dc.contributor.author | Koksvik, Ole | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-08-08T13:12:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2017-08-08T13:12:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-01 | |
dc.Published | Koksvik O. The Phenomenology of Intuition. Philosophy Compass. 2017;12(1):e12387 | eng |
dc.identifier.issn | 1747-9991 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/1956/16251 | |
dc.description.abstract | When a person has an intuition, it seems to her that things are certain ways; to many it seems that torturing the innocent for fun is wrong, for example. When a person has an intuition, there is also something particular it is like to be her: intuitions have a characteristic phenomenal character. This article asks how the phenomenal character of intuition is related to two core core questions in the philosophy of intuition, namely: Is intuition a source of justification and knowledge? and What are intuitions? | en_US |
dc.language.iso | eng | eng |
dc.publisher | Wiley | eng |
dc.rights | Attribution CC BY-NC-ND | eng |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | eng |
dc.title | The Phenomenology of Intuition | eng |
dc.type | Peer reviewed | |
dc.type | Journal article | |
dc.date.updated | 2017-05-09T12:30:37Z | |
dc.description.version | publishedVersion | |
dc.rights.holder | Copyright 2017 The Author(s) | eng |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12387 | |
dc.identifier.cristin | 1427948 | |
dc.source.journal | Philosophy Compass | |