Opprør, infiltrasjon og intervensjon. Korleis FN og UNOGIL medverka til at den libanesiske krisa i 1958 vart løyst.

Abstract

Den 11. juni 1958 vedtok Tryggingsrådet i FN og sende United Nation Observation Group In Lebanon (UNOGIL) til Libanon for å overvake grensa mellom Libanon og Syria. Avgjersla var grunna ein klage som den libanesiske regjeringa sendte til rådet to veker før. Libanesarane hevda at United Arab Republic (UAR) smugla våpen og sendte soldatar over grensa for å støtte opposisjonen i Libanon som hadde teke til våpen våren 1958. Avhandlinga freistar å fulle att eit hol i diskursen om kva rolle UNOGIL og FN spelte i å løyse den libanesiske krisa.

On the 11th of June 1958 the United Nation Security Council decided to dispatch an observation group; United Nation Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), ( ) so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders." The decision was due to a complaint by the Government of Lebanon, who blamed the United Arab Republic (UAR) for intervening in Lebanon's internal affairs. The UAR was accused of smuggling arms and infiltrating irregular soldiers to support the Lebanese opposition who at that time was waging war against their own government. This thesis aims to answer the broad question: How did Dag Hammarskjöld's silent diplomacy and UNOGIL's presence, -nationally and internationally respectively, contribute to the solution of the Lebanese crisis in 1958? Earlier studies tend to emphasis the American intervention on the 15th of July, or the succeeding American diplomatic effort as the most significant contribution in solving the crisis. The objective of this thesis is hence to fill the gap in the discourse regarding UN and UNOGIL's role in solving the conflict. The crisis in Lebanon can be divided into two phases, separated by the landing of US forces in Beirut. In the first phase UN and UNOGIL was implementing the resolution of the 11th of June in order to put an end to the infiltration. Mr. Hammarskjöld conducted his silent diplomacy and managed to get UAR to withdraw their support, while UNOGIL presences had a positive effect on the quantity of infiltration. When the US Marines intervened, the internal conflict in Lebanon was already coming to an end, making the American forces part of the problem rather then the solution. This second phase of the crisis had a more international character, and was subject to debate in a Special Emergency Session in the UN General Assembly, where USSR demanded the immediately withdrawal of US forces. With a new resolution of the 21th of August, Mr. Hammarskjöld and UNOGIL managed to secure Lebanon's integrity and independence while arranging for the withdrawal of American forces. Magnus Eldøy (b. 1984) is a student of Middle Eastern history at the University in Bergen. This thesis was completed in the spring of 2010.