dc.contributor.author | Abyaneh, Mohammad Reza Sohizadeh | eng |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-10-10T13:36:28Z | |
dc.date.available | 2012-10-10T13:36:28Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | eng |
dc.identifier.issn | 0302-9743 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1956/6109 | |
dc.description.abstract | Recently, Alomair et al. proposed the first Un- Conditionally Secure mutual authentication protocol for lowcost RFID systems(UCS-RFID). The security of the UCSRFID relies on five dynamic secret keys which are updated at every protocol run using a fresh random number (nonce) secretly transmitted from a reader to tags. Our results show that, at the highest security level of the protocol (security parameter= 256), inferring a nonce is feasible with the probability of 0.99 by eavesdropping(observing) about 90 runs of the protocol. Finding a nonce enables a passive attacker to recover all five secret keys of the protocol. To do so, we propose a three-phase probabilistic approach in this paper. Our attack recovers the secret keys with a probability that increases by accessing more protocol runs. We also show that tracing a tag using this protocol is also possible even with less runs of the protocol. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.subject | RFID | eng |
dc.subject | Authentication Protocol | eng |
dc.subject | Passive Attack | eng |
dc.title | Passive Cryptanalysis of the UnConditionally Secure Authentication Protocol for RFID Systems | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | |
dc.description.version | Draft | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/978-3-642-24209-0_6 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1042436 | |
dc.source.journal | Lecture Notes in Computer Science | |
dc.source.pagenumber | 92–103 | |
dc.source.volume | 6829 | |