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dc.contributor.authorStrømland, Eirik Andre
dc.contributor.authorTjøtta, Sigve
dc.contributor.authorTorsvik, Gaute
dc.date.accessioned2019-05-22T11:29:05Z
dc.date.available2019-05-22T11:29:05Z
dc.date.issued2018-08
dc.PublishedStrømland EA, Tjøtta S, Torsvik G. Mutual choice of partner and communication in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2018(75):12-23eng
dc.identifier.issn2214-8051
dc.identifier.issn2214-8043
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/19689
dc.description.abstractMany markets resemble repeated prisoner's dilemma situations with the possibilities for mutual partner choice. In this paper, we show experimentally that partner choice by mutual consent has a strong positive effect on cooperation. Mutual partner choice makes it possible to form long-lasting reciprocal partnerships. To understand partnership formation we also add a treatment where the participants could communicate with each other in a common chat room. Chat transcript reveals that promises are important in forming and sustaining a partnership.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherElseviereng
dc.rightsAttribution CC BY-NC-NDeng
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/eng
dc.subjectCooperationeng
dc.subjectPartner choiceeng
dc.subjectCommunicationeng
dc.subjectReciprocityeng
dc.subjectPrisoner's dilemmaeng
dc.titleMutual choice of partner and communication in a repeated prisoner's dilemmaeng
dc.typePeer revieweden_US
dc.typeJournal articleen_US
dc.date.updated2019-02-14T09:10:44Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2018 Elsevieren_US
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2018.05.002
dc.identifier.cristin1617712
dc.source.journalJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
dc.source.pagenumber12-23
dc.relation.projectNorges forskningsråd: 267428
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 2018, 75, 12-23
dc.source.volume75


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