Why countries do (not) lower the voting age: A mixed-methods study of conditions and processes
Master thesis
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Date
2024-06-03Metadata
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- Master theses [114]
Abstract
Many countries around the world have successfully lowered their voting ages to 16 at eitherthe local, regional, and/or national level. These countries have applied differing methods fortheir implementation process. Some have experienced a top-down process while others haveexperienced a bottom-up process. In this thesis, I investigate why countries lower their votingage – and why they don’t. I start with a literature review into enfranchisement reforms ingeneral, and youth enfranchisement in particular. Based on this, I formulate expectations aboutthe structural conditions for lower voting ages and outline possible actors and processesaccompanying the adoption of voting age reforms. In the empirical part of the thesis, I firstanalyse the conditions most often associated with a lower minimum voting age through a time-series cross-national analysis of 141 countries between 1960 and 2022. Here, I find thatmajoritarian electoral systems, more elderly people in a country, a high degree of politicalpolarisation, liberal democracy, and high degrees of regional authority correlate with lowerminimum voting ages. I use these findings as a foundation to further explore the processesinvolved in the adaption of a voting age reform drawing on the case of Norway, where loweringthe minimum voting age has been attempted, but rejected several times. Using six in-depthinterviews and process tracing, I investigate the actors and negotiations in the Norwegianadaption process. I find that the Norwegian case exhibits both top-down and bottom-uptendencies throughout the process. The discourse in the Norwegian case is academic in nature,and primarily focuses on democratic participation and health on the pro-side, and normativelegal arguments on the side against lowering. Critical actors in the top position of theresponsible ministry were crucial for the trial elections held in Norway, by first pushing forthem and later allowing the project to continue. Youth parties and organisations were crucialfor both accelerating the trial election process, but also turning parties on the issue. I also findthat political actors sometimes acted outside of party lines. I conclude that the Norwegianprocess failed implementation because of a lack of political will from political actors, andsubsequently the Norwegian public.