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dc.contributor.authorMacpherson, Elizabeth
dc.contributor.authorBorchgrevink, Axel
dc.contributor.authorRanjan, Rahul
dc.contributor.authorVallejo Piedrahita, Catalina
dc.description.abstractLaws that recognise rivers and their ecosystems as legal persons or subjects with their own rights, duties and obligations have been associated with theories of environmental constitutionalism. However, the extent to, and manner in which, constitutional law (with its elevated status) has been instrumental in the conferral of these ‘riverine rights’ is still not well-understood. In this article, we consider the constitutional relevance of the recognition of rivers as legal persons or subjects in Aotearoa New Zealand, Colombia and India. We argue that in these three countries riverine rights are constitutional experiments: as small-scale, ad hoc and ultimately incomplete attempts to transcend seemingly ineffective regulatory frameworks for rivers. However, they are also incremental, and influential, steps in a broader project of more fundamental social and environmental reform.en_US
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_US
dc.rightsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.titleWhere ordinary laws fall short: ‘riverine rights’ and constitutionalismen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2021 the authorsen_US
dc.source.journalGriffith Law Reviewen_US
dc.identifier.citationGriffith Law Review. 2021.en_US

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Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal
Med mindre annet er angitt, så er denne innførselen lisensiert som Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internasjonal