| dc.description.abstract | This thesis seeks to gain an understanding regarding what threats and vulnerabilities strategic actors in the maritime domain see as most relevant, both towards themselves and more generally in society. A secondary research question seeks to understand if they use the open threat assessments produced by the Norwegian intelligence- and security services, and what other sources they use to build their internal assessments. I will in this thesis use a broad number of sources, ranging from the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI), the public threat assessments, research within the field of maritime strategy and preparedness and disaster management, as a theoretical framework in which one can view the results from this study. The method employed to approach the research question was qualitative interviews with informants working with security at a managerial / strategic level. Due to time constraints and lack of response, the results of seven in-depth interviews ended up being the source of data in this study. That being said, I was lucky enough to be able to participate in several seminars and have a meeting with one of the main providers of private intelligence products, which broadened my understanding of the subject. The main findings in this this study are that piracy and cybersecurity-related threats both have a large focus in the day-to-day operations in the maritime industry. Some of the informants also point out that despite the fact that their organisations take security seriously, in some cases they have a larger focus on HSE. At the same time they are, not surprisingly, mostly concerned with the threats that could potentially harm their ability to profit from their operations. Regardless of this, however, they all had relevant information regarding more strategic vulnerabilities that were not necessarily directly relevant to their day-to-day operations. The other main finding is that they mostly use intelligence products specifically designed for the industry. | |
