dc.contributor.author | Ghandour, Ziad | |
dc.contributor.author | Siciliani, Luigi | |
dc.contributor.author | Straume, Odd Rune | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2023-03-29T11:49:39Z | |
dc.date.available | 2023-03-29T11:49:39Z | |
dc.date.created | 2022-05-11T10:11:05Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2022 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0167-6296 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3060897 | |
dc.description.abstract | We study the strategic relationship between hospital investment and provision of service quality. We use a spatial competition framework and allow investment and quality to be complements or substitutes in patient benefit and provider cost. We assume that each hospital commits to a certain investment before deciding on service quality, and that investment is observable and contractible while quality is observable but not contractible. We show that, under a fixed DRG-pricing system, providers’ lack of ability to commit to quality leads to under- or overinvestment, relative to the first-best solution. Underinvestment arises when the price-cost margin is positive, and quality and investments are strategic complements, which has implications for optimal contracting. Differently from the simultaneous-move case, the regulator must complement the payment with one more instrument to address under/overinvestment. We also analyse the welfare effects of different policy options (separate payment for investment, higher per-treatment prices, or DRG-refinement policies). | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Investment and quality competition in healthcare markets | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2022 The Author(s) | en_US |
dc.source.articlenumber | 102588 | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 2 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2022.102588 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 2023347 | |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Health Economics | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Health Economics. 2022, 82, 102588. | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 82 | en_US |