Dynamic Simulation Model of Common Pool Resource Cooperation Experiments

Abstract

We investigate the decision rules adopted by individuals in local communities, whoselivelihoods depend on common pool resource stocks and who face the cooperationdilemma in their everyday life. For this purpose, field experiments are modeled and themodel structure and output are confronted with experimental data and with the relevanttheory of collective action proposed by Ostrom (1998). The field experiments analyzethe cooperative action among coastal communities in Providence Island (ColombianCaribbean Sea). The simulation model is built according to the principles and methodsof System Dynamics. The model formalizes the feedback causality among reputation,trust and reciprocity as suggested by Ostrom (1998). Moreover, based on the payoffstructure used in the experiments, it considers other behavioral factors such astemptation to free ride, profit maximization, and awareness of the individuals infeedback perspective. Depending on the initial conditions and parameter values, modelbehavior replicates major patterns of the experimental data. It reveals path dependentcharacteristic to the initial trust of the individuals in the group. The variables anddecision rules built into the model structure provide the basis for a dialogue between thetheories of collective action and future experimental designs to test and improve suchtheories.