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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt Richard
dc.contributor.authorDalen, Dag Morten
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Rune
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-10T09:48:50Z
dc.date.available2023-07-10T09:48:50Z
dc.date.created2023-06-06T15:05:53Z
dc.date.issued2023
dc.identifier.issn0167-6296
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11250/3077449
dc.description.abstractHealth systems around world are increasingly adopting cost-effectiveness (CE) analysis to inform decisions about access and reimbursement. We study how CE thresholds imposed by a health plan for granting reimbursement affect drug producers’ pricing incentives and patients’ access to new drugs. Analysing a sequential pricing game between an incumbent drug producer and a potential entrant with a new drug, we show that CE thresholds may have adverse effects for payers and patients. A stricter CE threshold may induce the incumbent to switch pricing strategy from entry accommodation to entry deterrence, limiting patients’ access to the new drug. Otherwise, irrespective of whether entry is deterred or accommodated, a stricter CE threshold is never pro-competitive and may in fact facilitate a collusive outcome with higher prices of both drugs. Compared to a laissez-faire policy, the use of CE thresholds when an incumbent monopolist is challenged by therapeutic substitutes can only increase the surplus of a health plan if it leads to entry deterrence. In this case the price reduction by the incumbent necessary to deter entry outweighs the health loss to patients who do not get access to the new drug.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.rightsNavngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal*
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no*
dc.titleThe price of cost-effectiveness thresholds under therapeutic competition in pharmaceutical marketsen_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.description.versionpublishedVersionen_US
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2023 The Author(s).en_US
dc.source.articlenumber102778en_US
cristin.ispublishedtrue
cristin.fulltextoriginal
cristin.qualitycode2
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jhealeco.2023.102778
dc.identifier.cristin2152339
dc.source.journalJournal of Health Economicsen_US
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Health Economics. 2023, 90, 102778.en_US
dc.source.volume90en_US


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Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal