Chain of negligence: analysis of the decision-making in the proposed sale of Bergen Engines to a Russian- controlled entity

Abstract

The proposed sale of the Norwegian company Bergen Engines (BE) in 2020–2021 from Rolls Royce, UK, to Russian-controlled Transmashholding, listed for US sanctions, would have increased Russian military capability in a way that was not consistent with Norwegian or NATO security interests. Yet, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs initially had no objections. In the New Cold War situation, lessons from this case are relevant beyond Norway as regulatory loopholes can be exploited by non-allied powers. This article integrates perspectives from intelligence and organisation theory, using public documents as data, to analyse the BE case processing, its compliance with the established regulatory framework, sanctions and public threat assessments to understand and explain why the sale to sanctioned Russian-controlled entity was not administratively stopped, under the Export Controls Act or as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) under the Security Act, before the decision-making process escalated into public scrutiny and parliamentary critique. This article suggests that regulatory frameworks for Norwegian Export Controls and FDI need to be strengthened and reorganised. It is also important to define and operationalise considerations to national security across ministries in Norway. Joint operationalisation is also relevant for NATO and the EU in the current security situation,