Nordic1999_neut_make_final_data.cmd.

[288] Because parliamentary party preference is the most imporant dependent variable, I prioritize reliability on the national level. For example, if there are 4 respondents with *He* in Finland, and more than 10 in every other Nordic Country, only these 4 responents in Finland would be classified as missing. The category of *He* would still be included because there are more than 40 respondents at the Nordic level.

Table 37: The Number of Cultural Bias Combinations and Respondents by Variable and Country. NOS99 Limited.

	Norway		*Sweden*		*Denmark*		*Finland*		*Iceland*		*Nordic*	
	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR
CoherentS1	5	997	5	1000	5	1015	4	1003	5	817	5	4832
CultFixSupp1	4	873	4	893	4	896	4	890	4	733	4	4285
CultFixSupp2	10	879	10	896	10	899	10	896	10	740	10	4310
CultFixSupp3	14	880	14	896	14	899	14	898	14	740	14	4313
CultFixSupp4	15	880	15	896	15	899	15	898	15	740	15	4313
CultRankSupp1	4	873	4	893	4	896	4	890	4	733	4	4285
CultRankSupp2	16	867	16	889	16	889	16	885	16	724	16	4254
CultRankSupp3	31	788	32	820	30	812	31	807	31	650	29	3643
CultRankSupp4	25	648	26	696	28	719	27	690	22	520	23	3018
CultFixBinA1	8	995	8	999	8	1013	8	1003	8	813	8	4823
CultFixBinA2	24	993	24	999	24	1011	24	1001	24	812	24	4816
CultFixBinA3	31	980	31	984	32	1004	31	989	32	809	32	4766
CultFixBinA4	16	967	16	949	16	984	16	976	16	796	16	4672
CultRankBinA1	8	995	8	999	8	1013	8	1003	8	813	8	4823
CultRankBinA2	37	908	40	938	42	962	43	964	39	739	41	4382
~~CultRankBinA3~~	~~21~~	~~292~~	~~17~~	~~232~~	~~21~~	~~299~~	~~17~~	~~226~~	~~7~~	~~88~~	~~10~~	~~632~~
~~CultRankBinA4~~	~~2~~	~~24~~	~~3~~	~~37~~	~~5~~	~~61~~	~~4~~	~~44~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~-~~
CultFixTriA1	9	995	9	999	9	1013	9	1003	8	804	9	4814
CultFixTriA2	30	953	27	936	28	947	30	963	27	758	27	4444
CultFixTriA3	32	686	34	711	35	723	36	714	30	504	29	2881
CultFixTriA4	39	686	32	600	38	698	41	687	~~26~~	~~407~~	27	2310
CultRankTriA1	9	995	9	999	9	1013	9	1003	8	804	9	4814
CultRankTriA2	40	864	41	874	44	911	46	912	39	671	43	3923
~~CultRankTriA3~~	~~15~~	~~205~~	~~16~~	~~207~~	~~18~~	~~239~~	~~13~~	~~166~~	~~6~~	~~68~~	~~8~~	~~446~~
~~CultRankTriA4~~	~~7~~	~~94~~	~~9~~	~~118~~	~~9~~	~~120~~	~~8~~	~~106~~	~~4~~	~~45~~	~~5~~	~~276~~
CultRankTriA1_3	18	997	15	1000	22	1015	14	1003	6	817	6	4832
CultFixNeutA1	8	973	8	981	8	995	8	980	8	804	8	4733
CultFixNeutA2	24	872	24	886	24	888	26	905	24	718	24	4246
CultFixNeutA3	23	566	27	604	27	617	27	600	~~27~~	~~462~~	24	2574
CultFixNeutA4	39	686	32	600	38	698	41	687	~~26~~	~~407~~	27	2310
CultRankNeutA1	8	973	8	981	8	995	8	980	8	804	8	4733
CultRankNeutA2	33	758	35	786	37	805	40	823	35	618	36	3502
~~CultRankNeutA3~~	~~7~~	~~96~~	~~7~~	~~86~~	~~10~~	~~131~~	~~3~~	~~38~~	~~-~~	~~-~~	~~2~~	~~109~~

NC is the number of valid categories, i.e. categories where the number of respondents is above the limit (c10 and n40). NR is the number of the respondents in these categories. Variables with too few cases after the limit are marked with a strikethrough (n < 500 in a country or <2000 at Nordic level).

Those variables that had a small number of categories have not been affected by this, while variables that had a large number of categories have lost both categories and respondents. We can see an example of successful transformation near the middle of Table 37: *CultRankTriA2* divided respondents into 57 cultural combinations before the limit (see Table 77 in the appendix). However, only 40 categories remain after the limit was imposed. There has been a decline in the number of respondents, but the size of this decline is acceptable. The benefit of this transformation is that when we make the tables, we have enough respondents in every column.

These transformations did not work well for five variables, as it removed too many categories and respondents. For example, *CultRankTriA4* had respondents evenly distributed in close to 400 categories. Unfortunately, in each of the countries, there were only a few categories containing more than 10 people. Common for these five variables is that they originally divided respondents into more than 200 categories, which is quite impractical. Therefore, the loss of these variables is not a big concern.

I will now justify this choice by presenting the two rejected remedies.

Adjust According to the Effect from the Number of Categories Used

The second remedy, which adjusts according to an estimate of the effect from the number of categories used, is possible but not preferable. In Figure 30 above, we can see the strong curvilinear relationship between U and the number of CB categories. In particular, if the variables with a high number of categories are included, a curvilinear regression can explain most of the variation in U.

It looks like cultural bias combinations that balance the different concerns have less than 50 and more than 10 categories, which matches the number of categories for many of the limited versions of cultural bias variables in Table 77 below. When variables have hundreds of categories, many categories have only one respondent; in these categories, the cultural bias gives a perfect explanation for party preference, which obviously increases the U. However, this is a statistical artifact and should be regarded as a problematic feature. In addition, and as expected, when the number of categories is smaller than the number of parties, the explanatory power of cultural bias combinations is very low.

In theory, it is possible to use the coefficients from the regression analysis to remove the curvilinear effect (for the coefficients, see Table 81 in the appendix).[289] However, even if the theoretical comparability would increase, most of the contingency tables have a small n, where this estimate is less accurate. In those contingency tables with hundreds of categories, where the estimate is more accurate, we do not have samples large enough for sufficiently populating the table. This could have been a decent remedy if my goal was only to compare the assumptions. However, I am also looking for a cultural bias combination with a capacity that is sufficient enough to explain party preference. Instead, this remedy removes our ability to distinguish between the good and poor explanatory variables.

[289] If the relation between two variables moves from full independence to full dependence, the U will describe this linear relation as a curve. When compared with other measures of association, like Pearson's r, the U resembles R^2 more than r (Olszak and Ritschard 1995). However, the curve we see in Figure 30 is the opposite curve, so this is a different phenomena.

Therefore, I prefer the first remedy: to limit the number of categories to those with enough respondents.

Remove Variables with a High Number of Categories

The third remedy—i.e. to remove variables where the number of categories is too high (for example, more than 50 categories)—is not preferable since it removes many theoretically interesting variables. Just because a variable is impractical in a contingency table does not imply that it is not of theoretical importance. In Table 77 (on page 535), we can see that we would loose all ranked variables with 3 or 4 cultural biases in the label.

I believe that the comparison of the assumptions concerning the individual-culture relationship takes one-step forward when removing the long tails from the cultural bias combinations. Using the first remedy will create contingency tables that are more comparable in terms of the strength of the relationship (as the curvilinear effect from the number of categories is smaller when the range becomes limited). In addition, we do not loose theoretically interesting variables, which helps us to answer the questions posed. For the rest of this chapter, all results refer to limited data where cultural combinations are required to have at least 10 respondents in each country or 40 at the Nordic level.

Now that we have established the cut-off points and have created some comparability, we can move on to answer the next question, namely to what extent can cultural biases explain of party preferences?

How Much Can Cultural Biases Explain?

In Table 38 below, we can see the ability of the different variables to explain national party preferences, as measured by the uncertainty coefficient that shows the proportion of explained variance from 366 contingency tables.[290] The dependent variables in this table are the five national party preference variables and the Nordic party families. In the upper part of the table, we can see the cultural bias combinations and their performances. In the middle part of the table, we can see the effects of each cultural bias (not combinations). In the lower part of the table, we can see the effects of three well-known background variables: education level, household income, and position on the left-right dimension. [291]

There are some variables that contain less than half of the respondents. These are marked with a strikethrough in Table 38 and Table 39. One should be very careful when using these variables. They might give valuable and interesting insights into

[290] These tables are available in full at http://eero.no/publ/How_Much_Can_UC_explain_Neut_Fin_tri3565_bin50_c10_n40.htm.

[291] Education levels are not available in the data from Sweden.

how cultural biases interact with each other, but they should not be used to generalize to the population directly.

As can be seen in Table 38 below, many of the cultural bias combinations explain more than the left-right dimension, which itself explains only 18 percent of the variation (these are in bold). [292] The best cultural bias combinations explain a quarter of the variation in people's party preferences, which is better than the left-right dimension. For example, CBAbsNeutFix4 explains 32 percent of party preference in Sweden. However, given that the left-right dimension is just one dimension, and the party systems are multi-dimensional, one should expect that a multi-dimensional measure like cultural bias combinations would do better. This is especially true since the left-right dimension is based on just one question, while the cultural bias combinations here are formed based on a 20-question battery.

From Table 38, one should also notice how low the explanatory power is for each one of the single cultural biases (from *Cultural bias binary—hierarchy* to *cultural bias neutral—fatalistic*). They explain from 1 to 7 percent of the party preference at the national level and from 1 percent to 3 percent at the Nordic level. When using cultural biases in a one-by-one fashion, as was previously common to do, this is what we would end up believing that the effect of cultural biases on party preferences looks like.

What about ideological party families? In Table 39, we can see how cultural bias combinations explain ideological party family preference at the Nordic level. Parties having a similar ideology belong to the same party family.[293]

We can see that there are large differences between the different variables. For example, we can see that the poorest cultural bias combination, *coherent* cultural bias, explains only 1 percent of the variation in preferences for progress parties. At the same time, the left-right dimension explains 7 percent. The best cultural bias combination variables, *CBAbsFixTri4* and *CBAbsFixNeut4*, explain 14 percent of the preferences for the progress parties.

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[292] U multiplied with 100 gives explained variance in percentage terms.
[293] This classification is presented in Table 75 in the appendix.

Table 38: Cultural Bias Combinations Predict Party Preference, by Country. NOS99 limited. (U)

CultCombLabel	*N*	*S*	*D*	*F*	*I*	*Nordic*
Coherent - Strongest Support 1	.05	.07	.07	.05	.04	.04
CB Support Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.05	.07	.07	.05	.04	.04
CB Support Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	.09	.11	.11	.08	.07	.05
CB Support Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	.11	.12	.12	.11	.08	.06
CB Support Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	.11	.13	.13	.11	.09	.06
CB Support Ranked - top 1	.05	.07	.07	.05	.04	.04
CB Support Ranked - top 2	.12	.14	.14	.10	.10	.06
CB Support Ranked - top 3	.18	**.22**	**.20**	.18	.15	**.08**
CB Support Ranked - top 4	.18	**.23**	**.19**	.18	.13	**.09**
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.08	.07	.08	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	.13	.17	.15	.13	.12	.07
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	.16	**.20**	.18	.18	.14	**.08**
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	.11	.13	.13	.11	.09	.06
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 1 bias	.08	.07	.08	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 2 bias	**.19**	**.25**	**.22**	**.20**	**.19**	**.08**
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 3 bias	**~~.29~~**	**~~.38~~**	**~~.34~~**	**~~.34~~**	~~.08~~	**~~.16~~**
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 4 bias	~~.~~	~~.~~	~~.~~	**~~.19~~**	~~.01~~	**~~.15~~**
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.08	.08	.09	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	.15	**.21**	.17	.16	.14	**.07**
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.22**	**.29**	**.26**	**.25**	.17	**.11**
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	**.27**	**.32**	**.28**	**.27**	**.19**	**.12**
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 1 bias	.08	.08	.09	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias	**.21**	**.28**	**.23**	**.23**	**.21**	**.09**
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 3 bias	**~~.28~~**	**~~.38~~**	**~~.33~~**	**~~.35~~**	~~.06~~	**~~.12~~**
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 4 bias	**~~.26~~**	**~~.36~~**	**~~.28~~**	**~~.33~~**	~~.03~~	**~~.09~~**
CB Abs Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order	.11	.11	.10	.10	.07	.05
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.08	.07	.08	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	.14	**.20**	.16	.14	.12	**.07**
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.21**	**.27**	**.25**	**.24**	.13	**.11**
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	**.27**	**.32**	**.28**	**.27**	**.19**	**.12**
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 1 bias	.08	.07	.08	.06	.08	.05
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 2 bias	**.20**	**.27**	**.23**	**.22**	**.19**	**.09**
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 3 bias	**~~.31~~**	**~~.42~~**	**~~.37~~**	**~~.34~~**	~~.03~~	**~~.17~~**
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 4 bias	~~.~~	~~.~~	~~.~~	~~.~~	~~.~~	~~.~~
Cultural Bias Support - Hierarchical	.02	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Cultural Bias Support - Egalitarian	.02	.05	.04	.03	.02	.02
Cultural Bias Support - Individualistic	.04	.03	.04	.02	.02	.02
Cultural Bias Support - Fatalistic	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01
Cultural Bias Binary - Hierarchy	.02	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Cultural Bias Binary - Egalitarian	.02	.05	.04	.03	.02	.02
Cultural Bias Binary - Individualistic	.04	.03	.04	.02	.02	.02
Cultural Bias Binary - Fatalistic	.01	.00	.01	.01	.01	.01
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Hierarchy	.03	.02	.03	.02	.02	.01
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Egalitarian	.03	.07	.06	.04	.03	.03
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Individualistic	.04	.04	.04	.03	.02	.03
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Fatalistic	.02	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Cultural Bias Neutral - Hierarchy	.03	.02	.03	.02	.02	.01
Cultural Bias Neutral - Egalitarian	.03	.07	.06	.04	.03	.03
Cultural Bias Neutral - Individualistic	.04	.04	.04	.03	.02	.03
Cultural Bias Neutral - Fatalistic	.02	.01	.02	.02	.01	.01
Educational level in 3 categories. N, D, F, I	.02	.02	.01	.05	.01	.02
Household income	.02	.02	.02	.03	.02	.01
Left-Right position	.17	**.24**	.13	**.20**	**.19**	**.14**

Variables with a small N are marked with strikethrough. These are not significant at the 0.05 level. National U ≥ 0.18 and Nordic U≥ 0.07 are in bold

Table 39: Cultural Bias Combinations Predict Ideological Party Preference. NOS99 limited. (U)

	Left-Soc.	*Soc.Dem.*	*Liberal*	*Agrarian*	*Christian*	*Conserv.*	*Progress.*	*Green*	*N*
Coherent - Strongest Support 1	.07	.02	.01	.01	.02	.08	.01	.06	4832
CB Support Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.07	.02	.01	.01	.03	.07	.02	.06	4285
CB Support Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.02	.02	.01	.02	.09	.04	.06	4310
CB Support Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.04	.03	.02	.03	**.10**	.05	.06	4313
CB Support Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.03	.03	.02	.03	**.10**	.05	.06	4313
CB Support Ranked - top 1	.07	.02	.01	.01	.03	.07	.02	.06	4285
CB Support Ranked - top 2	**.11**	.03	.03	.02	.04	.09	.04	.08	4254
CB Support Ranked - top 3	**.12**	.04	.05	.02	.07	**.11**	.07	**.10**	3643
CB Support Ranked - top 4	**.12**	.04	.04	.02	.07	**.12**	.07	**.10**	3018
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.03	.05	4823
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.03	.04	.01	.03	**.10**	.05	.09	4816
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.11**	.04	.05	.03	.05	**.12**	.07	**.10**	4766
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	.09	.03	.03	.02	.03	**.10**	.05	.05	4672
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 1 bias	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.03	.05	4823
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 2 bias	**.12**	.05	.07	.02	.05	**.12**	.08	**.11**	4382
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 3 bias	.	~~.07~~	**~~.13~~**	~~.03~~	**~~.12~~**	**~~.26~~**	~~.08~~	**~~.13~~**	632
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.04	.06	4814
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.04	.04	.02	.04	**.11**	.06	.09	4444
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.14**	.05	.07	.03	.06	**.17**	**.11**	**.11**	2881
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	**.15**	.07	.08	.04	.09	**.18**	**.14**	**.12**	2310
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 1 bias	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.04	.06	4814
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias	**.14**	.05	.06	.03	.06	**.13**	.09	**.11**	3923
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 3 bias	~~.06~~	~~.03~~	**~~.10~~**	~~.02~~	~~.08~~	~~.07~~	~~.08~~	**~~.10~~**	446
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 4 bias	.	~~.04~~	**~~.12~~**	~~.02~~	~~.05~~	~~.06~~	~~.03~~	~~.05~~	276
CB Abs Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order	.05	.01	.00	.01	.02	.03	.00	.01	4832
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.03	.06	4733
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order	**.10**	.04	.04	.02	.03	**.12**	.06	.09	4246
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order	**.14**	.05	.07	.03	.06	**.19**	**.11**	**.12**	2574
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order	**.15**	.07	.08	.04	.09	**.18**	**.14**	**.12**	2310
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 1 bias	.07	.02	.03	.01	.02	.08	.03	.06	4733
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 2 bias	**.14**	.05	.06	.03	.05	**.14**	**.10**	**.11**	3502
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 3 bias	~~.00~~	~~.02~~	~~.00~~	~~.01~~	**~~.14~~**	~~.01~~	~~.00~~	~~.~~	109
Cultural Bias Support - Hierarchical	.02	.00	.02	.01	.01	.00	.01	.03	4781
Cultural Bias Support - Egalitarian	.04	.02	.00	.00	.00	.06	.00	.01	4770
Cultural Bias Support - Individualistic	.03	.01	.00	.00	.00	.03	.02	.03	4832
Cultural Bias Support - Fatalistic	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.03	.00	4832
Cultural Bias Binary - Hierarchy	.02	.00	.02	.01	.01	.00	.01	.03	4781
Cultural Bias Binary - Egalitarian	.04	.02	.00	.00	.00	.06	.00	.01	4770
Cultural Bias Binary - Individualistic	.03	.01	.00	.00	.00	.03	.02	.03	4832
Cultural Bias Binary - Fatalistic	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.03	.00	4832
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Hierarchy	.02	.00	.03	.01	.01	.00	.02	.03	4781
Cultural Bias Trichotomous -	.05	.02	.01	.00	.01	.08	.00	.02	4770
Cultural Bias Trichotomous -	.05	.01	.01	.00	.01	.04	.02	.03	4832
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Fatalistic	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.04	.00	4832
Cultural Bias Neutral - Hierarchy	.02	.00	.03	.01	.01	.00	.02	.03	4781
Cultural Bias Neutral - Egalitarian	.05	.02	.01	.00	.01	.08	.00	.02	4770
Cultural Bias Neutral - Individualistic	.05	.01	.01	.00	.01	.04	.02	.03	4832
Cultural Bias Neutral - Fatalistic	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.04	.00	4832
Educational level in 3 - N, D, F, I	.01	.01	.03	.03	.03	.01	.05	.02	4757
Household income	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	.03	.01	.01	3971
Left-Right position	**.20**	**.13**	.06	.04	.03	**.24**	.07	**.10**	4229

Variables with a small N are marked with a strikethrough. These are not significant at the 0.05 level.
U ≥ 0.1 are in bold

We can see that the ability of cultural bias combinations to explain Nordic ideological party family preferences is weaker than their ability to explain national party preferences, which is not surprising given that the ideological party families are dummy variables. Nevertheless, some of the cultural bias combinations perform better than the background variables. We can also see that there are some parties, like the agrarian ones, where cultural bias combinations explain very little of respondents' party preferences.

All in all, we can see in Table 39 that the left-right dimension gives a better explanation for the preferences for left-socialist parties, conservative parties, and social democratic parties. These are parties firmly rooted on the left-right dimension. However, some of the cultural bias variables give better explanations for support for the Christian parties, the green parties, the liberal parties, and the progress parties. The left-right dimension and cultural bias variables are equally capable of explaining support for the agrarian parties.

By comparing Table 38 and Table 39, it is possible to see that cultural bias combinations predict ideological party family preferences far better than the single cultural biases do. It is perhaps easier to recognize the patterns if we look at Figure 31, where each line displays the mean uncertainty coefficient. Figure 31 is drawn based on data from Table 38 and Table 39, but excludes those associations that are not significant at the 0.05 level or ones based on too few respondents. In the left-hand column, we can see the results for Nordic ideological party families as the dependent variable, and in the right-hand column, we can see the results for National parlamentary parties as the dependent variable.[294]

There are separate lines showing combinations based on support, binary, trichotomous, or neutral labeling systems. The top row shows the results for fixed bias ordering, and the bottom row shows the results for when the biases are ranked according to their strength. Finally, the x-axis distinguishes between how many biases are included in the label.

We can see that there are many interesting patterns that might be able to teach us something about the individual-culture relationship and let us answer the remaining questions asked in the beginning of this chapter: Does rejection matter; does indifference make any difference; and how many cultural biases do we need? I will come back to Figure 31 when I answer these questions.

[294] The right-hand column shows the numbers from Table 39, and the left-hand column from Table 38.

Figure 31: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias Combinations controlled for by Levels, Ordering Principle, and Number of Biases used. NOS99 limited.



Is Support Sufficient or does Rejection Matter?

The fourth question, does rejection matter, is intended to allow us to choose between different ways of operationalizing cultural bias combinations.[295] In order to find out what kind of effects support and rejection have, we can look at the average performance of cultural combinations in Figure 31 above. In other words, we are asking if the only continuous line (denoting support) is different from the three other lines.

[295] Earlier, I addressed the role of rejection of a cultural bias at the individual level. My previous research indicates that the rejection of cultural bias does influence individuals' party preferences. However, this research was based on two different Norwegian surveys from 1993 and 1995, using a short 8 or 10 question version of the cultural bias questions (Olli 1995, 1996, 1999). The present survey contains twice as many questions on cultural biases, which results in much more reliable scales and contains respondents from five different countries with five times as many respondents, which should lead to more reliable answers than my previous efforts. In any case, confirming this pattern in four new countries and in a new survey in Norway will add weight to my belief that this is a general trait of how cultural biases function at the individual level.

We need to place all variables relying on the support only version of cultural biases into the *support* category. Those variables that rely on binary, trichotomous, or neutral versions of cultural biases are placed into the category called *absolute value*,[296] which shows that they do actively use information concerning the rejection of a cultural bias. If rejection does not have a role, then support should perform best. If rejection does have a role, then it should have an uncertainty coefficient that is equal to or higher than what is found for support. We can test this by comparing means. Just to complicate things a bit, we should also consider the difference between predicting support for parties at the national level and support for ideologies at the Nordic level.

The small circles in Figure 32 below show the mean ability to predict preferences for parties. The error bars show the size of the 95 percent confidence interval around the mean. If confidence intervals overlap, we can conclude that the means do not differ from each other. If we compare within Nordic ideological party families, we can see that when cultural bias combinations are selected according to support, the mean ability to predict party preference is 4 percent. When selecting according to absolute value, the mean is 6 percent. Since the error bars for the confidence intervals do not overlap, we know that this difference is statistically significant. In addition, if we compare within the national parliamentary parties, we can see that the mean increases from 9 to 16 percent when we go from using support only to using rejection (absolute value), which is also a statistically significant increase (See Table 78 in the appendix).

We are thus increasing our ability to predict preferences for Nordic ideological party families, and for national parliamentary parties, we are almost doubling the performance of cultural bias combinations if we include rejection into our analyses.[297]

We should also remember the discussion concerning the tendency for yes-saying among respondents, or acquiescence (starting on page 326), which increases with age and is reduced by education. The cultural bias questions are vulnerable to acquiescence because there are no reversed questions. We have performed a test above which shows that rejection is important, despite the fact that the effects of acquiescence work in the other direction. The presence of the acquiescence effect increases my belief in the importance of accounting for rejection. We have now shown that rejection does make a difference, particularly if we are predicting national party preferences. Therefore, whenever possible in this thesis, I will rely on labels that employ rejection (absolute value).

[296] These variables are marked with D in Table 35.

[297] I have also checked this for other ways to operationalize cultural bias combinations. One of these, the S3 coding, which allows for degrees of support, is included in the appendix on page 551. In this version, rejection and support explain national party preferences equally well. However, there are large differences for some particular combinations.

Figure 32: Confidence Intervals for Explanatory Power by Support and Absolute Values and Dependent Variable. NOS99 limited. (Mean U).



This does not mean that one should never use a cultural bias version that is based on support only, but rather that the rejection of cultural bias is a phenomenon at the individual level that should be accounted for in the theory. The main goal here is to choose an operationalization rather than resolve a theoretical dilemma. The latter will have to wait until Chapter 13, where I discuss what rejection is in more detail by using tests that are more specific and targeted than the ones presented here. Now I will discuss the fifth question asked in this chapter, does indifference make any difference?

Does Indifference Make Any Difference?

Is there a difference between the results from trichotomous and neutral versions of cultural bias? Do we only use the extremes of the scale, like rejection and support, or do we rely on indifference too when we choose a party?

The differences between means of the ability of the various cultural bias combinations to explain preferences for parties can provide answers to these questions. In Figure 33 below, we can see how the means differ if we sort them according to the four different ways of labeling cultural biases (support, binary, trichotomous, and neutral). The small circles show the mean strength of association. We can see that the means for Nordic party ideology are practically the same. Trichotomous explains 7 percent of the ideological family preferences, while neutral version explains only 5 percent. Moreover, this difference is not statistically significant. Similarly, trichotomous explains 17 percent of national parliamentary party preferences, while the neutral version explains only 12 percent. This difference is statistically significant, as the confidence intervals do not overlap.

Figure 33: Confidence Intervals for Explanatory Power by Levels and Party Preference. NOS99 limited. (Mean U)



If we do the same analysis, without differentiating between ideological party family dummies and the National parliamentary party preferences, the neutral version explains significantly less of the party prefrences than the trichotomous version of cultural biases (See Table 79 in the appendix). Thus, including indifference reduces the ability to predict party preference.

We can thus conclude that including the neutral category does not add to the explanatory power of cultural bias combinations in general (the averages) when we explain preferences for ideological party families or national parties. People seem to use the ends of the cultural bias scale (rejection and support) more than the neutral. The trichotomous version performs better and is simpler than the neutral version. Therefore, I will use the trichotomous version of cultural bias combinations whenever possible.

How Many Cultural Biases are Needed?

The sixth and final question asks how many cultural biases are needed in order to predict preferences for particular parties? Knowing which kind of variables perform best can tell us something about the relationship between the individual and culture. However, since variables are the units of the following analysis, we should be careful by not claiming that this is how cultural biases function in people. An imprecise and general answer to a general question is worthwhile pursing during our wait for answers that are more precise.

This question can be reformulated as such: How does our ability to predict party preferences change when going from a label with one cultural bias to a label with two, three, or four cultural biases? The simple answer is "it depends".[298] In Figure 31 on page 384, we can see which assumptions together give the highest mean values on the U.

When predicting national party preferences, the best set of assumptions seems to be four biases in fixed order based on either trichotomous or neutral cultural bias versions, as can be seen in the top right-hand part of the figure. As shown in the lower right-hand quadrant, we also obtain respectable performance when ranking two biases based on the trichotomous or neutral versions, or when ranking three or four biases based on support only. The complexity of the label is increased when ranking labels, using the neutral category, and adding a fourth bias into the label. However, using all of them simultaneously gives too many categories for our purposes.

When predicting ideological party preferences, the best performance seems to be had when four biases are arranged in a fixed order and based on the trichotomous version. Interestingly, if we rank three or four biases, the support only cultural bias version does the best job.

These results suggest that sometimes three or four different cultural biases are needed in order to predict party preferences. However, the increased predictive ability comes with the cost of additional categories. Moreover, using the two cultural biases will be sufficient enough for many purposes.

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[298] By using unianova in SPSS, it is possible to estimate that the explanatory power of the cultural bias combinations rises by 2.8 percent every time we add one more cultural bias item into a combination when controling for the different principles established in this chapter. Nevertheless, I have not included this because it does not provide enough new information when compared with what we can learn from Figure 31. In some combinations, two biases are enough, and adding more biases will not help.

Summary

The main goal of this chapter was to create and select a way to operationalize the cultural bias combinations. Here, I will summarize the answers given to the six questions I asked at the beginning and try to draw a conclusion.

First, I illustrated how individual-level cultural bias combinations can be created in a systematic manner based on a set of principles. The biases used to describe an individual's cultural combination can be selected based on level of support or absolute deviation from the mean. There can be from one to four biases included in the label. Each bias can be divided into levels by support, binary, trichotomous, and neutral labeling system. Finally, the included biases are either ranked or in a fixed order.

Second, an analysis of thousands of cross tables found that when dividing the respondents into two categories, cultural bias combinations do a thorough job in explaining respondents' party preferences at cut-off point 50. Similarly, if we want to divide respondents into three categories according to their degree of support and rejection of particular cultural biases, cut-off points 35 and 65 perform well across different assumptions.

When the number of categories (labels used on individuals) becomes so high that only a few people are left in each category, we are faced with artificially strong explanations of variance. Therefore, as a remedy, I have applied a limit on the cultural combinations by requiring at least 10 respondents in each category in each country and at least 40 respondents in the full Nordic data file. This increases the comparability between the different sets of assumptions.

Third, the different sets of assumptions have varying abilities to explain party preferences. The single cultural biases explain very little (from 0 to 7 percent) of the variation in party preferences. The worst cultural combinations explain only 1 percent, while the best explain up to 32 percent. With such large differences between the ability of the different sets of assumptions to explain party preferences, the choice of assumptions becomes important.

Fourth, cultural combinations using information about support and rejection perform slightly better than combinations only using support. Therefore, we should utilize information about respondents' rejection of cultural bias whenever possible. However, sometimes the simplicity of the support variant makes it the best choice. This weakens the coherent and sequential individual approaches.

Fifth, accounting for indifference did not make any difference. The neutral version, which assigns labels for indifference toward a bias, did perform worse than the trichotomous version, which just ignores indifference. Therefore, we should use the simpler trichotomous version.

Sixth, people use several biases when they choose a party to support. Fixed four-bias combinations best explain party preferences; however, ranked two- bias combinations come close. Because two biases are simpler than three biases, and if using two biases is sufficient, it should be used whenever possible. Ranking the biases used does give a small advantage.

These results contradict the coherent individual approach in cultural theory, which claims that one supporting cultural bias is enough, and weakens credibility of the sequential individual approach, which claims that rejection is not needed. The synthetic individual view is strengthened, as it is the only one that fits well with all these findings.

Based on these answers, I believe that the most fruitful variables are the combination of the top two cultural biases ranked by absolute values, and the combination of all the neutral version of all four biases in fixed order, depending on the analytical needs.[299] In other words, we get the best predictions of party preferences if we assume that people use their two top-ranked biases divided into three levels or four cultural biases in a fixed order using the neutral values.

There are a few limitations in the analyses in this chapter. First, only one dependent variable, namely party preference, has been used, even if I have tried to remedy for this by using several versions of the variable. Generalizability is limited by the fact that that cultural biases do not necessarily relate to other phenomena in ways consistent with their relation to party preferences. Second, despite the wide approach adopted here, which explores multiple assumptions simultaneously, I have been forced to make some choices in an effort to make an analysis possible. There are alternative ways of creating sets of cultural bias combinations that, at least in theory, could give different answers. I have included one such set in the appendix on page 551. Third, this chapter uses a broad approach where many different combinations of cultural biases have been explored. Some of these seem to perform quite poorly, while others perform much better. In some sense, the poor combinations create noise in the analysis, and one should be careful and not assume that these results are valid for cultural theory in general. Nevertheless, I believe that these kinds of explorations are needed until we have firmly established the nature of the individual-culture relation.

In Chapter 13, I will return to the issue concerning rejection, but with a much more tailored and specific analysis, where much of the noise has been removed. However, I believe that the present analysis, despite its limitations, allows us to select the kind of cultural combinations that are worthwhile pursuing further. In the next chapter, I will try out two of these combinations and see how they explain party preferences. This will demonstrate that cultural combinations actually influence our political views, and that even if we are in fact labeling individuals, we still end up with labels that are multi-faceted, multilayered, and intricate enough to become useful.

[299] In other words, the variables labeled as *CB Abs Tri Ranked top 2 bias* and *CB Neut Fixed top 4 bias*.

Chapter 11

PARTY PREFERENCE AND CULTURAL BIAS COMBINATIONS

The results from the previous chapter need to be validated in more detail. Earlier in Chapter 10, entitled Combinations of Cultural Biases, we have seen a purely numerical analysis of the relation between cultural bias combinations and party preferences, but without any consideration of the contents and meanings of the different combinations. I believe that such quantitative analyses need to be supplemented by the use of cultural biases to explain a phenomenon. If the application does not make sense, then it is likely that there is something wrong. If the application makes sense, this increases my trust in the way I operationalize cultural biases. [300]

I am not attempting to challenge old explanations of party preferences, nor am I claiming that cultural biases are a better explanation. I will not delve deeply into any discussions about party preferences and political behaviors because my main purpose is to demonstrate that these variables can provide an explanation of political preferences that makes sense.

I will now turn away from the questions concerning the relation between individual and culture and focus on the practical use of cultural bias combinations in the prediction of party preferences. I will demonstrate the use of two very different operationalizations of cultural combinations. First, I will present ideological party families, which are used as the dependent variable in this chapter. Second, I will then use all four cultural biases in fixed order as *cultural space* to explore the Nordic political landscape. Third, I will move closer to the choice of a party and look how the *two top-ranked biases* are related to ideological party family preferences at the Nordic level.

Cultural Biases Shape Political Views

In political science there was once a belief that the electorate voted based on their political ideology. By the 1960's, however, a new understanding emerged which argued that voters are not so ideological (Converse 1964). This lack of political ideology has been described as a problem for democracy. Other explanations point

[300] All tables and figures in this chapter are created with the script Nordic party preference.sps.

out how people choose their representatives not out from ideology, but out from issues they care about, or out from a more general trust toward a party or representative (Hetherington 1998).

Describing cultural biases is one way to describe a worldview, which again can be interpreted as an understanding of how society works and a set of norms or values concerning the big questions in life. Political ideology is often defined as a description of a present state of affairs, a description of the future, and the means used to get there. An understanding of the present state of affairs and the path that leads to the future is closely related to an understanding of how society works, while values and norms from cultural biases can guide the choice of a preferred future. Thus, cultural biases and real life political ideologies are somehow related to each other.

Similarly, for rational choice models that study how voters make choices between parties in an ideological or issue space (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), it is possible to conceive of a cultural space defined by the cultural biases, where voters are likely to choose a party close to their own position. Moreover, parties would tailor their messages of how to organize, on whom to blame, and on which values to emphasize in efforts to comport with the cultural composition of their own supporters and to attract new supporters.

Studies of how voters make their choices have shown that we are not rational decision makers, nor is the electorate fully informed (See overviews in Niemi and Weisberg 1993c; Dalton and Klingemann 2007a; Zaller 1992). There has been much research on schemas, cognition, attitudes, and perceptions as shortcuts that we use when we are making voting decisions (Kuklinski 2001; Lau and Redlawsk 2006). These shortcuts can become institutionalized and studied as a political culture. Political culture has been widely used as an explanation in studies of democratization and modernization (Verba and Almond 1980; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1990; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993).

Cultural theory is a theory that can incorporate both shortcuts and schemas studied in social psychology and the institutionalization of core values. Our core values have a structure that is systematically related to an overall belief structure (Coughlin and Lockhart 1992, 1998). Cultural biases show great promise for unpacking the various social logics used in important political processes and institutions (Wildavsky 1987, 1988, 1989a; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 1992). In some sense, the social psychological studies of shortcuts and schemas are about how individuals think and understand the world, while cultural theory is a study of how these same shortcuts are patterned on the institutional level. People use their cultural preferences to make choices concerning issues like who to trust, how to organize the society, who is to blame for problems, how to interpret political messages during an electoral campaign, and, consequently, which party or representative to vote for. In other words, cultural theory has the potential to be an explanation that can be linked both further down and further up in the chain of norms and attitudes that influence our voting. Unfortunately, with the survey data available, it is not possible to test the mechanisms through which cultural biases influence our political choices. What can be done is to show the connection between cultural bias and political parties on the Nordic level.

Parties with similar ideological position have been labeled by their ideological position. I follow Grenstad in my classification of parties within party families (2003b).[301] The party families used are socialist left, social democratic, agrarian, liberal, Christian, conservative, progressive, green, and other. Those respondents who do know what to vote for or answer that they will not vote are excluded from the analysis. I have not accounted for detailed information concerning the issue positions of these parties. Instead, using preferences for ideological party families as a proxy for ideological positions is sufficient for my purposes in this piece.

In Table 40 below, we can see how popular the different party families are in each of the five Nordic countries, and clear differences are discernable between each of the countries. In Norway, the social democratic Labor Party and the Progress Party constitute the two largest parties. The Progress party is a populist party that is against migration, taxation, and government control, and in favour of government spending on care of the elderly, healthcare, and roads. Sweden and Iceland are dominated by conservative parties, while agrarian parties dominate in both Denmark and Finland. It is evident that by treating the Nordic party space as one single space, I am reducing the available variation and hiding some of the important differences between each country. However, by analyzing these five countries as one political space, even if they each have their own party system, the ideological characteristics of the cultural biases as they relate to the party families should become more rather than less visible. Unfortunately, if party families are weak and the sister parties within each family have only little in common, there will not be much systematic variation for the cultural bias combinations to explain. In addition, as was previously illustrated Table 38 and Table 39 cultural bias combinations explain national-level party preferences two to three times better than their ability to explain preferences for party families at the Nordic level. There is no doubt that a country-wise analysis would yield some very interesting findings. Nevertheless, in what follows, I will not do a complete analysis of each of the five countries because that would require too much space in this thesis.[302] In addition, if cultural theory makes sense where it is weak, it most likely will make sense on the national level too, where its ability to predict party preferences is much stronger.

[301] A listing of which party belongs to which party family is provided on page 533.

[302] These treatments would require a 2 to 3 page introduction to each country, a figure or table for each of the 40 parties, and a one page discussion per party. It is hard to see how this could be done in a systematic manner with less than 100 pages.

Table 40: Voter Preference for Party Family by Country. NOS99. (Percent within country)

	Socialist left	*Social democrat*	*Agrarian*	*Liberal*	*Christian*	*Conservative*	*Progress*	*Greens*	*Other*	*Total*
Norway	8.1	34.0	5.2	4.9	10.0	15.3	19.9		2.5	100.0
Sweden	12.2	29.7	4.5	5.6	12.2	29.0		6.1	0.7	100.0
Denmark	14.9	21.3	37.1	4.7	1.8	5.9	1.4	2.0	10.8	100.0
Finland	7.3	17.2	23.3	9.9	3.7	20.7		6.0	12.0	100.0
Iceland		26.8	14.3	1.1		49.9		5.4	2.6	100.0
Total	9.1	25.6	17.9	5.4	5.6	21.7	4.8	3.6	6.1	100.0
n = 3085										

Cultural Space

Cultural theory sometimes portrays society as a space where institutions compete for influence and supporters (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990: 1, 83-99). I believe my operationalization of cultural space is consistent with this view. If we look at the four biases simultaneously, we can describe the society as a four dimensional cultural space, where each dimension is divided into three values: rejection, indifference (the neutral position), and support.[303] A total of 4672 respondents have four valid cultural biases and can be located within this cultural space.[304] Even if we lose information concerning the relative strength of each bias, there are several advantages with this operationalization: It gives a new description to the political landscape, and almost all respondents can be included in the analysis.

There is no reason to expect an even distribution of individual biases within the cultural space. In Figure 34, we can see the distribution of respondents within the cultural space, and indeed, some combinations are more frequent than others. On the top row, we have respondents that reject hierarchy, and on the bottom row, we find respondents that support hierarchy. The columns vary according to support for fatalism: Supporters are found on the right-hand side, and those who reject fatalism are found on the left-hand side. The floor of each quadrant shows the relation to egalitarian and individualistic biases.

[303] Cultural space is almost identical with CultFixNeutA4. However, cultural space requires four valid cultural biases, while CultFixNeutA4 requires only two valid biases.

[304] The neutral position is labeled with consonants from the names of the biases: hie**r**archical (r), e**g**alitarian (g), in**d**ividualistic (d), and fa**t**alistic (t) cultural biases.

There is a clear pattern when we look at the combinations, despite the fact that each cultural bias has been divided into three in a manner that ensures equal proportions of people supporting and rejecting each bias in each country.

Figure 34: Cultural Space. NOS99. (Count of Valid Respondents)



The most frequent combination is support for all four biases, as seen in the lower-right quadrant. Another part of the cultural space that is more densely populated is the upper-left quadrant with rejection of hierarchy and fatalism, combined with either rejection of individualism or egalitarianism.

There are also several cultural combinations with less than 50 respondents in the Nordic countries. These rare cultural combinations are not likely to have much political influence, but they are included in order to avoid having holes in the figures.

This same layout of the cultural space will be used to present the respondents' preferences for particular party families.

Party Preferences in Cultural Space

I will present several figures like Figure 35. Each figure shows support for one of the parliamentary parties in the Nordic countries. Only those 3015 respondents who volunteered a party preference and have four valid cultural biases are included, thus the percentages are comparable to a popular vote, with the obvious reservations concerning generalizations from a sample to a population. Statistically significant increases in support for a party family is marked with a red top on the bar (looks dark gray in print). Statistically significant reductions in support for a party are marked with white.[305]

In Figure 35, we can see how there are several locations with strong support for the socialist left party family. The maximum level of support is in the upper-left quadrant, with support for egalitarianism and rejection of individualism, hierarchy, and fatalism. Within this quadrant, some 39 percent of the respondents prefer a socialist left party.[306]

It is also striking how respondents in the front corner (*Ei*) of the graphs within the upper and neutral rows support socialist left parties across all fatalistic bias values and across rejection and indifference to hierarchical bias. However, support for hierarchy seems to obstruct an increased support for the socialist left.

Some cultural combinations decrease the support for socialist left party family. These are marked with white. On the lower-left quadrant, we can see that rejection of egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases, together with support for hierarchy, reduces preferences of socialist left parties. Two of these are not visible: rejection of egalitarianism with support for individualism (in the back corner of floor of the figure), and rejection of hierarchical bias with either rejection or the neutral position of the fatalistic bias (the two upper-left quadrant) are hidden behind the high columns in the front.

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[305] To be precise, the adjusted standardized residuals that deviate more than ±1.96 from zero are marked, which corresponds with a 0.01 significance level.

[306] The numbers cannot be read from the figure. They are available in Table 82 on page 538.

Figure 35: Socialist Left Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



100 percent includes only respondents with party prererence.

In Figure 36, we can see how the increased support for green parties is located in the upper-left corner of the figure, making them a competitor of the socialist left and liberal parties. The strongest preference for green parties can be found where support for egalitarianism is combined with rejection of fatalism, individualism, and hierarchy. Here, 15 percent of the respondents say they would vote for a green party. It may not sound like much, but it is four times greater than the sample's 3.6 percent average support for a green party. If we loosen up the requirements for the neutral position on individualism or neutral position on fatalism, the support sinks to the 10 to 11 percent level.

There is a second location where the greens receive increased support: support for individualism combined with the neutral position on hierarchy and egalitarianism and rejection of fatalism. Thus, there seems to be two culturally different strains of green party support. A check reveals this second cultural position as important for the green party in Finland, but not in the other Scandinavian countries.

Nevertheless, in Finland, too, the greens receive their strongest support from the same pro-egalitarian population segment that is opposed to all other cultural biases.

Figure 36: Green Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



There are some similarities between the socialist left and green party families. They both seem to be popular among respondents with *hEif* biases. However, the green party family's cultural base seems to be much more narrow. Perhaps this can explain why the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party in Norway were able to block the Green Party's entrance to Norwegian politics. The existing parties managed to occupy the cultural space, and there was not enough space for the newcomer to maneuvering and capture voter support. It would be interesting to see how cultural space is related to the success or failure of other new parties.

Even if there are several cultural combinations where no one prefers the green party family, it is such a small party that the negative deviations are not statistically significant.

In Figure 37, we can see where the increased support for the social democratic party family is located in the cultural space.[307] The common cultural denominator for three of the locations is the combination of support for egalitarianism and indifference to individualism. This can then be combined with either support or indifference to hierarchy and any kind of fatalistic view. There are also two locations where increased preferences for the social democratic party family coincides with support for all three active cultures (hierarchy, egalitarianism, and individualism) combined with either support for or indifference to fatalism. The last increased preference is characterized by support for egalitarian and fatalistic biases, rejection of individualistic bias, and a neutral position regarding hierarchy. Thus, *Et* and *HEI* seem to capture the cultural biases of the social democratic party family. It is worth remembering that the corner *HEI* is where we also found the strongest population concentration in Figure 34.

Social democratic parties are known for their ideological history, although their growth in size and long periods rule have increased their pragmatism, and lately they have turned from fighting market forces to supporting the use of them for the common good. The *HEI* combination allows them to be pragmatic. A solution to a political problem can be based on any of the three active cultures, without becoming a cultural conflict. One must, however, ask how it is possible for an institution to be in favor of all three active cultural biases, which are supposedly always in conflict with each other (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990: 2). Perhaps social democratic parties should be studied as clumsy institutions. Clumsy institutions utilize procedures that allow for multiple voices and the presence of several cultural biases, thus avoiding some of the problems with the blind spots that each of the biases are hampered with (Verweij and Thompson 2006; Ney 2006; Thompson 2008: 15). It would be interesting to see if the concept of clumsy institutions could be used together with Kirscheimer's catch-all party thesis to study if there is a cultural logic involved in party growth (Kircheimer 1966; Randall 2003). Another possible avenue is to study parties as clumsy institutions in relation to Michels' theory of oligarchy (Larsen 2003). I suspect that dominant parties that have managed to stay more democratic and deliberative than others are relying on clumsy institutional solutions rather than allowing one cultural bias to dominate internally.

[307] It is not as good for showing lack of support as there are 5 significant points where the lack of support is invisible: *heIf, heIt, hgIf, redf,* and *rgIf* are hidden behind bars in the front of the figure.

Figure 37: Social Democratic Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



100 percent includes only respondents with party prererence.

Social democratic parties are often viewed as quite similar to the socialist left, but guided more by pragmatism and less by ideology. However, we can see that they are culturally quite far apart from each other. It is not just a difference in degree, as it would seem like if we only considered their position on the left-right dimension. Instead, it is a difference in world views that for some are incommensurable.

When turning our analysis to the agrarian party family, we can see that the most consistent cultural trait in Figure 38 is the lack of support for the agrarian party family if one rejects hierarchy and individualism, but supports egalitarianism (as seen in the top row). Moreover, its opposite is situated in the lower-right corner: Support for hierarchy, fatalism, and egalitarianism, together with rejection of individualism, increases support for the agrarian parties.

In the middle row, there are two locations with increased support: 1) indifference to hierarchy combined with support for individualism, indifference to egalitarianism and rejection of fatalism, or 2) support for fatalism, indifference to individualism, and rejection of egalitarianism. These two locations have only indifference to hierarchy in common.

The highest level of support is found in the *Hf* quadrant, but since this has fewer people when compared to some of the other quadrants, it is difficult to obtain significant effects here. *Hgif* shows 36 percent support for the agrarian party family.

Figure 38: Agrarian Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



100 percent includes only respondents with party prererence.

The agrarian party support comes from quite a variety of different cultural locations within the Nordic countries.[308] Consequently, there are few commonalities between the countries and only a few significant effects at Nordic level. The agrarian parties clearly belong to the same party family with respect to one issue—namely the urban-rural conflict dimension, but culturally they seem to differ a lot, which

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[308] Significant increases in support by country are N: *heit, rEiF, rEit.* S: *hEdF, HEiF, hEit, HgiF, HgIf.* D: *heIf, HeIf, hgIf, redF, reIf, rgIf.* F: *HEIf, rEIf.* I: *HEdF, HEit, Hgif, redF, rgif.*

should not come as a surprise given their various sizes and histories from one country to the next.

In slight contrast to support for the agrarian party family, we can see in Figure 39 below how support for the liberal party family is concentrated into a few cultural locations. Common for them is the rejection of hierarchy and rejection of individualism. The first pair is indifference to egalitarianism with rejection of or indifference to fatalism and the second pair is support for hierarchy with either rejection of or support for egalitarianism. In these locations, the liberal party support varies from 14 to 22 percent, while in the whole sample some 5 percent support the liberal party family.

Figure 39: Liberal Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



It is interesting to notice how there is an invariable core: rejection of individualism and hierarchy. The cultural variability comes from two biases: fatalism and egalitarianism, which both can have values ranging from rejection to support, but only in certain combinations. The effects do not seem to be additive in the sense that more of any single bias would increase support for the liberal party.

Nevertheless, a particular cultural combination, namely *ih*, seems to make the respondents well attuned to the liberal message.

I was expecting to find more support for the Christian party family among supporters of hierarchy in general, but it is present only in a few cultural spaces. As seen in Figure 40 below, the first obvious pattern is support for hierarchy in connection with rejection of fatalism (bottom row) and individualism in the lower-left corner. Combined with indifference to egalitarianism, 29 percent of the respondents support this party family, which receives less than 6 percent support among all respondents. Among those who support hierarchy but are indifferent toward all other three biases, some 20 percent support the Christian party family.

Figure 40: Christian Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99 (Percent)



100 percent includes only respondents with party prererence.

The second pattern is indifference to hierarchy (middle row) combined with I was expecting to find more support for the Christian party family among supporters of hierarchy in general, but it is present only in a few cultural spaces. As seen in figure 41, the first obvious pattern is support for hierarchy in connection with rejection of fatalism (bottom row) and individualism in the lower-left corner. Combined with indifference to egalitarianism, 29 percent of the respondents support this party family, which receives less than 6 percent support among all respondents. Among those who support hierarchy but are indifferent toward all other three biases, some 20 percent support the Christian party family.

Third, indifference to hierarchy and rejection of all other biases (*reif)* is consistent with support toward this party family. However, if we move from indifference to hierarchy to support for hierarchy, the popularity of the Christian party family plummets. And if we in increase support for egalitarian bias from rejection of the neutral position, we find the strongest support for the Christian party family (29 percent). All in all, we see strong interaction effects between hierarchical, fatalistic and egalitarian biases. In the next chapter, I will come back to this issue and test the additivity assumption.

Cultural biases alone do not trigger preferences for the Christian party family. Regular church attendance is still one of the most important predictors for a person's preference for a party within the Christian party family (Holberg 2007). Within NOS99, there are no questions concerning church attendance. Within the 1993 ISSP survey from Norway, however, this question was presented together with ten cultural theory questions. A logit analysis shows that the effect of cultural biases is minute if the respondent does not attend church. However, for frequent church goers, hierarchical and fatalistic biases have clear effects (Olli 1995). In Figure 41, we can see a model based on the logit analysis that shows the effects of hierarchical and fatalistic biases when controlling for the other cultural biases and common social background variables. The figure on left accounts for respondents who attend church at least once a month, and the figure on right accounts for respondents who do not attend church regularly.

Figure 41: Probability of Christian Party Preference in Norway in 1993 by Church Attendance and Hierarchy and Fatalism



Source: (Olli 1995: 170)

The combination of supporting hierarchy and rejecting fatalism seems to be the key to Christian party support both in Norway in 1993 and in the Nordic countries in 1999. It would be interesting know more about the relationship between church attendance and cultural biases.[309]

In Figure 42, below, we can see how the support for the conservative party family is distributed in the cultural space. As was the case with support for the socialist left, support for conservatives is strong in the upper-left corner, where supporters reject hierarchical and fatalistic biases. However, this increases the preferences for conservative party first when combined with support for individualistic bias and rejection of egalitarian bias. The strongest support can be found in *reIf*, where 62 percent of respondents prefer the conservative party family. The combination of rejecting egalitarian and supporting individualistic biases creates support for the conservative party family regardless of the respondents' view of hierarchical or fatalistic biases. It looks like rejection of egalitarian bias is more important than support for individualistic bias, as we find strong support for the conservative party family in five of the bars that lack support for individualism. The figure also clarifies how the combination of support for egalitarianism and rejection of individualism will turn voters away from the conservative party no matter what they think about hierarchy and fatalism.

[309] Churches and religions have different cultures (Douglas 1970), so one must not assume that participation in a church automatically increases support for hierarchy and rejection of fatalism. But it is possible that this is the dominant cultural coalition in the Nordic state churches or among the regular church goers.

Figure 42: Conservative Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99. (Percent)



In Figure 43, below we can see how the support for progress party family is distributed in cultural space. There are two locations with strong support for the progress party. The core seems to be support for individualism combined with indifference to egalitarianism, with equally strong support for fatalism and hierarchy (neutral position on both biases or rejection of both). The strongest support is at *HgIF*, where 25 percent of respondents prefer a progress party. In the entire sample, 5 percent of the respondents prefer this party.

Figure 43: Progress Party Family Support in Cultural Space. NOS99 (Percent)



Sometimes progress parties are presented as right-wing parties—ones even further to the right than the conservative party. Culturally, however, this does not seem to be the case. The lower-right corner, which denotes support for hierarchical and fatalistic biases, is also the corner where the social democratic party family has its strongest support, while the conservative party support is located in the opposite upper-left corner. What is common for the progress and conservative parties is the support for individualistic bias and rejection of egalitarian bias: If combined with support for fatalistic and hierarchical biases, respondents tend to lean toward the progress party family; if combined with rejection of fatalistic and hierarchical biases, the respondents lean toward the conservative party family. In other words, what separates progress party voters from the conservative party voters is exactly those cultural traits that social democratic voters have in common with progress party voters.

Summary of Party Preference in Cultural Space

What does the ideological landscape look like when viewed as a cultural space where parties compete for voters? Culturally speaking, the socialist left and the social democratic party families differ more than expected. The socialist left, the green, and the liberal party families have many cultural traits in common. The progress party shares several cultural traits with the social democratic party (at least this was the situation in 1999). The sharing of traits might reflect the social democratic party as perhaps being a clumsy institution. The conservative party is culturally quite remote from the social democratic party, while the Christian party family appears to have its own cultural space.

Overall, cultural space makes sense of the political landscape in the Nordic countries. As all four biases are presented, meaningful combinations using fewer biases can be detected. However, since it uses 81 categories, it requires such large samples that national-level analyses are not possible with NOS99. My trust in the operationalization of cultural biases as combinations presented in Chapter 10 has increased. Now I will go ahead with my second operationalization of cultural biases based on the two strongest cultural biases.

Party Preference and the Two Top-Ranked Cultural Biases

The main reason for engaging in the second operationalization, one that uses the respondent's two strongest cultural biases, is to highlight the cues an individual uses to select a party. The first operationalization, cultural space, uses information on a respondent's relation to all four biases. However, according to the analysis in the previous chapter, and as we saw using cultural space, sometimes two biases are enough.

Voters seek and process information in a manner that helps them to avoid cognitive dissonance (Taber and Lodge 2006). A respondent that supports several cultural biases could easily find him- or herself in a situation of cognitive dissonance because cultural biases are related to those schemas through which people understand the world. In other words, a person supporting several cultural biases would also be operating out from several different worldviews. What happens to these processes of selection if the respondents support several cultural biases?

One possible guide for selection could be the strength of a cultural bias. It is of course a simplification to assume that the salience of a cultural bias in a given situation can be directly measured by its strength. It is possible to picture a person who prefers moderate egalitarianism in many settings, even if there are other very high or low cultural bias scores so long as these scores apply only to a very few settings. I am here assuming that deviation from the mean is a sign of cultural bias strength because the analysis earlier indicated that this assumption has some merit.[310] The sequential individual model claims that the strength of a bias is a reflection of the importance of an institution or context in a respondent's life. The synthetic individual model claims that the strength of a bias is proportional to the salience of a bias, or how likely the respondent is to rely on this bias in a new setting. Nevertheless, I will here only demonstrate how the two top-ranked biases approach works on the individual level; I am not trying to test these models.[311]

People are dependent on some kinds of cues to select which of their cultural bias to use in a setting. The sequential individual model assumes that these cues are present in the social situation; people switch from one culture to another when they change roles (survey answers would be dependent on their manifest role). The synthetic individual model assumes that people do not really change, and their answers would be the same across all domains of life.

In a perfect research design based on the sequential individual model, we would have information about salience and which cultural bias applies in which social setting. However, this information is not available in NOS99 or NEPS95. The closest I can get is to use a standardized value of the cultural bias as a proxy for salience based on an assumption that it would be difficult to score very high or low on a non-salient bias.

The two top-ranked biases approach uses one piece of information that is not available for the cultural space operationalization—the ranking of biases. Nevertheless, the operationalization of the two top-ranked biases does not use all available information, as it disregards information concerning the two weakest biases. In addition, the two top-ranked biases approach ignores information concerning the neutral position, which could also be interpreted as indifference. We are thus reducing the degrees of freedom by moving from four biases on three levels to two biases on two levels, but we are increasing degrees of freedom by ranking the biases.

Overall, the ability of the two top-ranked biases approach to explain party preferences is somewhat weaker than the ability of cultural space. At the Nordic level, cultural space can explain 12 percent of differences in preferences for party families, while the two top-ranked biases method can explain only 9 percent of the differences. However, if we look at the results country by country, we can see that the two top-ranked biases method can explain from 21 to 28 percent and consistently out performs the left-right dimension. [312]

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[310] Cultural biases explain party preferences better if we assume that the absolute deviation from mean is used as a criteria of selection and ranking, rather than relying on only degrees of positive support. See page 386.

[311] See page 294 for a presentation of these models.

[312] See Table 38 on page 381, where these variables are called *CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias* and *CB Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order.*

In Table 41 below, we can see the independent variable, two top-ranked biases, and it is distribution country by country. The first letter indicates the strongest bias, and the second letter indicates the second strongest of the four biases.

Table 41: Two Top-Ranked Biases by Country. NOS99 limited. (Count)

	Norway	*Sweden*	*Denmark*	*Finland*	*Iceland*	*Total*
ef	41	36	40	37	25	179
eh	30	34	25	29	20	138
eI	29	39	39	35	27	169
EF	19	10	23	18	13	83
EH	21	22	21	24	18	106
EI	10	26	18	17	11	82
fe	14	18	24	19	20	95
fh	21	31	14	20	15	101
fI	13	28	15	15	17	88
FE	34	29	30	30	24	147
FH	47	53	40	42	32	214
FI	24	18	19	22	16	99
he	17	23	24	19	10	93
hE	15	16	11	21	20	83
hf	31	32	32	15	15	125
hi	24	26	30	37	20	137
HE	30	23	33	36	17	139
HF	26	22	25	23	19	115
HI	26	29	37	29	19	140
iE	27	28	34	15	27	131
if	41	27	25	16	24	133
ih	40	29	39	27	15	150
IH	23	10	16	26	16	91
Total	603	609	614	572	440	2838

A Nordic limit of n ≥80 for every combination is used.
In the data file the two top-ranked biases method is called *CultRankTriA2*

In the Nordic countries there are 57 cultural bias combinations of the two top-ranked biases present (the two largest absolute values of cultural biases ranked to represent the view of an individual).[313] Some of the cultural combinations have very few respondents. If I would only be concerned with random error, a more suitable limit would have been 40 respondents (see page 376). However, now that I am concerned with the meaning these cultural combinations carry, it useful to simplify the presentation by limiting the number of categories in cross tables even more. Therefore, I have excluded cultural bias combinations with less than 80 respondents in the Nordic countries. After this limitation, there are 2838

[313] See Table 77: Count of Respondents and categories by Variable. NOS99.

respondents with a valid cultural bias combination. Without this limit there would have been 4823 valid respondents. I have thus removed close to two thousand respondents from the analysis in order to focus the analysis on the 23 most common cultural bias categories rather than on the rare combinations. However, there is no reason to assume that the less frequent cultural biases have any lesser effect; we just have less data about it.

The sample used here is not representative of the population as a whole since only the most common cultural combinations are included. In order to understand the relationship between political views and cultural biases we do not need to describe the whole population. Numeric representation is, after all, one defining trait of democracy. Focusing on the common biases and ignoring the rarer ones will help us to focus on those cultural combinations most likely to have political consequences.

None of the 23 most common cultural bias combinations in NOS99 resemble the pattern we saw in the household chapters, where each household had one dominant bias and the second most important bias was typically a rejection. I will come back to this issue in Chapter 13.

Now that we have familiarized ourselves with both the party families in the Nordic countries and the distribution of the two top-ranked biases in the Nordic countries, we can better understand how cultural biases influence preferences for particular party families.

In Table 42 below, where a total of 1865 respondents have both a valid cultural combination and an expressed party preference (excluding the non-voters), we can see which party family the respondents with a particular combination of the two top-ranked biases would vote for in a hypothetical parliamentary election held today.

On the bottom row, we can see the proportion of total votes for each party family. Ten percent of respondents would vote for a socialist left party, 25 percent would vote for a social democratic party, 23 percent would vote for a conservative party, and so forth. This deviates a bit from the distribution presented in Table 40. This deviation is caused by the removal of respondents with rare cultural bias combinations (n<80). I have chosen to prioritize the ability to analyze robust patterns between party families and cultural bias combinations.

I have done the same analyses for country by country, which yielded much stronger results because some parties in some countries have unique cultural combinations as their support bases. When the data is analyzed at the Nordic level, the results are watered down by the historically unique differences within a party family and between countries, but we get more robust results concerning the political views. Country-by-country tables can be found in the appendix (see pages 544 to 547).

Table 42: Ideological Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases. NOS99 limited. (Row percent)

Ranked top 2 bias	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total (Count)*
ef	**1**	**10**	**24**	4	4	**49**	3	1	4	134
eh	**3**	17	12	4	2	**51**	2	3	4	89
eI	**2**	**7**	17	8	2	**54**	4	1	6	127
EF	6	34	22	8	2	12	6	6	4	50
EH	**22**	33	17	0	9	7	2	**2**	7	54
EI	6	29	16	2	8	16	6	6	10	49
fe	4	**12**	20	7	5	**45**	1	0	5	75
fh	12	32	12	9	8	15	0	**9**	3	66
fI	4	**8**	21	6	9	**40**	2	**9**	2	53
FE	8	**41**	15	3	5	7	6	**3**	**12**	86
FH	**4**	**34**	23	4	3	13	**12**	**1**	5	115
FI	**2**	31	17	3	7	17	**12**	3	7	58
he	10	25	17	8	0	27	5	2	5	59
hE	11	34	8	11	2	11	**2**	7	**13**	61
hf	**17**	24	11	**14**	3	21	3	2	3	90
hi	**20**	24	12	**12**	5	11	**1**	7	7	94
HE	6	**36**	22	1	7	13	**5**	2	8	86
HF	**2**	30	24	2	10	21	10	0	3	63
HI	5	24	23	2	**10**	22	9	**0**	6	93
iE	**28**	33	12	3	2	4	**4**	**11**	2	93
if	**20**	**36**	13	9	7	4	**2**	5	5	101
ih	**26**	23	13	11	5	7	**0**	**8**	6	108
IH	**2**	23	**28**	2	3	28	**10**	2	3	61
Total	10	25	17	6	5	23	5	4	6	1865

U = 0.093. Sign. = 0.000
Cells with statistically significant (Adj.s.res. ≥|1.96|) deviations are marked in bold. The adjusted standardized residuals are listed in Table 84 on page 542.

Table 42 is a key table for the rest of this chapter. Cells that have a particularly high or low proportion of supporters for a party preference are marked in bold. In the second column, we can see how support for the socialist left party family ranges from 1 to 28 percent depending on their cultural bias combination. There are thus certain cultural combinations where almost nobody voted for a socialist left party, and in the other end of the range we find a combination where more than a quarter of the respondents voted for this party family. Support for social democratic parties range from 7 to 41 percent, while support for agrarian parties range from 8 to 24 percent. Liberal party support ranges from 0 to 14 percent, and support for Christian parties range from 0 to 10 percent. There is a wide range of support for conservative parties, with a range from 4 to 54 percent, whereas support for progress parties range from 0 to 12 percent. Support for green parties is a narrow 0 to 11 percent, and support for other parties range from 0 to 13 percent.

To sum up, there is a connection between cultural biases and preferences for Nordic party families. The two top-ranked biases approach explains 9 percent of the variation in respondents' choices of party families at the Nordic level. This does not sound like much since we know that cultural biases explain twice as much when we look at single countries. However, now my purpose is to focus on the big picture and create a robust understanding of the relationship between cultural bias combinations and party families at Nordic level as a proxy for political views and ideologies. If I wanted to predict a respondent's party choice, I would obviously do better by studying the relationship on a country-by-country basis and by including more respondents.

Just because cultural bias combinations can explain variation in a cross table does not mean that they actually help us to understand why and how people vote. Do these combinations make sense? I will try to answer this question by looking at the support for one party at time. What do the cultural combinations of party supporters look like? Do they form some kind of cultural core or are there perhaps several cultural fractions present in the large parties? I will use the information from Table 42 in smaller portions to make the interpretation easier. In addition, I will convert the percentages to adjusted standardized residuals that show the extent to which the content of the cells deviate from an even distribution (as if there was no relation between the variables).

Support for the Socialist Left Party Family

What are the defining cultural bias traits of those that support socialist left parties? In Table 43 below, we can see those cultural biases listed that are associated with a significant increase in preferences for the socialist left party family. The adjusted standardized residuals show how much each cultural combination influences party preferences, as measured in standard deviations.[314] Positive residuals indicate that there are more people preferring this party than expected, and negative residuals show that there are less people preferring this party than expected. Values greater than 1.96 standard deviations above or below the mean (zero) are likely to be statistically significant deviations.[315]

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[314] The adjusted standardized residual is the residual for a cell. It is calculated by subtracting the expected value from the observed value, and divided by an estimate of its standard error. Adjusted standardized residual is expressed in standard deviation units above or below the mean. The adjusted standardized residuals have a asymptotically normal distribution and thus can be used for hypothesis testing. However, some caution should be shown when interpreting multiple cells simultaneously (Haberman 1973).

[315] This corresponds with a 0.01 significance level.

Table 43: Support for the Socialist Left Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
iE	**6.0**	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-1.3	**-4.3**	-.1	**3.6**	-1.5
ih	**5.8**	-.5	-1.2	**2.3**	-.2	**-3.9**	-2.3	**2.6**	.3
hi	**3.5**	-.2	-1.5	**2.4**	.2	**-2.9**	-1.7	1.9	.7
if	**3.5**	**2.5**	-1.2	1.2	.9	**-4.6**	-1.3	.7	-.3
EH	**3.1**	1.4	-.1	-1.9	1.5	**-2.7**	-1.0	-.7	.5
hf	**2.2**	-.2	-1.6	**3.4**	-.7	-.4	-.5	-.8	-1.0

This table contains selected rows from Table 87 on page 547 .

We can see that rejection of individualism combined with either rejection of hierarchy or support for egalitarianism are the two combinations with the highest level of support for the socialist left party family. In addition, support is increased when rejection of individualism or hierarchy is combined with rejection of fatalism. The only bias that is not rejected among these is the egalitarian bias.[316] In several countries, the socialist left parties are widely critical of incumbent regimes—a fact that also fits well with rejection. It looks like these supporters are more united by what they do not want (individualism and hierarchy) than by what they want.

So far, this is what one could expect. Accounting for cultural biases brings about the ability to see new similarities and differences between parties. Socialist left, green party, and liberal party families all receive support among *ih* and *hi*. Rejection of individualism and hierarchy seems fit all three parties well. However, if we do not include rejection of individualism, we seem to lose the green party: At *hf* we find increased support for the socialist left and liberal party families, but not the green parties. Similarly, by including support for the egalitarian bias *iE*, we find support for the socialist left and the greens, but not for the liberal party family. The fact that these parties compete with each other can seem counterintuitive if we only look at the left-right dimension, but cultural biases show that these party families sometimes can share a cultural base.

The combination *EH*—supporting egalitarianism and hierarchy—is also known as the social democratic alliance (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:89). However, it is interesting to note that when support for egalitarianism is stronger than hierarchy, as it is in this combination, there is strong support for the socialist left, but only minor support for the social democratic party family.

The largest cultural distance is between the socialist left and the conservative party families, with strong negative values indicating that supporters of these cultural

[316] If we think of the three active biases and reject two of them, we are left with preferences for pure egalitarian solutions. In cultural theory, those who support only one cultural bias and reject all other ways of life are sometimes called for fanatics because they see only one right way of doing things and find it difficult to make compromises.

combinations are very unlikely to vote for those within the conservative party family.

Support for the Liberal Party Family

All three cultural combinations that significantly increase support for the liberal party family were also included in the table for the socialist left party family. In other words, in all these three cultural combinations the liberal party and socialist party families are competing for the same voters. In Table 44, the combinations are sorted by the strength of support for the liberal party family. Rejection of hierarchy seems to be the common denominator among these cultural combinations. We can see how *hf* has the strongest effect on liberal party support, while it also provides some support for the socialist left. There is one more party family competing of these voters: Combinations *hi* and *ih* also increase the vote for the green party family.

Table 44: Support for the Liberal Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
hf	**2.2**	-.2	-1.6	**3.4**	-.7	-.4	-.5	-.8	-1.0
hi	**3.5**	-.2	-1.5	**2.4**	.2	**-2.9**	-1.7	1.9	.7
ih	**5.8**	-.5	-1.2	**2.3**	-.2	**-3.9**	**-2.3**	**2.6**	.3

It is understandable how voters can move between liberal and green parties, as supporters of each party family share many ideological traits. Similarly, the greens and the socialist left share much of the same ideological critiques of the modern capitalist society, but differ in the solutions they propose. However, it is hard to give an ideologically informed explanation of what is common between the socialist left and liberal parties. Nevertheless, we can see that they both receive support from respondents with similar cultural backgrounds.

We can see that for the rejection of hierarchy and individualism combination, it does not make much difference which of these two rejections is the strongest one. People vote quite similarly, even if *ih* increases support for the socialist left party family to a greater extent than the increase from *hi*.

Support for the Green Party Family

Cultural combinations that show significantly increased support for the green party family are listed in Table 45 below. We can see that rejection of individualistic and hierarchical biases and support for egalitarian bias are common. These same combinations give increased support for the socialist left. It looks like the socialist left and the green parties are competing for the same voters (*iE, ih* and *hi*). In addition, rejection of fatalistic bias, combined with support for individualistic bias, increases the vote for the conservative party family. However, there is one cultural combination, namely *fh*, where the green party is the only one that receives increased support.

Table 45: Support for the Green Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
iE	**6.0**	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-1.3	**-4.3**	-.1	**3.6**	-1.5
ih	**5.8**	-.5	-1.2	2.3	-.2	**-3.9**	-2.3	**2.6**	.3
fh	.6	1.2	-1.1	1.1	1.0	-1.5	-1.8	**2.3**	-1.0
fI	-1.5	**-3.0**	.7	-.1	1.5	**3.0**	-.9	**2.2**	-1.2
iE	**6.0**	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-1.3	**-4.3**	-.1	**3.6**	-1.5

The biases behind green party support seem to be pointing in several different directions. Perhaps this has something to do with differences between countries.[317] In Denmark, the Green Party's support base is in found in *ih* and *iE*, which also gives strong support to the socialist left, and *FE*, which supports only the Green Party. Norway does not have a green party in the parliament. The Norwegian *iE* and *ih* respondents support either the socialist left or the liberal party. Together these two countries influence the pattern we see in Table 45. In Sweden, the Green Party receives support from *FI* and *if*, which are in fact cultural opposites. In Finland, the green party receives support from *fh* and *FH* without any competition from other parties. Here too, we have two opposite cultural combinations. This indicates a possible cultural conflict inside the both the Swedish and Finnish green parties.[318] In Iceland, the increased support comes from *iE, EF,* and *EI,* and also without any successful competition from the other parties. The green parties thus seem to be quite different and culturally divided, and therefore the weak pattern on Nordic level is susceptible to influence from Norway, where there is no green party.

Support for the Social Democratic Party Family

In Table 46, we can see the four cultural bias combinations with the strongest tendency to prefer one of the social democratic parties. We can see that common for these are the support for egalitarian, hierarchical, and fatalistic cultural biases.

[317] See Table 86 and Table 87 for a country by country overview of party preferences.

[318] In the cultural space version, it is more difficult to make inteferences about conflicts because we know nothing about the salience of the four biases. Here, we know that the two strongest biases have opposite directions. If the two strongest biases are what people actually use, this will make it very difficult to strike compromises, and conflict is the likely result.

Table 46: Support for the Social Democratic Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
FE	-.5	**3.4**	-.5	-1.0	-.1	**-3.6**	.6	-.1	**2.4**
if	**3.5**	**2.5**	-1.2	1.2	.9	**-4.6**	-1.3	.7	-.3
HE	-1.3	**2.3**	1.2	-1.9	.9	**-2.2**	.1	-.7	1.0
FH	**-2.0**	**2.2**	1.6	-.8	-.8	**-2.5**	**4.1**	-1.7	-.2

HE is known as the social democratic cultural alliance (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:89). This combination seems to belong to social democratic parties alone, while the others are contested. Moreover, we should remember from the previous table how EH showed strong support for the socialist left, but not for social democrats. Thus, the relative strength of preferences on the individual level does seem to have an obvious influence on whether people choose the social democratic or the socialist left parties.

The strongest positive effect is found among support for fatalism and egalitarianism. These respondents tend to prefer either social democratic parties or progress parties. In Table 42, we can see that 47 percent of the respondents with an *FE* combination prefer one of these two parties.[319] It is somewhat surprising that the progress parties compete for voters whose cultural biases are also positively related to support for the social democratic party family. The second combination shared by these two party families is *FH*—support for fatalistic and hierarchical biases. Here, 46 percent of respondents choose either the progress party family or the social democratic family.

The two top-ranked biases approach does not seem to create much support for the social democratic party family. For the smaller parties, we can find cultural combinations where the probability of preferring the party is perhaps fivefold. By contrast, support for the social democratic party family increases from the average support of 25 percent to 41 percent maxim support (*Fi*).

There are several possible was to interpret this. The first has to do with selection bias, but even among the rarer combinations that were removed, support for the social democratic party never exceeds 46 percent. Second, perhaps the two top-ranked biases approach is not very good in explaining preferences for social democratic parties. Perhaps several biases are needed. Earlier, we did see that with cultural space, the four bias solution did yield up to 55 and 62 percent support for the social democratic party family from their two most significant cultural strongholds. Third, perhaps the neutral position on cultural biases is what actually defines social democratic party supporters. The strongest support comes from *HEdt* and *rEdf*—i.e. neutral-level support for individualism combined with support for egalitarianism and neutral-level support for either hierarchy or fatalism. Thus,

[319] 41 percent prefer the social democratic family and 6 the progress party family.

both of these have two neutral-level supports, while the two top-ranked biases used in Table 46 above ignore the neutral position. Fifth, the two top-ranked biases approach seems to be better in predicting who will not vote for the social democratic party family. Sixth, perhaps there is something about large parties—ones that have catchall ambitions—that make them culturally ambiguous or clumsy.

Support for the Agrarian Party Family

In Table 47, we can see the two combinations with increased support for the agrarian party family at the Nordic level. The two top-ranked biases approach does not have much influence on preferences for the agrarian party family. There are two cultural bias combinations that have a positive effect on agrarian party preferences at the Nordic level: support for individualism combined with support for hierarchy and rejection of egalitarianism combined with rejection of fatalism. However, we can see that *ef* increases support for the conservative party family much more than for the agrarian party family.

Table 47: Support for the Agrarian Party Family (Adj.s.res).

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
IH	**-2.2**	-.4	**2.2**	-1.5	-.6	1.0	**2.0**	-.9	-.8
ef	**-3.7**	**-4.1**	**2.1**	-1.2	-.3	**7.4**	-.9	-1.9	-.7

The situation is different when looking at the source of support for the agrarian parties country by country. In three of the countries, the agrarian parties are small, and thus it is difficult to obtain significant deviations. Voting for the agrarian parties increases according to *iE* in Norway, *HF* in Sweden, and *EF* and *IH* in Finland. However, in Iceland and Denmark the agrarian party is larger. In Iceland, *FH* increases preferences for the agrarian party, while in Denmark *ef, eI, and fI* increases preferences for the agrarian party. Culturally speaking, these agrarian parties do not have much in common. In Norway and Denmark, their supporters seem to be at the opposing ends when it comes to egalitarianism and individualism, while respondents in Iceland, Sweden, and Finland share a predilection for fatalism. Denmark, which has by far the largest agrarian party, rejects fatalism altogether. It looks a like the Danish agrarian party is culturally very similar to conservative parties in the other countries.[320]

Since preferences for agrarian parties are often considered to be connected to the rural-urban divide, this divisions should be accounted for when studying the effects of cultural biases. In Table 48, we can see a sample of those respondents who live

[320] The Danish Agrarian party has diversified its electoral base, and relies very little on the farmers (Cotta and Best 2007:227). See Table 86 and Table 87 for a country by country overview of party preferences.

in the countryside or who work as farmers or fishermen.[321] Denmark is excluded, because *Venstre* is quite different from the other agrarian parties. In this sample, 30 percent of the respondents prefer one of the agrarian parties (in urban areas only 4 percent would support agrarian parties). Thus, we are left with a better picture of the agrarian party family's cultural position in the rural areas.

Table 48: Agrarian Party Family Support among Rural Population in N, S, F and I (Adj.s.res)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
IH	-.7	-1.6	**2.5**	-.7	-.6	-.1	-.4	-1.0	1.7
FH	-1.0	-.4	**2.1**	-.1	-.9	-.1	1.0	-1.5	-.8
HI	-.7	-1.0	1.9	.6	1.1	-.5	-.5	-1.1	-.5

We can see that support for individualistic and hierarchical biases (*IH* and *HI*) increase the support for the agrarian party family, even if only one of the biases is significant. Of rural respondents with an *IH* bias, a full 63 percent would vote for the agrarian party. Similarly, support for fatalism combined with support for hierarchy (*FH*) increases support for the agrarian party family. This is interesting because the same combination in the urban population increases support for social democratic and progress party families.

One must remember that even if voting for agrarian parties out from these two cultural bias segments (*IH* and *FH*) seems to be the obvious choice for respondents, these respondents are only a small number of those that vote for agrarian parties (8 percent of them). Thus, this is not a good description of all agrarian party supporters. For a better picture of the preferences for agrarian parties, the analysis should be done on a country-by-country basis and include the rarer cultural combinations. Nevertheless, it looks like supporting hierarchy together with either individualism or fatalism increases votes for the agrarian party family.

Support for the Christian Party Family

The Christian party family is often understood as being less about political ideology than about promoting Christian values. To be sure, church attendance is often a good predictor of Christian party voting.

In Table 49, we can see how there is only one cultural bias combination that significantly increases support for the Christian party family: support for hierarchical and individualistic biases. The combination with the next strongest bias

[321] There are 778 respondents in this sample, of these 70 are selected because of their occupation and 722 because their municipality or county can be characterized as rural (Finland, Sweden, and Iceland) or becuase their municipality is classified as a primary producer or a mixture of primary production and industrial production (Norway).

is support for hierarchical and fatalistic biases, but this increase is not statistically significant.

Table 49: Support for the Christian Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
HI	-1.5	-.4	1.4	-1.6	**2.1**	-.3	**2.0**	**-2.0**	.3
HF	**-2.2**	.9	1.4	-1.5	1.7	-.4	**2.0**	-1.6	-.9

Support for hierarchy and individualism also increases voting for the progress party family, thus making these two parties successful competitors for voters within this cultural segment.

In the case of support for Christian parties, the order of biases does make a difference. Change from *HI* to *IH* does increase the support for the agrarian party and actually reduces the voting for the Christian party family (see Table 47). In other words, changing the order of the two top-ranked biases changes the effect it has on voting for the Christian party family. Hierarchical values seem to be central for these voters. Typical hierarchical values are often called traditional values or "family values", which refers to the hierarchical family ideal. When seen through the cultural theory lenses, this terminology is a successful public relations coup because it makes it possible in political debates to label the egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic family ideals as being anti-family.[322]

There are clear differences between the countries. In Norway, the significant increase for Christian party support comes from *if* and *HI*, in Denmark from *fh* and *fI*, and in Sweden from *HI, FI*, and *EI*. In Finland, the support comes from *ih*.[323] The commonalities between Norway and Sweden make the *HI* combination the only significant one at the Nordic level.

Support for the Conservative Party Family

The two top-ranked biases with increased support for the conservative party family are listed in Table 50. We can see that five cultural bias combinations give a significant increase in the support for the conservative party family. These are the strongest effects that the two top-ranked biases approach has on party preferences. Common for three of these is the rejection of egalitarian cultural bias as the first bias. This is combined with support for individualism, rejection of fatalism, or rejection of hierarchy.

The only supported bias among these is individualism, and in both cases individualism forms the second bias (*eI* and *fI*). Individualism is closely connected with economical liberalism. Culturally speaking, this shows that conservative parties

[322] Each way of organizing has its own corresponding family ideal. See pages 61-74.
[323] Iceland did not have a Christian democratic party.

are more about rejecting egalitarian, hierarchical, and fatalistic solutions than about promoting individualism. Rejection of cultural biases is thus a defining trait of the conservative party. We could not understand their voters' cultural bias positions without also accounting for the rejection of cultural biases.

Table 50: Support for the Conservative Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
eI	**-3.2**	**-4.9**	-.2	.9	-1.4	**8.8**	-.3	**-1.8**	-.1
ef	**-3.7**	**-4.1**	**2.1**	-1.2	-.3	**7.4**	-.9	**-1.9**	-.7
eh	**-2.1**	-1.9	-1.2	-.6	-1.2	**6.5**	-1.1	-.2	-.5
fe	-1.7	**-2.7**	.7	.2	.1	**4.8**	-1.4	-1.7	-.2
fI	-1.5	**-3.0**	.7	-.1	1.5	**3.0**	-.9	**2.2**	-1.2

In Table 50, above, three cultural bias combinations (*eI*, *eh*, and *fI*) significantly increase support for the conservative party family only, while *ef* also increases support for the agrarians and *fI* for the greens. In this table, the support for social democratic and socialist left party families is severely reduced. Here, there seems to be a similarity with one of the best-known political dimensions—namely the left-right dimension. In the literature on cultural theory, the left-right dimension is often seen as going diagonally from pro-egalitarianism on the left-hand side to pro-hierarchy and pro-individualism on the right-hand side.[324] However, when seeing these results we should ask if support for hierarchy really is part of the left-right dimension in the Nordic countries. Rejection of hierarchy is important for many of those that vote for socialist left parties. However, among supporters of the socialist left, we also find the *EH* combination—the so-called social democratic alliance. Thus, cultural biases are something other than the left-right dimension. They bring multidimensionality into the study of politics.

Support for the Progress Party Family

In Table 51, we can see those cultural combinations that significantly increase support for the progressive party family. We can see how the direction of support from *FH* goes mostly to the progress party family, but a bit also goes to the social democratic party family. Support for fatalistic and individualistic biases together increase support only for the progress party family.

There are three repeated traits here: support for fatalistic, hierarchical, and individualistic biases. At least in the political debates in Norway, the Progress Party was accused lacking consistency and making populist policies. This fits well with the support for three different cultural biases, and the lack of rejection of cultural biases can easily contribute to arguments that point toward a variety of different futures.

[324] (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998:46; Grendstad 2003a).

Table 51: Support for the Progress Party Family (Adj.s.res.)

CB	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
FH	**-2.0**	**2.2**	1.6	-.8	-.8	**-2.5**	**4.1**	-1.7	-.2
FI	**-2.1**	1.0	.0	-.8	.7	-1.0	**2.8**	-.1	.4
IH	**-2.2**	-.4	**2.2**	-1.5	-.6	1.0	**2.0**	-.9	-.8

It can be difficult to place the progress party family on the left-right dimension, and depending on the issue, they can end up on either side of the conservative party. However, if we use cultural biases, we can see that that conservative and progress party families are quite far from each other in relation to hierarchy and fatalism.

Do Biases Make Sense of Party Preference?

We have now seen two different ways of applying cultural biases as combinations where both support and rejection are accounted for. Both of these combinations seem to make sense. Whether we use cultural space or the two top-ranked biases approach, we can interpret every one of the eight ideological party families in light of cultural biases.

Naturally, the stories told by these cultural bias combinations are similar. The cultural bias combinations gave better explanations for some party families than others, which we knew already from Table 39 (on page 382). However, we did learn that those The Nordic-level party families, which were poorly explained by the cultural space approach and the two top-ranked biases approach, had rather large cross-national differences between their cultural compositions (most notability the agrarian and green party families), and in some party families the cultural biases become relevant only under certain conditions. For example, supporting hierarchy and rejecting fatalism was relevant for Christian party support only after accounting for regular church attendance.

When using cultural space, we learned that the socialist left and the social democratic party family supporters differ from each other culturally, while the socialist left, the green, and the liberal party family supporters have many cultural traits in common. Similarly, the progress party supporters share several traits with those that support social democratic parties, while the conservative party is culturally quite remote from the social democratic party. In addition, the Christian party family does have its own cultural space.

We obtain a more detailed picture when using the two top-ranked biases. We learn which particular cultural combinations influence party family preferences. I will not repeat these here. I will, however, mention that the two top-ranked biases approach emphasizes those cultural biases where the respondent deviates most from the rest of the respondents.

One of my findings is that preferences for some parties are triggered by just two cultural biases, while others require three. Norway serves as an example, where the Agrarian Party (SP) seems to be unrelated to cultural biases when we use *CultFixAbsTri3*, but if we use the ranked top two biases, preference for SP is greatly increased if the respondent belongs to *iE*.[325] Similarly, the Liberal Party (V) scores higher when using the ranked top two biases, while the Conservative Party (H) scores higher if we use the top two biases in a fixed order. I believe this indicates the absence of any particular cultural bias combination that can be used for everything, but rather we should select a way to represent cultural biases that fits with the task.

During the interpretation of the figures and tables presented in this chapter, the most important finding was that the rejection of a cultural bias helps to make sense of party preferences. Some cultural combinations defined by rejection of bias increase the preferences for particular party families. For example, rejecting egalitarianism, hierarchy, and fatalism increases support for the conservative party family, while rejecting hierarchy, individualism, and fatalism increases support for the socialist left party family. Some party families are defined by what they stand for: Social democratic party support is rooted in support for hierarchy, egalitarianism, and fatalism, which also leads to increased support for the progress party family. Information about rejection is what makes sense out of the relationship between party preferences and cultural biases. If we only had information about support, we could explain only a third of the variation in Nordic party family preferences when compared with the explanatory power of the cultural space approach.[326]

Multidimensionality is both a blessing and curse. It is a blessing because it allows a study of people's political preferences that goes deeper into their cultural fabric when compared to the depth achieved by many other perspectives (remember how Part I found a close connection between household structures and political views). It is a blessing because it has a complexity that resembles the real world (we are able to predict quite a lot of the party preferences that people have). However, it is also a curse because the whole point with theories is that they are supposed to simplify the world. It is very easy to end up with an application that is so complex that it is nearly impossible to use.

One of my research goals for this thesis has been to try to operationalize cultural biases in surveys in a way that balances between ease of use and real life complexity. I believe I have succeeded in both: Both ways of operationalizing cultural bias combinations allow us to see respondents' cultural biases in a manner that retains the complexity, similar to what we would expect in a large institution, rather than hiding or simplifying it. Unfortunately, the cultural space can hardly be described as easy to use, as it divides respondents into 81 categories, thus requiring samples that

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[325] These tables on the counts, but not the adjusted standardized residuals, are available at http://eero.no/publ/How_Much_Can_UC_explain_Neut_Fin_tri3565_bin50_c10_n40.htm

[326] In Table 38, coherent expains 4 percent of the Nordic party vote, while CultFixMid4 explains 12 percent.

are larger in size than what is commonly found in surveys. However, the two top-ranked biases approach creates a compelling image of respondents with complex cultural compositions that can be accessed through regular surveys. Nevertheless, in order to keep the tables short, I excluded many respondents and focused the discussion on the most common combinations. Thus, both operationalizations have their own shortcomings.

Is the Strongest Bias is more Important than the Second Strongest Bias?

The cultural space version of cultural bias combinations treats all four biases as equally important for the respondent. However, it seems likely that it is not just the combination that matters, but also the relative strength of each bias. In Table 42 (on page 412), we can see how the two top-ranked biases approach influences the preferences for particular ideological party families. Here, the strongest bias is always presented first, and it will be possible to distinguish for example between *EH* and *HE*. If the strongest bias is the most important, then these two combinations should have different effects. If the relative strengths of the biases are not important, then these two combinations should result in similar levels of support for the different party families. Instead, the analysis found the following:

> Those who prefer *EH* tend to vote for the socialist left party family. The supporters of *HE* tend to vote for social democratic parties. In addition, both combinations lead to reduced votes for the conservative party family.
>
> Those who prefer *Ei* or *iE* tend to vote for the socialist left party family, whereas only *iE* increases the vote for the green party family.
>
> Those who prefer *hf* tend to vote for the liberal party family, while those for prefer *fh* tend to vote for the green party family.
>
> Those who prefer *HI* tend to vote for the progress party family, while those who prefer *IH* tend to vote for the agrarian party family.
>
> Those who belong to *ih* or *hi* tend to vote for the socialist left, liberal, or green party families. For *ih*, the tendency to vote for the socialist left is twice as strong.

Thus, it matters whether a bias is ranked first or second. In the next chapter, I will analyze this in greater detail in the discussion concerning the dominant bias and the independence assumptions.

My trust in the cultural bias combinations has increased, as we have now seen that two different ways of using the cultural bias combinations—i.e. cultural space and two top-ranked biases—have categories that are informative and allow us to see how cultural biases are connected to political views. Since the two top-ranked biases approach allows us to explain a multidimensional phenomenon across national and sample boundaries, I believe it is an operationalization of cultural bias that is robust enough to be used for scrutinizing the assumptions behind survey research.

PART III: DISCUSSIONS

The third part of this thesis will discuss, and try to reach some conclusions, about the relation between individual and culture. While in the second part of the thesis a set of tools were prepared and tested, in this part these tools are used to analyze, discuss, and make some tentative conclusions about the individual-culture relationship. Cultural theory has not delivered as expected in survey research. I believe the reason for this a poor understanding of the individual-culture relation, which has lead to the use of analytical techniques not well suited for the task.

Part III is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 12, False Assumptions for Survey Research, three common assumptions used in quantitative analysis are scrutinized against survey data from seven different samples. It is demonstrated that the dominant cultural bias assumption is best understood as a fallacy. Similarly, the independence and the additivity of cultural biases effects assumptions lack empirical support. These findings indicates that the common statistical techniques are not well suited for analysing the effects of cultural bias on individual level data. I addition, the level of analysis is important, and I suggest that there are some parallels between the analysis of aggregated data, and the analysis of cultural biases, as both have to deal with cross-level inference.

In Chapter 13, What is Rejection of A Cultural Bias?, I use data from households and from the surveys to discuss rejection as a theoretical and empirical pheonomen.

Rejection on individual level and on institutional level are different phenomena, and one should not assume that indivuduals are copies of institutions. Rejection of a bias does carry meaning that individuals use as to guide in their party preferences. Accepting rejection as a individual level trait makes it easier to deal with cultural biases on individual level.

In Chapter 14, entitled *Final remarks*, I will summarize findings from the household research, and the surveys, and discuss the individual-culture relation in light of these findings. In addition, I will briefly comment upon how my findings can be used in the migration field. Finally, I give suggestions for direction for future research.

Chapter 12

FALSE ASSUMPTIONS FOR SURVEY RESEARCH

I share Achen's (1982:11) concern that "social scientists spend a great deal of time writing their results of statistical analyses, and very little time discussing the evidence that their [model] specifications are correct". Therefore, I will now search for empirical evidence that allows us to discuss and evaluate the assumptions behind the statistical analyses. Any successful statistical analysis is dependent on a correct model specification. If the assumptions guiding the analysis are not met, neither the parameter estimates nor the conclusions can be taken at face value. I am limiting my discussion to the assumptions because

> cross-level analyses are complex, and the added assumptions or information are often very demanding of theoretical agility and contextual knowledge. In consequence, too many practitioners try to evade the problem, or else attack it with conventional but inflexible sets of assumptions that are inappropriate for the data. (Achen and Shively 1995:4)

In this chapter, I will discuss and falsify three common assumptions behind survey research that uses cultural theory. Almost everyone using survey data to measure cultural biases at the individual level has been using one or more of the following three assumptions:[327] First, some assume the presence of *a dominant bias in individuals*. Every time the researchers label people as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic, they are relying on the truthfulness of this assumption. Indeed, the households I have studied all had a dominant cultural bias; and it is both easy and tempting to assume that individuals resemble institutions, including households, in this matter. Contrary to this, however, I will demonstrate that the idea of a dominant bias at the individual level is not compatible with the empirical evidence.

A second assumption maintains that *the effect of a cultural bias is independent of the values of the other biases*. This allows us study the effect of one bias alone, while disregarding the values of the other biases. All bivariate analytical techniques, like bivariate correlations, bivariate regressions, or even a two-way cross table, rely on a particular

[327] See Table 15: Examples of Research based on Surveys using Cultural Theory on page 282. As far as I can tell, all listed individual-level analyses using four cultural biases are relying on these assumptions. The higher-level analyses are not the subject of my analysis or critique.

value on a particular variable always having the same effect. However, if the effect of one bias is not the same across the values of another bias, these techniques estimate the effects with error, or in worst case, they become meaningless.

In the qualitative analysis of households, cultural biases carry meanings, and these meanings influence each other. In surveys, variables are stored one by one in neat columns of numbers, which are numeric representations of meanings that do not invite interplay between two meanings. I will demonstrate that on the individual level, the effect of one bias is not constant, but dependent on the values of the other biases.

The third assumption is that *the effects of cultural biases are additive*. The use of partial correlations and multivariate regressions require us to assume that the affects of each cultural bias can simply be added together. If the effects of two biases cannot simply be added together, we cannot trust that multivariate regressions give a correct picture of the relationship. In particular, the hypothesis tests are prone to fail when this assumption is violated, thus making inferences from the sample to the population questionable (Berry and Feldman 1985:10).

When analyzing households, I used figures that present the four cultural biases in the households and in their views of politics and society (see page 257). Fortunately, in these figures we do not need to assume that the effects are additive. The qualitative methods can deal with meaning. The assumption of additivity arrives as an unfortunate by-product of multivariate regressions, when we are trying to describe the effect of several biases across all cases, and not just one case. I will demonstrate that the effects of cultural biases are not additive.

In what follows, I will show that these three assumptions receive little or no empirical support on sample level, which leads me to conclude that these assumptions should be seen as fallacies. However, before I start the empirical analysis, I will present eight consequences and implications from these fallacies because all readers will benefit from knowing about the implications, while only those with quantitative research background will benefit from the numerous tests behind my argument.

Implications from the Fallacies

The dominant individual fallacy tells us that using only one bias, namely the dominant one, to represent a person's cultural bias does not reflect what is going on in the data. People are not just hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic. Real people are in fact far more complicated—a fact that should force us to consider several implications. First, researchers should refrain from making these kinds of oversimplifications, where people are labeled as *hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic*, even if it is easy and tempting to do so.

Second, the dominant bias assumption fails because *the coherent individual approach to cultural theory does not receive empirical support* in the survey data. Since peoples' cultural biases are not just miniatures of cultural bias present in institutions, we need to improve the model of the individual-culture relationship to cope with this challenge. One way to move on is to follow my suggestion and view individuals' cultural biases as consisting of both knowledge and degrees of preference for particular ways of life (See page 299).

A third implication is that the additivity of effects fallacy teaches us that *we cannot simply add together the effects of two biases*. This is probably caused by the effects from interaction between the cultural biases. A simple multivariate regression analysis is not well suited for this, unless the correct interaction effects are included in the analysis.[328]

Fourth, the independence of effects fallacy teaches us that *we cannot analyze cultural bias effects one by one*. A bivariate analysis showing that one cultural bias, for example egalitarianism, has little effect on party preference should be dismissed as a poor analysis because now we know that the interaction between the biases requires us to use more than one bias at once.

Fifth, combining these two false assumptions—i.e., additivity and independence assumtions—*severely restricts the analytical techniques that can be used on individual-level data* of cultural biases. We know that we should analyze several cultural biases at once, but at the same time, the most popular multivariate techniques are not well suited for this.

Most researchers using cultural theory on survey data during the last twenty years have tried to make connections from people's cultural biases to their attitudes or behaviors. Either these analyses rely on the dominant individual assumption and try to divide the respondents into four categories and use their dominant biases as an explanation, or they use correlational or multivariate techniques that rely on the additivity and independence assumptions. Sometimes authors have used only one cultural bias as an explanation, which requires the independence assumption to hold.[329] There is, however, one type of analysis that avoids my critique. Some researchers characterize institutions like parties by referencing individual-level data, in which case the level of analysis is different. People's cultural biases are aggregated up to the institutional level and this composite of cultural biases is then used either as an explanans or as an explanadum. I have only tested these assumptions in an individual-level causal chain; therefore, my critique does not apply to other levels of aggregation.

[328] When the interaction effects become complicated and strong, compared with the direct effects, the meaning of additivity becomes purely technical. I am interested in the additivity of two biases, without accounting for the 72 potential interaction effects.

[329] An example of this is using degrees of environmental ideology and only one, the egalitarian, cultural bias as explanation for private recycling behavior (Olli, Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001).

The sixth implication of my analysis in this chapter is that a *reanalysis* of some of the survey-based work that uses four-dimensional cultural biases might be warranted. There is a need to establish to what degree the conclusions are influenced by these fallacies. In this chapter, I have tried to establish if the assumptions are correct or not. This is an issue different from trying to establish the extent to which erroneous or divergent results will flow from analyses that rely on these false assumptions. Until this issue has been settled, we do not know if we can trust the conclusions from previous research. If a reanalysis changes the conclusions, then we should consider a reanalysis of not just a few projects, but most of the research projects that are based on survey data.

The seventh implication is that these fallacies can give *a methodological explanation* for why transferring cultural theory to individual-level analysis was never the success Wildavsky expected it to be, despite 20 years of survey research (Wildavsky 1987; Verweij and Nowacki 2010).[330] I have proposed the use of cultural combinations as one way to avoid the dominant bias, additivity, and independence fallacies. These combinations keep the meaning of cultural biases visible without assuming that individuals are small copies of institutions. However, one must not interpret my results as the success expected by Wildavsky. I merely give a few suggestions for how to analyze survey data in light of these three fallacies. Judging the merit of these suggestions should wait until others repeat these analyses while using my suggestions.

Last but not least, researchers applying a *two-dimensional measurement model* should check whether these assumptions are valid in their data. In this chapter, my critiques of the assumptions apply only to analyses that rely on individual-level measurements of the four cultural biases as four potentially separate dimensions, not the grid-group as two fixed dimensions. A different measurement model changes what one can potentially find. Therefore, I am not willing to claim that my conclusions can be applied to research that uses a different measurement model.

Overall, these eight implications of my research are quite important for research on cultural theory. Therefore, it is worthwhile to do a thorough analysis, even if it reduces the readability of this chapter. Since I am interested in the relationship between individual and culture, I will be testing hypotheses on the level of cultural biases, which is one step up from the level of individuals. An example of such a hypothesis would be that the first-ranked bias has a larger effect on party preference than the second-ranked bias. An example of a pure individual-level hypothesis would be that respondents who reject egalitarianism and support individualism vote conservative. However, as we have already seen in Table 42 on page 412, these kinds of hypotheses did not help us to understand the relationship between individual and cultural biases.

The data I have is individual-level survey data. Therefore, in most cases I will classify individuals into categories according to their cultural biases and test if these

[330] See introduction to Chapter 7 on page 279 for more details.

cultural bias categories have the properties they are expected to have. In many ways, this is comparable to aggregating individual-level data one step up to the level of cultural biases in order to test the hypothesis at the proper level (Achen and Shively 1995:2,23).[331]

I will here briefly repeat some of the relevant findings from Chapter 10 and Chapter 11. If the reader accepts these findings, the reader should also accept that this particular way of operationalizing cultural biases could provide a valid basis for testing these assumptions.

Chapter 10, entitled Combinations of Cultural Biases, lays out the different ways to create cultural combinations, and compares hundreds of these in the search for useful assumptions. Here we learned that rejection does matter (p. 384): Dividing cultural biases into rejection, indifference, and support is useful (p. 386); we can often ignore the indifference in order to simplify people's cultural bias combinations; and adding a new bias to a combination increases its explanatory power, but less than the previous one (p.388). Unfortunately, a high number of biases increases complexity thus making it difficult to apply, and requires an increasingly higher number of respondents in order to be useful.

Chapter 11, entitled Party Preference and Cultural Bias, applied two of the variables proposed in Chapter 10. The findings from this chapter demonstrate that the cultural biases carry meaning that can be combined in a way that makes sense of party preferences. These findings provide us with an external validation of the operationalization.

In the current chapter, I will use *size of effect on party preference* as my independent variable because it can be calculated for every data source, and party preference is a variable that can contain multiple dimensions and meanings.[332] As the dependent variable, I will use the *combination of the two highest ranked cultural biases* because previous tests and experience show that this performs well. However, I am not studying party preference as I did in Chapter 11; the current topic pertains to the assumptions behind statistical analyses using cultural bias as measured in surveys.

It is difficult to keep analyses of dominance, additivity, and independence separate from each other because many of the empirical tests are dependent on several of the assumptions at the same time. Thus, no single test alone can determine any of the issues. However, the pattern emerging from a series of tests can reveal which one of the assumptions is failing, thus causing the rejection of the hypothesis. In particular, the tests of additivity are dependent on either dominance or

[331] I am thus doing a form of cross-level inference in the easy direction. Since I have individual-level data, I will not suffer from under-indentification as there is plenty of data for most tests. However, I have tried many analyses where there are too few respondents left in each cultural bias category, or where the number of potential interaction effects between cultural biases becomes so large that the analysis breaks down.

[332] Using a simple scale, like degrees of political participation, as a dependent variable would not have allowed the multiple dimensions of meaning in cultural biases to be visible.

independence as mechanisms behind the additivity. Nevertheless, I will treat these assumptions one by one for the sake of clarity.

This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I test the dominant bias assumption. Second, I test the additivity assumption. Third, I test the independency assumption. These three sections all use both sample and individual-level analyses. Fourth, I will explore some new possibilities for analysis on the level of combinations.[333]

The Dominant Bias Fallacy

Do individuals have a dominant bias? Even if a dominant cultural bias is common in households, one must be careful not to use this as an indicator of the presence of a dominant cultural bias on the individual level.

Previous research shows that the large majority of households have a dominant bias. However, the findings demonstrated that some households did not have a dominant bias; they were in a transition from one bias to another, or the husband and wife had made an alliance that balanced two cultural biases against each other (Dake and Thompson 1999; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994).[334]

For me at least, all households included in Part I presented a rather coherent image of themselves (see pages 145-255). The stories they told depicted the household as one culturally cohesive unit with one dominant cultural bias. I was expecting to find much more ambiguity or cultural biases just being less relevant in the households' everyday life and self-presentation. Every one of the eight households was dominated by support for one bias.

The presence of a dominant bias makes it easier to interact with these households because it creates predictability and offers a possibility to use cultural theory as a toolkit for intercultural communication and cooperation. However, social interaction is interaction between individuals, even if they are a part of institutions. The institutional version of cultural theory would perhaps claim that you could not remove individuals from their institutional contexts; an individual without a social setting is like an empty container. In social sciences, however, there is such strong pressure toward using survey methodologies that it is almost impossible for a theory to become accepted without relating to individual-level phenomena.

It is effortless to treat individuals as hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian, or fatalistic. However, this requires the presence of a dominant bias in individuals. If

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[333] The script "False assumptions for Survey Research v5.sps" has been used to produce all tables and figures in this chapter.

[334] This finding is trustworthy because the three researchers undertook classifications independently, each used their own methods, each examined the same 127 households, and each arrived at the same conclusions concerning which cultural bias was the basis for organizing each household.

there is no such dominant bias, other and more complicated ways to label and analyze cultural bias on the individual level must be used. The dominant bias assumption is also a prerequisite for using the coherent individual approach to cultural theory research (see page 294).

Can the surveys used in this thesis tell us something about dominant biases in individuals? We have seen in the previous chapters how cultural biases have been measured in two different large-scale, multi-sample surveys, and how it is possible to deal with the lack of additivity of cultural biases on the individual level through presenting individuals' cultural biases as combinations of support and rejection of each of the four cultural biases. None of the surveys available for my research are designed with the purpose of establishing the presence of a dominant cultural bias. Nevertheless, I believe there are several analyses that can reveal to us something about the presence of a dominant bias in individuals.

I will now ignore the meaning carried by cultural biases. I will use the information concerning the level of the first-ranked bias, while ignoring *which* bias it is. There are four cultural biases, and at the level of cultural biases, they should behave in the same way and be treated in the same way. However, at the individual level they are, of course, kept separate. To test the dominant bias fallacy we do not need to know which bias is the strongest one; if the dominant bias assumption holds, the first-ranked bias should always have the largest effect.[335] Similarly, if the effects of the biases are additive, we do not need to know which biases produce the effects, just the sizes of these effects.

The best way to test dominance is to search for the effects of the dominant bias. If the dominant cultural bias does not have an effect that is different from the three weaker biases, then the whole concept of dominant bias becomes rather meaningless. The first-ranked cultural bias is the best candidate for the dominant bias.[336] The following empirical traits should be present if the dominant cultural bias exists at the individual level.

H1 The first-ranked bias has a significant effect on party preference while the second-ranked bias does not.

H2 The effect of the second-ranked bias on party preference is less than three quarters of the effect of the first-ranked bias.

If these two traits are not present in the empirical material, we should treat the dominant cultural bias assumption as a fallacy.

[335] To predict which party a respondent prefers, we need to understand the meaning carried by cultural biases. Therefore, we need to identify which cultural bias combination the respondent prefers. In this chapter, however, I am interested in the magnitude of the effect that cultural biases have on party preference, not which party the respondent prefers.

[336] This is identical with the variable CultRankTriA1 (see page 364). The strength of a cultural bias is here understood as the deviation from the sample mean, thus the more extreme your cultural biases are, the stronger the cultural bias. The four cultural biases are then compared and ranked on the individual level.

Hypothesis testing normally involves the formulation of a research hypothesis, which represents the theoretical statement we hope is correct, and the matching null hypothesis that one is testing. Rejection of the null hypothesis will then strengthen our belief in the alternative hypothesis. It does not mean that we have proven the research hypothesis to be true, but it increases our belief in the likelihood of its truthfulness (Rozeboom 1960:420; Hanushek and Jackson 1977:341; Kanji 2006:2; Sheskin 2011:57). Since, my principal goal with this chapter is to demonstrate some fallacies, all hypotheses representing these fallacies are treated as null hypotheses, while the research hypotheses are only implied and never numbered.[337] Instead of creating confusion by repeatedly referring to the "null hypothesis", I will number each null hypothesis (as H1 and H2, above) so that it always will be clear which hypothesis is being tested. Each rejection of a hypothesis will thus weaken our belief in the particular assumption under scrutiny.

The Single Effect Hypothesis

In Table 52 below, we can see how the percent of variation explained is dependent on the number of biases used in the cultural bias combination. I will compare the effects of using only the first-ranked cultural bias with the effects of using only the second-ranked cultural bias as the independent variable. The explained variation is measured as the strength of association between a cultural bias variable and party preference from one table (like Table 42 on page 412).[338] The data comes from two different surveys using different items to measure cultural bias, and covers seven separate samples from five different countries (See pages 305 and 343).

The first five lines in Table 52 present the strength of association country by country. We can see that in Norway the effect of the first-ranked bias is 8.2 percent, while the effect of the second-ranked bias is 4.8 percent. The last three lines present the results from NEPS95.

[337] I am not using the classical hypothesis testing model, but rather a modified version of a null hypothesis significance testing model. In addition, I will be testing based on confindence intervals whenever applicable (Sheskin 2011: 69-75).

[338] In other words, it is U for a whole table with all the different values for cultural bias (*H, h, E, e, I, i, F, f,* and *a*) and the different party preferences in variable TOTPARTY. One could of course measure the size of the effect for each value, each party, and the adjusted standardized residual, but this would give us 81 different Us to relate to in each country. Here, I instead simplify and present only one value for U.

Table 52: The Effect of First-Ranked and Second-Ranked Biases on Party Preference by Sample. NOS99 and NEPS95. (Percent explained variance)

	Country	*First-ranked bias* Percent explained variance[c]	Uncertainty coefficient	Asymp. std. error[a]	Approx. sign.[b]	*Second-ranked bias* Percent explained variance[c]	Uncertainty coefficient	Asymp. std. error[a]	Approx. sign.[b]
NOS99	Norway	8.2	.082	.010	.000	4.8	.048	.008	.000
	Sweden	7.8	.078	.011	.000	7.7	.077	.011	.000
	Denmark	8.0	.080	.010	.000	5.2	.052	.008	.000
	Finland	6.0	.060	.009	.000	4.9	.049	.008	.000
	Iceland	15.8	.158	.018	.000	4.9	.049	.012	.032
	Total	4.7	.047	.004	.000	2.4	.024	.003	.000
NEPS95	Env.Org.	8.4	.084	.005	.000	4.9	.049	.004	.000
	General	8.1	.081	.008	.000	5.3	.053	.006	.000
	Total	8.5	.085	.004	.000	5.1	.051	.003	.000

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.
c. Percent explained variance = 100 * U.
All data are unweighted.[339]

The single effect hypothesis (H1) states that the first-ranked bias has a significant effect on party preferences while the second-ranked bias does not. If the dominant bias is dominant enough, the other biases should not contribute to explaining party preferences. We can see in Table 52 that in every sample, the association between the first-ranked bias and party preference is significant. Similarly, the second-ranked biases have small, but statistically significant effects on party preferences in every sample ($p<0.05$).[340] We can thus conclude that both the first-ranked bias and the second-ranked bias do have an effect in every one of the populations. However, in Iceland, there is more uncertainty about the effect of second-ranked bias, and there

[339] For NOS99, Gallup has provided a set of weights to correct for sampling errors in relation to age and gender, but these change the population estimates very little. The values of explained variance change slightly, but not so much that it changes which assocations are significant and the results of the hypothesis test. For NEPS95, no weights are provided.

[340] Here, we are performing multiple comparisons. Using an alpha of 0.05 means that the probability of making a type I error is 5 percent for every single test. This probability is the same for each test. Therefore, by repeating these tests, we are each time increasing the probability of getting significant results simply by chance. There are corrections that can be made that will make the total level of comparisons match the hypothesis (i.e. test the hypothesis for a whole familiy of tests at once). Examples of these kinds of corrections that could have been applicable in this case are Fisher's LSD, the Bonferroni-Dunn correction, the Sidák correction, Tukey's HSD, and the Scheffé test. (Sheskin 2011:903-916). These corrections are not made here because the repeated hypothesis tests are performed on *different* sets of data. However, the likelihood of getting a significant result is still equal to $1-(1-\text{alpha})^{1/\text{n of tests}}$.

is a 3 percent probability of falsely rejecting the single effect hypothesis. For all the other samples, and with a high degree of certainty, we can reject the single effect hypothesis. Overall, there is no empirical support for the single effect hypothesis.[341]

The Weak Second-Ranked Bias Hypothesis

The weak second-ranked bias hypothesis (H2) is narrower than the single effect hypothesis: It allows the second bias to have a statistically significant effect, while restricting the *size* of the effect.[342] Since the first-ranked bias is tested for dominance, it seems appropriate to require the effect of the second-ranked bias to be no more than 75 percent of the effect of the first one. If the effect of the second-ranked bias is larger than this, we can then reject the weak second-ranked bias hypothesis.

The first column in Table 53 shows the size of the first biases effect found in each random sample. Each sample can deviate from the true population. Confidence intervals are commonly calculated around a parameter found in the sample. In this case, a 95% confidence interval is calculated for the three-quarters of the first-ranked bias, which is the baseline for comparison with the effects of the second-ranked bias. In Norway, the confidence interval for the three-quarters level in the population ranges from 4.1 to 8.1 percent. The fifth column shows the measured effect of the second-rank bias in the sample. In Norway, the second-ranked bias was measured to explain 4.8 percent of the variation in party preferences. Based on information in Table 52, it can be estimated with 95% confidence that among the population, this parameter will be somewhere between 3.2 and 6.4 percent.

If the confidence intervals for the first- and second-ranked biases overlap, we know that the second-ranked bias is likely to have an effect among the population that is more than three quarters of the effect of the first-ranked bias. In the next to last column in Table 53, we can see the size of the overlap: With the sole exception of Iceland, the confidence intervals overlap in every sample.

[341] I have checked this hypothesis by using a support version of the cultural biases, and in every sample we can reject the single effect hypothesis, which allows us to make the same conclusion.

[342] I have controlled this test for the proportional strength of the first- and second-ranked biases at the individual level. There is no statistically significant relationship between the strength of the second-ranked bias (made relative to the strength of the first-ranked bias) and the effect of the second-ranked bias (made relative to the first bias).

Table 53: Confidence Intervals for the Effects of the First- and Second-Ranked Bias on Party Preference by Sample. NOS99 and NEPS95.

		First - ranked bias		*75% of the first-ranked bias among the population*		*Second-ranked bias*				*Over-lap*	*test*
	Country	Percent expl.	Sampling error	Lower limit	Upper limit	Percent expl.	Sampling error	Lower limit	Upper limit		
NOS99	Norway	8.2	2.0	4.1	8.1	4.8	1.6	3.2	6.4	2.2	Reject H2
	Sweden	7.8	2.1	3.8	7.9	7.7	2.1	5.6	9.8	6.0	Reject H2
	Denmark	8.0	1.9	4.2	7.9	5.2	1.5	3.7	6.7	2.5	Reject H2
	Finland	6.0	1.8	2.7	6.4	4.9	1.6	3.3	6.5	3.8	Reject H2
	Iceland	15.8	3.6	8.3	15.4	4.9	2.3	2.7	7.2	-1.1	Keep H2
	Total	4.7	0.7	2.8	4.2	2.4	0.5	1.9	2.9	0.2	
NEPS95	Env.Org.	8.4	1.1	5.2	7.3	4.9	0.8	4.1	5.8	0.6	Reject H2
	General	8.1	1.5	4.6	7.6	5.3	1.2	4.1	6.5	2.0	Reject H2
	Total	8.5	0.9	5.5	7.3	5.1	0.7	4.4	5.7	0.2	

All numbers are calculated from Table 52. Sampling error = 1.96*Standard Errors*100.
Lower limit = Percent explained variance – Sampling error. Upper limit = percent explained variance + sampling error.

The last column in Table 53 gives the results from a hypothesis tests for each sample, and for the NOS99 and the NEPS totals. We can see that H2 can be rejected in eight out of nine possible instances. Only in Iceland must we conclude that the second-ranked bias has a weak effect, while in all the other samples we must conclude that the effect of the second-ranked bias is too large to be considered weak. The weak second-ranked bias hypothesis is supported by the empirical findings of only the Iceland case, but not in any of the other Nordic countries.[343]

Dominant Bias Assumption and Mixed-Level Data

There is, however, one weakness in the above analysis. All analysis happens on the level of cultural biases as the effects of the first- and second-ranked biases are measured at the sample level. Since we are interested in whether there is a dominant

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[343] The same test using the support version of cultural biases allows us to reject H2 in every sample, except in Denmark and environmental organizations.

bias at the individual level, we need to check if the same phenomenon exists at the individual level.[344] Unfortunately, we cannot measure the magnitude of the effect of cultural bias at the individual level because this in many ways is first visible in a group of people. Therefore, the measured effects from Table 52 are inserted into a data file containing all respondents from all samples. In this way, it is possible to see how differences in individual-level balances of first-ranked and second-ranked biases can influence the differences found at sample level.

Individual-Level Check of the Single Effect Hypothesis

The fact that some individuals have a dominant cultural bias does not imply that the presence of a dominant bias is a general trait within the distribution of cultural biases. If the dominant bias is a general trait, and the absolute values are a better choice, as I will argue in the next chapter, the following empirically verifiable trait should exist:

H3 The effect of the first-ranked bias increases by the absolute value of that bias.

In other words, the more extreme values that individuals have on the first-ranked bias, the larger the expected effects. If H3 is rejected, then the value of the first-ranked bias at the individual level is unrelated to the size of the effect of the first-ranked bias at the sample level. In order to see the influence of rejection, we must use the absolute value of the first-ranked bias.

Cultural bias can be measured as support (every support is larger than any rejection) or as absolute values (a strong rejection is larger than a weak support).[345] The choice between these two measurements is dependent on how we understand the role of rejection of cultural biases at the individual level, which is the main topic for the next chapter. In my tests of the three assumptions in will only refer to the absolute value version of cultural biases. However, I have conducted the same tests using the support version, and will comment upon these in the footnotes.

We can also formulate a parallel hypothesis about the second bias. If the dominance assumption is correct, then increasing the value of the second-ranked bias should not reduce the effect of the first-ranked bias. It is impossible to imagine a mechanism that would allow the first-ranked bias to still be dominant even when its effect is reduced by increasing the value of the second-ranked bias. Therefore, the following empirically verifiable trait at the individual level should be present in data:

H4 The effect of the first-ranked bias does not diminish by increasing the absolute value of the second-ranked bias.

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[344] Making individual-level conclusions from associations that exist at the sample level is called the ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950).

[345] See pages 360 and 388.

These two hypotheses are variations of the single effect hypothesis that was tested earlier. Given that we did not find a clear effect at the sample level (H1 and H2), it would be surprising, but still quite possible, to find a clear effect at the individual level (H3 and H4).

In Table 54 below, we can see how some individual-level characteristics correlate with the sample-level effects across all samples. The columns contain individual-level characteristics while the row contains the sample-level effect. The cells show how these are related to each other.

Three individual-level characteristics are included: In the two first columns, we see the absolute values of both first- and second-ranked cultural biases, and in the third column, we see the individual-level difference between the absolute values of the two top-ranked biases. An example will clarify the difference. If a respondent scores 1 on the hierarchical bias and -2 on the egalitarian bias, the value of the first-ranked absolute bias would be 2, while value of the second-ranked bias would be 1. The difference between the two absolute values would be 1 (2-1=1). We are thus disregarding information about which bias the respondent is using; only the relationship between the first- and second-ranked biases is of interest now.

Table 54: Correlations between Individual CB traits and Sample Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95.

		Absolute value of first-ranked cb	*Absolute value of second-ranked cb*	*Dominance A - difference between absolute values of two strongest biases*
Effect of first-ranked bias A on party preference (sample level)[b]	Pearson correlation	.01	**-.03**	**.05**
	Significance	.28	.00[a]	.00
	Test result	Reject H3	Reject H4	Reject H5

All surveys are combined into one data file with 7 895 cases. Statistically significant correlations are in bold (p ≤ 0.01). H3 to H5 refer to the hypotheses tested. Inconsistent combinations are marked with gray.
a. Manually calculated one-tailed significance = 2-tailed / 2.
b. The effect of CultRankTriA1 on party preferences measured in U for each sample.

The correlations presented in Table 54 allow for an empirical check of several assumptions. Since I am disregarding the content of people's values and looking only at some structural characteristics of the cultural biases, it is not surprising to find only very weak correlations.

To evaluate H3, we must look at the first column, where we can see that the absolute value of the first-ranked bias does not have a statistically significant influence on the effect of the first-ranked bias at the sample level. Therefore, we must reject H3. This tells us that the level of the first-ranked bias is not important when we do not know whether it is the hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic bias. The effects we can find in other sections of this thesis are mostly related to the *content of a bias, not just the level*.

H4 has direction and therefore only statistically significant positive correlations will allow us to accept this hypothesis. It requires a one-sided hypothesis test, while SPSS calculates two-tailed significances. Therefore, it is divided by 2 prior to the hypothesis test.

To evaluate H4, we need to look at the second column. There, we find a statistically significant negative association between the absolute value of the second bias and the effect of first-ranked bias, although our hypothesis states that this association should be positive. Therefore, we must reject H4. The association is negative: The more extreme the second cultural bias is, the less effect the first-ranked bias has.[346] This points toward an equal relationship between the first-ranked and second-ranked biases.

We can thus reject H3 and H4, both of which are components of the single effect hypothesis. The individual-level values of the first-ranked bias are not related to the effect at the sample level, and increasing the value of the second-ranked bias on the individual level has a negative effect on the first-ranked bias at the sample level. This goes against assuming that the first-ranked bias is a dominant bias.

Individual-Level Check of the Weak Second Bias

If dominance exists, the difference between the levels of the first- and second-ranked biases should not have any influence on the effect of the first-ranked bias. On the other hand, if the strengths of the first- and second-ranked biases operate independently, we could get situations where the first-ranked bias is strong and the second-ranked bias is weak, and therefore the effects of the former resemble those of dominance. Fortunately, it is possible to evaluate this. We can formulate a parallel hypothesis about the weak second-ranked bias at the individual level.

> H5 Increasing the difference between the absolute values of the first- and second-ranked biases has no influence on the effect of the first-ranked biases.

This hypothesis claims that the correlation is zero in the population. To evaluate H5, we must look at the third column in Table 54 above, where we can see that the relationship between the difference of the two first-ranked biases and the effect of the first one is statistically significant and positive: The larger the difference between the two biases, the larger the effect of the first bias alone. Thus, we must

[346] It is possible to interpret this differently. The strength of this relationship is so weak that it would be possible to conclude that the test proves that a zero-level effect as the absolute value of second-ranked bias barely influences the effect of the first-ranked bias. A correlation of -0.03 is comparable with 0.1 percent explained variance, which is negligible.

conclude that increasing the difference between two ranked biases does not influence the effect of the first-ranked bias. This shows us that the third independence hypothesis can be rejected, even if the effects are very small.

At the individual level, all three hypotheses are rejected, which indicates that the dominant bias assumption does not receive empirical support. I have demonstrated that the absolute value of the second-ranked bias is negatively related to the effect of the first-ranked bias, and that the larger the difference between the absolute values of the first- and second-ranked biases, the larger is the effect of the first-ranked bias. Both of these individual-level traits are the opposite of what the dominant bias fallacy would claim. None of the significant empirical findings fit with the dominant bias assumption, given that we reject cultural bias as an important individual-level trait.[347]

To summarize, neither the sample-level findings nor the individual-level findings provide any support for the dominant bias assumption, thus indicating that we are better off when treating the dominant bias assumption as a fallacy in survey research.[348] If the first assumption is a fallacy, then what about the second assumption, namely the additivity assumption?

The Additivity Fallacy

The additivity assumption states that the effects of two cultural biases are additive. In principle, the additivity should apply to the effects of all four biases. For the sake of brevity, however, I will here check only the additivity of the two first-ranked biases.

The additivity assumption is dependent on the independence assumption. The independence assumption states that the effects of the biases are independent of the values of the other biases, thus making it possible to analyze them one by one. If the independence assumption fails, then we should also be cautious about trusting the summation of the effects. Nevertheless, in this section I will try to analyze the additivity assumption alone because analyzing them both together becomes messy. Hence, I will postpone the scrutiny of the independence assumption until the next section.

The additivity assumption has following empirically verifiable prediction:

[347] I have also checked these hypotheses by using the support version of cultural bias: H3 and H4 were rejected, while H5 was retained.

[348] One methodological explanation for the lack of a dominant bias is the lack of social context in the survey situation. This explanation is valid only if the sequential individual approach to cultural theory is the most appropriate. In this case, people change their dominant bias from situation to situation. In a survey devoid of context, this type dominance would remain undetected.

H6 The sum of the effects from the first- and second-ranked biases, as measured one by one, equals the effect of the same biases measured in a combination.

Combination in this context means that we use cultural combinations like *He, Ef*, and *Eh* to predict party preferences. An example based on data from the NEPS95 general sample can be found in Table 91 (see page 556). Similar information from each sample is collected in Table 55 below, where we can see that in the NEPS95 general sample, the combination of two first-ranked biases explains 21.9 percent of the differences in party preferences.[349]

In Table 55, we can see the same effects of the first- and second-ranked bias as those presented in Table 52, but now they are added together. The sum of effects from the first- and second-ranked biases explains 13 percent of the total variation in party preferences in the sample from Norway. With a 95 percent confidence, we can estimate that the true value of the uncertainty coefficient in Norway means that the explained variance lies between 9.4 to 16.5 percent. The combination of the first- and second-ranked cultural biases explains 21.9 percent of the total variation in the sample, which is equal to the 19.7 to 24.2 percent explained variation in the population. We can see that in Norway, the confidence intervals do not overlap, and thus H6 can be rejected in the case of Norway. In Norway, the sum of the effects from the two first biases does not equal the effect of the two first-ranked biases, as the combination is a more potent explanation than the sum of first and second biases.

The same applies to every country in the Nordic survey, but not when the five countries are analyzed together at the Nordic level. On the Nordic level, the difference is much smaller: The combination explains 9.0 percent while the sum explains 7.1 percent of party preferences, making the difference between these two to just below 2 percent in the sample. When NOS99 is analyzed country by country, the differences are much larger, ranging from 8.6 percent in Denmark to 13.1 percent in Sweden. If the additivity hypothesis was correct, there should be a high degree of overlap between the confidence intervals.

[349] There is one small difference. In the table in the appendix, combinations (rows) with less than 10 respondents have been excluded because the percentages on very small samples are highly prone to sample errors. By contrast, these combinations are included in Table 55 because U takes sample size into account.

Table 55: The Effect of the Combination of Two First Cultural Biases on Party Preference by Sample (Percent Explained Variance)

Survey	*Sample*	*Sum of first and second*	*Lower limit*	*Upper limit*	*Combination of two first-ranked biases*	*Lower limit*	*Upper limit*	*Overlap*	*Test*
NOS99	Norway	13.0	9.4	16.5	21.9	19.7	24.2	-3.16	Reject H6
	Sweden	15.5	11.3	19.7	28.6	26.0	31.3	-6.31	Reject H6
	Denmark	13.2	9.9	16.6	21.8	19.5	24.1	-2.96	Reject H6
	Finland	10.9	7.5	14.3	22.1	19.9	24.4	-5.53	Reject H6
	Iceland	20.8	14.9	26.6	32.5	28.6	36.3	-2.05	Reject H6
	Nordic total	7.1	5.8	8.3	9.0	8.1	9.9	0.24	
NEPS95	Env. Org.	13.3	11.4	15.2	16.5	15.3	17.8	-0.12	Reject H6
	General	13.4	10.6	16.2	21.7	19.8	23.5	-3.65	Reject H6
	NEPS Total	13.6	12.1	15.1	15.6	14.6	16.6	0.55	

The percent of explained variance is calculated by multiplying the uncertainty coefficients by 100. The sum of first and second is calculated from Table 52. All uncertainty coefficients (sum and combination) have an approximate significance of .000. The combination of the two first biases = CultBiasTriA2.
Sampling error = 1.96 * standard errors * 100. The lower limit = percent of explained variance – sampling error. The upper limit is percent of explained variance + sampling error.

If we look at the results from NEPS95, we can see in the general sample a large improvement of 8.3 percentage points in the effect of using cultural combinations compared with the sum of single biases. In the sample consisting of members of environmental organizations, the difference is only 3.2 percentage points. It is possible that being a member of an environmental organization influences party preference through mechanisms other than cultural bias. Nevertheless, we must reject H6 in both of these samples. The effect from the combination is so much larger than the sum of effects from the two biases that it is not likely to be created by chance.[350]

When compared to any of the single samples, the totals in both NOS99 and NEPS95 have smaller differences between the effects of the sums and the combinations. The fact that both surveys have the same pattern suggests that the combinations are more context sensitive than the first or second biases. As long as cultural biases carry meaning and cultural combinations carry even more meaning, it is easy to see that the meanings they carry will differ from one cultural context to another. We should therefore not expect cultural theory to work well in analyses where many different contexts are lumped together. The party preference questions in these surveys refer to national elections. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that the strongest patterns of meaning appear at the national levels.

[350] The same test using the support version of cultural biases allows us to reject H6 in every one of the samples.

Cultural theory in its very general form can apply the same categories in different countries, but a closer attention to details would probably reveal that the content of these categories is no longer identical. The meaning carried by them will be different. Egalitarianism in one country is not necessary the same as it is in every other country.

Overall, there is no empirical support for the additivity assumption when analyzed at the appropriate national level. However, the additivity hypothesis must also be examined at the individual level because it is possible to have sample-level findings that do not correspond with what is happening at the individual level, as I have already argued (see page 437).

The Additivity Hypothesis at the Individual Level

We have seen in Chapter 11, entitled *Party Preference and Cultural Bias,* how the effects from single cultural biases seem to change when they are analyzed as a combination.[351] However, this could be just a random trait. I will therefore, test the additivity hypothesis at the individual level in an effort to reveal if it is a more general trait. I will do so by studying how individual-level characteristics are related to the additive effects of cultural biases at the sample level, as seen in Table 55. Given that the additivity assumption holds, the following empirical predictions should also be true:

H7 When the first or the second bias increases at the individual level, the sum of the effects grows at the sample level

This must be reformulated to fit the different operationalizations available:

H7a There is a positive relationship between the absolute value of the first-ranked bias at the individual level and the additive effect at the sample level

H7b There is a positive relationship between the absolute value of the second-ranked bias at the individual level and the additive effect at the sample level

It is also possible to incorporate the relative levels of the additive effect and the combination into an empirical prediction that should be true if the additivity assumption holds:

H8 When either the first or the second bias increases at the individual level, the effect of the combination does not grow more than the additive effect.

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[351] This is also visible in the decomposed effect in Table 91 on page 556.

This must be reformulated to fit the variables available:

H8a When the absolute of value of the first-ranked bias increases, the effect of the combination does not grow more than the additive effect.

H8b When the absolute value of the second-ranked bias increases, the effect of the combination does not grow more than the additive effect.

If there is pure additivity, then the levels of the first and second biases in relation to each other should not matter. For example, if we add the effects of support for hierarchy and support for egalitarianism together, it should not make any difference which one of these two is the strongest. The difference between the levels should also be of no consequence. The effects should be additive as they are. Thus, if the additivity assumption holds, then we should obtain the highest levels of added effect when both biases have a high value. Moreover, when we have one small value (close to zero) and one large value, the additive effect should be smaller. In this case, the following prediction should be true:

H9 The difference between the absolute values of the two first-ranked biases at the individual level has a negative relationship with the additive effect at the sample level.

The influence on the additive and combination effects should also be the same if the additivity assumption holds:

H10 When the difference between the two first-ranked biases grows, the additive and combination effects diminish equally.

These hypotheses can be evaluated with the same kind of analysis as was previously used to evaluate sample-level findings at the individual level (see Table 54 on page 439). Hypotheses H7 and H9 can be evaluated by using significance tests, while H8 and H10 refer to a relationship between two effects, and will be evaluated by comparing the confidence intervals for regression coefficients.

In Table 56 below, we can see how the individual traits influence the sum of the effects of the two first biases (measured one by one). Each column is marked with the hypothesis that is tested by it.

Table 56: Correlations between Individual CB traits and Additive Sample Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95.

		Absolute value of first-ranked cb	*Absolute value of second-ranked cb*	*Difference in absolute values*
Additive effect	Pearson correlation	.01	**-.04**	**.05**
	Sig. (1-tailed)[352]	.14	.00	.00
	Test	Reject H7a	Reject H7b	Reject H9

All surveys are combined into one data file containing 7 895 cases. Statistically significant correlations are in bold ($p \leq 0.01$). Additive effect = the effect of the first- ranked bias + the effect of the second-ranked bias.

We can quickly reject the hypotheses H7a and H7b because the relations are either non-significant or significant and negative. Thus, we know that the absolute value of second bias at the individual level has a statistically significant influence on the sample level additive effect, while the first bias does not have such an effect. However, the absolute value of the second bias has a negative effect: More extreme values of the second bias correspond with lower observed additive effects at the sample level. We can see that the absolute value of the second bias has a weak negative correlation (-.04) with the additive effect of the two first biases. Thus, the more extreme opinions the respondent has on the second bias, the weaker the additive effect becomes. Overall, the additivity assumption did not receive any empirical support from the testing of the two versions of H7.

The next hypothesis, namely H9, states that the relationship is negative. In the last column, we can see a statistically significant, but weak positive relationship (.05) between the difference of the absolute values and the additive effects. We must therefore reject H9. The larger the difference between the absolute values of the two first ranked biases, the larger the additive effect is. The effect is largest when the difference is maximized (one extreme bias and one close to the average).

Let us now take a step forward and look at H8. In Table 57 below, we can see the confidence intervals that are required for testing these hypotheses. Each row is a summary of one bivariate regression analysis, where the first column shows the dependent variable and the second column shows the independent variable. The standardized coefficients are equal to the Pearson coefficients in Table 56. The confidence intervals are calculated for each non-standardized regression coefficient.[353]

[352] SPSS calculates two-tailed significance tests for Pearson correlations, while H7 and H9 have a specific direction. Therefore, the calculated significances are divided by two in order to get the correct value for these hypothesis tests.

[353] The underlying cultural bias variables are measured on the same scale, and their means and variations are similar enough to make them comparable as unstandardized coefficients.

Table 57: Overview of Bivariate Regressions for Individual CB traits and Additive Sample Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95.

		Unstandardized coefficients		*Std. coefficients*			*Confidence interval for b*			
Independent	Dependent	b	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig.	Lower limit	Upper limit	Over-lap	Test
Absolute value of first-ranked cb	Additive effect	.085	.078	.01	1.08	.278	-0.07	0.24		Reject
Absolute value of first-ranked cb	Combination effect	.530	.152	.04	3.47	.001	0.23	0.83	-0.01	H8a
Absolute value of second-ranked cb	Additive effect	-.340	.108	-.04	-3.14	.002	-0.55	-0.13		Reject
Absolute value of second-ranked cb	Combination effect	-.365	.210	-.02	-1.74	.082	-0.78	0.05	-0.65	H8b
Difference in absolute value	Additive effect	.46	.10	.05	4.39	.000	0.25	0.66		Keep
Difference in absolute value	Combination effect	1.24	.20	.07	6.11	.000	0.84	1.64	0.18	H10

All surveys are combined into one data file with 7 895 cases. The constants are not shown. The variables are the same as in Table 56. The 95 percent confidence interval = b ± 1.96 SE.

In order to test these two H8 hypotheses, we must look at Table 57 above. First, the standardized coefficient for the combination should be smaller than the effect it is compared with. Second, and more importantly, when we compare population estimates for the unstandardized regression coefficients, they should not overlap. Overlap tells us that we do not know which one increases more. Therefore, any overlap will allow us to reject the hypothesis. According to the data, we can reject both versions of H8. In each pair of regression coefficients, the influence on the effect of the combination was larger than it was on the additive effect, which is the opposite of what the additivity assumption would predict.

The structure of H10 is different. It states that the effects diminish equally. Thus, no overlap means that the hypothesis must be rejected. We can see in Table 57 how the confidence intervals for the third comparison do overlap, and therefore we should keep H10 (When the difference between the two first-ranked biases grows, the additive and combination effects diminish equally).

Thus, the regression analysis gives us mixed answers. Some of the hypotheses that match the additivity assumptions seem to be valid for the population, while others are rejected.

In Table 58 below, we can see an overview of test results concerning the additivity of effects assumption. The sample-level analysis did not show any empirical support for the additivity assumption in any of the seven samples, while the individual-level tests were mixed. Nevertheless, out of the six hypothesis tests at the individual level, the additivity assumption was weakened five times and strengthened only once, which severely weakens our belief in the additivity assumption.[354]

Table 58: Results of Hypothesis tests on Additivity of Biases

Level	Type of phenomenon	Test result
Sample	Addition of first and second gives same effect as a combination of first and second bias	Reject H6 in every sample
Individual	First grows and additive effects grow	Reject H7a
	Second grows and additive effects grow	Reject H7b
	Increasing distance between first and second reduces additive effect	Reject H9
	When first grows, the combination does not grow more than additive effect	Reject H8a
	When second grows, the combination does not grow more than the additive effect	Reject H8b
	When the difference between two biases grows, the additive and combination effects diminish equally	Keep H10

Even if the results are not strong enough to conclude with confidence that H10 must be rejected for the population, the direction in the sample is the opposite of what we would expect to find if the additivity assumption holds. Overall, rather than relying on the notion of a dominant bias, we should try to find some other way to understand cultural biases at the individual level. After all, the superior performance achieved by the combination of the two strongest biases suggests that other factors are at play in the formation of political preferences.

To summarize, the findings at the sample level did not demonstrate support for the assumption that effects of the biases can simply be added together. The additivity hypothesis was rejected in every sample. At the individual level, five of the six hypotheses were rejected. All in all, this indicates that we are better off when treating the assumption of additivity as a fallacy in survey research. If the two first assumptions are fallacies, what about the third one—i.e., the independence of effects assumption?

[354] I have tested these same hypotheses by using the support version of cultural biases and received very similar results. The only difference was that H8b was accepted while H10 was rejected.

The Independence of Effects Fallacy

The independence of effects assumption states that it is possible to analyze the effects of cultural biases one by one. If the cultural biases influence each other's effects, analyses using just one cultural bias can become unreliable. In the next section, the analysis will use two top-ranked biases simultaneously in a combination. An example of an analysis of the influence that cultural combinations have on party preferences has already been presented in Chapter 11 (see page 391). The big difference is that this time we are trying to find out if the independence of effects assumption receives empirical support.

The independence assumption and the dominance assumption rule each other out.[355] If the dominant bias assumption was correct, then the other biases would not have independent effects, as their effects would be more or less canceled out by the dominant bias. Since we have just learned that the dominant bias assumption is a fallacy, we might be tempted to conclude that the independence assumption is correct. However, just because they both cannot be correct simultaneously does not mean that one of them is necessarily true. Therefore, the independence assumption must also be properly tested.

The independence of effects is not the same as the independence of variables. In statistics, the concept of independence of variables is well established: "Two random variables are independent if the conditional distribution is identical to the marginal distribution of each variable" (Hanushek and Jackson 1977:330). This type of independence can be violated if the correlation between cultural biases becomes too high (see Table 33 on page 350). However, this type of independence is about the distribution of values, not about their effects, which is my current concern.

If the independence assumption is correct, there should be no interaction effects.[356] There are a few empirically verifiable predictions that follow from the independence assumption:

> H11 The effect of a bias is the same no matter what kind of values the other biases have.

From this, I infer the following testable predictions:

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[355] There is a theoretical exception when the effect of the second bias is zero. In this case, we can accept the dominance, additivity, and independence assumptions at the same time, but as we have already seen during the test in Chapter 2, the effects of the second biases are not zero.

[356] A generalized log-linear model with a multinomial independent variable could in theory be used to study the interaction effects between the four cultural biases and party preference as the independent variable. Unfortunately, this leads to a contingency table with 892 cells, and since each of my samples typically contains close to 1000 respondents, it is impossible to get reliable results (Goodman 1984). To put it simply, we cannot make one analysis that contains all interaction effects. The problem must be divided into sub-problems. In addition, I believe that a larger number of readers can more easily follow an analysis that uses cross tables rather than one that uses estimates from the generalized log-linear analysis.

H11a The effect of a combination of two biases is the same regardless of the order of the biases.

H11b The effect of a combination of two biases is the same regardless of the order of the biases for every combination pair in a sample.

Another verifiable prediction that follows from the independence assumption relates to changes of values in the first bias:[357]

H12 The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection.

All tests will be performed with data from both NOS99 and NEPS95. I will compare the effects in small groups of people, thus bringing the analysis as close to the individual level as possible.

The Order of Biases in a Combination Does Matter

I will first test H11a because this test provides us with the evidence needed to test H11b. In order to test H11a, we can compare pairs of combinations that have the same biases, but ones arranged in different orders.

Table 59 below contains an example of one such pair, *eH* vs. *He*, from the general population sample in NEPS95. I am comparing the effect of the order for two biases: rejection of egalitarian bias combined with support for hierarchical bias. The cultural bias with the largest absolute value is ranked first. We can see that there are only 11 respondents with an *eH* combination and 16 with a *He* combination. The biggest difference is that the Christian Party is preferred by *He* respondents while the Conservative Party is preferred by the *eH* respondents—ones that also have difficulties in deciding who to vote for. Are these small differences enough to make any conclusions?

The differences in voting between these two groups are now reduced to only one difference: the order of the biases. We can see that the explained variance is 13.9 percent, which is substantial. More importantly perhaps, it is also statistically significant ($p<.05$). We can thus conclude that even if the sample is very small, the difference is large enough for us to believe that we will also find a difference in the population. Therefore, we must reject H11a, and conclude that the order of the biases matters in this particular combination.

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[357] A theoretically parallel hypothesis that could be used instead of H12 is "the effect of the dominant bias does not change because of the second bias."

Table 59: Party Preference by CB pair (*eH* and *He*) in the NEPS95 General Sample. (Count and Directional Measures)

Top two-ranked biases	*SV*	*DNA*	*Sp*	*V*	*Krf*	*H*	*Frp*	*Other*	*Dont know*	*Will not vote*	*Total*
eH	0	2	2		0	4	2		1	0	11
He	1	3	3		4	0	1		3	1	16
Total	1	5	5		4	4	3		4	1	27

U = .139 Asymp. std. error[a] = .037 Approx. T[b] = 3.642 Approx. sig.[c] = .040
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.

In order to be able to reach a conclusion on a more general basis, I have performed the same test for each pair where both combinations contained more than 10 respondents, and for each sample in the NEPS95 data. The results from these tests are presented in Table 60 below, where we can find the same *eH-He* pair, which we just saw in Table 59 above. In addition, we can find the results for all 16 pairs of combinations for both the members of environmental organizations and for the general public.

We can see in Table 60 below that there are several combinations, like *eF,* where changing the order makes a big difference. However, *fH* is the only combination that is significant in both samples.

In the fourth column, we can see the results for the hypothesis test for each pair of combinations. In the sample of the general public, we can reject H11a 3 times out of 16. In the sample of environmental organization members, we can reject it 5 times out of 16. If we combine these results, we are then rejecting one out of four hypothesis tests, which indicates that there is something wrong with H11a, while for three out of four combinations, the order of biases does not make much difference. Nevertheless, an assumption that is in error for a quarter of the pairs will guide us poorly and should be replaced.

Table 60: Percent of Party Preferences Explained by Change in Order of CB pair. NEPS95.

Sample	*CB Pair*	*Percent explained variance*	*Asymp. std.error*	*Approx. sig.*	*Test H11a*	*Test H11b*
Env.org.	eH-He	8.6	2.99	.306	Keep H11a	
	eh-he	8.4	2.79	.024	Reject H11a	
	eI-Ie	4.8	2.54	.405	Keep H11a	
	eF-Fe	13.9	3.18	.034	Reject H11a	
	ef-fe	5.6	3.20	.196	Keep H11a	
	EH-HE	5.7	2.26	.404	Keep H11a	
	Eh-hE	2.1	.68	.005	Reject H11a	
	Ei-iE	.8	.56	.734	Keep H11a	
	EF-FE	4.6	1.99	.355	Keep H11a	Reject H11b
	Ef-fE	1.9	.88	.279	Keep H11a	
	Hi-iH	5.9	3.13	.592	Keep H11a	
	hi-ih	1.9	.73	.010	Reject H11a	
	fi-if	3.6	1.56	.106	Keep H11a	
	fH-Hf	12.0	2.65	.002	Reject H11a	
	fh-hf	1.8	.93	.475	Keep H11a	
	Fh-hF	2.2	1.33	.338	Keep H11a	
	N	16	16	16		
General	eH-He	13.9	3.70	.040	Reject H11a	
	eh-he	2.5	1.67	.877	Keep H11a	
	eI-Ie	2.8	1.85	.570	Keep H11a	
	eF-Fe	7.0	3.29	.100	Keep H11a	
	ef-fe	7.2	3.55	.117	Keep H11a	
	Eh-hE	5.6	2.30	.565	Keep H11a	
	Ei-iE	5.1	2.12	.247	Keep H11a	
	EF-FE	9.5	3.09	.248	Keep H11a	
	Ef-fE	6.2	3.14	.379	Keep H11a	Reject H11b
	Hi-iH	8.5	4.36	.285	Keep H11a	
	hi-ih	1.4	1.74	.961	Keep H11a	
	fi-if	5.2	2.67	.541	Keep H11a	
	fH-Hf	11.3	3.54	.025	Reject H11a	
	fh-hf	6.3	2.96	.152	Keep H11a	
	FH-HF	8.0	2.96	.040	Reject H11a	
	Fh-hF	7.7	2.81	.346	Keep H11a	
	N	16	16	16		

A statistician might point out that with repeated testing, there are likely to be some false rejections by chance. Therefore, we should instead be testing H11b: The effect of a combination of two biases is the same regardless of the order of the biases for every combination pair in a sample. There are several ways to do this, and I have decided not employ the commonly used Bonferroni correction because it is not the most efficient correction, and because it wastes some of the power of tests (*Bonferroni correction* 2011; Sheskin 2011:906). In addition, the Bonferroni correction only gives us significance values that are adjusted for multiple comparisons. I will instead use a sequential test for the parameter of a Bernoulli population[358] (Kanji 2006:Test 70), which has the advantage of allowing us to calculate how many significant results will go to support or weaken the original hypothesis, or be inconclusive toward it. To put it simply, the sequential test for a Bernoulli population is more apt in solving the problem at hand and making the results easier to understand.

In this case, it is sufficient with 2 rejections out of 16 tests to reject the hypothesis, while only one rejection would be inconclusive.[359] We can see in Table 60 above that in the sample of environmental organization members, 5 tests are significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, H11b can be rejected in relation to the environmental organization members. Similarly, there are three significant results in the general population sample, thus allowing us to reject H11a three times. In other words, there are three pairs of combinations where order makes a difference. Given this, we can also reject H11b for the general population in NEPS95.

In order to strengthen our trust in the results, the same tests are also performed on the NOS99 survey. The results are presented in Table 94, which is placed in the appendix because of its size (page 555).

For Norway, H11a is rejected only once (*eI-Ie*). There are several combinations where the change in the order of the biases explains roughly 10 percent, but due to the small n, these are not statistically significant. Since we have performed 11 tests and got 1 rejection, based on the test by Kanji, the results are *inconclusive* for H11b as applied to Norway.

As for Denmark, there are four statistically significant results: For the combinations *eh-he, eI-Ie, ei-ie,* and *FH-HF*, changing the order does matter in the population, which allows us to reject H11a 4 times out of 13. This result allows us to *reject* H11b as applied to Denmark.

Moving on to Sweden, there is only one statistically significant result (*fh-hf*), which leads to the same conclusion as made for Norway concerning H11b: The results are *inconclusive*; based on this evidence it is not possible to decide with confidence what the status of H11b is.

Finally, we turn our attention to Finland and Iceland. In the former, there are three statistically significant results (*EH-HE, Ei-iE,* and *If-fI*). We can *reject* H11b in the case of Finland due to having 3 rejections out of 15 tests. As for the latter case, there are 2 statistically significant results (*ef-fe, fh-hf*). We can reject H11b in the case of Iceland due to having 2 rejections out of 12 tests.

Every Nordic country contained pairs where the order of two first-ranked biases makes a difference for party preferences. In samples from Denmark, Finland, and

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[358] This test requires that the tests are independent of each other, which these tests are since each one is done on a sub-sample containing only one combination pair. Each case can belong to only one test.

[359] For additional details behind this calculation, see Table 90 on page 554 in the appendix.

Iceland the number of pairs is high enough to conclude that the order of first-ranked biases makes a difference in the population. However, in both the Norwegian and Swedish samples, there were just one such pair, thus making it impossible to confidently reject or accept H11b.

The results from testing the independence assumption by looking at the effect of changing the order of the two first-ranked biases can be summarized as follows: First, there are many combinations of cultural bias pairs where the order of biases does make a difference. In the sample of members from environmental organizations, which is the largest sample available, H11a is rejected 5 times out of 16 compared to 3 times out of 16 in the general sample. Among the Nordic countries, H11a is rejected four times in Denmark, three times in Finland, twice in Iceland, once in Norway, and once in Sweden. Second, in five samples out of seven we can reject the hypothesis that there are no pairs of cultural biases where the order of the two first biases makes a difference (H11b). In two of the samples, the results were inconclusive because there was just one pair of cultural biases where the order did make a difference. Even in these two cases, however, one cannot conclude that the results give support for the independence assumption. So far, the independence of effects assumption has not received any empirical support.

The Second-Ranked Bias has a Larger Effect when the First-Ranked Bias is a Rejection

The second hypothesis we need to assess is the independence of effects assumption, or H12. This hypothesis states that "The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection." As a necessary preparation for testing H12, I will first present a sample-by-sample analysis of the effects that the two biases have on party preferences. To study the effects that the two top-ranked biases have on party preferences, it is useful to do it on a sample-by-sample basis because the relationship between parties and culture varies from one country to the next. If we organize all respondents by sample and their first-ranked biases, we get roughly 100 respondents in each group. Thus, we can study how the second bias influences party preference while we keep the first bias constant.

In Table 61 below, we can see the party preferences from the general NEPS95 sample for those 156 respondents whose first-ranked bias is rejection of egalitarianism. Close to the bottom, we can see that in total, the Conservative party receives 46 percent of the vote in this group and the Labor party receives 12 percent. When we also take into consideration the effect of the second bias, the preference for the Conservative party varies from 23 percent (*ei*) to 92 percent (*eF*). The cultural combination with the highest preference for the Labor party, namely *ei,* also has the lowest level of support for the Conservative party—at 23 percent. Conversely, the cultural combination with the highest level of support for the

Conservative party, namely *eF*, has the lowest level of support for the Labor party (0 percent). We can see how the inclusion of the second bias changes party preferences quite radically.

Table 61: Party Preference in Norway for Rejection of Egalitarian Bias as First-Ranked Bias controlled for by the Second-Ranked Bias. NEPS95. (Percent)

First Ranked	*Second Ranked*[360]	*Soc.left*	*Soc.dem.*	*Agrar.*	*Lib.*	*Christ.*	*Cons.*	*Progr.*	*Greens*	*Other*	*Total*
e		3.2	14.3	27.0	1.6	4.8	30.2	7.9	1.6	9.5	100.0
	f	.7	10.4	23.9	3.7	4.5	48.5	3.0	.7	4.5	100.0
	F	7.7					92.3				100.0
	h	3.4	16.9	12.4	4.5	2.2	50.6	2.2	3.4	4.5	100.0
	H		16.7	19.0	4.8	9.5	33.3	14.3		2.4	100.0
	i		20.6	29.4	2.9	5.9	23.5		2.9	14.7	100.0
	I	1.6	7.1	16.5	7.9	2.4	54.3	3.9	.8	5.5	100.0
	Total	1.8	12.2	19.7	4.6	4.0	46.2	4.4	1.4	5.8	100.0

U = 0.09 Approx. sig. = 0.305
The table contains only those 156 respondents from the general sample who have *e* as their first-ranked bias.

On the bottom of Table 61, we can see that the effect of the second bias explains 9 percent of variation in party preferences among these respondents. However, because of the small sample size, the results are uncertain and not statistically significant. The number of respondents is very small given the number of cells in the table, and we are pushing the limits of what is possible to analyze. In other words, we cannot be certain that the observed effect of the second bias (9 percent) exists in the population. There is a fair chance that in the population, there is no or even a negative effect. We can see that there are large differences in party preferences between the different cultural combinations, but we must remember that the number of respondents in each cell is small, thus making the results vulnerable to the influence of random effects.

I have repeated this analysis for every country and every first-ranked bias in NOS99, and used the emerging pattern to examine how the relationship between the first-ranked and the second-ranked bias is dependent on the qualities of the first-ranked bias. Not all first-ranked biases are equal in their effects.

In order to complete this analysis for all combinations in the seven samples, we need 40 tables like the one listed as Table 61.[361] The necessary pieces of

[360] On the first line, we can see that the second-ranked bias is presented as a blank entry. This indicates that the second bias is close to the sample average. To simplify the presentation, all weak biases like this are aggregated together (see Does Indifference Make Any Difference? on page 386).

information from these tables are collected into Table 62 below. We can see how the effect of the second bias is dependent on the content of the first-ranked cultural bias. On the first line in Table 62, we can see the same non-significant, 9 percent effect derived from adding the second bias for all the respondents in Norway who have *e* as their first bias. On the second line, we can see that when the first-ranked bias is *E,* the second bias has a statistically significant, 13 percent effect on party preferences. Thus, *E* as the first bias differentiates less between the parties than *e* does as the first bias. In addition, this is the only first bias where the second bias does have a statistically significant effect.

In Sweden, the second bias has a significant effect when the first bias is *f, h, i*, or *I.* Similarly, *f* and *i* in Denmark*, f* in Finland*,* and *e* in Iceland are the first biases where second bias has a significant effect. One way to interpret this is that there are differences between the countries concerning which biases are on their own insufficient to explain party preferences, or which first biases benefit the most from adding the second bias. Cultural bias combinations do not influence the party preferences in the same way in every Nordic country. This should not be a surprise, as the each country has its own political history.

Attempting to interpret the results for all Nordic countries as a whole brings us to the group labeled Nordic in Table 62 below. Because of the increased number of respondents in every cell, many of the effects are statistically significant, even if they are much smaller. We can see that the effect of the second bias is significant when the first bias is *e, E, f, h,* or *i.* Conversely, when the first bias is *H, F,* or *I* the second bias does not have a significant effect on party preferences. Notice how the second bias does not add that much when the first bias is a supportive one. However, the second-ranked bias is useful in explaining party preferences if the first bias is a rejection.

If we aggregate together all the first biases, we can see that the second bias has a 2.6 percent effect (Nordic total). We can compare this with the effects of the second bias for a particular value of the first bias. The effects range from a low 3.4 percent (first bias *H*) to a high 9.5 percent (first bias *F*). Thus, the effect of the second bias is higher for any given first bias versus the effect when all four different biases are aggregated together. This can only be interpreted as the second bias having a different influence on party preferences depending on which bias is ranked first. One cannot just add the effects together without losing the meaning of the cultural biases.

Similarly, if we compare the effect of the second biases at the Nordic level, which is 2.6 percent, to the effect these biases have in each country, we find that the effect in each country is larger than the effect at the Nordic level. Thus, Norway has 5.1 percent, Sweden has 7.5 percent, Denmark has 5.7 percent, Finland has 4.8 percent,

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[361] The row percentages from these 40 tables are collected in Table 93 in the appendix starting on page 558. This table gives a quite detailed view of how cultural combinations are related to party preferences country by country. The information is the same as that presented in Table 84 on page 542, although it is organized somewhat differently and presented country-by-country.

and Iceland has 5.3 percent. This makes sense if the effects that the cultural biases have on party preferences are country dependent. We lose about half of the effect of the second biases when we analyze the data at the Nordic level. The lost effect tells us that there are country specific components at work, like historically determined differences between parties. Therefore, it is useful to analyze the data country by country.

Finally, we are ready to test H12[362]. We will do so by comparing those tests where the first-ranked bias was rejection of a cultural bias with those tests where the first-ranked bias was support for a cultural bias.

In Table 62 below, we can see that among all the analyses done on the Nordic countries, only once were we able to obtain a significant effect from a second bias when the first bias is support (*E* in the sample from Norway). If we select those tests where the first bias is a rejection, the second bias had a statistically significant effect three times in sample from Sweden, and once in the samples from Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. The low statistical significances are closely connected with the high number of categories relative to the number of respondents. These analyses will now be repeated on the NEPS95 data in order to strengthen our trust in the results.

Table 63 below is similar to Table 64, although in the former we are looking at the environmental organization members and general samples. We can see that in the general sample, the effect of the second bias is significant only when the first bias is *f*, while in the environmental sample, the effect of the second bias is significant when the first bias is *E, f, h*, or *i*.[363] If we combine these samples, the effect of the second bias is significant when the first bias is *e, E, f, F, h,* or *I*.

When aggregating together all the first biases, the effect of all second biases is 4.9 percent in the environmental organization sample and 5.3 percent in the general sample. Given a particular first-ranked cultural bias, every single one of the effects of the second biases is higher than these values: These effects range from 7.9 percent to 18.7 percent among environmentalists, and from 11.5 to 18.6 in the general sample. This difference can be interpreted as confirming that the cultural biases carry meaning in a way that does not allow for simple addition. You lose close to half of the effects from the second biases if you do not know which bias is the first-ranked cultural bias. Similarly, this confirms that the second biases do have an effect, contrary to what the dominant bias assumption claims.

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[362] H12: The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection..

[363] The environmental organization sample is twice as large as the general sample, which makes it more likely to find statistically significant effects. However, support for *H*, *I*, and *F* as first bias is not that common among environmentalists. Therefore, the lack of significant effects for *H*, *I*, and *F* cannot be given increased importance. See in Table 93 in the appendix starting on page 565.

Table 62: The Effect of Second-Ranked Bias on Party Preferences when controlled for by First-Ranked Bias and Country

Country	*First ranked CB*	*Second ranked CB*	*Asymp. std. error*[b]	*Approx. T*[c]	*Approx. sig.*[d]
Norway	*e*	10.9	3.03	3.47	.305
	E	**13.2**	2.79	4.48	.041
	f	18.4	3.27	4.95	.201
	F	6.8	1.99	3.14	.800
	h	13.1	2.63	4.40	.340
	H	9.6	2.84	3.12	.592
	i	8.4	2.08	3.94	.142
	I	8.6	3.04	2.64	.698
	Total	**5.1**	0.78	6.50	.000
Sweden	*e*	16.2	3.46	4.04	.153
	E	23.5	3.47	5.65	.128
	f	**20.5**	3.54	5.94	.000
	F	16.8	3.29	4.68	.066
	h	**22.2**	3.21	6.47	.002
	H	12.5	3.92	3.01	.296
	i	**18.9**	2.97	5.53	.006
	I	22.4	4.82	4.19	.049
	Total	**7.5**	1.01	7.38	.000
Denmark	*e*	9.3	2.39	3.51	.591
	E	11.2	2.86	3.54	.760
	f	19.7	3.17	5.49	.074
	F	12.3	2.89	3.84	.596
	h	8.6	2.19	3.71	.654
	H	10.0	2.44	3.73	.362
	i	**17.7**	2.65	6.08	.000
	I	14.7	3.55	3.26	.252
	Total	**5.7**	0.79	7.10	.000
Finland	*e*	11.3	2.73	3.85	.133
	E	20.6	3.16	5.96	.248
	f	**20.5**	2.87	6.82	.032
	F	15.6	3.07	4.62	.103
	h	16.0	3.02	5.14	.130
	H	10.2	2.15	4.44	.311
	i	13.8	2.70	4.92	.172
	I	12.0	3.82	2.86	.499
	Total	**4.8**	0.81	5.84	.000
Iceland	*e*	**45.8**	7.14	3.72	.030
	E	12.8	4.61	2.60	.704
	f	19.1	5.38	3.02	.097
	F	15.1	4.03	3.40	.130
	h	9.3	4.40	1.97	.587
	H	12.3	4.47	2.40	.581
	i	10.3	3.34	2.94	.529
	I	5.6	5.98	.92	.759
	Total	**5.3**	1.20	4.33	.014
Nordic	*e*	**5.1**	0.97	5.23	.001
	E	**6.8**	1.22	5.41	.005
	f	**9.5**	1.27	7.43	.000
	F	3.5	0.83	4.16	.126
	h	**4.8**	0.96	4.97	.006
	H	3.4	0.83	4.00	.184
	i	**4.7**	0.87	5.30	.001
	I	5.2	1.22	4.17	.142
	Total	**2.6**	0.28	9.38	.000

b. Not assuming the null hypothesis. c. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
d. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. Statistically significant effects (=U*100) are in bold ($p \leq 0.05$)

Table 63: Effect of the Second-Ranked Cultural Biases when controlled for by First-Ranked Bias and Sample. NEPS95.

Sample	*First-ranked CB*	*Second-ranked CB*	*Asymp. std. error*[a]	*Approx. t*[b]	*Approx. significance*[c]
Env.Org.	*e*	15.8	2.78	5.20	.089
	E	**8.6**	1.27	6.43	.000
	f	**9.1**	1.24	7.11	.000
	F	12.9	2.02	6.21	.118
	h	**6.0**	0.84	7.07	.000
	H	14.3	2.51	5.31	.410
	i	7.9	1.35	5.68	.020
	I	18.7	3.32	5.17	.500
	Total	**4.9**	0.42	11.64	.000
General	*e*	14.3	2.28	5.65	.136
	E	16.8	2.62	5.73	.183
	f	**18.4**	2.50	6.26	.001
	F	11.5	1.95	5.41	.207
	h	13.9	2.19	5.82	.182
	H	12.1	2.18	5.09	.078
	i	16.2	2.65	5.64	.096
	I	18.6	3.05	5.04	.505
	Total	**5.3**	0.63	8.19	.000
Total	*e*	**10.2**	1.56	6.18	.001
	E	**8.1**	1.06	7.39	.000
	f	**8.5**	1.05	7.80	.000
	F	**7.9**	1.20	6.33	.006
	h	**6.0**	0.75	7.95	.000
	H	7.5	1.29	5.51	.074
	i	**7.6**	1.09	6.79	.000
	I	12.1	1.83	5.87	.176
	Total	**5.1**	0.34	14.83	.000

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. Statistically significant effects (=U*100) are in bold (p≤ 0.05)

In order to test H12, I combine the results from Table 62 and Table 63. There are seven independent samples. In each sample, we can have four supportive first biases and four rejections. In total, this gives us the possibility to compare the effects of rejection and support in 28 cases. These are collected in Table 64 below, where we can see in the first column whether the bias is hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic, and whether the first bias is supported or rejected. In the sixth column, we can see the difference between support and rejection for each bias from Table 62 and Table 63. A negative difference tells us that the second bias has a larger effect when the first bias is rejection. In the first row, we can see that in Norway the effect of the second bias is 3.5 percentage points larger when the first bias is rejection. However, in order to draw any conclusion about whether the direction also applies to the population, we need to compare confidence intervals.

The next four columns show the lower and upper limits for the confidence intervals for the effect of second bias in the population, counted from the findings for the sample data in Table 62 and Table 63. If the smallest possible overlap between the confidence intervals is positive, we must accept H12. If the overlap is negative, we can reject H12. The results of this comparison are presented in the last column.

Within the sample, there are 15 instances where the second bias has a larger effect when the first bias is rejection, but in only two of these instances do we find differences that large enough for allowing us to conclude that the differences also apply to the population. Similarly, there are 13 instances where the second bias has a smaller effect when the first bias is rejection in the sample. However, in only two of these instances do we find differences that are large enough for allowing us to conclude that the differences also apply to the population.

As before, we must calculate how many rejections we need before we can trust that they are not created by random processes, like sampling for example. Using the same sequential test for the parameter of a Bernoulli population (Kanji 2006:Test 70) to calculate how many significant results we must tolerate before we can reject the null hypothesis, we find out that 2 rejections out of 24 tests is sufficient.[364] Overall, Table 64 below shows four cases where the magnitude of the effect of the second bias is dependent on the value of the first bias. We would expect one of these to exist by chance even if the independence of effects assumption is correct. Nevertheless, 4 rejections out of 24 tests allow us to reject H12 and conclude that some of these are not likely to be simple random phenomena. It does make a difference whether the first bias is rejection or support.

Overall, the independence of effects assumption has not received empirical support. We have tested H11 (The effect of a bias is the same no matter what kind of values the other biases have) and H12 (The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection.). Both of these hypotheses are severely weakened because the empirical findings do not fit with the predictions. The order of biases matters, and it makes a difference whether the first-ranked bias is rejection or support for a particular cultural bias. Given these findings, we are better off by also treating the independence of effects assumption as a fallacy.

[364] See Table 90 on page 554 in the appendix for details behind this calculation.

Table 64: Comparing Confidence Intervals for the Effect of the Second Biases when the First Bias is Support or Rejection.

Sample	*First bias support or rejection of*	*Confidence interval for second bias when first is support* Lower limit	Upper limit	*Confidence interval for second bias when first is rejection* Lower limit	Upper limit	*Difference between effects of two second biases*	*The smallest overlap*	*Test of H12*
Norway	H	4	15	8	18	-3.5	7.3	Keep
	E	8	19	5	17	2.3	9.1	Keep
	F	3	11	12	25	-11.5	**-1.2**	Reject
	I	3	15	4	13	0.2	9.8	Keep
Denmark	H	5	15	4	13	1.4	7.7	Keep
	E	6	17	5	14	1.8	8.4	Keep
	I	8	22	12	23	-3.0	9.1	Keep
	F	7	18	13	26	-7.3	4.5	Keep
Sweden	H	5	20	16	28	-9.7	4.3	Keep
	E	17	30	9	23	7.4	6.2	Keep
	I	13	32	13	25	3.5	11.7	Keep
	F	10	23	14	27	-3.7	9.7	Keep
Finland	H	6	14	10	22	-5.7	4.4	Keep
	E	14	27	6	17	9.4	2.2	Keep
	I	4	19	9	19	-1.9	10.9	Keep
	F	10	22	15	26	-4.9	6.8	Keep
Iceland	H	4	21	1	18	3.0	14.4	Keep
	E	4	22	32	60	-33.0	**-10.0**	Reject
	I	-6	17	4	17	-4.8	13.5	Keep
	F	7	23	9	30	-4.0	14.5	Keep
Env.Org.	H	9	19	4	8	8.3	**-1.7**	Reject
	E	6	11	10	21	-7.3	0.7	Keep
	I	12	25	5	11	10.8	**-1.7**	Reject
	F	9	17	7	12	3.7	2.7	Keep
General	H	8	16	10	18	-1.8	6.8	Keep
	E	12	22	10	19	2.5	7.1	Keep
	I	13	25	11	21	2.5	8.7	Keep
	F	8	15	13	23	-6.9	1.9	Keep

The confidence intervals are calculated as second-ranked CB effect ± 1.96 standard errors from Table 62 and Table 63. The difference between two second biases = effect of second bias $_{\text{1st support}}$ – effect of second bias $_{\text{1st rejection}}$. The smallest overlap is calculated by comparing the appropriate upper and lower limits, depending on which is larger – the effect of the second bias $_{\text{1st support}}$ or the effect of the second bias $_{\text{1st rejection}}$. Cases where there is no overlap are marked with bold.

New Possibilities for Aggregating to the Level of Cultural Biases

The dominance and additivity assumptions have been tested at the level of samples and individuals by aggregating together cultural biases with the same rank. Here, I will have a look at a new level of aggregation, where the effects that cultural biases have on party preferences are aggregated to the level of particular values of single cultural biases and to the level of cultural combinations.[365] In addition, the effect on the preference for each party is recorded separately, while in the previous analyses the various preferences (parties) were aggregated together.

This is a novel level of aggregation, and more research is required before we can be sure which findings are related to the mathematical properties of aggregation, and which ones reveal to us how cultural biases function at the individual level. Aggregation does remove individual-level variation and leaves us only with the main effects, which in many ways is what a good analysis is supposed to do. However, analyses at the wrong level of aggregation can yield results that have more to do with the process of aggregation itself than with the underlying patterns in the data. In addition, the removal of individual-level variation almost always leads to strong correlations.

In this section, I will first show how I constructed the measurement of effects at this level of aggregation. Then, I will show a few tables containing correlations that indicate the possibility of additive effects when controlling for the cultural combinations. In other words, I suspect that the numerical properties of cultural biases exist within combinations, but not across combinations.

Instead of the sample-level effects, as we saw in Table 53, we can see in Table 65 and Table 66 an example of the effects on the level of the first ranked cultural bias. Each cell shows the effect that a particular cultural bias has on a particular party preference, as measured by standard deviations.[366] These tables allow us to compare the effects while controlling for both cultural biases and for party preferences. These controls are necessary because the biases have different effects on each party.

These aggregated effects are inserted back into the individual-level data file so that all those respondents who prefer the socialist left and have *e* as their first-ranked bias will get the value of -6.3 as the effect of that bias (see Table 65, second column). Using these standardized values removes some of the problems connected with the varying number of respondents in each cell (which corresponds

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[365] The particular values of the single biases used are *CultRankTriA1* and *CultRankTriSupp1*. The cultural combinations used here are *CultRankTriA2* and *CultRankTriSupp2*.

[366] These effects are measured as adjusted standard deviations, which take into account the number of respondents in each cell. A deviation is significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level when it is larger than 1.96 standard deviations.

with the unit of aggregation in cross-level analysis), and with the relative size of parties. If I had used percentages instead of adjusted standardized residuals, the percentages would have been difficult to interpret because a two-point increase in the support for a small party is large, while the same increase for a large party is small.[367] In many ways, in the individual-level data file the effects of cultural biases are now aggregated to the level of cells in the above tables.

Table 65: The Effect of the Absolute Value of the First-Ranked CB on Party Family Preference. NOS99. (Adj.S.Res.)

	First-ranked Abs CB (tri)								
	a	*e*	*E*	*f*	*F*	*h*	*H*	*i*	*I*
Socialist left	-1.8	-6.3	3.4	-.9	-2.2	3.3	-2.8	8.0	-1.9
Social democrat	1.4	-7.6	2.9	-.8	3.8	.1	.9	2.4	-1.6
Agrarian	.8	1.1	-.4	.3	.7	-3.5	1.6	-2.1	2.4
Liberal	-.4	-.9	-1.6	.4	-1.4	5.1	-2.5	1.7	-1.1
Christian	.7	-1.8	-.7	1.7	-.4	-2.4	3.2	1.0	-1.0
Conservative	-.3	14.6	-5.3	1.4	-3.9	-1.6	-.1	-8.0	1.9
Progress	-1.6	-.5	-.3	-2.9	4.0	-1.0	1.2	-2.9	3.8
Greens	.9	-2.8	2.5	2.0	-1.6	1.2	-3.1	3.9	-2.5
Other	-.6	-.3	.8	-1.3	.6	1.6	.0	.1	-1.3

Absolute value of first-ranked cultural bias = CultRankTriA1 with value *a* instead of blanks.

Table 66: The Effect of Absolute Value of the Second-Ranked CB on Party Family Preference. NOS99. (Adj.S.Res.)

	Second-ranked Abs CB (tri)								
	a	*e*	*E*	*f*	*F*	*h*	*H*	*i*	*I*
Socialist left	-2.3	-2.0	3.4	.4	-.9	3.4	-2.0	4.4	-3.9
Social democrat	1.1	-1.6	5.0	-1.9	-.5	-.4	1.7	.7	-3.9
Agrarian	.6	1.5	-1.9	.0	1.4	-2.4	2.5	-1.0	-.5
Liberal	-1.0	.1	-.6	2.0	-.9	2.0	-2.3	.9	-.4
Christian	1.3	-.6	-1.7	-.9	.7	-1.1	.5	1.5	.5
Conservative	-1.0	4.2	-6.5	3.3	-1.0	-.1	-2.1	-4.0	6.4
Progress	1.4	-1.4	.0	-1.5	1.1	-2.6	3.0	-2.4	2.1
Greens	-.1	-2.4	2.4	-.8	-.5	3.4	-2.9	1.8	-.8
Other	.0	-.7	1.4	-1.6	1.0	-.4	-.1	.3	.3

Absolute value of the second-ranked cultural bias = The second letter from CultRankTriA2 with value *a* instead of blanks.

[367] This is similar to the standardization recommended by Søren Lisberg-Thompson. I suspect that the cells in the above tables can be understood as the smallest possible functionally isomorphic units, which possibly makes them very suitable for making cross-level inferences.

Similar procedures are conducted for the effects that the two first-ranked cultural biases have on party preferences. Since these procedures divide the respondents into 513 cells, this analysis can only be performed at the Nordic level. Equally important, we can see that each cell corresponds with a unit of aggregation. In other words, the level of aggregation is not the same as the absolute values of first and second biases that operate with 81 units (cells). Analyses that combine different levels of aggregation are prone to several kinds of problems (Achen and Shively 1995). Therefore, all of the following tables and analyses only suggest a possible approach; the merits and weaknesses of each approach are yet to be evaluated.

In addition to the absolute value versions mentioned above, similar procedures are conducted for the support versions of all these variables.[368] Now we have the data to explore the additivity and dominance assumptions at the level of cultural combinations. I will not check the independence assumption, nor will I trust these analyses enough to perform formal hypothesis testing. I will show two tables, one using support and the other using absolute values, that reveal interesting patterns when the correlations are organized by the first bias.

Effects of Support Aggregated to the Level of Cultural Combinations

In Table 67 below, we can see how the aggregated effect of the top two biases based on support correlates with several other traits. These correlations are reported separately for each first bias (*E*, *F*, *H* and *I*). On the first line, we have those 460 respondents with support for the egalitarian bias as their strongest cultural bias. We can see that for them, the effect of first bias is strong, while the second bias has no effect. This pattern supports the dominant bias assumption. The same pattern is present among those respondents whose strongest support goes to the individualistic bias. By contrast, for respondents whose strongest support goes to fatalistic or hierarchical biases, the effect of the second bias is stronger than the effect of the first bias. In other words, support for egalitarianism and individualism can act as the dominant biases at this level, while support for fatalism and hierarchy cannot. On the last row, we can see the correlations for all respondents. We can see that the second bias has a significant effect, which weakens the dominant bias assumption.[369]

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[368] All these tables containing the particular effects can be downloaded from http://eero.no/publ/False_assumptions_tables_Effect_of_Biases_on_voting.html

[369] The correlation between the first biases' and the combinations' effect is more than twice as strong than correlation between the second biases' and the combionations' effect. However, this is not a good picture of their relative contribution. By squaring these correlations, we can find out the proportion of variance of the combinations' effect that can be explained by the effect from the first or second bias (comparable to a bivariate regression). This new measurement is then comparable to R^2 and to U. The first biases' effect explains 55 percent of the combinations' effect ($0.74^2 = 0.55$), while second bias explains 9 percent ($0.30^2=0.09$). Thus, the effect of the first bias on this level is so much larger than the effect of the second bias that for some applications of cultural theory, the effect of the second bias can be ignored.

In the third column, we can see the correlation from the additive effect, which tells us whether the effects of first and second biases can be added together or if the combination of these biases has a different effect. We can see that for all groups of respondents, the additive effects are strong and significant, which suggests that the additivity assumption cannot be rejected.

How big is the additive effect when compared with the non-additive effect of the biases? By squaring the Pearson correlations, we can make a rough estimate the additive proportion of the effect that the combination has on party preference.[370] Respondents with fatalism as their first bias have the smallest additive effect. In this case, however, the additive effect is 56 percent of the total effect of the combination.[371] Roughly speaking, the same applies when hierarchy is the first bias. For respondents with individualism or egalitarianism as their first bias, the additive effect is close to 80 percent of the total effect of the combination.[372] The unexplained portion that remains is the interaction effect between the biases, which ranges from 20 to 46 percent.

The fourth and fifth columns show us the correlation between the aggregated effect of top two biases and the individual level of support for the first and the second bias. The only significant relationship between the effect of two first biases and the level of first bias appears when the egalitarian bias is ranked first. In other words, among those who most strongly support egalitarianism, the level of support influences party preferences. For all other first-ranked biases, the level of support does not make any difference beyond our knowledge of which bias the person supports.

All in all, using support for cultural biases allows for an individualistic or egalitarian dominant bias, while dominance does not seem to be present if the hierarchical or fatalistic biases are ranked first. There also seems to be additivity within each cultural bias combination when we use the strongest support version of the cultural biases. How do these assumptions play out if we use an absolute value version of the cultural biases?

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[370] This could have been presented as a regression where the effect of top-two S biases = the effect of first CB S + the effect of second CB s, with explained variance = $R^2 = r^2 =$ (Pearson correlation)^2

[371] $0.75^2 = 0.56$.

[372] $0.90^2 = 0.81$ and $0.89^2 = 0.79$.

Table 67: Correlations Between the Effect of the Support for Top Two Biases (Aggregated) and other Characteristics when controlled for by Support for First Bias (Aggr). NOS99.

Support for first bias	Effect of top-two biases S (aggregated)	*Effect of first bias Supp (aggregated)*	*Effect of second bias S (aggregated)*	*Additive effect of first and second biases S (aggregated)*	*Strength of the strongest bias (individual level)*	*Strength of the second strongest bias (individual level)*	*N*
E	Pearson correlation	**.83**	-.01	**.89**	**.14**	-.03	460
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.79	.00	.00	.57	
F	Pearson correlation	**.53**	**.77**	**.75**	.03	.06	444
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.56	.19	
H	Pearson correlation	**.50**	**.73**	**.76**	-.04	.01	510
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.38	.84	
I	Pearson correlation	**.83**	-.02	**.90**	.05	-.01	467
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.62	.00	.28	.91	
Total	Pearson correlation	**.74**	**.30**	**.85**	.02	-.01	1881
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.49	.67	

All variables in this table use the support version of CB, and are marked with S or supp.
Correlations significant at p ≤0.05 level are in bold.
The additive effect S = effect of first bias S + effect of second bias S.

Effects of Absolute Values Aggregated to the Level of Cultural Combinations

Table 68 below contains corresponding variables and correlations, but is based on the absolute values of the cultural biases. The correlations are organized according to which bias is the first bias. Since rejections are also listed, more respondents are now included in the analysis.

The patterns visible in Table 68 are different from those in Table 67. When using absolute values, the effect of the first bias and the effect of the second bias correlate significantly with the effect of the combination of the top two biases across all values of the first bias. No value of the first bias can claim to be a dominant bias.

On the bottom row, we can see that when we look at all respondents, the effect of second bias has a significant correlation with the effect of two top biases. When compared to the effect of the first bias, the effect of the second bias is large enough to be acknowledged. If the first bias is support for egalitarianism or individualism, then the effect of the second bias is weaker. In other words, support for egalitarianism or support for individualism also reduces the effect that the other biases have on the respondents' party choices.

In some cases, the absolute value version of the second bias has a larger effect than the first bias. If the first bias is rejection of fatalism, the effect from the second bias is almost twice as large as the effect of the first bias. This makes sense: Rejection of fatalism increases the likelihood of voting, but rejection alone does not provide and answer to the question about which party to vote for; instead, the second bias provides some guidance for selecting a party to support. Similarly, rejection of hierarchy on its own is not enough to determine a party preference.

In the third column in Table 68, we can see how the additive effects of the two first biases strongly correlate with the effect of the combination of the top two biases, indicating that the additive component of the effect of the combination is substantial. Respondents who support individualism have the lowest additive effect (0.66). For them the additive component is 44 percent of the total effect of the combination ($0.66^2=0.44$), which gives a remaining non-additive interaction effect of 66 percent. Notice how the three lowest correlations with additive effects occur when the first bias is *E, H*, or *I*. The three highest additive effects are present when the first bias is *e, h*, or *i*. For these the additive component ranges from 76 to 90 percent of the total effect of the combination.[373] What remains is the non-additive interaction effect between the cultural biases, which ranges from 10 to 66 percent at this level of aggregation, depending on which bias is ranked first. The additive effects are thus large enough to be useful, while the effects of interaction between the biases are large enough to require their inclusion into the analyses.

[373] $0.92^2 = 0.90$ and $0.87^2 = 0.76$. 100 – 90 = 10 and 100 – 44 = 66.

Table 68: Correlations Between the Effect of Absolute value of Top Two Biases (aggregated) and other Characteristics when controlled for by First Bias A. NOS99.

First bias A	*Effect of top two biases A (aggregated)*	*Effect of first bias A (aggregated)*	*Effect of second bias A (aggregated)*	*Additive effect of first and second biases A*	*Absolute value of first-ranked cb (incl..*	*Absolute value of second-ranked cb*	*N*
e	Pearson correlation	**.88**	**.74**	**.95**	**.28**	**.21**	502
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	
E	Pearson correlation	**.69**	**.17**	**.73**	**.13**	.02	293
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.02	.69	
f	Pearson correlation	**.41**	**.77**	**.82**	.08	**.14**	355
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.12	.01	
F	Pearson correlation	**.73**	**.60**	**.86**	.09	**.15**	380
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.08	.00	
h	Pearson correlation	**.67**	**.61**	**.89**	**.13**	**.12**	394
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.01	.02	
H	Pearson correlation	**.44**	**.57**	**.71**	.07	.06	378
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.16	.27	
i	Pearson correlation	**.79**	**.53**	**.87**	**.24**	**.23**	468
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	
I	Pearson correlation	**.66**	**.33**	**.66**	.06	.00	257
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.30	.99	
Total	Pearson correlation	**.81**	**.55**	**.90**	**.24**	**.16**	3039
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	

All variables in this table use the absolute values of cultural bias, and are marked with an A.
Correlations significant at p ≤0.05 level are in bold.
The additive effect A = effect of first A bias + effect of second A bias.
Twelve cases with *a* as first bias are hidden.

All in all, using the absolute value version of cultural bias combinations at this level of aggregation produces an effect from the second bias that is so large that ignoring it by relying on the dominant bias assumption does not seem wise. This is in contrast to the results achieved when using the support version of cultural bias combinations, where the second bias has a much weaker effect.

All in all, when using the absolute value version of cultural bias combinations at this level of aggregation, we should not rely only on the additive effects, as the interaction effects between the biases are substantial enough to warrant their inclusion into the analysis. The same applies for the support version of the cultural biases.

Thus, the analyses at this level of aggregation confirm the previous analyses which show that the dominant bias assumption is a fallacy. However, the additivity assumption is not weakened at the level of combinations; even if it looks like it is weakened, the non-additive effects are large enough to warrant their inclusion into the analyses. These two explorative analyses close the empirical part of this chapter. Now it is time to summarize and see what we have learned in this chapter about the dominant bias, additivity, and independence assumptions.

Summary

In this chapter, we have seen that the dominant bias assumption, the additivity of effects assumption, and the independence of effects assumption are all fallacies. As long as we are working at the sample level, these common assumptions are fallacies, and we need to make some changes to our analytical strategies. In the beginning of this chapter, I listed eight consequences or implications that these false assumptions have at the sample level. I will not repeat these here, but merely note that changes in research practices seem to be required.

Some researchers have previously insisted upon the categorical nature of cultural biases, and treated them as one variable with four values. This practice allows us to classify people as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic. While others have insisted upon the continuous nature of cultural biases, as four dimensions that behave as scale-level variables that can be analyzed one by one according to their additive effects, I believe that both of these positions are sometimes wrong and sometimes right.

As the dominant bias assumption seems to be a fallacy at many different levels of analysis, the practice of classifying people as hierarchical, egalitarian, fatalistic, or individualist should be abandoned for most purposes. I believe a single cultural bias is best understood as an ordinal-level variable. However, to describe individuals, we should use combinations of cultural biases, which are best understood as nominal-level categories. Thus, it looks like some researchers were right concerning the categorical nature of cultural biases at individual level, even if they operated with too few categories because they failed to account for cultural combinations.

Since the additivity assumption looks like a fallacy, it is safe to say that cultural biases do not behave like proper scale-level variables at the individual level. This statement of course has many consequences for the analytical techniques that can be used. Nevertheless, based on my exploratory attempt to aggregate the effects at the level of cultural combinations, it seems that within a cultural bias combination, the effects are additive at the individual level. Perhaps the numerical properties are there, but only within cultural combinations. The numerical properties are thus quite particular rather than general properties that are valid for all respondents in a survey, as survey researchers normally expect scale-level variables to be. However, the possibility of additivity at the level of combinations is based on a new type of analysis and should be viewed with some caution.

The independence assumption did not receive any support in any of the seven samples. When choosing a party to support, people rely on several biases rather than just one bias. One way to understand the independence fallacy is that the numerous possible effects that are born out of the interaction between cultural biases mask the effects of single biases to the point where we cannot trust analyses of only one bias at time. Analyzing only the effect of one bias will thus give a poor image of the true effect of a bias. By using cultural combinations rather than four continuous cultural bias variables, the interaction effects between the cultural biases become visible for each particular combination.

The combination of lacking additivity and lacking independence suggests that we should avoid using multivariate regressions and other related techniques that depend on these assumptions. The critical reader might now wonder if I follow my own suggestions. After all, in Chapter 10 I used a multivariate regression analysis to show which assumptions seem to work best. However, this analysis steers clear of these three fallacies because the data analyzed does not pertain to individual-level behavior. The cases are cross tables, each representing a combination of cultural biases, and the data describes the strength of the relationship in these tables. The regression analysis is thus not undertaken at the individual level, but instead looks more like a meta-analysis of individual-level analyses.

I have one reservation concerning the generalizability of the analyses in large parts of the present chapter. I have been working with representative samples from different countries and members of environmental organizations. Each measure of association (U) is calculated across all parties and all values of first or second biases, or the top two cultural biases. It is thus a very gross simplification. It is possible that a different picture would emerge if we were to move closer to the individual level and look at only one party at the time, or one cultural combination at time. Perhaps biases are additive in certain situations or under certain conditions.

In order to address this issue, I presented an exploratory analysis which suggested that there are new possibilities for analysis at the level of cultural combinations, where the effects of cultural biases were aggregated to the level of cultural combinations. One must remember that combinations constitute fictive groups that consist of people with similar cultural biases. So even if this looks like a promising avenue for further research, we must remember that these are not institutions, only categories. Respondents with the same bias do not know each other, nor do they influence each other. To truly understand how cultural biases work at the individual level, we need multilevel analyses in order to study the way institutions influence people's cultural biases, choices, and behaviors. One important lesson to be learned from this chapter is that the results are dependent on the level we are using to study the effects. In statistical terms, this is a situation parallel to changing the level of aggregation. Different levels of aggregation usually have different functional forms, even if this is often ignored (Achen and Shively 1995).

We have also seen some indications that the rejection of cultural bias is also important. Rejected biases influence our political views by limiting our choices. Politics is often about compromises, and these rejections inform the voters about the kinds of organizing principles that might be inferior. Is rejection of a cultural bias just a consequence of support for another bias, or is it a trait of its own? This question is answered in the next chapter, which is devoted to the rejection of cultural bias.

Chapter 13

WHAT IS REJECTION OF A CULTURAL BIAS?

What is rejection of a cultural bias? Is it something important or just a methodological artifact best ignored? What kind of role does it have among households and in individuals? How common is it? What are its effects? I will discuss these questions both in relation to the households study and in relation to the surveys.

The previous chapter cannot solve these issues, even if the hypothesis tests used information about about rejection of cultural biases. These tests were designed to test three assumptions and do not give us answers to the above questions.

In the previous chapter, we saw how these three common assumptions are more likely to be fallacies. My solution for overcoming these fallacies is to use combinations of cultural biases. Theoretically, these combinations could work without accounting for the rejection of bias, but analyses in Chapter 10 show that combinations relying on rejection seem to work better. However, a discussion about the rejection of cultural bias is required since the concept is not a well-established part of quantitative applications in cultural theory.

This chapter will start by taking a look at the theoretical aspects of rejection. Then I will present some examples and findings from the household study. Since the controversy regarding rejection is about rejection of cultural bias at the individual level, most of this chapter will deal with this. First, I will discuss how rejection is intrinsically connected to the way cultural biases are measured. Second, I will look at how rejection is a common trait among individuals. Third, I will ask whether all possible combinations of cultural biases are present. Fourth, I will look at the effects that rejection has on party preferences. Fifth, I will show how rejection in a cultural bias combination can carry meaning that helps us to understand party preferences.

Rejection is Different than Support

Theoretically, rejecting a way of organizing is different from supporting a way of organizing. First, there is a difference concerning how it applies to the components of a stable way of organizing—i.e. cultural biases, social relations, and behavioral patterns (see page 11). As we have seen in the survey data, rejection is important when we are studying cultural biases. However, rejection does not apply in the same way to social relations versus patterns of behavior. In social relations, rejecting a particular way of life, A for example, could follow from supporting way of life B. However, simply observing support for B does not necessarily provide access to knowledge about the rejection of A. What one can observe is the lack of type A social relations, but not the rejection of A. Similarly, it is unlikely that rejection is a central component of the behavioral patterns. Again, what one normally can observe is a person's lack of type A behavior, not the rejection of A.[374] However, it is possible to imagine situations where another person engages in behaviors that are attributed to A by which the supporter of B must confront, for example by rejecting the proposed interaction.

A second potential theoretical difference concerns cultural stability. Can the same mechanisms that create enduring support for a cultural bias also create an enduring rejection of a cultural bias? I think that as long as we accept that rejection is not *the* dominant bias in an institution, but is instead just a component of the cultural bias in that institution, then there should be no reason for why the same mechanisms cannot be operating. Support for a particular cultural bias does not automatically determine who your adversaries are, even if sometimes cultural theorists define the cultures as always in opposition to each other. Institutions have some leeway in their choice of adversaries, and observing rejection of cultural bias allows us to capture this.

Traditionally in cultural theory, rejection has followed from support. Rejection can be seen in issues like taboos, witchcraft, and leprosy (Douglas 1992). The source of rejection lies in institutions and the manners of thinking that the institutions make possible.

> Individuals, as they pick and choose among the analogies from nature those they will give credence to, are also picking and choosing at the same time their allies and opponents and the pattern of their future relations. Constituting their version of nature, they are monitoring the constitution of their society. In short, they are constructing a machine for thinking and decision-making on their own behalf. (Douglas 1986: 63)

[374] Pondy describes how latent conflicts can become manifest conflicts with conflictful behavior. However, deciding what is conflictful behavior is not easy since sometimes just a lack of behavior is conflictful behavior.

> Knowledge of the organizational requirements and of the expectations and motives of the participants appears to be necessary to characterize the behavior as conflictful. This suggests that behavior should be defined to be conflictful if, and only if, some or all of the participants perceive it to be conflictful (Pondy 1967: 303).

Little by little, the grid-group typology became a systems theory,[375] but the typology still sees rejection as following from support for something else. Contradictory certainties are a concept that summarizes the manner in which rejection has been treated in the theory.

> A culture builds legitimacy on its own foundation of 'certainties' which contradict the 'certainties' of other cultures. Thus cultures are self-defined adversially. ... they need the adversary in order to know who they are and what they stand for ... The theory now assumes that in any community all four kinds of culture are actualized and in continual conflict. Their adversary relation is the essence of democracy (Douglas 1999: 413)[376]

The conflict between the ways of organizing is presented as a central aspect of the theory,[377] and much of the empirical research centers on political conflicts.[378] Nevertheless, rejection of a way of organizing has not been given a independent role. I believe that a good start would be to analytically distinguish between degrees of rejection. For example, we should not take it for granted that all hierarchical institutions reject with equal intensity egalitarian ways of organizing. We need to separate degrees of rejection by differentiating between the roles rejection has in an institution. Only a minority of institutions actively combat a particular way of life. There are institutions that are partly defined by their adversaries, for example environmental organizations who often promote egalitarian solutions to poorly executed hierarchical regulations and individualistic profit maximization (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). In such an institution, with a manifest rejection of a way of life, we expect to find lasting anti-individualistic or anti-hierarchical behaviors with more or less symbolic purposes. However, most institutions, like households, are much less political and less interested in changing anything beyond their own borders. In such institutions, it is difficult to imagine that rejection of a bias would manifest itself into strong behavioral patterns.

Given that some institutions actively reject particular ways of life while others do not, it seems like we should attempt to describe degrees of rejection when we describe institutions. The focus on political conflicts can give us a biased view of how rejection works in institutions. In some ways, the household is the universal institution since we are all part of one, whether it is a private household or an

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375 Thompson has been central in bringing the systems theoretical perspective into cultural theory (Thompson 1985; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1990; Thompson 1995, 2008)

376 At this stage, Mary Douglas had taken on board the systems thinking adopted by Thompson and Gyawali (personal communication with Michael Thompson).

377 The organization of each way of life relies on opposition or conflict with other ways of life (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4)

378 See (Wildavsky 1987; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 1992; Ellis 1993; Coyle and Ellis 1994; Ellis 1994; Rayner and Malone 1998; Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999; Ney 2006; Verweij and Thompson 2006; 6 2011).

institutional household.[379] Therefore, knowing how rejection is dealt with in households can teach us something important about rejection in general. We must, however, remember that households as institutions are different from political institutions, where rejection is likely to have a more prominent place.

Rejection of Cultural Bias in the Households Interviews

Rejection was not my main focus when I conducted the household interviews. The interviews looked toward in depth coverage of the households' internal organization and social relations, as well as their views of society and politics. Therefore, the interviews were not looking to solicit accounts of rejection, nor were questions asked that systematically explored rejection. The accounts of rejection were instead initiated by the households themselves, which shows that rejection is a salient trait in the households.

In Figure 8 on page 257, we can see an overview of each household's internal organization and their social relations. Every dark block is one trait that either supports or rejects a particular way of organizing. The figure has been dealt with previously, but there are some observations concerning rejection that we can draw from it.

First, the internal organization and social relations in six of the eight households exhibited characteristics that spoke to rejections of particular ways of organizing. More specifically, a majority of the households rejected a particular way of organizing internally or building helping relations.[380] The characteristics that were counted were quite similar. In terms of helping relations, four households rejected reciprocity, which is the basis of individualistic solidarity. This rejection could be observed in hierarchical, egalitarian, and fatalistic households, but not in any of the individualistic households.[381] Rejection of the hierarchical way of organizing did come in two different versions. In both the egalitarian Garcia and individualistic Lorca households, there was a distinct rejection of traditional gender-based divisions of labor. In both the individualistic Maheswaran and the fatalistic Truong households, there were clear rejections of using fixed time schedules as a method for structuring the households' internal organizations. We can see that the same rejection is observed in households with different ways of organizing.

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[379] Retirement homes, army units, convents, and correctional facilities are all institutional households. Furthermore, single person households could be interpreted and researched as institutions. They have their routines, justifications, and helping relations just like other households, even if they lack division of labour.

[380] Helping relations are the solidarities, or the obligations to and rights for both material and immaterial help, and those social relations out of which these arise. See page 74 for a discussion.

[381] The Natan, Garcia, Herrera, and Truong households rejected reciprocity as an principle in their helping relations.

Second, the remaining two households, Nguyen and Nga, did not show any signs of rejection, neither in their internal organization nor in their views of politics and society. Both of these households are from Vietnam, and the Vietnamese are known to avoid saying no because it is impolite (*Cultural etiquette in Vietnam* 2011). There is a similarity between rejecting a way of life and responding negatively to a statement. Therefore, it is difficult to know if they privately reject particular ways of organizing, but kept those rejections hidden from me, or if they genuinely do not reject any ways of organizing.

Third, as I have already pointed out on page 258, I did not observe traits indicating rejection of the household's dominant way of organizing in any of the households. In all eight households, there was a dominant way of organizing, and the rejected way of organizing served to clarify or strengthen support for the dominant way of organizing.

I believe that the interpretation of rejection is more valid in the household interviews than in the survey because here the rejection is part of the social interaction in the interview situation. The households actively presented stories about rejection and tried to ensure that I would understand what kind of household they did not want to be seen as. The way these stories were conveyed came with meanings behind each rejection, which gives a stronger face validity to each account. The stories about rejection were a way to make sure I understood what kind of households they were. For example, the egalitarian Garcia household told stories about their condemnation of hierarchical and individualistic behaviors, which clarified which type of household they were not. In surveys, measurements are not connected to a particular social institution or setting.

In the households interviewed, rejection was sometimes connected to the reasons for leaving their original homes. In particular, some of the Chilean households, who had to flee from a hierarchical despot, were very clear in their rejection of hierarchy as a way of life. Rejection is not just the lack of support or a way to emphasize what they are supporting. Instead, rejection can be based on previous experiences and can be so strong that it cannot be easily changed.

The lack of findings can also teach us something about the households. I have not seen any traits supportive of hierarchy in any of the Chilean households. Similarly, I did not encounter any traits within any of the Vietnamese households that supported an egalitarian bias.[382] Perhaps this is due to the fact that these households fled a regime that espoused an egalitarian ideology. The above parallel suggests that in some situations, forcing a way of life into an oblivion can be seen as a form of rejection. However, deliberately avoiding talk about a particular way of life can be interpreted in many ways.

[382] See Figure 8 on page 257.

Consequences of Rejecting a Way of Organizing.

Does rejection have any consequences for the households? In Figure 9 on page 261, we can see a count of the rejections of and supports for particular ways of organizing in each household. In the left-hand column, which is identical to Figure 8, we can see the count of traits within each household's internal organization and social relations. One way to find consequences is to compare this with their views of politics and society, as presented in the right-hand column.

There are four households, Nguyen, Nga, Truong, and Herrera, that did not display a rejection of cultural bias in their views of politics and society during the interviews. Thus, in none of the Vietnamese households could I observe the rejection of a cultural bias. Again, this could be the result of the Vietnamese avoiding the presentation of negative statements or my insensitivity to their way of dealing with these issues.

The four remaining households, Natan, Garcia, Lorca and Maheswaran, did show some rejection of cultural biases in their views of politics and society. Are these somehow connected to the rejected ways of organizing internally in the household (the left-hand column in Figure 9)? In some of the households, some commonalities can be observed. The hierarchical Natan household rejects reciprocity in their helping relations and they reject the view that competition is a healthy organizing principle for society. The egalitarian Garcia household rejects traditional divisions of labor in the household, and they are critical of the headmaster who failed to act according to his role. The individualistic Maheswaran household is critical of relatives that look to control other family members, and they think that there are too many rules and regulations in the society. Nevertheless, in none of the households can we observe rejection of a way of organizing causing changes in their view of politics and society. The observed traits of rejected cultural biases could just as well be a result of vocalizing and displaying support for their dominant cultural bias.

Rejecting a way of organizing internally in the households does not appear to correspond with a similar rejection in their views of politics and society. However, the rejected cultural biases help the households to make political choices. When the Natan household rejects competition and supports hierarchy, and the Maheswarans reject rules and regulations and support individualism, this will allow both households to reach quite different conclusions on many political issues. Rejection strengthens the dominant bias of the household and limits the available options when confronted with political issues.

None of the households in my sample are organized around rejection. However, this does not allow us conclude that rejection fails to play a central organizing role in other households. Rejected ways of organizing always have the potential for political mobilization. If a household's surroundings change, and its way of organizing is threatened by external forces, it could very well mobilize around a rejection of the organizing principles behind those external forces.[383] To study how rejection works in an institution, one should probably start with a sample of politically active organizations with clear adversaries. Nevertheless, the households in my sample all have one supportive dominant cultural bias, which is not the case in individuals, or so it seems when measured in surveys.

Rejection of Cultural Bias in the Surveys

What kind of properties does rejection of cultural biases have a the individual level? How common is it? Can we find all the possible combinations of support and rejection? What kind of effects does rejection have? Can rejection carry meaning? How important is rejection in relation to support? Here, I will try to answer these questions.

While the household interviews provide information about behavior and social relations, the surveys available to me provide very little information on these.[384] Within the surveys, the discussion concerning rejection is narrowed to only rejection of cultural bias.

We have already seen in Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 that combinations of cultural biases can utilize information about both rejection and support. In this section, I will try to settle the question of whether or not an operationalization using rejection really is necessary and better, or if information concerning support is sufficient.[385] I will do so first by showing how the presence of rejection is dependent on how we measure cultural biases in surveys. Second, a few new figures and tables will show how common rejection is and what kind of balance there is between rejection and support in the different samples. Third, the effects of rejection are dealt with through examples from other parts of the thesis and a hypothesis test where the effects of operationalizations based on rejection and support are compared. Fourth, examples of rejection as a carrier of meaning are presented. Finally, I argue that while rejection is important enough to have a role in the analysis, it is still less important than support.

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[383] Based on the Unilever household study, Michael Thompson has given me examples of egalitarian households where rejection of other ways of organizing was a central component (personal communication).

[384] In NOS99, there is no such information, while the NEPS95 environmentalist sample contains information concerning participation in the environmenal organization and its activities and some information concerning behaviors that are relevant for evaluating commitments to environmentalism.

[385] If rejection of cultural biases is important, we should select our two strongest cultural biases on the basis of the absolute values so that a strong rejection can be ranked above mild support. If rejection of cultural biases is not important, we should select our two cultural biases on the basis of the strength of support so that any support is always prior to rejection (see pages 360 and 384).

Measurement of Rejection in Surveys

In surveys, the rejection of cultural bias is a tricky topic because its existence is largely determined by how we measure the dimensions. There are two competing measurement models today. In most surveys using cultural theory, the measurement of cultural biases is based on or inspired by Dake and Wildavsky's approach that measures support for biases as four independent cultural dimensions. The positive end of each dimension points toward a cultural bias, but there have been discussions over what the negative end of each dimension points to. If you use the grid-group dimensions as the main dimension, then each cultural bias points toward the further corner: Negative hierarchical biases point toward individualistic biases in the opposite corner of grid-group diagram, negative egalitarian biases point toward fatalistic biases, and so forth (see a more thorough discussion on pages 283 to 294).

The other commonly used measurement model is the two dimensional operationalization composed by Kahan and associates, where the grid is measured with the hierarchical-egalitarian dimension and the group is measured with the individualistic-communitarian dimension. In this case, strong support for one bias can only be achieved by the rejection of the second bias on the same dimension (Kahan 2012). Therefore, support for hierarchical bias always equals rejection of egalitarian bias, and vice versa. By definition, there is no difference between support for hierarchy and rejection of egalitarian bias.

Thus, if you have extreme scores on two opposing cultural biases, like hierarchy and egalitarianism, you end up with the mean of these two and close to the middle (Kahan 2012; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008). Despite their promising results, I believe it is too early to rule out the possibility that individuals relate simultaneously to several cultural biases. Even if they have shown that cultural cognition performs better than traditional social background variables or party identification in explaining risk perception on several topics, this does not rule out the possibility that a different operationalization would work even better.

If you abandon a two-dimensional grid-group model and choose the four solidarities, ways of organizing, or cultures as the main theoretical unit, then negative cultural bias does not point toward another bias by default. It becomes an empirical question over how the four cultures have positioned themselves in the society, and how the composition of each individual's institutional affiliation influences the makeup of his or her cultural bias.

Measurement of Cultural Biases in this Thesis

As we have seen in Chapter 8, each cultural bias in the Nordic survey is measured with a five-item Likert-scale. We have also seen that this approach comes with problems of acquiescence since every item has same direction - namely support (see page 327). However, sometimes what seems like a methodological flaw can also be used as a benefit. Being prone to acquiescence comes with risks of overestimating support and underestimating rejection. Thus, more trust can be placed in those who say they are rejecting a bias than can be placed in those who say they are supporting one.

As we have seen in Chapter 9 and in NEPS95, the cultural bias scales include a selection of supportive Likert-type items, but in addition to these, I have included some items with reversed direction and some forced choice questions, thus making them less prone to acquiescence. The new items refer to a broader range of topics than those found in NOS99, including trust, wealth, and environmental items (see page 343).

It is possible to construct egalitarian and individualistic biases with or without the questions on the environment.[386] Inclusion or exclusion, however, significantly alters how the biases correlate with each other. When environmental questions are included in the cultural bias scales, E and I correlate by -0.5. Thus, we know that support for one bias often occurs together with rejection of the other. For example, E-I is the strongest political conflict dimension in Norwegian politics. Therefore, it should not be surprising to find consistency in peoples' responses that fits well into this dimension.

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[386] The environmental protection items show an underlying dimensionality that does not seem to fit with cultural theory as predicted. The pro-environmental protection end of the dimension is clearly linked with support for egalitarianism, but the other end of the dimension is linked to the three other biases. Thus I, H, and F become somewhat lumped together, and the scales correlate with each other more than they would if the views on the environment had several underlying dimensions.

NEPS95 was constructed to study environmental protection. This influences the variables available for analysis as well as the context or frame of references the respondents are put into during the survey. This also affects the samples chosen for study. Thus, there are several possible ways to interpret the correlation between the environmental items. Perhaps these constitute an accurate description of society, and the environmental views that cultural theory predicts do not exist in Norway. However, we must remember that cultural theory predicts these at the level of cultures, and the inability to find four separate groups of respondents can be explained in many ways. First, it can either be caused by a dominant ideological debate in Norway, where not all four environmental views described by cultural theory are present. Second, their absence might be caused by the weaknesses of these four voices within the Norwegian debate, which obstructs their ability to clarify their positions to a wider audience. It could also be that people simply do not pay enough attention to these debates, thus making it difficult to distinguish between these four views of nature. The environmentalists are likely to pay attention, but the items ask about respondents own views, and the environmentalists, with their support for egalitarianism and tendency to see nature as fragile, do not share the same views as others. Third, it is also possible that people do not keep these different views separate in the survey because surveys attempt to be context free. We do not know what people would have said in a different institutional context. Fourth, it is possible, but not likely, that the questions used are not well enough adapted to the Norwegian context. Given the above possibilities, it is difficult to know if a negative correlation between E and I is a good thing or a bad thing.

Factor analysis

The choice between the two different measurement models is difficult. Should we use a two-dimensional measure of grid and group or a four dimensional measure of cultural biases? Using the data available to me, it is possible to find empirical evidence that can both strengthen and weaken the four-dimensional model. There are two competing propositions. First, the rejection of cultural bias is an important trait, thus each of the four biases should appear in the factor analysis as a separate factor. Second, the rejection of a cultural bias is actually nothing more than support for another bias. Thus, a two-dimensional solution should emerge in the factor analysis even when we have collected information for all four biases. If support for hierarchy equals rejection of egalitarianism, as the model used by Kahan and associates suggests, then these two biases should emerge as one factor. Similarly, fatalism and individualism should come out on the same factor.

A factor analysis of the cultural bias items in NOS99 can tell us if there are two or four dimensions present in the data. In Table 23 on page 324, we can identify four separate factors, each linked to their own cultural bias. This would not have been the case if rejection of one bias automatically equals support for a second bias. This strengthens the case for the four-dimensional model and weakens the case for the two-dimensional model.

To increase our trust in this finding, it is repeated on our second dataset. In Table 69 below, we can see a corresponding factor analysis of the items used to measure cultural bias in NEPS95, where some new items, including views of trust, nature, and the distribution of wealth, are added to the items composed by Dake and Wildavsky. The new items have a different wording and different structures of possible responses. These differences influence the covariance matrix so that it is not directly comparable with the factor analysis in Table 23. The factor analysis shows the seven oblimin-rotated factors. In the structure matrix, we can identify the factors as no ecological catastrophe, trust/anti-fatalistic, hierarchical, wealth, egalitarian, modify nature, and anti-individualistic.[387] Even if this factor analysis should be viewed with some skepticism, as the new items of nature, trust/anti-fatalistic, and wealth became their own factors, we can see that all four cultural biases came out as their own factors.[388] According to the two-dimensional measurement model, the egalitarian and hierarchical factors should have emerged as been the opposite ends of one factor, and similarly, the anti-fatalistic and anti-individualistic factors should have been the opposite ends of a second factor. The

[387] We can identify the same factors in the same order in an orthogonal rotation. Using a oblique rotation allows the factors to correlate with each other, which strengthens our interpretation (DeVellis 2003: 124).

[388] Some of the new items are forced choice items where the respondent is asked to choose from the four biases. This gives a very different covariance matrix from Likert-type items. Therefore, they should not be expected to come out on the same factors as the Likert-type items. Even if this somewhat muddles the mathematical properties of the cultural bias scales, the increased content validity and decreased acquiescence makes up for this.

findings resemble more of what I would expect to find in the four-dimensional model than in the two-dimensional model.

Table 69: Factor Analysis of CB items used in NEPS95.

Total variance explained

Component	Initial eigenvalues			Extraction sums of squared loadings			Rotation sums of squared loadings[a]
	Total	% of variance	Cumulative %	total	% of variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	3.5	14.8	14.8	3.5	14.8	14.8	2.5
2	2.7	11.1	25.8	2.7	11.1	25.8	2.6
3	2.3	9.5	35.3	2.3	9.5	35.3	2.1
4	1.7	6.9	42.3	1.7	6.9	42.3	2.2
5	1.3	5.5	47.7	1.3	5.5	47.7	1.8
6	1.1	4.7	52.5	1.1	4.7	52.5	1.6
7	1.1	4.4	56.9	1.1	4.4	56.9	2.3

Extraction method: principal component analysis.
a. When components are correlated, the sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.

Structure matrix	Component						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
H1 authority	.21		**.53**				-.36
H2 preserve customs			**.58**		.21		-.34
Trust: Church of Norway M272		.37	**.65**				
Trust: Norwegian defense forces (military) M273		.46	.46				
Humans meant to rule over nature M199	.22		**.52**			.41	
E1 justice in the world	-.28			-.27	**.66**		.20
E2 tax shift					**.74**		
E3 divide work	-.23			-.21	**.71**		
Wealth E - equal				**-.90**	.21		
Growth E - environment	-.48		-.21				.36
Trust: Environmental organizations M269m	-.26	**.68**					
nature_e	**-.83**				.27	-.24	
I1 chance to succeed							**-.71**
I2 ability				.31	-.36	.30	-.46
Wealth I - by contribution				**.91**			
Trust: Business and companies M271		.43	.21		-.44		-.33
Right to change environment for human needs M189	.36			.20		**.63**	
Skill and wisdom will keep earth fine M192	.49			.20		.39	-.37
NOT on our way to ecological catastrophe M202r	**.85**						
OK to tamper with human genome M253r					-.23	**.73**	
F1 whichever party		-.25					**-.52**
F2 cooperation		-.26	**.53**				-.37
Trust F - Count of distrust		**-.76**	-.21				
Trust F2 NO- Party, EnvOrg, EnvGov, PolSys, UN		**-.88**					

Extraction Method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Values below 0.2 are hidden. Values >|0.5| are in bold.

Component correlation matrix

Component	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1	1.00	-.03	.14	.16	-.13	.20	-.09
2	-.03	1.00	.07	-.10	-.09	-.03	.04
3	.14	.07	1.00	.06	.05	.02	-.20
4	.16	-.10	.06	1.00	-.16	.18	-.14
5	-.13	-.09	.05	-.16	1.00	-.10	.02
6	.20	-.03	.02	.18	-.10	1.00	-.04
7	-.09	.04	-.20	-.14	.02	-.04	1.00

Extraction method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

In the component correlation matrix, we can see that none of the components correlate strongly with each other, which suggests that the distribution behind the cultural bias items does not give any reason to treat the four cultural biases as only two dimensions. We should be cautious by measuring and using the cultural biases separately.

The factor analyses of NOS99 and NEPS95 both result in a factorial solution where four (more than two) factors are clearly linked to cultural biases. Nevertheless, the presence of rejection is a choice made by the researcher. Given an operationalization similar to Kahan's, the rejection of a cultural bias is not treated as an independent phenomenon nor can it be detected. That might be a useful simplification—one that keeps the measurement and subsequent analysis as simple as possible without losing empirical parsimony. However, a four-dimensional measurement of cultural biases allows us to see that the rejection of a cultural bias is a trait in individuals that does not automatically follow from supporting something else. This opens up for a new question, namely how common is the rejection of a cultural bias?

Rejection of One or Two Cultural Biases is Common

The rejection of one or more cultural biases is quite common. In Figure 44 below, we can see how the number of cultural biases rejected varies from survey to survey. On the left-hand side of the diagram (NOS99), we have a very tight pattern; the five countries are remarkably similar in this regard.[389] As represented by the solid line, Norway somewhat deviates from the others by having fewer respondents who do not reject cultural biases and several who reject one. Otherwise, there are very small differences between the countries. This distribution can be summed up as follows: One-quarter of the respondents reject none of the cultural biases; one-third reject one cultural bias; one-quarter reject two cultural biases, and the small remainder reject three or four cultural biases.

[389] The cultural biases are standardized country by country, which of course creates a mean of 0 for each country. Standardization on the Nordic level would have differentiated countries more, but would not change the logic of the argument.

The proportion of people rejecting one cultural bias is dependent on where the cut-off point that defines rejection is placed.[390] Nevertheless, even if the cut-off point determines the level of rejection for one bias, the pattern in Figure 44 is the result of how an individual relates to several cultural biases simultaneously.

On the right-hand side of Figure 44, we can see how rejection is distributed among the general population and among the environmental organization member sample (NEPS95). Norway has been measured twice: The Norwegian general population sample from 1995 (dotted line on the right) can be compared with the Norwegian sample from 1999 (solid line on the left). This will show us how differences in measurement influence our results. We can see how in the 1995 general population sample, there are fewer who reject none, and several who reject one or two of the biases, which is different than what is found in the 1999 Norwegian sample. The main reason for this is likely to be the different items included in the scales, which are tailored to be less influenced by acquiescence and to include a wider range of domains.[391] The four–year time span between these two surveys should not produce marked differences in this pattern.

Figure 44: Proportion of Respondents by Count of Rejected Cultural Biases. NOS99 and NEPS95.



[390] In Chapter 10, we saw that a useful placement of the cut-off points are at the bottom 35 percent of the respondents as rejecting a bias, the top 35 percent as supporting a bias, and all those in between as indifferent. See the description of the process behind choice of cut-off points starting on page 366. To facilitate comparisons, the cut-off points used for the environmentalist sample are the same as those in the general sample.

[391] The content of cultural bias items used here is different and the acquiescence effect has been reduced by including some forced choice questions and some items with reversed order (see page 344-355).

The most remarkable trait in Figure 44 is the high level of rejection found among members of environmental organizations, where almost half of them reject two cultural biases while very few reject none of the cultural bias. It seems like many environmental organization members have clear visions of what they do not want when compared with the general population.

Based on previous findings, cultural theory predicts that many environmental organizations promote egalitarian solutions and reject hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic ones (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Hendriks 1994: 55; Thompson 1997b).[392] What we have here is empirical evidence showing that the members of environmental organizations have cultural biases that match the expectations derived from cultural theory. This match is to some extent surprising. I would have expected that only elites or those people who engage deeply in environmental organizations have cultural biases like these. This is especially the case because Ellis and Thompson found that, "in each of the three environmental groups surveyed ... the more active members consistently express greater antipathy to individualism, greater support for egalitarianism, and more distrust of hierarchical authority relations" (Ellis and Thompson 1997: 183).

The large majority of the environmental organization members that participated in NEPS95 are passive members who have no social contact with the other members. I interpret this as evidence of membership to these organizations as being of little importance in their lives when compared with the rest of their social relations and institutional attachments. In addition, some of the environmental organizations included in this sample are quite mainstream. This shows how important social context is for individual cultural biases: It influences not only which cultural biases are supported, but also which biases are rejected.

Can We Find all Combinations of Support and Rejection?

There are a limited number of possible combinations of rejection and support, and if they all occur, then support for one bias does not always create the same rejection response. If all possible combinations are present, this suggests that rejection is not fully determined by support. There is at least a possibility that the four cultural biases are true dimensions, where both ends of the scale can carry meaning.

In Figure 34 on page 395, we were able to see how the Nordic respondents are distributed within a cultural space consisting of all possible combinations of

[392] I am not saying that all environmental organiations are egalitarian. There are also other kinds of environmental organizations, like the long-established conservationists groups, that are more hierarchical, and some organic farming associations are individualistic (Rayner 1992)

rejection and support.[393] Each bar shows the count of respondents with a particular combination of all four cultural biases. There are no empty cells, thus indicating that all combinations of support and rejection exist. However, we can see that the distribution of cultural biases is not even. Some combinations, like support for all four cultural biases (144) or rejection of all four cultural biases (235) are common, while others have less than 30 people within them.

We need to check this on a sample-by-sample basis because a combination could be missing in only one of the countries. Since these tables are rather large, they are presented in the appendix. In Table 95 (on page 567), we find no empty cells in any of the countries surveyed in NOS99. There are respondents in every combination of the four biases, even if the distribution is far from even. In Table 96, we can see the same distributions in NEPS95. With one exception, there are at least a few respondents in every possible combination of the support and rejection of cultural biases. In the general sample, there are no respondents with combination *EIFh*.

To sum up, in six of our seven samples, we found respondents in every one of the 81 combinations defined by rejection of, indifference to, and support for hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases. In addition, in the seventh sample, which is the general sample from Norway, there was only one empty combination out of 81 combinations. In every sample, the distributions are not even, and some combinations are much more frequent than others are.

The Balance between Rejection and Support

In order to understand how rejection is distributed, it is useful to see rejection in relation to support. In Table 70 below, we can see a summary of information from Table 95, which contains the total from NOS99, and Table 96, which contains both samples from NEPS95. [394] Now we are counting only how many cultural biases the respondent supports and rejects. Information concerning indifference and which cultural bias is supported or rejected is not included. In Table 70, we can see for each survey the counts and the total percent of the distribution. We can see that a large proportion of the respondents support a few and reject a few in every sample.

If the classical view of individuals as having only one cultural bias (see coherent individual model on page 294) were correct, we should expect that each respondent would have one, and only one, supported bias. Since 31 percent of the respondents in NOS99 support only one bias, we can easily deduce that 69 percent of respondents do not fit this description. Similarly, 64 percent in the general sample from NEPS95 and 75 percent in the environmentalist sample fail to fit with a description that would directly support the coherent individual view of the individual-culture relationship.

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[393] More details can be found in the Chapter entitled *Combinations of Cultural Biases*. Only respondents with four valid cultural biases are included.

[394] Figure 44 demonstrated that the five countries have similar distributions in NOS99. Therefore, Table 70 only deals with these as the Nordic total.

Table 70: Count of Rejected by Count of Supported CBs. NOS99 and NEPS95. (Count and total percent)

Sample		Count of rejected CBs	Count of supported CBs 0	1	2	3	4	Total
NOS99 all samples	*Count*	0	55	195	307	349	223	1129
		1	187	472	485	231		1375
		2	330	563	245			1138
		3	362	335				697
		4	142					142
		Total	1076	1565	1037	580	223	4481
	Total percent	0	1	4	7	8	5	25
		1	4	11	11	5		31
		2	7	13	5			25
		3	8	7				16
		4	3					3
		Total	24	35	23	13	5	100
NEPS95 General sample	*Count*	0	8	38	60	54	14	174
		1	43	101	137	43		324
		2	49	157	79			285
		3	42	78				120
		4	5					5
		Total	147	374	276	97	14	908
	Total percent	0	1	4	7	6	2	19
		1	5	11	15	5		36
		2	5	17	9			31
		3	5	9				13
		4	1					1
		Total	16	41	30	11	2	100
NEPS95 Environmentalist sample	*Count*	0	9	33	32	19	2	95
		1	58	212	168	44		482
		2	130	477	335			942
		3	84	288				372
		4	14					14
		Total	295	1010	535	63	2	1905
	Total percent	0	0	2	2	1	0	5
		1	3	11	9	2		25
		2	7	25	18			49
		3	4	15				20
		4	1					1
		Total	15	53	28	3	0	100

Cultural theory must somehow deal with these distributions. People relate to cultural biases in a more complicated ways than what is assumed by the coherent individual model. As long as we insist upon the coherent individual model, which tells us that a dominant cultural bias is the norm at the individual level, distributions like these are a problem for cultural theory. Some of the problem can be solved, as I have suggested previously, by understanding individuals' relations to cultural biases not as belonging to one dominant culture, but rather as individuals having competence and positive and negative preferences toward particular cultural biases, in addition to the social relations and behaviors that cultural theory already deals well with (see page 299).

The distribution of support and rejection tells us a static story. By looking at the effects of rejection, we learn more about how cultural biases influence people's choices and political preferences.

The Effects of Rejection on Party Preferences in Surveys

For rejection to have an independent interpretation in surveys, it must have a meaningful effect that can be observed. A rejection of hierarchy, for example, must thus mean something other than just a very low score on the hierarchical bias. Since the idea of rejection has been one of the red threads in this thesis, it has been dealt with several times previously.

Earlier, starting on page 384, I discussed if measuring support is sufficient or if rejection matters based on data from NOS99. In that analysis, hundreds of rather similar cross tables were compared in an effort to illuminate their abilities to explain party preferences, as measured by support for ideological party families at the Nordic level or by support for national parliamentary parties on a country-by-country basis. This was thus an extremely broad test. The results presented in Figure 32 on page 386 show that tables using absolute values differ significantly from tables using only support, and particularly that the absolute values of cultural biases explain national party preferences well. In this test, however, different operationalizations are compared simultaneously: the number of cultural biases needed, the different ways to order the included biases, the number of categories for each bias, the importance of the indifferent neutral category, and the absolute values versus support only. While all options were still kept open in Figure 32, now it is time to make a test specific to the two top- ranked biases, which is the operationalization I favor.

How can we observe the independent effect of rejection? We classify the respondents either by giving support a priority or by giving support and rejection an equal priority during classification. Afterwards, we will see which classification best explains party preferences. In other words, we create cultural combinations by using two different methods. We rank the two strongest biases in two different ways. First, we can prioritize support, in which case we use cultural bias scales as they are: Zero equals the sample mean, positive values are counted as support, and negative values are counted as rejection. Two highest values are selected as the cultural bias combination that represents the respondent. Second, we can prioritize rejection equally by using absolute values during ranking: Zero is still the sample mean, and positive values are still counted as support; but negative values are converted into positive values. In this case, a strong rejection gets a higher value than weak support. For example, respondent X scores +2 on the hierarchical bias, +1 on the individualistic bias, -2.5 on the egalitarian bias, and 0 on the fatalistic bias. When ranking by strength, respondent X's cultural combination is *HI*, while ranking by absolute values, would yield *eH* (see page 360 for more details). An example of the cultural combinations using the top two absolute values can be seen in Table 41.

Since I believe rejection is important, I have formulated a null hypothesis which claims that the support version of the classification is better:

> H13 The ability of the top two-ranked biases explain party preferences is equal to or higher when ranked by support than when ranked by absolute values.

In Table 71 below, we can see that in every sample, the ranking by absolute values, which utilize information about rejection, perform much better than a combination that only uses information about support. We can compare the first column, which shows how well the combination of top-two biases ranked by absolute values explains party preferences, with the sixth column, which shows how well the combination of the top two biases ranked by support explains party preferences. In the environmental organization members sample, the difference between these two is only 6 points. However, in the sample from Sweden, the difference moves up to 17 points. In many of the samples, the increase is comparable to doubling the ability of cultural biases to explain party preferences.

Can we get this large improvement just by chance? We can test this directly by calculating the confidence intervals for the ability of the cultural combinations to explain party preferences and then check to see if the confidence intervals overlap. The absence of overlap is indicated by inscribing *reject* in the last column. We can see in Table 71 below that the hypothesis can be rejected in every one of the seven samples as well as in the Nordic total and in the NEPS95 total. The situation is the same in every sample: The population estimate for support is lower than the population estimate for the effect based on absolute values. Thus, our trust in the opposite of H13 increases. We have every reason to believe that the absolute values version of cultural biases performs better than versions based on support. This indicates that *rejection is important, and information about rejection should be utilized whenever possible*. However, until we understand the meaning of rejection, it is difficult to know what kind of theoretical consequences this has.

Table 71: The Two Top Biases Ranked by Support and Absolute values. NOS99 and NEPS95. (U)

Sample	Combination of two top biases ranked by absolute values. Percent explained	Asymp. SE	Approx. Sig.	95 Percent confidence interval low limit	upper limit	Combination of two top biases ranked by support Percent explained	Asymp. SE	Approx. Sig.	95 Percent confidence interval low limit	upper limit	Test of H13
Norway	23.6	1.2	.000	21.3	26.0	14.7	1.2	.000	12.4	16.9	Reject
Sweden	32.3	1.4	.000	29.5	35.0	15.3	1.3	.000	12.8	17.9	Reject
Denmark	22.0	1.2	.000	19.7	24.3	14.7	1.1	.000	12.4	16.9	Reject
Finland	22.4	1.2	.000	20.1	24.7	11.0	1.1	.000	8.8	13.2	Reject
Iceland	32.5	2.0	.000	28.6	36.3	18.3	1.9	.000	14.5	22.1	Reject
Total	9.5	0.5	.000	8.6	10.4	6.9	0.4	.000	6.0	7.8	
Env.org.	16.5	0.6	.000	15.3	17.8	10.9	0.6	.000	9.7	12.1	Reject
General	21.7	0.9	.000	19.8	23.5	11.8	0.9	.000	10.0	13.6	Reject
Total	15.6	0.5	.000	14.6	16.6	10.6	0.5	.000	9.7	11.6	

NOS99 is weighted. Percent explained = U*100. By calculating the value ± 1.96 std, we can calculate the population estimates for U and compare absolute values with support.

Rejection as a Carrier of Meaning

Everybody would agree that cultural biases are packages of meaning. However, there is no agreement over how we should understand rejection as carrier of meaning. Here, I will first show examples of how the meaning carried by the cultural combinations can be made understandable. Afterwards, I will refer to a more general analysis.

The effects that cultural biases have on party preferences was discussed in Chapter 11. Because this is an analysis where the Nordic countries are analyzed as one, parties are lumped together into Nordic party families where the national idiosyncrasies of the parties are downplayed, and the commonalities between cultural biases and the political positions of the party families are highlighted. In Table 72 below, we can see which cultural bias combinations give significantly increased support to a particular party family. We can see that 15 of these combinations consist of two rejections, 10 consist of support for two biases, and 5 consist of one rejection and one support. Therefore, rejection of a cultural bias is a common cause for selecting a particular party.

Table 72: Cultural Combinations by Preferred Party Family. NOS99 (CultRankTriA2)

Socialist left	Liberal	Green	Social democratic	Agrarian	Christian	Conservative	Progress
ih	*hf*	*iE*	*FE*	*IH*	*HI*	*eI*	*FH*
iE	*hi*	*Ih*	*If*	*Ef*	*HF*	*ef*	*FI*
hi	*ih*	*Fh*	*HE*			*eh*	*HI*
if		*fI*	*FH*			*fe*	
EH		*Hi*				*fI*	
hf							

These combinations are the statistically significant positive deviations collected from Table 43 to Table 51.[395]

For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to respondents who have statistically significantly increases in tendencies to prefer a party family as voters for the parties within these families. For several party families, rejection is a defining characteristic of their voters. We can see that the conservative party family's voters are characterized by support for individualism and rejection of everything else. The liberal party family voters are characterized by their rejection of hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic biases. The socialist left voters reject individualistic and support hierarchical bias. The green party voters reject hierarchical bias. For many voters, rejection of a bias or two makes it easier to choose a party.

Some party families are mainly defined by support. The supporters of social democratic party family are in favor of both egalitarian and fatalistic cultural biases. The supporters of the Christian party family are in favor of hierarchical cultural bias. The supporters of the progress party family are in favor of everything other than the egalitarian cultural bias.

It is the rejection of hierarchical bias that predominately differentiates between voters for green parties and those that vote for the socialist left. Rejection of individualistic bias differentiates socialist left voters from social democratic voters. Similarly, it is the rejection of the egalitarian bias that separates conservative voters from other voters on the right. These differences make sense and help us to understand what differentiates the various party families.

Overall, the party family preferences can be better understood when we consider the rejection of cultural biases.[396] Without information about rejection, it is difficult

[395] These tables demonstrate how the two top-ranked cultural biases can make sense of party families. Those cultural combinations that give strong support to a party family are identified and presented through a set of tables starting on page 412.

[396] Using cultural combinations is a novel way to describe the political ideology in a population that makes sense to me. If the reader finds the above argument too brief, they are invited to make up their own mind. It may be helpful to look at party preferences according to the two top-ranked biases from NEPS95 in Table 92 (on page 557) and from NOS99 in Table 93 (on page 558). Each country has a full page table that lists cultural combinations. If you have previous knowledge of

to understand how cultural biases influence the preferences that respondents have for particular political parties.

Rejection is Still Less Important than Support

To summarize, in this chapter we have seen that *rejection in cultural theory applies differently to social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases*. In social relations and behavioral patterns, rejection does not need to be visible, which makes rejection a bit difficult to establish empirically. At the same time, rejection of a cultural bias should be easily observable both in interviews and in surveys.

In the household interviews presented in this thesis, rejection was present both in the households' internal organizations and social relations, and in their views on politics and society. However, it is difficult to claim that rejection internally causes any rejection in their cultural biases, as the same rejection of cultural biases can also be explained by the dominant cultural bias in the household. *Rejection in these households seems to serve as a way to clarify and strengthen the dominant cultural bias.*

These findings in institutions need to be contrasted with the findings at the individual level. We have seen that a factor analysis of the cultural bias items gives us more than two factors, which indicates that the two-dimensional measurement model does not give an adequate picture of the variation in the data. *A four-dimensional model where every cultural bias has its own dimension with both support and rejection fits the data better.*

The distribution of support and rejection tells us that *rejection of one or more cultural biases is very common* in all samples. Similarly, we saw that we normally could find all possible combinations of rejection of and support for cultural biases. *Support for one bias can go together with the rejection of any other bias.*

We have established that the *top-two cultural biases, ranked as absolute values* that equalizes the importance of rejection and support, *explains party preferences far better than the top-two cultural biases ranked according to support.* This is so far the best evidence we have for the importance of rejection. This cultural bias combination can explain roughly 20 to 25 percent of the variation in party preferences within the national samples.

In addition, we have seen which cultural bias combinations are overrepresented among the different party family supporters. Rejection is an important element in most of these families. Rejection of cultural bias helps us to differentiate between the socialist left and the greens, between the socialist left and the social democrats, and between the conservatives and other right-wing parties. *Rejection of cultural bias thus seems to carry meaning that helps respondents to choose a party.*

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one of the parties in one of the countries, I recommend looking that country up and trying to see what kind of political conflicts and puzzles cultural biases make sense of.

So far, I have argued for the importance of rejection. However, there is also evidence that limits the importance of rejection. At the end of the discussion on the independence of effects fallacy on page 459, we learned that the second bias has a larger effect when the first ranked bias is rejection. Conversely, this means that the second bias has a smaller effect when the first ranked bias is support. In short, *support is still more important than rejection in determining people's party preferences*, but the difference is small.

None of my arguments concerning the existence and importance of rejection should be interpreted as implying that support for cultural biases has lost its importance. However, the effect of rejection is present and large enough to warrant its inclusion into cultural theory.

In sample surveys, the measurements of cultural bias can be constructed so that rejection does not apply. However, during my household interviews, rejection of cultural bias appeared without being solicited. The choice of including rejection in the measurement of cultural bias on the individual level opens up for a study of how individuals and their cultural biases relate to institutions, which I believe has a large potential for generating useful knowledge. It is possible that rejection of a cultural bias has a strong influence on what kind of social relations or institutions we reject or do not want to be part of, what we see as the biggest political problems, which policies and political parties we abhor, and what kind of cultural alliances we are willing to enter into.

If we do not include rejection, we are left with two main options for developing cultural theory. First, we stay with institutions and drop individuals. More specifically, we use the coherent individual model, observe how this model does not fit with the multiple roles and cultural biases that people have, and conclude that cultural theory does not work on individuals, who 'flit like butterflies from context to context and chant the nature of their arguments as they do so' (Rayner 1992:108-109). Second, we can drop institutions and stay with people. More specifically, we can use the two-dimensional cultural biases model, as developed by Kahan and associates (see presentation on page 286), and explain the patterns of cultural biases through cognitive psychology, thus arriving at a cultural theory without institutions (Kahan 2012).

My firm belief is that cultural theory, in its present form, is developed well enough to deal with institutions, and it has great potential for developing toward a theory that also accounts for individual choices and behaviors by incorporating at the individual level the idea of rejecting cultural biases. I have several suggestions for how this can be done. First, we should use a measurement model where individuals have varying degrees of knowledge and preferences toward ways of organizing. Second, we should measure all four cultural biases independently of each other. Third, individual-level combinations of cultural biases ranked by their absolute values allow us to use information concerning the rejection of cultural bias without relying on the independence of effect or additivity assumptions. Fourth, we should drop the dominant cultural bias assumption at the individual level and keep it at the institutional level since the assumption seems to work fine in households. I hope creating a theoretical opening for the rejection of cultural biases at the individual level allows us to utilize the present developments in cognitive and social psychology without giving away the importance of institutions.

Chapter 14

FINAL REMARKS

The main research problem of *how we should understand the relationship between individuals, social structures, and cultural biases* has been approached from two different angles: from a study of migrant households as institutions and from several surveys that used cultural biases at the individual level. Both of these have brought us a little further along in our understanding of cultural theory. In what follows, I will first summarize the issues from all parts of the thesis that are relevant to cultural theory. I will then focus on cultural theory as it relates to migration issues.

Household research and Cultural Theory

Since the findings from the household study have already been presented in Chapter 6, I will only repeat the main points of that study. The research problem for the household study was formulated as follows: *How is a household's way of organizing related to its views on politics and society?*

In order to answer to the research question, I had to *find an operationalization* that could be used on households in Norway. Cultural theory, after all, is a rather abstract theory that needs to be operationalized for a particular context. In doing so, I build upon the British household study, modified it a bit to make it transferable to a Norwegian context, and limited its scope to internal organization and helping relations. In addition, I made a list of predictions about how political views are connected to each of the four ways of organizing.

The operationalization of the four ways of life allowed me to describe and analyze the internal organization and helping relations of the eight households. Every household had a dominant way of organizing, even if they sometimes borrowed a few traits from another way of organizing. Moreover, within each household, the research found no indication that the dominant way of organizing was contradicted. On some occasions, households did express rejection of ways of life other than their dominant way of organizing. This allowed them to strengthen their dominant way of organizing, and to communicate to me what kind of household they were.

My research confirms one of the findings from the British household study: Even if households are very small and informal institutions, *the categories of cultural theory can be successfully used to describe households* (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Dake and

Thompson 1999). For cultural theorists, this might sound like saying that the sky is blue, but it is still an important statement and something that should not be taken for granted. Households are the most common institution around, and we all participate in one. Therefore, developing a better understanding of what happens inside households is the first step in understanding how individuals relate to institutions. The choice of migrant households from three different cultural spheres increases our trust in this finding, even if the number of households in this study is small. Cultural theory is not just for the studies of political conflicts, but something that can be used on households.

Household Research and Political Views

Some 2500 years ago, Herodotus, the father of ethnography and history, observed a fundamental type of connection between local beliefs and local institutions, despite all the variability between them:

> If one were to order all mankind to choose the best set of rules in the world, each group would, after due consideration, choose its own customs; each group regards its own as being the best by far. (Herodotus 1998:185)

Similarly, today's migrant households seem to believe that their own way of organizing also provides for the best rules and customs for society. However, the lack of a correlation between country of origin and belief demonstrates that the national origin of the household does not determine what they believe is best for society. Instead, the evidence suggests that the household's internal organization and their helping relations with other households is connected with their views on politics and society. In each of the eight households analyzed, *their political views matched their internal way of life* to a surprising degree. At the very least, this confirms that there is a linkage between the way a household is organized as an institution and the political views held by its members, as predicted by cultural theory.

Political views are also quite consistent when interpreted in light of cultural theory, which contradicts a common understanding of the electorate as inconsistent. I suggest that political science would benefit from a greater emphasis on the social origins of political views. Political science, since the developement of survey methodologies, has only in a minor degree been interested in households as a source of political views (Zuckerman 2005). My research on households shows that the similarity between a household's internal organization and their political views is greater than what is comme-il-faut in political science.

Out from the household data, I cannot make conclusions about the causal direction. Either people create their own households based on their deepest values and beliefs about human nature and institutions, or they learn these at home and believe that what works at home should work for society too. Nevertheless, the connection is strong and the political views are culturally consistent, which suggests that household structures can be used to predict political views, at least in a statistical sense.

Overall, the household study shows that social structure and political views are intimately connected at the household level. Moreover, this connection is stronger than the connection between their national origins and their political views.

Survey Research and Cultural Theory

My main goal for part II was to *create a working operationalization at the individual level* by using available survey data. I believe I have succeeded in this goal.

I identified some issues related to the lack of clarity in the individual-culture relationships, and methodological problems concerning the measurement, operationalization, and statistical analysis of cultural biases. First, we still do not have a good method for measuring cultural biases, social relations, or behavioral patterns in surveys. Second, the measurement of cultural biases is intrinsically interwoven with our understanding of the individual-culture relationship. Third, it is very easy to confuse descriptions and analyses of individuals and institutions in statistical analyses. Fourth, cultural biases are not numbers; they are instead patterns of meaning that do not permit the use of a wide variety of statistical calculations.

I have previously presented the Coherent, Sequential, and Synthetic Individual approaches as alternative ways of operationalizing cultural theory at the individual level. The main difference between these is found in their various understandings of how institutions influence an individual's cultural bias. If we do not know how institutions influence individual cultural biases, then it is almost impossible to describe institutions by using the results from measurements of people's four cultural biases.

In order to test my ideas, I first had to create four continuous scales for measuring the four cultural biases in two different large-scale surveys: the Nordic Cultures Survey from 1999 (NOS99) and the Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey from 1995 (NEPS95).

I suggest that cultural biases should be analyzed as individual-level cultural combinations. This avoids the problems connected with the meaning carried by cultural biases (lack of additivity and lack of independence), as well as avoids confusion about the levels. The great advantage of using simple cross tabulations is that they can be used on nominal-level variables and are not dependent on those assumptions I want to test. As it was unclear which assumptions give the best results, I explored a large number of different sets of assumptions and then selected for further use the variable that gave the best explanation of political views. The small choices made during operationalization end up making a big difference in the explanation of party preferences: Employing a poor method for combining cultural biases explains nothing, while a robust method behind the cultural bias combinations can explain up to one third of the variation in party preferences, as measured country by country.[397]

The winner of the race between variables was the *two top-ranked biases* approach, which operates under the following assumptions: First, a person's relation to a particular cultural bias can be divided into three relational types: support, indifference, and rejection. Second, those 35 percent with highest score in each country relate to cultural biases by supporting them, whereas those 35 percent with the lowest score on the scale relate to cultural biases by rejecting them. Third, the 30 percent in the middle are labeled as indifferent, and are thus ignored in this variable. Fourth, information concerning rejection is as almost as important as information concerning support, and therefore rejection should be used as a variable that describes respondents' cultural biases. Fifth, including several cultural biases in the variable increases the variable's ability to explain party preferences up to the point where the data is too scant to support our findings. In a common sample size with 1000 respondents, using two biases strikes a good balance between richness of description and having enough respondents in each category. Sixth, ranking people and ranking biases keeps these labels as close to the individual level as possible (without the use of means). At the national level, this variable can explain from 21 to 28 percent of the party preferences in the Nordic countries.

For larger samples, it is possible to use all four biases as *cultural space*. This variable includes a label for the respondents in the neutral category, while it ignores rank because the biases are in a fixed order. At the national level, this variable can explain from 19 to 32 percent of party preferences in the Nordic countries.

I demonstrated how both the cultural space and the two top-ranked biases variables can be used to explain preferences for particular ideological party families at the Nordic level. The categories available in these variables help to make sense of preferences for ideological party families, and they open up for some new insights. We learned how socialist left, liberal, and green party families are culturally similar. Likewise, even if the progress party family is sometimes located to the right of the conservative party on the left-right scale, culturally it has much more in common with the social democratic party family. Given this demonstration, I feel confident that my operationalization of cultural biases as individual-level combinations is useful and works as well as one can expect.

Discussing the Individual-Culture Relation

Finally, in Part III, the previously developed research was reapplied to cultural theory in order to tell us more about the individual-culture relationship. Survey

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[397] See Table 38 on page 381.

research within cultural theory has used some assumptions that I believe are fallacies. In order to falsify these assumptions, I test a multiplicity of different hypotheses for each fallacy—often on the sample and individual levels—in seven different samples taken from NOS99 and NEPS95. One hypothesis test is not enough to falsify a common assumption. However, when I can repeatedly show the lack of empirical support for any of the assumptions in any of the countries, it becomes increasingly difficult to believe that these assumptions are sound.

It has often been assumed that people have *a dominant cultural bias*, just as the households in Part I were found to have. However, a scrutiny of this assumption shows that the best candidate for the dominant bias is not the only bias with an effect, as the second strongest bias also has a clear effect. The dominant bias assumption did not receive empirical support and should be regarded a fallacy. This also means that the coherent individual approach lacks empirical support. Therefore, we should avoid labeling people as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic.

In variable-oriented survey research, it is commonly assumed that the effects of two biases can be added together, which I call *the additivity assumption*. Similarly, it is commonly assumed that each bias has its own independent effect, which I call *the independency assumption*. Hypothesis tests show that these assumptions do not receive empirical support. Therefore, we should avoid statistical techniques, such as correlations and regressions, that require these assumptions.

The above findings are hard to deal with. The lack of a dominant cultural bias means that the tendency to divide people into four cultural types is wholly inadequate. The lack of additivity makes it difficult to study the effects of more than one bias at a time. At the same time, the lack of independence makes it difficult to study the effects of only one bias. I suggest that individual-level combinations of cultural biases can be a way forward because it is not dependent on these assumptions.

Based on these findings, I suggest that the breach of these assumptions is a methodological explanation for why, despite the promises made by Wildavsky (1987), individual-level cultural theory has been met with little or no success when applied to surveys. By using the combination of the two top-ranked biases, a reanalysis of the data from this research tradition might provide for better results and show that cultural biases can predict political preferences, behaviors, and risk perceptions.

Little by little, it looks like some of the unfinished business of cultural theory can be settled, at least for the versions that rely on Dake's four-dimensional measures of cultural biases: The knowledge model of cultural theory allows the individual to have different knowledge of and preferences towards each of the ways of organizing. The rejection of cultural bias is a phenomenon we need to relate to, both in households and in surveys, but it is still less important when compared to support. It is also possible to include new domains into the cultural bias measurements. We have seen how the dominant bias assumption at the individual level is a fallacy, the additivity of effects assumption is a fallacy, and the independency of effects assumption is fallacy. The combination of two top-ranked cultural biases avoids these problems and opens up for the possibility of using cultural theory on individual-level applications.

Individuals seem to have a more complex relationship with culture than what has been recognized by cultural theorists. Even if this seems novel in the context of cultural theory, it is old news for those who work with migrants, identities, and other individual-level aspects of cultural phenomena. Even if people should not be labeled by a ways of organizing, I can imagine that in any given particular context, individuals can present themselves in coherent manner for other participants, if they are competent in the particular way of organzing. We should not confuse being and behavior.

One of the most important findings in this thesis is that rejection applies differently in institutions versus individuals. In households, rejection seems to serve as a way to clarify and strengthen the dominant way of organizing. Rejection does not apply the same way to social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases because the rejected social relations are visible only in their absence, while rejection can be observed directly both in behavioral patterns and in cultural biases.

With respect to individuals and survey data pertaining to cultural biases only, maintaining each of the four biases as its own dimension while accounting for both support and rejection produces a more robust fit with the data when compared to the fit from the two-dimensional model. The rejection of one or more biases was quite common in all samples. The findings show that support for one bias can go together with the rejection of any other bias. In other words, rejection seems to carry meaning that helps respondents to choose a party, although the effect of rejection is smaller than the effect of support. Nevertheless, the effect is large enough to warrant its inclusion in cultural theory because it is needed if we are to make sense of how cultural biases work at the individual level.

The Migration Research

There is a large among of uncertainty among many people, governmental bodies, and professionals when it comes to questions on *how to deal with migrants*. This uncertainty provided me with the opportunity to obtain public funding for Part I of the thesis. My answer to the question is novel among migration researchers, but old news among cultural theorists. I suggest that the categories from cultural theory can be used to describe migrant households in a way that helps to break down nationality-based stereotypes. Even if the four ways of organizing are themselves stereotypes, they are still beneficial insofar as they do not follow the old stereotypes, they give guidance on how to behave, and they activate our existing social competences.

While the migrant households originated from a variety of different countries, the similarities in the ways that some of them were organized, regardless of their origins, coincided with very similar views on politics and society. By contrast, households that were organized differently, even when coming from the same country, had divergent views on politics and society. Indeed, migrant households are as diverse as the households among the Norwegian majority. We should be more attentive to this diversity and not assume that households from one country are similar, just as we do not assume that all Norwegian households are the similar.

I suggest that knowledge about the four different ways of organizing a household can be very beneficial for those professionals who need to build repertoires with unfamiliar households. The four ways of organizing are crude simplifications, but they are solid enough to serve as foundations for interactions (Olli 2007).

I suggest that our *ability to deal with migrants is better than most of us believe.* Most of us are competent in several of the four ways of organizing. A lot of literature and academic prestige has been devoted to explaining differences between cultures. However, I believe that the majority and minority households are much more similar than some of us like to think, and it is here where academic research should focus. We can use our own knowledge of the ways of organizing as the social competence required to create working interactions with migrants. At least one requisite for friendly social interaction is present when participants can agree upon using the same cultural bias.

Directions for Future Research

My original intention was to allow qualitative and quantitative methods to clash and compete with each other, as I expected to find a plethora of incompatibilities between these two methods. Little by little, however, I realized that it is possible to create a bridge between the institutionally-oriented, qualitative cultural theory and the individually-oriented, quantitative cultural theory. At present, the bridge is still fragile, but hopefully it can strengthened in the future.

Cultural theory is developing into two different directions—an institutionalist theory and a cognitive theory of risk. These two directions seem to be further from each other now than ever before. I hope my research can provide a link between these two strains of cultural theory.

The cognitive theory of risk has its starting point in individuals, and it explains the formation of cultures through cognitive and psychological processes, without the need for evoking the role of institutions (Kahan 2012). While this might solve some of the problems with functional explanations in cultural theory, the main problem lies in the rejection of institutions as the main arena of cultural learning (Grimen 1997). Institutions are replaced by a generalized popular debate, and people's views are simply averaged together. Hodgson has given an insightful analysis of the necessary role of institutions in all explanations of social phenomena and gives a warning to those, mainly economists, who believe that they can do social science without accounting for institutions:

> This problem has a parallel in biology: It is like to trying to talk about the effects of genes without environments, and commonly recognized to be a dead end. Social scientists should likewise acknowledge that consideration of individuals without an institutional context is also a non-starter. (Hodgson 2007:219)

Cultural theory has excelled as a theory of institutions, and these strengths should be developed further. The household study shows that even those institutions that are common in our everyday lives do indeed matter. I believe it is possible to build a bridge from the institutional theory towards the more psychological version of cultural theory by using the knowledge model of the individual-culture relationship, where individuals have knowledge of and positive or negative preferences toward cultural biases. The rest of cultural theory can largely remain the way it has been. By allowing for this bridge that relates individuals to institutions, we can incorporate the findings from experiments that demonstrate how cultural theory works in and between individuals. I would like to bring the insights from the cognitive theory of risk to the institutional version of cultural theory.

Even if Kahan and associates approach avoids the problem of functional explanation often attributed to cultural theory, they do this with the cost of loosing the institutional level (Kahan and Braman 2006; Grimen 1997). Verweij, Luan, and Nowacki have articulated a cultural theory research program that contains nine important hypotheses that can and should be tested. I share their belief in that the testing of cultural theory should focus on its structural rather than its functionalist roots (2011). Therefore, research should focus on the connection between individuals and institutions.

Cultural theory still works rather poorly in surveys, and I believe I have pushed the limits for what can be done with Dake and Wildavsky's approach to measuring cultural bias. Even if combinations of cultural biases can be a solution, it probably is not the most efficient and elegant solution. Moreover, while I have proposed several models for the individual-culture relationship, these models need to be confirmed so that we can start trusting at least one of them.

Another aspect still in need of development is the interaction between the cultural biases, which probably causes the lack of additivity. Using the two top-ranked bias combinations either solves or hides the interaction problem, depending on your view, by allowing each combination to have its own effect (effect of first bias + effect of second bias + their interaction effect). These interaction effects should be analyzed in greater detail. After all, we know very little about how these combinations actually work. Under which conditions do combinations become important? Under which conditions do biases operate alone? Are the effects of these combinations connected to particular domains, particular issues, particular biases, or particular institutional contexts? Will an individual rely on the same combination when he or she is faced with many different situations? There are at least two possible approaches for engaging in more detailed analysis: One can study the cultural bias combinations as configurations (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) or one can study the interaction effects through statistical procedures like UNIANOVA. Based on some of my explorations that employed these techniques, I believe that one should analyze a small subset of combinations rather than analyzing all combinations at once.

During the research process, I have become more aware of the possibilities in cross-level inference and believe that we should check how the additivity and independence assumptions operate with respect to cultural combinations (Achen and Shively 1995). It is possible that by moving closer to the individual and keeping the different cultural combinations separate, cultural biases start to behave more like numbers. This is a method for controlling for the interaction effects between the biases.[398]

Another task is to assess how old results change and new insights might arise if we were to reanalyze the data, but this time by using cultural combinations. For example, by using data from Sweden and Brazil, Sjöberg has shown the limited ability of cultural biases to explain variations in the perceptions of risk (in the 5 percent range). However, he used both correlations and multivariate regressions, each of which rely on the false assumptions of independence and additivity (Sjöberg 1995). This otherwise excellent article has been quite important, at least in the Nordic countries, for the debate concerning the value of cultural theory in quantitative research. Perhaps Sjöberg's conclusions would be different if we analyzed the same data by using cultural combinations.

Suggestions for Better Ways of Measuring Cultural Biases

What is the best way to measure cultural biases? Kahan and associates use a two-dimensional model of cultural biases, while the more common approach is to use a four-dimensional model. Kahan and associates are studying individual-level cognition and perceptions related to moral and political controversies that take place within the national media. They jump over the meso-level, or the institutions that provide people with the chance to find out what to mean. It would be useful to have a research project that compares the two- and four-dimensional measurements, particularly in relation to respondents' institutional attachments.

[398] A webpage with an example of detailed effects can be seen at http://eero.no/publ/False_assumptions_tables_Effect_of_Biases_on_voting.html.

Even if experimental research has great potential for clarifying theory, there is always the problem of transferring the results from experiments to real-life situations.[399] In political science, rational choice theory has been extensively tested with experiments, but real people in real-life situations do not always behave according to the models. In particular, I suspect that these experiments are not well suited for dealing with the role that institutions have in people's lives.

A standard battery of cultural theory items for survey research should be developed by using well-established methods (DeVellis 2003). For theoretical improvements, better measurements of the central concepts are required. In previous research, the selection of questions has been heavily guided by attempts to utilize existing survey data, and I believe that by now this path has been adequately explored. New questions should be created that focus on justifications of contextualized issues rather than on agreements or disagreements with abstract statements. If we want to increase our understanding of the linkages between individuals and institutions, we need measurements that allow us study the level of consistency in people's views across different domains.

The Relationship Between Individuals and Institutions

Research tailored to unraveling some of the secrets of individuals in institutions is needed if we are to further develop cultural theory. Qualitative research is needed for developing new hypothesis about the mechanisms involved. Quantitative research is needed for testing and confirming the existence of these mechanisms. Instead of lofty dreams, I will here give two concrete examples of what kind of research could provide new answers concerning the relationship between individuals and institutions.

Environmentalists in their Organizations

Previous research has shown how social contact among members of environmental organizations increases private recycling behavior as much as the increases obtained from all attitudinal variables combined (Olli, Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001). A more detailed analysis of the cultural biases and behaviors among environmentalists can teach us a lot about how important these institutions are for their attitudes and the way cultural biases propel their behaviors.

Even if I have treated the environmentalist sample in NEPS95 as one large sample, it is actually a sample of member lists from 12 environmental organizations. This

[399] Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, Braman, et al. 2010; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012; Verweij and Nowacki 2010.

gives us a possibility of comparing organizations and their members, even if the number of members in each organization is small (see page 343).

The data also contains information about how much time the members spend in the organizations' activities, about their social contacts with others within the same organization, and about the multiple organizational memberships. If organizations have a central place in the lives of the members, then the organizations should also influence the cultural biases of their members. Similarly, if the members select an organization to join on the basis of their cultural biases, then the members should be expected to have similarities with other members from the same organization, but differences with members from other organizations. However, one should not assume that individuals have similar cultural patterns simply because the organizations they belong to can be described as having particular cultural patterns (Hofstede 2001:399).

The NEPS95 data is rich but underutilized because of the original researchers' disappointment with the performance of the cultural bias scales.[400] However, my thesis has shown that by including some new items into the scales, the cultural bias scales can still be useful. This opens up for many new possibilities, particularly the use of multilevel analyses.

The data also contains several questions about behavior, which also opens up for a study of the relative importance of institutions, versus cultural biases, as a basis for behavior. What is the relationship between the hard-core activist and the passive members? How similar are the hard-core activists across organizations?

It would strengthen the possibilities of analysis if the ways in which organizations are structured could be established from information other than the data found in surveys. There are some books written about environmentalism and environmental organizations from this period, and these can provide information about each organization (Berntsen 1994; Strømsnes and Selle 1996). In addition, publications by the organizations and other written materials can help to establish knowledge on how they organize their activities and what kind of arguments they use. Interviews with a few central figures could be used to validate the interpretation based on written sources.

Individuals in Institutions: More Household Research

Households are a miniature institution that everyone has experience with, and therefore households should have a prominent position in cultural theory research that focuses on the relationship between institutions and individuals. One of the main contributions of this thesis is that we now have a slightly better understanding of how individuals deal with cultural biases, which in turn will allow for research on individuals in institutions by using both the institutional and individual levels at the same time. This can teach us several new things about the individual-institutional

[400] Personal communication.

relationship. To do so, we need to collect data that can describe individuals' cultural biases, social relations, and behaviors within each household, and we need to describe the household as a unit.

Additional research into households might focus on several interesting and fruitful research questions. For example, how do households compartmentalize or deal with multiple cultures that are present in one household? How do households and individuals deal with changes? How do individuals deal with multiple ways of organizing within the household? Finally, what is the nature of the interaction between the various cultural biases at the individual level? Multilevel analyses will make it possible to search for the correct functional form of the relationship between the different levels of data, which is needed if we ever want to use cross-level inference. Without cross-level inference, we will always need to collect data on both levels. A proper understanding of the functional form makes it possible to use survey data to describe institutions and, for example, to predict behavior at the level of institutions or cultural bias combinations.

Because individuals have institutional attachments outside their households, one can study how individuals deal with the multiple roles that come from these attachments and how these multiple roles can become sources conflict. If the sequential individual model is correct, then we should expect that people are very good at keeping their roles separate and never see the multiplicity of roles as a problem. If the synthetic individual approach is correct, then we should expect that individuals have various strategies for dealing with conflicting roles that arise out from varying organizational practices within institutions.

Creating changes in institutions just for research purposes is ethically dubious. However, it is still possible to sample households that are in a state of flux. Examples of these might be new households consisting of people who have just moved in together, or ones that recently moved to a new city or new country, or couples that are considering divorce. Each of these has enough potential for change so that we can study the dynamics within the household and the household's relationship with its environment.

APPENDIXES

Interview Guides and Schema

One Example of the Many Tailored Versions of My Letter of Introduction:

UNIVERSITETET I BERGEN

INSTITUTT FOR SAMMENLIKNENDE POLITIKK
Christiesgt. 15
5007 Bergen
Tlf.: 55 58 21 75/55 58 21 78
Kontorsjef: 55 58 22 35
Fax: 55 58 94 25

DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS
UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN
Christiesgt. 15 - N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Tel.: 47-55 58 21 75/47-55 58 21 78
Executive officer: 47-55 58 22 35
Fax: +47 55 58 94 25

tirsdag, 25. januar 2005

Informasjon til de som skal intervjues:

Du og din husholdning kan være blant de jeg ønsker å intervjue. Dette brevet innehoder informasjon til deg for at du skal kunne velge om du vil bli med eller ikke. Jeg holder på med doktoravhandling om innvandrer husholdninger i Bergen med bakgrunn fra Vietnam, Sri Lanka eller Chile.

Hva skjer om du blir med?
For det første, jeg må få vite at du/dere vil være med eller ikke. Vennligst send det vedlagte svar-konvoluttet tilbake til meg uansett. For det andre, vi må avtale en tidspunkt for intervjuet. Min jobb er å gjøre intervjuer, så jeg er veldig fleksibel, med unntak av noen uker i August når jeg er på ferie. Kanskje har du spesielt godt tid i sommer?
Jeg ønsker å intervjue deg og din husholdning **hjemme hos dere**. Som regel forsøker jeg å få til **to intervjuer**. For noen husholdninger vil et intervju være nok, mens for noen andre kan jeg ønske å intervjue flere enn to ganger. Intervjuene vil vare fra en til to timer om gangen.
Til første intervju tar jeg med meg et **kontrakt**: jeg skriver under en taushetserklæring og du/dere skriver under at jeg får lov å bruke den informasjonen jeg har samlet. Dette vil definere hva informasjonen kan brukes til senere.
Jeg ønsker å gjøre et **lydopptak** av intervjuet, fordi det er veldig lett å misforstå hverandre. På denne måten kan jeg være sikker på at jeg forstår og siterer deg riktig. Du kan selvfølgelig be om at jeg ikke tar opp hele eller deler av vår samtale.

Hvorfor burde du bli med?
For mye av debatten og den offentlige politikken styres av det folk, politikere og byråkrater tror om innvandrere. Eneste måten å rette på dette er å høre på innvandrerne selv har å si. Nå har DU muligheten til å bli hørt. Du vil også hjelpe meg i å bli ferdig med doktoravhandlingen min, noe jeg personlig setter veldig pris på. Derimot, vil du vil ikke få betalt eller få noe spesial behandling av offentlige etater fordi ingen vet at du deltar.

Ansvarlig for prosjektet:
Jeg synes det er viktig at dere vet litt om meg som er ansvarlig for prosjektet: Mitt navn er Eero Olli. Jeg er 33 år, født i Finland, flyttet til Norge i en alder av 18 år, nå Norsk stasborger, tok hovedfag i Sammenliknende politikk 1995 og har siden arbeidet på Institutt for Sammenliknende Politikk ved Universitetet i Bergen. Hvis du er nysgjerrig kan du slå opp på http://www.uib.no/people/sspeo/ for å se min private hjemmeside. Har du noen som helst spørsmål, kan du ringe eller sende en epost til meg (se nederst).

Om mitt forskningsprosjektet:
Intervjuet er del av prosjektet *Innvandrerhusholdningenes strategier for ressursforvaltning -- Hvordan får de endene til å møtes?* som igjen er en del av Norges Forskningsrådets satsing på Internasjonal Migrasjon og Etniske Relasjoner, dvs. at NFR finansierer meg og mitt forskning. Formålet med mitt prosjekt er å beskrive hvordan innvandrerhusholdninger i Bergen lever sitt liv og hvordan dette har endret seg fra tiden før de kom til Norge, i løpet av de første årene i Norge og til situasjonen i dag. Dette prosjektet forsøker med andre ord beskrive forskjellige måter å klare seg på i Norge. Prosjektet skal være ferdig i løpet av år 2003.

Stipendiat Eero Olli Tel. +47 55 58 25 58 Fax. +47 55 58 94 25 E-mail. eero.olli@isp.uib.no

Informasjonen er godt beskyttet:
I Norge har man en *Lov om personregistre* som skal beskytte folks privatliv. Dette prosjektet er godkjent av *Datatilsynet* som har som oppgave å påse at denne loven blir fulgt. Informasjonen som blir samlet inn kan brukes bare til det formålet som du har godkjent på forhånd. Din identitet vil bli skjult, dvs. at bare Eero Olli vil vite hvem du er. Ditt navn, adresse og andre trekk som kan gjøre det mulig å finne ut hvem du er vil bli endret i alle papirer som er tilgjengelig for andre.
Etter at prosjektet er ferdig vil informasjonen til slutt bli lagret hos *Norsk Samfunnsvitenskapelig Datatjeneste* (NSD) med personidentifikasjon, dvs. at opplysningene blir lagret sammen med navn og adresse. Dette skal lagres på denne måten fordi at jeg ønsker å foreta en oppfølgingsundersøkelse om ca. 10 år for å finne ut hva som har skjedd med deg og de andre innvandrerne jeg har snakket med. NSD er litt som en bank som lagrer verdifulle ting som ikke må komme i gale hender. NSD har ikke lov å fortelle noen hvem du er, men de har lov til å gi den anonymiserte informasjonen til andre forskere etter visse ganske strenge regler.

Taushetsplikten må holdes:
Jeg og andre forskere har taushetsplikt. Samtidig er vår jobb å formidle kunnskap til andre. Dette er to motstridende krav, men taushetsplikten har første prioritet. Dvs. at vi kan ikke gi informasjon om dine personlige forhold til andre uten å beskytte deg og dine interesser. Vi rapporterer ikke til Sosialkontoret, Politiet eller Utlendingsdirektoratet om deg, ditt liv eller eventuelle brudd på norsk lov.
I et rettssak angående et alvorlig lovbrudd kan jeg bli tvungen til å gi fra meg informasjon om deg, men då må retten først vite at jeg har informasjon om deg. Og det vil de aldri vite, om ikke du selv forteller dem.

Deltagelse er frivillig:
Du kan selv velge om du ønsker å bli intervjuet. Ingen andre får vite om du ville eller ikke ville bli med.
Du kan sette grenser: selv om du sier ja til å delta i intervjuet, trenger du ikke fortelle om noe du ikke ønsker. Du bare sier fra at det er en privatsak og ønsker du ikke snakke om det.

Selv om du sier ja til å bli intervjuet og bli med i prosjektet videre kan du når som helst ombestemme deg og trekke deg fra resten av prosjektet. Du kan også be om å få all eller deler av informasjon om deg slettet, dvs. at då er jeg tvungen til å fjerne informasjon jeg har samlet inn (lydband, notater etc.) og kan ikke bruke noe av det videre. Fordi deltagelsen er frivillig, trenger du ikke begrunne hvorfor du ikke lenger vil være med.

Hva skal informasjonen brukes til?
Resultatene av prosjektet skal publiseres som en doktorgradsavhandling i sommeren 2003. I tillegg vil det bli skrevet mindre rapporter og vitenskapelige artikler. Jeg håper selvfølgelig at resultatene vil få oppmerksomhet også i media. Hvis du er interessert kan du få et av de mindre arbeidene som takk for din deltagelse.

Vennlig hilsen

Eero Olli

Stipendiat Eero Olli Tel. +47 55 58 25 58 Fax. +47 55 58 94 25 E-mail. eero.olli@isp.uib.no

Interview Guide for the First Interview

I would like to perform an interview with two adults in the household. I would expect that spouses have different connections, and are able to provide the household with different types of resources. Therefore, the interview must be adjusted to fit the informant. Alternatively, some topics are covered very briefly.

By the time of the first interview, the informants have already received a letter with information about the project, with information required by *Datatilsynet*. Unfortunately, the information is relatively technical and detailed. In addition, because I prefer to do at least one of the interviews at peoples' homes I already have either an oral or a written confirmation of their willingness to participate in the project.

Before the Interview

Present the project and myself.
Check that they have information about the project (Letter of introduction).
Agree upon a time frame for the interview
Sign the declaration of professional secrecy in front of them (front)
Let them sign the consent for participation (back)
Is it OK if I make a recording?

Household

Ask everybody to present him or herself to help
transcription.
Can you shortly describe to me who are you?
Who lives in this household?

Schemas

Fill in life-history schema. This takes most of the interview.
Fill in housing and work-history schemas if needed.

Life now:

How is life now? Job? Housing?
What is important in life?

Old ambitions and dreams:

Did life turn out the way you had hoped for?
How did you think life in Norway would be?
How would you like your future to look like? Dreams
How do you try to fill these dreams?

Resource management:

Income and expenses:
Give them a few stories of people who have difficulties with making their ends meet.
Who is in control of the economy?
Do you have the overview? (Who has?)
Where does the income come from? Is that steady?
How do the expenses look like? Are they steady or do they vary?

If you will get something expensive, how will you do it? How do you know if you can by something expensive?	Why would you not buy it? How could you afford it? What about holidays?
What expensive things have you bought lately? Why?	
Do you save money? For what? Why?	
What are the regular expenses? (Housing, food, clothes, travel, gifts, family obligations, entertainment)	Who knows? Who decides?
Have you had any big economic surprises? How did you solve these?	From whom can you borrow money? Whom are you helping?
How does a normal day look like? Are there some weekdays that are different?	
How does a normal day look for your spouse?	

Cultural theory -traits

Decision-making	How do you make big decisions in the family?	
House-work	How do you divide the work at home? (Cleaning, cooking, shopping, reparations, childcare)	Why? (Principle for division of work) Check for regularity (same person, same day,)

Round up

Thank you for participating.
I would like to come back for a second interview after a few weeks.

Schemas for Life-, Work- and Housing-History

Life-History Schema (Original in A3 size)

Confidential Household:______________ Date of Interview:___________
Interview person:_____________________________

Year	Important happenings	Housing:	His Work/Studies	Her Work/Studies:
1978				
1979				
1980				
1981				
1982				
1983				
1984				
1985				
1986				
1987				
1988				
1989				
1990				
1991				
1992				
1993				
1994				
1995				
1996				
1997				
1998				
1999				
2000				
2001				
2002				

Work-History Schema (A4 size)

Job history for ____________________________________ Given by ___ interview subject ___ partner Date of interview:_______________________						
Job	Short description of content, tasks, positive sides…	How did you get the job? Who helped?	Where? Distance?	For how long? Start & end.	Why did you leave the job?	What else happened the same time?

Housing-History Schema (A4 size)

Housing history for ____________________________________ Given by ___ interview subject ___ partner Date of interview:_______________________						
Place	Short description: how was it, location, size, type, N of rooms	How did you get the place? Who helped?	Who used to live there? Friends/family	For how long? Start & end.	Why did you leave the place?	What else happened the same time?

Interview Guide for the Second Interview

Before starting up

Check timeframe for the interview

Can I make a recording?

Please, introduce yourself by name for the transcription.

Follow up from first interview—justifications

Find the missing justification from the 1st intervew.

Draw a social map—Social networks

Who are important people?

Who is helping whom?

Justice and fairness—get quotes that show connection between judgements and specific people.

Changes? How was this 5-10 years a go?

Follow up questions

Which organizations are you a member of? Participation?

Who are the people you meet regularly?

Who are the people you help?

Who are the people that help you?

Who do you trust?

Conflicts

Always follow up on conflicts mentioned.

Have you experienced conflicts in Norway?

What was it about? Who were involved? How did it start? How did it end?

Social relations

Relationship to the rest of the society

Positive and negative feelings to social relations.

Symmetry—asymmetry , Support—burden

Stereotypes

How do you belive Norwegians think of you? In which category do they put you? How are you treated? Can you influence how you are treated and looked upon?

What do you think Norwegians think about immigrants and Tamils/Vietnamese/Chileans?

Relationship to the welfare state and the public authorities

What kind of experiences do you have with:

The Welfare State

Politics and parties

Schools

Mother tongue education

Becoming Norwegian

The police

UDI

The Municipality

The Social welfare office

Discussing politics

Where do you get your information from? Who do you discuss politics with?

Citizenship

What does citizenship mean to you?

What have you learnt in Norway?

Closing up

Picture? Pseudonym?

Thanks for participation!

Social Relations Schema (Size A3)

While the author alone filled in the other schemas, the Social Relations Schema was typically drawn under the supervision of the interview subject.



Equipment Used in Transcription

All interviews are recorded on a Minidisk player in mono mode. This allows for 145 minutes of continuous recording with excellent sound quality. These are then transferred to a computer as wav-files. We used pedals by *Start-Stop Universal Transcription System* to control the playback of the sound, hence freeing both hands for writing. This system delivers much better sound quality than traditional dictation systems and with better control during transcription. The price of this system is also lower than other professional recording and transcription systems, because the system is built around the most expensive part of the equipment needed—a regular desktop computer—which I already possessed.

I also had plans to use a sound based analysis system called *Qualitative Media Analyzer* (QMA).[401] This program allows attachment of codes and notes directly to these sound files. In other words, one is not analyzing text, but rather the sound from the interview. It is a system with great potential, because it reduces the need of transcription. After coding the material (dividing into categories or by giving values to variables) the researcher, can select quotes based on this coding. Thus, I could have asked for all positive statements about the police by the highly educated, and played them one by one.

After some serious use, I decided against the use of QMA, even if I had put lots of time and effort in it early in the process (Datatilsynet put stricter requirements on research, because of the search possibilities). The main reason was that I had difficulties with understanding my informants' statements when they were separated from the rest of the interview. When one listened to a whole interview, one or several times, one learned about the peculiarities of accent and wording used by members of one household. Little by little, more details and nuances become understandable and these can be worked into the transcription. When the interview is divided and rearranged during analysis, speech becomes harder to understand, while the quotes retain their legibility, as quotes are transferred to a more standardized language. I am thus counseling against the use of this system if interviews are conducted in a second language, and not in the participant's mother tongue. However, I am equally convinced that for other types of interviews this system can prove to be most useful, when one becomes accustomed to analyzing speech instead of the transcriptions of it.

[401] In late 2004 the support and distribution of the program seems to have been discontinued.

Scores for Each Household

These scores are based counts of items in the summaries of each household, which is also used to create Figure 9 (see page 261). However, there is one difference, as in Figure 9 both contra and pro counts are drawn into the figure. Here the contra traits are given negative values, pro traits positive values, and then simply added together. For example, the Natan household shows one contra and one pro individualistic trait internally for the household, which gives the value zero for individualistic way of organizing.

Each way of organizing is represented by two values. The first one consists of traits related to the household's *internal organization and helping relations*. The second one of traits related to the *household's view of politics and society*. If these two values are close to each other, they correspond with expectations based on cultural theory.

Table 73: Indicators for Ways of Organizing in each Household. (Count)

Household pseudonym	*Hierarchical internally*	*Hierarchical politics*	*Egalitarian internally*	*Egalitarian politics*	*Individualistic internally*	*Individualistic politics*	*Fatalistic internally*	*Fatalistic politics*
Nguyen	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0
Natan	5	6	1	2	0	0	0	0
Garcia	-1	-1	6	6	-1	0	0	0
Herrera	0	0	5	4	-1	1	1	0
Nga	0	1	0	0	5	5	0	0
Lorca	-1	-1	1	0	6	5	0	-1
Maheswaran	-2	-1	0	0	6	4	0	0
Truong	-1	0	0	0	0	0	6	3

Correlation Matrix—Household vs. Society by Bias

The correlation matrix below is calculated based on the scores presented on the previous page. The variables are divided into two different sets: *household* refers to traits of internal way of organizing and their external helping social relations; *politics* refers to traits of views of politics and society.

Table 74: Internal and External CB Traits in Households. Correlation Matrix.

		Hierarchical internally	*Hierarchical politics*	*Egalitarian internally*	*Egalitarian politics*	*Individualistic internally*	*Individualistic politics*	*Fatalistic internally*	*Fatalistic politics*
Hierarchical internally	Pearson Correlation	1.00	**.98**	-.23	-.10	-.42	-.49	-.25	-.14
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.00	.59	.81	.30	.22	.54	.74
Hierarchical politics	Pearson Correlation	**.98**	1.00	-.33	-.18	-.37	-.46	-.20	-.06
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.00		.42	.66	.37	.25	.64	.89
Egalitarian internally	Pearson Correlation	-.23	-.33	1.00	**.97**	-.54	-.36	-.18	-.21
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.59	.42		.00	.17	.39	.67	.61
Egalitarian politics	Pearson Correlation	-.10	-.18	**.97**	1.00	-.63	-.48	-.19	-.16
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.81	.66	.00		.10	.23	.65	.71
Individualistic internally	Pearson Correlation	-.42	-.37	-.54	-.63	1.00	**.95**	-.30	-.38
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.30	.37	.17	.10		.00	.47	.36
Individualistic politics	Pearson Correlation	-.49	-.46	-.36	-.48	**.95**	1.00	-.35	-.46
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.22	.25	.39	.23	.00		.40	.26
Fatalistic internally	Pearson Correlation	-.25	-.20	-.18	-.19	-.30	-.35	1.00	**.95**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.54	.64	.67	.65	.47	.40		.00
Fatalistic politics	Pearson Correlation	-.14	-.06	-.21	-.16	-.38	-.46	**.95**	1.00
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.74	.89	.61	.71	.36	.26	.00	

All Pearson correlations (r) are calculated based on the same eight cases. Values of significance are 2-tailed. Items marked with bold are significant on p<0.01 level

Appendix II - the Surveys

Statistical Software Used

I have used SPSS 15, SPSS 18 (PASW), and IBM SPSS 19 with the Python programmability extensions for all statistical data analysis and prepration. For SPSS 15 Python 2.4 is required and for SPSS 18 and 19 Python 2.6 is required. In addition, pywin32-214.win32-py2.6.exe is installed, in order to give python the ability to read and write files through windows (win32api).

The author will provide the scripts used in this thesis by request.

The Sampling procedures used for NOS99

In the final report describing the Nordic Cultures Survey the sampling procedures are described as following (Grendstad et al. 1999):

Denmark

> The country was stratified to ensure representation of all geographical regions. A random sample of telephone numbers was then obtained. When telephone contact with a household was established, the interviewer asked for the person of aged 15 or above with the most recent birthday. Recalls were limited to seven attempts. For the final sample, weights were estimated with considerations to sex, age, and size of household and county. The sample is representative of the population aged 15 or above. The fieldwork was done between 22 and 28 March. The sample size is 1.015.

Finland

The whole country was divided into regions from each of which a random sample of telephone numbers was drawn in proportion to the region's population size. When telephone contact was obtained, the respondent was picked by quota selection based on sex and age. The survey was conducted in the Finnish language only. The final sample is representative of the Finnish-speaking population aged 15 or above. The final sample includes weights by sex and age. The fieldwork was done between 23 March and 5 April. The sample size is 1.003.

Iceland

An adjusted gross sample of 1.160 individuals, ranging between 16 and 75 years of age, was randomly drawn from National Population Register covering the whole country. A predicted response rate of about 70 percent yielded a sample size of 817 respondents. Weights were not estimated for the final sample because sample bias was accounted for in the gross sample. The fieldwork was done between 27 March and 8 April.

Norway

A random sample of telephone numbers was drawn from private households proportional to the number of inhabitants in all Norwegian municipalities. The interviews were further made proportional to gender and to the 19 counties. When telephone contact with a household was obtained, the interviewer asked for the person aged 15 or above with the most recent birthday. If a person meeting these conditions was found, the interview was carried out immediately. If not, an appointment was made for an interview later. Recalls were limited to eight attempts. After the sampling, weights were estimated to account for county, sex and four age groups. The fieldwork was done between 15 and 21 March. The sample size is 997.

Sweden

The country was divided into 70 geographical regions from which a quota of random telephone numbers was drawn. The selection of respondents was based on the request to speak to, on an alternating basis, the youngest/oldest man/woman of the household aged 15 or above. Recalls were limited to five attempts. For the final sample, weights were estimated with considerations to sex and age. The sample is representative of the population aged 15 and above. The fieldwork was done between 15 and 21 March. The sample size is 1.000.

Questions used in the 1999 Survey

This list of questions is not complete. It contains all cultural bias questions, and a few other questions concerning risk, environmental crisis, and political preference. The questions in English, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish and Icelandic are from *Nordic cultures measurement, consequences and comparisons : study description and frequencies* (Grendstad et al. 1999).

English items

Hierarchy
AH1 One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.
AH2 The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.
AH3 Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.
AH4 Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn.
AH5 Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.
Egalitarianism
AE1 The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.
AE2 What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.
AE3 I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.
AE4 We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women.
AE5 Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation.
Individualism
AI1 Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.
AI2 If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.
AI3 People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit.
AI4 Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.
AI5 In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.
Fatalism
AF1 It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.
AF2 Cooperation with others rarely works.
AF3 The future is too uncertain for a person to make seriouos plans.
AF4 Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.
AF5 I feel that life is a lottery.
Environmentalism
AM1 The so-called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.

AM2 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.
Strongly agree, Mildly agree, Neither, Mildly disagree, Strongly disagree

Risk

R1 How great a risk do you think there is that you personally will suffer an injury stemming from genetic
A engineering?
R2 How great a risk do you think there is that people in [country] in general will suffer injuries stemming from
A genetic engineering?
No significant risk, little risk, moderate risk, considerable risk, great risk

Politics

AP1 Which party would you vote for if there was a general election tomorrow?
P2 In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. On a scale where the value of 1/0 indicates 'left' and the
A value of 9/10 indicates 'right', where would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?

Norwegian items

Hierarchy

NH1 Et av problemene med folk i dag er at de altfor ofte setter seg opp mot autoritetene.
NH2 Vi tar best vare på de kommende generasjoner ved å holde fast på våre seder og skikker.
NH3 Samfunnet fungerer best når folk følger alle lover og regler nøye.
NH4 Respekt for autoriteter er en av de viktigste tingene barn bør lære seg.
NH5 Folk lever mer harmonisk sammen, når forskjellige slags mennesker har hver sin plass i samfunnet.

Egalitarianism

NE1 Det ville bli fredeligere i verden dersom rikdommen var fordelt mye jevnere mellom landene.
NE2 Vårt land trenger en langt større grad av rettferdighet slik at rikdommen kan fordeles jevnere.
NE3 Du er tilhenger av en skattereform som legger den største belastningen på selskaper og personer med høye inntekter.
NE4 Vi må drastisk redusere ulikhetene mellom menn og kvinner.
NE5 Beslutninger i næringslivet og i politikken bør i større grad baseres på folkelig deltakelse.

Individualism

NI1 Alle bør ha like muligheter til å lykkes eller feile uten at myndighetene blander seg inn.
NI2 Dersom noen har visjoner og evner til å skaffe seg eiendom, burde de ha mulighet til å nyte den.
NI3 Folk som har suksess i forretningslivet har rett til å bruke rikdommen sin slik de selv har lyst til.
NI4 Markedskonkurranse er nesten alltid den beste måten å dekke folk sine behov.
NI5 I et rettferdig system vil de som er flinkest tjene mest penger.

Fatalism

NF1 Uansett hvilket parti man stemmer på, så fortsetter alt som før.
NF2 Samarbeid med andre mennesker fungerer sjelden.
NF3 Framtiden er for usikker til at det er mulig å legge reelle planer.
NF4 De fleste mennesker skaffer seg venner bare fordi de har nytte av dem.
NF5 Jeg føler at livet er et lotteri.

Environmentalism

NM1 Den såkalte 'økologiske krisen' menneskeheten står overfor er sterkt overdrevet.
NM2 Naturens balanse er stabil nok til å motstå påvirkningen fra moderne industriland.
Helt enig, Litt enig, Hverken enig eller uenig, Litt uenig, Helt uenig, (Ubesvart/vet ikke)

Risk

NR1 Hvor stor tror du risikoen er for deg personlig for å bli skadet av genmanipulasjon?
NR2 Hvor stor tror du risikoen er for folk i Norge generelt for å bli skadet av genmanipulasjon?
Ubetydelig; Liten; Moderat; Stor; Meget stor

Politics

NP1 Hvilket parti ville du stemme på dersom det var Stortingsvalg i morgen?
P2 I politikken snakkes det ofte om ’høyre-siden’ og ’venstre-siden’. Tenk deg en skala der 1 betyr venstre og 9 betyr høyre. Generelt sett, hvor vil du plassere ditt eget politiske syn?

Swedish items

Hierarchy

SH1 Ett av problemen med dagens människor är att de alldeles för ofta ifrågasätter auktoriteter.
SH2 Bästa sättet att stödja kommande generationer är att behålla det förgångnas seder och bruk.
SH3 Samhället fungerar bäst när människor noga följer alla regler och bestämmelser.
SH4 Respekt för auktoriteter är en av de viktigaste sakerna som barn bör lära sig.
SH5 Människor lever mera harmoniskt tillsammans när de får olika roller.

Egalitarianism

SE1 Världen skulle vara fredligare om välståndet fördelades mera jämlikt mellan olika länder.
SE2 Vad vårt land behöver är en starkt ökad rättvisa som skulle göra fördelningen av välståndet mera jämn.
E3 Jag är anhängare av en skatteförändring som leder till att bördan läggs mer på företag och folk med mycket
S pengar.
SE4 Vi måste drastiskt minska skillnader mellan män och kvinnor.
SE5 Beslut i näringslivet och politiken bör tas under större folkligt inflytande.

Individualism

SI1 Alla bör ha lika möjligheter att lyckas eller misslyckas utan att myndigheterna blandar sig i.
SI2 Om människor har vision och förmåga att skaffa sig egendom så bör de få chansen att njuta av den.
SI3 De som lyckas i affärer har rätt att njuta av sin förmögenhet på det sätt de själva vill.
SI4 Konkurrens på marknaderna är nästan alltid det bästa sättet att förse människor med vad de behöver.
SI5 I ett rättvist system bör de som har större förmåga också tjäna mera pengar.

Fatalism

SF1 Oavsett vilket parti man röstar på så förblir allt som förut.
SF2 Samarbete med andra fungerar sällan.
SF3 Framtiden är alltför osäker för att man på allvar ska kunna göra upp planer.
SF4 De flesta skaffer sig vänner bara för att de har nytta av dem.
SF5 Jag tycker livet är ett lotteri.

Environmentalism

SM1 Den s k 'ekologiska krisen' som mänskligheten står inför är starkt överdriven.
SM2 Naturens balans är stabil nog för att motstå de moderna industriländernas påverkningar.
Instämmer helt, Instämmer i stort sett, Varken/Eller, Tar avstånd i stort sett, Tar helt avstånd

Risk

SR1 Hur stor tror Du risken är för Dig personligen att skadas av genmanipulation?
SR2 Hur stor tror Du risken är för folk i allmänhet i Sverige att skadas av genmanipulation?
Obefintlig; Liten; Måttlig; Stor; Mycket stor

Politics

SP1 Vilket parti skulle du rösta på om det vore val til riksdagen idag?
P2 I politiken talar man om vänster och höger. Tänk dig en skala där 1 betyder att dina politiske åsikter ligger
till S vänster och 9 att de ligger til höger. Var skulle du, allmänt sett, placera in dig själv?

Danish items

Hierarchy

DH1 Et af problemerne med nutidens mennesker er at de udfordrer autoriteterne for meget.
DH2 Den bedste måde at sikre fremtidens generationer på, er at bevare vores skikke og traditioner.
DH3 Samfundet virker bedst, når borgerne nøje efterlever alle regler og forskrifter.
DH4 Respekt for autoriteter er en af de vigtigste ting, som børn skal lære.
DH5 Folk lever mere harmonisk sammen, når forskellige slags mennesker har hver deres plads i samfundet.

Egalitarianism

DE1 Verden ville være fredeligere hvis goderne var fordelt mere ligeligt mellem nationerne.
DE2 Vores land bør indrettes mere retfærdigt, så goderne fordeles mere ligeligt.
E3 Jeg går ind for reformer i skattesystemet, der pålægger større byrder på virksomheder og folk med høje
D indkomster.
DE4 Vi har stærkt behov for at reducere uligheder mellem mænd og kvinder.
DE5 Beslutninger i forretningslivet og i politik burde underlægges en stærkere folkelig kontrol og deltagelse.

Individualism

DI1 Alle bør have lige chance for succes og fiasko uden at det offenlige skal blande sig i det.

DI2 Hvis folk har evnen til at erhverve sig materiell velstand, skal de have lov at nyde det.
DI3 Folk, som har succes i erhvervslivet, har ret til at nyde deres rigdom som de selv har lyst til.
DI4 Markedsmekanismen er næsten altid den bedste måde at forsyne folk med det de behøver.
DI5 I et retfærdigt system, vil de dygtigste tjene flest penge.
Fatalism
DF1 Det er lige meget hvilket parti jeg stemmer på - det ændrer ikke noget.
DF2 Samarbejde med andre mennesker fungerer sjældent.
DF3 Fremtiden er for usikker til at det nytter at planlægge den for alvor.
DF4 De fleste knytter kun venskaber fordi det er til nytte for dem selv.
DF5 Jeg synes livet er et lotteri.
Environmentalism
DM1 Den såkaldte ’økologiske krise’, som menneskeheden står overfor, er kraftigt overdrevet.
DM2 Naturens egne balance er stærk nok til at modstå påvirkningen fra de moderne industrinationer.
Meget enig, Delvist enig, hverken enig eller uenig, Delvist uenig, Meget uenig.
Risk
DR1 Hvor stor tror De Deres personlige risiko er for at blive skadet af genmanipulation?
DR2 Hvor stor tror De, at risikoen for at blive skadet af genmanipulation er for danskerne generelt?
Ubetydelige, lille, jævn, stor, meget stor
Politics
DP1 Hvilket parti ville De stemme på, hvis der var Folketingsvalg i morgen?
P2 I politikken taler man ofte om en højre-venstre skala. Hvor ville De generelt placere Dem selv på en skala fra 1
D til 9, hvor 1 var venstre og 9 var højre?

Finnish items

Hierarchy
FH1 Yksi tämän päivän ihmisten ongelmista on se, että he kääntyvät liian usein esivaltaa vastaan.
FH2 Paras tapa luoda perustaa tuleville sukupolville on perinteisten tapojemme ja tottumustemme säilyttäminen.
FH3 Yhteiskunta toimii parhaiten silloin kun ihmiset tottelevat kaikkia sääntöjä ja määräyksiä.
FH4 Esivallan kunnioittaminen on yksi tärkeimpiä asioita, joita lasten tulisi oppia.
FH5 Ristiriidaton kanssakäyminen helpottuu kun erilaisilla ihmisillä on kullakin oma paikkansa yhteiskunnassa.
Egalitarianism
FE1 Maailma olisi huomattavasti rauhaisampi paikka, jos rikkaudet olisi jaettu tasaisemmin kansakuntien kesken.
E2 Maamme tarvitsee ennen kaikkea oikeudenmukaisuuden selvää vahvistumista, mitä kautta varat ja resurssit
F voitaisiin jakaa tasavertaisemmin.
E3 Kannatatte sellaista verouudistusta, jolla nykyistä suurempi osa verotaakasta siirretään suuryhtiöiden ja
F suurituloisten kansalaisten kannettavaksi.
FE4 Meidän on dramaattisesti tasattava miesten ja naisten välisiä eriarvoisuuksia.
FE5 Elinkeinoelämän ja politiikan päätöksenteon tulisi nykyistä enemmän perustua kansalaisten osallistumiseen.
Individualism
FI1 Kaikilla tulisi olla samat mahdollisuudet onnistua tai epäonnistua ilman että julkinen valta puuttuu asiaan.
FI2 Jos ihmisillä on taito ja kyky hankkia omaisuutta, heillä pitää olla oikeus nauttia siitä.
FI3 Elinkeinoelämässä menestyneillä ihmisillä on oikeus nauttia varallisuudestaan parhaaksi katsomallaan tavalla.
FI4 Kilpailuun perustuvat markkinat ovat melkein aina paras tapa tuottaa ihmisille sitä mitä he tarvitsevat.
FI5 Oikeudenmukaisessa järjestelmässä kyvykkäillä ihmisillä pitäisi olla muita suuremmat tulot.
Fatalism
FF1 Vaikuttaa siltä, että äänestipä mitä puoluetta tahansa asiat jatkuvat suurin piirtein samaan malliin.
FF2 Yhteistyö muiden kanssa kantaa harvoin hedelmää.
FF3 Tulevaisuus on niin epävarma, että vakavien suunnitelmien tekeminen ei juuri kannata.
FF4 Useimmat ihmiset solmivat ystävyyssuhteita pelkästään sen vuoksi, että ystävistä on heille hyötyä.
FF5 Mielestäni elämä on kuin arpajaispeli.
Environmentalism
FM1 Ihmiskuntaa joidenkin mielestä uhkaavaa “ekologista kriisiä” on liioiteltu huomattavasti.

FM2 Luonnon tasapaino on niin vankka, että se kestää nykyajan teollisuusvaltioiden taholta tulevat vaikutukset.
Täysin samaa mieltä, Jokseenkin samaa mieltä, Ei samaa eikä eri mieltä, Jokseenkin eri mieltä, Täysin eri mieltä (Ei vastausta)

Risk

FR1 Kuinka suureksi arvioitte Teille henkilökohtaisesti geenimanipulaatiosta aiheutuvan vahinkoriskin?
FR2 Kuinka suureksi arvioitte suomalaisille ylipäätään geenimanipulaatiosta aiheutuvan vahinkoriskin?
Olematon, Vähäinen, Kohtalainen, Suuri, Hyvin suuri

Politics

FP1 Mitä puoluetta äänestäisitte, jos eduskuntavaalit pidettäisiin huomenna?
P2 Poliittisessa keskustelussa puhutaan usein “vasemmistosta” ja “oikeistosta”. Mihin sijottaisitte itsenne asteikolla F joka ulottuu nollasta kymmeneen vasemmalta oikealle?

Icelandic items

Hierarchy

IH1 Einn gallinn vi folk i dag er ad thad setur sig of oft upp a moti yfirvoldunum.
IH2 Thad er best fyrir komandi kynslodir ad vardveita sidi og venjur fortidarinnar.
IH3 Samfelagid gengur best thegar folk fer nakvaemlega eftir reglum og fyrirmaelum.
IH4 Virding fyrir yfirvaldi er eitt thad mikilvaegasta sem born eiga ad laera.
IH5 Thegar hver hefur sinn stad i samfelaginu gengur folki betur ad lifa saman i satt og samlyndi.

Egalitarianism

IE1 Thad vaeri fridvaenlegra i heiminum ef audaefum vaeri skipt jafnar milli thjoda.
IE2 Her a landi tharf ad storauka rettlaeti med jafnari dreifingu lifsgaeda.
IE3 Eg styd breytingu a skattkerfinu, sem faerir skattbyrdina meira yfir a fyrirtaeki og hatekjufolk.
IE4 Vid thurfum ad draga storlega ur ojofnudi milli karla og kvenna.
IE5 Venjulegt folk aetti a taka meiri thatt i akvordunum i atvinnulifi og stjornsyslu.

Individualism

II1 Allir aettu ad hafa somu taekifaeri til ad na arangri eda mistakast i lifinu an thess ad stjornvold skipti ser af thvi.
II2 Ef folk hefur hugmyndir og haefileika til ad safna eignum a thad ad fa ad njota thes.
II3 Folk sem naer arangri i vidskiptum a rett a ad njota audaefa sinna eins og thad kys sjalft.
II4 Samkeppnismarkadir eru naestum alltaf besta adferdin vid ad utvega folki thad sem vantar.
II5 I sanngjornu kerfi aettu their haefari ad hafa meiri tekjur.

Fatalism

IF1 Thad er sama hvada flokk madur kys, thad breytist ekkert.
IF2 Samvinna vid adra skilar sjaldan arangri.
IF3 Framtidin er of oviss til a folk geti gert raunhaefar aaetlanir.
IF4 Flestir eignast bara vini tkil ad hafa gagn af theim.
IF5 Mer finnst lifid vera einsog happdraetti.

Environmentalism

IM1 Umhverfisvandamalin sem mannkynid stendur frammi fyrir eru storlega ykt.
IM2 Jafnvaegi natturunnar er naegilega oflugt til ad standast ahrifin fra idnadarthjodum nutimans.
Mjög sammala, frekar sammala, hvorki sammala ne osammala, frekar osammala, Mjög osammala (svarar ekki/veit ekki)

Risk

IR1 Hversu mikil haetta finnst ther a ad thu verdir sjalf/ur fyrir skada vegna erfdabreyttra lifvera?
IR2 Hversu mikil haetta finnst ther a ad almenningur a Islandi skadist vegna erfdabreyttra lifvera?
Mjög litil, Frekar litil, Hvorki mikil ne litil, Frekar mikil, Mjög mikil.

Politics

IP1 Hvada stjornmalaflokk myndir thu kjosa ef thad vaeru althingiskosningar a morgun?
P2 I stjornmalum er talda um haegri og vinstri. Hvar myndir thu almennt talad stadsetja thinar skodanir a kvarda
I thar sem 1 er lengs til vinstri og 9 er lengst til haegri?

Cultural Bias Questions used in Norway

Only questions intended to measure cultural biases are included in this overview. Sometimes, like for NEPS95 it is possible to find additional questions that can be included in the scales.

Likert type items	*ISSP Env 1993*	*NEPS 1995*	*NOS 1999*	*ISSP Env 2000*
Hierarchy				
H1 One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.	ch1	rh1	rh1	x
H2 The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.	ch2	rh2	rh2	
H3 Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.			rh3	
H4 Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn.			rh4	
H5 Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.			rh5	
H6 Considering everything, the world is becoming a better place.				reverse
Egalitarianism				
E1 The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.			re1	
E2 What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.	ce1		re2	
E3 I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.	ce2	re2	re3	
E4 We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women.			re4	
E5 Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation.			re5	
E6 We must redistribute wealth more evenly to get more justice in the world.		re1		
E7 Multinational corporations are to blame for most of the evil in the world.	ce3			
E8 Authorities should redistribute income from people with high income to those less fortunate.				x
E9 Private businesses needs to be controlled in order to secure everybodys needs				x
In order to reduce unemployment we must divide the work better between us		re4		

Individualism				
I1 Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.	ci1	ri1	ri1	
I2 If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.	ci2	ri2	ri2	
I3 People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit.			ri3	
I4 Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.			ri4	
I5 In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.	ci3		ri5	
I6 People with money ougth to be allowed to enjoy it				x
I7 In some cases people should follow their concious even if it is a breach of law.				x
I8 All societies have inequalities that are best not to infere with.				x
Fatalism				
F1 It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.	cf2	rf1	rf1	
F2 Cooperation with others rarely works.	cf1	rf2	rf2	
F3 The future is too uncertain for a person to make seriouos plans.			rf3	
F4 Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.			rf4	
F5 I feel that life is a lottery.			rf5	
F6 There is little people can do to change their lives				x

Forced Choice between Cultural Biases	*ISSP Env 1993*	*Env 1995*	*Nordic 1999*	*ISSP Env 2000*
We use the concept “Equality” in different ways when it comes to division of wealth in society. Which one of the following forms of equality is most fair and should apply for the society?				
a. Everybody should be distributed an equal amount of wealth in the Society		Wealth_e		
b. Everybody should distributed wealth by their contribution to the Society		Wealth_h		
c. Everybody should be distributed wealth by their position in the Society		Wealth_i		

Dataset: Environment, 2000, Norwegian part of ISSP

“This survey is carried out on the basis of the research collaboration in "The International Social Survey Programme" (ISSP). ISSP is an international organization that prepares and coordinates annual surveys in its member countries, mainly within the fields of political science and sociology. The topic of the surveys varies, but are repeated at intervals of a few years. In this way, changes in behavioral patterns and attitudes over time as well as differences between countries and cultures, are possible to be detected and measured.

The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) became a member of ISSP in 1989 and have since been responsible for carrying out the surveys in Norway. In connection to the survey, Norwegian researchers are invited to add supplementary questions to the Norwegian respondents.

In 2000, the objective was to collect data on the perceptions of and attitudes towards values, nature and environment, environmental efficacy, knowledge of environment and science, risks of certain environmental problems, the environmental effort and involvement of individuals, business and state, trust in environmental information from different groups/sources and individual individual participation in environmental issues. NSD and ISSP conducted a similar survey in 1993.

The Norwegian additional part was in 2000 developed in collaboration with Pål Kjetil Botvar, KIFO (Centre for Church Research) og Gunnar Grendstad, Department of Comparative Politics, UiB. The questions in the Norwegian part deals with (among other issues) popular religiousity and New Age-influenced religiousity." (nsddata.nsd.uib.no)

Dataset: The ISSP 1993 Survey on environmentalism

This survey is conducted by NSD as the Norwegian part of the 1993 ISSP survey on environmental attitudes. The questionnaire was mailed to 2300 respondents aged from 16 to 79 years based on a single random sample. After three reminders 1414 of the returned questionnaires were accepted for the datafile. The response rate, corrected for dropout for natural reasons, is 63.4 percent. (Kalgraf-Sjåk and Bøyum 1994).

The Norwegian survey contained additional questions, including 10 of Dake's 20 cultural theory items.

Party Family Preference

In Table 75, below, we can see the Nordic party families as defined by Grendstad (2003b:Appendix 1).There are a few minor differences in how I have treated the parties. Basically the very small parties are moved to Other parties, because they will be too small to give a reliable picture of the national party. These parties are: The Red Ellectoral Alliance (Rød Valgallianse), Pensioner's Party (Pensjonistpartiet) and Coastal Party (Kystpartiet), Young Finns (Nuorsuomaliset) and True Finns (Perussuomaliset).

Table 75: National Parties by Nordic Party Family

	Iceland	*Norway*	*Denmark*	*Sweden*	*Finland*
Conser-vative	Independence Party (Sjálfstðis-flokkurinn)	Conservative Party (Høyre)	Conservative Party (Konservative Folkeparti)	Conservative Party (Moderata samlingspartiet)	Conservative National Coalition Party (Kansallinen Kokoomus)
Liberal	Liberal Party (Frjálslyndi flokkurinn)	Liberal Party (Venstre)	Social-Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre)	Liberal Party (Folkpartiet liberalarna)	Swedish People's Party (Ruotsalainen Kansanpuolue)
Social Demo-cratic	The Alliance (Samfylkingin)	Labour Party (Arbeiderpartiet)	Social Democratic Party (Social-demokratiet)	The Social Democrats (Arbetarepartiet social-demokraterna)	Social Democratic Party (Suomen Sosiali-demokraattinen Puolue)
Agrarian / Centrist	Progressive Party (Framsóknar-flokkurinn)	Centre Party (Senterpartiet)	Liberal Party (Venstre)	Centre Party (Centerpartiet)	Centre Party (Suomen Keskusta)
Left Socialist		Socialist Left Party (Sosialistisk Venstreparti)	Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti)	Left Party (Vänsterpartiet)	Left-Wing Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto)
Christian		Christian People's Party (Kristelig Folkeparti)	Christian People's Party (Kristeligt Folkeparti)	The Christian Democrats (Kristdemokratiska samhällspartiet)	Christian League (Suomen Kristillinen Liitto)
Progress		Progressive Party (Fremskritts-partiet)	Progress Party (Fremskridts-partiet); Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti)		True Finns (Perussuomalaiset)
Environ-mental	Left-Green Movement (Vinstrihreyfingin-grænt framboð)		Unity List (Enhedslisten)	Green Party (Miljöpartiet de gröna)	Green League (Vihreä Liitto)
Other / Centrist			Centre Democratic Party (Centrum-Demokratene)		Reform Group (Remonttiryhmä)

Cut-off points Used for Labeling Cultural Biases

In Table 76 we can see how the selected cut-off points, 50 for Binary and 40&60 for the Trichotomous and Neutral approaches are converted to cultural bias scales country by country. The differences between countries are not large, but sufficient to make difference.

Table 76: Cut-off Points in Cultural Bias Scales By Country and Percentiles. NOS99.

	Cut-off points in Percentiles	*Country* Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Finland	Iceland
Hierarchy	50	.01	-.03	.03	.07	.02
	35	-.27	-.31	-.24	-.18	-.16
	65	.29	.26	.31	.33	.24
Egalitar	50	.09	.09	.04	.14	.14
	35	-.22	-.19	-.19	-.18	-.12
	65	.31	.32	.35	.36	.32
Individu	50	.09	.09	.12	.11	.07
	35	-.16	-.19	-.18	-.18	-.19
	65	.36	.31	.33	.32	.29
Fatalism	50	-.12	-.04	-.04	-.04	-.07
	35	-.36	-.30	-.33	-.30	-.30
	65	.18	.21	.19	.18	.20

Combinations of Cultural Biases

Table 77: Count of Respondents and categories by Variable. NOS99.

	Norway		Sweden		Denmark		Finland		Island		Nordic	
	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR	NC	NR
CoherentS1	4	995	4	999	4	1013	4	1003	4	813	4	4823
CultFixSupp1	4	873	4	893	4	896	4	890	4	733	4	4285
CultFixSupp2	10	879	10	896	10	899	10	896	10	740	10	4310
CultFixSupp3	14	880	14	896	14	899	14	898	14	740	14	4313
CultFixSupp4	15	880	15	896	15	899	15	898	15	740	15	4313
CultRankSupp1	5	880	5	896	5	899	5	898	5	740	5	4313
CultRankSupp2	21	880	21	896	21	899	21	898	21	740	24	4313
CultRankSupp3	48	880	46	896	47	899	47	898	47	740	57	4313
CultRankSupp4	68	880	70	896	70	899	71	898	70	740	82	4313
CultFixBinA1	8	995	8	999	8	1013	8	1003	8	813	8	4823
CultFixBinA2	26	995	24	999	25	1013	26	1003	25	813	30	4823
CultFixBinA3	39	995	41	999	39	1013	37	1003	36	813	55	4823
CultFixBinA4	39	995	47	999	37	1013	33	1003	30	813	69	4823
CultRankBinA1	8	995	8	999	8	1013	8	1003	8	813	8	4823
CultRankBinA2	50	995	48	999	49	1013	50	1003	49	813	54	4823
CultRankBinA3	190	995	193	999	197	1013	191	1003	192	813	221	4823
CultRankBinA4	341	995	364	999	345	1013	350	1003	332	813	496	4823
CultFixTriA1	9	995	9	999	9	1013	9	1003	9	813	9	4823
CultFixTriA2	39	995	37	999	39	1013	38	1003	38	813	43	4823
CultFixTriA3	87	995	90	999	88	1013	86	1003	84	813	106	4823
CultFixTriA4	106	995	124	999	104	1013	101	1003	95	813	160	4823
CultRankTriA1	9	995	9	999	9	1013	9	1003	9	813	9	4823
CultRankTriA2	57	995	57	999	57	1013	57	1003	57	813	57	4823
CultRankTriA3	217	995	221	999	222	1013	225	1003	224	813	249	4823
CultRankTriA4	342	995	358	999	357	1013	374	1003	337	813	567	4823
CultRankTriA1_3	238	997	250	1000	229	1015	240	1003	222	817	321	4832
CultFixNeutA1	12	995	12	999	12	1013	12	1003	12	813	12	4823
CultFixNeutA2	56	995	54	999	54	1013	54	1003	54	813	61	4823
CultFixNeutA3	112	995	118	999	113	1013	113	1003	109	813	138	4823
CultFixNeutA4	106	995	126	999	107	1013	102	1003	95	813	176	4823
CultRankNeutA1	12	995	12	999	12	1013	12	1003	12	813	12	4823
CultRankNeutA2	89	995	82	999	83	1013	88	1003	81	813	105	4823
CultRankNeutA3	318	995	319	999	320	1013	321	1003	318	813	440	4823
CultRankNeutA4	472	995	496	999	482	1013	491	1003	454	813	913	4823
Hierarch_Supp	2	989	2	974	2	1001	2	998	2	806	2	4768
Egalitar_Supp	2	984	2	984	2	998	2	987	2	808	2	4761
Individu_Supp	2	986	2	989	2	1004	2	995	2	807	2	4781
Fatalism_Supp	2	983	2	989	2	1009	2	998	2	809	2	4788
Hierarch_bin	2	989	2	974	2	1001	2	998	2	806	2	4768
Egalitar_bin	2	984	2	984	2	998	2	987	2	808	2	4761
Individu_bin	2	986	2	989	2	1004	2	995	2	807	2	4781
Fatalism_bin	2	983	2	989	2	1009	2	998	2	809	2	4788
Hierarch_tri	3	989	3	974	3	1001	3	998	3	806	3	4768
Egalitar_tri	3	984	3	984	3	998	3	987	3	808	3	4761
Individu_tri	3	986	3	989	3	1004	3	995	3	807	3	4781
Fatalism_tri	3	983	3	989	3	1009	3	998	3	809	3	4788
Hierarch_mid	3	989	3	974	3	1001	3	998	3	806	3	4768
Egalitar_mid	3	984	3	984	3	998	3	987	3	808	3	4761
Individu_mid	3	986	3	989	3	1004	3	995	3	807	3	4781
Fatalism_mid	3	983	3	989	3	1009	3	998	3	809	3	4788

NC is the number of categories. NR is the number of the respondents in these categories.

The table above shows how many categories each variable divides the respondents into, and how many respondents have valid values using this variable. No limits have been applied. Compare with limited data in Table 37 (on page 377).

Table 78: The Ability to Predict Party Preference by Support vs. Absolute value. NOS99 limited. (U)

	Ideological Party Families			*All Parliamentary Parties*		
Variables use:	Mean	SD	Valid N	Mean	SD	Valid N
Support	.04	.033	130	.09	.061	65
Absolute value	.06	.042	190	.16	.074	92

U with sign<=0.05 and at least 50% of responents
When combining all cases the difference between support and absolute value:
F= 43.3 Significance = 0.000

Table 79: The Ability to predict Party preference by Trichotomous vs. Neutral versions. NOS99 limited (U)

	Ideological Party Families			*All Parliamentary Parties*		
Variables use:	Mean	SD	Valid N	Mean	SD	Valid N
Supp. - indiff. - rejection	.07	.051	80	.17	.083	39
Supp. - neutral - rejection	.05	.045	100	.12	.092	48

U with sign<=0.05 and at least 50% of responents
When combining all cases the difference between support and absolute value:
F = 10.8 Significance = 0.001

Table 80: Respondents in Cultural Space in NOS99. (Count)

		Reject I			*indiff*			*Support I*			
Hierarchy	Fatalism	Reject E	Indiff	Supp. E	Reject E	indiff	Supp. E	Reject E	indiff	Supp. E	*Total*
h	Reject F	144	129	133	116	53	44	122	46	24	811
	Indiff	82	54	77	46	41	38	68	32	29	467
	Supp. F	58	43	50	48	29	44	42	29	25	368
Indiff	Reject F	53	52	55	80	47	31	88	39	26	471
	Indiff	55	52	44	58	57	49	72	44	37	468
	Supp. F	29	59	76	47	59	48	37	42	60	457
H	Reject F	28	22	39	30	36	33	71	32	62	353
	indiff	30	32	53	40	55	52	58	60	88	468
	Supp. F	28	56	83	37	81	115	72	102	235	809
Total		507	499	610	502	458	454	630	426	586	4672

This table shows how the Nordic Population is distributed into cultural space. This contains the same data as Figure 34 on page 395 .

Table 81: Explanatory power of N of Categories by type of Party Preference. NOS99. (Cubic Regression Model Parameters)

Dependent Variable: U	Model Summary R Square	F	df1	df2	Sig.	Parameter Estimates Constant	b1	b2	b3
Ideological Party Families	.842	883.0	3	496	.000	.022	.001	-8.79E-007	4.59E-010
All Parliamentary Parties	.985	5517.5	3	246	.000	.031	.004	-8.72E-006	8.66E-009

The independent variable is Number of categories. Both models are cubic. [402]

[402] Datafile used is Nordic1999_OMS_Crosstabs_CB_fin1_tri3565_bin50.sav

Cultural Space

Table 82 shows party preference by cultural space in the Nordic countries in row percent. These numbers are used to draw the four dimensional figures in Chapter 11. Most of these cells contain enough respondents to give quite solid population estimates, but some of them have small N, making it difficult to generalize from the sample to the population (See Table 80 on page 536). The N is too small to present the information country by country.

Table 82: Party Preference by Cultural Space. NOS99 (Row percent)

Cultural Space	Socialist Left	Social Democrat	Agrarian	Liberal	Christian	Conservati v	Progress	Greens	Other	Total
Hedf	4.8	13.3	20.5	6.0	1.2	43.4	6.0	2.4	2.4	100.0
hedF	3.8	23.1	30.8			26.9		3.8	11.5	100.0
hEdf	18.2	33.3	9.1	6.1	6.1	6.1		6.1	15.2	100.0
hEdF	12.0	36.0	16.0	8.0		12.0	8.0	4.0	4.0	100.0
Hedf	4.8	19.0	28.6	4.8	4.8	28.6	4.8		4.8	100.0
HedF	7.1	21.4	14.3	7.1	7.1	35.7	7.1			100.0
HEdf	10.0	30.0	20.0	5.0	5.0	15.0		10.0	5.0	100.0
HEdF	8.3	44.4	16.7	2.8	5.6	8.3	4.2	1.4	8.3	100.0
hedt	9.4	12.5	9.4	3.1	3.1	46.9	6.3	3.1	6.3	100.0
hEdt	12.0	32.0	20.0			8.0	4.0	8.0	16.0	100.0
Hedt		25.0	29.2		4.2	33.3	4.2		4.2	100.0
HEdt	7.7	61.5	7.7		3.8	11.5			7.7	100.0
heif	10.3	31.8	14.0	7.5	9.3	18.7	0.9	3.7	3.7	100.0
heiF		34.3	17.1	14.3	8.6	14.3	2.9	2.9	5.7	100.0
heIf	1.1	8.6	12.9	7.5		62.4	1.1		6.5	100.0
heIF	6.7	16.7	10.0	6.7	6.7	40.0	6.7	3.3	3.3	100.0
hEif	38.5	27.9	2.9	6.7	1.0	1.9		15.4	5.8	100.0
hEiF	31.3	15.6	3.1	21.9	6.3	6.3		9.4	6.3	100.0
hEIf	21.4	28.6	7.1	14.3	7.1	14.3	7.1			100.0
hEIF		38.9			11.1	11.1	11.1	11.1	16.7	100.0
Heif		27.8	16.7	11.1		44.4				100.0
HeiF	14.3	28.6	19.0		4.8	9.5	9.5		14.3	100.0
HeIf	1.7	13.8	27.6	3.4	3.4	41.4	3.4	1.7	3.4	100.0
HeIF	2.0	16.0	20.0	4.0	6.0	26.0	16.0		10.0	100.0
HEif	16.0	40.0	12.0	8.0	16.0			4.0	4.0	100.0
HEiF	7.7	17.3	28.8	1.9	7.7	13.5	9.6	5.8	7.7	100.0
HEIf	10.8	21.6	29.7			21.6	10.8	2.7	2.7	100.0
HEIF	8.0	38.0	19.0	2.2	8.0	11.7	5.1	2.2	5.8	100.0
heit	4.4	26.7	22.2	8.9		26.7		2.2	8.9	100.0
heIt		7.0	16.3	7.0		53.5	9.3	2.3	4.7	100.0
hEit	32.0	20.0	16.0	4.0	2.0	2.0		10.0	14.0	100.0
hEIt	25.0	31.3	12.5	12.5		6.3	6.3		6.3	100.0
Heit	5.0	15.0	20.0	10.0	10.0	15.0	10.0	5.0	10.0	100.0
HeIt	2.6	15.8	21.1	5.3	10.5	31.6	5.3		7.9	100.0

HEit	18.2	33.3	27.3		15.2	3.0		3.0		100.0
HEIt	4.8	38.7	16.1	3.2	1.6	17.7	6.5	3.2	8.1	100.0
hgdf	14.3	25.0	14.3	10.7	3.6	17.9	7.1	3.6	3.6	100.0
hgdF	7.7	30.8	23.1		7.7	23.1			7.7	100.0
Hgdf		24.0	16.0	4.0	4.0	32.0	4.0		16.0	100.0
HgdF	6.8	29.5	18.2	4.5	9.1	22.7	6.8	2.3		100.0
hgdt		38.5	15.4	11.5	3.8	11.5	3.8	7.7	7.7	100.0
Hgdt	10.0	26.7	16.7	3.3	20.0	13.3	3.3		6.7	100.0
hgif	17.6	30.8	11.0	19.8	4.4	5.5	1.1	8.8	1.1	100.0
hgiF	22.2	18.5	18.5	7.4		11.1	7.4	3.7	11.1	100.0
hgIf	3.7	7.4	25.9	7.4		48.1		3.7	3.7	100.0
hgIF		14.3	28.6		14.3	14.3	14.3		14.3	100.0
Hgif		14.3	35.7		28.6	21.4				100.0
HgiF	3.0	33.3	24.2	6.1	12.1	9.1	3.0	3.0	6.1	100.0
HgIf	4.2	12.5	33.3	4.2	4.2	33.3			8.3	100.0
HgIF	2.7	17.8	20.5	5.5	4.1	16.4	24.7	1.4	6.8	100.0
hgit	9.8	29.3	14.6	17.1	4.9	9.8	4.9	4.9	4.9	100.0
hgIt	14.3	35.7	7.1		7.1	7.1	7.1		21.4	100.0
Hgit	4.5	27.3	22.7	9.1	13.6	18.2			4.5	100.0
HgIt	7.0	16.3	23.3		7.0	30.2	7.0	2.3	7.0	100.0
redf	1.7	13.6	27.1	1.7	8.5	45.8	1.7			100.0
redF	3.8	19.2	34.6	7.7	3.8	15.4	11.5		3.8	100.0
rEdf	9.1	54.5	18.2			9.1	4.5		4.5	100.0
rEdF	9.5	23.8	14.3	9.5		23.8	9.5	4.8	4.8	100.0
redt	2.5	12.5	22.5		5.0	37.5	7.5	2.5	10.0	100.0
rEdt	12.0	40.0	20.0		4.0	4.0	12.0		8.0	100.0
reif	5.6	25.0	8.3	2.8	22.2	13.9	2.8	2.8	16.7	100.0
reiF		8.3	16.7		25.0	33.3			16.7	100.0
reIf	2.8	8.5	19.7	2.8	4.2	57.7		1.4	2.8	100.0
reIF		25.0	8.3	8.3	4.2	41.7	12.5			100.0
rEif	27.9	34.9	11.6		7.0	7.0	2.3	7.0	2.3	100.0
rEiF	19.0	42.9	16.7		2.4	2.4	2.4	4.8	9.5	100.0
rEIf		26.3	26.3	10.5	5.3	26.3			5.3	100.0
rEIF	7.7	38.5	10.3	2.6	5.1	12.8	7.7	5.1	10.3	100.0
reit	9.4	21.9	28.1	9.4	3.1	15.6		6.3	6.3	100.0
reIt	4.2	16.7	14.6	6.3	2.1	43.8	4.2	2.1	6.3	100.0
rEit	26.9	30.8	19.2	3.8			7.7	3.8	7.7	100.0
rEIt	5.3	26.3	26.3		5.3	15.8	21.1			100.0
rgdf		26.5	23.5	2.9	8.8	23.5	2.9	5.9	5.9	100.0
rgdF	3.2	22.6	19.4	6.5	6.5	25.8	6.5		9.7	100.0
rgdt	2.9	25.7	25.7	2.9	8.6	20.0		8.6	5.7	100.0
rgif	7.7	35.9	23.1	10.3	5.1	7.7	2.6	5.1	2.6	100.0
rgiF	18.8	40.6	6.3	3.1	9.4	12.5	3.1	3.1	3.1	100.0
rgIf	3.7	7.4	33.3	3.7	18.5	18.5	3.7	11.1		100.0
rgIF	7.1	25.0	21.4		10.7	25.0	7.1		3.6	100.0
rgit	3.3	40.0	10.0	6.7	10.0	16.7	3.3	3.3	6.7	100.0
rgIt	5.9	20.6	20.6	8.8	2.9	20.6	17.6		2.9	100.0
Total	9.1	25.6	18.0	5.5	5.7	21.7	4.9	3.5	6.1	100.0

Valid N = 3015. All Nordic countries and all 81 categories of Cultural Space are included.

Table 83: Party Preference by Cultural Space. NOS99. (Adj. s. res.).

	SocL	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
hedf	-1.4	**-2.6**	.6	.2	-1.8	**4.9**	.5	-.5	-1.4
hedF	-.9	-.3	1.7	-1.2	-1.3	.6	-1.2	.1	1.2
hEdf	1.8	1.0	-1.3	.1	.1	**-2.2**	-1.3	.8	**2.2**
hEdF	.5	1.2	-.3	.6	-1.2	-1.2	.7	.1	-.4
Hedf	-.7	-.7	1.3	-.1	-.2	.8	.0	-.9	-.3
HedF	-.3	-.4	-.4	.3	.2	1.3	.4	-.7	-1.0
HEdf	.1	.5	.2	-.1	-.1	-.7	-1.0	1.6	-.2
HEdF	-.2	**3.7**	-.3	-1.0	.0	**-2.8**	-.3	-1.0	.8
hedt	.1	-1.7	-1.3	-.6	-.6	**3.5**	.4	-.1	.0
hEdt	.5	.7	.3	-1.2	-1.2	-1.7	-.2	1.2	**2.1**
Hedt	-1.6	-.1	1.4	-1.2	-.3	1.4	-.2	-.9	-.4
HEdt	-.3	**4.2**	-1.4	-1.2	-.4	-1.3	-1.2	-1.0	.3
heif	.4	1.5	-1.1	.9	1.7	-.8	-1.9	.1	-1.0
heiF	-1.9	1.2	-.1	**2.3**	.7	-1.1	-.6	-.2	-.1
heIf	**-2.7**	**-3.8**	-1.3	.9	**-2.4**	**9.7**	-1.7	-1.9	.2
heIF	-.5	-1.1	-1.1	.3	.2	**2.4**	.5	.0	-.6
hEif	**10.6**	.6	**-4.1**	.6	**-2.1**	**-5.0**	**-2.3**	**6.7**	-.1
hEiF	**4.4**	-1.3	**-2.2**	**4.1**	.1	**-2.1**	-1.3	1.8	.0
hEIf	1.6	.3	-1.1	1.5	.2	-.7	.4	-.7	-1.0
hEIF	-1.3	1.3	**-2.0**	-1.0	1.0	-1.1	1.2	1.8	1.9
Heif	-1.3	.2	-.1	1.1	-1.0	**2.3**	-1.0	-.8	-1.1
HeiF	.8	.3	.1	-1.1	-.2	-1.4	1.0	-.9	1.6
HeIf	**-2.0**	**-2.1**	1.9	-.7	-.7	**3.7**	-.5	-.7	-.8
HeIF	-1.8	-1.6	.4	-.5	.1	.7	**3.7**	-1.4	1.2
HEif	1.2	1.7	-.8	.6	**2.2**	**-2.6**	-1.1	.1	-.4
HEiF	-.4	-1.4	**2.1**	-1.1	.6	-1.5	1.6	.9	.5
HEIf	.4	-.6	1.9	-1.5	-1.5	.0	1.7	-.3	-.9
HEIF	-.5	**3.4**	.3	-1.7	1.2	**-2.9**	.1	-.8	-.1
heit	-1.1	.2	.7	1.0	-1.7	.8	-1.5	-.5	.8
heIt	**-2.1**	**-2.8**	-.3	.4	-1.6	**5.1**	1.4	-.4	-.4
hEit	**5.7**	-.9	-.4	-.5	-1.1	**-3.4**	-1.6	**2.5**	**2.4**
hEIt	**2.2**	.5	-.6	1.2	-1.0	-1.5	.3	-.8	.0
Heit	-.6	-1.1	.2	.9	.8	-.7	1.1	.4	.7
HeIt	-1.4	-1.4	.5	-.1	1.3	1.5	.1	-1.2	.5
HEit	1.8	1.0	1.4	-1.4	**2.4**	**-2.6**	-1.3	-.1	-1.5
HEIt	-1.2	**2.4**	-.4	-.8	-1.4	-.8	.6	-.1	.7
hgdf	1.0	-.1	-.5	1.2	-.5	-.5	.6	.0	-.6
hgdF	-.2	.4	.5	-.9	.3	.1	-.8	-.7	.2
Hgdf	-1.6	-.2	-.3	-.3	-.4	1.3	-.2	-1.0	**2.1**
HgdF	-.5	.6	.0	-.3	1.0	.2	.6	-.4	-1.7

hgdt	-1.6	1.5	-.3	1.4	-.4	-1.3	-.2	1.2	.3
Hgdt	.2	.1	-.2	-.5	**3.4**	-1.1	-.4	-1.0	.1
hgif	**2.8**	1.2	-1.8	**6.1**	-.5	**-3.8**	-1.7	**2.8**	**-2.0**
hgiF	**2.4**	-.8	.1	.4	-1.3	-1.3	.6	.1	1.1
hgIf	-1.0	**-2.2**	1.1	.4	-1.3	**3.3**	-1.2	.1	-.5
hgIF	-.8	-.7	.7	-.6	1.0	-.5	1.2	-.5	.9
Hgif	-1.2	-1.0	1.7	-.9	**3.7**	.0	-.8	-.7	-1.0
HgiF	-1.2	1.0	.9	.1	1.6	-1.8	-.5	-.1	.0
HgIf	-.8	-1.5	**2.0**	-.3	-.3	1.4	-1.1	-.9	.5
HgIF	-1.9	-1.5	.6	.0	-.6	-1.1	**7.9**	-1.0	.3
hgit	.1	.5	-.6	**3.3**	-.2	-1.9	.0	.5	-.3
hgIt	.7	.9	-1.1	-.9	.2	-1.3	.4	-.7	**2.4**
Hgit	-.7	.2	.6	.7	1.6	-.4	-1.1	-.9	-.3
HgIt	-.5	-1.4	.9	-1.6	.4	1.4	.6	-.4	.3
redf	**-2.0**	**-2.1**	1.8	-1.3	.9	**4.5**	-1.1	-1.5	**-2.0**
redF	-.9	-.7	**2.2**	.5	-.4	-.8	1.6	-1.0	-.5
rEdf	.0	**3.1**	.0	-1.1	-1.2	-1.4	-.1	-.9	-.3
rEdF	.1	-.2	-.4	.8	-1.1	.2	1.0	.3	-.3
redt	-1.5	-1.9	.7	-1.5	-.2	**2.4**	.8	-.3	1.0
rEdt	.5	1.7	.3	-1.2	-.4	**-2.2**	1.7	-1.0	.4
reif	-.7	-.1	-1.5	-.7	**4.3**	-1.1	-.6	-.2	**2.7**
reiF	-1.1	-1.4	-.1	-.8	**2.9**	1.0	-.8	-.7	1.5
reIf	-1.9	**-3.3**	.4	-1.0	-.5	**7.4**	-1.9	-1.0	-1.2
reIF	-1.6	-.1	-1.2	.6	-.3	**2.4**	1.7	-.9	-1.3
rEif	**4.3**	1.4	-1.1	-1.6	.4	**-2.4**	-.8	1.3	-1.0
rEiF	**2.3**	**2.6**	-.2	-1.6	-.9	**-3.1**	-.8	.5	.9
rEIf	-1.4	.1	.9	1.0	-.1	.5	-1.0	-.8	-.1
rEIF	-.3	1.9	-1.3	-.8	-.1	-1.4	.8	.6	1.1
reit	.1	-.5	1.5	1.0	-.6	-.8	-1.3	.9	.0
reIt	-1.2	-1.4	-.6	.2	-1.1	**3.7**	-.2	-.5	.1
rEit	**3.2**	.6	.2	-.4	-1.3	**-2.7**	.7	.1	.3
rEIt	-.6	.1	.9	-1.1	-.1	-.6	**3.3**	-.8	-1.1
rgdf	-1.9	.1	.8	-.7	.8	.3	-.5	.8	.0
rgdF	-1.1	-.4	.2	.2	.2	.6	.4	-1.1	.8
rgdt	-1.3	.0	1.2	-.7	.7	-.2	-1.3	1.7	-.1
rgif	-.3	1.5	.8	1.3	-.1	**-2.1**	-.7	.6	-.9
rgiF	1.9	**2.0**	-1.7	-.6	.9	-1.3	-.5	-.1	-.7
rgIf	-1.0	**-2.2**	**2.1**	-.4	**2.9**	-.4	-.3	**2.2**	-1.3
rgIF	-.4	-.1	.5	-1.3	1.2	.4	.6	-1.0	-.6
rgit	-1.1	1.8	-1.1	.3	1.0	-.7	-.4	.0	.1
rgIt	-.7	-.7	.4	.9	-.7	-.2	**3.5**	-1.1	-.8

Two Top-Ranked Biases

Table 84: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases. NOS99 limited. (Adj.s. res.)

	SocL	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef	**-3.7**	**-4.1**	**2.1**	-1.2	-.3	**7.4**	-.9	-1.9	-.7
eh	**-2.1**	-1.9	-1.2	-.6	-1.2	**6.5**	-1.1	-.2	-.5
eI	**-3.2**	**-4.9**	-.2	.9	-1.4	**8.8**	-.3	-1.8	-.1
EF	-.9	1.4	.9	.6	-1.0	-1.8	.5	.8	-.5
EH	**3.1**	1.4	-.1	-1.9	1.5	**-2.7**	-1.0	-.7	.5
EI	-.9	.5	-.2	-1.2	1.0	-1.1	.6	.9	1.4
fe	-1.7	**-2.7**	.7	.2	.1	**4.8**	-1.4	-1.7	-.2
fh	.6	1.2	-1.1	1.1	1.0	-1.5	-1.8	**2.3**	-1.0
fI	-1.5	**-3.0**	.7	-.1	1.5	**3.0**	-.9	**2.2**	-1.2
FE	-.5	**3.4**	-.5	-1.0	-.1	**-3.6**	.6	-.1	**2.4**
FH	**-2.0**	**2.2**	1.6	-.8	-.8	**-2.5**	**4.1**	-1.7	-.2
FI	**-2.1**	1.0	.0	-.8	.7	-1.0	**2.8**	-.1	.4
he	.1	.0	-.1	.8	-1.8	.8	.2	-.8	-.2
hE	.4	1.7	-1.9	1.8	-1.2	**-2.1**	-1.1	1.2	**2.5**
hf	**2.2**	-.2	-1.6	**3.4**	-.7	-.4	-.5	-.8	-1.0
hi	**3.5**	-.2	-1.5	**2.4**	.2	**-2.9**	-1.7	1.9	.7
HE	-1.3	**2.3**	1.2	-1.9	.9	**-2.2**	.1	-.7	1.0
HF	**-2.2**	.9	1.4	-1.5	1.7	-.4	**2.0**	-1.6	-.9
HI	-1.5	-.4	1.4	-1.6	**2.1**	-.3	**2.0**	**-2.0**	.3
iE	**6.0**	1.8	-1.4	-1.2	-1.3	**-4.3**	-.1	**3.6**	-1.5
if	**3.5**	**2.5**	-1.2	1.2	.9	**-4.6**	-1.3	.7	-.3
ih	**5.8**	-.5	-1.2	**2.3**	-.2	**-3.9**	**-2.3**	**2.6**	.3
IH	**-2.2**	-.4	**2.2**	-1.5	-.6	1.0	**2.0**	-.9	-.8

Nordic 80 limit is used. Adjusted standardized residuals ≤ |1.0| are in gray. Adjusted standardized residuals ≤ |2.0| are statistically significant deviations (on significance level 0.02) are in bold.

Table 85: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases. NOS99 limited (Row percent.)

	SocL	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef	0.7	10.4	23.9	3.7	4.5	48.5	3.0	0.7	4.5	100.0
EF	6.0	34.0	22.0	8.0	2.0	12.0	6.0	6.0	4.0	100.0
eh	3.4	16.9	12.4	4.5	2.2	50.6	2.2	3.4	4.5	100.0
EH	22.2	33.3	16.7		9.3	7.4	1.9	1.9	7.4	100.0
eI	1.6	7.1	16.5	7.9	2.4	54.3	3.9	0.8	5.5	100.0
EI	6.1	28.6	16.3	2.0	8.2	16.3	6.1	6.1	10.2	100.0
fe	4.0	12.0	20.0	6.7	5.3	45.3	1.3		5.3	100.0
FE	8.1	40.7	15.1	3.5	4.7	7.0	5.8	3.5	11.6	100.0
fh	12.1	31.8	12.1	9.1	7.6	15.2		9.1	3.0	100.0
FH	4.3	33.9	22.6	4.3	3.5	13.0	12.2	0.9	5.2	100.0
fI	3.8	7.5	20.8	5.7	9.4	39.6	1.9	9.4	1.9	100.0
FI	1.7	31.0	17.2	3.4	6.9	17.2	12.1	3.4	6.9	100.0
he	10.2	25.4	16.9	8.5		27.1	5.1	1.7	5.1	100.0
hE	11.5	34.4	8.2	11.5	1.6	11.5	1.6	6.6	13.1	100.0
HE	5.8	36.0	22.1	1.2	7.0	12.8	4.7	2.3	8.1	100.0
hf	16.7	24.4	11.1	14.4	3.3	21.1	3.3	2.2	3.3	100.0
HF	1.6	30.2	23.8	1.6	9.5	20.6	9.5		3.2	100.0
hi	20.2	24.5	11.7	11.7	5.3	10.6	1.1	7.4	7.4	100.0
HI	5.4	23.7	22.6	2.2	9.7	21.5	8.6		6.5	100.0
iE	28.0	33.3	11.8	3.2	2.2	4.3	4.3	10.8	2.2	100.0
if	19.8	35.6	12.9	8.9	6.9	4.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	100.0
ih	25.9	23.1	13.0	11.1	4.6	7.4		8.3	6.5	100.0
IH	1.6	23.0	27.9	1.6	3.3	27.9	9.8	1.6	3.3	100.0
	9.8	25.3	17.2	6.1	5.0	22.6	4.5	3.8	5.7	100.0

Table 86: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases and Country. NOS99 limited. (Row percent)

Norway	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef		21.4		7.1	3.6	53.6	14.3			100
eh	5.6	22.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	44.4	11.1			100
eI		8.7		8.7	8.7	56.5	17.4			100
EF		35.7	7.1	14.3		21.4	21.4			100
EH	9.1	72.7			18.2					100
EI		33.3				16.7	33.3		16.7	100
fe		30.0			10.0	50.0	10.0			100
fh	9.1	36.4	18.2	9.1	18.2	9.1				100
fI		66.7				16.7	16.7			100
FE	8.3	45.8	8.3	4.2	8.3		20.8		4.2	100
FH		33.3	6.7		6.7	10.0	43.3			100
FI		45.0	5.0		5.0	10.0	35.0			100
he	15.4	46.2	7.7			7.7	23.1			100
hE	21.4	42.9		7.1		7.1	7.1		14.3	100
hf	15.8	42.1		5.3		15.8	15.8		5.3	100
hi	29.4	29.4	11.8	5.9			5.9		17.6	100
HE		55.0	10.0		15.0		20.0			100
HF		25.0	6.3		18.8	12.5	37.5			100
HI	5.3	21.1	5.3		21.1	10.5	36.8			100
iE	25.0	25.0	25.0		5.0	5.0	15.0			100
if	21.9	31.3	6.3	9.4	18.8	3.1	6.3		3.1	100
ih	23.3	26.7	10.0	16.7	6.7	6.7			10.0	100
IH		33.3	6.7		6.7	13.3	40.0			100
	9.1	33.7	6.5	4.8	8.2	16.1	18.8		2.9	100
Sweden	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef		21.7	8.7	4.3	13.0	52.2				100
eh	4.8	19.0		4.8		61.9		9.5		100
eI	3.4	6.9		10.3	3.4	72.4		3.4		100
EF	14.3	28.6	14.3	14.3				14.3	14.3	100
EH	25.0	37.5			25.0	12.5				100
EI	7.1	21.4	7.1	7.1	28.6	21.4		7.1		100
fe		14.3		7.1	14.3	64.3				100
fh	9.1	50.0		13.6	4.5	13.6		9.1		100
fI					20.0	66.7		13.3		100
FE	10.0	50.0	10.0		10.0	10.0		10.0		100
FH	12.0	40.0	8.0	12.0	4.0	24.0				100
FI		22.2			33.3	22.2		22.2		100
he		25.0				68.8			6.3	100
hE	8.3	25.0	16.7	8.3	8.3	16.7		8.3	8.3	100
hf	27.3	4.5	4.5	18.2	13.6	31.8				100
hi	29.4	35.3			17.6	5.9		11.8		100
HE		54.5	18.2		9.1	18.2				100
HF	10.0	40.0	20.0		10.0	20.0				100
HI	7.1	21.4	7.1		28.6	28.6			7.1	100
iE	38.9	50.0		5.6	5.6					100
if	27.8	44.4	5.6		5.6			16.7		100
ih	26.7	33.3	13.3	6.7		6.7		13.3		100
IH		66.7	16.7			16.7				100
	11.8	28.7	5.3	5.9	10.1	31.5		5.6	1.1	100

Denmark	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef	2.8	5.6	63.9	5.6	2.8	11.1			8.3	100
eh		20.0	45.0		5.0	20.0			10.0	100
eI		3.4	55.2			17.2	3.4		20.7	100
EF	14.3	42.9	21.4	7.1		7.1			7.1	100
EH	30.0	10.0	40.0				10.0		10.0	100
EI	13.3	26.7	33.3				6.7		20.0	100
fe	8.7	13.0	39.1	13.0		17.4			8.7	100
fh	36.4	18.2	18.2		18.2				9.1	100
fI	9.1		72.7		18.2					100
FE	9.1	31.8	18.2		4.5	4.5		9.1	22.7	100
FH	3.8	38.5	34.6				3.8		19.2	100
FI	10.0	20.0	50.0			10.0			10.0	100
he	21.1	5.3	42.1	21.1		5.3			5.3	100
hE	11.1	22.2	22.2	11.1					33.3	100
hf	22.2	22.2	25.9	18.5		7.4		3.7		100
hi	25.0	20.8	25.0	12.5		4.2		4.2	8.3	100
HE	17.4	26.1	30.4			4.3			21.7	100
HF		28.6	42.9	7.1	7.1	14.3				100
HI	6.9	31.0	34.5		3.4	6.9	3.4		13.8	100
iE	50.0	17.9	14.3			3.6	3.6	10.7		100
if	30.0	45.0	15.0	5.0					5.0	100
ih	45.5	15.2	9.1	12.1		3.0		12.1	3.0	100
IH	8.3	16.7	41.7	8.3		16.7			8.3	100
	16.8	20.6	34.0	5.6	1.9	7.1	1.3	2.4	10.3	100

Finland	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef		3.3	23.3		3.3	56.7		3.3	10.0	100
eh	5.0	10.0	5.0	10.0		55.0		5.0	10.0	100
eI	4.0	12.0	20.0	16.0		44.0			4.0	100
EF		33.3	55.6		11.1					100
EH	40.0	6.7	20.0		6.7	6.7			20.0	100
EI		33.3	33.3			16.7			16.7	100
fe	7.7	7.7	23.1		7.7	38.5			15.4	100
fh	8.3	25.0	8.3	16.7		8.3		25.0	8.3	100
fI	10.0		10.0	30.0		10.0		30.0	10.0	100
FE	11.1	38.9	22.2	5.6					22.2	100
FH	6.3	25.0	37.5	12.5	6.3			6.3	6.3	100
FI		9.1	18.2	18.2		27.3			27.3	100
he		12.5	12.5	12.5		37.5		12.5	12.5	100
hE	18.2		9.1	36.4				18.2	18.2	100
hf		7.7	15.4	23.1		38.5		7.7	7.7	100
hi	12.5	8.3	12.5	29.2	8.3	8.3		16.7	4.2	100
HE	4.8	23.8	28.6	4.8	9.5	23.8		4.8		100
HF		23.1	38.5		7.7	15.4			15.4	100
HI	4.5	13.6	36.4	9.1		31.8			4.5	100
iE		40.0		20.0				20.0	20.0	100
if	13.3	13.3	20.0	33.3		6.7			13.3	100
ih	10.0	15.0	25.0	10.0	15.0	5.0		15.0	5.0	100
IH		12.5	43.8		6.3	25.0		6.3	6.3	100
	7.0	15.1	22.6	12.0	3.9	22.6		6.7	10.1	100

Iceland	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*	*Total*
ef						100				100
eh		10.0				90.0				100
eI		4.8		4.8		90.5				100
EF		16.7	16.7			33.3		33.3		100
EH		50.0	20.0			20.0		10.0		100
EI		37.5				37.5		25.0		100
fe			20.0	6.7		73.3				100
fh		10.0	30.0			50.0		10.0		100
fI			18.2			81.8				100
FE		41.7	16.7	8.3		33.3				100
FH		27.8	38.9			33.3				100
FI		50.0	25.0			25.0				100
he		100								100
hE		66.7				26.7		6.7		100
hf		66.7				22.2			11.1	100
hi		41.7				50.0			8.3	100
HE		27.3	18.2			27.3		9.1	18.2	100
HF		40.0	10.0			50.0				100
HI		33.3	11.1			55.6				100
iE		47.1	11.8			11.8		29.4		100
if		43.8	25.0			12.5		12.5	6.3	100
ih		40.0	10.0			30.0			20.0	100
IH		8.3	25.0			66.7				100
		29.6	13.3	1.1		47.8		5.6	2.6	100

Directional Measures	*Party Families Dependent*			
Country	Uncertainty Coefficient	Asymp. Std. Error	Approx. T	Approx. Sig.
Norway	.20	.015	12.6	.000
Sweden	.24	.017	13.0	.000
Denmark	.19	.014	11.9	.000
Finland	.20	.016	12.1	.000
Iceland	.30	.025	10.4	.000

Table 87: Party Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases and Country. NOS99 limited. (Adj.s.res.)

This table uses CultRankTri2 and Nordic limit n≥80.

Norway	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef	-1.7	-1.4	-1.4	.6	-.9	5.6	-.6		-.9
eh	-.5	-1.0	-.2	.2	-.4	3.3	-.8		-.7
eI	-1.6	-2.6	-1.3	.9	.1	5.4	-.2		-.9
EF	-1.2	.2	.1	1.7	-1.1	.6	.3		-.7
EH	.0	2.8	-.9	-.8	1.2	-1.5	-1.6		-.6
EI	-.8	.0	-.7	-.6	-.7	.0	.9		2.0
fe	-1.0	-.2	-.8	-.7	.2	3.0	-.7		-.6
fh	.0	.2	1.6	.7	1.2	-.6	-1.6		-.6
fI	-.8	1.7	-.7	-.6	-.7	.0	-.1		-.4
FE	-.1	1.3	.4	-.2	.0	-2.2	.3		.4
FH	-1.8	.0	.0	-1.3	-.3	-.9	3.6		-1.0
FI	-1.5	1.1	-.3	-1.0	-.5	-.8	1.9		-.8
he	.8	1.0	.2	-.8	-1.1	-.8	.4		-.6
hE	1.6	.7	-1.0	.4	-1.1	-.9	-1.1		2.6
hf	1.0	.8	-1.2	.1	-1.3	.0	-.3		.6
hi	3.0	-.4	.9	.2	-1.3	-1.8	-1.4		3.7
HE	-1.5	2.1	.7	-1.0	1.1	-2.0	.1		-.8
HF	-1.3	-.7	.0	-.9	1.6	-.4	2.0		-.7
HI	-.6	-1.2	-.2	-1.0	2.1	-.7	2.1		-.8
iE	2.5	-.8	3.4	-1.0	-.5	-1.4	-.4		-.8
if	2.6	-.3	-.1	1.3	2.3	-2.1	-1.9		.1
ih	2.8	-.8	.8	3.2	-.3	-1.5	-2.7		2.4
IH	-1.3	.0	.0	-.9	-.2	-.3	2.1		-.7

Sweden	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef	-1.8	-.8	.7	-.3	.5	2.2		-1.2	-.5
eh	-1.0	-1.0	-1.1	-.2	-1.6	3.1		.8	-.5
eI	-1.5	-2.7	-1.3	1.1	-1.2	5.0		-.5	-.6
EF	.2	.0	1.1	1.0	-.9	-1.8		1.0	3.3
EH	1.2	.6	-.7	-.7	1.4	-1.2		-.7	-.3
EI	-.6	-.6	.3	.2	2.3	-.8		.3	-.4
fe	-1.4	-1.2	-.9	.2	.5	2.7		-.9	-.4
fh	-.4	2.3	-1.1	1.6	-.9	-1.9		.7	-.5
fI	-1.4	-2.5	-.9	-1.0	1.3	3.0		1.3	-.4
FE	-.2	1.5	.7	-.8	.0	-1.5		.6	-.3
FH	.0	1.3	.6	1.3	-1.1	-.8		-1.3	-.6
FI	-1.1	-.4	-.7	-.8	2.3	-.6		2.2	-.3
he	-1.5	-.3	-1.0	-1.0	-1.4	3.3		-1.0	2.0
hE	-.4	-.3	1.8	.4	-.2	-1.1		.4	2.4
hf	2.3	-2.6	-.2	2.5	.6	.0		-1.2	-.5
hi	2.3	.6	-1.0	-1.1	1.1	-2.3		1.1	-.5
HE	-1.2	1.9	1.9	-.8	-.1	-1.0		-.8	-.4
HF	-.2	.8	2.1	-.8	.0	-.8		-.8	-.3
HI	-.6	-.6	.3	-1.0	2.3	-.2		-.9	2.2
iE	3.7	2.1	-1.0	-.1	-.7	-2.9		-1.1	-.5
if	2.2	1.5	.0	-1.1	-.7	-2.9		2.1	-.5
ih	1.8	.4	1.4	.1	-1.3	-2.1		1.3	-.4
IH	-.9	2.1	1.2	-.6	-.8	-.8		-.6	-.3

Denmark	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef	-2.3	-2.3	3.9	.0	.4	1.0	-.7	-1.0	-.4
eh	-2.1	-.1	1.1	-1.1	1.0	2.3	-.5	-.7	.0
eI	-2.5	-2.4	2.5	-1.4	-.8	2.2	1.1	-.9	1.9
EF	-.3	2.1	-1.0	.3	-.5	.0	-.4	-.6	-.4
EH	1.1	-.8	.4	-.8	-.4	-.9	2.5	-.5	.0
EI	-.4	.6	-.1	-1.0	-.6	-1.1	1.9	-.6	1.3
fe	-1.1	-.9	.5	1.6	-.7	2.0	-.6	-.8	-.3
fh	1.8	-.2	-1.1	-.8	4.0	-.9	-.4	-.5	-.1
fI	-.7	-1.7	2.7	-.8	4.0	-.9	-.4	-.5	-1.1
FE	-1.0	1.3	-1.6	-1.2	.9	-.5	-.5	2.1	2.0
FH	-1.8	2.3	.1	-1.3	-.7	-1.5	1.2	-.8	1.5
FI	-.6	-.1	1.1	-.8	-.4	.4	-.4	-.5	.0
he	.5	-1.7	.8	3.0	-.6	-.3	-.5	-.7	-.7
hE	-.5	.1	-.8	.7	-.4	-.8	-.3	-.5	2.3
hf	.8	.2	-.9	3.0	-.8	.1	-.6	.5	-1.8
hi	1.1	.0	-1.0	1.5	-.7	-.6	-.6	.6	-.3
HE	.1	.7	-.4	-1.2	-.7	-.5	-.6	-.8	1.8
HF	-1.7	.7	.7	.3	1.4	1.1	-.4	-.6	-1.3
HI	-1.5	1.4	.1	-1.4	.6	.0	1.1	-.9	.6
iE	4.9	-.4	-2.3	-1.3	-.8	-.7	1.1	3.0	-1.9
if	1.6	2.8	-1.8	-.1	-.6	-1.3	-.5	-.7	-.8
ih	4.6	-.8	-3.1	1.7	-.8	-.9	-.7	3.8	-1.4
IH	-.8	-.3	.6	.4	-.5	1.3	-.4	-.5	-.2
Finland	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef	-1.6	-1.9	.1	-2.1	-.2	4.7		-.8	.0
eh	-.4	-.7	-1.9	-.3	-.9	3.6		-.3	.0
eI	-.6	-.4	-.3	.6	-1.0	2.6		-1.4	-1.0
EF	-.8	1.5	2.4	-1.1	1.1	-1.6		-.8	-1.0
EH	5.1	-.9	-.2	-1.5	.6	-1.5		-1.1	1.3
EI	-.7	1.3	.6	-.9	-.5	-.4		-.7	.5
fe	.1	-.8	.0	-1.4	.7	1.4		-1.0	.7
fh	.2	1.0	-1.2	.5	-.7	-1.2		2.6	-.2
fI	.4	-1.4	-1.0	1.8	-.6	-1.0		3.0	.0
FE	.7	2.9	.0	-.9	-.9	-2.4		-1.2	1.8
FH	-.1	1.1	1.5	.1	.5	-2.2		-.1	-.5
FI	-.9	-.6	-.4	.6	-.7	.4		-.9	1.9
he	-.8	-.2	-.7	.0	-.6	1.0		.7	.2
hE	1.5	-1.4	-1.1	2.5	-.7	-1.8		1.5	.9
hf	-1.0	-.8	-.6	1.3	-.7	1.4		.1	-.3
hi	1.1	-1.0	-1.2	2.7	1.2	-1.7		2.0	-1.0
HE	-.4	1.2	.7	-1.1	1.4	.1		-.4	-1.6
HF	-1.0	.8	1.4	-1.4	.7	-.6		-1.0	.7
HI	-.5	-.2	1.6	-.4	-1.0	1.1		-1.3	-.9
iE	-.9	2.2	-1.7	.8	-.6	-1.7		1.7	1.1
if	1.0	-.2	-.2	2.6	-.8	-1.5		-1.1	.4
ih	.5	.0	.3	-.3	2.6	-1.9		1.5	-.8
IH	-1.1	-.3	2.1	-1.5	.5	.2		-.1	-.5

Iceland	*SocL*	*SocD*	*Agr*	*Lib*	*Chr*	*Cons*	*Prog*	*Gr*	*Oth*
ef		-2.8	-1.7	-.5		4.5		-1.0	-.7
eh		-1.4	-1.3	-.3		2.7		-.8	-.5
eI		-2.6	-1.9	1.7		4.1		-1.2	-.8
EF		-.7	.2	-.3		-.7		3.0	-.4
EH		1.4	.6	-.3		-1.8		.6	-.5
EI		.5	-1.1	-.3		-.6		2.4	-.5
fe		-2.6	.8	2.1		2.0		-1.0	-.7
fh		-1.4	1.6	-.3		.1		.6	-.5
fI		-2.2	.5	-.4		2.3		-.8	-.6
FE		.9	.3	2.4		-1.0		-.9	-.6
FH		-.2	3.3	-.5		-1.3		-1.1	-.7
FI		1.3	1.0	-.3		-1.3		-.7	-.5
he		2.7	-.7	-.2		-1.7		-.4	-.3
hE		3.2	-1.6	-.4		-1.7		.2	-.7
hf		2.5	-1.2	-.3		-1.6		-.7	1.6
hi		.9	-1.4	-.4		.2		-.9	1.3
HE		-.2	.5	-.4		-1.4		.5	3.3
HF		.7	-.3	-.3		.1		-.8	-.5
HI		.2	-.2	-.3		.5		-.7	-.5
iE		1.6	-.2	-.5		-3.1		4.4	-.7
if		1.3	1.4	-.4		-2.9		1.3	.9
ih		.7	-.3	-.3		-1.1		-.8	3.5
IH		-1.7	1.2	-.4		1.3		-.9	-.6

Cultural bias combinations, Age and Gender

Very little research explores the relationships between the common social background variables like age, gender, educational level, occupation, location, and cultural bias. There is one article by Grendstad that presents does this, and presents an overview of what others have found (2000). And there is one article by Grendstad and Sundback looking at socio-demographic effects on cultural biases based on the Nordic 1999 survey (2003). In addition, “older respondents were more likely to be hierarchs and less likely to be egalitarians” (Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994:27).

According to cultural theory, cultural biases are strongly connected to institutions, and therefore there should not be a clear relation between age and gender, unless there are some mechanisms that select people into the different institutions. Nevertheless, my findings in this survey indicate that that there might be some connections between common social background variables and cultural bias combinations.

Age and education are dealt already under the heading Acquiescence starting from page 326. Here I will shortly demonstrate how age and gender are related to cultural bias combinations.

In Figure 45 we can see how average age and gender vary by cultural bias combination. According to cultural theory this should not happen, because cultural biases are connected to institutions, not personal background characteristics.

Figure 45: Average Age and Gender by Cultural Bias Combination (Fixed Abs Tri 3) NOS99.



Figure 46: Average Age and Gender by Cultural Bias Combination (Two Top-ranked Abs) NOS99.



For some of these groups the deviation in gender proportion is large enough to be statistically significant.[403] Combinations that are below 0.42 or above 0.65 deviate statistically significantly: those with more men than expected are *e-f, eIf, eIF, he-, He-, heF, heI, and HIf;* those with more females than expected are *HEF, hif, Eif, EIf*, and *h-f*.

However, the connection we can observe between age and gender inFigure 45, above, is less obvious if we use the two strongest cultural biases ranked into a combination, as in Figure 46 above. In this figure there is some obvious clustering round the 0.5 gender average, which tells us that these cultural combinations are not connected to gender. Nevertheless, there are some combinations that have fewer women (*ef, eh, eI, Fe, he, He, hI, Ie, If*) and some combinations that have many women (*Ef, EF, EH, Ei, FE, fh, hi, if, ih*).

The Alternative S3 Coding Scheme

It is possible to keep Support and Rejection as equal principles and code them as similarly as possible, and make variables that are blue copies of each other in all other ways. I call this coding for the S3 coding scheme, because it differentiates between three different levels of support, just as we differentiate between three different levels of rejection.

I will not present any testing related to choice of cut-off points, as the results are very similar as what we saw in the empirical search of cut-off points on page 367. The same cut-off points are used here as in the rest of the thesis. I have also applied a national limit of 10 respondents and a Nordic limit of 40 respondents per category. Categories with fewer respondents are considered missing. This increases the comparability across variables.

In Table 88, below, we can se how the different variables using degrees of support or degrees of rejection perform. Each cell is the explanatory power of one contingency table (uncertainty coefficient * 100).

Even if this coding scheme is not used in Part III the variable *CB Tri Ranked– top 2 biases - Absolute*, is identical to the one used in Part III to the analysis of fallacies and rejection. This variable is marked in bold. We can se that also in this coding scheme, it performs quite well, and even if there are other variables with even higher explained variance, they have many more categories, making them more difficult to use.

[403] Pairwise comparison of gender proportions, two-sided tests with significance level 0.05 with Boniferroni correction for multiple comparisons.

Table 88: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Combinations by Country. S3 NOS99 limited. (Percent explained variance).

Dependent variable: National Party Preference	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden	Denmark	Finland	Iceland	Norway	Sweden
	Absolute values					Support				
CB Bin Fixed - 1	8	6	8	8	7	8	7	6	6	9
CB Bin Fixed - 2	15	13	12	13	17	14	13	10	13	15
CB Bin Fixed - 3	18	18	14	16	20	18	17	14	16	19
CB Bin Fixed - 4	13	11	9	11	13	13	11	9	11	13
CB Bin Ranked - top 1	8	6	8	8	7	8	7	6	6	9
CB Bin Ranked - top 2	22	19	17	18	24	17	15	12	16	19
CB Bin Ranked - top 3	34	30	4	29	37	28	28	14	27	33
CB Bin Ranked - top 4	31	20	0	33	23	31	30	11	30	34
CB Tri Fixed - 1	9	6	8	8	8	7	5	5	6	8
CB Tri Fixed - 2	17	16	13	15	20	13	11	8	13	15
CB Tri Fixed - 3	25	24	14	22	28	20	20	10	20	24
CB Tri Fixed - 4	26	26	12	25	30	26	26	12	25	30
CB Tri Ranked - top 1	9	6	8	8	8	7	6	5	6	8
CB Tri Ranked - top 2	22	22	18	19	27	19	21	14	19	23
CB Tri Ranked - top 3	33	35	3	27	35	33	33	7	32	38
CB Tri Ranked - top 4	21	32	1	23	34	33	34	4	29	37
CB Neut Fixed - 1	8	6	8	8	7	9	8	6	7	10
CB Neut Fixed - 2	16	15	12	14	20	17	17	11	17	21
CB Neut Fixed - 3	24	23	12	21	26	24	26	8	23	31
CB Neut Fixed - 4	26	26	12	25	30	26	26	12	25	30
CB Neut Ranked - top 1	8	6	8	8	7	9	8	6	7	10
CB Neut Ranked - top 2	22	22	16	19	26	20	20	11	21	25
CB Neut Ranked - top 3	37	34	1	27	36	33	33	4	34	39
CB Neut Ranked—top 4						38	.	1	.	.
CB Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order	10	8	3	10	10	16	13	6	13	17
Average	19	18	9	17	21	20	18	8	18	22

Country limit 10 and Nordic limit 40 for each category,
and cutpoints bin 50 and trichotomous 35&65 are used.
Percent explained variance = U*100.
Results for the variable identical to the one used in Part III are in bold.

Some variables have too low number of respondents, even if they do seem to provide a high explained variance.

Appendix III - the Discussions

Multiple tests of hypothesis on the same data

When multiple hypothesis tests on same data are performed, the possibility of finding statistically significant results created by chance increases. In Table 89 we can se calculated probability of getting at least one statistically significant test result when we perform several tests. If alpha (probability of type I error) is set to 0.05 and we perform 10 statistical tests, then there is 40 percent chance of getting at least one significant result just by chance.

Table 89: Probability of Getting at least one Significant Result

N of tests	*Alpha*	
	0.05	0.01
1	0.05	0.01
2	0.10	0.02
5	0.23	0.05
7	0.30	0.07
10	0.40	0.10
16	0.56	0.15
20	0.64	0.18

Therefore, some authors suggest that an adjusted alpha value is used. The most common correction is Bonferroni correction, but wastes some of the power (it is too conservative) (Sheskin 2011:914). An easily calculated alternative is the Šidák correction, which can be used to calculate the corrected alpha value for each test so that whole family of tests as a collective will have the alpha value set by the researcher (*Bonferroni correction* 2011)

Table 90: Conclusions when Repeating Hypothesis Tests

n of trials	Count of Rejected Hypothesis					
	0	1	2	3	4	5
2	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
4	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
5	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
7	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
12	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
15	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
16	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
18	More trials	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
20	More trials	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
24	Keep H0	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
28	Keep H0	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
30	Keep H0	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
35	Keep H0	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0	Reject H0
40	Keep H0	More trials	More trials	More trials	Reject H0	Reject H0

Interpretation of Table 90: Given 16 tests, two rejections are needed before we can reject H0; one rejection requires us to conclude that more trials are needed; and with no rejections, we cannot reject H0. Given 18 tests, three rejections are needed before we can reject H0. Given that, it is impossible to increase the number of trials, "more trials" can be interpreted as inconclusive overall result.

These conclusions are based on Test 90: Sequential test for the parameter of a Bernoulli population in (Kanji 2006). This test balances type I errors against type II errors, and allows us to make the right conclusions using multiple tests, while keeping as high power as possible.

We must preselect several values for this test. The probability for type I error for this test is set to 0.05 and type II error to 0.1.

Alpha	Propability of type I error	0.05
Beta	Propability of type II error	0.1
P0	true proportion rejections lower limit	0.001
P1	true proportion rejections upper limit	0.1

False Assumptions

Dominant Bias Assumption

The next tables (Table 91 - Table 92) are from NEPS95, and show how party preference is influenced by cultural combination. Common for these is that cultural bias combinations with less than 10 respondents in each sample or with less than 20 respondents in both samples together, have been removed.

The variables used are CultBiasTriA1 for the first bias, and called Rem_Dominant_CultRankTriA2 for the second ranked bias. The second ranked bias is not constructed from ranks directly, but by removing the first letter from CultBiasTriA2, which leaves us with an indicator for the second ranked bias, with same missing as CultBiasTriA2, which is needed for the comparison of percent explained variance in Table 55 (on page 443). The party preference variable includes only expressed party preferences. Respondents who do not express a preference to one of the given party alternatives or who reply that that they would not vote are excluded. The difference is that in Table 55 also small combinations (n<10) are included.

Table 91 and Table 92 are examples of the tables that are the basis for calculating the percent explained variance. The uncertainty coefficient for the se tables is give below.

		Uncertainty Coefficent	*Approx. Sign.*
Table 91	Environmental organisation member sample	.177	.000
Table 92	General Population Sample	.233	.000

In Table 91 we can see how party preference in the environmentalist sample is influenced by cultural bias combinations. For example, 48.1 percent of those who's strongest bias is rejection of egalitarianism vote for Høyre (on the row e total), and if we add support for individualism as the second bias, a whole 62 percent of respondents vote for Høyre (on the row *eI*). If we combine rejection of individualism with indifference to all the other biases, a whole 30.8 percent of the environmentalists would vote for Frp. Similarly, if the dominant bias is rejection of hierarchy, combined with rejection of individualism 24.4 percent of the respondents would vote for RV

Table 91: Party Preference by the Two Strongest CB. Env Org Sample from NEPS95. (Row percent.)

First ranked CB	Second Ranked CB	RV	SV	DNA	Sp	V	Krf	H	Frp	Other	Total	Count
		Vote if today										
			SocL	SocD	Agr	Lib	Chr	Cons	Prog	Oth	Total	
e		0.0	0.0	15.4	7.7	7.7	7.7	23.1	30.8	7.7	100	13
	f	0.0	0.0	25.0	12.5	6.3	0.0	50.0	0.0	6.3	100	16
	F	0.0	0.0	18.8	18.8	18.8	0.0	25.0	18.8	0.0	100	16
	h	0.0	5.6	22.2	5.6	0.0	0.0	55.6	5.6	5.6	100	18
	H	0.0	0.0	5.9	11.8	5.9	0.0	58.8	11.8	5.9	100	17
	I	0.0	0.0	20.8	12.5	0.0	0.0	62.5	4.2	0.0	100	24
	Total	0.0	1.0	18.3	11.5	5.8	1.0	48.1	10.6	3.8	100	104
E		4.3	8.7	30.4	13.0	30.4	0.0	8.7	4.3	0.0	100	23
	f	3.2	47.6	9.5	14.3	14.3	6.3	3.2	0.0	1.6	100	63
	F	0.0	41.2	5.9	17.6	23.5	0.0	0.0	11.8	0.0	100	17
	h	13.9	48.5	10.9	10.9	11.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	100	101
	H	5.3	10.5	21.1	31.6	10.5	15.8	0.0	0.0	5.3	100	19
	i	5.6	42.1	7.5	21.5	10.3	9.3	1.9	0.0	1.9	100	107
	Total	7.3	40.9	11.2	16.7	13.6	5.2	1.8	0.9	2.4	100	330
f		0.0	13.0	34.8	13.0	21.7	0.0	17.4	0.0	0.0	100	23
	e	0.0	0.0	51.9	3.7	14.8	0.0	29.6	0.0	0.0	100	27
	E	0.0	37.8	23.2	13.4	14.6	7.3	2.4	0.0	1.2	100	82
	h	1.8	33.9	25.0	5.4	16.1	1.8	14.3	0.0	1.8	100	56
	H	0.0	4.8	38.1	0.0	14.3	14.3	23.8	4.8	0.0	100	21
	i	1.9	15.1	26.4	18.9	26.4	5.7	3.8	1.9	0.0	100	53
	I	0.0	12.5	37.5	9.4	6.3	3.1	25.0	3.1	3.1	100	32
	Total	0.7	22.4	30.3	10.5	16.7	4.8	12.6	1.0	1.0	100	294
F		0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0	12.5	12.5	12.5	25.0	12.5	100	8
	e	0.0	0.0	0.0	9.1	27.3	0.0	54.5	0.0	9.1	100	11
	E	0.0	25.0	10.0	15.0	10.0	15.0	5.0	15.0	5.0	100	20
	h	13.8	13.8	10.3	10.3	10.3	0.0	6.9	17.2	17.2	100	29
	H	0.0	0.0	28.6	14.3	28.6	0.0	0.0	14.3	14.3	100	7
	i	0.0	11.8	11.8	23.5	0.0	11.8	11.8	11.8	17.6	100	17
	Total	4.3	12.0	12.0	13.0	12.0	6.5	13.0	14.1	13.0	100	92
h		5.6	22.2	22.2	11.1	22.2	0.0	11.1	5.6	0.0	100	18
	e	0.0	15.4	34.6	3.8	23.1	3.8	11.5	0.0	7.7	100	26
	E	14.9	50.5	4.8	5.3	10.6	1.1	2.1	0.5	10.1	100	188
	f	5.6	34.7	30.6	4.2	9.7	0.0	9.7	2.8	2.8	100	72
	F	14.5	25.5	5.5	9.1	12.7	0.0	14.5	1.8	16.4	100	55
	i	24.4	33.3	11.3	4.8	13.7	1.2	2.4	0.0	8.9	100	168
	Total	15.6	37.6	12.5	5.5	12.7	0.9	5.3	0.9	8.9	100	527
H		4.3	4.3	30.4	13.0	8.7	13.0	21.7	4.3	0.0	100	23
	e	0.0	0.0	20.0	10.0	0.0	10.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	100	10
	E	0.0	0.0	18.2	27.3	18.2	18.2	18.2	0.0	0.0	100	11
	f	0.0	5.0	35.0	30.0	10.0	5.0	15.0	0.0	0.0	100	20
	i	0.0	10.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	30.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	10
	Total	1.4	4.1	27.0	20.3	10.8	13.5	21.6	1.4	0.0	100	74
i		4.8	33.3	28.6	14.3	4.8	4.8	9.5	0.0	0.0	100	21
	E	7.0	28.2	12.7	25.4	9.9	9.9	4.2	1.4	1.4	100	71
	f	8.3	33.3	11.1	13.9	25.0	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	36
	h	6.2	47.7	10.8	9.2	15.4	4.6	0.0	0.0	6.2	100	65
	H	0.0	0.0	11.1	33.3	11.1	22.2	11.1	11.1	0.0	100	9
	Total	6.4	34.7	13.4	17.3	13.9	7.9	3.0	1.0	2.5	100	202
I		0.0	8.8	26.5	8.8	11.8	0.0	38.2	5.9	0.0	100	34
	e	0.0	0.0	16.7	11.1	11.1	0.0	50.0	11.1	0.0	100	18
	Total	0.0	5.8	23.1	9.6	11.5	0.0	42.3	7.7	0.0	100	52
Grand total		7.8	29.8	16.3	11.7	13.1	4.2	10.0	2.2	5.0	100	1675

Table 92: Party Preference by the Two First Ranked CB. General Sample from NEPS95. (Row percent.)

First Ranked CB	*Second Ranked CB*	*Vote if today* RV	SV SocL	DNA SocD	Sp Agr	V Lib	Krf Chr	H Cons	Frp Prog	Other Oth	*Total* Total	*Count*
e		0.0	0.0	21.4	28.6	0.0	14.3	28.6	7.1	0.0	100	14
	f	0.0	5.9	17.6	17.6	11.8	0.0	47.1	0.0	0.0	100	17
	F	0.0	0.0	20.0	30.0	0.0	10.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	100	10
	h	0.0	0.0	30.8	7.7	0.0	7.7	38.5	7.7	7.7	100	13
	H	0.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	40.0	20.0	0.0	100	10
	I	0.0	0.0	22.0	7.3	0.0	0.0	43.9	24.4	2.4	100	41
	Total	0.0	1.0	21.9	15.2	1.9	3.8	37.1	17.1	1.9	100	105
E		0.0	0.0	55.0	10.0	5.0	5.0	20.0	0.0	5.0	100	20
	f	0.0	23.5	41.2	5.9	0.0	17.6	5.9	5.9	0.0	100	17
	F	0.0	9.1	45.5	36.4	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	11
	H	0.0	33.3	44.4	11.1	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	100	9
	I	0.0	34.8	26.1	26.1	0.0	4.3	4.3	4.3	0.0	100	23
	Total	0.0	20.0	41.3	17.5	2.5	6.3	8.8	2.5	1.3	100	80
f		0.0	0.0	42.1	15.8	15.8	5.3	15.8	5.3	0.0	100	19
	e	0.0	0.0	40.9	9.1	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	100	22
	E	0.0	5.3	47.4	5.3	5.3	21.1	15.8	0.0	0.0	100	19
	h	0.0	26.1	65.2	4.3	0.0	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	100	23
	H	0.0	6.3	50.0	6.3	0.0	12.5	25.0	0.0	0.0	100	16
	i	0.0	26.3	57.9	5.3	5.3	5.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	19
	I	0.0	6.7	60.0	13.3	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	100	15
	Total	0.0	10.5	51.9	8.3	3.8	6.0	18.8	0.8	0.0	100	133
F		0.0	3.4	27.6	27.6	0.0	6.9	6.9	20.7	6.9	100	29
	e	0.0	0.0	47.8	21.7	0.0	0.0	13.0	17.4	0.0	100	23
	E	8.3	0.0	33.3	25.0	0.0	8.3	16.7	8.3	0.0	100	12
	h	0.0	7.1	50.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	7.1	7.1	14.3	100	14
	H	0.0	11.1	33.3	22.2	0.0	5.6	5.6	22.2	0.0	100	18
	i	0.0	0.0	44.4	44.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0	100	9
	Total	1.0	3.8	38.1	24.8	0.0	3.8	8.6	16.2	3.8	100	105
h		0.0	14.3	42.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	28.6	14.3	0.0	100	14
	e	0.0	7.1	28.6	14.3	0.0	7.1	35.7	7.1	0.0	100	14
	E	10.0	25.0	50.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	5.0	5.0	0.0	100	20
	f	0.0	16.0	40.0	12.0	4.0	4.0	24.0	0.0	0.0	100	25
	F	20.0	10.0	40.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	20.0	10.0	0.0	100	10
	i	5.3	36.8	21.1	5.3	5.3	15.8	5.3	0.0	5.3	100	19
	Total	4.9	19.6	37.3	5.9	2.9	4.9	18.6	4.9	1.0	100	102
H		0.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	11.1	22.2	22.2	11.1	0.0	100	9
	e	0.0	8.3	25.0	25.0	0.0	33.3	0.0	8.3	0.0	100	12
	E	0.0	0.0	53.8	30.8	3.8	11.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	26
	f	0.0	10.0	35.0	10.0	0.0	40.0	0.0	5.0	0.0	100	20
	F	0.0	0.0	48.1	25.9	3.7	14.8	3.7	3.7	0.0	100	27
	i	0.0	0.0	30.0	10.0	0.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	10
	I	0.0	0.0	33.3	25.0	0.0	12.5	20.8	8.3	0.0	100	24
	Total	0.0	2.3	39.8	21.1	2.3	23.4	6.3	4.7	0.0	100	128
i		0.0	19.0	28.6	19.0	4.8	14.3	9.5	0.0	4.8	100	21
	E	3.2	12.9	29.0	32.3	6.5	12.9	0.0	3.2	0.0	100	31
	f	5.9	17.6	58.8	5.9	0.0	11.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	100	17
	h	11.8	29.4	23.5	5.9	11.8	5.9	5.9	0.0	5.9	100	17
	H	0.0	0.0	41.7	8.3	0.0	33.3	16.7	0.0	0.0	100	12
	Total	4.1	16.3	34.7	17.3	5.1	14.3	5.1	1.0	2.0	100	98
I		4.0	4.0	52.0	6.0	2.0	2.0	22.0	8.0	0.0	100	50
	e	0.0	0.0	29.4	11.8	0.0	5.9	41.2	11.8	0.0	100	17
	Total	3.0	3.0	46.3	7.5	1.5	3.0	26.9	9.0	0.0	100	67
Grand total		1.4	9.6	39.0	15.6	2.7	9.2	15.3	6.4	0.8	100	818

Table 93: Party Prefrence by Two First Ranked Biases by Country NOS99 (Row percent)

Nordic total

First	Second	Soc.Left	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Christ.	Cons.	Progr.	Greens	Other	Total
a		2.1	34.0	23.4	4.3	8.5	19.1		4.3	4.3	100.0
		2.1	34.0	23.4	4.3	8.5	19.1		4.3	4.3	100.0
e		3.2	14.3	27.0	1.6	4.8	30.2	7.9	1.6	9.5	100.0
	f	.7	10.4	23.9	3.7	4.5	48.5	3.0	.7	4.5	100.0
	F	7.7					92.3				100.0
	h	3.4	16.9	12.4	4.5	2.2	50.6	2.2	3.4	4.5	100.0
	H		16.7	19.0	4.8	9.5	33.3	14.3		2.4	100.0
	i		20.6	29.4	2.9	5.9	23.5		2.9	14.7	100.0
	I	1.6	7.1	16.5	7.9	2.4	54.3	3.9	.8	5.5	100.0
	Total	1.8	12.2	19.7	4.6	4.0	46.2	4.4	1.4	5.8	100.0
E		13.6	30.3	16.7	4.5	6.1	7.6	12.1	3.0	6.1	100.0
	f	3.6	42.9	14.3	3.6		14.3		14.3	7.1	100.0
	F	4.7	34.9	23.3	7.0	2.3	14.0	7.0	4.7	2.3	100.0
	h	16.0	40.0	8.0	8.0		4.0		12.0	12.0	100.0
	H	22.2	33.3	16.7		9.3	7.4	1.9	1.9	7.4	100.0
	i	35.3	26.5	17.6			2.9		8.8	8.8	100.0
	I	7.0	27.9	18.6	2.3	9.3	16.3	2.3	7.0	9.3	100.0
	Total	14.7	32.8	17.1	3.4	4.8	9.6	4.4	6.1	7.2	100.0
f		3.1	23.4	25.0	3.1	7.8	25.0	3.1	6.3	3.1	100.0
	e	4.0	12.0	20.0	6.7	5.3	45.3	1.3		5.3	100.0
	E	22.2	37.0	7.4	11.1	3.7		3.7	3.7	11.1	100.0
	h	12.1	31.8	12.1	9.1	7.6	15.2		9.1	3.0	100.0
	H		42.3	30.8			15.4			11.5	100.0
	i	15.6	33.3	13.3	4.4	15.6	4.4	2.2	8.9	2.2	100.0
	I	3.8	7.5	20.8	5.7	9.4	39.6	1.9	9.4	1.9	100.0
	Total	7.9	23.9	18.5	5.9	7.6	24.4	1.7	5.6	4.5	100.0
F		5.4	21.6	18.9	5.4	8.1	23.0	8.1	2.7	6.8	100.0
	e	5.6	33.3	33.3		5.6	5.6	11.1		5.6	100.0
	E	8.1	40.7	15.1	3.5	4.7	7.0	5.8	3.5	11.6	100.0
	H	4.3	33.9	22.6	4.3	3.5	13.0	12.2	.9	5.2	100.0
	i	17.2	48.3	13.8	3.4	3.4	13.8				100.0
	I	1.7	31.0	17.2	3.4	6.9	17.2	12.1	3.4	6.9	100.0
	Total	6.1	33.7	19.2	3.9	5.3	13.9	8.9	2.1	6.8	100.0
h		6.0	26.0	16.0	8.0	6.0	12.0	6.0	4.0	16.0	100.0
	e	10.7	21.4	17.9	8.9		28.6	5.4	1.8	5.4	100.0
	E	11.5	34.4	8.2	11.5	1.6	11.5	1.6	6.6	13.1	100.0
	f	16.7	24.4	11.1	14.4	3.3	21.1	3.3	2.2	3.3	100.0
	F	25.0	16.7	16.7	8.3		16.7		8.3	8.3	100.0
	i	20.2	24.5	11.7	11.7	5.3	10.6	1.1	7.4	7.4	100.0
	I	3.2	29.0		6.5		41.9	12.9	3.2	3.2	100.0
	Total	13.7	25.9	11.7	10.9	3.0	18.5	3.8	4.6	7.9	100.0
H		7.3	25.6	15.9	4.9	14.6	22.0	2.4		7.3	100.0
	e	9.1	22.7	27.3		4.5	36.4				100.0
	E	5.8	36.0	22.1	1.2	7.0	12.8	4.7	2.3	8.1	100.0
	f	3.0	18.2	15.2	6.1	3.0	36.4	9.1	3.0	6.1	100.0
	F	1.6	30.2	23.8	1.6	9.5	20.6	9.5		3.2	100.0
	I	5.4	23.7	22.6	2.2	9.7	21.5	8.6		6.5	100.0
	Total	5.3	27.4	20.8	2.6	9.2	21.6	6.1	.8	6.1	100.0

First Ranked	*Second ranked*	*Soc.Left*	*Soc.Dem.*	*Agrar.*	*Lib.*	*Christ.*	*Cons.*	*Progr.*	*Greens*	*Other*	*Total*
i		9.6	27.4	19.2	4.1	11.0	9.6	4.1	2.7	12.3	100.0
	e	2.4	26.8	19.5	4.9	9.8	24.4		4.9	7.3	100.0
	E	28.0	33.3	11.8	3.2	2.2	4.3	4.3	10.8	2.2	100.0
	f	19.8	35.6	12.9	8.9	6.9	4.0	2.0	5.0	5.0	100.0
	F	15.6	31.3	15.6	6.3	6.3	9.4		9.4	6.3	100.0
	h	25.9	23.1	13.0	11.1	4.6	7.4		8.3	6.5	100.0
	H	10.0	40.0	15.0	10.0	15.0		5.0		5.0	100.0
	Total	19.0	30.1	14.5	7.1	6.6	7.7	2.1	6.6	6.2	100.0
I		5.6	23.3	21.1	3.3	1.1	27.8	11.1		6.7	100.0
	e	8.3	25.0	27.8	5.6	8.3	13.9	5.6		5.6	100.0
	E	11.5	30.8	3.8	3.8	3.8	26.9	15.4	3.8		100.0
	f	2.9	11.4	37.1	5.7	2.9	28.6	8.6		2.9	100.0
	F	12.5	25.0	6.3	6.3	18.8	31.3				100.0
	H	1.8	18.2	29.1	1.8	3.6	29.1	10.9	1.8	3.6	100.0
	Total	5.8	21.7	23.3	3.9	4.3	26.4	9.7	.8	4.3	100.0
Total		6.4	24.8	20.2	4.3	7.6	20.0	6.4	2.5	7.9	100.0
	e	6.5	21.0	22.2	5.6	5.2	29.8	3.2	1.2	5.2	100.0
	E	14.2	35.9	13.5	4.7	4.0	9.2	5.0	5.5	7.9	100.0
	f	9.3	22.3	18.3	7.6	4.3	27.1	3.6	3.1	4.5	100.0
	F	7.8	27.9	18.4	4.5	6.7	22.9	5.0	3.4	3.4	100.0
	h	14.9	24.7	12.2	8.3	4.2	22.2	.7	7.3	5.6	100.0
	H	6.4	29.8	22.4	3.2	5.8	17.0	9.0	1.0	5.4	100.0
	i	18.2	28.8	15.7	6.4	6.4	10.6	.8	6.4	6.8	100.0
	I	3.5	18.3	17.5	4.9	6.2	34.6	6.4	3.0	5.7	100.0
	Total	9.2	25.6	17.9	5.4	5.7	21.7	4.8	3.5	6.1	100.0

Continues on next page

Norway

First	Second	Soc.Left	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Christ.	Cons.	Progr.	Other	Total
a			54.5	9.1		18.2	18.2			100.0
	Total		54.5	9.1		18.2	18.2			100.0
e			38.5		7.7	7.7	15.4	30.8		100.0
	f		21.4		7.1	3.6	53.6	14.3		100.0
	h	5.6	22.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	44.4	11.1		100.0
	H		38.5		7.7	7.7	7.7	38.5		100.0
	i		25.0			25.0	50.0			100.0
	I		8.7		8.7	8.7	56.5	17.4		100.0
	Total	1.0	23.3	1.0	6.8	7.8	41.7	18.4		100.0
E		7.4	25.9	7.4	3.7	11.1	11.1	25.9	7.4	100.0
	F		35.7	7.1	14.3		21.4	21.4		100.0
	H	9.1	72.7			18.2				100.0
	Total	5.8	38.5	5.8	5.8	9.6	11.5	19.2	3.8	100.0
f			35.7	14.3	7.1	21.4	7.1	14.3		100.0
	e		30.0			10.0	50.0	10.0		100.0
	E	20.0	40.0		10.0	10.0		10.0	10.0	100.0
	h	9.1	36.4	18.2	9.1	18.2	9.1			100.0
	i	23.1	38.5		7.7	23.1		7.7		100.0
	I		66.7				16.7	16.7		100.0
	Total	9.4	39.1	6.3	6.3	15.6	12.5	9.4	1.6	100.0
F		5.3	36.8	5.3	5.3	15.8	5.3	26.3		100.0
	e		50.0	10.0		10.0	10.0	20.0		100.0
	E	8.3	45.8	8.3	4.2	8.3		20.8	4.2	100.0
	H		33.3	6.7		6.7	10.0	43.3		100.0
	I		45.0	5.0		5.0	10.0	35.0		100.0
	Total	2.9	40.8	6.8	1.9	8.7	6.8	31.1	1.0	100.0
h			44.4		11.1	11.1	11.1	22.2		100.0
	e	15.4	46.2	7.7			7.7	23.1		100.0
	E	21.4	42.9		7.1		7.1	7.1	14.3	100.0
	f	15.8	42.1		5.3		15.8	15.8	5.3	100.0
	i	29.4	29.4	11.8	5.9			5.9	17.6	100.0
	I	7.7	38.5				23.1	30.8		100.0
	Total	16.5	40.0	3.5	4.7	1.2	10.6	16.5	7.1	100.0
H			38.9	5.6	5.6	27.8	11.1	11.1		100.0
	E		55.0	10.0		15.0		20.0		100.0
	f		36.4			9.1	18.2	27.3	9.1	100.0
	F		25.0	6.3		18.8	12.5	37.5		100.0
	I	5.3	21.1	5.3		21.1	10.5	36.8		100.0
	Total	1.2	35.7	6.0	1.2	19.0	9.5	26.2	1.2	100.0
i		15.8	15.8	5.3	10.5	10.5	21.1	15.8	5.3	100.0
	E	25.0	25.0	25.0		5.0	5.0	15.0		100.0
	f	21.9	31.3	6.3	9.4	18.8	3.1	6.3	3.1	100.0
	h	23.3	26.7	10.0	16.7	6.7	6.7		10.0	100.0
	H	10.0	50.0		10.0	20.0		10.0		100.0
	Total	20.7	27.9	9.9	9.9	11.7	7.2	8.1	4.5	100.0
I		4.2	25.0			4.2	25.0	41.7		100.0
	e	25.0	25.0		8.3	8.3	16.7	16.7		100.0
	E	7.1	42.9			7.1	14.3	28.6		100.0
	f		22.2		11.1	11.1	22.2	33.3		100.0
	H		33.3	6.7		6.7	13.3	40.0		100.0
	Total	6.8	29.7	1.4	2.7	6.8	18.9	33.8		100.0
Total		4.5	32.5	5.2	5.2	13.6	14.3	22.7	1.9	100.0
	e	11.1	37.8	4.4	2.2	6.7	20.0	17.8		100.0
	E	12.7	42.2	8.8	2.9	7.8	3.9	17.6	3.9	100.0
	f	10.1	30.3	2.0	7.1	9.1	23.2	15.2	3.0	100.0
	F		30.0	6.7	6.7	10.0	16.7	30.0		100.0
	h	15.3	27.1	10.2	11.9	8.5	18.6	3.4	5.1	100.0
	H	2.5	41.8	3.8	2.5	10.1	7.6	31.6		100.0
	i	21.1	31.6	5.3	5.3	13.2	10.5	5.3	7.9	100.0
	I	2.5	29.6	2.5	2.5	8.6	25.9	28.4		100.0
	Total	8.2	34.1	5.2	4.9	10.0	15.3	19.9	2.3	100.0

Sweden

First	Second	Soc.Left	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Christ.	Cons.	Greens	Other	Total
a			16.7	8.3	8.3	16.7	50.0			100.0
	Total		16.7	8.3	8.3	16.7	50.0			100.0
e			16.7			33.3	33.3	16.7		100.0
	f		21.7	8.7	4.3	13.0	52.2			100.0
	F	16.7					83.3			100.0
	h	4.8	19.0		4.8		61.9	9.5		100.0
	H				20.0	40.0	40.0			100.0
	I	3.4	6.9		10.3	3.4	72.4	3.4		100.0
	Total	3.3	13.3	2.2	6.7	8.9	61.1	4.4		100.0
E		25.0	41.7	8.3	8.3			8.3	8.3	100.0
	f		85.7					14.3		100.0
	h		60.0				20.0	20.0		100.0
	H	25.0	37.5			25.0	12.5			100.0
	i	41.7	50.0					8.3		100.0
	I	7.1	21.4	7.1	7.1	28.6	21.4	7.1		100.0
	Total	19.0	44.8	3.4	3.4	10.3	8.6	8.6	1.7	100.0
f		7.1	42.9		7.1	14.3	21.4	7.1		100.0
	e		14.3		7.1	14.3	64.3			100.0
	h	9.1	50.0		13.6	4.5	13.6	9.1		100.0
	i	9.1	36.4			27.3		27.3		100.0
	I					20.0	66.7	13.3		100.0
	Total	5.3	30.3		6.6	14.5	32.9	10.5		100.0
F			20.0			30.0	40.0	10.0		100.0
	E	10.0	50.0	10.0		10.0	10.0	10.0		100.0
	H	12.0	40.0	8.0	12.0	4.0	24.0			100.0
	i	33.3	33.3	16.7	16.7					100.0
	I		22.2			33.3	22.2	22.2		100.0
	Total	10.0	35.0	6.7	6.7	13.3	21.7	6.7		100.0
h		14.3	14.3	14.3		28.6	14.3	14.3		100.0
	e		25.0				68.8		6.3	100.0
	E	8.3	25.0	16.7	8.3	8.3	16.7	8.3	8.3	100.0
	f	27.3	4.5	4.5	18.2	13.6	31.8			100.0
	F				33.3		33.3	33.3		100.0
	i	29.4	35.3			17.6	5.9	11.8		100.0
	Total	16.9	19.5	5.2	7.8	11.7	29.9	6.5	2.6	100.0
H		23.1	15.4			38.5	23.1			100.0
	e	9.1	36.4			9.1	45.5			100.0
	E		54.5	18.2		9.1	18.2			100.0
	F	10.0	40.0	20.0		10.0	20.0			100.0
	I	7.1	21.4	7.1		28.6	28.6		7.1	100.0
	Total	10.2	32.2	8.5		20.3	27.1		1.7	100.0
i	l	8.3	50.0			25.0	16.7			100.0
	e		30.0			20.0	50.0			100.0
	E	38.9	50.0		5.6	5.6				100.0
	f	27.8	44.4	5.6		5.6		16.7		100.0
	F	14.3	42.9	7.1	7.1	14.3		14.3		100.0
	h	26.7	33.3	13.3	6.7		6.7	13.3		100.0
	Total	21.8	42.5	4.6	3.4	10.3	9.2	8.0		100.0
I		11.8	41.2	11.8	5.9		29.4			100.0
	E	40.0			20.0		20.0	20.0		100.0
	f			20.0	20.0		60.0			100.0
	F	20.0	30.0		10.0	30.0	10.0			100.0
	Total	16.2	27.0	8.1	10.8	8.1	27.0	2.7		100.0
Total		10.7	31.1	4.9	3.9	18.4	25.2	4.9	1.0	100.0
	e	2.0	25.5		2.0	9.8	58.8		2.0	100.0
	E	19.6	41.1	8.9	5.4	7.1	10.7	5.4	1.8	100.0
	f	14.7	26.7	6.7	8.0	9.3	29.3	5.3		100.0
	F	14.0	30.2	7.0	7.0	14.0	20.9	7.0		100.0
	h	11.1	36.5	3.2	7.9	1.6	28.6	11.1		100.0
	H	13.2	34.2	5.3	10.5	13.2	23.7			100.0
	i	28.3	39.1	2.2	2.2	13.0	2.2	13.0		100.0
	I	3.7	12.3	2.5	4.9	18.5	49.4	7.4	1.2	100.0
	Total	12.2	29.7	4.5	5.6	12.2	29.0	6.1	.7	100.0

Denmark

First	Second	Soc.Left	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Christ.	Cons.	Progr.	Greens	Other	Total
a		8.3	41.7	33.3						16.7	100.0
	Total	8.3	41.7	33.3						16.7	100.0
e		5.6	11.1	61.1			5.6	5.6		11.1	100.0
	f	2.8	5.6	63.9	5.6	2.8	11.1			8.3	100.0
	h		20.0	45.0		5.0	20.0			10.0	100.0
	H		8.3	58.3		8.3	8.3	8.3		8.3	100.0
	i			45.5			18.2			36.4	100.0
	I		3.4	55.2			17.2	3.4		20.7	100.0
	Total	1.6	7.9	56.3	1.6	2.4	13.5	2.4		14.3	100.0
E		23.5	29.4	29.4	5.9			5.9		5.9	100.0
	F	14.3	42.9	21.4	7.1		7.1			7.1	100.0
	h	30.0	30.0	10.0	10.0				10.0	10.0	100.0
	H	30.0	10.0	40.0				10.0		10.0	100.0
	i	45.5	18.2	27.3					9.1		100.0
	I	13.3	26.7	33.3				6.7		20.0	100.0
	Total	24.7	27.3	27.3	3.9		1.3	3.9	2.6	9.1	100.0
f		8.3	8.3	50.0			8.3		8.3	16.7	100.0
	e	8.7	13.0	39.1	13.0		17.4			8.7	100.0
	E	22.2	33.3	11.1	11.1					22.2	100.0
	h	36.4	18.2	18.2		18.2				9.1	100.0
	H		37.5	50.0						12.5	100.0
	i	25.0	25.0	25.0			12.5			12.5	100.0
	I	9.1		72.7		18.2					100.0
	Total	14.6	17.1	39.0	4.9	4.9	7.3		1.2	11.0	100.0
F		10.5	21.1	36.8	10.5		5.3	5.3		10.5	100.0
	e	12.5	12.5	62.5						12.5	100.0
	E	9.1	31.8	18.2		4.5	4.5		9.1	22.7	100.0
	H	3.8	38.5	34.6				3.8		19.2	100.0
	i	14.3	71.4	14.3							100.0
	I	10.0	20.0	50.0			10.0			10.0	100.0
	Total	8.7	31.5	33.7	2.2	1.1	3.3	2.2	2.2	15.2	100.0
h		14.3	7.1	28.6	21.4			7.1		21.4	100.0
	e	21.1	5.3	42.1	21.1		5.3			5.3	100.0
	E	11.1	22.2	22.2	11.1					33.3	100.0
	f	22.2	22.2	25.9	18.5		7.4		3.7		100.0
	F	33.3	22.2	22.2			11.1			11.1	100.0
	i	25.0	20.8	25.0	12.5		4.2		4.2	8.3	100.0
	Total	21.6	16.7	28.4	15.7		4.9	1.0	2.0	9.8	100.0
H		12.5	37.5	25.0			6.3			18.8	100.0
	e	9.1	9.1	54.5			27.3				100.0
	E	17.4	26.1	30.4			4.3			21.7	100.0
	F		28.6	42.9	7.1	7.1	14.3				100.0
	I	6.9	31.0	34.5		3.4	6.9	3.4		13.8	100.0
	Total	9.7	28.0	35.5	1.1	2.2	9.7	1.1		12.9	100.0
i		8.7	21.7	43.5		8.7				17.4	100.0
	e		36.4	45.5	9.1	9.1					100.0
	E	50.0	17.9	14.3			3.6	3.6	10.7		100.0
	f	30.0	45.0	15.0	5.0					5.0	100.0
	h	45.5	15.2	9.1	12.1		3.0		12.1	3.0	100.0
	Total	32.2	24.3	21.7	5.2	2.6	1.7	.9	6.1	5.2	100.0
I		4.5	22.7	59.1						13.6	100.0
	e		21.4	64.3	7.1	7.1					100.0
	f	9.1	9.1	81.8							100.0
	H	8.3	16.7	41.7	8.3		16.7			8.3	100.0
	Total	5.1	18.6	61.0	3.4	1.7	3.4			6.8	100.0
Total		10.5	22.2	41.8	3.9	1.3	2.6	2.6	.7	14.4	100.0
	e	9.3	15.1	48.8	10.5	2.3	9.3			4.7	100.0
	E	25.3	25.3	19.8	2.2	1.1	3.3	1.1	5.5	16.5	100.0
	f	14.9	19.1	44.7	8.5	1.1	6.4		1.1	4.3	100.0
	F	13.5	32.4	29.7	5.4	2.7	10.8			5.4	100.0
	h	29.7	18.9	20.3	6.8	4.1	6.8		6.8	6.8	100.0
	H	7.4	25.0	42.6	1.5	1.5	4.4	4.4		13.2	100.0
	i	23.0	23.0	27.9	4.9		6.6		3.3	11.5	100.0
	I	6.4	17.0	46.8		3.2	8.5	3.2		14.9	100.0
	Total	14.9	21.2	37.2	4.7	1.8	5.9	1.5	1.8	10.8	100.0

Finland

First	Second	Soc.Left	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Christ.	Cons.	Greens	Other	Total
a			25.0	41.7	8.3		8.3	16.7		100.0
	Total		25.0	41.7	8.3		8.3	16.7		100.0
e		5.6	5.6	33.3			33.3		22.2	100.0
	f		3.3	23.3		3.3	56.7	3.3	10.0	100.0
	h	5.0	10.0	5.0	10.0		55.0	5.0	10.0	100.0
	i		40.0	20.0	10.0		20.0		10.0	100.0
	I	4.0	12.0	20.0	16.0		44.0		4.0	100.0
	Total	2.9	10.7	20.4	6.8	1.0	45.6	1.9	10.7	100.0
E			50.0	25.0		25.0				100.0
	f	10.0	30.0	20.0	10.0		10.0	10.0	10.0	100.0
	F		33.3	55.6		11.1				100.0
	h	10.0	40.0	10.0	10.0			10.0	20.0	100.0
	H	40.0	6.7	20.0		6.7	6.7		20.0	100.0
	i	22.2		33.3			11.1	11.1	22.2	100.0
	I		33.3	33.3			16.7		16.7	100.0
	Total	15.9	23.8	27.0	3.2	4.8	6.3	4.8	14.3	100.0
f				33.3			44.4	22.2		100.0
	e	7.7	7.7	23.1		7.7	38.5		15.4	100.0
	E	25.0	37.5	12.5	12.5			12.5		100.0
	h	8.3	25.0	8.3	16.7		8.3	25.0	8.3	100.0
	H		36.4	27.3			18.2		18.2	100.0
	i	7.7	30.8	30.8	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7		100.0
	I	10.0		10.0	30.0		10.0	30.0	10.0	100.0
	Total	7.9	19.7	21.1	9.2	2.6	18.4	13.2	7.9	100.0
F		6.7	20.0	26.7			26.7		20.0	100.0
	E	11.1	38.9	22.2	5.6				22.2	100.0
	H	6.3	25.0	37.5	12.5	6.3		6.3	6.3	100.0
	i	33.3	16.7	16.7		16.7	16.7			100.0
	I		9.1	18.2	18.2		27.3		27.3	100.0
	Total	9.1	24.2	25.8	7.6	3.0	12.1	1.5	16.7	100.0
h			10.0	30.0			10.0	10.0	40.0	100.0
	e		12.5	12.5	12.5		37.5	12.5	12.5	100.0
	E	18.2		9.1	36.4			18.2	18.2	100.0
	f		7.7	15.4	23.1		38.5	7.7	7.7	100.0
	i	12.5	8.3	12.5	29.2	8.3	8.3	16.7	4.2	100.0
	I				33.3		50.0	16.7		100.0
	Total	6.9	6.9	13.9	23.6	2.8	19.4	13.9	12.5	100.0
H		5.6	16.7	27.8	16.7	11.1	5.6		16.7	100.0
	E	4.8	23.8	28.6	4.8	9.5	23.8	4.8		100.0
	f	10.0		20.0	10.0		40.0	10.0	10.0	100.0
	F		23.1	38.5		7.7	15.4		15.4	100.0
	I	4.5	13.6	36.4	9.1		31.8		4.5	100.0
	Total	4.8	16.7	31.0	8.3	6.0	22.6	2.4	8.3	100.0
i		8.3	33.3	8.3	8.3	8.3		8.3	25.0	100.0
	e	6.7	13.3	20.0	6.7	6.7	26.7		20.0	100.0
	E		40.0		20.0			20.0	20.0	100.0
	f	13.3	13.3	20.0	33.3		6.7		13.3	100.0
	F	30.0	10.0	30.0	10.0				20.0	100.0
	h	10.0	15.0	25.0	10.0	15.0	5.0	15.0	5.0	100.0
	H	10.0	30.0	30.0	10.0	10.0			10.0	100.0
	Total	10.9	20.7	19.6	14.1	6.5	6.5	6.5	15.2	100.0
I		7.1	14.3	21.4	14.3		21.4		21.4	100.0
	e		30.0	10.0		10.0	30.0		20.0	100.0
	f		10.0	30.0			50.0		10.0	100.0
	H		12.5	43.8		6.3	25.0	6.3	6.3	100.0
	Total	2.0	16.0	28.0	4.0	4.0	30.0	2.0	14.0	100.0
Total		4.5	17.0	27.7	6.3	3.6	17.9	5.4	17.9	100.0
	e	4.3	15.2	17.4	4.3	6.5	32.6	2.2	17.4	100.0
	E	10.3	27.9	17.6	13.2	2.9	7.4	8.8	11.8	100.0
	f	4.5	9.1	21.6	11.4	1.1	37.5	4.5	10.2	100.0
	F	9.4	21.9	40.6	3.1	6.3	6.3		12.5	100.0
	h	8.1	19.4	12.9	11.3	4.8	21.0	12.9	9.7	100.0
	H	11.8	20.6	32.4	4.4	5.9	10.3	2.9	11.8	100.0
	i	12.9	17.7	21.0	14.5	6.5	11.3	9.7	6.5	100.0
	I	3.8	11.3	22.5	16.3		32.5	5.0	8.8	100.0
	Total	7.3	17.2	23.3	9.9	3.7	20.7	6.0	12.0	100.0

Iceland

First	Second	Soc.Dem.	Agrar.	Lib.	Cons.	Greens	Other	Total
e					100.0			100.0
	f				100.0			100.0
	F				100.0			100.0
	h	10.0			90.0			100.0
	H	8.3	8.3		83.3			100.0
	i	20.0	60.0			20.0		100.0
	I	4.8		4.8	90.5			100.0
	Total	5.0	5.0	1.3	87.5	1.3		100.0
E		16.7	33.3		33.3	16.7		100.0
	f	27.3	18.2		27.3	18.2	9.1	100.0
	F	16.7	16.7		33.3	33.3		100.0
	H	50.0	20.0		20.0	10.0		100.0
	i	50.0					50.0	100.0
	I	37.5			37.5	25.0		100.0
	Total	32.6	16.3		27.9	18.6	4.7	100.0
f		20.0	33.3		46.7			100.0
	e		20.0	6.7	73.3			100.0
	h	10.0	30.0		50.0	10.0		100.0
	H	57.1	14.3		28.6			100.0
	I		18.2		81.8			100.0
	Total	13.8	24.1	1.7	58.6	1.7		100.0
F			18.2	9.1	63.6	9.1		100.0
	E	41.7	16.7	8.3	33.3			100.0
	H	27.8	38.9		33.3			100.0
	i	60.0	10.0		30.0			100.0
	I	50.0	25.0		25.0			100.0
	Total	33.9	23.7	3.4	37.3	1.7		100.0
h		60.0			30.0		10.0	100.0
	E	66.7			26.7	6.7		100.0
	f	66.7			22.2		11.1	100.0
	i	41.7			50.0		8.3	100.0
	I	33.3			58.3		8.3	100.0
	Total	53.4			37.9	1.7	6.9	100.0
H		17.6	17.6		64.7			100.0
	E	27.3	18.2		27.3	9.1	18.2	100.0
	f	16.7	25.0	8.3	50.0			100.0
	F	40.0	10.0		50.0			100.0
	I	33.3	11.1		55.6			100.0
	Total	25.4	16.9	1.7	50.8	1.7	3.4	100.0
i		28.6	28.6		14.3	14.3	14.3	100.0
	e	40.0			20.0	40.0		100.0
	E	47.1	11.8		11.8	29.4		100.0
	f	43.8	25.0		12.5	12.5	6.3	100.0
	F	37.5	12.5		37.5	12.5		100.0
	h	40.0	10.0		30.0		20.0	100.0
	Total	41.3	15.9		19.0	17.5	6.3	100.0
I		7.7	7.7		84.6			100.0
	E	28.6	14.3		57.1			100.0
	F	16.7	16.7		66.7			100.0
	H	8.3	25.0		66.7			100.0
	Total	13.2	15.8		71.1			100.0
Total		18.4	17.2	1.1	57.5	3.4	2.3	100.0
	e	10.0	15.0	5.0	60.0	10.0		100.0
	E	45.2	11.3	1.6	27.4	11.3	3.2	100.0
	f	27.7	13.8	1.5	46.2	6.2	4.6	100.0
	F	24.3	10.8		56.8	8.1		100.0
	h	20.0	13.3		56.7	3.3	6.7	100.0
	H	27.1	23.7		47.5	1.7		100.0
	i	44.8	13.8		31.0	3.4	6.9	100.0
	I	21.7	7.2	1.4	65.2	2.9	1.4	100.0
	Total	26.9	14.2	1.1	50.0	5.2	2.6	100.0

Independency of Effects Assumption

Table 94: Percent Party Preference Explained by Change of Order of CB pair. NOS99.

Country	*Table Number*	*Percent variance explained by change of rank*	*Asymp. Std. Error*	*Approx. Sig.*	*Test of H11a*
Denmark	*eh-he*	13.0	3.53	.010	Reject
	eI-Ie	15.0	3.30	.009	Reject
	ei-ie	25.6	3.03	.005	Reject
	ef-fe	3.4	2.55	.448	Keep
	EH-HE	5.2	3.45	.374	Keep
	Ei-iE	1.9	1.78	.840	Keep
	EF-FE	5.5	2.65	.441	Keep
	hi-ih	3.1	2.43	.425	Keep
	fi-if	5.6	3.93	.470	Keep
	HI-IH	4.2	2.56	.578	Keep
	If-fI	12.4	4.77	.239	Keep
	fh-hf	10.1	2.92	.056	Keep
	FH-HF	12.3	2.67	.038	Reject
	N	13	13	13	
Finland	*eh-he*	2.2	2.69	.924	Keep
	eI-Ie	8.6	3.87	.134	Keep
	ei-ie	5.0	3.61	.626	Keep
	ef-fe	3.9	2.75	.592	Keep
	EH-HE	12.6	4.39	.017	Reject
	Ei-iE	23.8	3.94	.010	Reject
	EF-FE	12.5	4.16	.081	Keep
	hi-ih	2.4	2.25	.760	Keep
	Fi-iF	12.8	4.49	.306	Keep
	fi-if	9.1	3.98	.220	Keep
	HI-IH	5.9	2.21	.421	Keep
	If-fI	21.1	5.77	.020	Reject
	fH-Hf	15.0	4.39	.092	Keep
	fh-hf	7.5	4.82	.331	Keep
	FH-HF	8.5	2.81	.284	Keep
	N	15	15	15	
Iceland	*ei-ie*	23.7	9.24	.101	Keep
	ef-fe	23.5	6.17	.035	Reject
	EH-HE	5.5	3.88	.488	Keep
	EI-IE	12.6	5.61	.218	Keep
	Ei-iE	12.8	7.63	.164	Keep
	EF-FE	11.7	5.96	.195	Keep
	hi-ih	5.3	4.79	.445	Keep
	Fi-iF	5.4	5.00	.535	Keep
	HI-IH	6.1	7.43	.307	Keep
	fH-Hf	8.4	7.36	.275	Keep
	fh-hf	24.0	8.25	.016	Reject
	FH-HF	4.8	5.11	.229	Keep
	N	12	12	12	

Norway	*eh-he*	8.9	4.74	.168	Keep
	eI-Ie	10.2	4.64	.047	Reject
	ef-fe	2.2	2.11	.722	Keep
	EH-HE	10.9	3.20	.102	Keep
	EF-FE	9.2	2.93	.103	Keep
	hi-ih	4.3	1.97	.385	Keep
	fi-if	1.9	1.02	.884	Keep
	HI-IH	2.9	2.68	.695	Keep
	If-fI	10.1	7.14	.375	Keep
	fh-hf	11.5	3.38	.089	Keep
	FH-HF	1.3	2.06	.789	Keep
	N	11	11	11	
Sweden	*eh-he*	8.2	2.55	.267	Keep
	ef-fe	2.8	2.15	.641	Keep
	EH-HE	12.6	5.41	.149	Keep
	EI-IE	11.3	5.19	.235	Keep
	Ei-iE	6.2	2.76	.421	Keep
	hi-ih	7.9	2.55	.211	Keep
	Fi-iF	6.8	4.10	.501	Keep
	fi-if	6.1	4.68	.288	Keep
	If-fI	19.3	5.57	.076	Keep
	fh-hf	12.3	4.38	.004	Reject
	FH-HF	3.0	2.29	.652	Keep
	N	11	11	11	
Total	*eh-he*	2.5	1.29	.132	Keep
	eI-Ie	5.1	1.83	.001	Reject
	ei-ie	1.5	1.29	.787	Keep
	ef-fe	.8	.66	.699	Keep
	EH-HE	2.1	1.21	.219	Keep
	EI-IE	4.9	2.13	.105	Keep
	Ei-iE	2.2	.98	.290	Keep
	EF-FE	1.7	1.11	.421	Keep
	hi-ih	.4	.37	.927	Keep
	Fi-iF	3.9	1.73	.300	Keep
	fi-if	.9	.80	.768	Keep
	HI-IH	1.4	.90	.463	Keep
	If-fI	3.8	1.70	.157	Keep
	fH-Hf	8.3	2.76	.032	Reject
	fh-hf	1.8	.94	.194	Keep
	FH-HF	1.2	.81	.458	Keep
	N	16	16	16	
Total	78	78	78	78	

What is Rejection of A Cultural Bias?

Table 95: Count of Respondents in Cultural Space by Country. NOS99.

			Reject I			*indiff*			*Support I*		
	Hierarchy	Fatalism	*Reject E*	*Indiff*	*Supp. E*	*Reject E*	*indiff*	*Supp. E*	*Reject E*	*indiff*	*Supp. E*
N	Reject H	Reject F	37	26	32	25	11	10	22	14	7
		Indiff	16	11	17	13	8	3	12	6	5
		Supp. F	8	8	8	7	4	5	9	4	4
	Indiff	Reject F	12	9	19	12	11	7	13	3	4
		Indiff	11	7	8	12	11	5	16	16	7
		Supp. F	7	8	14	12	13	12	10	7	16
	Supp. H	Reject F	4	5	8	8	11	3	7	1	9
		indiff	6	6	9	7	8	11	14	11	23
		Supp. F	6	12	16	5	16	23	16	30	49
D	Reject H	Reject F	29	31	30	22	9	10	22	8	4
		Indiff	10	9	13	9	6	9	15	4	7
		Supp. F	13	8	7	7	5	6	10	8	4
	Indiff	Reject F	13	8	7	19	6	6	20	9	4
		Indiff	5	9	14	10	12	11	14	5	10
		Supp. F	9	13	15	8	9	7	6	12	11
	Supp. H	Reject F	5	3	3	5	2	4	20	7	8
		indiff	3	8	8	8	15	16	11	6	14
		Supp. F	3	14	19	4	21	25	19	14	36
S	Reject H	Reject F	34	29	29	23	14	5	19	9	4
		Indiff	13	11	26	9	8	8	13	5	5
		Supp. F	15	10	11	12	8	9	3	5	4
	Indiff	Reject F	7	12	14	18	9	4	22	11	6
		Indiff	11	8	6	14	13	11	16	11	7
		Supp. F	3	10	18	10	11	4	7	9	4
	Supp. H	Reject F	5	3	3	4	2	8	19	7	10
		indiff	7	6	13	8	8	4	18	17	10
		Supp. F	8	7	11	4	10	36	14	26	56
F	Reject H	Reject F	28	22	19	24	9	8	29	8	4
		Indiff	20	15	11	8	9	10	11	7	6
		Supp. F	10	9	15	14	5	11	13	3	4
	Indiff	Reject F	15	13	6	16	12	8	11	7	6
		Indiff	14	15	4	11	12	10	15	6	8
		Supp. F	4	11	11	6	12	7	8	5	14
	Supp. H	Reject F	6	3	14	7	7	6	10	13	15
		indiff	6	6	9	6	9	10	6	12	21
		Supp. F	3	13	20	7	12	17	16	15	50
I	Reject H	Reject F	14	15	22	18	6	10	28	6	3
		Indiff	17	8	7	7	9	8	15	7	6
		Supp. F	10	6	7	8	6	12	7	8	9
	Indiff	Reject F	4	9	9	12	7	6	21	6	5
		Indiff	12	7	8	9	7	9	10	5	4
		Supp. F	5	13	12	7	10	16	4	9	14
	Supp. H	Reject F	7	5	8	4	9	9	14	3	16
		indiff	7	6	11	9	11	7	6	12	16
		Supp. F	7	10	12	13	18	11	5	9	32

4481 respondents with four valid cultural biases and a valid response to the party preference question are included.

Table 96: Count of Respondents in Cultural Space by Sample. NEPS95.

			Reject I			*indiff*			*Support I*		
	Hierarchy	Fatalism	*Reject E*	*Indiff*	*Supp. E*	*Reject E*	*indiff*	*Supp. E*	*Reject E*	*indiff*	*Supp. E*
Env Org	Reject H	Reject	14	38	240	20	28	45	27	9	12
		Indiff	16	43	220	14	16	46	22	2	10
		Supp.	18	37	241	17	15	29	13	11	5
	Indiff	Reject	10	21	73	16	21	30	22	19	10
		Indiff	8	10	41	11	9	11	15	9	5
		Supp.	5	9	33	8	6	6	4	2	4
	Supp. H	Reject	3	15	41	8	12	15	24	11	7
		indiff	4	6	24	9	7	8	14	3	6
		Supp.	4	3	22	4	8	6	10	3	2
General	Reject H	Reject	5	14	38	12	10	9	20	12	5
		Indiff	8	6	32	7	9	8	12	6	6
		Supp.	10	16	23	15	5	8	15	9	0
	Indiff	Reject	8	9	22	12	17	8	14	7	2
		Indiff	5	6	14	11	8	9	13	6	6
		Supp.	8	3	14	9	13	7	23	8	7
	Supp. H	Reject	10	7	12	9	12	12	20	7	7
		indiff	1	9	11	7	10	8	23	15	15
		Supp.	4	10	12	12	16	15	24	17	14

2813 respondents with four valid cultural biases and valid response to the party preference

Table 97: References by Original Year of Publication

	Frequency	*Valid Percent*
<= 1949	6	1,2
1950 - 1979	33	6,8
1980 - 1984	31	6,4
1985 - 1989	28	5,8
1990 - 1994	68	14,0
1995 - 1999	110	22,7
2000 - 2004	89	18,4
2005+	120	24,7
Total	485	100,0
Missing	1	
Total	486	

In Table 97, we can see that 43 per cent of the referenced material is originally published year 2000 or later. In text, the references are to the edition of the work I happened to have at hand. The original year of publishing is included in the list of references. For example, (Douglas 1996c) is a new edition of a book first published in 1979. In the list of references it is presented as

Douglas 1996c. *The world of goods*. 2 ed. London: Routledge. Original publ. 1979.

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