Conflictual Accountability: Behavioral Responses to Conflictual Accountability of Agencies
Schillemans, Thomas; Overman, Sjors; Fawcett, Paul; Flinders, Matthew; Fredriksson, Magnus; Lægreid, Per; Maggetti, Martino; Papadopoulos, Yannis; Rubecksen, Kristin; Rykkja, Lise H.; Salomonsen, Heidi Houlberg; Smullen, Amanda; Verhoest, Koen; Wood, Matthew
Journal article, Peer reviewed
Published version
Åpne
Permanent lenke
https://hdl.handle.net/11250/2839015Utgivelsesdato
2021Metadata
Vis full innførselSamlinger
- Department of Government [480]
- Registrations from Cristin [10714]
Sammendrag
In contemporary public governance, leaders of public organizations are faced with multiple, and oftentimes conflictual, accountability claims. Drawing upon a survey of CEO’s of agencies in seven countries, we explore whether and how conflictual accountability regimes relate to strategic behaviors by agency-CEO’s and their political principals. The presence of conflictual accountability is experienced as a major challenge and is associated with important behavioral responses by those CEO’s. This article demonstrates empirically how conflictual accountability is related to (a) controlling behaviors by principals, (b) constituency building behaviors by agencies, and (c) a general pattern of intensified contacts and information processing by both parties.