dc.contributor.author | Foros, Øystein | |
dc.contributor.author | Hansen, Bjørn | |
dc.contributor.author | Vergé, Thibaud | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-08-22T11:15:19Z | |
dc.date.available | 2024-08-22T11:15:19Z | |
dc.date.created | 2023-08-31T15:56:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2023 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0922-680X | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11250/3147580 | |
dc.description.abstract | Ever-increasing data consumption and evolving technologies make cooperation on investments and network sharing crucial issues in mobile telecommunications markets. In this paper, we analyze incentives for cooperation and investment in product quality. Generalizing quality investment in a Hotelling duopoly model, we allow investment to have heterogeneous effects on consumers’ changing demand responsiveness to prices. If the effect of investment on demand elasticity is weak, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher when firms are prevented from cooperating on quality investment. Otherwise, firms should be allowed to jointly decide on quality improvements and share these improvements as long as they compete in the downstream markets. | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_US |
dc.rights | Navngivelse 4.0 Internasjonal | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.no | * |
dc.title | Co-operative investment by downstream rivals: network sharing in telecom markets | en_US |
dc.type | Journal article | en_US |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | en_US |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | en_US |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2023 The Author(s) | en_US |
cristin.ispublished | true | |
cristin.fulltext | original | |
cristin.qualitycode | 1 | |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s11149-023-09462-1 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 2171458 | |
dc.source.journal | Journal of Regulatory Economics | en_US |
dc.source.pagenumber | 34-47 | en_US |
dc.identifier.citation | Journal of Regulatory Economics. 2023, 64, 34-47. | en_US |
dc.source.volume | 64 | en_US |