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"An erring conscience is an absurdity": The later Kant on certainty, moral judgment and the infallibility of conscience

Knappik, Franz Ulrich; Mayr, Erasmus
Peer reviewed, Journal article
Published version
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URI
https://hdl.handle.net/1956/21478
Date
2019
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  • Department of Philosophy [139]
Original version
https://doi.org/10.1515/agph-2019-1004
Abstract
This article explores Kant’s view, found in several passages in his late writings on moral philosophy, that the verdicts of conscience are infallible. We argue that Kant’s infallibility claim must be seen in the context of a major shift in Kant’s views on conscience that took place around 1790 and that has not yet been sufficiently appreciated in the literature. This shift led Kant to treat conscience as an exclusively second-order capacity which does not directly evaluate actions, but one’s first-order moral judgments and deliberation. On the basis of this novel interpretation, we develop a new defence of Kant’s infallibility claim that draws on Kant’s account of the characteristic features of specifically moral judgments.
Publisher
De Gruyter
Journal
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Copyright
Copyright 2019 Walter de Gruyter

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