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dc.contributor.authorZahle, Julie
dc.date.accessioned2020-05-05T13:16:50Z
dc.date.available2020-05-05T13:16:50Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-19
dc.PublishedZahle J. Limits to Levels in the Methodological Individualism-Holism Debate. Synthese. 2019eng
dc.identifier.issn0039-7857
dc.identifier.issn1573-0964
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/1956/22098
dc.descriptionUnder embargo until 19.11.2020.
dc.description.abstractIt is currently common to conceive of the classic methodological individualism–holism debate in level terms. Accordingly, the dispute is taken to concern the proper level of explanations in the social sciences. In this paper, I argue that the debate is not apt to be characterized in level terms. The reason is that widely adopted notions of individualist explanations do not qualify as individual-level explanations because they span multiple levels. I defend this claim relative to supervenience, emergence, and other accounts of the social world as levelled. Moreover, I discuss the consequences of this finding for the ongoing methodological individualism–holism debate.en_US
dc.language.isoengeng
dc.publisherSpringereng
dc.subjectMethodological individualism–holism debateeng
dc.subjectOntological levelseng
dc.subjectExplanatory levelseng
dc.subjectSocial scienceseng
dc.titleLimits to Levels in the Methodological Individualism-Holism Debateeng
dc.typePeer reviewed
dc.typeJournal article
dc.date.updated2020-01-24T07:12:46Z
dc.description.versionacceptedVersion
dc.rights.holderCopyright 2019 Springer Nature B.V.eng
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02469-2
dc.identifier.cristin1749915
dc.source.journalSynthese


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