Konferansen for sikkerhet og samarbeid i Europa og britisk politikk

Abstract

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its Final Act in Helsinki in August 1975 also comprising the non-aligned and neutral states in Europe, led to rapprochement between East and West. As a result, the Eastern Bloc obtained its primary goal: recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe through the principle of inviolability of frontiers. However, the Soviet Union was forced to accept the principle of peaceful change of frontiers, chiefly pursued by West Germany, which refused to accept any provision which would hinder the possibility of reunification of Germany. Moreover, the Soviets also had to accept, as a part of signing the Final Act, human rights as a legitimate part of international relations. A decisive precondition for this multilateral phase of Détente was the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany with her Ostpolitik had established new and constructive relations with her neighbours in Eastern Europe and Soviet. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger sought to improve the US relationship with the USSR based on cooperation, not confrontation." Together with Brandt's Ostpolitik, Nixon's Linkage politics laid the foundations for the CSCE. In this Masters thesis I examine the driving forces behind the CSCE, with a main focus on the British policy towards the signing of the Final Act. Britain, in concert with West Germany and France, formed a powerful partnership through the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Taking the lead from NATO, EPC shaped the CSCE agenda by extracting important concessions from the Soviet Union. Thorough preparations, willingness to coordinate and strong unity constituted the main factors for Western success. British policy was very effective in keeping the alliance together, out of which came a clear advantage for the West.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), with its Final Act in Helsinki in August 1975 also comprising the non-aligned and neutral states in Europe, led to rapprochement between East and West. As a result, the Eastern Bloc obtained its primary goal: recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe through the principle of inviolability of frontiers. However, the Soviet Union was forced to accept the principle of peaceful change of frontiers, chiefly pursued by West Germany, which refused to accept any provision which would hinder the possibility of reunification of Germany. Moreover, the Soviets also had to accept, as a part of signing the Final Act, human rights as a legitimate part of international relations. A decisive precondition for this multilateral phase of Détente was the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany with her Ostpolitik had established new and constructive relations with her neighbours in Eastern Europe and Soviet. Simultaneously, Nixon and Kissinger sought to improve the US relationship with the USSR based on cooperation, not confrontation." Together with Brandt's Ostpolitik, Nixon's Linkage politics laid the foundations for the CSCE. In this Masters thesis I examine the driving forces behind the CSCE, with a main focus on the British policy towards the signing of the Final Act. Britain, in concert with West Germany and France, formed a powerful partnership through the European Political Cooperation (EPC). Taking the lead from NATO, EPC shaped the CSCE agenda by extracting important concessions from the Soviet Union. Thorough preparations, willingness to coordinate and strong unity constituted the main factors for Western success. British policy was very effective in keeping the alliance together, out of which came a clear advantage for the West.